

# **African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)**



## **Boko Haram Terrorist Activities And The Crises Of Governance In North Eastern Nigeria**

Arirabiyi-Ibrahim, Olorunfemi

## **Boko Haram's Tactics, Targets and Arsenal of Terrorism.**

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Omar Khalfan

التطرف الديني في الإسلام والموقف الأفريقي  
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## Editorial

*Ambassador Francisco Caetano Madeira, AUC Chairperson's Special Representative for Counter-terrorism Cooperation and Director of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT).*

This is the second issue of the African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism devoted to Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism (CVE). The reasons for such a preference are accounted for by an upsurge in the phenomenon and a threat to peace and security on the continent. Radicalization and Violent Extremism is impacting our societies and their normal way of life in a particularly worrying manner. Many questions are being asked about this complex problem, its origins, its causes, its manifestations, its evolution and the way it can be prevented, fought and eradicated. Much has been said and written about radicalization and violent extremism but so many questions remain unanswered.

General theoretical approaches are confronted with intricate concrete realities. The causes of radicalization and violent extremism can neither be attributed to a single factor alone, nor is the process of transformation of radicalized individuals simple and linear. What works in some communities does not seem to work in others. The sources and consequences are complex and far reaching and the transformation required must simultaneously address the different causes and the specific environment in which they emerge.

The ACSRT contribution to this effort has been to promote continuous studies and research on the phenomenon and ensure that knowledge and expertise developed and accumulated by bright African minds on these issues, is known and made available to AU member states and CVE practitioners. Hence, this new publication which, I believe, is not the last.

Researchers and authors of the seven articles in this volume have tackled a broad range of interrelated issues, from defining a number of



different concepts to discussing the gradual stages of the radicalization process and their point of contact with the triggers and catalysts that induce individuals to embrace violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram and commit acts of terrorism.

In 2012 and 2013, the ACSRT organized 3 CVE workshops. Two for North Africa, SAHEL and West African Regions, and one for EAST Africa and the Horn of Africa Region. The third CVE workshop was jointly organized by the ACSRT and UNICRI in Algiers and dealt with radicalization and de-radicalization in prison settings.

In April 2013, the ACSRT was actively involved in the Symposium on Countering Violent Extremism in West Africa and the SAHEL organized in cooperation with GCTF in Ouagadougou, from 18 to 19 April 2013.

These workshops coincided, in essence, in their final conclusions. They recognized the complexity of the radicalization process and highlighted the conditions conducive to it as being, among others, a combination of ideological factors, social grievances, inter-community tensions, conflicts, political and socio-cultural frustrations, personal or collective identity claims, dissenting interpretation of religion and history, economic and social marginalization, exclusion and other aggravating factors that pose challenges which the society struggles to correctly and effectively address.

The conclusions of the same workshops coincided once again when they pinpointed education, good governance (political, economic, cultural and social), tolerance, rule of law, respect for human rights, justice, the creation of economic opportunities for the youth as well as guarantees of minimal conditions and equity of social existence for all populations, the role of the media and efforts to counteract extremism, marginalization and exclusion as the key factors on which to base all actions for the prevention and fight against radicalization .

Radical thought began to attract the attention of African leaders long before the events of 9/11. In Dakar, in 1992, the Assembly of



OAU Heads of State and Government adopted resolution 213 on the need for member states to enhance cooperation and coordination in order to fight the phenomenon of extremism. This was followed by a more explicit formal pronouncement in June 1994 in Tunis when they adopted a declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations, which unequivocally rejected fanaticism and extremism or the use of religion to commit acts of violence, including terrorist acts.

Although leaders did not believe that radical thinking in itself was a problem, they realized, however, that it was becoming a serious national and regional security threat as members of the community or citizens of a member state embraced or engaged in violence and direct action as a means to promote ethnic, racist, political, ideological or religious extremism. That propelled them into action and they have been acting vigorously ever since.

Terrorism needs to be tackled in the mind for, it does not occur out of the blue. It starts with a grievance. Genuine or not, the perception of a grievance is fueled by an extremist motivating ideological narrative. When these two are accompanied by a degree of operational capability and a triggering agent that propels the aggrieved into action, a terrorist act is, most likely, bound to occur.

Ideology is the organizing factor for terrorists. It provides them with a framework for action, and motivation and justification of their acts. Ideology is their language for mobilization and radicalization.

Without an ideology it will be hard for terrorists to spread and sustain their cause.

Together with the various approaches in countering terrorism, including operational and law enforcement aspects, we must seek to adopt a strategic approach which is aimed at countering violent extremist reasoning with a narrative that creates a hostile environment for terrorists and violent extremists, de-legitimizes and destroys the



ideology that motivates and connects individuals and terrorist groups together and perpetuates their existence.

This can be achieved through a coordinated and complementary action by Governments, Civil Society, Media and international partners.

Within the Civil Society it is important to highlight the significant role that can be played by senior religious leaders of all denominations. Religions have enormous resources that can be used to fight budding radicalization. Each religious community has assets that can be engaged in de-radicalization. Taken collectively, religious social structures represent significant channels for communication and action that, if engaged and transformed, could enable religious believers to function as powerful agents of change in transforming radicalized environments.

The ACSRT 2014-2017 Strategic Plan of Action adopted by the 7<sup>th</sup> Session of the Focal Points last December, has concrete provisions to carry this CVE coordinated approach to fruition.



## **BOKO HARAM TERRORIST ACITIVITIES AND THE CRISES OF GOVERNACE IN NORTH EASTERN NIGERIA.**

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### **Introduction**

The study will take us through the historical perspectives of peace and conflict studies, history of ideas of peace and peace theories, the theories of violence and peace. Our approaches would be to try and navigate through the historical perspectives using Nigeria as the main focus and do a study of conflicts in its various forms viewing it through the histories of some ideas, the violence such ideas have caused and their challenges including the catastrophes that all the processes have thrown upon the women as a result of the roles of different actors and their impacts. This paper will attempt to apply some of the theories and specifically that of violence to explain the case study for this paper, which is Boko Haram Terrorist Activities and The Crises of Governance in North Eastern Nigeria.

It will not be out of place to have a good historical background of our case study, where it comes from and the journey so far. It will be intellectually enriching to put at fore therefore the historical background of Nigeria as a nation which is a creation of British colonial imperialism, and that idea that was used to subjugate the territories as a result of the use of violence asymmetrical powers. The name Nigeria is a derivation from the words 'Niger' and 'Area'; 'Niger' being the name of the third longest River in Africa that has it source from Guinea highland bordering Sierra Leone. Nigeria as a country has well over 400 ethnic groups and 375 languages with a population that is well over 175 Million people. It should be noted that before the advent of colonialist power and their imperialists idea of amalgamation, Nigeria



was a collection of Kingdoms and territories which was referred to as 'State' or 'Statelets' (Obayemi 1980: 152) were very wealthy. Both archeological, oral tradition and ethnographical information attested to the dynamic and flourished societies with well-organised political systems and very rich agricultural land that existed before what initially took the forms of exploration and then later exploitation, and subjugation by the imperialist power.

All those loose societies became colonies of British in 1861 and divided into two protectorates in 1898 in line with the Berlin conference of 1884 which gave node to the Europeans' partitioning of Africa for their imperialist gain. The processes which actually started inform of compartmentalisation of the territories and or Kingdoms into protectorates by Colonialist were later brought together in 1900. This is the period when the three already administrative structured territories were renamed and reclassified. The colony of Lagos with its Yoruba hinterland already under the colonial officer became the colony and protectorate of Lagos; the Niger Coast protectorate and the Bights of Benin and Biafra and their hinterland became the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and placed under Colonial office too. The last being Northern Nigeria which was under the Royal Niger Company which became a Protectorate too and placed under the Colonial Office (Afigbo, 2005, p. 426). All these were set agendas of the Colonialists procedure for bring the Territory to be named 'Nigeria' effectively under its colonial rule and thus the conquest of territories in 1903 became a fait accompli. This led to the amalgamation of the Northern and southern protectorate into what is today Nigeria in 1914; and the Federation placed under the direct rule of Sir Frederick Lugard despite strong protest against the idea of amalgamation by some of the kingdoms. As we shall see later in this paper, the amalgamation policy triggered off many conflicts which Nigeria has been battling since 1914 till date. Nigeria eventually became independent from colonial rule October 1st 1960.

After the two bloody military coups that almost led to the balkanisation of Nigeria as parked together by the Colonialists with



the amalgamations policy of 1914, the then Military administration of General Yakubu Gowon who headed the administration that fought the civil war in 1967 promulgated decree to dissolve the former four regions and replaced them with twelve States. One of the twelve states which though have been further fragmented into four or more states is the North Eastern part which currently is the flash point zone where the Boko Haram terrorist activities take it dominance now.

What is equally important here is that Colonialist succeeded in creating a class society with certain groups having right to everything, thus the political arraignments the Colonialist left behind after independence have played tremendous role in the conflicts situations of the country as well as busy grounds for students of conflict studies. The system equally promoted further different Political development based on ethnicities as the following important factors namely cultures- language, traditions and religion were ignored during the amalgamation planning. Ho-Won Jeong perception of an ideal peaceful society aptly put this in a better perspective when he wrote “The ideals of peace are influenced by value systems of a particular society. Continuation of violence suggests that humans have not achieved the political, emotional and spiritual maturity needed for the realisation of peace” (Ho-Won, 2000:1) This paper will therefore be looking at how the dynamics of the historical backgrounds given permeated the governance crisis in Nigeria that produces a group like Boko Haram and its terrorist ideology unleashed on the North Eastern Part of Nigeria since 2009.

## **The Crises Of Governance In Nigeria**

The crises of governance in Nigeria as a country did not start after the independence from her Colonialist in 1960, but was actually sown by the colonialist who with total disregards to the ethos of the territories they met on ground went ahead and forced those systems together regardless of their views and concerns of the citizens on the issue for no other good reason than interest. Having succeeded the colonial power



went ahead using their Company such as Royal Niger Company as a conduit pipe and thoroughly syphoned Nigeria natural resource such as the agricultural products without corresponding economic development or growth. This is well capture in this statement that ‘the state in Nigeria has a colonial origin..... designed with the primary intention of promoting capitalist expansion and therefore serve the interest of both domestic and international capitalist’ (Hussaini, 2010).

For sixty year Nigeria as a state was subjected to economic and political conflicts of domination perpetrated by the British security forces and her Nigerian surrogates. This comes more to fore after the independence when the colonialist had to hand power over to those they trusted. It is this conspiracy against the territories and the citizens of the territories that culminated into the level of poverty and miss-governance that has let to total decay in the system at all sectors in Nigeria and which has bred the monster of violence that is rocking the country till this day. Scholars have said the current crises of governance in Nigeria could be located and rooted in the context of four contemporary social forces. The first could be epitomised in the continuing force of prolonged dictatorship and or sustained authoritarian rule by the military. Having become trapped in a militarised order in which social structures and values have been modeled in the fashion of authoritarianism, and governance continues to be conducted in a command barrack fashion, because those of them that became the Head of the Government are either ex-military personnel or those who are not, but who surrounded themselves with those that had romanced with the military and became militarised. This will account for the reason why, the executive branches were seen, as both dominant and domineering. The executive thus became so powerful and power drunk that alone, to the exclusion of other arms of the Government, that is, the legislature and even the judiciary embodied itself the government. Under this kind of faulty perception and indoctrination, democracy becomes an instrument of bewitchment and blackmail. The result of these are conflicts that leads





to impeachments or threat of impeachments which in turned made the system very unstable.

The second factor is that all the arms of “the constitutional institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, political parties and executive bodies are made to frustrate and retard in growth or they are gravely weakened. In the case of the legislature, there was no space previously to experience the value of law making derived from a representative social order because there was no legislature distinct from the executive in politics and governance” (Oyovbaire, 2007 nd). The fact is that many of the politicians who found their ways as elected persons into the legislative arm in 1999 for example when the military ended their misadventure in Nigeria governance, knew little or nothing about legislation and the legislative process outside of the idea and provisions of the constitution and so it was conflicts upon conflicts that further tensed the majority of the people whose peace were already jeopardized by the problem of poverty they have been subjected from the faulty structure problems of the colonial surrogates.

The third social factor according to this school is that of the country’s political economy which was inherited. Suddenly the class character of the economy became super obvious as unearned wealth in the form of corruptly accumulation of state funds and resources by some individuals through rent seeking and patronages have tended to make power relations highly unsymmetrical. The reason being that majority of the people do not have equal access to political field, and the role of money in elections has suddenly made it difficult if not impossible for a large segment of the political class to participate effectively in aspiring for power. “The element of predation in the social relations of power has saddled the legislature and other activity sectors with persons who have more consciousness and drive for self-service rather than the concern for public service, their constituents and the common good” (Oyovbaire 2007.nd) further maintained. Considering the humongous power the executives wedged in the administration of the country and by



implication have unchallenged control over the unearned accumulation. The drive for money, favours and contracts logically have to be shifted to that arms of administration as the epicenter of power relations. The implication of this is very simple, impunity which manifested itself informs of bracing corruption gradually more than before gone haywire.

Fourthly is the domestication of the executive offices of the President, Governors and others in leadership structure who turned these offices to personal properties and rule like entrepreneurs. This is an anti-thesis to, by all intent the spirit of constitutional and democratic governance. This is further buttressed by this statement

*“a regime of personal rule, Persons take precedence over rules, the office holder is not efficiently bound by his office and is able therefore to change its authority and powers to suit his own personal rule; the rulers and their appointed leaders take precedence over the formal rules of the political game; the rules do not efficiently regulate political behaviour; and the people therefore cannot predict or anticipate conduct from the knowledge of the rules. The state is government of men and not of laws” (Oyovbaire 2007:10, nd)*

Those forces mentioned above embolden the Nigeria executive branches and their avarices for more wealth and thus more corruption which became the epicenter of the governance crisis and the violence it breeds in the process. Thus the unchecked corruptive tendencies led to aversion for more power and then the willingness to use all tools of conflicts to get such power even when it means turning army of the mass unemployed youths which are not in short supplies though into foot soldiers for a price. These were parts of the prerequisite to the factors that built some Boko Haram sect members in the North East region of Nigeria and the siege of violence it has been unleashing on Nigeria. At this level once again we may wish to ask ourselves, what is violence in our conceptual framework?



## Concept Of Violence

Violence has a long list of forms and that makes it a bit difficult for us to be defined. However for this purpose I will define it by looking at some of the typologies from the worldviews of some of the theorist. Ho-Won Jeong looked at violence not only from the physical harm alone, because according to him, there are various conditions that existed which could cause human pains and sufferings. He therefore sees peace as opposite of violence and went on to typified violence into two, the first he referred to as structural and the second direct violence. These two will be relevant to the explanations of why a group like Boko Haram should embarked on such a violent campaign the members have unleashed while using terrorism as a philosophy against the state.

Starting from the structural point of view on how the symptom propels the aggression, Johan Galtung, wrote that Poverty, hunger, repression and social alienation constitute another way to characterise situations causing human misery. That quality of life is reduced by denial of educational opportunities, free speech and freedom of association. These conditions according to him are associated with uneven life chances, inequitable distribution of resources and unequal decision making power. Given its indirect and insidious nature, structural violence most often works slowly in eroding human values and shortening life spans. It is typically built into the very structure of society and cultural institutions (Galtung, 1969)

One could posit therefore that when human beings are denied some basic fundamental needs that could make their lives better, especially such things like a place call home with family care, there is possibility of looking elsewhere to fill that missing gap; in the process contacts are developed with peers who lacked same needs; this leads to formation of gangs, and anti-social behaviours set in, circumstances like these are always fatal grounds for violence to breed and germinate. This will be apt for majority of the street children popularly called almajaris who are



in millions all over our streets. I brought forward in the introductory part of this work the role of colonial imperialism in preparing the fatal grounds for the social malaise as the result of their exploitativeness which came to bear several generations after in what today became Boko Haram. This confirms the claims that structural violence is apparent in all social systems maintained through exploitative means Ho-Won Jeong (2000), it is thus a fact that Nigeria social system from the inception has been maintained through exploitative means that were handed over to the neo colonialist Nigerians who have now developed to expertise level.

The other type of violence which Ho-Won Jeong referred as direct violence has to do with the physical aspect that could cause injuries and pains to human beings and even in its extreme form caused fatalities. Thus terrorist activities such as killing and beating which either happened inter-personally or such actions like war will be classed as direct violence. Direct violence as claimed by (Bulham, 1985) could take the form of verbal and psychological abuse. What this means therefore is that direct violence must involve a minimum of two actors, i.e. a doer and a receiver. Direct violence generally works faster and dramatically. It is personal, visible, manifest and non-structural. It is carried over time by traumas left behind by its effect of harming the whole entity of beings, body, spirit and mind (Galtung, 1999: 31).

Could this be the aim behind Boko Haram ruthless actions or are we looking at violent individuals or individuals shaped by violent situation? The answer to this we would get by veering a bit into micro-sociological theory to dissect situations which 'shape the emotions and acts of individuals who step inside them' (Randal Collins, 2008). Randal opined that it would be a waste of time and purpose which would amount to false lead to look for violent individuals that is constant across situations. This shares this opinion that individuals are not inherently born to be violent, and those that are violent are, as a result of the situation that shaped them. Randal therefore concluded that:



*even people we think of as very violent-because they have been violent in more than one situation, or spectacularly violent on some occasions- are violent only in very particular situations. Even the toughest hoodlums are off duty some of the time. Most of the time, the most dangerous, most violent person are not doing anything violent. Even for these, the dynamics of situations are crucial in explaining what violence they actually do (Randal 2008, pg. 3).*

The above is a further confirmation that major causes of violent conflicts are structural in nature, and it is the forms and or features that the situation brings forward that will determine the nature and the dynamics and gravity of the violence as was succinctly put thus “..... that what happens further back, before people arrive in a situation of confrontation, is not the key factor as to whether they will fight, nor how they will fight if the situation moves in that direction; nor indeed who will win and what kind of change gets done (Randal 2008:20). This is an apt statement to help shift to examine the emergence of Boko Haram sect for us to be able to explain the genesis and or the trigger of the conflict that has consumed well over 20,000 souls since it started in 2009.

### **The Emergence Of Boko Haram Religious Sect In The North Eastern Nigeria**

The emergence of Boko Haram would be more understood when we take into consideration the backgrounds and characters that are likely to constitute the majority of the foot soldiers. These are Pupils, Students (almajarai) population, majority of who have no known homes, or known parents or brothers and sisters; but whose only known friends and parents are those fellow groups members with whom they passed through the same radical Quranic indoctrination, and their (malam) ‘Quranic teacher’, who served as their guardians, and whose biddings



must be automatically carried out because of the authority they wield and the punitive measure awaiting disobedient student. It would be pertinent for this paper to take a look at these students and the kinds of transformation they passed through as foot soldiers' either through their developmental process in the pulpit of their malams or gang members and why they are always ready made tools for use.

Almajarai is a Muslim system of education peculiar to the northern Nigeria and the Sahel region, in which a student, from an early age, leaves his home and family to study under an Islamic Teacher called malam (Okoye and Ya'u1999:16). Another important fact to this is that the malam's main characteristic is that of mobility. They are known to be consistently on the move and without any stable income generating job. Anywhere they moved, they automatically become the burden of the community in terms of feeding and general maintenance. This system the colonial rule completely altered through the introduction of formal educational system in the 19th Century during the first contact with the North thereby destroying a system in place for hundreds of years. This led to the drop in support for the system and with little or no recognition given either the system or the students by government again. Other developments like urbanisation, rural urban-migration, economic crisis and the increasing commercialisation of formal education and shrinking opportunities, have made formal education unaffordable and unattractive to poor. Parents, especially in rural areas were therefore left with an option of Almajiranci, which has led to increasing concentration of almajarai in most cities. The levels of poverty and unemployment have also made feeding of the pupils difficult as results the leftover that were normally given to those pupils in form of alms have been equally reduced (Last 1991: Okoye and Ya'u 1999).

As the consequence of these intra personal conflicts the groups were usually subjected, they often got exposed to drugs and militant gangs who mostly had equally passed through the same orientation and



experiences in the past. At this level they have graduated to become teenagers and would be able to function either as vigilante group 'controlling territory' as their own domain or doing menial jobs that barely keep them to survive. These are the groups that become easily recruited into movement like Boko Haram as foot soldiers, having been radicalized through years of rigid Quranic indoctrinations and left with no job to survive or known home but slept under bridges, uncompleted building and ramshackle make-shift tents. This is the situation in the North Eastern states of Bauchi, Borno, Gombe and Yobe which is the focus of this paper. It is equally important to have a look at the geographical contiguity of these States so as to be able to explain the possible transnational dimension of Boko Haram terrorist activities with particular reference to the Sahel region.

The North Eastern part of Nigeria is bordered by some other Countries like Niger Republic, Chad Republic and the Cameroon and residents of those border countries have family and cultural ties across the artificial boundaries. One could cross from Niger republic to fetch water in Nigeria for example, farmers worked side by side, with one leg in Nigeria and another in Niger or Chad. The type of scenario we are trying to paint here is very important to be able to appreciate the dynamics of any kind of conflict that could affect that part of Nigeria especially in-term of the migration pattern of some of the actors in the terrorist and or other transnational border activities like trafficking, kidnapping, narcotic and smuggling.

It is equally important to note that from the near absence of governance in those region of Nigeria, one can conveniently confirm that North Eastern part of the country is one of the most backward parts of Nigeria with 0.332% human development profile thereby making the region the lowest human development profile zone and the highest poverty Index with an average score of about 49% thus making the region the poorest part in Nigeria according to UNDP Human Development Index report 2008-2009. It is important to know however that this report



was before the advent of the current violence and the occupation of the zone by the Nigeria Military which has further destroyed the zone. It is therefore not unexpected to see streams of unemployed youths roaming around the streets looking for different kinds of activities and menial jobs such as guard, Cart pushing, water selling, etc. with which to be engaged. Governance are therefore virtually nonexistence due to unhindered corrupt practices and the inability to provide public goods thereby abdicating social responsibilities to religious organisations and their clerics like the late Sheik Yusuf Mohammed; thus the unhindered privileges to mold and unmold those young mind with such ideologies which have triggered a lot of militancy in that part of Nigeria between years 2002 and 2009. One would not be surprised therefore why the region is constantly a flash point area for violence related conflicts because there are more than enough willing hands to be employed whenever the triggers are off the hooks.

The following statement made by Alhaji Baba I Bashiru, Chairman People Democratic Party (PDP), Borno at The Media Trust Head Office Abuja, Nigeria on the 22th November, 2011 as published in Daily Trust of 23th November, 2011, will help in our understanding and analysis of the dynamics of the Sect. Alhaji Baba I Bashiru was reported to have said that “the Yusufiyya Movement, better known as Boko Haram, came to prominence in Borno when it helped to bring Governor Ali Modu Sheriff to power in 2003 and the current trouble began when it fell out with him”. The report in the daily trust as written by Nuruddeen M. Abdallah went further that Alhaji Bashiru explained that “When Ali Sheriff was working to snatch Borno State from then Governor Mala Kachallah earlier this decade, he entered into a pact with the Yusufiyya Movement with a promise to implement Shari’a rule in Borno State”. He continued in his report that “after becoming the governor, Bashiru said, Sheriff created a Ministry of Religious Affairs and appointed Alhaji Buji Foi, who was Yusufiyya’s national secretary, as its first commissioner”.





From the report, one could explain the reason for the violence conflict and probably deduced the ideology behind it. Boko Haram we can explain is a radical Islamic based religious sect that came into existence in 2002 and operating in some States of Northern Nigeria, namely Borno with its capital city in Maiduguri; Yobe Capital City Damatur; Bauchi with Capital City in Bauchi; and Gombe with Capital City in Gombe. The sect which is known by the name Yusufiyya's movement is officially known among members as 'Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad' translated to mean people committed to the propagation of Prophet's Teaching and Jihad, but however popularly called 'Boko Haram' because of their detest for western style of Education regarded as corrupted by all form of evils, immorality and indecency. The Sect advocates as an alternative to British form of education, a Shar'ia system with strict Islamic laws (Femi Ibrahim 2013).

After the two bloody military coups that almost led to the balkanisation of Nigeria as parked together by the Colonialists with the amalgamations policy that came to force in 1914, the then Military administration of General Yakubu Gowon promulgated to dissolve the former four regions and replaced them with twelve States. One of the twelve states which though have been further fragmented into four or more states is the North Eastern State. Borno State where they are majorly operating and part of the territory in which the group once annexed, is one of the thirty-six States in Nigeria and one of the twelve states that adopted or planned to adopt Shari'a before 2003. For this reason, the Sect and the State had cozy relationship to the extent that one of the Sect members who was once the movement Secretary was appointed a Commissioner in the Government to be in-charge of Ministry of Religious Affairs. However things turned sour around 2005 after the 2003 election; there were ideological difference on the issue of implementation of Shari'a laws and the Commissioner and the members he brought into the government left as a result of the irreconcilable differences. This further heightened the already tensed relationship to the extent that the Sect shifted their



loyalty against the State government whom they helped installed. The state Governor conscious of the enormous powers he wedged turned to the Police to 'deal' with the 'new opponents' of the state. The Police being at liberty to be used by the ruling party to oppress and perpetrate all forms of intimidations including silencing the dissent voices, came up with the brutal enforcement of Peace by killing innocent citizen members of the movement. When justices sought by the Sect they were rebuffed and further met with more brutalization, destructions of the properties and open killings on the streets of Maiduguri. This is the genesis of the violence conflicts that has turned peace of Nigeria upside down and makes the security of the North Eastern parts of Nigeria a nightmare.

Towards the end of July 2009, the Government hastily setup a joint security Agency comprising of the police and the military to haunt for the Sect leadership and brought him to justice. Yusuf Mohamed the sect leader was arrested along with other 800 teenage Sect members who were mostly students and were summarily executed by the Nigeria Police in the State July 30th, 2009 in the presence of hundreds of on lookers without recourse to the law courts. The northern part of Nigeria has not known peace as the vestiges of the Sect members went underground and had since 2009 till date carried out such audacious attack on Police formations, Army Barracks, Churches and even the United Nation Building, in Abuja the Nigeria Federal Capital Territory, was not left out. We may posit a question thus: Is Boko Haram a perverted Islamists who are blood thirsty or a creation of structural conflict?

### **The Ideological Background**

The question here is whether Boko Haram terrorist activities could be seen from the perspective of its ideology or from the point of pervert Islamist blood thirsty group who are looking for recognitions? This paper will attempt to proffer an explanation looking at some worldviews of theorist and experts on terrorism. Stepanova, defined Ideology as a set of ideas, doctrines and beliefs that characterizes the thinking of an



individual or group and may transform into political or social plans, actions or systems” (2008:27). Boko Haram sect I alluded to earlier in this paper as a member of the Ahl Al-Sunna wa al-Jama’a (The people of the way of the Prophet and the Community of Muslim) belongs to a radical ideological group called the Salafist- the companion, the fore father and the successor who see themselves as the models of human behaviours and the carrier of correct belief for all Muslims and those mankind that follows the ways of the Prophet. While rejecting post Quranic interpretations that are not part of the sacred texts, the sect seeks to revive the Islam of old by rallying against what they considered as impure practices such as polytheist i.e. veneration of popular shrines asides from the one in Mecca and Medina. To this group salvation are meant for them who obeyed the Prophet according to Allah’s order as contained strictly in the Quran and the Hadith. They see themselves as the only saved group. The group rejects scholarly interpretation of Quran (ijma) and analogy (qiyas), they reject the idea of derivative judgments (ijthihad) and other qualified judgments that are not inconformity with what Quran and hadiths specified. All those Muslims that ran contrary to their doctrines are declared idolaters (Mushrik), innovators (mubtadi) and nonbeliever (Kafri) and considered as more dangerous than none Muslims and often pronounced death (Takfiri fatwas) on them. This is the world views of Yusuf Mohammed while combining belief and religious idea for the purpose of mobilizing for political action without necessarily restoring to carrying arm against the state.

Yusuf Mohammed’s extra judicial killing and the destruction of the groups’ schools and other properties coupled with the takeover of the sect by a more reticent and far more radical Abubakar Shekau, a ‘Jihadi Salafist’ radically changed the ideological posture of the group with his focus on the combination of political and moral reform of the society within the radical wahhabist approach. The sect’s members based on their own strict interpretations of the Quran according to Ibrahim Femi (2013) had been able to justify all their terrorist activities on the just



war narratives. A philosophy based on legitimization of killing that permission to fight against people that wronged and driven them away from their homes unjustly in their efforts to preserve Muslim faiths and principles (Qur'an 8:60, 73), and because they are fighting a just cause God will give them victory. This is the kind of ideology that has been the driving force behind Boko Haram killings and wanton destruction, an ideology that they have consistently maintained is rooted and backed by Quran and have quoted same copiously to justify these actions. This has led grievously, to destruction of lives and properties. The level of fatalities alone Aljazeera was quoted to have put to be more than 14,000 people between 2010 and 2011, and, OCHA a United Nations organ put the numbers of fatalities at 1,224 between May last year when the emergency rule was imposed on some States of the North East by the President of Nigeria till December 2013. If one should take all the destructions into consideration from its face values one would be right to describe the group as pervert Islamist. However the interest of this paper is not to pass judgments but look at conflict involved here using terrorism as weapon and analyse same based on its historical dimensions. If one therefore could take a snapshot of the series of events that took place before the 29th July 2009 and reflect on the activities of the sect members from 2002 when it has been generally agreed that the group came into existence under late Sheik Yusuf Mohammed and the role in the election of former Governor Amadu Sheriff, the picture we are trying to get would be clearer.

The Sect for example had consistently been advocated for the Islamitisation of the Northern Part of Nigeria with a system based on Islamic laws and jurisprudences; this was what led the sect fractionalisation and the subsequent pacts with the former Governor, Sheriff who allegedly promised to carry out the group political ideology and thus reneged haven won the Governorship. Their bone of contention was the impunity of the leaderships that breeds poverty in which majority of them are victims, as a result of the corruption and miss-governance that pervaded all the levels of structure whose change



the sect advocated in the light of their doctrine and ideology which deals with morality. The group does not believe in the secular system of education promising that “this war that is yet to start would continue for long” if the educational and political systems were not changed. The group is encouraged with their propagation for the changes based on the Quran phrase that “Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors”. As far as the group is concerned those political leaders are transgressors and forbidden to rule them because they are not governed by the Quran. Attacks on the Churches were premised on the fact that they are being used as a means of selling their missionary ideas and converting those born into Islam to Christianity, an action they regarded as ‘haram’ (forbidden) and finally it was clear that the security officers exhibited high degree of impunities based on the incidences that took place between 27 and 29th July 2009 when their houses and school were bulldozed, and many of their students and children buried under rubbles; house by house search were conducted and teenagers were hauled into waiting police pick-ups, brought and lined with the face down on the streets of Maiduguri and summarily executed by men of the Nigeria Police. These are the triggers- triggers motivated by structural problem, religious ideology and grievances.

This paper will therefore argue against stereotyping the sect as pervert or psychotic killers. Existing researches are fairly consistent to the fact that serious psychopathology or mental illnesses among terrorists are relatively rare, and certainly not a major factor in understanding or predicting terrorist behavior (McCauley, 2002; Sageman, 2004). Friedland (1992) opined that empirical support to date had proved that there is no compelling evidence that terrorists are abnormal, insane, or match a unique personality type and that there are in fact, some indications to the contrary. Fried (1982) further observed, that “even in the cases of the terrorist who is clearly psychotic and delusional in his thinking, awareness of political realities can play a significant



role in determining behavior.” From the narrative given one could conveniently depose to the fact that Boko Haram activity is firmly rooted on grievances and ideology.

It is clear from the pictures that we have painted specifically as it affected our case study, Boko Haram in this paper the unpredictability of the dynamic of conflicts, how it could change from simple conflict situation to that of violent as a result of failure of governance impunities carried out by the Security arms of government. The failure of the victim not getting proper and appropriate justice as demanded by the Boko Haram’s leader Yusuf Mohammed, but who instead neutralized in the process by the same security officers could explain for the primary reason for the violence.

This paper will not be completed without arguing for one or two recommendations that could put a halt to the ranging conflict and possibly herald Peace. It is true that a movement that operates underground would be very difficult to negotiate with, but it is the opinion of this paper that, there could be a chance for trust building if the Federal Government is serious about negotiating with the group, so negotiation should be explored rather than confrontation and neutralization.

Another point is that the Security Agents should be made accountable for their excesses, extra-judicial killing has never been justification for any crime committed, it is the opinion of this paper that by honestly bringing the perpetrators involved in extra-judicial killing to the open court and punished them according to the law of the land without necessarily appearing to have conceded too much to the Sect’s wish, will go a long way to finding a lasting solution.

Finally, foreign military intervention should be discouraged because this paper believes that it has never worked and will never work. Western intervention in Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries did not work and as a matter have created more problems structurally and physically for the receiving country, a mapping of the MENA would confirm this



position. In Afghanistan, it has been reported that American government are now trying to bring the Taliban to the roundtable, haven wasted so many lives and money prosecuting a war that bound to fail.

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## **BOKO HARAM'S TACTICS, TARGETS AND ARSENALS OF TERRORISM.**

*M. Arirabiyi-Ibrahim, Olorunfemi  
MISAHEL, Bamako-Mali*

### **Introduction**

This paper seeks to study Boko Haram's tactics, targets, and arsenal of terrorism. The needs arose from the rates of Boko Haram's precision in carrying out their terrorist activities; and secondly to help bridge the lacuna that might be present in the process of seeking to arrest the activities of the terrorist. Our target, "Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad" which translated from Arabic to mean *people committed to the propagation of Prophet's Teaching and Jihad* and locally called 'Boko Haram' (Western Civilization forbidden) is a derivative words in Hausa which portrays disgust for Western culture, its civilizations, Educational systems and influences; which the sect said is immoral, corrupt, evil and should be forbidden and rejected. In the sect's first Press release after the murder of their founding leader, Sheik Yusuf Mohammed, the acting leader Sanni Umaru, clarified the meaning of Boko Haram which he said was not that 'Western Education is a sin, but rather that Western Civilization is forbidden. The difference he asserted was, "while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West, that is European, which is not true, the second affirms our believe in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determine by Western Education.<sup>1</sup>

Boko Haram started its operation in the North Eastern Region of Nigeria comprising, Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba and Adamaw States in 2002 with its networks spread to other Northern States. Like its other *Alh-as-Sunnah Wa'l Jamm'ah* (the save sect) in the Sahel, Boko Haram sect members are Salafist<sup>2</sup>. Salafism as a doctrine derives



from the term which means the pious forefather (*al-salaf al-salib*), the first three generations of Muslims who had firsthand experience of the rise of Islam and are regarded as exemplary for the “correct way” to live as Muslims. Its golden period is considered to be restricted to the first generation of Muslims or even to the period of the four rightly guided Caliphs (632-661).<sup>3</sup> Salafi is normally divided into two groups i.e. the politically submissive Salafis who believes in winning converts through proselytising and the Salafi-Jihadist on the other hand, believes that proselytisation must go along with holy war to make a change happened. Jihad is therefore seen as the only way to self-fulfillment. Boko Haram as a revivalist group therefore rejects Western culture, its economic and political manifestation in all its ramifications including secularism and its sciences and technologies. Thus, as alternative, the sect advocates for education and governance system based on strict Islamic law, the Shari’a.

### **Background**

Sheik Yusuf Mohammed was known to be an ardent follower of Taqi al-ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), a respectable Islamic scholar, and one of the foremost contributors of Salafist who believed in the rigorous doctrine of complete submission to Allah as dictated by the Quran and *Hadith*. This view is supported by Ahmad Salkida who said the late Boko Haram’s founder based his teachings on the works of Ibn Taymiyya, after whom he named his mosque in Maiduguri. And Ibn Taymiyya equally influenced other modern radical Islamist movements in the northern part of Nigeria. Ibn Taymiyya believed in the strict adherence to the Kroan and principles of the Prophet Mohammed, and was devoted to the concept of holy war.<sup>4</sup> Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf had his sermons woven around this theme. As part of his sermon Mohammed Yusuf was known to have condemned Nigeria elites, especially the northern politicians and Governors of the states as bunch of corrupt people. His fierce attack and called for strict adherence to Qur’an made his popularity soared for people were always trooping his sermons.



Borno state like all other northern states was already operating a weak Shari'a system that at least satisfied the sect minimal condition, this accounted for the support Sheik Yusuf Mohammad eventually gave to Sherriff Ali with the pact that if he won the election, he would fully implement Shari'a. After the election Boko Haram came to prominence said Alhaji Baba I. Bashiru as he helped the Sheriff Ali to win the election. Governor Sheriff in fulfillment of the pact, create the first Ministry of Religious Affairs and appointed Alhaji Buji Foi who was the National Secretary of the Sect as its first Commissioner.<sup>5</sup> However Alhaji Baba Bashiru went further that the sect had to part ways because Governor Sherriff Ali could not fulfill his promise to implement Shari'a rule so, Yusuf Mohammed directed for the withdrawal of the Commissioner and members of the sect who constituted the bulk of the Ministry.

The sect had a large community which Sheik Yusuf Mohammed ran like a "mini-state within Borno state" in-line with their ideology to live away from sins. Within the community, the sect had a department (*laginas*), a cabinet (*Shura*), a brigade of guilds (*hisbah*) and a military wing. It equally had hierarchy of its own ruling emirs across the northern Nigeria and in the neighbouring countries like Niger, Cameroon and Chad who were accountable to Sheik Mohammed Yusuf.<sup>6</sup> He had large expanse of lands that housed residential buildings for members of his families and some of the leaders, students and youngsters who were equally given free food and education. Apart from these, the sect had a microfinance system where members could draw money for businesses; had large farm which supported the feedings of the Jama'atu apart from the *zakat* (Islamic obligatory offering) that wealthy people normally gave which constituted substantially to the sect's incomes. This was confirmed by the Borno State Governor, Kashim Shettima in an interview when he said that Mohammed Yusuf established the sect with good welfare system, which attracted the poor. The Governor equally confirmed that the sect leader had far reaching welfare programmes, which included arranging "cheap marriages" for his followers in otherwise very "costly" environments<sup>7</sup>. He opined that the welfare packages enticed most of the Boko Haram members into the fold. It would therefore plausible to say



this contributed to the influx of more young Islamists from the neighbouring countries like Chad and Nigér into the sect's fold.

The increased in the fold of the Sect gave its members audacity to become more militant in the framing of their messages. Verbal attacks were directed at the person of Governor Sherriff Ali and his corrupt governance systems. This was confirmed in an interview by Governor Sherriff Ali himself when in answering a question; he said he saw it coming at a stage particularly when he saw the tape of Yusuf's sermon where he dared him and the Nigerian state, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of this country. He was daring every leader... He threatened that they knew where we slept, our route to the offices and therefore they would deal with us. He specifically mentioned my name and said I was the biggest *Kafir*, unbeliever who must be dealt with<sup>8</sup>.

July 2009 took dramatic turn with incessant clashes and on one occasion the sect had an encounter with soldiers on patrol that they tried to disarm and the soldiers had no choice than to open fire on them<sup>9</sup> which led to the killings of the sect members. Mohammed Yusuf persistent calls for justice for the murder of his members by the Police were not heeded. The sect members who had grown far more popular and with large follower across the northern Nigeria and neighbouring countries and always moving in teams captured and slaughtered a police officer to revenge the death of their colleagues. July 2009 became a month of bloody violence across the Northeastern Nigeria with killings and reprisal attacks from the both sides. The death of another 19 members of Boko Haram further escalated the protracted conflicts that started since the withdrawal of Boko Haram members led by Buji Fai the Commissioner of Religious Affairs in early part of 2007. Observers said there was large procession of the members following the corpses of some dead members to burial ground when they were suddenly stopped by armed policemen who arrested some members for ridding motor-bike without crash helmets. This triggered the conflicts which led to the death of the 19 members. Yusuf was said to have gone to different



arms of security to report the incidence and demanded for justice for the death of his members but was ignored.

As a reaction to the perceived injustices the sect went to prisons and police stations, setting free their arrested members. This became a serious concern to the then President Umar Yar'Adua, who setup a combined joint military and police task force code named *Operation Flush* to hunt for, and arrest Mohammed Yusuf and the other leaders, and restore peace. Part of the strategies of restoring order and peace were the elimination of Yusuf Mohammed and some members of the sect. This accounted for the five days brutal bloodletting with Boko Haram having field days. After five days of deadly violence which left more than 800 dead, Yusuf Mohammed was arrested alive by the military who interrogated him and handed him over to Police Officers. But in a dramatic event that followed, the police paraded Muhammad Yusuf's corps with bullet injuries all over his body on Friday July 31, 2009 to the press and the public. The combined task force did not stop at this, but demolished the houses and schools belonging to the sect while in the process crushed and buried sect members under the rubbles. The same actions were replicated in the remaining five states of northeastern Nigeria where the sect has its strongholds. The vestige who escaped the onslaught, went underground to ponder on their miscalculations and failures, took time to heal their wounds, re-grouped - but haven learnt a bitter lesson of been too overt, vowed never to let what happened to them repeated again. The group therefore chose to remain underground with another leader named and who has since transformed Boko Haram into most vicious sect in Nigeria history.

The new leader Sheik Abubakar Shekau was Yusuf Mohammed's deputy; an introvert who was always studying and writing. He was also known to be more devoted and modest than everyone; always found in cheap clothing, never accepted to drive a car but preferred to be on motorbike, if he must ride one. In one of his posts in YouTube after taken over as the new leader, he said "Truly, God defends those who believe. Verily, God likes not any treacherous ingrate. Permission to



fight is given to those who are fought against because they have been wronged, and, surely, God is able to give them victory, those who were expelled from their homes unjustly only because they said, Our Lord is God.” With this philosophical statement, cited from Qur’an (22:39) the group after six months of being underground came out in January 2010 to test their arsenal with the killing of four people on the street of Maiduguri and went back underground to come out again on September 7 to revenge according to Shekau, the injustice melted against its organization. Their targets of revenge according to the video released, which we shall be dealing with later in this chapter, are in three categories. They are President of Nigeria who the sect promised more trouble time ahead, the Christian Association of Nigeria for its use of violent abusive language against the sect and lastly are individual Christians or Muslims or media who exposed or betrayed them. “The Nigerian state and Christians are our enemies and we will be launching attacks on the Nigerian state and its security apparatus as well as churches until we achieve our goal of establishing an Islamic state in place of the secular state”.<sup>10</sup> This is the background of Boko Haram sect members who since September 2010 had with precision and audacity carried out attacks on Police formations, Army Barracks, Churches, United Nation Building Abuja and recreation Centres making real their promises.

This chapter which is on “Boko Haram’s tactics, target and arsenals” is based on qualitative methodology with case study strategy in analysis, while relying on verifiable secondary information for it data. The chapter is in three parts; part one is the introduction and background of the sect, part two looks at the concept of terrorism which is the basic propaganda of the sect’s *modus operandi* that includes their tactics, targets and arsenals being used, while part three is the conclusion. s

### **Boko Haram’s Tactics**

Boko Haram like other terrorists groups relies on public intimidation of inciting widespread public fear that is beyond its major objectives; this tactic the sect has used in different forms to achieve its goals.



Boko Haram members are conscious of their relatively few numbers of members; this ordinarily should put them in an asymmetric position against the Nigeria State with multiple superiorities, and conventionally a stronger side. But this notwithstanding, the sect too is conscious of the fact that the state has its own inherent, organic, generic vulnerabilities that are often inevitable by-products of its main strengths and these are not minor or temporary flaws that could be quickly fixed<sup>11</sup>. This gave the sect the leverage. The group knows these flaws in their own strength and their inherent weaknesses that would not be able to match the state man to man, or arms to arms. But because they are conscious of the weakness of the state too, they have been able to turn their weaknesses to strength and reverse the asymmetric status of the state into bottom-up reversal by turning the state to a reactive organ while dictating the tune.

First, the group recruited and sent members to other cells in the Sahara region for military training based on the narratives of “the injustice meted against it”. Accordingly, to get the sympathy of the Islamic radicals and to justify its subsequent actions, the group embarked on the just war narrative that, “permission to fight is given to those who are fought against because they have been wrong, and surely, God is able to give victory. Those who have been expelled from their home unjustly, only because they said, Our Lord is God”.<sup>12</sup> From this moment networks of independent cells that have no direct contact to the leadership were setup. This is important as it removed the barrier in the bid of each cell’s desire to inflict indiscriminate casualties. These individual networks maybe less technically sophisticated or competent, they are however capable of having greater freedom and independence in tactical decisions than traditional terrorist cells.<sup>13</sup>

Secondly the most significant step taken was the sending of their members for tactical trainings both militarily, in the science of making bombs and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Mali and Somalia. After the returned of Boko Haram member from trainings, the sect was able to make Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). This boosted the sect’s capability in the act of manufacturing and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The



sect thus proliferated the factories all over their operation bases. The Algeria's Deputy Foreign Minister, Abd-el-Kader Messahel confirmed this when he was quoted that there was strong coordination between Boko Haram and the Algeria-based north African branch of Al Qaeda. "We have no doubts that coordination exists between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda. The way both groups operate and intelligence report shows that there is cooperation".<sup>14</sup>

Thirdly having acquired the required trainings, Boko Haram declared holy war against the Nigeria government, the security arms and their formations and all perceived collaborators. Thus marked, the beginning of making real their political ideology on governance system based strictly on shari'a law and terrorist attacks on people causing the populace to live in perpetual fear of unknown. Residents could no longer predict any safe haven; this was compounded by the ease with which the sect members carried out attacks on police stations and army formation using such weapons like Molotov cocktails, arson, and motorcycle drive-by - shootings that targeted police, military personnel, and civilians. By this tactic, the sect made people to feel extremely vulnerable and thus helped in creating in their mind extreme phobia.

Fourthly is the use of communication as a tactic which is what terrorism as an ideology embodied. The essence is to attract attentions through their act of violence, and subsequently continue to set agenda both for the press and their targets. As an act of communication, Boko Haram employed both verbal and nonverbal means. The verbal communication employed include using recorded video messages which were often posted on YouTube, and granting telephone interviews through safe lines or trusted channels. Video of martyrs before their operation were shown as form of the sect's capability to inflict terror and also for the potential recruits for martyrdom. The nonverbal communications were in the form threats of attacks, and attacks carried out to create panic or fear with the intention of making the system ungovernable. The rich Media environments have been able to support them with free





advertisements thus helping in the sect's narratives with different kind of framings which in the end helped in their propagandas.

The fifth tactics used by the sect is psychological warfare. Conscious of their disadvantages in prosecution of conventional war as a result it lacks in the military sophistication and the financial muscles which could not match that of the state, it thus embarked on the weapon of the weak, terrorism. Terrorists use as its tool, 'guerilla tactics' in the process of constant attrition, especially when they recorded heavy casualty, rather than resembling the victories and defeats of symmetrically-based wars in which technical sophistication levels and resources, to a degree, matched.<sup>15</sup> However the most important aspect of Boko Haram successful strategy is the ability to determine the theatre war asymmetrically, while giving the Nigeria Government and other 'enemies' no choice than to be reactive opponents. Through this effort, the sect members have been able to redeem their short coming where they are disadvantaged. This strategy perfectly worked for the sect; and succeeded in dictating the tune to Nigeria security agents.

Sixth Boko Haram members have succeeded in employing the use of psychology and fear. They deliberately created an atmosphere of fear and anxiety through their terrorist acts, Boko Haram makes citizens live in perpetual fear of unknown through social vulnerability. For example a bomb explosion at polling unit near an open market shortly after the accreditation of voters began in Maiduguri, Borno state on the April 9, 2011 or the bombing attack on the All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger state on July 10, 2011 were all meant to create sense of fear for voters who were about carrying out their civic responsibilities and Christians. The attacks on Churches were to psychologically pressure the Christian denomination for retaliation and attack on Muslims respectively and to create in the mind of people the vulnerability of places of worship while at the same time instigating reprisal attacks from the Christian community against Muslim community. This was exactly what happened in Kaduna on June 17, 2012 when Christian



Youths took to the street with reprisal attacks on the Muslims. The essence of this strategy is to create fear and despondency amongst the population which could further instigate citizens' reaction against the government by making the State look as if incapable of protecting its citizen and has no monopoly to weapon of violence any longer.

Seven, suicide bombing is unarguably the most potent tactic employed by terrorist groups which portrayed their fanatical sense of commitment to a cause. Its effectiveness is beyond imagination and this is so because the attacks unlike other terrorist operations are less complicated and compromising. The attackers do not build any form of escape plan into its strategy because of their willingness at sacrificing themselves in order to get at their targets. If attacker succeeded in detonating the bomb, there is no assailant to be arrested. For this reason, terrorists have found suicide bombing very attractive and more advantageous in operation compared with other psychological weapons. "Suicide tactics are devastatingly effective, lethally efficient, have a greater likelihood of success, and are relatively inexpensive and generally easier to execute than other attack modes".<sup>16</sup> Suicide terrorism is different from other forms of terrorist operation in a major sense that the perpetrator's own death is required for the attack to succeed.<sup>17</sup>

Boko Haram in order to induce fear and psychological paralysis into Nigeria population, and in-line with concept of martyrdom, successfully carried out series of suicide bombings. One of the most audacious and most daring of such was the bombing of Nigeria Police Force Headquarters. In an article titled "Two died in Abuja bombing", Yusuf Alli and Sanni Ologun gave account of how a bomb went off at Louis Edet House, the headquarters of the police – a few kilometers from Aso Villa, the seat of power. Police said a lone suicide bomber suspected to be Boko Haram religious fundamentalist groups, carried out the act.<sup>18</sup> It further reported that seventy three vehicles were burnt in that single attack. To further prove its capacity as a master of the game, and in an attempt to tighten its "existing links with al-Qaeda in the Maghreb"<sup>19</sup>



Boko Haram on August 26 carried another suicide bomb attack on the United Nations building Abuja, when a suicide bomber rammed a car loaded with explosives into the gate of the building and pulled down the gate before it exploded. “A car loaded with explosives crashed into the main United Nations’ building in Nigeria’s capital and exploded Friday, killing at least 18 people in one of the deadliest assaults on the international body in a decade. A radical Muslim sect blamed for a series of attacks in the country claimed responsibility for the bombing, a major escalation of their sectarian fight against Nigeria’s weak central government... The brazen assault in a neighborhood surrounded by heavily fortified diplomatic posts represented the first suicide attack to target foreigners in oil-rich Nigeria, where locals already live in fear of the radical Boko Haram sect. The group, which has reported links to al Qaeda, wants to implement a strict version of Shariah law in the nation and is vehemently opposed to Western education and culture”.<sup>20</sup>

Most of the attacks on Churches in Jos metropolis that led to the death of hundred of worshipers were carried out using suicide tactics. “We are responsible for the suicide attack on a church in Jos and also another attack on another church in Biu,” the spokesman calling himself Abul Qaqa told reporters in the northeastern city of Maiduguri in a phone conference.<sup>21</sup> The ECWA Church Wusasa Zaira, Kaduna State as well as Christ the King Church was bombed in a coordinated attack by Boko Haram on June 17, 2012. In Wusasa suicide drove in a Honda Accord and in the process of gaining access into the church compound he was stopped by the security agent but rather than stopped he forced his vehicle towards the Church and the vehicle exploded between the main church and the children section of the church.

Apart from the suicide tactic, the sect devised other strategies of getting at their goals. These include hit-and-run operations which came inform of hurling explosives from moving vehicles into target such police posts, markets and mall; or planting explosives in busy areas or inside a parked vehicle which were remotely detonated. Direct assassination and even open warfare were carried. The most commonly used are



Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) which were assembled by the sect themselves, using materials like canes of soft drinks and vegetable oil tins as containers for IEDs. In an article in Thisday [Nigeria] Newspaper of 27 June, 2012, the Kano State Police Commissioner, Ibrahim Idris disclosed that 17 of the suspected gunmen, who attacked the police post at Dala division with explosives and gun fire on Tuesday night, were killed. Three were arrested, while the command diffused 14 improvised explosive devices planted in different locations the gunmen. The extremist who were about 30 attacked the police on duty with assault rifles and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were repelled<sup>22</sup>, the report claimed.

Boko Haram members have however been very daring on few occasions as they had equally embarked on conventional warfare strategies whereby the group drove into police posts or the Joint Task posts and engaged in fierce gun battles with security agents. Example of this as reported by Punch [Nigeria] Newspaper of January 23, 2012 was the group's attack on Kano on Friday January 20 in which over 200 people died.<sup>23</sup> Apart from these, Boko Haram members used assassination of politicians, traditional leaders who themselves are Muslims, and of some of their members, as tactics to discourage other from giving information that could give them away or as punishment for given information about them.

### **Boko Haram's Targets**

Terrorism as an art is not just for the sake of an art, it has propelling goals in focus; and for their tactics to achieve the desire goals, it must get across their desired objectives to target audience unmistakably. Most often than not, their targets are treated as victims, they are seen as people who found themselves in a wrong place at a wrong time because they are not consider as the actual target, but a victim who just happened to be a means to an end. Terrorists are equally very careful in the selection of their targets. They will for example, prefer to carry out more productive attacks than going for a more spectacular one. Going



by the above explanation, we can recognise three actors in terrorist violence and target with each interacting with one another. These are (i) the terrorists, (ii) the immediate symbolic target of the terrorist, and (iii) the eventual or overall target. The civilian killed or maimed by the terrorist bomb are not opponents in the terrorist's view; rather they are primarily incidental victims of the conflict between the terrorists and their enemy i.e. the target regime. However the significance of their 'role' is such that what happened to them and or what might happen to the potential future victims is assumed by the terrorists to influence the decision of the policy makers.<sup>24</sup>

Boko Haram like all other terrorist groups has its targets. According to Imam Shekau Abubakar, the targets are (i) President Goodluck Jonathan, who is the symbol of Government, (ii) The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) who represents the Christian body and the symbol of Western Culture, and (iii) the individuals and groups he framed as "cancer or diseases". Imam Shekau further defined the sect's enemies as the security personnel- the Police, army and their formations, whom he said have been persecuting his group and most especially for the murder of their leader Mohammed Yusuf while in police custody; and for the killing of their members and the destructions of their Centres. Their second target group are Christians whom he holds responsible for the killing of Muslims in different parts of the North during the religious and ethnic crises for the past years and then the Muslim informants and moles (*yan chun*) who helps government identified and killed its members and finally any member of the Media that misrepresents them to the public and failed to heed to warning. Since January 2010, the sect has directed its target on these categories of people.

In what appeared as one of the most audacious actions and direct assault by the sect on the Nigeria security Systems, on June 16, 2011, the group carried out a coordinated bomb attack on the police force headquarters in Abuja, the Federal Capital of Nigeria. This led to yet unknown numbers of deaths. A few months after Boko Haram further discredited Nigeria when two of its members carried out a suicide bomb attack on



the United Nations Building leaving at least twenty three people dead and many more injured. Attacking prisons and police formation all over the Northern Nigeria were frequent occurrences. On the September 7, 2010, the group attacked Bauchi prison, set free 700 inmates; and on April 1, 2011, the sect attacked a police station in the same Bauchi. And in April 22, 2011 Boko Haram sect freed 14 prisoners during a jail break in Yola, Adamawa State; and November 5, there were coordinated attacks in Yobe and Borno States that led to 67 people dead and leaving Government offices burnt and State police headquarters in ruins.

Churches as Boko Haram's direct target are rampant routine in the Northern part especially the Northeastern six flashpoint states of Yobe, Bauchi, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba and Borno and also the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. Most widely hit are Jos the Capital city of Plateau state, that has being engulf in intractable conflict since 1994, so also are Kaduna, Niger and Adamawa states. The St. Theresa's Madalla in Niger State was targeted with bomb blast came as a result of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) thrown from a moving vehicle;<sup>25</sup> while the Jos blast on 2011 Christmas Day that left hundreds of deaths in their trails all over the six Northeastern State, like the United Nations suicide bombing, were symbolic targets for Boko Haram. In taking responsibility for the attacks, Boko Haram spoke person Abul-Qaqa in a telephone in Maiduguri was quoted to have said, by the grace of God, they were responsible for all the attacks on Sunday, Christmas Day, and that it served as a revenge for the killing of Muslims in Jos during the Islamic festival, Eid-el Fitr.<sup>26</sup> Apart from these, there are catalogues of attacks targeted on Churches by Boko Haram in the different parts of Northern Nigeria where the sect reigns supreme. Boko Haram launched violent strings of attacks that targeted multiple police stations, government buildings, and civilian targets simultaneously in Kano, Nigeria on January 20, 2012 the series of attacks killed 185 people.

The last categories of people under the sect's target are the Muslims or any other person who are informants or secular elites and politicians from the Northern part of the country who are consid-



ered traitors to their cause and or those who criticized their causes. “Alhaji Abbah Anas Umar El-Kanemi, younger brother of the Shehu of Borno, Alhaji Abubakar Ibn Umar Garbai El-Kanemi, was shot dead by suspected members of the notorious Islamic fundamentalist group, Boko Haram.<sup>27</sup> Also killed were Modu Bitube a politician who was shot dead outside his house, a prominent Muslim cleric Liman Bana was equally killed so also was Zakariya Isa, a Maiduguri based Journalist with Nigeria Television authority who was accused by the sect to have been an informant to the Government. All these mentioned incidences are consistent with the sect’s primary targets. In a video released on YouTube January 12, 2012 the sect leader Imam Abubakar Shekau maintained in the video, that anybody who thinks he could hide under praying in the Mosque and be cheating while hiding under the cloak of religion, that if such a person is known, the sect will not hesitate to eliminated the person, and this position is in-line with the teaching of Qur’an. The killings will equally be justified and seen inconsistent with the sect’s salafiyya notion of apostasy (abandoning the true faith) which gave the right to view those involved as haven abandoned the faith; and thus pose more danger to Muslim community. Elimination of anybody in that group would be justified according to the sect. This leads us to arsenals being used by Boko Haram in the execution of their tactics in hitting at their targets.

### **Boko Haram’s Arsenals**

The first few months of the sect’s saw them with less sophisticated weaponries and weapons majorly looted during any of the raid conducted on the police stations whose armoury were looted and guns and grenades taken away. The sect’s arsenals then were Ak-47 rifles, Molotov cocktails, Dane Guns, bulletproof vests, machetes, swords and knives. However frequent successful raids on police posts gave them added amount of weapons. Things changed drastically in 2011 especially with proliferation of weaponry as a result of Libyan war. The porous borders



afforded Libyan rebels to trade weapons across the Sahara using the legion of weapon smugglers that abounds in the Sahara routes. Such weapons found their ways into the hand of other cells who proliferated the weapons. However most of the arsenals found their ways into sub-Sahara region after the fall of Libyan leader Momamar Ghadafi supported by Nigeria Government.

In a United nations assessment team report on the impact of the Libyan civil wars on the countries of Sahel region which including Nigeria, Niger and Chad said the governments of the countries visited indicated that, in spite of efforts to control their borders, large quantities of weapons and ammunition from Libyan stockpiles were smuggled into the Sahel region,” the report said. Such weapons include “rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, automatic rifles, ammunition, grenades, explosives (Semtex), and light anti-aircraft artillery (light caliber bi-tubes) mounted on vehicles.”<sup>28</sup> These Arsenals ultimately found their ways into the hands of Boko Haram and this would account for the level of sophistication and confidence with which the sect battled the army and other security agents. Although the report concluded that Boko Haram members concentrated its terrorist acts inside Nigeria, seven of its members were allegedly arrested while transiting through the Niger to Mali. Further more and more significant information that came out from those arrested were the possession of documents about explosives manufacturing, and contact details for known al Qaeda members. These accounts for the churning out of Improvised Explosives Devices (IEDs) that came in canes and any available Tin that now litter the Northern and Middle Belt of Nigeria. However it should be stated that no precise number could be given about the sect’s armaments.

## Conclusion

This paper deals with Boko Haram tools of terrorism i.e., its tactics, targets and arsenals. In the introduction and background we saw how Nigeria government unwittingly promoted a terror group in process of





trying to exterminate a radical group through the use of its monopoly of terror. This could be seen in the extra judicial killing of the sect's leaders at the instance of the late Nigeria President, Umaru Yar'Adua and Governor Alli Sherriff who used the Police and the army to turn their guns against their former compatriots. I discussed about how politicians always acceded to different demands made during the process of campaigning for votes, would change their positions the moment they assumed power. And how such powers acquired through the vote of the citizen could be misused to cause a lot of conflicts for the citizenries. This was the development of major fault-line that would cave-in with "finish them" order given by the late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua which led to the extra-judicial murder of Sheik Yusuf Mohammed and which propelled the jihad that is ravaging the Northern part of Nigeria and making other parts of Nigeria to live in the fear of unknown.

I equally discussed on how the murder of the Sect's leaders and members had driven the survived members of the sect underground, where they have been able to successfully connect some other terrorist cells that share their doctrine, trained and developed their capacity of terror which have been successfully unleashed on Northern Nigeria. Their targets have been symbolic, their tactics precise and their arsenals have been deadly. Their objectives of driving other religions out of existence in the Northern part of Nigeria, their rejection of secular state and their unwillingness to be ruled by a Christian president have been pursued with vigour. As an alternative they have been advocating for an Islamic systems based on Shari'a. The level of their sophistication and strategic planning underscore the general beliefs held that the sect members are majorly bunch of street urchin (*Almajaris*). The ignorance of the Nigeria government over the composition of the group and their ideology probably led to ill-advised murdered of the Yusuf Mohammed and his members. The level of members' innovation I said, in the fabrication and manufacturing of explosives clearly make it far more plausible to say that the group are bunch of intellectual. The paper equally covertly discussed Nigeria unwitting support for the crises in Libya that led to



removal of Gaddafi which has turned round to hunt Nigeria Government with the proliferation of arms and ammunitions that found their ways into the hands and armoury of Boko Haram members through the porous borders.

Lastly there is this agitating question over the wisdom in the destruction of the sect's community which could be seen from the points of structural and cultural violence emanating from the state handling of conflicts. For example how much of the conflict mapping was carried out by the Federal and State Governments and their agents as to identify the problems and the actors? Did anybody subject any of the members to rigorous questioning on why they chose to live away from the society to form their own community? Was their separation from the outside world into secluded lives a form of revolt against Nigeria structural decay and corrupt system which they abhor? Were there any forms of engagements with the sect by the government before it got to the point of mass killing? These are question begging for answers.

Terrorism is not like civil war where cease fire could be negotiated for parties to lay down weapons and talk at the whims of either parties. Nigeria government's handling of the dissent voices to say the least had always been counterproductive. Generation of rulers have developed the mentality of force (maybe as a result of long military intervention) to resolve conflicts using the Hard realist approaches which have never yielded any positive result except deaths and more deaths.

### Notes

1. Boko Haram resurrects declares total Jihad in Vanguard [Nigeria] Newspaper of August 14, 2009 That the Boko Haram is an Islamic Revolution which impact is not limited to Northern Nigeria, in fact, we are spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria, and Boko Haram is just a version of the Al Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamised which is according to the wish of Allah.

2. The Salafist are the radical Muslim ideologues whose belief is based on the strict application of Qur'an and Hadith with their outward meaning without interpret-



ing away (ta'wil) or change the meanings unless there was a necessity (daura) to so do. They see themselves as the only member of the victorious group that will be saved in the hereafter (*al-ta'ifa al-mansura, al-firqa al-najiya*).

3. Roel Meijer (ed), *Global salafism, Islam's new religious movement*, New York: Columbia University, Press, 2009,

4. 'Boko Haram: From preaching to bombing'. The *Nation Newspaper*, 23 May 2012, 4-5. Ahmad Salkida was a reporter with *Daily Trust* [Nigeria] Newspaper and worshiped in Sheik Yusuf Mohammed Mosque before he was murdered. Salkida was arrested according to him, and put in the police cell like many other arrested Boko Haram members. When Yusuf was brought in, he heard the police singing "no mercy, no mercy". Yusuf was executed by an impromptu firing squad according to the article behind Mr. Salkida's cell quoting Salkida.

5. Nuruddeen M. Abdallah. 'How Boko Haram began by Bono PDP' *Daily Trust Newspaper*, 23 November 2011. Alhaji baba I.Bashiru, the Chairman of Borno State People Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria, in an interview he granted the Media Trust published by the *Daily Trust* [Nigeria] Newspaper of November, 23 2011.

6. Tunji Ajibade. 'undoing the farce of denying Boko Haram' *African Herald Express*, 27 January 2012.

7. Yusuf Alli. 'Boko Haram not faceless, says Borno governor' *Nation Newspaper* 20 February, 2012, 2.

8. Ikechukwu Amaechi. 'Boko Haram Worse than maitasine- Gov Sherrif' *Daily Independent Newspaper* 28 August 2009. The Governor of Borno State Sherriff Ali, in an interview the Governor denied ever meeting Yusuf Mohammed whose Secretary of the movement was his Commissioner of Religious Affairs for about two-and-half years.

9 The Governor of Borno State in an interview he granted *Daily Independent* [Nigeria] Newspaper, August 28, 2009

10 . The spokesman of Boko Haram Abul Qaqa told reporters in the northeastern city of Maiduguri in a phone conference monitored by France 24 International News of June 10, 2012.



11. E. Stepanova, *Terrorism in asymmetrical conflict, ideological and structural aspects*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
12. The statement of Boko Haram leader, Sheik Shekau Abubakar's in the message he released on Youtube as translated by Dr. Aliyu U. Tilde.
13. Bruce Hoffman. *Inside terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 273-4.
14. Ndubushi, Ugah. Boko Haram Has Ties With al Qaeda, Says Algeria *Thisday Newspaper* 27 June 2012.
15. John Horgan, *The psychology of terrorism*. New York: Published by Routledge, 2005, 10-11.
16. Bruce Hoffman. *Inside terrorism* New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 132.
17. Yoram Schweitzer, *Suicide terrorism: development and main characteristics*, Journal of International Policy Institute for Counter – Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Centre, 2001, 76.
18. *The Nation Newspaper*, Friday, 17 June 2011, 4.
19. Ahmad, Salkida. The Nation [Nigeria] Newspaper, May 23, 2012 in a article culled from the Financial Times.
20. CBS world of August 26, 2011 as updated at 2:35 p.m. ET.
21. See news coverage by France 24 International News 'Boko Haram claims twin attack on Jos Churches' 10 June 2012.
22. Ibrahim Shuaibu 'Kano: Police Kill 17 Gunmen, Arrest 3 Others', *Thisday Newspaper* 27 June 2012. Thisday referred to Boko Haram or gunmen without mentioning the name of the sect on purpose; A suicide bomber attacked Thisday office on May 1, 2012. Footage of a video released on Youtube shows the office of ThisDay exploding in flames. The message in Hausa language, says: "We attacked Thisday because we will never forget or forgive anyone who abused our Prophet. The statement attacked local and international media for carrying a report that a faction of the sect was involved in the kidnapping of a British and an Italian who were killed during an unsuccessful rescue attempt in March. The statement says: "We said we have nothing to do with it, yet these media houses reported that we were responsible for the incident.
23. Punch Newspaper 'Why we bombed Kano – Boko Haram' 23 January 2012. The attack was one of the bloodiest warfare tactics the sect had ever used. It was according to the Paper triggered by the Sect's earlier warning in a letter to the Kano



State Governor, Dr. Rabi'u Kwankwaso, in August that it would attack the city if the State Security Service continued hunting its members. The group also stated in the letter that it sent a similar open letter to the late President Umar Yar'adua, security chiefs and the people of Borno State. It stated that the its warning was taken as a joke, and to make real their threat the members stormed the city and battled the securities for hours.

24 . John Horgan, *The psychology of terrorism*, 2005, 10.

25. Yusuf Alli, 'Bomb thrown from moving vehicle, says Azazi', *The Nation Newspaper* of 26 December 2011. The National Security Adviser General Andrew Azazi in a statement he gave to Media, said that the security had in a week earlier before the St. Theresa's bomb attack, recovered five Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in five Churches in Mubi, Adamawa and as a result of the sect's frustration from the proactive measure taken by the Security, the sect decided to throw the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

26 . Timothy Ola, 'Xmas bombing: Why we did it Boko Haram' *The Sun Newspaper* of Wednesday, 28 December 2011. Abdul-Qaka is pseudo-name of the spoke person for Boko Haram who is a ranking member of the 30man decision making body of the sect.

27. *Thisday Newspaper* 1 June 2011. Alhaji Abbah Anas Umar El- Knamei was a member of the ruling house and as an employee of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), he was seen as an informant to the Security.

28. Louis Charbonneau, 'Arms from Libya could reach Boko Haram, al Qaeda : *United Nations (Reuters)*, 26, January 2012 5:16pm EST.



## **RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM: CAUSES, IMPACT AND COUNTER STRATEGY**

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### **Introduction**

The role of religion in politics, with specific reference to fundamentalism/extremism, received renewed interest in the aftermath of 9/11, during which the influence of religion as a motivating factor for terrorism was questioned. In the previous discussion the primary aim was to detach the audience from the emotion associated with a topic such as religion and rather to rationally identify the characteristics, development and potential threat of fundamentalist/extremist movements to national, regional and international stability. Fundamentalism and extremism extends beyond any particular religion, geographic position, political dispensation or social class. In essence the character and impact of fundamentalist/extremist ideas are located in the nexus of moral and social issues found within interaction between the state and society that ultimately might have a political outcome and even an impact on security. Despite the 'worst case scenario' the primary objective of fundamentalist/extremist doctrines are to provide their followers with spiritual and moral support and guidance during periods of change. It is an indisputable fact that religious groups have considerable impact on socio-political issues: Religion could be used as a vehicle or ideology of the opposition and could also be used as a basis of protecting the spiritual and even material interests of a particular community. Within Africa, as in other parts of the world, the development of religious fundamentalist/extremist movements were the result of socio-economic conditions, in particular state centralization and



urbanization in an attempt of ordinary people to come to terms with these often-dramatic changes.

It might be accurate to assume that we, as human beings, believe in God or another higher power that not only explain our existence, our purpose in this life but also a power to whom we need to account to. Left, as a guide is religious texts that were written during different periods of time and by different authors. Although texts might vary, all religious share a few basic principles: Our relation to God and our relation to other human beings. Due to the fact that texts (particular reference to Christianity, Islam and Judaism) were written in different periods of time under different circumstances, these texts are open for our interpretation, to apply these texts to our daily circumstances. It is exactly with this interpretation, in the hand of fallible human beings that led to the reason that we discuss this topic: Religious extremism and terrorism. Religious texts can be quoted and manipulated by men and women to suit their argument and or circumstances, justifying their conviction and actions. Whether this interpretation is really the will of God, go beyond the focus of this paper and presentation. The essential principle of this discussion is that we as human beings constantly interpret the message and will of God often for our own personal (and selfish) gain. In the following discussion the following inter-related topics would be briefly addressed:

- Differences between fundamentalism and extremism;
- Some of the causes that internally and externally motivate individuals to become victims of fundamentalism and extremism;
- The impact or consequences of extremism; and
- How governments and their security forces could react or rather what strategy not to implement to prevent and combat extremism.

## **Fundamentalism and Extremism: Two sides of the same coin?**

Essential to this discussion is the need to distinguish between the following three concepts: fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism.



These three concepts are not synonyms of each other as will be presented in the following discussion.

### **Fundamentalism**

Fundamentalism in the Oxford dictionary<sup>1</sup> is described as “the strict maintenance of the ancient or fundamental doctrines of any religion or ideology”, while extremism refers to “a person who holds extreme political and religious views”. Religious fundamentalists are not confined to any particular faith or country, or to the poor and uneducated.

Jeffrey K. Hadden<sup>2</sup> has identified four types of fundamentalism:

- *Theological fundamentalism* or a theological movement concerned with defending the traditional religious doctrine against modern thinking.
- *Political fundamentalism* is a combination of theological fundamentalism and the personal commitments of religious adherents to combat worldly vices.
- *Cultural fundamentalism* – above-mentioned two types of fundamentalism melted together to combine a caricature of culturally unenlightened individuals who are focussed on preserving tradition at the expense of progress.
- *Global fundamentalism* - The political activity engaged in by fundamentalists invited comparison to other religiously motivated groups around the world. Accordingly, as a phenomenon it denotes many religiously motivated politically active groups existing in a variety of religious traditions and political systems.


Although internal influences such as the cultural, economic and political environment could stimulate fundamentalism in both Christianity and Islam, the process radicalization or the move from fundamentalism to extremism that could ultimately include the resort to violence is considered to be more complex. Eric Sharpe<sup>3</sup> in a study conducted on the





development of fundamentalist movements identified three phases during which fundamentalism/extremism develop:

- Social change produces cultural tension among members of society. The first is that of *rejection*, when traditionally accepted authority is challenged.
- The cultural tension produces an attempt to accommodate, leading to distortion and change in social patterns, causing social disruption. In the second phase, *adaptation*, an attempt is made to accommodate the old philosophy with the new.
- The third phase, *reaction*, is when fundamentalist practice arises. As a response to cultural tension, fundamentalism/extremism emerges in the form of an orthodox restatement of cultural patterns. This is spread through evangelism, often through the office of one or more charismatic figures.





This process can be better illustrated in the following graphic presentation:

It is important to recognise that conceptually, “fundamentalism” has a different meaning in Islam, especially since all Muslims refer to themselves as fundamentalists in practicing their religion. It is in particular this misuse of the term in the media that contributed to the formation of perceptions within the West. In other words, the concept “fundamentalism” within Christianity has a total different connotation, referring to “anti-modernist, with a rather narrow and literal interpretation of the Bible and a strong emphasis upon traditional Christian ethics.”<sup>4</sup>

Although it often is difficult to precisely indicate when fundamentalism flows over into extremism, fundamentalism could be classified as a personal belief, while extremism based on fundamentalist ideals resort to an external action, in particular when fundamentalists intervene in the political process to ensure that society is forced to conform to the behaviours their worldview requires. The belief that they are right, without any question, justifies, in their own minds, taking upon themselves the right to impose their point of view, by force if necessary<sup>5</sup>.

### Causes

Fundamentalism is often a response to the loss of traditional influence or status. The key to understanding fundamentalist movements lies in the careful investigation of their history combined with an analysis of the specific contemporary conditions that bring about their emergence at particular times. In essence, a majority of these movements are a consequence of change. For example, when a group in society perceives itself as having its power and authority usurped in the course of social change, the group comes to blame both internal and external causes for its fall from power<sup>6</sup>.

- Internally, the group may blame itself for its decline. Its leaders often point to internal decadence as the principal reason. They



accuse members of society of becoming weak and indecisive to the point where they let others oppress them.

- Externally, the group target the “other”, and identifies it as an oppressor, or the reason for everything on all levels of existence that might ‘have gone wrong’. Usually the movement advocates resistance, including violent resistance against the “oppressor”. The core operations of the fundamentalist/extremist movement may vary, ranging from acts of terrorism and other forms of violence (illegal dissent) to more peaceful protests and non-violent action (legal dissent).

According to Stuart Sim<sup>7</sup> “fundamentalism in America was a response to liberalising trends in modern life...about how to preserve their faith in a rapidly changing world, where humanism was beginning to chip away at their religious ethos.” In other words, while Christian fundamental movements seldom develop into political movements, aimed at the creation of a theocracy – the opposite is the case in Islam (more defined relationship between state and religion).

Fundamentalism, revivalism, extremism etc. are more likely to experience an upsurge anywhere people perceive the need to fight a godless, secular culture - even if they (in the mind of fundamentalists/extremists) have departed from the orthodoxy. In fact, what fundamentalists everywhere have in common is the ability to adopt their messages to fit the times. In other words, fundamentalists see themselves as the guardians of the truth, usually to the exclusion of others’ interpretation. Although all religions (formal identified as well as sects) and its religious texts are open for interpretation - that in essence makes it vulnerable to ‘misinterpretation’ by individuals and groups that need acceptance or justification for its actions or activities.

Members of fundamentalist/extremist movements see themselves as saviours of society. Enabling them to justify almost any action, however extreme, even personal sacrifice, however great, for their cause. In other words there is a tendency to see the world in black and



white terms. People are clearly categorized as enemies or friends. In Islam for example (although developed in another historical context) the world is divided in the world/realm of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) and the world/realm of war/unbelief (*dar al-harb*) explaining the constant battle against both with the objective to redeem the former. Historically, although conquests have been conducted in military terms, the primary focus of above-mentioned objective was to redeem the world of unbelief (primary focus on non-Christians and Jews) through missionary work.

As mentioned in the preceding introduction, a misconception exists that fundamentalism flourishes under the poor and uneducated. To a large extent it is true that fundamentalists will target those who has nothing to loose – but more often the recruits come from the educated unemployed or underemployed, or from employed professionals in the applied sciences, (areas of specialization) who have realized that education is not a way out of often very desperate circumstances. Other external causes that can lead to a call to fundamentalism and ultimately extremism include: Political marginalization and exclusion, accumulated with poor socio-economic conditions, inequality, marginalization motivated by nationalistic, ethnic, cultural or other motivations, international political developments etc. It is important to note that only the perception of these conditions is sufficient to ‘drive’ individuals and communities to fundamentalism, isolation and extremism.

### **Extremism**

“Extreme” comes from the Latin word *extremus*, meaning “the outermost” or “last”. In other words an extremist could be described as excessive and outermost in his views and actions. From the outset it must be stated clearly that extremism per se does not necessarily have a negative meaning. The focus of the following discussion will however be on the ‘negative’ meaning, especially in a context where a country’s stability and social fabric is at stake. An extremist could be defined as: “a person who advocates the use of force or violence; advocates



supremacist (an ideology, quality, state of being, or position of being superior to all others in something) causes based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or national origin; or otherwise engages to illegally deprive individuals or groups or their civil rights.<sup>8</sup>”

Extremism can therefore be defined as a way of thinking by which extreme views and measures are advocated that go beyond the boundaries of moderation and exceed what is viewed by the middle ground/modernists as reasonable. Although not all extremists will turn to violence, the resort to violence becomes highly likely. In reality the selective use of religious texts are used to justify the use of violence, contribution to a situation in which an ideology is created. Equally a distinction should be made between concepts such as extremism, radical, militant, etc. to differentiate between the moderate practice of the religion and individuals and groups that resort to violence in the name of Islam: “To the radical and militant Islamic groups the reformist vision centres on a program of rigorous moral reform enforced in unbelievers by a government of the ‘chosen’, laying down rules and laws as to how life should be lived.”<sup>9</sup>”

Religious terrorism could broadly be described as the use of terrorism for a religious purpose. Acts of religious terrorism are predominately committed from the belief that they are sanctioned to restore ‘good’ based on their own principles to separate ‘good’ from ‘evil’. The manifestation of this phenomenon and its symbolism varies from religion to religion and culture to culture. Despite these variations, previous acts of terrorism suggested that religious motivated groups are more lethal, especially since religion is used to legitimize or justify the use of violence. Bruce Hoffman identified the following ‘core characteristics of religious terrorism’<sup>10</sup>:

- View on violence – “For religious terrorist, violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand and imperative.<sup>11</sup>” Explaining the resort to indiscriminate killing in contrast to other forms of terrorism.



- Religious sanctioning of violence therefore legitimizing the use of force – Victims targeted by religious terrorists are often portrayed as not human (through name calling such as ‘infidels’ etc.)
- Absence of a ‘constituency’ – “leads to a sanctioning of almost limitless violence against a virtually open-ended category of targets: that is, anyone who is not a member of the terrorists’ religion or religious sect.”
- Perception of themselves and the role of violence – “Where secular terrorists regard violence either as a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good or as a means to foment the creation of a new system, religious terrorists see themselves not as components of a system worth preserving but as ‘outsiders’ seeking fundamental changes in the existing order. This sense of alienation also enables the religious terrorist to contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than secular terrorists...”<sup>12</sup>

It is equally important to differentiate between the leaders and the followers of those becoming involved in extremism. Without providing an in depth study, leaders are often:

- Charismatic;
- Educated;
- Ability to manipulate; and
- Able to exploit and adapt to conditions.

While followers often have a personal motivation or reason for becoming involved. This emotional connotation and believe in the cause under the ‘control’ of a leader often make these individuals replaceable foot soldiers.



## Christian Extremism

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda could be used as an example where Christian principles, in particular the Ten Commandments and traditional beliefs were used to justify acts of terrorism and acts of violence directed against unarmed civilians. The Lord's Resistance Army grew out of an earlier rebel militia called the Holy Spirit Movement. A peasant woman, Alice Lakwena, who claimed to channel spirits, founded the Movement. In 1986, she gathered thousands of soldiers from the Acholi tribe in northern Uganda for what she declared to be a war against evil. According to them the greatest evil in the land was the government run by ethnic southerners in Kampala. After initial success Alice's army was defeated, whereupon she fled to Kenya in late 1987 and took up residence in a refugee camp. In her absence, a former altar boy named Joseph Kony<sup>13</sup> claimed to be the new medium for Lakwena.

The LRA's ostensible aim is to rule Uganda according to the biblical Ten Commandments. Although strict principles were followed in the earlier period of the conflict that included the banning of looting, rape and adultery Kony later allowed his followers to loot and burn villages, but also murder people they've attack<sup>14</sup>. Throughout the 1990s, the conflict was fuelled by tensions between Sudan and Uganda: Khartoum allowed the LRA to set up camp in southern Sudan in retaliation to Kampala's support for Sudanese insurgents. At the end of 2002, the two countries signed an agreement ending the sponsorship of insurgency in each other's countries. This meant that the Ugandan army was free to chase the LRA rebels across the border into Sudan. At the time the two countries also decided to deploy a joint monitoring team on the border to deal with allegations that both sides were resuming support for rebel groups operating in the area<sup>15</sup>.

The LRA seldom attacks any strategic target, rather preferring nocturnal hit-and-run raids on rural communities. It is also known for its brutality towards civilians and for the abduction of approximately 20 000<sup>16</sup> children. The LRA was subsequently made up largely of child abductees, who have matured over the years into adults and hardened



fighters, and are now preventing more recent recruits from leaving their ranks<sup>17</sup>.

In another example, elements within rightwing extremists in South Africa defend their objectives on the philosophy of the Israeli Identity / Israel Vision. Although based on Christian principles, the Israeli Vision has its own bible, that include its interpretation of religious texts in the Bible. In summary people are divided into two groups:

- The children of God or Adam represented by Abel and Seth after the union between Adam and Eve. Representatives of this union according to them are the white peoples of the West or the ten lost tribes of Israel that were traced to the British Isles, the United States and the Nordic people of Europe.
- The children of Satan include the offspring of Cain in the union between Satan and Eve. Followed by Ham that father of black and brown people in Africa.

“Israel Identity places strong emphasis on the historical separation between the southern kingdom of Judah, which includes the tribes of Benjamin and Levi, and the northern kingdom of Israel which includes the remaining ten tribes of Israel. According to Israel Identity, the greater part of the tribes of Benjamin and Levi mixed with the descendants of Esau. As Esau married Canaanite women – who, in turn, were the descendants of Ham – the lineage of Judea and Benjamin was mixed with the seeds of Satan. For Israel Identity most Jews of today are descendants of Judea and Benjamin, and consequently they are Satan’s children. Thus, God’s chosen people are not the Jews of today, who are ‘Satanic impostors’. God’s true chosen people are the descendants of the ten lost tribes of Israel: the white peoples of the West.”

According to Martin Schönteich and Henri Boshoff the “South African followers of Israel Identity justify their demands to bring back segregationist policies, and establish a white or Afrikaner state, as being a divine right. Radical offshoots of the Israel Identity movement in South Africa go so far to argue that they have a divine duty to prevent racial





mixing and fight for God's chosen people. Moreover, that blacks being the descendants of Satan do not possess a soul. This makes the killing of black people morally justifiable. A number of radical followers of Israel Identity have committed atrocities directed at blacks. For example:

- Barend Strydom (self proclaimed leader of the White Wolves) killed eight black people in the vicinity of Pretoria's Strydom Square in 1988.
- In 1990 two members of the *Orde van die Dood* were convicted of killing a black taxi driver. They claimed the murder was justified on biblical grounds.
- Eugene Marais was convicted of shooting and killing seven black bus passengers and injuring 27 in 1990, in retaliation for the stabbing of eight white by blacks on the same day.
- On Christmas eve 1996 three members of the *Boere Aanvals Troepe* (Boer Attack Troops) set off two bombs at a Worcester shopping centre killing four Coloured shoppers and injuring 60.
- In January 2000 Johan de Wet Kritzinger allegedly shot and killed two black commuters and wounded four others in Pretoria. Kritzinger is a follower of the White Wolves."

Interesting to note that although individual interaction – explaining philosophical similarities – between rightwing elements throughout the world, the impact and theatre of operations of these groups remained to a large extent domestic. Despite this trend, the threat of individuals and groups that justify their actions on Christian doctrines are posing an equal threat to human security than any other religion or sect.

### **Islamic extremism**

Islamic extremism associated with international and transnational terrorism, including agents of terrorism in a jihad against infidels or unbelievers, is a primary illustration of this category. Individuals and groups associated with this category of terrorism believe that God sanctions their actions, thereby freeing them from any political or moral constraints. Central to the strategy of Usama bin Laden is the



threat to consolidate local conflicts (in which Muslims are a party) throughout the world, as a unified Islamic struggle; thus hoping that it might stimulate the focus on the international brotherhood of Muslims. In other words, centralized control (transnational philosophy) but decentralized execution. Classifying the world into the traditional *dar al-Islam* (world of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (world of war, referring to territories not under Islamic rule), in the minds of extremists there exist no innocents. Unlike the al-Qa'eda network, the majority of these groups are not transnational, despite links with similar movements in neighbouring countries. Virtually all are the product of particular states or internal or regional conflicts. What they share are similar goals such as Islamizing their state and society by advocating Shari'a law as the partial or sole basis of the legal system. However, the means used vary greatly and are context specific. Although al-Qa'eda is considered to be a loose configuration of groups and individuals and although the majority of Muslims do not agree with the tactics of al-Qa'eda, even moderate Muslims confronted by the realities of the 'war against terrorism' often support the ideas of al-Qa'eda.

In retrospect, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the creation of the State of Israel, the Iranian revolution, the aftermath of the Afghan war and the impact of the Gulf War in 1991 played very important roles in the development of Islamic extremism as we have come to know it. Especially since it opened the way for extremist elements, such as Usama bin Laden that had dire consequences for stability in Africa. One can only recollect the influence from former mujahideen fighters against the Soviet Union in the development of extremist organizations in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, that were willing to resort to violence, including acts of terrorism to get their message across. Usama bin Laden and other extremist groups will use any situation, from poor socio-economic conditions, political fragmentation and, in particular, a United States attack against Iraq to their advantage. The Gulf War even provided a new cause that led to more recruitment. Indirectly, on a more psychological level, Muslims and Westerners perceived the war differently. The latter referred to the war as one of liberation, while the former were humiliated. It is, however, important to differentiate between Muslim governments and their populace. The Gulf War had



a greater immediate effect on northern African countries, in particular Muslim Arab countries, than on African countries in the south with less substantial Muslim populations. Although these countries, as part of the allies, benefited greatly in terms of economic contributions and in establishing their role in international politics, their populations regarded the surrender of Iraqi troops to United States servicemen as humiliating. Under the auspices of the ‘war against terrorism’, the United States increased its presence in the region. The fact that some governments are perceived as puppets in the hands of the United States provides legitimacy for claims to replace current governments with truly ‘Islamic’ governments. African countries, in particular countries with a predominantly Muslim population, are currently confronted with a delicate situation, ultimately challenging internal stability in the medium and long term. Although these countries are committed to assist the United States in its war against terrorism – particularly motivated by previous experiences with terrorism but also as a result of their dependence on US military and humanitarian assistance – their own populations might regard this as a flirtation with the ‘enemy’, resulting in the familiar ultimatum: ‘You are either against or for us’. Either way, a loose-loose situation exists.

It is important at the outset to understand the inner dynamics of extremism, especially its development into national and international security risks. Extremist groups first adapted to the internal conditions of their particular countries. Most often a small group would exploit economic hardship and convert it into a semi-religious ideology. This ideology would then be transformed into a political agenda. As with the Algerian experience, the inability of the current regime to accept possible defeat will justify a military or subversive campaign as a means to attain power. This scenario provides two lessons:

- Any counter-terrorism strategy should focus on the original stimuli, implying that until individual states and the international community address social and economic conditions that lead to marginalisation, terrorism will continue to be a threat to national, regional and international security.



- Terrorism cannot be countered, combated or prevented by force or military means.

Algeria and Egypt are the best examples of exporting ‘domestic’ terrorism to a transnational network. For example, according to Jane’s Defence Weekly, approximately 2,800 Algerians were trained in al-Qa’eda training camps in Afghanistan, making Algeria the third biggest contributor of foot soldiers after Saudi Arabia and Yemen.<sup>18</sup> As with Egyptian nationals, Algerians – as a result of tough counter-terrorism strategies in reaction to a period that could be categorized as a ‘civil war’ – fled to countries in Europe or Afghanistan, Chechnya and Pakistan. This trend proved to be correct in the number of arrests made in which Algerians were suspects in the aftermath of 9/11.

In contrast to public perception, transnational terrorism, as we came to know it today developed from ‘domestic’ terrorism. Central to this development are the following characteristics:

- There has been a basic change from small groups of professional terrorists to amorphous groups. These decentralized groups are predominantly motivated by an extremist philosophy that provides a concept or idea rather than a well-defined organization.
- Often organized in small local groups around a charismatic leader.
- Despite being loosely knit, these groups have a global scope.

But why the shift from a conflict directed against domestic governments towards a ‘global jihad’? The answer to this question might differ from person to person, but to explain it in a simplified manner, ‘domestic’ conflicts are often presented as part of a broader struggle between good and evil (with the West, in particular the United States, presented as the greatest evil).

Equally hard-handed approaches on the part of governments not only drive extremists to other ‘unexpected’ Western countries, but also provide an opportunity for extremists of different nationalities to communicate and consolidate forces. Since 2001, the US administration advised African countries to curb down on Islamic groups. As a result



several African governments have used the war on terrorism as an excuse to direct their attention against legal opposition groups:

- In countries with a Muslim majority, the formation of political parties based on religious principles are not permitted that directly impact on political reform and representation. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt for example come to mind in which one could question if the Muslim Brotherhood are prevented from political participation to ensure regime security or whether this step really prevent and combat terrorism? If the focus is on the latter political exclusion rather have a counter effect in that it stimulate radicalization.
- In countries with a Muslim minority, suspicion on the part of governments and security forces often manifest in arrests influenced by racial profiling. Another source of radicalization.

A belief was thus introduced amongst Muslims that they would never be in a position to practice their faith freely or introduce a legitimate government.

Prior to 9/11 terror groups were perceived as comprising of hundreds of radical Islamic organisations operating around the world, all individual and distinct from each other. Usama bin Laden proved that it is possible to co-ordinate devastating acts of terrorism using this decentralized system. This global network tied Islamic groups together in a loose coalition of organisations and sympathetic individuals from all over the Muslim world, including financiers and aid donors, government officials and diplomats, former and possibly current military officers, intelligence agents, former and current guerrilla and militant groups, information technology specialists and operational commanders and ordinary supporters.

Focussing on the reach of Usama bin Laden's influence in Africa, Kenya and Tanzania already serve as examples of his capabilities. Other countries include Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Uganda, Sudan, Congo and Guinea-



Bissau, all of which only serve as part of a network that includes more than 60 countries. African and Asian nationals also established networks in Europe and the Middle East, including Belgium, Switzerland, Turkey, Bangladesh, Romania, Yemen and Syria.<sup>19</sup> According to Rohan Gunaratna's book *Inside Al-Qa'eda*, al-Qa'eda has established links with a number of Islamic political parties, terrorist groups and key individuals in central and southern Africa. In addition to the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the CIA managed to prevent the bombing of the US embassy in Kampala, Uganda on 18 September 1998. The bombings in Kenya and Tanzania had been planned since 1994 when al-Qa'eda first established a presence in Nairobi and Mombassa. Usama bin Laden was approached with photographs and sketches on account of his knowledge of civil engineering to identify the path of entry of the explosives van into the embassy. The operation was originally planned for 1996 but was delayed. In addition to southern and eastern Africa, Usama bin Laden also planned to make inroads into central and western Africa. Plans were set in motion for further attacks against US embassies as a means to politicise and radicalise African Muslims in the hope of provoking anti-Muslim backlashes. Al-Qa'eda and the National Islamic Front (NIF) of Sudan also launched long-term plans to penetrate Muslim communities in sub-Saharan Africa by infiltrating NGOs. According to intelligence sources, 90 per cent of the international Islamic NGOs operating in Uganda were either established or operated by Arabs with funding from the Middle East. Often those who funded and managed these NGOs in individual countries did not know what was happening in the outreach offices.<sup>20</sup>

In June 2002 al-Qa'eda officials made attempts to unify the various Islamic groups in Algeria. According to both organisations, the Salafi Group enjoys good relations with al-Qa'eda. This relationship was formalized on 23 January 2007 when the GSPC changed its name to the al-Qa'eda Organisation for the Countries of the Arab Maghreb. Through this step al-Qa'eda – Maghreb incorporates jihadists from Algerian, Moroccan, Libyan, Tunisian and Mauritanian and is therefore no longer an Algerian organization, but rather a transnational terror



organization. In reaction to this development Interior Minister Dahou Ould Kabilya announced during a visit to Tunisia that the Algeria-based group “has been almost totally eradicated and no longer poses a serious threat”. This statement was made notwithstanding the fact that security forces near Tunis had killed fourteen members of the group in December and January on suspicion that the group had been planning a terrorist attack.<sup>21</sup> In addition to this incident the impact of the former GSPC and now al-Qa’eda Organisation for the Countries of the Arab Maghreb extends well beyond Algeria.

### **Cults**

Religion as an instrument to justify acts of violence is not limited to Christianity and Islam. Africa is also the home of traditional belief systems that could be used as a source of justification of violence. In Nigeria the Alusi Okija serves as an example: In August 2004 police in eastern Nigeria discovered more than 50 corpses ranging from businessmen to civil servants who had been poisoned. Alusi Okija takes its name from a local oracle god and the town and is an ancient sect of the area’s ethnic Ibo people. Although few details of the cult are available, the cult practices the ritual of swallowing poisons to test guilt. The practice was originally intended to deter crime but has become a way for priests and their collaborators to kill and defraud people. After the poisoning ritual, the community hands the body, money and property of the deceased to the priests<sup>22</sup>.

Although the geographical influence of cults is relatively limited in comparison to the larger, more traditional religions such as Christianity and Islam, its resolve to resort to extreme tactics is well recorded. One could immediately recall the release of deadly nerve gas on the Tokyo underground in March 1995 by Aum Shinrikyo. In both African and Asian countries sects or traditional beliefs could easily tap into traditional fascination with the mystical that combine the spiritual with the supernatural. In comparison to sects in the United States and Japan, sects/cults in Africa proved to discriminately direct their acts, resorting to available means and not Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).



### **Impact of fundamentalism and extremism**

Fundamentalism strives to change the world through evangelistic promulgation of its belief structure. Therefore social action, beyond the adherence of religious principles, is a regular feature of the behaviour of movement members. Activities might range from the distribution of information, political participation, to active or passive social resistance within the boundaries of the law, to violent struggle. It is at this point where the actions of fundamentalist religious revival groups often go through a metamorphosis to extremism. These groups might also develop into a religio-political movement - merging religion and politics. The formation of an extremist religious ideology might then be used to justify its actions.<sup>23</sup>

Elements of fundamentalist thinking can be seen in almost all struggles - armed and peaceful - against opposing governmental forces. For example, fundamentalist Christian movements in the United States developed into extreme social action as a result of legislation legalizing abortion. Contributing to a change in strategy from 'peaceful' protests to a more violent strategy, ranging from assaults on physicians performing abortions to the bombings of abortion clinics.

Extremism can have devastating consequences. In addition to the possibility of violence, society is not only divided between different religions, separation is also made between followers of the same religion. As a result of isolation classifications are made between 'us' versus 'them', two camps that is not only difficult to identify it is also open-ended in which even believers of the same religion can be categorized as an 'unbeliever'.

A definite threat of individuals and groups associated with religious fundamentalism/extremism is the willingness to die for their cause, or becoming martyrs. Although this cannot be considered the norm, this possibility always exists. In addition, related to this threat the narrow perception of the world divided by two opposing sides itself could become a threat to human and state security. First of all, fundamentalism/





extremism often justifies hatred, often to endorse the use of violence. The idea that God hates the ‘enemy’ not only makes the use of violence ‘acceptable’, it on a subconscious level contribute to a perception that God ‘encourage’ the use of force. Explaining why a large number of religious extremist groups and individuals justify terrorism and murder as being “God’s will.”

In summary extremist groups are often in defiance of civil authority, and difficult to predict or control. They often operate on the edge of the law creating tension with the society in which they exist. As a result, it is often difficult for security forces to decide how to interact with extremists. Especially since the mere separation from society (contributing to a perception of being secretive and suspicious) at large can be regarded as threatening to public order. Although freedom of religion and expression are often protected in the constitution of the majority of countries, how individuals and organizations react to these fundamental freedoms is another question. Where should the political dispensation, in particular its security forces, draw the line between the use or misuse of religion as a threat to security and honouring it as a basic right? Often the line is drawn at violence. No matter how justified the cause of a movement, or how beneficial its activities, in most societies it will meet official resistance when it espouses violent action.

The impact of globalization, especially the influence of mass media and the Internet imply that its spread and impact could extend beyond national and cultural borders. The influence of the Internet can in particularly be seen in the growing identification and influence of smaller cells, often with devastating consequences.

### **How should government react to extremism?**

Irrespective of the religion being used, the manipulation of religion to justify the use of violence had devastating consequences in human history. Leaving us with the question: How should governments and security forces react to this threat?



Probably most important is to realize that anything possible should be done to prevent the creation of perceptions and stereotypes. The best counter measure to prevent further radicalization as a result of perceptions and stereotypes are through dialogue and education. It is equally important that the policy statements of governments and the action of its security forces in executing policy should reflect the other. Saying that the ‘war against terrorism’ is not a ‘war against Islam’ followed by racial profiling at airports is unfortunately doing more harm than good in further contributing to stereotypes and the forming of perceptions. Therefore justifying perceptions created by extremists that the world is divided between ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Leading to another principle in developing a successful counter strategy: Countering radicalization, extremism and religious terrorism can only be done through a holistic multi-layered strategy that first and foremost address the underlying reasons that led to fundamentalism and extremism on a domestic level. This strategy is not only essential to prevent further radicalization but also to limit reasons used by extremists to justify their strategy and action.

In addition to addressing the underlying causes, the actions of security forces should be driven by intelligence – targeting only those who are involved that can be proven in court. A blanketed military strategy or mass arrest campaign were never successful. As a matter of fact, these strategies often play to the advantage of the extremists in again driving those impacted by these campaigns to extremism. In summary countering terrorism could be compared to a chess game in which all parties concerned realize that its actions will have consequences, the objective – similar to a chess match – is to outmanoeuvre the opponent in adopting a strategy that will also incorporate possible tactics of the opponent in always being one step ahead.



## Conclusion

The manipulation of religion to harness support or to justify the use of violence is a historic reality. How we analyse and address the underlying issues and the manner in which ordinary people, security forces and government react will determine international success to prevent and combat terrorism. Ironically the international community has taken substantial steps to prevent the financing of terrorism, since it hoped that if funds would dry up, the threat of terrorism would diminish, while the opposite has been done to prevent the philosophical spread of al-Qa'eda's ideology. Considering that it will always be possible for terrorists to fund their activities, whether through crime or donations distributed through an informal network of supporters, but without the latter and individuals willing to commit to terrorism as a strategy it will be impossible to sustain a campaign of terrorism. Preventing and combating terrorism on a long-term will only be possible through adopting a strategic approach aimed at preventing further radicalisation, considering that al-Qa'eda will abuse any domestic situation to recruit new followers and to justify terrorism as a tactic. In other words, instead of saying that the war against terrorism is not a war against Islam it might be time to act accordingly in developing a strategy to engage with Islamic role-players that the United States in particular not always agree with. Through this the United States might be more successful in preventing being drawn into domestic power politics that often backfire. Equally instead of using a military approach, a strategy aimed at addressing the reasons behind the resort to violence and terrorism might be more effective.

The same strategy will also effectively address other forms of religious extremism – whether the *Boeremag* in South Africa or cults influenced by traditional beliefs – in making a distinction between religion and the underlying causes. Followed by a strategy addressing the underlying causes. Returning to religion under difficult circumstances is a normal reaction. This in itself should not be considered as a threat, but rather as a way in which people try to make sense of reality. Forcing people



not to use religion will equally not be effective to prevent the use and or spread of radicalization, instead it rather further open the possibility of extremists to manipulate this exclusion to their advantage.

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## LE SAHEL : CARREFOUR DE TOUS LES DANGERS<sup>1</sup>

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### Introduction

Pendant très longtemps, le Sahel et l'Afrique du nord était particulièrement concernée et affectée par le trafic et la contrebande de cannabis. Cependant, ces dernières années, une nouvelle menace s'installe dans la région avec la cocaïne, l'héroïne, la contrebande illicite de cigarettes et même le trafic humain ou esclavage des temps modernes. Tous ces trafics sont par ailleurs aggravés par la présence active de groupes narco-terroristes tel que AQMI (Al Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique), Ansar Dine (Défenseurs de la foi) ou Boko Haram (l'éducation est illicite).

Le crime organisé en Afrique de l'ouest a aujourd'hui un effet débilissant indéniable sur la région, déjà vulnérable, instable et sous-développée. L'augmentation des activités criminelles au Sahel et dans le Golfe de Guinée souligne aussi le besoin urgent d'actions afin de renforcer la souveraineté des états concernés. Car le problème, trop complexe et important pour qu'un Etat puisse l'éradiquer seul, est transnational et va au-delà des frontières nationales.

Selon l'évaluation de l'Office des Nations-Unis contre la Drogue et le Crime (UNODC) qui a conduit une mission dans la région en décembre 2011, le Sahel (particulièrement le nord du mali) est devenu un dangereux carrefour de drogue, crime, terrorisme et insurrection<sup>2</sup>. Déjà vulnérable à cause de la porosité des frontières, une situation

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1. Cette étude est sous l'entière responsabilité de l'auteur et n'engage en aucune manière l'institut d'études de sécurité.

2. Walter Kemp, As Crime in West Africa Spreads, Response Requires Regional Cooperation, <http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/231-as-crime-in-west-africa-spreads-response-requires-regional-cooperation.html>



humanitaire catastrophique, des tensions entre les Touaregs et leur gouvernement central respectif, et sa position stratégique de route de trafic de cocaïne, la région est dorénavant devenu encore plus instable à cause de la prolifération d'armes en tous genres tombés dans les mains des insurgés comme les Touaregs du MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad) ou les groupes terroristes d'AQMI, Boko Haram et MUJAO. Cette situation dramatique est en outre compliquée par les différents incidents liés aux nombreux kidnappings.

En analysant la question de sécurité et de trafic de drogue au Sahel, il est cependant pertinent d'opter pour une approche globale, holistique, sociologique et géographique afin d'avoir une meilleure compréhension des enjeux qui se jouent sous ce fléau. En effet, différentes forces et paramètres exogènes doivent être pris en compte, variant de la mafia européenne, les cartels de drogues d'Amérique du sud, des trafiquants d'opium afghans et des groupes terroristes présents au Sahel. Tous ces groupes et protagonistes sont d'une façon ou d'une autre, intimement liés dans ces trafics en tous genres qui ne cessent de croître.

Aujourd'hui, le terrorisme et le crime organisé transnational ne peuvent donc être analysés séparément car leurs coopérations ne cessent de croître. En effet, s'il y a seulement une décennie, les groupes terroristes et les trafiquants de drogue étaient perçus comme étant motivé par différents et diamétralement opposés buts, tel n'est plus le cas désormais. Alors que les terroristes avaient jusqu'à récemment une orientation politico-idéologique, les narco-trafiquants et autres criminels étaient eux, principalement attirés par l'appât du gain. Cette tendance a désormais changé. Cette étude soulève les différents acteurs et paramètres qui mettent en danger non seulement la stabilité du Sahel mais aussi les populations locales.

L'Océan sahélien<sup>3</sup>, qui s'étend de l'Océan Atlantique aux côtes somaliennes et la Mer Rouge est un vaste désert qui a travers l'histoire et les époques a été le théâtre de différentes luttes et rivalités.

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3. Cette expression est de Mehdi Taje.



De tout temps, le Sahel a en outre été un espace géographique fascinant pour beaucoup ainsi que d'importance immensément stratégique pour les états<sup>4</sup>. Cette importance géostratégique avait même poussé le missionnaire chrétien Charles de Foucauld dès 1912, a élaboré un plan proposant la réorganisation militaire et administrative de la région sahélienne<sup>5</sup>. Aujourd'hui, le Sahel est sans nul doute la plaque tournante de l'Afrique francophone mais surtout et avant tout, un espace géostratégique et lieu d'enjeux politiques et économiques dont les frontières demeurent cependant extrêmement poreuses<sup>6</sup>.

Pendant longtemps, la drogue essentiellement disponible et consommée au Sahel était le cannabis (ou hachisch) cultivé principalement au Maroc. En 2011, le revenu émanant du trafic de hachisch était estimé à USD12.5 milliards<sup>7</sup>, ce qui fait du royaume chérifien le premier producteur mondial de cannabis. Cependant, depuis plusieurs années maintenant, les drogues dites dures, comme la cocaïne et l'héroïne, ont-elles aussi fait leur apparition dans la région.

Comme souligné en introduction de cette analyse, ces récentes années, l'Afrique de l'ouest et, par ricochet, le Sahel, sont devenus un espace de transit vers l'Europe<sup>8</sup> et une plateforme pour le trafic international de drogues dures telles que l'héroïne et la cocaïne. L'une des explications à ce dangereux phénomène toxique est que la « région est moins dangereuse que les routes plus directes entre les zones de production d'Amérique latine et le continent européen qui est aussi le premier marché de consommation mondiale »<sup>9</sup>. Par ailleurs, cette recrudescence et augmentation du trafic de drogue en Afrique de l'ouest est ces dernières années aussi due à plusieurs facteurs exogènes. Selon Christina Schori Liang, la corrélation entre le terrorisme et les

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4. André Bourgeot, p. 22

5. Ibid., p. 24

6. Ibid. p. 47

7. In Christina Schori Liang

8. La distance du détroit de Gibraltar entre l'Espagne et son enclave marocaine de Ceuta est de 13 kilomètres.

9. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i4431.asp#P323\\_48989](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i4431.asp#P323_48989)





crimes organisés sont principalement le fruit de quatre développements majeurs : la mondialisation, la fin de la guerre froide, la facilitation de communication (Internet) et la lutte contre le terrorisme mondial<sup>10</sup>.

Depuis le début du 21<sup>ème</sup> siècle, les cartels de la drogue sud-américains, en particulier les colombiens, ont en effet focalisé leurs 'exportations' vers le continent européen en utilisant comme route, la côte ouest africaine et le Sahel en tant que plaque tournante. Le marché nord-américain étant au demeurant saturé et ne rapportant plus suffisamment, ils se tournèrent alors vers le marché européen. Etant donné que la voie la plus courte d'approvisionnement n'est pas nécessairement la plus sûre, ils optèrent pour la *Highway 10* (en référence au 10<sup>ème</sup> parallèle) pour pénétrer par l'Afrique de l'Ouest<sup>11</sup> (voir carte 1). Ce trafic est de plus aggravé par la présence d'héroïne et cocaïne provenant d'Afghanistan et transitant aussi par cette zone ainsi que la côte est du continent africain, en particulier, la Somalie. Les marchandises remontent, ensuite, vers l'Europe, empruntant des itinéraires clandestins à travers le Tchad, le Mali, le Niger et le Maroc<sup>12</sup> dont la porosité des frontières facilite les déplacements (voir carte 1). A titre indicatif, et selon l'Office des Nations-Unis contre la drogue et le crime (UNODC), en 2009, il est estimé que 21 tonnes de cocaïne ont transité par l'Afrique de l'ouest pour le marché européen<sup>13</sup>. Ce qui équivaut à \$900 millions pour l'économie locale, équivalant au PNB de la Guinée et de la Sierra Leone réunis<sup>14</sup>. Cette même année, 60 tonnes de haschich provenant du Maroc était aussi interceptées en Afrique du nord<sup>15</sup>. Selon ce même office onusien, en 2008, il était aussi estimé que 30-40 tonnes d'héroïne transite annuellement par l'Afrique de l'est<sup>16</sup>.

10. Op. Cit.

11. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i4431.asp#P323\\_48989](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i4431.asp#P323_48989)

12. Ibid.

13. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Transatlantic\\_cocaine\\_market.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Transatlantic_cocaine_market.pdf)

14. Walter Kemp

15. <http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/60-tonnes-de-droque-saisies-la-marchandise-a-ete-interceptee-aux-frontieres-marocaines-180058>

16. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA\\_Report\\_2010\\_low\\_res.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf)



Toutes ces tonnes de drogues finissent par arriver au Sahel afin de financer les groupes terroristes implantés dans la région, tel qu'AQMI, Boko Haram ou Al Shabab en Somalie. Ce dévoue sur le Sahel s'explique principalement par la faiblesse des états qui composent cette zone géographique, le manque flagrant de surveillance, la porosité des frontières ainsi qu'à la corruption qui gangrène les institutions des états, tel que l'armée, la douane ou la police<sup>17</sup>.

En novembre 2009, l'affaire du Boeing d'« Air Cocaïne » soulignait les énormes carences, sinon l'incurie, des gouvernements locaux. Un Boeing 727 en provenance d'Amérique du sud atterrissait en plein désert du nord du Mali sur une piste aménagée pour l'occasion. Une fois la cargaison de cocaïne déchargée, l'avion, embourbé dans le sable, ne put redécoller. Voulant pathétiquement effacer toute trace, les trafiquants mirent le feu à l'avion. Il fut ensuite établi que ce Boeing avait été loué au Venezuela, était immatriculé en Arabie Saoudite et volait sous une licence expirée et délivrée par la Guinée-Bissau<sup>18</sup>. Cette affaire qui souligne les connections et ramifications de ce trafic international souligne/indique aussi qu'un tel trafic ne peut se faire sans la complicité des locaux. Il a en effet été établi que des notables locaux étaient présents lors du déchargement de la marchandise de l'avion. Selon un diplomate français, il existe même des liens étroits entre AQMI et des membres de l'ancien gouvernement malien<sup>19</sup>.

En plus du trafic de drogue et d'armes, l'importante contrebande de cigarettes à travers le Sahel est aussi très rémunératrice pour les trafiquants de la région. Les cigarettes qui proviennent d'usines de contrefaçon, principalement du Nigeria, sont distribuées au Maghreb, au Moyen-Orient et ailleurs en Afrique. Même si les effets nocifs sur la santé des populations locales n'est pas comparable à ceux de la drogue, il n'en demeure pas moins que ce trafic est une source importante de financement pour les groupes terroristes de la région du Sahel. Ces terroristes qui ne sont pas forcément directement impliqués dans ce

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17. Voir à ce sujet Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou

18. Ibid. Voir aussi [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i4431.asp#P323\\_48989](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i4431.asp#P323_48989)

19. <http://www.grip.org/fr/siteweb/images/RAPPORTS/2012/Rapport%202012-6.pdf>, p. 29



genre de contrebande, s'enrichissent toutefois en imposant une 'garde rapprochée' rémunérée aux contrebandiers<sup>20</sup>.

Ce trafic de drogue entre l'Amérique latine et l'Europe via le hub que leur procure le Sahel est en outre aggravé par des groupes européens tels que la Camorra. En effet, il est clairement établi que la mafia italienne et Al Qaeda ont coopéré dans le passé récent afin que ce dernier profite de l'expertise de la Camorra pour, par exemple, le trafic de faux documents. Les terroristes qui frappent le continent européen profitent de ces techniques et même de la coopération active de la Camorra qui leur procure, le cas échéant, un toit<sup>21</sup>.

A travers ces coopérations, ce sont tous ces groupes qui s'entraident et bénéficient de leur expertises respectives qui pourra, dans le moyen ou long terme les transformer en groupes hybrides comme le sont actuellement les Forces Armées Révolutionnaires de Colombie (FARC). Le groupe colombien est en effet un exemple de groupe basé sur une idéologie politique qui a muté en groupe crimino-narco-terroriste. Pour la *US Drug Enforcement Agency* (DEA), 60% des groupes terroristes étrangers ont un lien avec le trafic de drogue<sup>22</sup>. Pareillement, il est estimé que 80% des chefs Talibans en Afghanistan, combattent pour le profit financier et non pour une quelconque idéologie religieuse<sup>23</sup>. *Aussi, la prépondérance et le lien entre le crime organisé et le terrorisme a aujourd'hui des répercussions gouvernementales et sociétale globales et négatives sur la sécurité, la santé et le développement des pays affectés par ce fléau.*

Afin de recycler l'argent généré par leurs trafics de drogues, les narco-trafiquants procèdent au blanchiment d'argent à travers différentes opérations plus ou moins légales. Les criminels investissent souvent cet argent sales dans des projets immobiliers ou contrats d'assurance, le plus souvent dans des pays où la législation demeure vague et les

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20. Ibid.

21. Christina Schori Liang

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.



opportunités énormes. Au Maroc et au Sénégal par exemple, le marché de l'immobilier en constante augmentation facilite l'acquisition de bien. Ce genre d'acquisition est par ailleurs difficilement détectable de par l'absence de fichier centralisé ou/et de cadastre<sup>24</sup>. Des courtiers indéliçables permettent aussi les placements d'assurance en échange de faveurs financières<sup>25</sup>.

La chute d'Al Qaddafi en Libye et l'instabilité géopolitique régnante qui s'ensuit a procuré aux terroristes et autres trafiquants une opportunité de renforcer leur position dans la région. Les hommes et Touaregs qui ont fui le pays ont rapporté avec eux de nombreuses armes et autres véhicules légers qu'ils ont pu aussi revendre aux terroristes. La situation politique au Mali<sup>26</sup> qui est en partie la conséquence de l'instabilité libyenne profite largement aux trafiquants en tous genres mais aussi met dans une situation humanitaire difficile la population locale dont les conditions de vie sont déjà catastrophiques. En effet, pendant ces périodes de rebellions, profitant du vide juridique qui s'installe, l'espace sahélien devient encore plus un lieu de trafic en tous genres comme la drogue, les cigarettes ou autres produits illégalement commercialisée<sup>27</sup>.

*Last but not least*, la présence croissante des terroristes au Sahel a déjà un impact négatif sur l'économie de la région qui n'en demandait pas autant avec une industrie du tourisme qui a dramatiquement chuté, sinon disparu. Par exemple, l'agence de voyage française Point-Afrique, qui se spécialise dans le tourisme saharien, a dû se retirer de la région après le kidnapping et l'assassinat de touristes français en Mauritanie en 2007 et au Niger en 2010<sup>28</sup>. Pareillement, dû à la menace grandissante du terrorisme, les organisateurs de la course automobile mythique du

24. Nacer Lalamp. 3

25. Ibid.

26. Depuis mars 2012, la partie nord du pays est sous l'autorité des groupes rebelles et terroristes présents dans la région.

27. Ce phénomène se retrouve aussi pendant les périodes de guerres à travers le monde entier ou une minorité profite du chaos et du manque d'autorité gouvernementale qui peut s'installer pour s'enrichir.

28. In Le Monde Diplomatique, avril 2012



Paris-Alger-Dakar ont dû depuis 2009 se résoudre à ‘délocaliser’ celle-ci qui se déroule dorénavant en Amérique du sud<sup>29</sup>.

C’est dans ce contexte dramatique que la prolifération d’armes, de drogues, de trafics de cigarettes et autres produits illicites prend racine au Sahel. Des trafiquants qui profitent de la vulnérabilité socio-économique des populations locales pour les convaincre qu’ils peuvent améliorer leur quotidien grâce aux trafics illégaux. Le désœuvrement de ces populations est sans nul doute un terreau idéal pour le développement de la criminalité qui s’est maintenant transformée dans bien des cas en narco-terrorisme en lien avec les groupes terroristes présents depuis des années dans la région.

Il est primordial ici d’analyser les raisons derrière la vulnérabilité des populations locales qui sont influencés et ensuite tombent dans l’illégalité. La pauvreté est un important facteur sur lequel les trafiquants s’appuient afin de convaincre les gens en détresse qu’ils peuvent s’enrichir rapidement à travers et grâce à la drogue. Ce lien grandissant entre les groupes terroristes et les organisations criminelles ne fait cependant que contribuer à la souffrance humaine des populations locales du Sahel et d’Afrique du nord qui n’avait nullement besoin de cela. L’«océan sahélien» est en outre, idéalement placé en ce qui concerne l’immigration clandestine vers l’Europe. En dépit des mesures pour endiguer ce phénomène et des actions de coopérations entreprises avec les gouvernements de la région, le Sahel continue d’être un lieu de passage obligé pour des milliers de migrants, et ce, malgré les risques encourus (voir carte 3).

Cette immigration illégale qui rêve encore d’un Eldorado européen est aussi très souvent lié au trafic de drogue et passeurs de clandestins qui sévissent entre le Sahel et le continent européen. Ces migrants illégaux imitent de plus en plus leurs homologues d’Amérique du sud qui émigrent vers les Etats-Unis qui transportent la drogue dans leur estomac après les avoir soigneusement ingurgités à l’aide de réservoirs

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29. Malgré son nouveau teint latino, le nom de la course n’a pas été rebaptisé et demeure toujours sous l’appellation plutôt incongrue de Paris-Dakar.



en latex. Ces mules, telles qu'elles sont dénommées sont de plus en plus nombreuses en Afrique de l'ouest. Au péril de leur vie, ces candidats à l'immigration courent un très grave danger d'intoxication ensuivie de mort dans le cas où l'une de ces boules éclaterait pendant le voyage. Les trafiquants ne sont jamais en cours d'imagination afin de déjouer la vigilance des autorités et ne reculent devant rien afin de parvenir à leurs fins. En juillet 2012, les douanes de Nador au nord du Maroc interceptaient 10 kilogrammes d'héroïne dissimulées dans 30 copies de corans<sup>30</sup>. Même le sacré ne les arrête !

Aussi, et comme le souligne Kemp, c'est en améliorant les conditions de vie de ces gens, de conduire des programmes de prévention et d'éducation et de fournir une assistance humaine et renforcer la bonne gouvernance que les trafic en tous genres en Afrique de l'ouest peuvent être combattus<sup>31</sup>. Le tout-sécuritaire ne serait qu'une solution temporaire qui ne ferait que retarder la vraie solution à ce problème dont les racines socio-politico-économiques sont profondes. La sécheresse, la famine, l'absence de sécurité alimentaire et de perspectives économiques sont autant de facteurs favorisant et incitant les populations locales à tomber dans le piège tendu par les narco-terroristes.

### Analyse

Le Sahel est plus globalement, l'Afrique de l'ouest est véritablement devenue un hub pour les trafics internationaux en tous genres. Ce territoire qui émerveillait comme un enfant l'explorateur et scientifique français, *Théodore Monod*, est en grand danger, devenant ces dernières années, « un lieu de passage privilégié pour de nombreuses filières criminelles »<sup>32</sup>. La mondialisation, la fin de la guerre froide, la facilitation de communication grâce à Internet et la lutte contre le terrorisme mondial n'ont fait qu'exaspérer la situation au Sahel où les terroristes et trafiquants ont trouvé en cette région un terreau facile et fertile pour leur activité illégales et illicites.

30. <http://oumma.com/13496/maroc-10-kgs-dheroine-caches-30-corans>; [http://nador.nadorcity.com/مصحف-30-داخل-تعينتها-عبر-الحدرات-تهريب-حاولت-أسرة-توقيف\\_a4120.html](http://nador.nadorcity.com/مصحف-30-داخل-تعينتها-عبر-الحدرات-تهريب-حاولت-أسرة-توقيف_a4120.html)

31. Op. Cit.

32. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i4431.asp#P323\\_48989](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i4431.asp#P323_48989)



Car en effet, si nous avons concentré cette étude sur le trafic de drogue et les groupes terroristes, il n'en demeure pas moins que d'autres commerces illicites tels que le trafic de déchets toxiques, de pétrole, de voitures ou de médicaments sévissent et s'enracinent au Sahel. Au-delà du fait que tous ces trafics sont d'une manière ou d'une autre liés, c'est sans nul doute et surtout les raisons et les racines derrière ce fléau qu'il est urgent de questionner afin d'y remédier. La faiblesse des institutions nationales, la misère, la pauvreté, l'injustice sociale et le manque de perspective d'avenir sont parmi les raisons qui non seulement facilitent la prolifération de tels trafics au Sahel mais aussi poussent les populations locales à tomber dans ce piège de l'argent facile et d'une hypothétique vie meilleure.

Ce que nous indique aussi cette étude, c'est qu'une coopération grandissante, entamée depuis plusieurs années s'accélère entre les groupes terroristes présents en Afrique de l'ouest et les cartels d'Amérique du sud et autres barons de la drogue africains et européens. Par ailleurs, en sus des revenus provenant des demandes de rançons qui sont souvent payés, les groupes terroristes tel qu'AQMI ont très rapidement compris l'intérêt financier qu'ils pouvaient en tirer en se rapprochant des groupes criminels et autres trafiquants de tous bords, et ce, quel que soit leur points communs, s'ils existent. A ce sujet, Mohamedou est probablement proche de la vérité lorsqu'il argumente qu'alors que les actions d'AQMI sont présentées sous l'idéologie et les idéaux religieux, le groupe est bien plus intéressé par l'appât du gain à travers ces demandes de rançons et autres activités parallèles comme le crime organisé<sup>33</sup>.

### Conclusion

La situation socio-économique et géopolitique au Sahel demeure préoccupante. En sus des conditions difficiles dans lesquelles les populations locales vivent, ces derniers sont confrontés aux trafics

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33. Op. Cit.



en tous genres ainsi qu'à la violence de ces mêmes trafiquants. La coopération entre les groupes terroristes et les trafiquants de drogues ne font que mettre en danger grandissant les populations locales.

Il est malheureusement clair que ce fléau qui ne cesse d'accroître est loin d'être éradiqué. Et si rien n'est fait, il est fort probable que ce trafic en Afrique de l'ouest se propage comme une trainée de poudre à travers tout le continent africain déjà ravagé par de nombreux conflits et problèmes socio-économiques. Ce lien qui se tisse rapidement entre les groupes terroristes et les trafiquants ne fait par ailleurs qu'affaiblir les états fragiles du Sahel tel que le Mali ou le Niger. Car ce narco-terrorisme ne se renforce qu'au sein d'institutions faibles. Dans un monde global et mondialisé, la (ou les) réponse(s) à ce fléau doivent être multiples, nationale, régionale et internationale. La coopération entre les états mais aussi entre les différentes organisations et autres institutions est une condition sine qua non pour obtenir des résultats probants. Car l'éradication totale ne serait sûrement qu'un vœu pieu. Et ce pour longtemps. Mais la solution à ce problème se trouve aussi, et principalement, dans la pauvreté et l'absence d'éducation dans laquelle la majorité des africains vit.



## Cartographie Carte 1



Les principales routes de l'immigration clandestine entre l'Afrique et l'Europe.  
Source : <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228236.stm>.

## Carte 2




Activité d'Al Qaeda au Sahel.

Source: [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i4431.asp#P323\\_48989](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i4431.asp#P323_48989).

Principales routes de cocaïne, 2008

**Carte 3**



Source: UNODC Rapport mondial sur la drogue, 2010.  
Principales routes d'héroïne originaire d'Asie, 2008.

**Carte 4**

Source: UNODC Rapport mondial sur la drogue, 2010





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## TUAREG INSURGENCY IN MALI AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE SAHEL

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### Abstract

*Africa as a continent has in recent times being weighed-down by multiple forms of conflict. However, the West African State of Mali has faced Tuareg insurgency for over a decade now. This work is centred on the Tuareg insurgency in Mali and its implication on the Sahel region. It revealed that the factors which gave fillip to the insurgency include the radicalization of Islam in the North by fundamentalists, the 'Tuareg question' and the democratic crisis as well as the military coup that followed in 2012. The loss of lives, properties and the destruction of the World Heritage Sites in Timbuktu were amongst the immediate impacts. More still, the multiplier effect of the insurgency on the Sahel region was highlighted. The work finally called for multidimensional approach to the counterinsurgency and peace building process in the country, especially under the leadership of the Ibrahim Boubacar Keita's government.*

### Introduction

An insurgency in politics and international relations is any kind of armed uprising against an incumbent government (Calvert, 2010:4; Desai and Eckstein, 1990). Insurgency is an organized, armed political struggle whose goal may be the seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government. In some cases, however, an insurgency's goals may be limited. For example, the insurgency may intend to break away from government control and establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or religious



territorial bounds. The insurgency may also only intend to extract limited political concessions unattainable through less violent means (US, Dept. of Army 1990). Insurgency could start as a social protest (Gamson, 1975) from a given group of people, who feel continuously marginalized in the affairs of government.

The people of Northern Mali have over the years perceived the independent Malian government as a 'southern agenda' that have sustained their marginalization. This perceived sense of marginalization began to develop the feelings of insurgency in the area. Consequently, in November, 2011, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was formed. The group continued to agitate for a sovereign state and improved government presence in the North.

In the same March, 2012; the military, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo felt that President Amadou Toumani Toure has not being efficient in managing the growing national crisis and toppled his government. Following regional pressure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as other international actors an Interim Government was created. To make matters worse, while the insurgents were fighting to sustain their stronghold in the North, clashes broke-out between the junta forces and the commandos loyal to deposed president thereby increasing national tension. In July, 2012, the Head of the Interim Government, Dioncounda Traore and former Speaker of Parliament created the National Committee on Negotiations. The committee had the primary mandate of promoting dialogue, negotiating peace and mediating between the government, the military and the insurgents on the quest for peace.

Unfortunately, due to their inability to quell the secessionist and insurgent mood of the North, the Tuareg insurgents declared the independent state of Azawad in Northern Mali in April, 2012. In May, 2012 the junta leader, Captain Sanogo accepted to renounce power, while the interim president promised to conduct a democratic election in one year time. To the chagrin of many who believed that the rise of an interim government would began create a dawn for peace building, the



conflict situation of the country was worsened on May 22, 2012 when the Interim President was beaten-up by protesters, who were not comfortable with the general situation of things in Mali as well as his deep corrupt link with the out-gone government. The departure of President Traore for treatment in France heightened the 'political vacuum' in Bamako, leading to increased advantages for the insurgents. He returned in July, 2012 after two months, but the centre can no longer hold, as the 'anarchy' of the insurgents has fallen upon the whole world of the Malian people. In January 2013, France championed a coalition of Africa-peacekeeping troops that went for a counterinsurgency operation in the country at a time the groups that made up the insurgency were gaining more territorial and strategic advantages into the Southern part of Mali, leader to the reduction of the insurgent threats that paved way for a democratic election.

### **The Background History of Tuareg Insurgency**

"Timbuktu is home to nomadic Arab tribes and another nomadic people called Tuaregs (they prefer to call themselves Kel Tamasheq). The Tuaregs are a sub-branch of the Amazigh peoples who were already there when the Arabs arrived to claim the region for Islam. The Tuareg insurgency could be traceable to the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries. It would be recalled that in the golden age of the then Mali Empire, it was the troops made up mainly of the Tuareg that recaptured Timbuktu and Walata in 1434 before it fell to Sunni Ali (Ogini, 1973:46-62). Akoda and Ogo (2013:38) wrote that Sunni Ali annexed Timbuktu in 1468, after Islamic leaders of the town requested his assistance in overthrowing marauding Tuaregs who had taken the city, following the decline of Mali (Empire). Sunni Ali notwithstanding the fact that he was a Muslim dealt harshly with the *Ulama* (Islamic scholars) in the then University of Sankore, Timbuktu, because they formed closer alliance with the Tuareg who were hostile to his government. Again, when their rebellion as well as the raids of the Mossi led to the weakening of collapse of the Songhai Empire (Onwubiko, 1967:24).



The Arabs and Tuaregs of Mali constitute between 10-15% of the total population” of Mali (Hashim, 2013). The Tuareg question has remained a fundamental factor in the growth of the insurgency in Northern Mali as well as in the coefficient of conflict and security in the Sahel region. The Tuareg nation is a widely spread semi-nomadic people who inhabit parts of present day Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria and Libya. The divide and rule policy of the francophone colonial government did not consider the need for the sovereignty of ethnically affiliated Tuaregs and the Arabs in the above countries. Hence after independence in 1960, the Tuareg micro nationalism began to grow. Hence, from 1962-1964, the Alfellaga (a name that is popularly used to represent the first Tuareg insurgency) was experienced. It was primarily an uprising against the Southern dominated socialist leadership of Modibo Keita. The Malian army used excessive force to quell them and send some of their kinsmen into exile in other neighbouring countries.

“An economically and politically vulnerable Mali faced a second Tuareg rebellion. By 1991, alienated by years of discrimination and by massacres in Mali and Niger, Tuaregs in both countries rebelled” (Hashim, 2013). This time, it took the Malian army an extra year to quell the rebellion that had already touched the vital city of Gao. Francis (2013) wrote that there have been five Tuareg rebellions in Mali since independence, three in neighbouring Niger and sporadic insurrections in Algeria. The years of popular insurgencies include 1962-1964, 1990-1995, 2007-2009, and the recent 2012 insurgency.

Over the years, the Tuareg in Northern Mali have progressively criticised the widespread poverty in their area, blaming it on poor governance and sometimes launching rebellions with the support of their kiths and kilns from neighbouring countries. Tuareg tribes of aristocratic descent saw their hitherto position in Kidal region as it is increasingly eroded by the Malian leadership under President Toure (2002-2012). In order to maintain his Northern political elite friends, Toure relied on militias from Tuareg and closed his eyes of justice as they expansively





engaged in the flourishing drug-trafficking market of Northern Mali. As their Northern geo-political milieu was increasingly neglected, their developmental agitation became fundamentally nationalistic. It could be recalled that in October, 2011, Tuareg combatants who went to fight in the Libyan conflict and some indigenous Tuaregs in Libya joined their kiths and kiln in Mali to form the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. Some Tuareg soldiers in the national military and some of them that were integrated into the force as part of the previous peace accord did not waste time to join 'the patriotic call' for insurgency in their region.

Consequently, the insurgents in their strategic calculation used the opportunity of the March, 2012 coup to declare the rise of the Islamic state of Azawad, which covered around 60% of Mali's sovereign territory and included the strategically important cities of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao. Ethnicity influences insurgency and civil war (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The return of Northern Malians to join in the insurgency was widely welcomed with patriotic zeal. United Nations Security Council (2012), following the joint UN-AU assessment mission on the impact of the Libyan Crisis on the Sahel Region, showed that over 200,000 registered returnees and 400,000 unregistered migrants had crossed the Libyan borders into Niger, Chad, Mali and Mauritania by the end of 2011. And it was widely believed that amongst these unregistered migrants were armed Tuareg and Toubou ex-combatants in the Libyan civil war. While some perceived Azawad sovereign milieu as limited to Northern Mali, some of their kiths and kiln that were part of the insurgency saw it as an emerging state, which would be a national homeland for other Tuareg groups in the Sahel region thereby enhancing the fear and potential threat to security due to the multiplier effect of the insurgency. There was equally the belief that following the increasing discovery of oil in the Northern region of the Sahel, the Tuareg will one day control the petro-dollar politics of the Sahel region.



### **Causes of the Recent Insurgency**

The pressures which population growth impact on limited resources is amongst the factors that gave rise to insurgents in pre-modern times that still appear to operate today (Goldstone, 1991; Foran, 1997; Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989). The history of rebellion and insurgency in that country is as old as the patriotic quest for independence. “Northern Mali had gone through several rebellions soon after the country’s independence in 1960. The most recent northern rebellion (before the insurgency of 2012) ended with the 2006 Algiers Accord brokered by Algeria. This agreement stipulated the re-integration of Tuareg rebels into the Malian army and the reduction of troops in the North. Unfortunately, the agreement was never fully implemented, which is considered to have made the situation worse and to have fuelled Tuareg grievances” (Affa’a-Mindzie and Perry, 2013:4). The agreement was historically difficult for implementation because the mainstream national army was not hitherto disposed to accept their one time foes as friends and colleagues. There was equally the fear that their presence would destroy the sense of trust and comradeship amongst the military, which is a vital requirement for any successful military establishment. Unfortunately, the inability to integrate them created much security burden to the professional integrity of the Malian army and the country at large as those of northern background increasingly exhibited less faith in their professional calling.

There was the problem of the inability of the Malian liberal democracy to enthrone transformative leadership in its decades of history. While the Malian democracy promoted reasonable freedom of expression, civil society activities, entrepreneurial development and flourishing tourist industry that attracted foreign investment (Whitehouse, 2012: 17), there was the widespread life of poverty, especially in the North. There, the popular life of penury amongst the masses progressively won faithful to the voice of opposition/ criticism against the government, hence fuelling the spirit of insurgency in that region of the country. While the apologists of the then democratic government argued that the



president wanted a robust democracy following his willing declaration that he will not participate in the 29<sup>th</sup> April, 2012 presidential election. But on the other hand, many of the masses perceived the government as a democratic umbrella for limitless corruption. Whitehouse (2012:17) showed that a poll conducted one month after the military junta, revealed that two-thirds of Bamako residents supported the junta and its leader, Captian Amadou Sanogo. The junta searched for legitimacy by criticizing the deep-rooted corruption and failure of government to manage the recurrent cases of rebellion in the North.

The situation was made worse by the fact that politicians who wanted their selfish share of the national economy began to form alliance with the insurgent group as a fillip to their attainment of state power. The post independence one party socialist leadership of President Modibo Keita was ousted in 1968 by the military coup led by Moussa Traore. Traore took over the administration of the country for more than two decades and gave fillip to military-driven corruption. The masses felt cheated and shouted-out their resentment to the leadership of Traore until 1991 when Amadou Toumani Toure overthrew Traore. Toure organized democratic election and Alpha Oumar Konare, a hard-line popular opposition voice won the election. By the time President Konare completed his two-term democratically and constitutionally allowed period in 2002, he handed over to Amadou Toumani Toure, who was re-elected in 2007. It was this ‘Soldier of Democracy’ as President Amadou Toumani Toure was called that nurtured consensus politics and democratic corruption to an unimaginable level as the dividend of democracy was in most cases shared according to political cleavages, political loyalty and other forms of alliances with the ruling power elite. The rich and the poor, the sceptre and the crown as well as the military and civilians; all engaged in the centripetal petty politics of sycophancy and state patronage, hence sacrificing the highly needed dividend of democracy to the low alter of multidimensional corruption.

In addition, many of the petty political elite, who were strongly expectant of the ‘presidential political anointing’ that would give them



an easy move to the seat of national power in Bamako were disappointed that few months before the April 2012 election count-down, there was no official presidential-backed candidate for the seat of the presidency. Soon, some political elite and groups in the country began to attach themselves and form increasing alliance with the frontline insurgent ideology in order to boost their political chances. This disgruntled group of politicians began to re-echo the conflict in the North, thereby giving the insurgency more national importance and placing the insurgent groups at the forefront of media politics. The agenda setting role of the media popularised the agitation of the insurgents. Soon, Islamist fundamentalist network from within the country and the neighbouring states, began to join the insurgency like Ansar Dine (Defenders of Faith), which had ties to ideologically motivated external groups such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Mali's democratic corruption and popular disenchantment of the citizenry was widely criticized (*Slate Afrique*, 2012). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) noted that "though it is not a recent phenomenon, corruption seems to have worsened with the democratization process, higher levels of development assistance and the growth of private sector... In addition, the search for compromise, which characterizes the social, political and economic life in Mali, has generated a culture of tolerance and impunity" (UNDP, 2010).

Islam is another factor that promoted the growth of the insurgency. The Islamic popularity and its widespread adherents in Mali could be traceable to the history of the ancient Mali and Songhai Empires (Thomas, 2013). The city of Timbuktu, which was on the cross road of ancient commerce between the 12<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries grew into a major centre of Islamic scholarship and trade. According to Al-Bakri, a ruler of Mali was converted to Islam during a drought. The traditional priests had prayed for rain unsuccessfully. A Muslim guest of the king offered to pray for rain if the king promised to convert and have his people convert to Islam. The Muslim's prayer was successful, so the ruler was subsequently converted. Al-Bakri mentions that the commoners



remained in their traditional religions (Levtzion and Hopkins, 1881: 82). This form of top-down conversion pattern was typical. With this type of conversion, Islam becomes associated with the government and powerful people. As Babou noted; “the association of Muslim clerics with the business of government helped to enhance the prestige of Islam and its expansion among the commoners” (Babou, 2007:22). Malian society was rigidly hierarchical, therefore the divisions between commoners and the nobility served as an obstacle and filter for the expansion of Islam. In this environment, retentions from the traditional religion persisted. Over time, however, a drive toward a more orthodox practice of Islam gave birth to a scholarly community that was respected throughout the Islamic world as well as the building of mosques and the institutionalization of Islam in Mali. This means that Islam expanded slowly in Mali from an early core of believers over many years (Thomas, 2013).

When Mansa Musa (1312-1337), the most famous emperor of Mali went on pilgrimage to Mecca in 1327, he impressed the Muslim world with a display of the fabulous wealth of Mali. With his generosity, Mansa Musa also attracted Muslim scholars and artisans, architects and other skilled men and brought them to Mali. It was those artisans, who helped Mansa Musa build some of the beautiful mosques in the Empire of Mali, including the elegant mosque in the city of Timbuktu. Mansa Musa’s construction of an Afro-Islamic civilization base in his empire resulted from his famous pilgrimage or *hajj* (Thomas, 2013). Timbuktu was one of the cities that flowered during the reign of Mansa Musa. During the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, Timbuktu became the most famous bastion of Islamic learning in West Africa. As an expanding Empire, Mali brought Islam to surrounding areas and strengthened Islam in Muslim kingdoms. From what has transpired thus far, it can be said the Empire of Mali was an agent for the expansion of Islam in the region as well as a force for Islamic conformity. The same can be said for Songhai and most of the successor states in the region. The alliance of Islam and the state is an important aspect of Islamic expansion (Davidson,



1998:42). The traditional Maliki School of Sunni Islam and the growing number of Salafists, Sufi practices and other brands of 'home-grown Islam' in Mali is widely spreading and making progressive inroads to the rural and urban setting, where they are winning the hearts of thousands of new converts. Some of these emerging Islamist groups were coming up with new and radicalized interpretation of the Holy Quran and Hadith, hence giving new doctrinal and violent meaning to the teaching of Islam.

Aning and Bah (2009) pointed-out that Mali is a country at cross road due to an acute combination of the challenges of poor governance, constitutional crisis, armed rebellion and growing criminality, especially drug trafficking and illicit flows of small arms and light weapons. Affa'a-Mindzie and Perry (2013) on their side argued that the roots of the current crisis in Mali include poor governance, constitutional crisis and growing criminality in the North. The challenge of deep-rooted unemployment, widespread lack of social amenities, biting reality of poverty and drought gave fillip to the problem of insurgency and security threat in the region. The factors that led to the outbreak of an insurgency are not necessarily those that may enable it to continue to develop (Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis, 2005). Again, it is important to bear in mind that all who take part in an insurgency do not all do so for the same reasons (Cramer, 2006). This may be the case in the marriage of convenience between the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Islamic fundamentalist groups that initially formed an alliance with them and gradually began to assert their spheres of influence, leading to the expulsion of MNLA from their vital stronghold of Gao. "The insurgency has since fragmented along ideological lines, with extremist groups increasingly outmanoeuvring the separatists (Arieff and Johnson, 2012). There was the popular concern that AQIM high-jacked the insurgency and strategically spread its tentacles of terrorism and alliance to many Al Qaida affiliate groups within Mali and the larger Sahel region thereby created heavy negative impact on the society and making counterinsurgency difficult (Lewis, 2012; Entous and Henshaw, 2012; Bloomberg, 2012).



## **Funding of Tuareg Insurgency**

In the ancient times, the Tuareg funded their insurgency in Mali and Songhai empire true revenue collected from the caravan merchants and through raids/loots. Unfortunately, “the decline of the Trans-Saharan trade had far-reaching effects. It destroyed the means of livelihood of the Tuaregs, who depended on what they got from their business as guides and transport agents or as raiders of the Caravans crossing the desert. The result was that they began to prey with greater ferocity than ever before on the settled agriculturists on the fringes of the desert. Bornu suffered greatly from Tuareg invasions in the 18<sup>th</sup> century” (Onwubiko, 1967:63). This made Sunni Ali to engage on jihad against the Tuareg “for political and economic reasons. A good example being the campaign against the Tuaregs of Agades. By the conquest of these Tuareg, his north-eastern border was secured and by his capture of Agades, he also gained control of an important centre of Trans-Saharan trade” (Awe, 1965:68). Francis (2013) wrote that “in economic terms, with the introduction of camels as a means of transportation in the Sahara Desert 2,000 years ago, the Tuaregs controlled the Trans-Sahara trade routes and commodities such as gold, salt and spices. But their economic decline started with the advent of transatlantic slave trade and the switch in trade from the Sahara to the Atlantic Ocean”.

However, the contemporary economics of insurgency (Sansom, 1970) is expensive, hence the impunity with which the insurgents kidnap for ransom, loath private and public properties as well as seek alternatives of raising money. Amongst the very historic show of terror by the insurgents was the kidnap of five Europeans by AQIM in two separate incidents in Northern and Eastern Mali, in which a German tourist was killed in November, 2011. They were kidnapped in Timbuktu in the North and two French nationals were abducted in Hombori, Eastern Mali. Similarly, “in Mali, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA or MUJAO after its French acronym) in particular was identified as being involved in illegal activities and using religion only as a cover for drug and cigarette trafficking. Other criminal activities



that generate cash flows include human trafficking (in particular, trafficking of migrants trying to reach Europe through the desert) and hostage taking as well as the payment of ransoms. These large flows of foreign currencies especially Euros illustrate the growing economic power of Islamist and criminal groups across the Sahel-Sahara region” (Affa’a-Mindzie and Perry, 2013:5).

Arguing further, Lacher and Tull (2013) stated that “the vast sums of ransom money that European governments paid for the release of hostages played an important role in this development. The insurgents equally held, and are still holding, Algerian hostages for years and some Malians as prisoners of their insurgency (Agence France Presse, 2012). Ransom money created shared interests between terrorists, tribal leaders and high level decision makers. It also fuelled local rivalries, as did control of the drug trade. When Tuareg fighters returning from Libya’s civil war arrived Mali in autumn 2011, the power balance tipped in favour of Tuareg groups that had been on the losing side of Toure’s divide and rule policies”. The difficulty in separating the illegal drug-traffickers from the Islamist groups and their political allies in the North promoted the spread of trafficking and the economy of the insurgents. The heavy ransom money were seen more as resource waste as many European analysts do not perceive ransom payment as a proper way of managing hostage-taking.

### **Operational Alliance of the Insurgents**

It would be recalled that some of the actors in the insurgency were already key protagonists in the conflict within Northern Mali in the 1990s as well as the 2006-2009 rebellion. Within these decades of conflict, the government forces manipulated and sustained the pro-government militias in the North. The insurgents, which were made up of MNLA; Ansar al Dine (Protectors of the Faith), who are sometimes called Ansar/Ancar Dine or Ansar Eddine; AQIM and MUJAO, which pulled-out of AQIM in June, 2012 subsequently came together to launch a progressive insurgency on the country. From late March to early





April, 2012; AQIM leadership began to appear in public in Timbuktu to declare their support for the insurgents.

The return Libyan fighters with all forms of arsenal, created a heavy pool of arms that gave fillip to the insurgency. Due to the increasing inability of the central government to hold these dissenting interests in check, some politicians and drug merchants joined other fundamentalist groups like AQIM, Ansar Dine and MUJAO to give the insurgency strong strategic and economic advantages, hence they manoeuvred themselves into a very formidable power and security bloc in the country. The aggression (Lorenz, 1966) of the insurgents and the mass assassination (Kirkham, Levy and Crotty, 1970) of soldiers in Aguelhok could equally be perceived as an act of terrorism (Hyams, 1975), which affected the political order of the society (Huntington, 1968) and influenced increased external involvement and intervention (Little, 1975). Extremist groups who perceived the insurgency as a war against non-Islamic traditions did not waste time to attack government and cultural sites.

### **Impacts of the Insurgency**

The impact of the insurgency has been felt in all aspects of the Malian national life; from economic, security, socio-political to other aspects of human existence. Arieff and Johnson (2013:4) wrote that “while the risk of Islamist fundamentalism is “most vividly on display in the North, it has also affected politics in Bamako. For example, in 2009, a draft family code that would have expanded and guaranteed a number of women’s right was fiercely opposed by Malian civil and religious groups, despite being a signature initiative of the then President Traore. A revised version, prepared with inputs from religious leaders and lacking many of the progressive provisions of the first version, was enacted in December 2011”. The United States and other multilateral donors sent assistance, not only to cushion the food crisis in Mali but also to offer assistance to Malian refugees at a time the conflict began to unfold. Later, “direct United States assistance to the Malian security forces-in



addition to several other types of foreign aid, has been suspended in line with congressionally mandated restrictions triggered by the coup. The aid suspension does not include humanitarian assistance, including health and food security, of which the United States is a leading provider in Mali and the region” (Arieff and Johnson, 2012).

At that time, Margesson (2012) showed that the issue of humanitarian access could rise on the international policy agenda, if active fighting breaks out among armed groups. If these groups intensify their objections to the presence of aid agencies, or if concerns arise over the potential diversion of aid to terrorist groups as the insurgents are equally much more likely to resort to terror as a technique (Weinstein, 2006:327-328). The politicians who collaborated with the insurgents no sooner than later began to lose faith in the insurgency as their political ambitions cannot be sustainably married to the rise of a Sharia-driven society, which the fundamentalists were imposing on the society.

The extremist members of the sect imposed Islamic dress codes and behavioural styles on the citizenry living in the territories that they have captured. The Sharia legal code was often manipulated in their interest in the areas under their control. The implementation of the Sharia law came down heavily with draconian punishments like executions, amputations, public flogging and stoning to death. Unfortunately, some casualties of these brute and naked judgements were guilty of make-up cases that has direct and indirect relationship to alcohol consumption, fornication, adultery, unholy social relations amongst youth like handshaking and hugging of the opposite sex as well as violation and negligence of dress codes amongst the residents. While these forms of brutal Sharia-based attacks were getting worse, the Christians in the North began to feel the fire of ‘holy jihad’ against them. Some were killed, while others were abducted causing the massive flight of Christians from the North (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

In the course of the insurgency, the MNLA engaged in massive rape and that began to cost them their popularity and local support, thereby influencing Ansar Dine and MUJAO to increasingly distance themselves



from them. They (Ansar Dine and MUJAO) introduced the protection of women to get societal support on one hand but used the other hand to recruit their children into the insurgency. In July 2012, UNICEF reported the growing use of child soldiers in the insurgency. Volluz (2012) wrote that this new wave of recruits into the insurgency were 10 years old children. Children were recruited to join the insurgency and were made to believe that they are fighting a sinful human order and socio-political system, which they need to wipe away and replace with sound Islamic way of life. The children in some cases acted as informants, in other cases, they were combatants and bombers. Using them as bombers was reinforced by the fact that the unsuspecting crowd would hardly imagine nor believe that the child around them is carrying a luggage of explosives, which would be laid for the onward maximal harvest of death amongst the people. The quest to implement the Sharia legal system and culture in the Northern region of Mali led to the rain of extra-ordinary human rights abuses. Affa'a-Mindzie and Perry (2013:4) wrote that "serious human rights violations were reported, with cases of arbitrary arrests, torture, public flogging and amputations, sexual and gender-based violence, summary executions and the use of children in armed groups. MUJAO also destroyed a number of ancient holy sites in Timbuktu, some of which were listed as United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Sites".

In January 2012, the insurgents exhibited their violent prowess through the massacre of Malian troops and civilians in the city of Aguelhok. There is different account of the death toll in the attack following the sect's strategic advantage over a local military base. Al Jazeera reported 82 deaths, the Malian Association for Human Rights (AMDH) and the International Federation for Human Rights based in France gave the number of those killed as 153, while the Malian police unfortunately could not determine and give an authoritative number of those who died in that attack (Keita, 2012). This mass sentence to death generated a lot of national and international reactions, which was heightened by 'the Bamako March' of military officer's wives, in protest for the harvest of deaths and security risk faced by their husbands and



relations. The insurgency weakened the professionalism of the Malian military. This was because the approximately 7,700 military personnel of the country remained in disarray and low moral due to the killing of their colleagues, and lack of leadership on one hand and logistical support on the other.

On the side of the state, it was also reported that the Captain Sanogo-led military, used excessive torture, engaged in massive sexual abuse and forcefully sentenced the soldiers who carried out the counter-coup, to the great beyond. The significant division in the security sector is between the 'red berets', which supported former President Amadou Toumani Toure and led the military coup against former President Moussa Traore in 1992 on one hand and the 'green berets', who orchestrated the March 22, 2012 coup that overthrew President Toure. Tension between the two factions further increased, following a failed counter-coup led by the red-beret paratroopers in April, 2012 (Affa'a-Midzie and Perry, 2013). The implication was the reign of military-driven arbitrary arrests, widespread torture, regular clashes, which sent twenty souls to their untimely death (Human Rights Watch, 2012B). Journalists equally cried foul to the intimidations, abductions, high handedness and physical assault of their members and other civilians, who openly criticized the military (Committee for the Protection of Journalist, 2012). Thus the military became, under him, an instrument of repression and dehumanization of those who do not want them to have things their way. The fact that Captain Sanogo was made the leader of the July 2012 Committee on the Reform of Defense and Security Forces does not in any way speak well about the future rise of a professional and united military, following the fact that he was in the past, a key actor on one side of the military divide, hence the need for an independent leadership reform committee that would reposition the military for sustainable internal and border security, with other neighbours in the Sahel region.



## **Implications of the Insurgency in the Sahel**

The Tuareg insurgency has a lot of implication not only for the Malian State but also for the whole Sahel region. This was why in 2005; the International Crisis Group (ICG) predicted that while the Sahel was under the potential security bomb of the Islamist terrorism, Mali “runs the greatest risk of any West African country other than Nigeria of violent Islamist activity” (International Crisis Group, 2005). In the wake of the increasing escalation of the insurgency, “regional and Western leaders warned of a rising threat to international security associated with an expansion of AQIMS’s influence and scope of operations as well as a possible spread of violent extremist ideology and state fragmentation” (Reuters, 2012). In the onset, international concern was focused on the fact that unrest in Mali was dealing a serious setback to regional stability (State Department, 2012).

There were massive international migrations, who were mainly internally displaced persons and refugees to Algeria, Mauretania, Burkina Faso and Niger Republic. The conflict in the Northern part of Mali displaced over 420,000 people (UNOCHA, 2012). Affa’a-Mindzie and Perry (2013:1) have stated that despite some early victories for the French and Malian troops in January and February, 2013, military intervention will not address the root causes of the acute insecurity that the people of Mali face. Indeed, this recent crisis is only the tip of the iceberg in Mali and the Sahel-Sahara region as a whole. Given persistent underdevelopment, recurring humanitarian crisis and entrenched terrorist and organized criminal networks in the region, short term crisis management is unlikely to be sufficient. This is because the semi-arid nature of the Sahel region where the Tuareg insurgents and other groups that threatens security, operates; remains a major advantage for them. They spread very easily and could speedily launch an attack on unsuspecting citizenry and disappear into their terror cells. Refugees International (2012) has pointed out that the underfunded international response to the Malian insurgency has added stress to Sahel food crisis.



The widespread scattering of nomads and other sedentary Sahelian inhabitants has influenced the rise of “volatile cocktail of underdevelopment and insecurity” in the region (Simon, Mattelaer and Hadfield, 2011:19). Mali and the Sahel region in general has faced the destabilising wind of “political and security challenges caused by weak governance and security structures, radical Islamism and religious driven violence; all exacerbated by the consequences of the 2011 Libyan crisis and growing transnational criminality” (Affa’a-Mindzie and Perry, 2013:2). It was estimated that between 7 million to 10 million arms and light weapons were already traded in West Africa (Adedeji and Mazal, 2003) thereby expanding the areas under the dangerous and potential threat to insecurity in the Sahel region, before the fall of President Muammar Gaddafi in October, 2011. By the time Gaddafi’s government came crashing, the Libyan State arms became loose for unlimited access by all manners of criminal networks, who sold it and exported to neighbouring countries and beyond, where they were used to increase security threat. It is equally widely believed that the insurgents’ alliance with the Arab Movement of Azawad, AQIM, Boko Haram and Ansaru has a wider regional implication for the Sahel. Arieff and Johnson (2012) wrote that the open presence of AQIM commanders in Northern cities, along with reports of foreign fighters travelling to Mali from Nigeria, Somalia, Pakistan and elsewhere, have raised acute concerns that Mali could become a training ground and launching pad for transitional terrorist attacks.

As state authority in Mali has withered, transnational violent extremists and drug traffickers have pressed their advantage. This has made the conflict-torn Mali a significant and regional transit point in the flow of cocaine and other kinds of hard drugs between South America and Europe (State Department, 2012). There is equally the increasing threat of humanitarian workers in the Sahelian region as they are increasingly becoming both real and potential victim of hostage-taking and kidnap-oriented killings. There were cases of attacks on soldiers that are assisting in the counterinsurgency. On Friday, 10<sup>th</sup> May, 2013; “suspected Islamists carried out three suicide attacks on soldiers from



Mali and Niger in northern Mali, wounding a Malian soldier. At least five bombers died” (*The Guardian*, 2013: 8).

### **The Challenge of counter-insurgency**

“Counterinsurgency is perhaps the most neutral term available for the various techniques and theories that relate to the prevention and suppression of armed insurgencies, but it is not wholly neutral, most of the people who are interested in counterinsurgency are military strategists and military as well as civilian agents of incumbent governments, whose duties are to maintain some sort of strategic order. Counterinsurgency has, therefore, come to mean a form of strategy which is mainly military and within the military context, one designed to fight irregular, especially guerrilla war” (Calvert, 2010: 148). Counterinsurgency is equally seen in some quarters as a form of warfare and its management (Pustay, 1965). The insurgency in Mali generated diverse international reactions and perceptions, especially as it has to do with counterinsurgency. In July, 2012; ECOWAS pushed for the deployment of a 3,000 troop intervention force in Mali (*The Guardian*, 2012: 9). On August 14, 2012, Mali’s military hierarchy rejected the idea of an ECOWAS troop deployment that would spread into southern parts of the country, stating that any regional intervention would have to be in the North to support the Malian troops (Reuters, 2012). On July 5, 2012, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2056 noted the AU and ECOWAS request for a counterinsurgency mandate but called for an explicit explanation of the objectives, means and modalities of the envisaged troop’s deployment (Arieff and Johnson, 2013). The EU and France (2013) outlined the United Nation’s Security Council resolutions for the African-led International Mission in Mali (MISMA) as to:

- a. Support for the full restoration of the constitutional order of the transition roadmap including the holding of peaceful, credible and unconditional presidential and general elections in 2013 and an inclusive national dialogue;



- b. Support for the restoration of the authority of the State and the rule of law throughout the country, while respecting the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Mali and support for the eradication of groups affiliated to criminal and terrorist organizations;
- c. Support in this context, for the restoration by Mali, of all public services and in particular of basic services by implementing a strategy that provides for short, medium and long-term measures;
- d. Support for the return in dignity and in freedom of refugees and displaced persons;
- e. Support for the revival of a dynamic economic and social development which will constitute a fundamental driver to solving the crisis of security and development in the Sahel and Mali in particular.

The corruption in the Malian state did not waste time to spread into the military institution as the counterinsurgency preparation was on the way. It was alleged that the army “was riven by nepotism, mismanagement and corruption. Money from the USA to train and equip soldiers to fight the Tuareg rebellion and jihadist terrorism was siphoned off, by high-ranking officers with disastrous implications for the logistics of the Northern garrisons” (Africa Confidential, 2012). The Islamist groups in Northern Mali are not only armed to the teeth but they are strongly linked with local population and “have threatened to carry out attacks against governments in the region that would commit troops to a counterinsurgency military intervention” (Agence France Presse, 2012).

Arrieff and Johnson (2013) revealed that the inter-agency Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) was conceived as a successor to the 2002-2004 Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which focused on enhancing the border security and counter terrorism capabilities of four West African states: Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. The





TSCTP aims to counter violent extremism in the Sahel region through multidimensional security assistance, national development and good governance. The goal remains to design and enhance multi-faceted programs that take into account the region's complex developmental and security problems. This goal is focused on the long run elimination of terrorism and other forms of violent insurgencies in the region. Unfortunately, bilateral and multilateral diplomatic bottlenecks as well as divergent-ideological influenced foreign assistance have remained a problem in the coordination and implementation of their counter terrorism agenda. Arieff and Johnson (2008) wrote that the program has suffered since its inception from challenges in establishing a comprehensive strategic design, transcending a more traditional bilateral style of foreign assistance, ensuring inter-agency coordination and evaluating outcomes. USAID in 2011 evaluated the counter-insurgency activities of TSCTP and concluded that higher-level goals, measured through surveys on attitudes towards extremism were yielding result but of limited impact and again the implementation of the TSCTP has coincided with a worsening of the terrorist threat in parts of the Sahel (USAID, 2011).

The truth remained that ending protracted conflict in a state that has experienced terror and insurgency (Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, 2007) is often not easy. It would be recalled that Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra while revealing his selfish enjoyment of power and rejection of the ECOWAS call for his resignation in July 2012, stated that "I will not resign and I cannot resign. The Islamists did not take hold in the north on March 22 or April 17, 2012 but over the last 10 years. And it's not in three months that a transitional government will get the Islamists out. We need time to organize ourselves (*The Guardian*, 2012). Ogbonnaya (2013B:16) wrote that a UN peacekeeping force is been deployed to replace some 3,200 French troops in Mali. "A June, 2013 agreement (by the insurgents) with the Malian government allowed the election to go ahead in the Tuareg stronghold of Kidal. In the end, however, some MNLA forces did their best to sabotage the process" (Ogbonnaya, 2013A: 16).



## Conclusion and Recommendations

The Malian democratic experienced has undergone different forms of turbulence, however, the recent Tuareg insurgency dealt a heavy blow on the state. The paper has shown how the military intervened in politics as a roadmap for a new strategic leadership, which gave way to an interim government that could not immediately tackle the numerous threats to nation building thereby reducing government popularity and enhancing the prominence of the insurgents and their quest for an independent state. Tull and Lacher (2013) wrote that “first, conflict in the North is fundamentally between elites from tribal and ethnic groups, some of whom, for tactical reasons, have allied themselves with heavily armed extremists. Second, the government in Bamako has been largely paralysed ever since a military coup deposed President Amadou Toumani Toure in March 2012”. Their destruction of the UNESCO World Heritage ancient mosques and tombs generated lots of international reaction from the media (UNESCO, 2013). Many of the insurgents were raping women and using child soldiers, while looting government properties, offices and building in Gao and Timbuktu (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

The Paradox created by the complex and violent nature of the insurgency was that many local and international analysts criticized this conflict-based order of things in Northern Mali but there was a minority of the society, who did not only support the insurgents but sees them as warriors for a just and better societal order in Mali. The insurgency generated high level of divisiveness in the Malian national army, which remains a major threat to the growth of post-conflict peace building. There is widespread low morale and the increasing leakage of intelligence information to the insurgent groups.

The unlearned lesson of counterinsurgency (Shafer, 1988) is the need for multidimensional long-run roadmap to sustainable peace building. Amongst the roadmap to the resolution of the Tuareg insurgency in Mali include the rise of President Dioncounda Traore’s Interim Government, the ECOWAS-led mediation process and the coalition of international



counterinsurgency operation. However, a more comprehensive approach is needed, one that addresses the structural causes of the conflict in Mali, accounts for the multidimensional nature of the cross-border threats in the region and invests in the institutions and popular participation needed for the long term peace, stability and development of the Malian State in particular and the region in general (Affa'a-Mindzie and Perry, 2013:1).

The UN-AU report recommended that the UN and other international actors should “strengthen its security capacity and presence on the ground and develop integrated programs to fight drug trafficking and organized crimes (as well as) an overarching mechanism or framework” for the states in the Sahel to address underlying challenges (UN Security Council, 2012). The EU and France (2013) have reiterated that it is necessary to define the support measures in priority areas such as support for decentralisation and the balanced development of the region, justice, the rule of law, management of public finance, support for the private sector, agriculture and food security, employment, migrant remittances, adaptation to climate change, education, health and cultural transformation. European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso has stated that the European Union will pledge to contribute more than 500 million Euros to help Malians rebuild their country at a conference of aid donors in Brussels in May, 2013. Mali stated in May, 2013 that she will ask international donors for nearly €2b to help rebuild the country and try to halt the guerrilla attacks of the insurgents. The Malian Government said it would be able to finance just over half of a €4.3b plan for 2013-2014 national reconstruction programme (*The Guardian*, 2013: 8). The international community is greatly needed to finance and support the Malian State with technical assistance to build on their domestic strengths in managing their national problems that have fuelled the insurgency.

Finally and just recently, the former Malian Prime Minister, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (widely known as IBK), in a run-off election won Modibo Sidibe Soumaila Cisse, a former Finance Minister in the recent



presidential election. The first election was held on 28<sup>th</sup> July, 2013 and the peaceful run-off, was conducted on 11<sup>th</sup> August, 2013. “Despite the difficult conditions, Malian administration showed its determination to guarantee the transparency and the credibility of the elections” (Ashton, 2013:60). Keita had earlier received nearly 40 percent of ballots in the first round and endorsements from nearly all the candidates of the first round but there was still complain of about 400,000 spoilt ballots, inability for voters to receive their cards (*DailySun*, 2013:16) and what Cisse called organized fraud (Ogbonnaya, 2013A: 16). The election is pivotal to helping Mali end a period of instability as it attempts to recover from a military coup and Islamist insurgency (Ogbonnaya, 2013B:16).

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## UNDERSTANDING DE-RADICALIZATION DEFINITIONS AND CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF DE- RADICALIZATION

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### Introduction

In the book of Ann E. Robertson "Terrorism and Global Security" (2007), James O Ellis in his Foreword said: 'Though Edmund Burke coined the term terrorism in the 18<sup>th</sup> century to describe Robespierre's Reign of Terror during the French Revolution, acts of terrorism have been documented as early 66 C.E between the Zealots and the Romans.' He continues saying: 'in the modern age, terrorism often takes the form of assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, hostage situation, hijackings, arson, and armed assaults.'

Most political, academic experts and religious leaders would agree that terrorism is the greatest threat to global security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Few of those experts and leaders, however, would agree about a definition of what exactly constitutes terrorism, that is why in return *De-radicalization* process meets hindrances in most affected countries by the terrorist acts. There is no standard international definition of terrorism





nor is there even one single definition used by the US Government<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, writes terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, ‘*The decision to call somebody or label some organization “terrorist” becomes almost unavoidably subjective, depending largely on whether one sympathizes with or opposes the person/group/cause concerned*’.<sup>2</sup>”

In research on political violence in advanced democracies in the 1970s, the term radicalization emerged to stress the interactive (social movements/state) and processual (gradual escalation) dynamics in the formation of violent, often clandestine groups (Della Porta 1995). In this approach, radicalization referred to the actual use of violence, with escalation in terms of forms and intensity. In recent years, the term “radicalism” became prominent in research on terrorism, particularly research on Islamist terrorism in OECD countries. Scholars were especially concerned with the phenomenon of young Muslims with Western socialization who joined militant Islamist groups. Much of this research sought to explain processes of individual radicalization and ways of becoming part of violent groups (see, e.g., McCauley and Moskaleiko 2008; Wiktorowicz 2005; Waldmann 2009). Some studies identified elements in the personal and social situation of Muslim immigrants that make them vulnerable to radicalization. A number of these studies also examined the role of certain groups and settings (e.g., mosques), as well as typical trajectories of radicalization processes on the micro-level. Closely connected with this were a number of studies focusing on processes of de-radicalization and disengagement from terrorism (in particular, Bjorgo and Horgan 2009) and discussions of how terrorism ends (e.g. Cronin 2009; LaFree and Miller 2008). With few exceptions, this research was characterized by its focus on individuals, on ideological and psychological processes, and on examining violent groups in isolation from their social and political context. Several recent works on Islamist terrorism in Middle Eastern countries deal with the emergence of violent groups and processes of decline and

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1. Ann E. Robertson: Terrorism and global Security (2007), p. 3.

2. Bruce Hoffman. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia university Press, 1998.



disengagement from terrorism (e.g. Hafez 2003; Hegghammer 2010). They contribute important insights, which, however, have so far only partially been integrated into the general debate on radicalization and de-radicalization.

Although there has been a great deal of research on the radicalization, until recently, there has been relatively little research on the *deradicalization* of those who have been recruited specifically into Islamist extremist movements and organizations.

Just as there are processes through which an individual becomes an extremist, there are also processes through which an extremist comes to renounce violence, leaves a group or movement, or even rejects a radical worldview. Moreover, there is reason to believe that deradicalization is not merely the radicalization process in reverse: Deradicalization appears to have its own distinct features—some of which are quite different from the factors associated with the initial radicalization.

What is terrorism?

According to Ann E. (2007:5) ‘‘Terrorism is a political strategy whereby groups or individuals use violence against civilian or symbolic targets to persuade a government to change a specific policy’’.

De-radicalization: to free from radical ideas, goals, or elements<sup>3</sup>

According to International Journal of Conflict and Violence (2011-2)

Radicalization may be understood as a process leading towards the increased use of political violence, while de-radicalization, by contrast, implies reduction in the use of political violence. Taken together, the study of radicalization and de-radicalization is central to answering the question of how political violence emerges, how it can be prevented, and how it can be contained.

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3. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/deradicalize> retrieved on 20th November 2012.



## **Processes Of Radicalization And De-Radicalization**

Many researchers conceptualize radicalization as a process characterized by increasing commitment to and use of violent means and strategies in political conflicts. Radicalization from this point of view entails a change in perceptions towards polarizing and absolute definitions of a given situation, and the articulation of increasingly “radical” aims and objectives. It may evolve from enmity towards certain social groups, or societal institutions and structures. It may also entail the increasing use of violent means. Radicalization in these approaches refers to patterns of both behavior and attitudes. These two dimensions of radicalization – action (behavior) and attitudes (aims and perceptions) – are closely linked, but must not be understood as necessarily depending on or even corresponding to each other. Radical attitudes do not always precede or lead to violent acts. Groups voicing the most radical aims are not necessarily the first to engage in violence.

Becoming involved in violent groups and engaging in acts of violence does not always presume adherence to radical aims and frames of reference, but can be motivated by, for example, personal relationships and loyalty to a group. It is therefore helpful to distinguish micro, meso, and macro levels of radicalization. Individual processes of radicalization should be distinguished from radicalization on the group and organizational level, and both need to be situated in prevailing structural conditions and discursive settings. Radicalization, in other words, is a phenomenon composed of various processes which should be distinguished analytically as they seem to be driven by different mechanisms, follow different patterns, and need to be understood in their social and political context. Especially the latter aspect needs further scrutiny. The concept of radicalization is often used in a way that focuses attention on “radical groups” or certain individuals considered prone to radicalization, suggesting that the problem of violence lies with some quality intrinsic to these groups and individuals, rather than being a result of a larger conflict and societal and political conditions. Radicalization may more profitably be analyzed as a process of



interaction between violent groups and their environment, or an effect of interactions between mutually hostile actors. It takes, for example, the form of escalation processes between protest movements and state security forces, or of escalating confrontations between different social groups. Moreover, radicalization may be an expression as well as a trigger of larger social change.

The term de-radicalization can be understood to simply denote the reversal of radicalization processes. Yet even more than radicalization, the concept of de-radicalization suffers from a lack of precision concerning the actual processes involved. Often what is meant is the prevention and disruption of radicalization (i.e. non-radicalization) rather than its reversal, and often behavioral and cognitive elements are not clearly identified.

Again, de-radicalization needs to be scrutinized on micro, meso and macro levels, and most importantly the interplay between these dimensions. On the individual level, it is important to distinguish between the de-radicalization of attitudes and beliefs, the disengagement from violent behavior, and the process of leaving violent groups and reintegrating into other social groups and structures. Again, these processes do not necessarily correspond. People can, for example, disengage from violence or leave violent groups but retain “radical” beliefs and attitudes. On the meso-level, the ending of violent campaigns by radical groups can result from defeat, declining resources, organizational disintegration, or, connected to the macro level, from changing political opportunity-structures. Thus, aims and attitudes can remain the same, be adapted to changing circumstances, or be even further radicalized. At this point we know relatively little about how processes of de-radicalization are involved when the disengagement from violence is not voluntary. Individual and group processes of disengagement can be linked in various ways.

Groups can disintegrate or radicalize as a result of defections. And individuals can de-radicalize in parallel with their organization. On the other hand, it can also often be observed that new, even more radical



groupings emerge when the leadership of an organization decides to stop a violent campaign. How social changes, sometimes enhanced by radicalization processes themselves, and changing discourse in larger society, affect radical groups and individuals also remains a largely open question.

Considering the social quality of radicalization and the role of political context, the analysis of de-radicalization, too, has to take account of interactions and relationships.

De-radicalization involves the disruption (or reversal) of cycles of escalation and self-reinforcing dynamics in violent confrontations, for example between protest movements and police, insurgent and incumbent forces, or between different armed groups in a civil-war situation. In addition, de-radicalization may involve changes in the structure of violent groups as well as changes in the conflict structure. For example, ending violent campaigns may entail (or require) a shift in power between different factions or political and military wings of an organization. Finally, de-radicalization may involve – or even may result from – changes in the relationship between violent groups and certain audiences, in particular the legitimacy of radicalism in the perspective of groups' constituencies and other audiences. In line with the interdisciplinary and international scope of the African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, in this volume we seek to establish a comparative perspective on processes of radicalization across national and cultural contexts as well as with respect to different phenomena of political violence and violent conflict. Our aim is to encourage comparative interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary perspectives on radicalization and deradicalization that adequately address the complexity of these phenomena.

### **Negative Consequences On Radical Organization**

The disengagement process typically begins with a consequence that calls into question a person's commitment to a radical organization. This consequence is frequently a traumatic event that precipitates an emotional



crisis. For example, gang members often begin to contemplate leaving a gang after they or someone close to them has been the victim of a violent attack. Violence also plays a role in the decision to leave Islamist radical organizations. The deaths of hundreds of civilians in the October 2002 Bali bombing, for instance, prompted former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), leader Nasir Abas to reconsider his involvement in this militant group. Less dramatic events that cast the group in a negative light can also serve as a trigger. In one example, a couple that eventually left the Church of Scientology began to have doubts about the sect after witnessing a church official striking a subordinate. Similarly, members often leave extreme right-wing or racist organizations due to intragroup conflicts that believe the organization's professed commitment to brotherhood. Alternatively, the trigger does not have to be a particular event.

Instead, it can be an accumulation of events, the dawning conclusion that the group's ideology does not accurately explain the world, or the realization that it has failed to bring about social or political change. Many Italian Red Brigade activists began to have doubts about their role in the group only after it became apparent that the organization had failed to achieve its objectives and most of its members were in prison. Compassion by an outsider—someone who does not belong to the radical organization—has, at times, led religious radicals to question ideologies that vilify those with different beliefs. In all of these examples, the trigger brings to light an inconsistency in the radical's worldview. At this moment, when evidence emerges that contradicts an individual's beliefs, there is a cognitive opening, meaning that the individual is now receptive to different ideas. After the militant worldview has proved to be inadequate, the individual may begin a period of reflection and question his or her radical orientation.

Furthermore, once doubts arise, they often quickly spread; most radical organizations are total institutions, meaning that every aspect of the group's worldview is interdependent. Thus, if one aspect is called into question, the entire belief structure tends to unravel. If the trauma is minor or further inconsistencies are not readily apparent, however,



the radical may simply ignore the discrepancy or rationalize the event to achieve cognitive consistency.

### **Disengagement Or Deradicalization?**

While deradicalization is the process of moderating one's beliefs, disengagement is simply the process of changing one's behavior by refraining from violence and withdrawing from a radical organization. John Horgan notes that disengagement can be the product of psychological factors (for example, disillusionment) or physical factors (most notably, imprisonment). He further argues that disengaging from a terrorist organization does not necessarily entail leaving the group; rather, a person disengages from terrorism by not executing violent attacks, even if that person remains affiliated with the radical organization. This is called *role change*. Because role change may involve continued active support for the radical group, which, in turn, enables the group to use violence, we diverge from Horgan and do not consider role change to be an example of disengagement.

Similarly, others have pointed out that disengagement can depend on receiving something in return (conditional disengagement) and that the degree of disengagement can vary (selective engagement). An example of the latter would be an extremist who chooses to distinguish between legitimate targets, such as military personnel, and illegitimate targets, such as civilians. Like the concept of role change, however, neither conditional nor selective disengagement involves abstaining from violence or breaking with a radical group. Therefore, we do not consider these categories as true examples of disengagement.

Another way to think about disengagement and deradicalization is in terms of rational choice theory—specifically, its distinctions between motives, strategies, and structure. From this perspective, deradicalization involves a change in one's fundamental objectives. By contrast, disengagement entails an instrumental change in behavior due to shifting constraints (namely, the costs suffered or benefits gained by



pursuing a certain course of action). For instance, a person could exit from a radical organization and forgo violence because a government's counterterrorist measures become increasingly effective or because the government offers financial assistance to those who abandon violence.

Although this individual may temporarily leave an extremist organization, he or she could still espouse radical beliefs and return to terrorism in the future when conditions change. In short, a militant will refrain from terrorism only if the expected utility of moderation exceeds the utility of extremism.

A true (and successful) deradicalization program should therefore produce a change in an individual's underlying beliefs, not simply a change in behavior. As noted earlier, behavior can change while objectives remain constant. This suggests several potential problems with deradicalization programs. First, it is extremely difficult to determine whether an individual is truly deradicalized or merely disengaged; the only way to judge an individual's underlying objectives is by observing his or her words and actions, yet words and actions do not always accurately reflect objectives. This problem is particularly acute in the case of Islamist extremists, who often participate in deradicalization programs after being detained and thus have strong incentives to misrepresent their beliefs in an effort to secure their freedom.

Second, even if deradicalization is a viable possibility for some extremists, others are likely to be "irreconcilables"—committed militants who refuse to renounce their beliefs or refrain from the use of violence.

Unfortunately, there is no reliable method for identifying these irreconcilables. As a result, some deradicalization programs simply assume that high-ranking members of a terrorist organization or those with blood on their hands are beyond help. There are, however, examples of high-ranking or violent radicals who subsequently disengaged and, in some cases, even publicly renounced their previous extremism.





Third, many deradicalization programs have an ideological component and a material component. In other words, not only do these programs incorporate a theological dialogue in which scholars engage radicals in discussions to try to convince them that Islam does not condone terrorism, they also offer tangible benefits in the form of jobs, training, and subsidies to encourage cooperation. As a result of this dual strategy, it is extremely difficult to determine whether a reformed extremist has experienced a true change in preferences (and is therefore deradicalized) or is merely responding to the inducements that have been offered (and is merely disengaged).

Each of these dilemmas is compounded by the fact that deradicalization programs do not have an accurate way to measure success.

Instead, they point to recidivism rates, which only measure disengagement.

Perhaps more importantly, most deradicalization programs dealing with Islamist extremists boast extremely high success rates, but these claims remain unverified because these programs often lack adequate monitoring.

These issues raise an important question: Should state-sponsored programs aim to deradicalize their detainees, or is disengagement a more reasonable goal? It has been asserted that deradicalization should be the objective because it produces a more enduring change that significantly reduces the likelihood of recidivism. If a militant disengages solely for instrumental reasons, the barriers to recidivism are only as strong as the inducements that are proffered. Conversely, when deradicalization accompanies disengagement, it creates further hurdles against a reversion to extremism. In this view, disengagement is a temporary condition that is costly to realize and often backfires; as a result, more durable attitudinal change must be attempted.

Others, like Bjørge and Horgan, maintain that policymakers should focus on the more attainable goal of disengagement. After interviewing dozens of former terrorists, Horgan concluded that while they were all disengaged, none was truly deradicalized.



Political science professor Zachary Abuza concurs and argues that most of Indonesian prisoners who have recanted are not really deradicalized:

“At the end of this program, you are probably still going to have someone who is committed to the establishment of sharia, who is probably still going to be less than friendly toward non-Muslims and ethnic minorities.”

Since it is undoubtedly difficult, if not impossible, to alter a person’s fundamental preferences, these scholars argue that disengagement should be the focus of existing programs. Moreover, while an individual’s personal beliefs may be abhorrent to mainstream society, it is only the person’s actions that truly cause harm. Consequently, efforts to rehabilitate terrorists should focus on changing their behavior.

Consistent with the views of these deradicalization skeptics, some programs seem to be embracing the more modest goal of disengagement.

For example, the Saudi government has recently sought to compensate for past failures and increase the effectiveness of its deradicalization program by emphasizing behavior modification over ideological change. While the Saudi program still includes a religious dialogue, it has offered the detainees more financial incentives and increased contact with their families.

Nevertheless, even if deradicalization skeptics are correct and disengagement is a more feasible goal for government-sponsored programs that does not necessarily mean that deradicalization is impossible.

In some cases, disengagement may actually be the first step on a longer-term path to deradicalization.

A large body of applied social psychology theory has argued that an extended period of instrumental compliance can lead to identity change through three mechanisms.

**First**, an individual may eventually abide by a set of rules or norms due to habit or routinization. In this case, the person has not been persuaded to change his or her mindset; nevertheless, in the absence of incentives or sanctions the person remains disengaged.



**Second**, to avoid psychological dissonance, an individual may adjust his or her preferences to align with imposed behavior, a process referred to as *rationalization*.

**Third**, efforts to justify one's behavior can lead an individual to inadvertently begin an internal dialogue, resulting in the conscious acceptance of new beliefs.

In short, there are a number of ways that disengagement could, over time, evolve into deradicalization.

Perhaps more importantly, although many scholars and practitioners emphasize the feasibility and potential effectiveness of disengagement, there are reasons to believe that deradicalization is still the more appropriate goal for programs that seek to counter religious extremism.

For example, Froukje Demant et al. have suggested that ideology plays a more significant role in motivating some types of extremists. ***Because some religious beliefs are so ideologically motivated, they may be less susceptible to material rewards and punishments.*** If so, then instrumental disengagement may be difficult to achieve and, especially, to sustain over time, which suggests that deradicalization may be a necessary, if challenging, goal.

Moreover, if a radical ideology is left unchallenged, it is more likely to continue attracting recruits. Even if an organization espousing the ideology fades away, another group is likely to adopt this world-view and continue the struggle. Therefore, to truly extinguish the threat from a radical philosophy, it may be necessary for members to renounce their beliefs and explain why they are erroneous. In other words, a wholesale rejection of this worldview may be required.

## **The Disengagement and Deradicalization Processes**

In addition to studies that focus specifically on disengagement from militant Islamist organizations, we have examined related areas of research, including disengagement from street gangs, desistance from crime, withdrawal from right-wing or racist groups, voluntary departure



from cults and religious organizations, and exit from non-Islamist terrorist organizations. Despite the differences among these types of organizations, the literature on exiting these groups suggests that there is a common trajectory for members who consider leaving, attempt to leave, and ultimately succeed in disengaging.

The process of disengagement begins as the result of a trigger, which is frequently a traumatic event or emotional crisis; this creates a cognitive opening and doubts about remaining in the group. During this period of questioning, an individual makes a simple calculation weighing the pros and cons of exiting. Whether this internal debate ultimately leads a person to exit depends on the strength of “push” and “pull” factors, the benefits of remaining with the group, and the barriers to exit, which together determine whether the expected utility of leaving exceeds the expected utility of remaining. When this condition manifests, the person reaches a turning point and decides to disengage from the radical organization. After exiting, the former radical tries to create a new identity and reintegrate into mainstream society (see Figure 1.1). Four plausible hypotheses—the presence of a moderate social network, whether the individual has a job, whether the individual is accepted or ostracized by society, and whether the individual deradicalizes—can be postulated to influence the likelihood that the former extremist will reengage in radical behavior.

### **Radicalization and De-Radicalization in Repressive Settings**

The literature on radicalization processes has so far focused mainly on episodes of radicalization in non-repressive settings, such as political violence perpetrated by small groups in Western democracies or collective riots in large Western cities. Thus far few researchers have considered radicalization processes in repressive settings, such as authoritarian regimes. Two papers in this focus section deal directly with this issue. Pénélope Larzillière examines how radicalization and de-radicalization operates in Jordan, a highly authoritarian regime, pointing out how professional associations and the Islamist social movement



have been critical to these processes. Larzillière's work underscores the need for less state-centered explanations of radicalization and de-radicalization processes. Similarly, Felix Heiduk examines how radicalization and de-radicalization processes play out in post-Suharto democratic Indonesia. Observing that political liberalization has at the same time witnessed a strengthening of moderate Islamic civil society organizations and Islamic parties, but also the emergence of violent Islamist groups, he points out the highly ambiguous relationship between state and political Islam, with parallel policies of repression and co-optation. The resurgence of political Islam is therefore linked to the power politics that lies behind the post-1998 creation of democratic institutions in Indonesia.

### **The Legitimacy of Radicalization/De-Radicalization**

Given that de-radicalization – just like radicalization – occurs in front of audiences, the legitimacy the audience may bestow on, or withhold from transforming radical groups, is highly relevant for the course of de-radicalization. Radicalized electorates, for example, may exert pressure against conciliatory policies; religious leaders may influence radical sects to reconsider the religious mainstream; countercultures may sanction a return to mainstream behavior; the opinion of a social movement's base may lead it to return to the fold; and the certification an international body (e.g., the UN Security Council) may provide to the parties engaged in a peace process can supply incentives to either continue or break the process, depending on the circumstances. When and how, therefore, is legitimacy an impediment, and when and how does it boost de-radicalization? The phenomena connecting legitimacy and de-radicalization fall into the purview of a range of academic disciplines and sub-disciplines. Yet, on a basic level, they all concern the relationship between actors and audiences. Bill Kissane examines many of these legitimacy issues in a paper on the effects of elections on the development of nationalism in Ireland. Examining the victory of Sinn Féin's moderate wing in 1922–23, he focuses on the potentially



de-escalating effects of elections as crucial mechanisms for making nationalist elites accountable to their citizens.

### **Institutional Radicalization/DeRadicalization**

States may of course play a major role in radicalization and de-radicalization. Extreme examples of radicalized states, societies that murdered large proportions of their own population, are Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union under Stalin, and Cambodia and Rwanda in the mid-to late twentieth century. But less obvious cases of state radicalization dynamics, such as the contemporary “war on terror” in nominally liberal states, also need to be investigated.

In ordinary situations, state institutions often respond to challenges with repressive means that are prone to escalate conflicts with social movements, oppositional groupings, or external contenders. In many cases, interactions between states and their societal opponents result in processes that are difficult to halt or turn around.

### **Organizational Dynamics of De-Radicalization**

Violent groups, organizations, and movements are complex entities. Leaders face the challenge of maintaining organizational cohesion and discipline, of securing economic resources, and of gaining sustainable approval for their role and strategies. Violent organizations are composed of different factions and sub-groups that compete over power and over the group’s political and strategic direction.

Veronique Dudouet focuses on the organizational dynamics of what she defines as non-state armed groups.

Noting that these represent important stakeholders in political conflicts, she presents original empirical findings on the rebel leaders’ own accounts of the internal dynamics in rebel organizations. Based on participatory action research, the paper contributes new knowledge on negotiation processes in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Nepal, Aceh, El Salvador, Colombia, and South Africa. In all seven countries and territories, processes of negotiation, demobilisation, disarmament, and



democratic institutionalization ended up in successful transitions from violent insurgency to peaceful political participation,

## **The Outcomes Of Radicalization/De-Radicalization**

If radicalization is understood to be the strategic use of physical force to influence several audiences, and deradicalisation as an intended reverse process, what are some of the intended and unintended outcomes of radicalization and de-radicalization? Lasse Lindekilde directly addresses these issues. Using the Danish case as an example, he observes the potential dangers when the term radicalization has been stretched to include beliefs (rather than behaviors) and used for so-called anti-radicalization policies that stigmatize large portions of the population. Just belonging to a group with potential grievances, identifying with a certain community, or being particularly religious can come to be considered as indicators of high radicalization potential. The unintended outcome is then mistrust among the affected population and a de-legitimization of the regime.

## **Key Components Of Successful Deradicalization Programs**

Based on our analysis of the individual-level processes of disengagement and deradicalization, we argue that efforts to rehabilitate radical Islamists should be rigorous and comprehensive programs that counter a radical's affective, pragmatic, and ideological commitment to an extremist organization. To effectively challenge radical Islamism, a program must employ an interlocutor whom the militants view as credible. In addition, after the program has been completed, graduates must be carefully monitored and offered continued support to reduce the likelihood of recidivism.

The processes of disengagement and deradicalization are not necessarily linked to the particular reason that an individual radicalized.

Once an individual joins an extremist organization, he or she usually develops a number of ties that bind him or her to the group and



make exit difficult. For example, even if a person joined an extremist organization because of bonds of friendship and kinship, this individual will probably be indoctrinated into accepting the group's ideology and usually also becomes reliant on the organization to provide for basic needs.

Therefore, a deradicalization program is not likely to succeed unless these ties can be broken and alternative means to meet the militant's psychological and material needs are provided. Simply refuting the ideology is not likely to result in permanent disengagement or deradicalization if the individual continues to associate with radical peers and has little chance of establishing a new life outside the group.

Countering the radical Islamist ideology is necessary but not sufficient to produce permanently rehabilitated ex-radicals.

As discussed earlier, many deradicalization programs focus on discrediting the extremist ideology through theological dialogue. These discussions are more likely to be effective if the militants respect their interlocutor's authority. Such respect may stem from the interlocutor's formal theological training, experience as an accomplished militant, or personal religious devotion.<sup>20</sup> Even credible partners must persistently engage militants who are often initially hostile or unreceptive.

The theological dialogue model is not the only way in which a rehabilitation program can challenge extremist beliefs. Other methods include providing information on Islam through classes or access to religious texts so that the militants, who often have a shallow and truncated understanding of Islam, can gain a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the religion. In the same vein, a program may make information on alternative interpretations available to encourage debate among the militants as a way of indirectly undermining extremism. In addition, a deradicalization program must also break a radical's affective and pragmatic commitment to the group. To undermine affective commitment to a radical organization, a program must provide the individual with emotional support and help him or her locate peers who are opposed to radicalism. Moreover, many





radical organizations not only provide for all their members' basic needs, but they also offer assistance to their members' families. Thus, deradicalization programs need to help ex-militants and their families find alternative sources of income, housing, health care, and education. Finally, deradicalization programs need to continue to monitor and support rehabilitated extremists after they have completed the program to facilitate their reintegration into mainstream society. In sum, efforts to rehabilitate Islamist extremists should have affective, pragmatic, and ideological elements, as well as a robust aftercare program. Religious discussions should be led by a credible figure, and the practical support offered should be extended to ex-militants and their families.

**Affected countries by Radicalizations, Extremism in the Region, even beyond:**

Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, Mali, Algeria

US, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, etc

### **De-Radicalization Programmes**

**Here we should encourage affected countries to go through these programmes as they should be set up to eradicate terrorism and its related acts. This is a task of ACSRT to figure out those countries according to a set of priorities.**

Radicalization and de-radicalization emerge as important concepts both in our understanding of political violence and in the choice of policy strategy to contain it. In focusing on these concepts, this special set of articles presents diverse theoretical approaches, methodological choices, and disciplinary contributions, in the context of a broad range of countries and types of violent political action.

When selecting these papers for publication, we, as editors, have explicitly sought diversity as a way to enrich our knowledge on political violence and policies addressing it. In line with this journal's emphasis, we believe in the virtue of cross-fertilization between disciplines



and approaches as a necessary balance against trends towards over-specialization which are present in most disciplines.

Of course, interdisciplinary, theoretically eclectic, and methodologically pluralist knowledge is difficult to develop – but we hope this volume can represent a step in this direction.

### **Islam As Theory In International Relations<sup>4</sup>**

The Traditionalists:

The traditionalist school is defined by the concept of *Jihad*. The world is essentially divided into two realms, *Dar al Harb* (The realm of War) and the *Dar al Islam* (The realm of Islam). Here a very distinct concept of foreign relations as defined by the constant struggle for survival is evident. The *Dar al Islam* is those areas under Islamic control where the rights of Muslims are observed and ruled by a true Muslim.

The world beyond this domain is the *Dar al Harb*. This is the space under the hegemony of the non-Muslims.

### **The Non-Traditionalist Approach**

Non traditionalist theories of Islamic I.R. are a relatively new addition to Islamic political thought being products of the second and third debates beginning in the late 19th and late 20th centuries respectively. Traditionalism during this period manifested as Islamism and Islamic revivalism but a new trend with more accommodating liberal concepts, particularly in response to modernity.

The traditionalist concept of the divided world is largely a product of the *Hannah fiqh*, which non-traditionalists would argue is in fact *ijtihad*. *Ijtihad* is the concept of religious endeavor

The traditionalist concept of the divided world is largely a product of the *Hannah fiqh*, which non-traditionalists would argue is in fact *ijtihad*.

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4. Mohammed Abo-Kazleh, Rethinking I.R. Theory in Islam: Towards a More Adequate Approach in Turkish Journal of International Relations vol.5 no.4 (Winter 2006) p.41



This would be contradictory to the traditionalist dismissal of Quranic interpretation. Traditionalist argue that this concept is applicable only to the particular time and place of its origin, that this was a temporal condition resulting from an emergency situation in which Islamic world was in a persistence existential struggle with its neighbours.

Non-traditionalist argue that this concept is invalid to the contemporary and insist that it is not an absolute division of the world. They argue for a third way, **the concept that of the *Dar al Ahd* (realm of treaties). This is a principle regarding the possibility of peace with the non Muslim world.**

### **New Islam Theorists**

The new-Islam theorists emerged in Egypt in the late 1970's seeking to establish themselves as a school of thought as opposed to a political party. They are representative of contemporary non-traditionalists thought. Among the most noted of the new-Islam theorists are **Yusuf al Qaradawi, Tariq al Bishri and Fahmi Huwaydi**. Influenced in particular by the work of Jamal al din al Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammed Abduh (1849-1905) their approach to international politics is centred on the concept of *wasatiya* (middle way).

### **Islam Solution To Radicalization**

First of all Islam has no hand of what terrorist(s), extremist(s) do by killing innocent people, persons, by demolishing infrastructure, etc.

May we consider some of the Koranic Ayaat (verses) that unify the world: such as Surat al Mumtahnah: 60: 8-9 and many others.

Muhammad (SAW) had good relationship with Christians and Jews, this was shown and observed when He migrated to Medina, and this is a real Islamic history.

In the Holy Koran, there are many *ayaat* verses on WAR, but extremist do interpret them wrongly, as they use to say: *kill the infidels wherever you find them*. This is concerned only with a war period, I mean when



non-Muslims fight unjustly Muslims. As it is the main meanings in the *Surat al Mumtahanah*, 60: ayaat 8-9.

Islam teachings on war do not differ from international law, and international humanitarian law, where any conflicting party is required not to kill children, women, elderly people. Specifically Islam teachings do not allow fighters in legitimate or illegitimate war to kill children, women, elderly people, and even priest or religious leaders. Not even destroying churches, synagogues or other places of worship (..)

## Case study: Rwanda

► **Radicalization during 1950s, 60s, 70s, 80, 90s. Culminated to Genocide against Tutsis in 1994.**

► From 1994 up to 2003, Govt. of National Unity has set up measures /mechanisms with tangible results. Such as:

► Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Societal cohesion 82% current status)

► Commission of Human Rights

► Gacaca Courts/Traditional Jurisdictions

► Commission on fight against genocide, etc.

## Rwanda: Religious Level

There are:

► Interfaith Commission

► Muslim-Christian Relations

Muslims and Christians meet and discuss different national issues with consensual solutions

## Suggestions On De-Radicalization

► Regional, sub-Regional and National *Home grown Solution*, such as :



- ▶ 1) Psychological Rehabilitation
- ▶ 2) Religious Rehabilitation
- ▶ 3) Meeting with Scholars
- ▶ 4) Govts, and partners financial support
- ▶ 5) Support of Affected families
- ▶ 6) Seminars and workshops, and other support from Int'l community
- ▶ 7) Int'l, Regional, Sub-regional bodies



## Conclusion

Terrorism in Africa is something new, it is a phenomenon that all African countries must work together to eradicate it. Nevertheless African countries should think not to focus on eradicating this new phenomenon without setting up strong and logic mechanisms, I mean to eradicate terrorism, Africa should go back to see what are causes and genesis of terrorism, as we have seen in our introduction to this article, terrorism at more than 50% is political, but with some sub-components such as erroneous ideologies or misinterpretation of Holy Books such as Bible and Koran, some individuals or groups of persons putting in front their personal interests. On the other hand, there are historical problems that are left by colonial legacy specifically the Berlin conference in 1884-85 where Africa was partitioned according to the political interests of former colonial masters. As results (bad), some of the current consequences that we are witnessing around the world or in Africa are related to this political partition. As some percentage of terrorist acts are related to erroneous ideology, this of course should be dealt with intensive training and seminars as African Union through its Center of Study and research on counter-terrorism had already initiated it, these training and seminars should be re-enforced and supported by not only African countries but also by all international community, because terrorism is an international phenomenon. International Politics is often described as a "GAME" in which the rules, while generally known and observed, are often changed and sometimes openly violated. Game theory attempts to provide models for studying world politics. A common version is the so-called ZERO-SUM GAME in which party loses what the other wins. This theory does not fit the current problem solving philosophy, one party to take all, it means that the other party "opponent" is defeated militarily, but the idea and ideology's interests are still in the mind of its members, so one day they would be re-organized and comeback, or emerge and start a terrorist act or a war.

For as J.K. Zawodny reminds us "We must recognize that some types of international "conflict" today can be solved only by situations in



which neither side loses and in which sometimes both sides may win under the theory of **NON-ZERO SUM GAME**. Here I do remind something which is important; it is not every fighter who should benefit from this theory because, as I said above, you may find some ideological claimers with an erroneous long list of claims!!

Radicalization and de-radicalization emerge as important concepts both in our understanding of political violence and in the choice of policy strategy to contain it.

workshops and seminars should be one of the long term solutions to radicalization. As radicalization and terrorism are global pandemic, int'l community should work together to eradicate them.

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## التطرف الديني في الإسلام والموقف الأفريقي

محاضرة عامة للاستاذ الدكتور / محمود أبو العينين

محاضرة أقيمت في سيمينار نظمه المركز الأفريقي للدراسات ولبحوث حول الإرهاب التابع  
للإتحاد الأفريقي بعنوان ...

يمثل التطرف الديني عموماً ظاهرة خطيرة وتهدد الأمن في عدد كبير من دول القارة، كما أن التطرف ظاهرة توجد في كل الأديان وفي هذه المحاضرة أركز على التطرف الديني في الإسلام باعتباره الدينامي الغالب في أفريقيا من جانب، ومن جانب آخر، فإن التطرف ظاهرة ينبذها الإسلام السمح، دين الفطرة والوسطية المعتدلة وسوف أركز حديثي حول هذا الموضوع في أربعة أبعاد رئيسية :

**البعد الأول، المفاهيم الأساسية للتطرف والإرهاب.**

**البعد الثاني، أسباب التطرف الديني في الإسلام عموماً وفي القارة الأفريقية بصفة خاصة .**

**البعد الثالث، الموقف الإفريقي من ظاهرة التطرف والإرهاب .**

**البعد الرابع، رؤية حول النموذج المصري في مكافحة التطرف والإرهاب .**

### أولاً : فيما يتعلق بالمفاهيم الأساسية

من أهم الملاحظات التي أبدتها منذ البداية في هذا الصدد:

(1) إن أفريقيا ليس لديها حتى الآن مفهوماً واحداً للتطرف والإرهاب، وهي الموضوعات الهامة التي نناقشها في هذا اللقاء.

(2) برغم أننا اقتربنا، في المداخلات السابقة من هذه المفاهيم، لكننا لم نصل بعد إلى الحد اللازم للاتفاق، وربما نستطيع في نهاية المناقشات أن نصل إلى ذلك - لأنه من المهم الوصول إلى توافق، حول مفهوم التطرف، ومفهوم الإرهاب من المنظور الإفريقي وليس بالضرورة بأساليب لغوية، ولكن بأساليب إجرائية، فالإسلام هو أقرب لأن يكون نظاماً عاماً، ويتحمل التعددية في الفكر والاتجاهات، كم إن الخبرة الإسلامية تحتوي على الكثير من المتناقضات في التطبيق ومن هنا علينا التمتع بالمرونة في الرؤية.



لا أن نكون متشددين فنقول مثلا إن أغلب المتدينين هم السلفيين والاصوليين، وبأن أغلب الأصوليين هم متطرفون، وأن أغلب المتطرفين هم أرهاييون ... الخ. فهذا لن يجي نفعا .  
والأجدر بنا أن نعطي مفهوما إجرائيا للمتطرف، كأن نقول :

1- إن المتطرف هو المتمتزم في الفكر الديني وغيره، ولا يرضى بالوسطية .

2- إنه يميل الى العنف في السلوك.

3- إنه لايقبل الآخرين المخالفين له في الدين أو الرأي، وينزع للعداء والصراع معهم.

هذا دون أن تدخل في المبادئ الاسلامية ذاتها لأننا نصطدم مع العلماء المسلمين أو بعضهم ولن نتجح في تحديد وعزل الفئة المتطرفة.

## مفهوم التطرف الديني بين المسلمين

يعني التطرف الديني الغلو والتشدد وتجاوز الاعتدال في السلوك الديني، سواء في الفكر أو العمل، والمعيار هنا هو فهم سلوك السلف الصالح في الاسلام، وقد يعني التطرف الخروج عن النسق السليم والنهج الصحيح للدين الاسلامي الوسطي، وذلك باتباع الأفكار والمذاهب الشاذة والضعيفة، ومحاولة فرض ذلك على الآخرين، وتكفير من لا يؤمن به والخروج عن سلطة المجتمع والدولة وحكم الدين الصحيح .

وبحكم أننا لسنا رجال دين، وإنما خبراء في شئون مختلفة، يهمننا في مفهوم التطرف:

انه يميل الى التزمّت في الفكر، والى العنف في السلوك، وعدم قبول الآخر المخالف، بل وتكفيره .

والتطرف الديني له تاريخ طويل في الخبرة الاسلامية، كما شهد صورا عديدة ومناهج مختلفة من الانحراف عن نهج الأمة والجماعة والمجتمع بدءا من الخوارج الذين خرجوا عن طاعة الامام على وانقسموا الى فرق عديدة كانت سببا في كثير من الحروب والفتن، مروراً بفرق اليزيدية والقرامطة والبهاية وغيرها، وانتهاء بالتطرفين المحدثين من جماعات التكفير والهجرة والجهاد وغيرها من المتشددون الاسلاميين الذين يستغلون الدين الاسلامي السمح لتحقيق مآرب خاصة بهم، ساعدهم على ذلك تشتت الأمة الإسلامية والعربية وواقعها الأليم ووقوعها تحت الضغط والحصار من قبل الصهيونية والاستعمار الجديد، مما جعل افكار هذه الفرق تجتذب عناصر من الشباب في معظم البلاد الاسلامية بما في ذلك البلاد الأفريقية .

وثمة بعض الملاحظات عن هذا المفهوم:

**الملاحظة الأولى،** إن ظاهرة التطرف الديني لا تقتصر على الدين الاسلامي وحده بل تمتد الى الاديان كلها بما فيها اليهودية والمسيحية والهندوسية وغيرها.

**الملاحظة الثانية،** إن التطرف الديني فى الاسلام جعل الغربيين يسمون غالب المسلمين بالتطرف، بينما المتطرفين يمثلون أقلية قليلة بين المسلمين فى واقع الأمر، وهو تعميم لا يسنده أى منطق او دليل علمي.

**الملاحظة الثالثة،** اتهم بعض رجال الكنيسة الغربية وبعض السياسيين أصحاب الدعاية الغربية، إتهموا الاسلام نفسه، ممثلا بالنصوص المقدسة، بأنه يدعو الى التطرف، بل ان بعضهم اتهم رسول الاسلام (صلى الله عليه وسلم) بنفس التهمة وأشد منها، وهذا مخالف للفهم الصحيح لدين الاسلام وقصور فى فهم رسالة رسول الاسلام . ولا تعدو المسالة من وجهة النظر السليمة إلا نوعا من القصور فى التلقي والفهم المغلوط للنص عن البعض، ومحاولة للتشويه لاغراض مفهومة عند البعض الآخر.

### مفهوم الارهاب

لايعد الارهاب ظاهرة أفريقية، بل ظاهرة عالمية قديمة قدم التاريخ، حيث تعددت أشكاله وأنماطه، كما تعددت أساليبه وأدواته باختلاف طبيعة كل مرحلة تاريخية وباختلاف الاهداف التى ينشدها الارهابيون. ويقصد بالارهاب بشكل عام ” مختلف السلوكيات والممارسات التى تنطوى على استخدام فعلي غير قانوني للقوة أو التهديد باستخدامها، وذلك بقصد إلحاق الأذى والضرر بالأشخاص أو الممتلكات العامة أو الخاصة، لتحقيق أهداف سياسية مباشرة، أو أهداف أخرى اقتصادية أو ثقافية أو دينية ذات دلالات وأبعاد سياسية . والأعمال الارهابية قد تكون جماعية او فردية، علنية أو سرية، منظمة أوغير منظمة، ظرفية مؤقتة أو طويلة الأمد، ومن أبرز الأعمال الارهابية أخذ الرهائن واختطاف الطائرات والاشخاص وقتلهم ووضع المتفجرات او العبوان الناسفة فى اماكن تجمع المدنيين او وسائل النقل العامة والتخريب وتغيير مسار الطائرات بالقوة واعمال الاغتيال واستخدام المواد السامة او الملهبة والوبائية وغيرها من الاعمال التى تثير الذعر والهلع بين المواطنين المدنيين وحمل حكومات معينة على التطرف على نحو معين دون غيره.

وقد مرت ظاهرة الارهاب بعدة مراحل، عبر ثلاثة أجيال :

**الجيل الاول،** وكان يمثل موجات الارهاب ذات الطابع القومي المتطرف وكانت ساحته الرئيسية أوروبا منذ أواخر القرن 19 وحتى عقد الثلاثينيات من القرن العشرين .



**الجيل الثاني،** موجات الارهاب ذات الطابع الايديولوجي، وخاصة اثناء الحرب الباردة، حيث كان الارهاب، احد أدوات الصراع بين الشرق والغرب . اذ تشأت العديد من الحركات الارهابية فى أوروبا الغربية كجماعة الألوية الحمراء فى ايطاليا، وجماعة باورد ماينهوف الالمانية، والجيش الاحمر فى اليابان.

**الجيل الثالث** وهو يمثل موجات الارهاب التى بدأت منذ هجمات 11 سبتمبر 2001، والتى مثلت نقلة نوعية هامة فى ظاهرة الارهاب أطلق عليه البعض ” الارهاب الجديد ” الذى اصبح يشكل النهج الرئيسى للصراع على الساحة الدولية، وتتسم جماعات الارهاب فى هذا الجيل بغلبة النمط العابر للجنسيات تجمعها أيديولوجية دينية أو سياسية محددة، وتنتقل من مكان لآخر بشكل يصعب متابعته وتستهدف ايقاع أكبر قدر من الخسائر المادية والبشرية، وليس مجرد لفت الانظار لمطالب سياسية أو عقائدية معينة، كما ان هذا النمط الجديد من الارهاب صار قادرا على استخدام منظومات تسليحية أكثر تعقيدا بما فى ذلك منظومة أسلحة غير تقليدية .

### **ثانياً : أسباب ظاهرة التطرف الديني في الإسلام في القارة الأفريقية**

يتطلب بحث هذا الأمر، أى وضع خريطة للتطرف الدينى على مستوى القارة، يتطلب تصنيفاً لجماعات التطرف، سواء ما وصف منها بجماعات أرهابية من الدرجة الأولى وهذه الفئة تنطبق فقط على تنظيم القاعدة والتى ليس لها جنود أو مصادر أفريقية، وكذلك جماعات الإسلام الراديكالي المتوطنة فى القارة، وهى من الدرجة الثانية، كمنظمة الاتحاد الإسلامى الصومالى التى اندمجت فيما بعد فى إطار المحاكم الإسلامية، ويتفرع عنه الإتحاد الإسلامى فى الأوجادين يضاف الى ذلك، تنظيم الجبهة الإسلامية القومية فى السودان، ودورها الراديكالي خاصة قبل انفصال تنظيم حسن الترابى عنها فى ديسمبر 1999 عنها .

وهناك جماعات اخرى ذات طابع عرفى ودينى، من ذلك جبهة الأورومو المسلحة فى أثيوبيا، وجيش الرب للمقاومة فى شمال أوغندا وهى الحركة التى تستهدف أقانة دول دينية مسيحية فى أوغندا .

وفى غرب أفريقيا هناك جماعات متطرفة مثل الجماعات السلفية للدعوة والقتال، وفى نيجيريا هناك جماعات تقوم على أسس عرفية ودينية مختلفة، سواء فى الشمال أو الشرق أو الجنوب، وتمثل حظرا على أستقرار ووحدرة البلاد، وكذلك بعض المنظمات الإسلامية فى جنوب أفريقيا وارد بعض الانفجارات فى كيب تاون فى أواخر التسعينيات .

### **أسباب التطرف والعوامل المحددة له في القارة الأفريقية :**

هناك عوامل ومحددات متنوعة للظاهرة، يمكن أن نقسمها الى فئتين رئيسيين :

**الفئة الأولى تتعلق بالبيئة الاقليمية والدولية** وتضم الأسباب والعوامل العابرة للقوميات ( إقليمياً وعالمياً ) التى تساعد على نمو الظاهرة التطرفية وتسهم فى عدم القدرة على السيطرة عليها، وأهمها :

1. **البعد الجغرافى**، المتمثل فى التداخل بين أفريقيا والشرق الأوسط، فأقليم الشرق الأوسط الكبير الذى يعتبر المصدر الأساسى لظاهرة التطرف الإسلامى، يتداخل جغرافياً مع أفريقيا بشكل أكبر من أى إقليم آخر، فالعالم العربى وهو المكون الرئيسى للشرق الأوسط يتداخل مع أفريقيا، بحيث نجد أن 3/2 العالم العربى الأفريقى ( 10 دول أفريقية، هى عربية ) ولذلك، فإن الظاهرة الملتبهة فى الشرق الأوسط تمتد لتتطال جزءاً من القارة الأفريقية، ويسهل أن تمتد إلى عديد من بلدان القارة جنوب الصحراء، بحكم التداخل بين الإقليمين جغرافياً وسكانياً وثقافياً ودينياً .

1. **ضعف سيطرة الدولة فى أفريقيا على الحدود**، مما يوفر فرصة ملائمة لانتقال الجماعات عبر الحدود غير المحروسة والسواحل المفتوحة الأمر الذى يساعد المتطرفين على سهولة الحركة وارتكاب أعمال إرهابية .

1. **تتأثر أفريقيا بتأثيرات العولمة السلبية وخاصة من جانب ” العولمة الثقافية ”** التى صاحبت النظام الدولى الجديد منذ بداية التسعينيات . والعولمة الثقافية وما يرتبط بها من غزو ثقافى وإعلامى كبير تسود فيها التوجهات، السلبية سواء الخاصة برفض فكرة احترام التنوعات الثقافية وتعدد الحضارات، وإن التصادم بين الإسلام والغرب لأنه لا توفيق أو تبادل فى القضايا والمسائل الدينية والقومية .

والآن تعيش أفريقيا، شأن الأقاليم الأخرى فى العالم الثالث، تعيش فى مناخ مضطرب، خلقته العولمة الثقافية بتوابعها ومضاعفاتها، الأمر الذى أضعف من تيار الحوار بين الحضارات والتعايش السلمى بين الثقافات، سواء فى العالم الغربى أو العربى، أو أفريقيا . فمثلاً هناك روبرت كوكس R.W. COX الذى قدم ورقة حول التعددية ونظام الأمم المتحدة ( أبريل 1991 ) وهو أحد ممثلى هذا الاتجاه، وكذلك السيد يسين وحسن نافعة من مصر، والبروفيسور على مزروعى الأستاذ المتميز فى الدراسات الأفريقية والثقافات العالمية من أفريقيا، وكلهم من أنصار حوار الحضارات والترويج للتعايش السلمى بين الثقافات والأديان . فعلى مزروعى يرى أنه يمكن التفاعل السلمى والتعايش بين الإسلام والحضارات الغربية، وأن خبرة العلاقات بين الطرفين خلال القرن العشرين تكشف عن أن الغرب أستطاع أن يقوم بعملية تغريب واسعة للعالم الإسلامى المدارس الحديثة، والأستخدام المتزايد للغات الأوربية، والبث الإعلامى المتزايد والمؤثر، وأدخال



التقويم المسيحي الغربي ” التقويم الجريجورى ” ، وبعض العطلات من بعض البلاد ، فضلاً عن زي الرجال ” البدلة الغربية ” .. الخ . فيما يخلق شعوراً بأن ثمة أمبريالية ثقافية غربية غير رسمية تتخفى فى ثوب العالمية قد ولدت وتم اعتناقها ، وفى المقابل حدث نوع من الحضور السكانى الإسلامى داخل العالم الغربى ، ممثلاً فى هجرة أعداد كبيرة من المسلمين إلى بلدان الغرب ، واعتناق بعض الغربيين للإسلام ، ومن ثم وصل عدد المسلمين فى أوروبا الغربية أكثر من 20 مليون مسلم ، ونحو ألفى مسجد ومركز دينى قرأنى فى الولايات المتحدة ، وأن عدد المسلمين فى الولايات المتحدة قد يتفوق للعدد اليهود ، ويأتى الإسلام فى فرنسا كثنائى أكبر ديانة ، كما ان للمسلمين مكانة متزايدة فى بريطانيا .

وهكذا فإن عصر العولمة يمكن ان يتطور على تباين وتفاعل بين الجانبين رغم الانتقادات والمخاوف المتبادلة .

والأن تتضاءل هذه الأصوات وغيرها بجانب الضعف الذى حل بمنظمة اليونسكو وهى المنظمة المختصة بدفع التعاون الدولى فى ميادين الثقافة والفكر ، وبسبب إختلال التوازنات السياسية داخل اليونسكو ذاتها ، وتعالى الصيحات داخل حظيرة العالم الغربى ، يعززها اعتقاد بتفوق وهيمنة الحضارة الغربية .

هذه التوجهات التى تتميز بالعنصرية الثقافية ” زاد منها وأججها سياسات الإدارة الأمريكية تجاه العالم الاسلامي بعد أحداث 11 سبتمبر ، وهى لاحتجاج إلى بيان أو إيضاح كل هذا وغيره ، كإضطهاد اليهود الاسرائيليين للفلسطينيين وحصارهم ، ساهم فى إحساس المسلمين بان ثقافتهم ودينهم يتعرض للضرب والحصار ، مما دفع جماعات هنا وهناك ، بما فيها جماعات افريقية ، إلى تبني مواقف متطرفة ، وربما يمثل نمو الارهاب عند بعض الأوساط والجماعات ، وهذا يعنى فى تحليلنا الأخير اننا نعيش فى بيئة عالمية مضطربة ، يتعرض فيها المسلمون للطعن والغزو ووتتعرض ثقافتهم و دينهم للحصار .

#### 4- تتميز البيئة الأفريقية بظاهرة انتشار الصراعات، وخاصة الصراعات الداخلية، التى تتشابه فيها العوامل العرقية مع العوامل الثقافية والدينية والطائفية .

فأفريقيا تستأثر منذ التسعينيات بحوالى 1/2 عدد الصراعات الداخلية فى العالم كله ، وهى صراعات تمتد تأثيراتها لتعبر حدود الدولة الواحدة إلى الدول المجاورة بفعل الامتدادات القبلية والعرقية خاصة فى أفريقيا جنوب الصحراء ، وكذلك فإن مثل تلك الصراعات تمثل مصدراً لإستنفار المشاعر الاسلامية فى الدول ذات الاغلبيات الاسلامية ، وبصفة خاصة فى منطقة القرن الأفريقي وغرب أفريقيا ومنطقة الساحل ، وهو ما يؤدي إلى زيادة موجة التطرف لدى عدد من المسلمين فى هذه المناطق وغيرها .

كما تتميز البيئة الأفريقية، بظاهرة الدول المنهارة او الفاشلة ( الصومال، ليبيريا، سيراليون )، أو المهددة بالانهيار، وهذا يعني فقدان سلطة الحكومة المركزية، أو ضعفها، الأمر الذى يخلق تربة خصبة للتطرف وملاذاً آمناً للارهابين وقواعدهم .

### الفئة الثانية : العوامل الداخلية ( داخل الدول والمجتمعات) :

وتنقسم هذه العوامل الداخلية : أولاً الى عوامل ذات طابع سياسي واقتصادي واجتماعي وثانياً الى عوامل أخرى تتعلق بالخطاب الاسلامي والشئون الاسلامية ودور المؤسسات الدينية ، وثالثاً الى عوامل مجتمعية وتربوية وأمنية .

#### 1. العوامل ذات الطابع السياسي والاقتصادي والاجتماعي :

ومن اهم هذه العوامل :

أ- ضعف الكثير من الأنظمة السياسية وفسادها وعدم قدرتها على استيعاب الجماعات الدينية واشراكها فى العملية السياسية - فالنظم التى تفرز التطرف غالباً ما توصف بأنها نظم ينتشر فيها الفساد والرشوة والمحسوبية ومحابة الأقارب وعدم وجود برامج لمكافحة الفساد لديها، كما انها نظم عاجزة عن استيعاب كافة القوى والتيارات على الساحة الداخلية واشراكها - دون عنف - فى الحياة السياسية . فالتطرف الديني يمثل المساحة التى تعجز الدولة عن نلئ فراغها او التى تظهر نتيجة تدهور العمل السياسي وضعف الأحزاب، حيث تضطر بعض الجماعات الى التستر بالشعار الديني لجذب الجماهير ألى المشروع الايماني بعد عجز أو فشل المشروع المدني ” الذى تمثله الدولة ونظامها السياسي.

ب- التطرف العلماني والتقليد للغرب، فبعض الدول الإسلامية لاتتصرف بحكمة إزاء موجات الانحراف والانحلال الخلقي وانتشار الرذائل وتقشي البغاء، وتقسخ الأسرة وتمزق الروابط الاجتماعية وشيوع المخدرات والخمر، والزواج العرفي، وما إلى ذلك من أمور تتصادم مع القيم الدينية والأخلاقية فى الإسلام وتتجمل وسائل الإعلام المملوكة للدولة وغيرهما دوراً فى هذا التطرف العلماني الذى يعد سبباً رئيسياً فى ولادة التطرف الديني والتعصب والعنف .

ج- تفاقم الأوضاع الاقتصادية والاجتماعية فى معظم الدول الأفريقية، وهذا لا يحتاج الى دليل، فالغالبية العظمى من الدول التى توصف بأنها الأشد فقراً فى العالم هى دول أفريقية، حيث يعيش الفرد فى المتوسط على دولار واحد فى اليوم، وهذه الأوضاع المتردية تمثل بيئة خصبة للتطرف وانتشاره، فالارتباط بالجماعات المتطرفة، أو حتى الإرهابية المسيسة يمثل مخرجاً من هذه الأوضاع المتعاقبة .



تفاقم الأوضاع الاقتصادية والاجتماعية فى معظم الدول الأفريقية، وهذا لا يحتاج الى دليل، فالغالبية العظمى من الدول التى توصف بأنها الأشد فقراً فى العالم هى دول أفريقية، حيث يعيش الفرد فى المتوسط على دولارا واحدا فى اليوم، وهذه الأوضاع المتردية تمثل بيئة خصبة للتطرف وانتشاره، فالارتباط بالجماعات المتطرفة، أو حتى الإرهابية المسيسة يمثل مخرجاً من هذه الأوضاع المتعاقبة .

## 2 . العوامل ذات الطابع الديني ودور المؤسسات الدينية :

ومن أهم هذه العوامل :

1. ضعف المؤسسات الدينية الرسمية، وعدم قدرة رجال الدين والعلماء المتخصصين فى الرد على الأفكار المتطرفة وتفنيدها وبيان الصحيح فى مجال العبادة .
2. الخطاب الإسلامى فى الساحة غير قادر على التوجيه والتثيت والإرشاد الدينى وذلك لعدم قدرة الخطباء وضعف تأهيلهم ، الأمر الذى يمكن المتطرفين من إعتلاء المساجد أو الزوايا الصغيرة وتوجيه الشباب نحو الفكر المتطرف .
3. عدم وجود معاهد متخصصة لتخريج الدعاة والخطباء وخاصة فى ظل الهجمات الشرسة للمتشددين دينياً، وكذلك عدم وجود دورات للخطباء الموجودين حالياً لاعادة تأهيلهم ورفع قدراتهم للحوار مع المتشددين وتقديم الإسلام الصحيح للناس .
4. عدم وجود حركة ترجمة للمؤلفات الإسلامية للدول الأفريقية بلغاتها المحلية أو اللغات التى يتحدثها الناس، بحيث يتم اختيار ترجمة المؤلفات التى تتميز بالوسطية والأعتدال فى الفكر الدينى مما ترك الساحة للكتب الصفراء وانصاف المتعلمين الذين لا يميزون بين الإسلام الصحيح وغيره .

## 3. عوامل مجتمعية وتربوية وأمنية، ومن بين أهم تلك العوامل :

- أ- ضعف التنشئة الأسرية والاجتماعية، خاصة فى النواحي الأخلاقية والدينية .
- ب- عدم قدرة المؤسسات التربوية والتعليمية ( خاصة المدارس ) على تربية النشئ وتحسينه ذاتياً، وإبعاده عن التطرف والتشرد .
- ج- البطالة وعدم وجود فرص عمل للشباب بعد التخرج، فالفراغ والبطالة والفقر مقدمة طبيعية كى يكون هؤلاء صيداً سهلاً للمتسلطين والمتشددين.

- د- ضعف الاجهزة الامنية وتهالكها، وعدم قدرتها على التخطيط للوقاية والمواجهة بأساليب علمية لظاهرة التطرف والتعامل بمسؤولية مع المتطرفين.
- ه- عدم القدرة على اتخاذ اجراءات صارمة للحد من تسلل المتطرفين وكتبهم وشروئهم والكاسيتات التى يروجون من خلالها فكرهم المتشدد.
- و- عدم القدرة على تعبئة الجماهير واشراكها فى مكافحة الظاهرة، سواء على مستوى الفرد أو الأسرة او النادي أو النقابات والأحزاب .

### ثالثا : الموقف الأفريقي من ظاهرة التطرف والارهاب

تظهر أهمية الموقف الافريقي من ظاهرة الارهاب عموما، على ضوء عدة حقائق :

**الحقيقية الأولى،** أن أفريقيا، رغم أنها ليست الاساس للتطرف والارهاب أصلا، إلا انها صارت هدفا لبعض الجماعات الارهابية، تمثل ذلك فى المحاولة الفاشلة لاغتيال الرئيس مبارك فى أديس أبابا يونيو عام 1995، وتقجير سفارتي الولايات المتحدة فى كل من كينيا وتنزانيا فى أغسطس 1998، وقتل السياح الاجانب فى الأقصر، وخطف العاملين فى الصليب الأحمر فى اثيوبيا وغيرها.

**والحقيقة الثانية،** أن بعض المناطق فى القارة الافريقية صارت متهمه ارهابيا من قبل الولايات المتحدة وخاصة بعد احداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر 2001، واهم هذه المناطق منطقة القرن الافريقي فى شرق افريقيا ومنطقة الساحل الافريقي التى تضم الدول من تشاد وحتى موريتانيا. فقد ظهرت فى بعض هذه المناطق بعض التنظيمات المتطرفة والارهابية والجماعات المسلحة، الامر الذى جعلها هدفا من اهداف الحرب العالمية على الارهاب .

**الحقيقة الثالثة،** ان الدول الافريقية - كحكومات - ودون استثناء، وقفت وادانت احداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر 2001 فى الولايات المتحدة، وحتى الدول التى لم تكن لها علاقات جيدة مع واشنطن فى ذلك الوقت (ليبيا والسودان)، انضمو للمنددين . ولم يقتصر الامر على ذلك بل ابدت كل الدول الافريقية استعدادها للتعاون الكامل مع الولايات المتحدة فى القضاء على الارهابيين ومحاصرتهم ومعالجة الاسباب التى تؤدي الى ذلك، واهمها التطرف والتنظيمات التى تبني افكارا متشددة، كما تعهدت هذه الدول بتطبيق المستويات العالمية للديمقراطية وتعزيز حقوق الانسان والاهتمام بالمرأة والشباب الى غير ذلك من الاجراءات .

ويمكن ان نلخص الموقف الافريقي، الجماعي والاقليمي الفرعي، من التطرف والارهاب، على النحو التالى:

## الموقف الافريقي من خلال منظمة الوحدة الافريقية :

تعتبر منظمة الوحدة الافريقية هي المنظمة القارية التي تجمع كل الدول الافريقية، وتعتبر قراراتها عن التوجه الافريقي الجماعي للحكومات والدول الافريقية .

هذا التوجه يظهر لنا من خلال الاتفاقيات والاعلانات والقرارات التي صدرت عن المنظمة بشأن التصدي الافريقي لظاهرة الارهاب والتطرف، على النحو الآتي :

(1) تبني منظمة الوحدة الافريقية ”لاتفاقية منع ومواجهة الارهاب ” Convention on The Prevention and Combating of Terrorism، وذلك في قمة الجزائر ( قرار 132 في 12-14 يوليو 1999 )، والاتفاقية يأخذ بشأنها عدم تصديق الدول الافريقية عليها (فيما عدا نسبة ضئيلة منها مصر والجزائر )، كما انها لم تتضمن مبدأ تسليم المجرمين وترفض استقبال لجان التحقيق القانونية المشكلة من دول اخرى، لاعتبارات تتعلق بالسيادة الوطنية، لكن الدول الافريقية تدعو العالم لتبني استراتيجية أوسع لمواجهة الارهاب .

(2) سبق هذه الاتفاقية، قرار ( قمة داكار ) 28 / 29 يونيو - 1 يوليو 1992، وهو القرار ( AHG/ RES 213 / xxv111 ) الصادر تحت مسمى ” دعم وتقوية التعاون والتنسيق بين الدول الأفريقية ”

والقرار صدر استجابة للتحديات التي تواجه وتعوق التنسيق والأنسجام والتعاون بين الدول الأفريقية ويدعو إلى :

1. احترام مبدأ الخير لدول الجوار ومنع استخدام اراضيها بواسطة أفراد أو جماعات لايزاء دول الجوار الأعضاء من المنظمة وحرم السماح للحركات أيا كانت سواء كانت قائمة على الاختلافات الدينية أو العرقية أو الثقافية للقيام بعمل عدائي ضد دول أفريقية،/ وعدم دعم أي جماعة يمكن ان تؤثر سلباً الاستقرار السلامة الإقليمية للدول بالوسائل العنيفة .
2. فيما يتعلق بمحاصرة ظاهرة التطرف والإرهاب بدعو القرار 213 المشار اليه إلى ” تقوية التشاور وتعزيز بين الدول الأفريقية حول دعم ونشر قيم التسامح والأعتدال والتضامن بين الدول الأفريقية .

3. وفي القمة العادية الثلاثين للمنظمة في تونس ( يونيو 1994 )، صدر الإعلان رقم 2 حول ” قانون إدارة العلاقات الأفريقية CODE Of Conduct for Iner- African Relations . والذي عبر في البند رقم 13 عن رضا الدول الأفريقية عن اعلان داكار في القمة رقم ( 28 ) والذي يدين الإرهاب والتطرف، كما عبرت الدول الأفريقية في البند رقم 14 من

نفس الاعلان عن ” ضرورة وضع معايير وتبني إجراءات مناسبة وقواعد فيما يتعلق بالمسائل المتصلة بالخلافات الدينية والعرقية وذلك كى تتمكن من تشجيع الاستقرار فى أى بلد افريقى بشكل مباشر او غير مباشر، “ وتعزيز الاحوال الضرورية للحفاظ على التضامن الدولى فى مجال حفظ السلام والأمن . وفى هذا السياق، يشير الإعلان إلى عزم الدول الأفريقية على عدم السماح بتنظيم أو حث أو تسهيل أو تمويل أو تشجيع أو التسامح مع الأنشطة التى يمكن أن توصف بأنها بطبيعتها اراهيبية أو يمكن أن تكون كذلك . وعدم السماح بأن تكون اقاليم الدول الأفريقية مكانا لمعسكرات تدريب أو مراكز لعناصر اراهيبية او حركات، وأخيرا تعلن الدول الأفريقية عن التزامها بالضوابط التى يضعها القانون الدولى فى مجال تحقيق العدالة ومكافحة العناصر الإرهابية .

### الموقف الإفريقي من خلال الاتحاد الإفريقي :

استمر موقف الحكومات الأفريقية ملتزما بمكافحة التطرف والإرهاب فى ظل الإتحاد الإفريقي الذى برز إلى حيز الوجود التنظيمي والسياسي عام 2002، وتجسد هذا الالتزام فى الآتى :

(1) فى مؤتمر الاتحاد الإفريقي (سبتمبر 2002 بالجزائر ) تم إقرار خطة عمل لتنفيذ “اتفاقية OAU لعام 1999 الخاصة بمنع ومكافحة الارهاب، كما تمخض المؤتمر عن الموافقة على تأسيس ” المركز الإفريقي للدراسات والبحوث حول الارهاب ” فى الجزائر ( ACSRT ) وهو ما ناقش فى إطاره قضية التطرف الديني والارهاب فى القارة .

(2) أيد الاتحاد الإفريقي كذلك بكل قوة قرار مجلس الامن الدولى رقم 1269 الذى يعيد التأكيد على وقف الاعمال الارهابية الدولية، بما فى ذلك الاعمال التى تتورط فيها الدول، باعتبار ان ذلك يعد مسألة اساسية فى المساهمة فى الحفاظ على السلام والامن الدوليين.

**وعلى المستوى الاقليمي الفرعي،** اهتمت عدد من المنظمات الاقليمية بمكافحة الارهاب والتطرف بشكل مكمل لجهود المنظمة القارية :

فقد اقامت بعض المنظمات الاقليمية الفرعية فى أفريقيا مثل منظمة الايكواس ” الجماعة الاقتصادية لدول غرب افريقيا ” اقامت أو أسست وحدة خاصة بالتحري والاستخبارات، تهتم بأنشطة الارهاب وتهريب المخدرات وغسيل الأموال.

أجتمعت قمة أفريقية فى داكار فى 17 أكتوبر 2001، ضمت وفود 27 دولة، بمبادرة من الرئيس السنغالي عبدالله واد، واصدرت اعلانا شجبت احداث 11 سبتمبر فى الولايات المتحدة الامريكية، وطالبت الدول الافريقية بعقد قمة خاصة لمتابعة مدى التقدم الذى تم احرازه حتى حينه فى مجال مكافحة الارهاب، واعداد بروتوكول مكمل للاتفاقية المشار اليها، بمعنى بروتوكول افريقي لمكافحة الارهاب .

قمة الایجاد التاسعة بالخرطوم (يناير 2002)، أقرت مشروع حكومة الخرطوم لمكافحة الإرهاب .  
الدول الأفريقية تحركت أيضا واصبحت طرفا فى 12 اتفاقية دولية، وبروتوكولا تتعلق بمقاومة الإرهاب على المستوى الدولى، وهوما دعى اليه قرار مجلس الامن الدولى رقم 1373.  
كما اصبحت بعض الدول الأفريقية طرفا فى جميع الـ 12 اتفاقية وبروتوكول ( منها بتسوانا – مالى – غانا ) والدول الاخرى التحقت فى هذه البروتوكولات والاتفاقيات .

هذا هو الموقف الأفريقى م ظاهرة التطرف والإرهاب والذي يبين ان افريقيا وقفت ضد الإرهاب والتطرف الدينى منذ بدايات التسعينيات، اى قبل 11 سبتمبر 2001، كما زادت وتيرة تعاونها مع المجتمع الدولى بعد احداث 11 سبتمبر، الامر الذى يثبت جدية التوجه الأفريقى فى التعاون من اجل محاصرة الظاهرة. ومع ذلك، ما تزال مشكلة التطرف الدينى تمثل تحديا امام الدول الأفريقية وتتطلب تضافر الجهود لاجراء بروتوكول افريقى لمواجهة التطرف والإرهاب يعكس وجهة النظر الأفريقية العامة وخصوصية الظاهرة فى مستواها الأفريقى.

## رابعاً : النموذج المصرى فى مكافحة التطرف والإرهاب

بالرغم من أن مصر خاضت تجربة مثيرة فى مواجهة جماعات التطرف والإرهاب الدينى، منذ السبعينيات من القرن العشرين، ممثلاً فى جماعات التكفير والهجرة، وحركة الجهاد الإسلامى، والجماعة الإسلامية، وعناصر من الإخوان المسلمين، وغيرهم، الا أنه بالامكان القول بعض الملاحظات المهمة عن الخبرة المصرية فى هذا المجال وأهمها :

**أولاً :** أن مصر قد قدمت نموذجاً ناجحاً فى مكافحة الإرهاب الذى ضرب البلاد منذ السبعينيات والثمانينيات، كما حاصرت ظاهرة التطرف الدينى بكل السبل والوسائل المتاحة، وهذا لايعنى أن مصر أصبحت محضة ضد أية عمليات إرهابية أو إن التطرف قد استوصل تماماً، ولكن المعنى هنا ينصرف إلى تقليص حجم الظاهرة إلى أدنى مستوى يمكن تصوره .

**ثانياً :** ويمكن عرض النموذج المصرى تظهر بايجاز على مستويين :

**المستوى الأول :** يتعلق بالمبادئ الحاكمة للموقف المصرى من ظاهرة الإرهاب والتطرف وضرورة مواجهتها وأهم هذه المبادئ ما يلى :

1. تجنب الخلط بين العمليات الإرهابية وبين حركات التحرير الوطنية التى تلجأ للكفاح المسلح للتخلص من احتلال أجنبى للتراب الوطنى وتمكين الشعوب من حقها فى تقرير مصيرها على النحو الذى اعترفت به اتفاقيات جنيف عام 1949، والاتفاقيات الدولية لمناهضة أخذ الرهائن، التى استبعدت، من دائرة الإرهاب، الأفعال التى ترتكب أثناء المنازعات المسلحة

فى إطار النضال ضد الإستعمار والإحتلال الأجنبى وممارسة حق تقرير المصير وكذلك ميثاق الأمم المتحدة وإعلان مبادئ القانون الدولى الخاصة بالعلاقات الودية بين الدول .

2. إن حرص مصر وإدانتها لتلك العمليات لا يمتد إلى إطلاق الأحكام العامة على الشعوب وتشويه صورتها فى الأذهان، لأن من مصلحة المجتمع الدولى عزل الفئة المتطرفة القليلة والتي تحترف الإرهاب وتجاهد به.

3. إن مصر تؤمن وتدعو منذ عام 1986 بأهمية عقد مؤتمر دولى تحت رعاية الأمم المتحدة، بأخذ فى الاعتبار جميع الإتفاقيات المعنية بالإرهاب الدولى بهدف عقد إتفاقية شاملة لمكافحة وردعة، بحيث تشمل الإتفاقية على كافة النواحي المتصلة بالإرهاب والتعاون المطلوب بين الدول وتوفير الوسائل الضرورية اللازمة لهذه المواجهة.

4. أوضحت مصر للعالم أجمع بأن الإسلام برىء من الإتهامات الجرافية والخاصة بدعمه للإرهاب والتطرف، وأن عدة عوامل ساهمت فى استهداف العالم الإسلامى، منها:

- عدم وجود صورة واضحة عن الإسلام وتعاليمه السمحة فى الدول غير الإسلامية، على نحو أتاح الربط بين الإسلام ومفاهيم التطرف والمغالاة والعنف والرغبة فى تدمير الغير، وقد ساهمت أعمال قلة متشددة وغير مسئولة بتصرفات مخالفة لكافة تعاليم الإسلام فى هذا الوضع.
- أن العديد من الشعوب والدول التى مازالت تعاني من الإستعمار والإحتلال الأجنبى حتى الآن، تنتمى لدول العالم الإسلامى، وقد تم تصوير سعى هذه الشعوب والبلدان نحو الإستقلال وحق تقرير المصير على أنه إعتداء على الحضارات والديانات الأخرى.
- أن العنصر العقائدى بدأ يدخل فى تشكيل السياسات التى تنتهجها الدول، مختلط بالمصالح والتحالفات، الأمر الذى ينذر بسرعة ظهور حالة من الصراع بين الأديان قد تقود العالم أجمع إلى موجة جديدة من التشدد والتطرف.

### المستوى الثانى : جهود وأساليب مكافحة التطرف والإرهاب

منذ مبادرة الرئيس مبارك، التى أطلقها امام الجمعية البرلمانية لمجلس اوروبا فى يناير 1986، والخاصة بعقد مؤتمر دولى لمكافحة الإرهاب، كان التصور المصرى يستند على قاعدتين :

**القاعدة الأولى /** أمنية، وتقضى بملاحقة الخلايا الإرهابية وعناصرها فى كل مكان، وأن يقوم تعاون دولى بين الأجهزة الأمنية لهذا الغرض، وأن يتم ملاحقة مصادر تمويل الإرهاب عبر الشبكة المالية الدولية .

**القاعدة الثانية /** متعددة الجوانب، وتتقضى بالبحث عن جذور الإرهاب والتطرف واستئصالها، وخاصة أن الظاهرة ليست فى معزل عن الظروف الإجتماعية والإقتصادية والسياسية والإقليمية ( عربياً وشرق أوسطياً وأفريقيا ) ودولياً.

وفيما يتعلق بأساليب مقاومة التطرف، على مستوى أجهزة الدولة المصرية، ثم بكل حزمة من الأساليب يغلب عليها التوجه العلمى وأساليب الحوار الأيديولوجى وأساليب التصادم والعنف. وهذه الحزمة من الأساليب يمكن عرضها على النحو الآتي :

( 1 ) على المستوى السياسى والاجتماعى،

1. تطوير الحياة السياسية مع زيادة فاعلية الأحزاب .
2. اخراج الأغلبية الصامتة والسلبية تجاه ظاهرة التطرف، وإشراكها بشكل ايجابي في الحياة السياسية.
3. التنمية الإجتماعية للمناطق الريفية والنائية والمعزولة، وإعادة تخطيط المناطق العشوائية التى تمثل تربة خصبة للتطرف.
4. الاهتمام بالتجمعات الشبابية .

( 2 ) على المستوى الثقافى والأعلامى،

1. مواجهة الإتجاهات الثقافية والدينية المغلوطة بمزيد من التثوير الدينى والثقافى.
2. وضع خطة قومية لمحو الأمية العامة والثقافية.
3. تفعيل دور الأسرة فى بناء الوعي الثقافى والدينى.
4. نشر الفكر السوي وادخال المواطن كطرف أساسى فى عملية المواجهة.
5. المبادأة والإستمرارية - اعلامياً - بدلاً من الإنتظار لحين وقوع حوادث إرهابية
6. ملءمة المواد الإعلامية المذاعة مع القيم الأخلاقية للشعب.
7. التمييز الإعلامى بين التطرف والإرهاب، ووضع كل منهما فى حزمة الطبيعى.

( 3 ) على المستوى التشريعى،

1. تشريع وسن قوانين خاصة بمكافحة الإرهاب كبدل لقانون الطوارئ المعمول به حالياً، وذلك لمواجهة تطورات النشاط الإرهابى.

2. إعادة النظر فى أحكام الإعدام الغيابية فى قضايا التطرف.
3. استغلال قوانين التوبة لإعطاء المتطرفين فرصة العودة.
4. اللجوء لسياسة المكافأة والتشجيع وليس الردع فقط.
- ( 4 ) وفى المجال الأمني.
1. تنمية الحس الأمني لدى مختلف الكوادر الأمنية.
2. إحاطة رجال الأمن بكافة الاتجاهات الفكرية التى يتبناها المتطرفون والإرهابيون.
3. عدم تثبيت الكوادر الأمنية لتفادي حدوث استرخاء أمني.
4. التدريب العملي باصطناع نماذج تدريبية مشابهة بالأحداث الأمنية.
5. اعطاء دور أمني للمواطنين والإرتقاء بهذا الدور.
6. توسيع دائرة التعاون والتنسيق بين الأجهزة الأمنية.
7. التجنيد داخل السجون والمعتقلات وزرع مندوبين داخل صفوف عناصر الإرهاب والتطرف.
8. الإستفادة من تحقيقات اللجان القضائية مع العناصر المتطرفة والإرهابية والخروج منها ببعض الدروس.
9. تخفيف الضغط على الجهات المعتدلة، حتى لا يؤدي ذلك لانحرافها.
- ( 5 ) فيما يتعلق بالمستوى الإقتصادي:
1. تحقيق نتائج ملموسة فى مواجهة مشكلات الشباب.
2. تخفيض الضغط على كاهل الفئات الفقيرة.
3. تنمية المناطق الفقيرة والعشوائيات.
4. إتاحة الفرصة للقطاع الخاص للمساهمة فى التنمية.
- ( 6 ) على المستوى الديني :
1. إيجاد مناخ عام يسمح بمزيد من التنوير الثقافى والدين للمجتمع.
2. التنسيق مع جهات الاختصاص لتحسين صورة الإسلام كدين وحضارة.





3. وضع رؤية الجهات الدينية فى إعادة صياغة من مناهج الدراسة فى شتى نواحي التعليم.
4. توجيه المجتمع ككل الى ضرورة الحفاظ على الإعتدال فى الممارسات الدينية.
5. المساعدة فى تطوير المجتمع من الرزائل والفساد وإشاعة الفضيلة.
6. الحرص على عدم التناقض بين المؤسسات والجمعيات الدينية لتحقيق الإقناع.
7. مقاومة محاولات نسبة الأخطاء للمتدينين والسخرية منهم.
8. حث المواطنين على الرجوع الى العلماء المتخصصين فى أمور الدين.
9. ضرورة المام الدعاة بالمتغيرات العالمية الجارية.
10. توسيع قنوات الاتصال بالعالم الإسلامى.
11. تدعيم القنوات التليفزيونية بكوادر دينية على مستوى عالمي.
12. إصدار مؤلفات بعدة لغات للتصدي للتصوير والأفكار والمفاهيم الخاطئة.
13. زيادة أعداد المراكز الإسلامية بالعواصم والمدن الأجنبية.
14. تأهيل الدعاة الأفارقة لإجادة الدعوة باللغات الأفريقية المحلية الى جانب اللغات الرسمية الأخرى.

وتجدر الإشارة إلى ان هذا البرنامج، لايعبر رسمية عن رأي الحكومة المصرية، ولكنخ رؤية ملاحظة على التعاملات المصرية مع الظاهرة، والحقيقة التي نلمسها أن الإجراءات الأمنية كانت فعالة جداً في مقاومة الإرهاب منذ المراحل الأولى، وحتى الآن تقوم بالتعامل مع التطرف بكل جدية.

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### Disclaimer

***" The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) . "***



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