FINAL REPORT

GHANA WORKSHOP ON ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: A HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
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Report of an Experts’ Workshop organized by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra, Ghana and the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) based in Algiers, Algeria with the support of the Spanish Government, 7-8 November, 2016.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Increasingly, Violent Extremism (VE) has mutated into terrorism, becoming a major security concern to governments and organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

While activities of violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram (Nigeria), Al-Shabaab (Somalia), and Al-Qaeda (in the Sahel) are aiming at undermining security of states as attested by the removal of Amadou Toumani Toure from power in 2012, their impact is much greater on human security, as individuals, families and societies continue to bear the brunt of terrorist attacks across Africa. The kidnapping of over 200 Chibok school girls in Nigeria in 2014, as well as the attack against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, that left at least 65 people dead and the killing of 147 students at the Garissa University, April 2015, also in Kenya, show the extent to which violent extremists are shaking the very core of human security in Africa.

Consequently, the seven elements of human security, namely economic, environmental, community, political, food, health and personal security, are being affected in different forms and dimensions across Africa. Food security, for instance, has become a major concern in the Sahel countries such as Mali, Niger and to an extent Northern Nigeria where, as a result of insecurity, agricultural activity has been affected due to reduced mobility, reduced access to raw materials and markets, increased theft of agricultural assets and sharp inflation in the prices of goods, products and services. On the other hand, the social environment has become increasingly less cohesive, with internally displaced persons and refugees in neighbouring states. Health conditions of women and children have also been gravely affected. In essence, the core elements of human security in these regions have been

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compromised, raising concerns about the need for organizations such the AU and ECOWAS to be more innovative in addressing the menace of VE in Africa.

Against this background, the Algiers-based ACSRT, in collaboration with the KAIPTC, Accra, deemed it important and timely to organize a two-day national workshop on VE with funding support from the Government of Spain, in Accra from 7-8 November 2016. The two-day workshop aimed at addressing the root causes of VE through a human security approach. It brought together speakers from across Africa, including Academics, Security Practitioners, Researchers, Civil Society Organizations and representatives from the AU and ACSRT, as speakers and resource persons. Among the key speakers and representatives were Honourable Prosper Bani, Minister of Interior, Ghana; Air Vice Marshal Griffiths Santrofi Evans, Commandant KAIPTC; Brigadier-General Emmanuel Kotia, Deputy Commandant KAIPTC; H.E Larry Gbevlo Lartey Esq, Director of ACSRT; and Dr Kwesi Aning, Director of the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR), KAIPTC; among others. Almost 70 participants from State Institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Civil Society Organizations, Religious Organizations, Community Leaders and the Security Agencies, including the Military, Police, National Security Secretariat, Bureau of National Investigation, Immigration and the National Fire Service and academia, also attended the workshop.

The involvement of participants with diverse backgrounds from Ghana was to create a platform for broad national understanding of VE and its relationship with Human Security and, more importantly, help to identify practical and solution-oriented approaches to contribute to managing the threat of VE on the continent. The overall purpose of the workshop were to:

- Provide an opportunity for the relevant government, civil society and local community actors to discuss the concepts of VE and Human Security and share experiences and points of view.
• Provide an opportunity for stakeholders to discuss a Human Security approach to and community participation in the response mechanisms to VE and how this can complement traditional law enforcement methods.

• Examine the phenomena of indoctrination and radicalization within local communities and establish the major attributes and characteristics.

• Review the existing legal instruments, Counter Terrorism and Countering VE (CVE) frameworks and practices at the international, continental, regional and national levels in order to identify existing gaps, as compared to good practices and available lessons learnt, and

• Identify the roles of respective actors at the national, regional and international levels in the prevention and the countering of violent extremism and set out a list of priority of action for group of actors.

Key Recommendations

• Stronger and coherent CVE policy frameworks and plans of action should be developed at the regional, sub-regional and national levels.

• Human security should be mainstreamed into CVE strategies to ensure that such strategies are people-centred, community-owned, context-specific and comprehensive.

• Good governance, strengthening the rule of law and access to the dispensation of justice in AU member states should be key considerations.

• Strategies and options for addressing VE should seek to address social injustices and vulnerabilities such as poverty, marginalization, illiteracy and unemployment especially among youth and women;

• Disengagement and reintegration tools/mechanisms should be an intrinsic part of strategies and options.
- Strong counter-narratives should be used in responding to the threat of VE. To this end, the crucial roles from Imams, traditional leaders and mothers (and family members) should be identified as they would be better received as opposed to messages from security forces whose approach may sometimes be counter-productive.

- The Media should play a critical role by projecting counter-narratives through electronic and print media, taking into consideration the need for media professionalism and patriotism above their commercial and monetary considerations that constitute the primary motivations of media practice.

- Individuals should also play key roles through the positive use of social media.

- There is the need to change and reshape the image of Islam and the curriculum of Islamic clergy education in giving them a new orientation.

- Resources for national development should be equitably allocated in line with a human security approach.

- National policies should be established to provide the context and framework for the development of effective CVE strategies.

- National educational curricula should be reviewed to include peaceful indigenous messages, as well as negotiation and dialogue.

- Appropriate laws should be enacted to criminalize and punish support and involvement in VE.

- Neighbourhood watchdog system should be adopted and empowered as a CVE mechanism.

- On-line radicalization should be monitored to combat the incidence of youth recruitment through that means.
OFFICIAL REMARKS

The workshop began with opening remarks by Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Griffiths Santrofi Evans, Commandant of the KAIPTC, and a message from H.E Larry Gbevlo-Lartey Esq, Director of the ACSRT. The keynote address was delivered by the Minister of the Interior, Honourable Prosper Bani.

In his opening remarks, the Commandant, AVM Evans, welcomed all the participants to the KAIPTC for the two-day workshop on VE. He highlighted the existing collaboration with the ACSRT/CAERT and noted that the phenomenon continues to pose daunting security challenges to the United Nations Security Council, and also undermines continental and regional efforts in CVE.

He cited a number of terrorist and extremist groups, including; Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Al-Shabaab, whose activities pose serious danger to state security. The Commandant stressed that the incidence of terrorist attacks in West Africa, including Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire demonstrate the extent to which extremist groups are mutating into terrorist groups and undermining the territorial integrity and stability of states in West Africa. He expressed optimism that the calibre of resource persons assembled for the workshop would be key in finding solutions to the challenge of VE. To conclude, AVM Evans urged the participants to engage in robust discussions with the resource persons so as to contribute to finding practical and lasting solutions to approaches in addressing the threat of VE on the continent.
In his brief remarks, the Director of ACSRT, H.E Larry Gbevlo-Lartey Esq. expressed his gratitude to the KAIPTC for the partnership. He stated that there would be similar workshops on VE in Nigeria and Kenya, and the outcomes, together with that of Ghana, would be used to shape the responses for addressing VE in Africa. He also pledged the African Union’s (AU) support in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and that he looked forward to the continuous collaboration of the two Centres in the fight against VE.

Delivering the keynote address, the Minister for Interior, Hon Prosper Bani, reiterated the concern expressed by the Commandant on the growing threat of VE to Africa. He recalled the terrorist incidents in Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, and the extent to which those incidents created fear and uncertainty in Ghana. Given that VE is a West Africa-wide challenge with likely consequences on Ghana, the Minister emphasized the need for a collaborative and comprehensive approach in addressing the threat. He noted that as resource persons and participants engage in deliberations, they should be mindful of the fact that addressing VE will also require a preventive approach. He however indicated that there would be challenges ahead as donors are interested in interventions rather than preventive measures. This required a holistic approach by Africa to be able to address the threat.
The Minister concluded his remarks by expressing his appreciation to the Spanish Government for its support, and to the ACSRT for collaborating with KAIPTC, to make the workshop a reality. He reaffirmed the commitment of the Government of Ghana to countering VE and finally thanked participants for honouring the invitation to participate in the workshop.

SESSION 1: REVIEW OF THE CONTINENTAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM SITUATIONS

Review of the Terrorism and Violent Extremism Situation in Africa

The first presentation was by Mr Idriss Mounir Lallali, Acting Deputy Director ACSRT. He gave an extensive background of VE and terrorism in Africa, highlighting the situation in 2012 and the current situation as of 2016. He made reference to groups such as Al-Shabaab and its linkage with arms and drug trafficking syndicates. He argued that terrorist threats on the continent could be broken down into a number of categories, including: terrorist attacks on African interests; terrorist attacks on Western and other foreign interests; use of African territories as safe havens; use of Africa as a terrorist breeding ground and source of recruitment and financing; Africa as a transit point for terrorists and fund-raising tied to other illicit activities; Africa as a rallying point for international jihadists; Africa as confrontation ground between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State for supremacy and leadership of the violent Jihad movement; and clashes between drug cartels and IS affiliates.

He outlined a number of factors that are contributing to the spread of terrorism in Africa. Among them include: radicalization and VE; links with Transnational Organized Crimes (TOCs), narco-terrorism; kidnapping-for-ransom and piracy, among many others. In terms of the mode of operation, he mentioned attacks on military barracks, military and civilian convoys, symbols of the states, laying of mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and attacks on prisons to liberate prisoners and detained terrorists. Moreover, there are incidents of hostage-taking, kidnappings and executions such as the Chibok girls in Nigeria,
the West Gate Mall in Kenya, the Garissa University in Kenya, and the Radisson Blu and Splendid Hotels in Mali and Burkina Faso respectively.

He drew the attention of the participants to the continued mutation of the groups. For emphasis, he mentioned emergent hybrid groups that are conducting a mixture of criminal and terrorist activities, including narco-terrorism, kidnapping and piracy among the most common. The substantial amounts of funds generated through these activities contributed to the present instability and expansion of their fields of operations. He noted that there has been an increase in the exploitation of local grievances and socio-economic conditions to recruit and develop new networks, the emergence of new forms of mercenaries and the increasing use of sophisticated IEDs, including use of women, children and animals. These have been perpetrated through illegal means of accessing funds, which include seizure of gold bullions (gold bullion vans?) and other assets from banks, illegal exploitation of natural resources, looting and selling of antiquities, imposition of taxes and royalties, and drug trafficking.

Mr. Iddris described the current situation of extremism in Africa, with the zones of operations extending to Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Kenya, Tanzania and linking West and East Africa sub-regions. Other countries that are also affected are Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Mali, Algeria, Uganda, Tanzania, India, and Chechnya where foreign fighters continue to spread knowledge of sophisticated IEDs.

He concluded the presentation by explaining what the future trends and developments would look like, believing that there would be more decentralized decisions, the use of soft power to win hearts and minds versus brutal and violent actions, the use of social media networks on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, etc. He went on to suggest that there would also be globalization and loss of identity, and the use of technology for communication, such as Viber, Skype and Telegram, as well as the use of couriers. Moreover, he envisaged that there will be more suicide attacks with the abundance of synthetic drugs (terrorists under the influence), attacks on Civil Aviation and Tourist Sites, rifts within both AQIM and Al-Shabaab
resulting in the multiplication of dissident groups and the situation was dire and warranted continuous monitoring.

**Review of Status of Violent Extremism in West Africa and Ghana.**

Dr Kwesi Aning began his presentation by making reference to a study conducted in eight countries\(^2\) on the perception of VE in West Africa. He argued that the study provided the most nuanced understanding and appreciation of the phenomenon of VE in the sub-region, noting that in analyzing the VE situation, it was significant to emphasize the role of vocabulary and the need for understanding in the globalized world, both *semantic and semiotic* wars (relating to significance and symbols) preceding conventional wars.

Citing a number of assumptions from the study, he pointed out first, that the location of the rise of extremism and its violent variant within the state, according to these studies, are perceived as ‘orphan’ states with little historical, cultural and filial attachments to the territories that they govern; second, that the burden of its psychological structures also contributes to the malaise of statehood; and third, that the armed dissidence and violence in various gradations that we experience in these states are reflective and expressions of deficiencies, dysfunctionalities and the gross inadequacy of the post-colonial state to tackle and respond to the expectations of citizens. He thus argued that all eight states attained independence in the 1960s, and that the periodization of the post-colonial state construction is the same, namely: the military nature and underpinnings of the states; increasing civilianization of presidential regimes who are desperate to show that they are good boys of the school of good governance.

He disagreed with the existing view that Islamist theocracy is a major threat that drives violent extremism. He emphasized this by comparing the religious index with other indicators such as politics, economic, social and international factors. In many of the research findings, religion and ideology were less of contributing factors to VE. So far, it was rather the military

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\(^2\) The eight countries included: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Chad.
that had posed the greatest threat to all eight states mentioned. This point is important, because when one considers Senegal for example, the stabilizing and pacificatory effect of religion is evident all over. Despite the non-religious nature of the state, the political power of the Tijaniya and Mouridiya brotherhoods are substantial in promoting peace.

With specific reference to Ghana, he emphasized the need to be context-specific, but at the same time noted that contentions and struggles exist among various groups such as Ahlussunna, Waljama, Tijaniyya, etc. Moreover, similar to the eight countries mentioned earlier, drivers such as poverty, youth bulge and victimhood of exclusion also characterize Ghana. He concluded by cautioning against the deliberate and manipulative use of religion in the discourse on VE, underscoring the need for communities to integrate as states which are not functioning effectively.

**Shaping Violent Extremism: Response Option and Mechanisms**

In discussing response options and mechanisms, *Dr Ibrahim Bangura*, cited the UNDP report of 2015, which indicated that “drivers and enablers of violent extremism are multiple, complex, context-specific and have religious, ideological, political, economic and historical dimensions. Violent Extremism defy easy analysis and our understanding of the phenomenon remains incomplete.”

Consequently, he stressed the need to: identify the root causes, underlying causes and immediate causes of VE; the need to recognize that VE requires significant resources; better conceptual and contextual understanding of the phenomenon; the importance of considering both the security and the developmental approach; and that one of the main challenge is the need to have an integrated regional and sub-regional approach (intelligence sharing, planning etc.) to confront the threat of VE. Dr Bangura concluded his presentations with a number of recommendations as follows:

- Stronger policy frameworks and plans of action should be developed at the regional, sub-regional and national levels
• Good governance, strengthening the rule of law and access to the dispensation of justice in the AU member states should be key considerations

• Strategies and options should seek to address social injustices and vulnerabilities such as poverty, marginalization, illiteracy and unemployment especially among youth and women

• Disengagement and reintegration strategies should be an intrinsic part of strategies and options

• The capacity of local communities (resilience) and CBOs and CSOs should be strengthened

• Investments in community education programmes, developed and owned by the communities

• Gender should be mainstreamed in all options and mechanisms, and

• Security agencies should be trained to professionally respond to VE.

Summary of Discussions for Session 1

Participants made the following contributions to the discourse following the three presentations:

• In concurrence of the points by two of the speakers, it was agreed that there is no mono-causal factor to VE and therefore in finding solutions, context specificities should be a key consideration.

• While narratives have become dominant, there is also the need for strong counter-narratives as a way of responding to the threat of VE. To this end, identification of whose role this should be as crucial as, for instance, narratives from Imams, traditional leaders and mothers, would be better received than from the security forces whose approach may sometimes be counter-productive.
• Given the dire situation in places such as Mali, Nigeria, Niger etc. there is the need to focus on the economic approach to addressing VE in Africa.

• Views on the discussion of Islam and some related terminologies like Jihad differed. One view argued that the use of the term cannot be avoided as most of the terrorist groups have Islamic affiliations and espouse Islamic ideologies in perpetrating attacks. The other view, however, stressed the need to dissociate extremists and jihadists from true Islamic teaching.

• Media has a critical role to play in the fight against VE by projecting and disseminating counter-narratives over and above their commercial and monetary considerations. Counter-narratives should take precedence in the national effort over monetary interests. The efforts of the media towards countering VE will not be effective unless they changed their priorities.

SESSON 2: IDENTIFYING THE ROOT CAUSES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The Local Community and Concepts of Radicalization, Recruitment, Enlistment and Violent Extremism

After agreeing on the earlier notion that there is no singular concept or definition of VE, Dr Benjamin Olagboye mentioned that until now, VE has been defined as “the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals.” However, as far as contextualization is concerned, there is the need to better define VE. Simply put, all forms of VE seek change through the propagation of fear and intimidation rather than through peaceful means. He identified a number of drivers, namely: socio-economic, political and cultural/religious drivers. Socio-economic drivers deal with perceptions of social exclusion and marginalization, social networks and groups’ dynamics, social discrimination, frustrated expectations and unmet social and economic needs.
On the other hand, political drivers involve denial of political rights and civil liberties, repressive governments that engage in gross violations of human rights, foreign occupation, political and military intrusion, endemic corruption and impunity, poor governance, weak state capacity, and intimidation by VE groups. Under cultural/religious drivers, he discussed the fact that Islam has increasingly come under siege, in a milieu of broader threat to cultural traditions, customs and values. He concluded that what is currently being witnessed in some West African states is the promotion of religious agenda by groups seeking to impose their version of Islam, Jihad, on the local populations.

The Nexus between Governance, National Security and the Development of Behaviours in West Africa

In his presentation on the nexus between governance, national security and the development of violent extremist behaviours in West Africa, Dr Thomas Jaye mentioned that these issues are not new and their interconnections are historical and perennial factors of African politics. Thus, the challenge is not about the differences in the definitions of the concept, but in the politics behind them. In elaborating on the aspect of governance, he pointed out that it is important to consider government not just as an agent, but also as a process. The concept of governance is broad and encompasses the life of a country so there is the need to understand the linkage between governance and national security.

He argued that VE should not be understood only in a religious sense, but more so in a political sense as earlier reiterated by Dr Aning. Thus, in identifying the root causes of VE, it is important to revisit the historical legacy of the colonial state system, which was characterized by absolutism. He emphasized the link between the nature of power under colonialism and the post-colonial state. He emphasized that the struggle for political power had overshadowed the need for human security. As a result, VE can be associated with long years of exclusion of local people. Mali, for instance, provides a classical case where the state has been absent in the northern part of the country with basic necessities such as water
and health care, lacking. Such conditions, among others, have helped to create VE groups, constituting insecurity and undermining the legitimacy of states.

**Social, Cultural and Religious Factors in the Development of VE Behaviour in West Africa**

Sheikh Aremiyao Shuaib began his presentation by drawing attention to the enormity of the challenge, not only to Africa, but also to the globe as a whole. He cited the example of a young Ghanaian boy who joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). He also cited the episode of Muslim youth in the Western Region who embarked on a protest on religious grounds, emphasizing the increased consciousness among Muslim youth of their human rights, such as the wearing of Hijab.

In discussing the behaviour of the youth and their predisposition to VE, he introduced the concept of environmental determinism, which shapes or can shape the behaviour of people to engage in VE. Poverty, however, makes one vulnerable, impatient, feeling inferior. These issues are therefore critical in finding a long-term solution to the threat of VE. Boko Haram, for instance exploited vulnerabilities, such as poverty, to lure and influence the youth to engage in VE behaviour. But a key issue for consideration is to revisit the philosophy of communitarianism or *Ubuntu*, “*I am because we are and we are because I am*”. This concept is important to bring individuals, families and communities together. He made specific references to Ghana, where doctrinal rivalries between groups such as Ahlussuna and Tijaniyya have underlined the emergence of extremist behaviours. He concluded by emphasizing the need to change and reshape the image of Islam, including the need for the curriculum of Islamic clergy education to be given a new orientation.
Summary of Discussions for Session 2

- The discussion focused on the need to adopt preventive measures to confront VE in Africa. In this regard, efforts should be geared towards containment as notable terrorist organizations as ISIS are under increasing pressure from states such as Iraq and the United States. Such pressure poses a potential danger to Africa due to the continent’s weak capacity for containment, but more so because of weak border security management and control.

- There is the need to re-examine the value of family units as the basis for functional societies and states. When families lack moral values and become dysfunctional, they invariably affect individuals, societies and states.

- Communities should be strengthened as the basis for countering terrorism. In this regard, the effective role of Imams, chiefs, pastors should be considered critical.

SESSION 3: INTERNATIONAL, AU, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL INITIATIVE ON COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Review of the UN Plan of Action on the Prevention of Violent Extremism
Brigadier General (Dr) Emmanuel Kotia, Deputy Commandant of KAIPTC, started the session with a review of the UN Plan of Action on the Prevention of Violence Extremism. He focused on key areas identified by the UN as underlying the reasons for the emergence of VE, including the lack of social economic opportunities, poor governance and violation of the rule of law, unresolved conflicts and marginalization, discrimination and radicalization in
prisons. These, he argued, are critical in discourses on VE. In examining how to manage VE, he focused on four areas identified by the UN Plan of Action, including the global framework of preventing VE, national plans of action, regional plans of action and mobilization of resources.

First, he pointed out that the global frameworks of preventing VE should reflect commitment and values of the UN Charter, International Law of Armed Conflict and the Geneva Conventions, Human Rights and Refugee Laws and the UN Guiding Principles for Counter Terrorism. In the context of these there is the need to ensure the application of the rule of law and the repeal of discriminatory laws in member states. The effectiveness of these, however, will be underpinned by addressing development, governance and human rights challenges.

On National Plans of Action, each member state is expected to develop a strategy, set up national priorities to address the drivers of VE and the action plan must be based on the principle of national ownership. At the regional level, efforts should be made for the National Plans of Action to complement Regional Plans. In this regard, member states must come together to develop regional plans. He emphasized the need for mobilization of resources and the efficient use of existing resources by member states. Re-echoing the introductory remarks by the Minister for Interior earlier during the workshop, he stressed the need to adopt a preventive approach, which is important and more cost-effective than mitigation. He made reference to the United Nations High-Level Independent Panel on Peace. Operations (HIPPO) report (2015) that mentions prevention and mediation as key issues for consideration in fighting VE and concluded on seven key issues, namely the importance of ensuring good governance, community engagements, education, skills development, empowering the youth, strategic communication and the social media.
Review of AU, REC/RM Approach to CVE

In reviewing the AU, REC/RM approach to CVE, Dr Abdoulaye Maiga made a number of observations. He noted that the UN Plan of Action does not give specific definition of VE and that terrorism is a manifestation of VE. In view of the lacunae of specific definition, Member States need to be given space to define VE in their country specific contexts. Arguing from the semantic points of view, he noted that “if there is VE, then there is extremism that is non-violent. He mentioned the success of the Islamic Salvation Front which won the legislative elections in Algeria. This case is an example of non-violent extremism that deserves attention.

From this background, he mentioned two types of extremist groups in Africa; one that recognizes the nature and existence of states and the other which is subversive and often seeks to reverse the state model, citing groups such as Boko Haram and al-Qaeda, whose operations are characterized by irrationality. He emphasized that most of the subversive ones are Muslim groups, who are linked to Transnational crimes such (al-Qaeda and drug trafficking). He made specific reference to the Sahel and argued with specific reference to Mali, with vast geography characterized by a number of vulnerabilities such as scarcity of water, which could be a possible triggering factor for emergence of VE. He cited the dual religious education system in many sahelian countries (formal and informal) with apparent contradictions. The difficulty is that the religious education programmes of informal schools escape the state, which amplifies the risk of indoctrination and radicalization.

The Regional /Country CVE perspective

Presenting on “The Regional /Country CVE Perspective” Ms. Emma Birikorang mentioned the ECOWAS strategy of prevent, pursue and reconstruct as clearly articulated in the diagram 1. She argued that the AU and ECOWAS counter-terrorism frameworks exist, but action must be taken by states because of issues surrounding state sovereignty. Reference was made to two case studies of Mali and Nigeria, where extremists and terrorist attacks
have sought to undermine national security, with unimaginable consequences on human security relative to kidnapping, sexual exploitations and killing on innocent civilians, including women and children.

In Mali, several terrorist incidents have been recorded in recent times, with attacks on public institutions, MINUSMA facilities etc. While terrorism in Mali has often been traced to the Tuareg rebellion in 2011/2012, the threat became more formidable following an alliance between the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2012. This has transformed the threat into Regional crisis, especially given the flow of funds from Transnational Organized Crimes (TOCs). Through several legislations and peace agreements, the Government and other international actors are seeking to cut the sources of funding to extremist groups such as al-Qaeda. However, opportunistic extremist groups continue to take advantage of instability in neighbouring countries such as Burkina Faso to perpetrate further attacks.

She also made reference to Nigeria, where Boko Haram has consistently been at war with the state in the north-eastern part of the country and its effects on civilians. She described the Boko Haram threat as a governance rather than security crisis, highlighting issues of corruption and poverty as underlying causes similar to concern enumerated by Sheikh Aremiyao earlier. Although soft approaches have been used to address the challenge, the continued change of tactics and the level of violence precipitated the regional response in which the AU-backed Multi-National Joint Taskforce (MNJTF) was deployed.

In her conclusion, Ms. Birikorang indicated that as opposed to what pertained in the past where terrorists targeted the US and other Western interests, Africans are increasingly being targeted and this calls for more concerted efforts from the region.
Summary of Discussions for Session 3

- Reflecting on the regionalized nature of the extremist threat, participants’ questions and concerns that followed the presentations related to Ghana’s capacity to prevent and respond to possible VE attacks. It was pointed out that the Ghana government has established a Committee involving the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Foreign
Affairs and Regional Integration, and civil society groups, to develop strategies to counter possible terrorist attacks in the country. There are also rapid response measures in place to effectively respond to threats. It was noted however that the establishment of a committee and rapid response units would work well if Ghana establishes a national security policy from which a national security strategy will be developed. This can be enhanced by the oversight of parliament. These approaches will ensure that rapid response units, for instance, can be effective.

- Another concern that was raised is the fact that although there may be individual country strategies, it is uncertain to what extent such strategies speak to one another. Since there is increasing concern for concerted regional efforts at addressing the threat, country strategies should connect with one another to maximize their impact.

- Combatting VE and terrorism should be through intellectual means also rather than on the battlefield. It is important to watch cyber space because of online radicalization.

SESSION 4: THE HUMAN SECURITY RESPONSE APPROACH TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM/ DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Human Security; Concepts and implications for CVE/Drivers of VE

Within the contemporary narrative of CVE, human security, defined as freedom from fear, want and threats to dignity is fast becoming commonplace. The concept and application of Human Security within CVE therefore served as the foundation for the two-day workshop. Dr Philip Attuquayefio addressed the concept of human security and its implications for CVE and drivers of VE.

Explaining the linkages between human security and CVE, he pointed to five trends that place people at the core of VE and CVE. These include the reality that threats to the survival
of people can and do create conditions for radicalization and VE; the fact that violent extremists recruit people from within affected communities; and the reality that externalities from CVE bear the potential to negatively affect people thus launching what he termed as a VE/CVE cycle. He also opined that programmes that target people could mitigate some of the motivators of VE. Dr Attuquayefio observed that within that context, it is critical for human security to be mainstreamed into strategies for CVE. Presenting a framework for co-opting human security into CVE, he called for engendering people-centred of strategies that are multi-sectorial, comprehensive, context-specific and oriented towards prevention. Such strategies, he noted, could be developed through consultation and inclusion, capacity building and collaboration.

The Community, Human Security and CVE

In his contribution to the discourse around the community, human security and VE, Dr Vladimir Antwi-Danso focused on the continued disintegration of African communities as one of the biggest challenges that partly drive VE. The post-independence era has been characterized by failure of the state and issues of development within communities are increasingly being politicized. As a consequence, governance has become a zero-sum game, while the role of communities as symbol of unity, peaceful co-existence and watchdogs for safety and security has either been relegated or taken over by governments due to excessive politicization.

The failure of governments and the less visible role of communities have created conditions in which extremist groups continue to demand recognition and arrogate unto themselves the power of determining the process of governance. They continue to disobey laws on the basis of claiming support from political parties. In Ghana for instance “vigilante” groups like “AZOKA”\(^3\) have at one point in time or another engaged in extremist activities. Moreover, because of external influence, and arguably the promotion of foreign interest by some civil

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3 AZOKA is a vigilante group in the Northern Region of Ghana and is believed to be affiliated with the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC).
society organizations, there is clash of cultures. Much of civil society will have to obey global ethics that are usually based on ethnocentric approaches. In his concluding remarks, he noted that it is about time Africans built their own security strategies based on African values and restore the concept of community.

Summary of Discussions in Session 4

- Plenary discussions focused on the need to instil good values in the youth in order to rebuild the broken society. It was agreed that external extremist forces would continue to have influence on the youth. However, in the midst of enormous external influences, there is need to be cautious against compromising African values. In this regard, the ability of African leaders to negotiate well on international issues becomes highly imperative.

- The question was raised about how do we start from the human security perspective in addressing VE? It was argued that although human security is broad, there is need to consider what is critical and constitutes a pervasive need.

- A people-centred approach should be adopted.

- There should be a community-led security approach.

- A holistic approach to strengthen the state should also be considered.
DAY TWO: PRESENTATION BY VARIOUS GROUPS

Day two of the workshop focused on group exercise discussions and presentations, which resulted in key conclusions and recommendations for the workshop. In all, participants and resource persons were clustered into four groups named after four regional capitals in Ghana, namely:
Group 1 - Accra, Group 2 - Cape Coast, Group 3 - Takoradi and Group 4 - Tamale.

GROUP ONE

TOPIC: THE DRIVERS AND ENABLERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM - CASE STUDY OF WEST AFRICA

Introduction

The issue of VE in West Africa is not an isolated phenomenon within the context of Africa. The drivers and enablers of VE are largely common in the various countries in West Africa. The drivers and enablers can be categorized into political, socio-economic, cultural, religious and ideological factors. However, the nature and the frequency with which these drivers occur are context specific within the various countries. The presentation of Group One was aimed at discussing the drivers and enablers of violent extremism, possible actors in West Africa and recommendations on the way forward.

Historical Drivers and Enablers of VE

- Historical legacies of colonial powers domination, oppression, subjugation and interference.
• Perception that current geo-political events represent a continuation of neo-colonial interests.

• Divide and rule resulting widened gap in socio – economic development.

Possible Actors

Agents of the state.

Ideological / Religious Drivers and Enablers of VE

• Clash of doctrinal differences amongst various sects within Islam. Example Tijanniya and Ahlulsunnah clashes in Ghana. The actors include: Imams, Preachers etc.

• Clash of Western Judeo-Christian Values with Islam.

• Political Islam: Establishment of Caliphate.

Possible Actors

• Religious leaders.

• Political leaders.

• Faith based organisations.

• Parents.

Cultural Drivers and Enablers of VE

• Protracted unresolved chieftaincy conflicts.

• High levels of societal divisions along ethnic lines.
Possible Actors

- Traditional Authorities.
- Ethnic leaders.
- The state.
- Parents.

Political and Governance Drivers and Enablers of VE

- Electoral process and events.
- High levels of corruption and impunity amongst state officials.
- Heightened sense of Political exclusion amongst the populace.

Possible Actors

- Political Parties.
- Electoral institutions and agents.
- State officials and cronies.
- Vigilante Groups.

Socio-Economic Drivers and Enablers of VE

- Increase sense of economic deprivation and inequalities.
- High levels of illiteracy.
- Persistent Economic mismanagement.
- High levels of unemployment and limited economic opportunities.
- Social injustices.
Possible Actors

- The state and its organs.
- The youth (Vulnerabilities).
- Parenting (Loss of African family values).

Recommendations

- Increased focus on youth empowerment/engagement.
- Reinforcement of African family values.
- Create and sustain equal opportunities for all.
- Promotion of good governance, Human rights, Rule of Law and Human Security.
- Promotion of Religious and cultural tolerance.
- Formulate an integrated national action plan to prevent and respond VE.
- Creation of Early Warning Systems.
- Conduct Research to identify triggers of Violent Extremism.
- Bridging the economic gap between South and North divide.
Introduction

Extremism in Africa has mutated over the years into a more difficult and complex threat such that it defies conventional unilateral approach to counter it. In other words, the nature and dynamics of extremism shows that no single entity will have the capacity to address it. Consequently, in designing strategies to counter violent extremism, the role of governments, civil society groups, the media, international, regional, sub-regional as well as community leaders is absolutely imperative. However, there are challenges associated with CVE at these levels. Thus, the aim of this section is to discuss the challenges and proffer recommendation to overcome such challenges.

Government Level Challenges

- Lack of policy guideline or policy direction.
- Lack of requisite structures to counter violent extremism.
- Lack of effective coordination of the various strands of security measures.
- Misplaced priorities sometimes as a result of lack of funding or budgetary constraints.
- Over Securitization of the state (the use of brute force).

Civil Society and Media

- Diversity of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) with different interest (Profit driven), very hard to handle for CVE purposes (No one point of call for CSOs.)
Some CSOs are externally – funded/influenced jeopardizing their usefulness as local tools for CVE.

- Lack of professionalism by some media practitioners (All-purpose Journalism/lack of special desk).
- Unchecked/Borderless Media Landscape.

International, Regional and Continental Level

- Pre-existing rivalries between countries leading to safe havens for VE.
- Proximity to conflict-prone regions and activities leading to a difficulty in regulating the flow of arms, individuals, and ideas etc.
- Sovereignty/the need to respond to VE.

Community Level Challenges

- Ungoverned spaces where the only visible State presence is Police or revenue collectors.
- Lack of awareness by community actors.
- Disintegration of community/cultural values.
- Negative/external cultural influences.
- Religious intolerance between and among groups.

Cross-Cutting Challenges

- The problem of definition.
- Funding – donor support.
- Globalization of the threat and its response.
- Coordination – National, Regional and Continental.
- Coordination and cooperation – mostly regional.
• Ungoverned spaces where the existence of government is the presence of security agencies and no development.
• Nexus between crime and VE. There is the challenge of dealing with both simultaneously.

**Recommendations**

• Understand the problem – intricacies.
• Constructive specialized research/applied research on CVE.
• Equitable resource allocation in line with the Human Security approach.
• Craft a national policy on countering VE.
• Provide requisite resources to relevant institutions in the fight against VE.
• A focus on proactive measures not reactive.
• Education on all levels – local, national, regional and continental.
• Carefully crafted messages that counter the violent narrative.
• Identity and power Muslims to lead CVE.
• Reorient/restructure our educational curriculum to include peaceful indigenous messages.
• Media and CSOs should be strong advocates on CVE.
• There should be laws enacted to criminalize, and punish support and involvement in VE.
• National regulation of the media (fear of censorship?).
• Integrated approach to CVE/coordination of efforts on all levels.
• Education of security forces in the promotion of Human Rights in their operations.
• Proper strategic direction founded on our indigenous selves– national and continental level.
• Need for civic education on CVE – to prevent bigotry and xenophobia.
• Neighbourhood watchdog system should be adopted and empowered.
• Need for establishment of a special fund for CVE research.
GROUP THREE

TOPIC: NATIONAL CVE STAKEHOLDERS IN WEST AFRICA AND THEIR VARIOUS ROLES IN THE PREVENTION AND COUNTERING OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Introduction

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram are the largest violent extremist groups in West Africa. Boko Haram started as a pressure group but its followers engaged in periodic clashes with security forces during its formative years. From 2009 to 2015, Boko Haram insurgency claimed several lives. For example, the group kidnapped 250 school girls in Chibok in April 2014. The activities of violent extremists have had dire effects on various aspects of West Africa countries especially in countries they are present. The negative effect of violent extremists calls for concerned stakeholders to play key roles to counter their activities. The presentation of Group Three seeks to identify national CVE stakeholders in West Africa and analyze their various roles in the prevention and countering of VE.

Definitions

- **Violent Extremism (FBI):** Encouraging, condoning, justifying or supporting the commissioning of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social or economic goal".
- Counter Violent Extremism (Zeiger and Aly): “Programmes and policies for countering and preventing radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism and terrorism…”
- CVE Stakeholders: Persons, organizations or society at large with interest in countering violent extremists.

CVE Stakeholders
• Executive, Legislature and Judiciary (Government).
• Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).
• Religious Groups.
• Civil Society.
• Security Agencies.
• Media.
• Traditional leaders.
• Opinion leaders.
• Non-state Actors.
• International and Regional Organizations (UN, AU, ECOWAS, MANO RIVER UNION)
• Development/Bilateral Partners (SPAIN, USA, UK, FRANCE).
• Education Sector.

Role of Stakeholders

• Governments (Executive, Legislature and Judiciary) – Formulate policies, make laws, prosecute, enforce and coordinate activities towards good governance.
• Non-Governmental organizations (NGO) – Provide support (in terms of food, water, health and education) to ensure survival, livelihood and dignity in the community.
• Religious Groups – Playing peaceful roles and spiritual development.
• Civil Society – Watchdog groups, advocacy, provide information on threats in the society.
• Security Agencies – Ensure the protection of life and property.
• Media – Dissemination of information, sensitization and awareness creation.
• Traditional leaders – Promote, protect and preserve social values.
• Opinion leaders – Speak out and mediate on issues that are bothering the community.
• International and Regional Organizations (UN, AU, ECOWAS, MANO RIVER UNION) – Peace-making and peace building initiatives.
• Development/Bilateral Partners (USA, UK, FRANCE, etc.) – Provide information and support (e.g. Financial and capacity building.).
• Education Sector – Formulate, implement standard curriculum and monitor educational activities.
• Non-state Actors – AQIM and BOKO HARAM sometimes open up to negotiation.

The Way Forward

• Education: Critical thinking courses, extracurricular programmes, scholarships, ethics and civic engagement courses.
• Health services: Mental healthcare, improved access to care, and affordable healthcare options.
• Social engagement: Democracy-building, local governance initiatives, and criminal justice reform.
• Cultural awareness: Sensitivity training, interfaith dialogues, and cross-cultural engagement.
• Personal development: Job training, counselling services, and language skill development.
• Policies to guide internet usage.
Introduction
The concept of human security basically focuses on protecting and empowering people and communities. In other words, it places human beings rather than states as the focal point of security considerations. Traditionally limited to the issues of human rights, it has lately expanded to encompass issues of development, rule of law and democracy. These broad notions of human security should underpin the effective response to violent extremism, highlighting the following pillars i.e. Economic, Environmental, Community, Political, Food, Health and Personal Security.

Conceptualizing Human Security

• “To protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”- The Commission on Human Security

Violent Extremism

• “Advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social economic or political objectives.”- USAID
Elements of Human Security

- Economic.
- Environmental.
- Community.
- Political.
- Food.
- Health.
- Personal.

Drivers/Enablers of Violent Extremism

- Marginalization and Political Exclusion of minority groups including perceptions of the two. An example of this is in Mali.
- Natural resource conflict- Nigeria, Somalia.
- Poverty and economic deprivation.
- Unemployment with the youth most at risk- Nigeria, Liberia.
- Youth bulge.
- The nature of politics in Africa (monetization, winner takes all, ethnicity).
- Bad governance.
- International politics.
- Porous borders.
- Imposition of values/ practices.

Responding to Violent Extremism

- Policy for CVE must be developed.
• Implementation of the policy developed.
• Advocacy (Civil Society).

Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism

• Community Engagements and use of Social Capital.
• Outreach programmes targeted at the youth and most vulnerable.
• Dialogue and Mediation.
• Gender Engagements.
• Sustained and institutionalized participation of key stakeholders.
• Provision of basic needs and inclusion in Economic, Social and Political processes.
• Development and implementation of policies that ensure inclusion and equitable distribution of resources.

CONCLUSION

There is the need for wider consultations, collaboration and cooperation between all stakeholders on a Community, National, Regional and International levels linked to a carefully developed and implemented CVE policy framework if this menace of VE can be successfully prevented or countered. Also, this is not only a Muslim issue but has its roots in the fabric of society and as such solutions can only be found through continuous dialogue and mediation.

CLOSING REMARKS

The closing remarks were delivered by Brig Gen (Dr) Emmanuel Kotia, the Deputy Commandant of the KAIPTC and H.E Larry Gbevlo Larkey Esq., Director, ACSRT, Algiers, Algeria.
Brig Gen Kotia expressed the Centre’s gratitude and appreciation to the resource persons and participants for contributing to fruitful two-day deliberations on addressing the root causes of VE in Africa. The gathering of both Ghanaians and external facilitators has been key in the success of the workshop. He urged participants to always use dialogue and mediation in addressing issues and made reference to the mediatory role of the Ghana National Peace Council, which fits into the framework of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the ECOWAS mechanisms for conflict prevention. To this end, the Deputy Commandant mentioned the Conflict Analysis and Mediation Course that has been developed by the KAIPTC, run yearly and beneficial to organizations who work on conflict prevention and mediation in Africa. He concluded by re-echoing the need for states to have national security policies, out of which Member States can develop strategies to collaboratively confront the threat of VE.

On his part, the Director ACSRT, Larry Gbevlo-Lartey Esq. said that, the mandate of ACSRT entails building the capacities of AU Member States to prevent as well as combat terrorism. In this regard, the ACSRT has Member State focal points through which the Centre liaises with Member States. He observed that there is a lack of standardization as to which institution in Member States is given responsibility as focal point to ACSRT. He attributed this to the absence in a number of AU Member States, of a clear Counter-Terrorism architecture. He advocated the need for AU Member States to evolve their Counter-Terrorism strategies and architecture in order to facilitate the assignment of responsibility for Counter-Terrorism and Violent Extremism policy and activity planning, coordination and implementation. He encouraged participants to continue within their various institutions to deliberate on the essence of a Root Cause/Human Security approach to the prevention and response to VE so as to come out with effective ways to confront the threat. He concluded by expressing his gratitude to the KAIPTC, noting that there would be more collaboration with the Centre. He urged all participants to develop interest in the activities of the ACSRT by visiting its website and Facebook page and contributing to the discourse therein.
### APPENDIX 1

**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS**

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<tr>
<th>Srl</th>
<th>Rank / Title</th>
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<th>Organisation</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Mr.</td>
<td>Kennedy Atiibo</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Mr.</td>
<td>Prince Addo</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Mr.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Mr.</td>
<td>Augustine Safi</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Mr.</td>
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<td>Mr.</td>
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<td>Mr.</td>
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<td>Ms.</td>
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<td>Julius Kuunnor</td>
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<td>Mark Adelibam</td>
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## APPENDIX 2

### LIST OF FACILITATORS

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>H.E</td>
<td>Larry Gbevlo-Lartey Esq</td>
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<td>Chair of Presentations</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Brig Gen (Dr)</td>
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<td>Review of the UN Plan of Action on the Prevention of Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Mr.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Dr</td>
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<td>Dr</td>
<td>Thomas Jaye</td>
<td>Deputy Director FAAR, KAIPTC</td>
<td>The Nexus between Governance, National Security and the Development of Violent Extremist Behaviours in West Africa</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Dr</td>
<td>Philip Attuquayefio</td>
<td>Senior Research Fellow, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana, Legon</td>
<td>Human Security: Concepts and Implications for CVE/Drivers of Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Dr</td>
<td>Benjamin Olagboye</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>The Local Community and Concepts of Radicalization, Recruitment, Enlistment and Violent Extremism.</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Dr</td>
<td>Ibrahim Bangura</td>
<td>Transition International</td>
<td>Shaping VE: Response Options and Mechanisms</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Sheikh</td>
<td>Aremiyao Shuaib</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Social, Cultural and Religious Factors in the Development of Violent Extremist Behaviour in West Africa</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Col (Rtd)</td>
<td>Festus Aboagye</td>
<td>Africa Peace Support Trainers Association</td>
<td>Chairperson for Session 2</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Dr</td>
<td>Abdoulaye Maiga</td>
<td>Analyst Alert and Prevention, ACSRT</td>
<td>Review of AU, REC/RM Approach to CVE</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Emma Birikorang</td>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>The Regional/Country CVE perspective.</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Dr</td>
<td>Vladimir Antwi-Danso</td>
<td>Dean, Academic Affairs GAFCSC</td>
<td>The Community, Human Security and CVE</td>
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NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON THE ROOT CAUSES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM:
A HUMAN SECURITY RESPONSE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

Date: 7th – 8th November, 2016
Time: 0900
Venue: KAIPTC

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ACSR/CAMET
African Centre for the Study & Research on Terrorism