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Contributions

African journal on Terrorism is a continental, peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary journal. The journal seeks to publish quality grounded research on all aspects of terrorism, counter-terrorism and violent extremism. The journal seeks to provide a platform that encourages critical analysis and sustained reflection of terrorism and violent extremism on the continent.

Procedures

All submitted manuscripts are subject to an initial blind peer-review by the Editors, and, if found suitable for further consideration, to a second peer-review by at least two independent, anonymous expert referees. The Editor In Chief and Editors review the comments from reviewers, and where appropriate communicate them directly to the author. The Editors will inform the author if the original or revised paper has been accepted for publication in the journal.

Length and Format

Authors submitting papers for the consideration of the journal should limit their works to between 5000 and 6000 words, including references, text, all tables and figures. They are encouraged to support their arguments with relevant statistics, pictures and graphical illustrations. The preferred referencing format of the journal is the electronically generated endnotes. The referencing style however, is the Harvard referencing style. Abstract should not exceed 300 words with at least five keywords.

Editorial Comment

The Board of this Journal met in Algiers in July 2019 where a number of reform policies were put in place. One of the resolutions was to get the editions out timeously and in high impact-making qualities. Unfortunately, COVID-19 makes it difficult for the board to physically meet since then. This notwithstanding we have succeeded in getting the present volume of the journal out. As usual, it addresses the rest of the African continent on the emerging issues on terrorism and their management. This feat requires us to specially thank our board members, committed paper reviewers, and the dedicated staff members of the African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) for keeping faith with the African Union's commitment to ridding Africa of all forms of violent extremism and terrorism.

The main lesson of the deaths, social and economic losses associated with the COVID-19 pandemic is that our understanding of security threats in Africa must continue to be broadened. The new issue now is "health issues"; it must be treated more actionably than we have ever done. In this respect, the African Journal on Terrorism would like to use this forum to announce its interest to do a special edition on the security impact of the pandemic. The Journal awaits the indication of interest by anybody willing to serve as our Guest Editor in this respect. He/she is assured of our support to get quality papers across the continent.

As the rest of the continent locks down due to the pandemic, ACSRT monitors the responses of African states to the deadly situations. The efforts the countries put into managing the deadly disease further reinforces our belief in the mantra of "African solutions to African problems". We need similar energies for fighting against terrorism and violent extremism in the continent. The pandemic kills and works against the agenda of sustainable development in Africa as terrorism and violent extremism does. In considering these issues, ACSRT is particularly challenged by the African Union's 2020 theme of "Silencing the Guns: Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa's Development". What COVID-19 has shown is that the AU has more than the human factors to contend with in realizing this dream. Issues relating to health security must now be appropriately captured in our response mechanisms. It is not an issue to be left to those in the medical sciences alone; it is a frontline human security problem that should be of interest to all and sundry. Those fighting violent extremism and terrorism must also draw some cursory lessons from the battle against COVID-19.

For us at the African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) our aspirations for the year 2020 have been slowed down by the pandemic. Amongst other things, this edition of our journal has had to be produced under very challenging situations. But we are here at last on the account of our commitment to remaining a centre of excellence for promoting knowledge on issues relating to the prevention and management of terrorism in Africa.

We cannot but be on top of the challenging situations given the fact that terrorism and violent extremism have continued to emerge as major security challenges in Africa. The situation poses threats to our political leaderships, social and economic lives. Even in this period of COVID-19 violent extremist groups have continued to strike across the continent: taking human lives and

destroying invaluable state and private assets. ISIS appears presently to be on the retreat in the Middle East following intensified international actions which has resulted in the killing of several of its top leaders and fighters including its leader Abubakar Al-Baghdadi as well as the degrading of its assets in Iraq and Syria. However, the group's affiliates still have the capacity to unleash terrorist chaos in various parts of the African continent. This is compounded by the possible return of an estimated 6,000 African fighters that joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

As the scourge of terrorism persists across the globe and Africa in particular, there exist continuous efforts in the areas of policy and research to addressing the threat. However, despite the sustained investments of African countries at national, regional and continental levels to eradicate terrorism from the continent, Africa has remained vulnerable to terrorist aggressions. New terrorist groups have often emerged exploiting gaps in security-development nexus and sometimes contradictory socio-economic and political processes prevalent across the continent to sustain the terrorism enterprise with its attendant consequences. The challenge of exorcising terrorism from Africa has therefore become a continuous engagement for states, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union.

In addressing all of these issues, the African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) is committed to its role as the leading African Union institution and Centre of Excellence for research and training that foster counterterrorism cooperation in the continent. The *African Journal on Terrorism* is the flagship journal through which the ACSRT publishes research from various experts and scholars working on the challenge of terrorism in Africa. This edition, the first of 2020, covers a wide range of subjects relating to the nature and dynamics of the challenge of terrorism in Africa. Our expectation is that it would inform and guide policy processes and other levels of endeavour targeted at addressing the complex scourge of terrorism in Africa.

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**AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE JIHAD: TERRORISM
AS A FOCAL POINT**

By

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ABSTRACT

The perception of Islam on Jihad has been misconstrued by non-Muslims such that whenever the word Jihad is mentioned they understand it to be a holy war against non-Muslims, but the term “holy war” is actually European invention and derives from the study of war in its European context.ⁱ Jihad cannot be equated semantically with holy war, for its meaning is much broader, includes many activities unrelated to armed combat, and is determined in part by legal criteria that parallel modern just-war thinking in the West.

Keywords: Islam, Terrorism, Jihad, Holy War, Suicide Killing.

INTRODUCTION

Many people and scholars are confused about the difference between jihad and fighting. Every time the word *jihad* is mentioned it is misunderstood and thought to mean fighting or engaging in battle. In fact, *jihad* has a broader and more comprehensive meaning than simply fighting, which is only one type of *jihad*. The comprehensive meaning of *jihad* extends to spending one's wealth, to *jihad* by the word, internal *jihad*, and so on. However, in the modern era, the notion of *jihad* has lost its jurisprudential relevance and instead given rise to an ideological and political discourse.ⁱⁱ

The misunderstanding that Islam promotes war and sets no limit in means and methods of armed combat is illusive. Islam as a religion of peace abhors aggression and made armed combat a legitimate phenomenon only when it becomes necessary. Even in cases where Islam approves armed combat as a legitimate option and allows Muslims to participate in the hostilities, it has at the same time provided for rules to regulate the conduct of the war. The words “terrorism” and “terrorist” have become commonplace in the media and in the speeches of politicians since 11 September 2001. Frequently these words are preceded by the adjective “Islamic”. The uninformed reader might believe that terrorism is something new and something which is essentially and exclusively associated with Islam.

In Arabic, the translation of, “holy war” is not *jihad* but ‘*harb muqaddas*’, a term which does not exist in any form in the Islamic tradition. *Jihad*, both linguistically and as a technical term, means “struggle”, and is etymologically related to the words *mujahadah*, which also means struggle or contention, and *ijtihad*, which is the effort exerted by jurists to arrive at correct judgments in Islamic law.ⁱⁱⁱ The Arabic term

jihad has been misused due to misconception, manipulation or distortion of its true meaning. Linguistically, the term *jihad* is derived from the Arabic word '*jahd*', which means fatigue, or from the Arabic word '*juhd*', which means effort. Thus, the term *jihad* literally means to strive, or to exert one's efforts, or to earnestly work towards a desired goal or to prevent an undesired one. In other words, it is an effort (which makes one feel fatigued) that aims at bringing about benefit or preventing harm. In the holy Qur'an the term "*jihad*" is basically used for an all-out struggle for a certain cause.

"Holy war" is actually a term that comes out of Christianity. Until its acceptance by the Emperor Constantine in the fourth century, Christianity was a minority religion that was often persecuted, and which grew only through preaching and missionary activity. Christians were in no position to make war, and indeed Christ's teachings to turn the other cheek kept them from retaliation against their persecutors in most cases. When Christians came to possess real military power, however, they were faced with the task of fighting wars and of deciding when, if ever, a Christian could fight in a war and still be considered a true follower of Christ. Augustine was one of the earliest of Church thinkers to address this question in detail, discussing it under the general rubric of "just war". Both he and his mentor Ambrose of Milan described situations in which justice would compel a Christian to take up arms, but without forgetting that war should only be seen as a necessary evil and that it should be stopped once peace is achieved. Such ideas were later elaborated upon by such figures as Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius. It was with the rise of the Papal States and ultimately with the declaration of the Crusades that the concept of "holy war" came to be an important term. It is noteworthy that the earliest "holy wars" were often wars by Christians against other Christians, in the sense that the protagonists saw themselves as carrying out the will of God. However, it was with the "taking of the cross" by the Christian warrior sent by Pope Urban in the eleventh century that "just war" became "holy war" in its fullest sense. It was only with the authorization of the Pope that a knight could adopt the symbol of the cross. "Holy war", as a term, thus has its origins in Christianity, not Islam.^{iv}

The term "holy war" is thus inaccurate and unhelpful; implying that for Muslims war has a kind of supernatural and unreasoned quality removed from the exigencies of the world. On the contrary, Islamic law treats war as sometimes a necessary evil, whose conduct is constrained by concrete goals of justice and fairness in this world. ^v

JIHAD IN THE ISLAMIC LAW PERSPECTIVE

First, we should have look at the concept of *jihad*, which is usually mistranslated in the West as “holy war”. The term *jihad* comes from the Arab verb “*jahada*”, meaning to struggle or exert.^{vi} The Prophet Muhammad is believed to have stated that exertion of force in battle is a minor *jihad*, whereas ‘self-exertion in peaceful and personal compliance with the dictates of Islam (constitutes) the major or superior *jihad*’.^{vii} The Prophet Muhammad is also reported to have said that the ‘best form of *jihad* is to speak the truth in the face of an oppressive ruler’.^{viii} In Islamic jurisprudence, *jihad* has been defined as ‘exertion of one’s power to the utmost of one’s capacity’.^{ix}

Jihad is classified into inner (greater) *jihad*, which involves a struggle against one’s own base impulses, and external (lesser) *jihad*, which is further divided into *jihad* of the pen/tongue (debate and persuasion) and *jihad* of the sword.^x At an internal level, therefore, *jihad* is undertaken for self-discipline and to follow a right path in life; at an external level, it is to struggle against evils in society, or an external evil threatening society, and this struggle may be taking up arms or equally, by using non-violent means. For example, *jihad* may be undertaken for a righteous cause, perhaps to free refugee children from detention, or against political corruption. In these cases, *jihad* may be waged through a letter writing campaign, public speeches, demonstrations, contributing money and other forms of political lobbying, none of which need involve violence.

Jihad is sometimes referred to as the sixth pillar of Islam, though this designation is not commonly recognized.^{xi} Nonetheless, the term “*jihad*” is surely one of the most powerful terms in the Muslim psyche. “It evokes the legitimate self-defense struggle of the Prophet and his followers in the glorious days of early Islam. What can be more powerful and more moving to the downtrodden masses in the contemporary Muslim world than *jihad*? ”^{xii}

According to Ahmad al-Dawoody, seventeen derivatives of *jihad* occur altogether forty-one times in eleven *Meccan* texts and thirty *Medinan* ones, with the following five meanings:

- i. Striving because of religious belief (21);
- ii. War (12);

- iii. Non-Muslim parents exerting pressure, that is, *jihad*, to make their children abandon Islam (2);
- iv. Solemn oaths (5); and
- v. Physical strength (1).^{xiii}

The term *jihad* is used for right as well as wrong in the holy Qur'an. In *Surah Ankabut*, it is said:

Those who strive hard (*jahadu*) in our (cause) we will certainly guide them to our paths.^{xiv}

In the same *surah*, this very word is used for polytheist parents who used to force their Muslim children's to assign partners with Allah. Allah says in the Holy Qur'an:

If they strive to make you join with me (in worship) anything (as a partner) of which you have no knowledge, then obey them not.^{xv}

Moreover, *jihad* is a multi-dimensional term, referring to struggles of varying levels and circumstances. John Esposito, one of the United States foremost authorities and interpreters of Islam, describing it initially as the struggle pertaining to the difficulty and complexity of living a good life: struggling against the evil in oneself in order to be virtuous and moral. He further adds, that the term *jihad* can also mean fighting injustice and oppression, spreading and defending Islam, and creating a just society through preaching, teaching and, if necessary, armed struggle.^{xvi} Therefore, the term *jihad* is comprehensive which is composed of several elements, only one of which involves the use of force or military means under the doctrine of necessity.

What of terrorism associated with Islam? Is there something in the teachings of Islam which encourages Muslims to go out and kill other people? Examining the sources of Islamic law to see what is contained in the Qur'an and *Sunnah* and how the laws and principles contained in these have been put into effect by Muslims over the years will address this question.

TERRORISM AT A GLANCE

Terrorism is as old as human history. One of the first recorded terrorist groups was the Jewish Zealots-Sicarii who used terrorist attacks to try to undermine the Roman Empire.^{xvii}

Terrorism is, in the broadest sense, the use of intentionally indiscriminate violence as a means to create terror, or fear, to achieve a political, religious or ideological aim.^{xviii}

The terms “terrorist” and “terrorism” originated during the French Revolution of the late 18th century^{xix} but gained mainstream popularity during the U.S Presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981 – 89) after the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings^{xx} and again after the attacks on New York City and Washington D.C. in September 2001^{xxi} and on Bali in October 2002.^{xxii}

There is no commonly accepted definition of “terrorism”.^{xxiii} Being a charged term, with the connotation of something “morally wrong”, it is often used, both by governments and non-state groups, to abuse or denounce opposing groups.^{xxiv}

Broad categories of political organizations have been claimed to have been involved in terrorism to further their objectives, including right-wing and left-wing political organizations, nationalist groups, religious groups, revolutionaries and ruling governments.^{xxv} Terrorism related legislation has been adopted in various states, regarding “terrorism” as a crime.^{xxvi} There is no universal agreement as to whether or not “terrorism”, in some definition should be regarded as a war crime.^{xxvii}

There are over 109 different definitions of terrorism.^{xxviii} U.S. American political philosopher Michael Walzerin 2002 wrote:

Terrorism is the deliberate killing of innocent people, at random, to spread fear through a whole population and force the hand of its political leaders.^{xxix}

A few examples of definitions of terrorism that have been voiced are:

- Terrorism is an act that naturally causes one to feel insecure and frightful.
- Terrorism results in the gathering of fear within people, by way of violence.
- Terrorism is the use of intentional and organized means that naturally stir fear, to attain particular objectives.
- Terrorism is a barbaric horrific act. Terrorism is an act that contradicts societal modes, and violates the honour of man.^{xxx}

If you were to analyze these definitions, and study the level of specification, and the degree to which one can rely upon them to declare if an act is terrorism, you would conclude that all of these descriptions fail to make a clear categorical explanation of the concept of terrorism. These definitions are either too broad or too precise, or not broad or precise enough, and the differences in the definition of terrorism stem from the different views, interests and ideologies that exist in different countries. Every country explains terrorism in a way that agrees with its policies and interests, regardless of whether the definition agrees with the correct meaning of terrorism or contradicts it. This is the reason that you'll find an act carried out by a group of

persons or individuals described as a "terrorist act" in one instance and you'll find another similar act, perhaps even more barbaric conducted by others that is not considered terrorism.

In November 2004, a Secretary-General of the United Nations report described terrorism as any act "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act".^{xxxix}

Those labeled "terrorists" by their opponents rarely identify themselves as such, and typically use other terms or terms specific to their situation, such as separatist, freedom fighter, liberator, revolutionary, vigilante, militant, paramilitary, guerilla, rebel, patriot, or any similar meaning word in other languages and cultures. More so, it is common for both parties in a conflict to describe each other as terrorists.^{xxxii}

The pejorative connotations of the word can be summed up in the aphorism, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter".^{xxxiii} This is exemplified when a group using irregular military methods is an ally of a state against a mutual enemy, but later falls out with the state and starts to use those methods against its former ally. Ronald Reagan and others in the American administration frequently called the *mujahidin* "freedom fighters" during the Soviet-Afghan War, yet, twenty years later, when a new generation of Afghan men were fighting against what they perceive to be a regime installed by foreign powers, their attacks were labeled "terrorism" by George W. Bush.^{xxxivxxxv} Groups accused of terrorism understandably prefer terms reflecting legitimate military or ideological action.^{xxxvi}

Some groups, when involved in a "liberation" struggle, have been called "terrorists" by the Western governments or media. Later, these same persons, as leaders of the liberated nations, are called "statesmen" by similar organizations. Two examples of this phenomenon are the Nobel Peace Prize laureates Menachem Begin and Nelson Mandela.^{xxxvii}

ISLAMIC STANCE ON TERRORISM

According to an Islamic Scholar, *Sheikh* Hammoud bin 'Uqlâ ash-Shu'aybî, the correct definition of terrorism is based on two factors:

- Defining terrorism according to the Arabic language.
- Defining terrorism according to the *Shari'ah* texts.

As for language, the derivatives of the word terror are terrorise, terrorised and

terrorism, which comes from the root word '*rahiba*' (to cause fear). Terrify, scare, intimidate, horrify, frighten and affray are all synonymous words and all lead to fear. Some of these words are deeper in meaning than others, and if we were to follow up on this subject in the Noble Qur'an, we will find that *rahiba* means extreme fear.

Allah, the Majestic says:

...they call upon us, in hope and fear...^{xxxviii}

And He said,

And prepare for them what you can, from the power and steeds of war, to terrorise the enemy of Allah and your enemy...^{xxxix}

Ibn Jareer says: "It is said, 'I panicked the enemy', in that I terrorised them, with terror. And from it is the statement of Tufayl al-Ghanawi "Woe to the Mother of *Hayy*, you struck in their cores, The People of *Kulaab*, the mornings of panic and terror - you struck fear in them."

This is supported by the statement of Prophet Muhammad, "I have been given victory through striking fear (*ru'b*) in the enemy, equivalent to the distance of one month (in battle)".

This is a brief summary of the meaning of terrorism in the language of the Arabs.

As for the concept of terrorism in *Shari'ah*, it consists of two categories:

Firstly, the concept of terrorism in Islam is that of the detested and forbidden, being of the major sins and those who do it deserves punishment and criticism, be it at the level of the state, groups or individuals. It manifests in reality as an attack against calm people through plundering undertaken by a criminal state, group or individuals. This occurs by stealing wealth and property, taking the prohibitions and making the pathways outside the cities not secure and by oppressive governments overcoming its citizens by suppressing freedom, and ruling by whims and desires, and the likes.

Secondly, terrorism that is legislated by Allah for us, commanded by Him, is sufficiently preparing to fight the enemies of Allah and His Messenger, Allah says,

And prepare for them what you can from power and the steeds of war to terrorize the enemies of Allah and your enemies...^{xl}

In this noble passage, explicit words are used concerning the obligation to exert effort to terrorise the enemy, by becoming acquainted with weaponry and the training of armies, so that the enemy may fear them and reconsider a thousand times before going forth against the Muslims. I say that the obligation of preparation for fighting is an issue upon which all Muslim scholars have agreed upon, whether

this fighting is defensive or offensive.

One of the significant aspect of terrorism is suicide bombing, it is addressed to an extent next.

SUICIDE BOMBING

Suicide bombing was introduced as a new type of warfare in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a response to the brutal aggression by the Israelis. As a general rule, suicide is prohibited in Islam. There is a *hadith* concerning suicide, as follows:

He who kills himself with anything, Allah will torment him with that in the fire of Hell.^{xli}

Those who seek to defend suicide bombing do so under the principles of martyrdom and necessity. A person killed defending his country on the battlefield is a martyr and, in religious terms, his sacrifice of his life in fighting the enemy is for the benefit of his people, and it is believed that they can be assured of entry into Paradise in recompense for their sacrifice.

However, life is one of the “five essential values” in Islam.^{xlii} The overarching principle in Islam concerning violence is the famous verse in the Quran:

The taking of one life is like the killing of all humankind.^{xliii}

Islam strongly renounces the killing of innocent civilians, children and women even in war times.^{xliiv} Suicide otherwise called self-annihilation is inconsistent with Islamic law because it frequently advocates killing non-combatants. It is a well-established law of war that non-combatants are not viable military targets. Furthermore, Islamic law prohibits any form of military aggression or violence against noncombatants.^{xliv}

In January 2002, a six-day meeting was held by a group of scholars affiliated with the Muslim World League in order to define “terrorism” within Islamic law.^{xlvi} The scholars were concerned that *jihad* would be equated with terrorism by Western media and uneducated Muslims. At the end of the six-day meeting the scholars issued a statement defining “terrorism” as “any unjustified attack by individuals, groups, or states against a human being; including any act of violence or threat designed to terrorise people or endanger their lives or security.”^{xlvii} The scholars further stated that jurists and *Shari’ah* had clearly prescribed the scope of the doctrine of *jihad*. These sources explicitly prohibit the “killing of non-combatants and innocent women, children and elderly men, as well as fighters who surrender and [have been taken as] prisoners.”^{xlviii} The council of scholars went on to state that

Islamic law also prohibits “attacks against installations, sites, and buildings not related to the fighting.”^{xlix} Not only are the ‘*jihad*’ organizations promoting and performing militant acts of *jihad* without a declaration of *jihad* from the Caliph, but they are also promoting and performing actions that are prohibited and outside the scope of the *jihad* doctrine. Thus these actions performed in the name of Islam are nothing more than terrorism and guerilla warfare wrapped in a shroud of Islamic doctrinal rhetoric.ⁱ

In the “war on terror”, much effort has been expended on combating the symptoms of the problem, but there has been almost no attempt to tackle the real causes. The Muslim world believes that it has many genuine grievances, which if addressed, would deny the real terrorists their recruiting base. These grievances include:

The Israeli occupation of Palestine – The creation of the modern state of Israel in 1948 resulted in the forcible dispossession of the Palestinians and no successful attempt has been made to create a stable Palestinian state or to offer just compensation. The past 50 years have seen an ongoing and violent struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The US, in particular, has offered support to Israel and has both vetoed UN resolutions critical of Israel and effectively ignored Israel’s breaking of UN resolutions. The US’ support of Israel in such circumstances, parallel with its criticism of Iraq, is seen as hypocritical by the Muslim world.

The “Moro” separatist movement in the Philippines – The modern Muslim separatist movement originated in the 1960s. The Spanish conquerors had never managed to subdue the Muslims of the southern Philippines completely, and they continue to struggle for independence from the Christian north, which they see as exploiting their land and denying them autonomy. In the 1972 - 1980 war between Muslim separatists and the Philippines military, at least 50,000 people were killed and one million internal refugees created.ⁱⁱ The struggle has continued without any end in sight, but it is really a struggle with nationalism rather than religion at its core.

Kashmir – After India and Pakistan were partitioned in 1947, the Hindu *maharajah* of Kashmir elected to have Kashmir join India, despite its overwhelmingly Muslim majority population which were opposed to this move. The United Nations ordered a referendum on the matter which was never held. Kashmiri separatists, allegedly armed and supported by Pakistan, have been fighting ever since for their

independence from India, and many would apparently prefer independence from Pakistan also. This dispute also has its roots in nationalism, although it is flavoured by religious differences.

Chechnya – When the Soviet Union broke up, many of the former republics gained their independence from Russia. The Chechens also wanted independence but the Russian government refused. In the course of Russian military action to prevent Chechen independence, the capital city of Grozny has been reduced to rubble, at least 15,000 Chechen civilians have been killedⁱⁱⁱ and thousands have fled as refugees to neighbouring countries. Despite the use of chemical weapons, the Chechen resistance continues, resorting to guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

Bosnia and Kosovo – In the Serbian attack on Bosnia, the West initially placed an arms embargo on the warring parties. However, the Muslim population was virtually unarmed, while the strong well-armed Serbian army continued to be supplied by its traditional allies in Russia. As a result, in the eyes of the Muslim world, Muslims were slaughtered while the West stood by. There were those in the Muslim world who believe that the West's hesitation to intervene in Bosnia and Kosovo was part of a deliberate strategy to eliminate a Muslim presence from Europe. The EU's reluctance to allow Turkey to join the European Union also reinforces this perception.

Afghanistan – The US bombing of Afghanistan in retaliation for September 11 was a source of great anger in the Muslim world, although few mourned the displacement of the Taliban. The fact that Afghanistan has not been rebuilt as promised, and remains a dangerous, unstable and impoverished country has not helped dispel this anger.

Iraq – Despite the acknowledged evils of Saddam Hussein's regime, Muslim doubts as to the motivations of the US-led attack on Iraq, and the 13 years of sanctions imposed on Iraq which resulted in the deaths of 500,000 Iraqi children under the age of fiveⁱⁱⁱⁱ and possibly more than one million deaths in total,^{liv} fuelled Muslim anger against the US and its allies. The post-war shambles in Iraq has also increased anti-Western fervour and the threat of terrorism against Western targets.

CONCLUSION

Better understanding and a comprehensive study of Islamic teachings in respect of relations between Islam and the West, both by Muslims and the others (Westerners) will eliminate the misconception of a *jihad* in one side; and misconception of Islam and the Muslims in the other one. Understanding Islam and Muslim peoples will be one of eliminating terrorism. But the most important is how Muslims all over the world have a good understanding of how the Prophet explained what really *jihad* is. *Jihad* is not “holy war”, but “struggle” and “effort”. This is a very important religious principle. The term jihad reminds all Muslims that Islam as a religion (*al-din*) is never something achieved or finished. The revelation is given, but those who follow it have to make an effort, day by day, year after year, to put it into practice in a flawed and tragic world.^{iv}

Moreover, Muslim jurists operate in a framework that consists of three factors: the sources and objectives of the law, on the one hand, and the methodologies for pronouncing on the laws, on the other. Studies of Islamic laws should, indicate these three factors in relation to all Islamic rulings. This helps outsiders, not only non-Muslims but also Muslims who are not involved in the process of pronouncing on Islamic laws, to understand the objectives and, thus, the changeability of some of the laws.^{vi} In other words, more scholarly works, clarifying and expounding topics of this nature should be published and made available to the public to stem misinformation, propaganda and muddled or cluttered perceptions.

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Meta-cultural Threats and Moral Disengagement - Cognitive Mechanisms Influenced by Islamic State Recruitment Advertising on the African Continent

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Abstract: This article gathered scientific literature with the objective of investigating cognitive processes involved in the enrolment of new members and the operation in the terrorist group Islamic State (IS) and how to analyze these phenomena can be useful for the construction of strategies to fight terrorism. The article analyzes the problem in the reality of the African continent, demonstrating how IS influences it and how it can be ineffective or even dangerous to use simple explanations for a very complex security challenge involving multiple countries. For the discussion, two theoretical concepts were used to explain the psychological aspects of enlistment in terrorist organizations: Meta-cultural threats and Moral Disengagement. Finally, it demonstrates how these cognitive mechanisms are influenced by the official IS electronic magazine, Dabiq. In order for the discussions presented in this article to be pertinent and updated, only recent sources were selected as bibliography (only material published during the period from 2016 to 2020). There are sources referring to a small amount of production on the topic, which is cited as one of the biggest scientific gaps on terrorism (Khalil, 2017, p. 45). In this context, this article aims to gather pertinent and recent bibliographies in order to contribute to the understanding of the use of advertising for recruitment by the IS.

Keywords: Cognitive Processes; IS advertising; Meta-Cultural Threat; Moral Disengagement; Terrorism in Africa.

1.Introduction

Terrorism can be defined as the threat of use or the actual illegal use of force or violence by non-state agents to reach political, social, economic or religious targets and make

an impact through fear, coercion and intimidation (Fleischmann, 2018, p. 2). During the period between 2000 and 2014, the number of deaths caused by terrorism worldwide increased more than 9 times, rising from 3,329 to 32,658. In addition, more than 61,000 occurrences of terrorist attacks were registered until 2015 across the planet (Ejikeme, 2018, p. 41). Despite a decline in this number today - 15,962 deaths worldwide in 2018, terrorism is a problem that still affects at least 71 countries and generates economic losses globally: in 2018, its annual financial impact reached \$ 33 billion (IEP, 2019).

The African continent has been the scene of a large number of terrorist actions: it is estimated that there was a 200% increase in the number of attacks and more than 750% in fatalities in Africa between 2009 and 2015 (Ejikeme, op. cit. p. 43). According to Okereke et al. (2016, p. 5), such actions are manifested on the continent in the form of bombings, kidnappings, torture, murders, fires, sabotage, intimidating phone calls, muggings, poisoning, among others. These events constitute the reality of security on the African continent, which also faces problems such as political instability, armed conflicts, corruption, poverty, diseases and environmental problems (ibid, p. 5). In addition to these challenges, there are a number of difficulties arising from terrorist activities involving areas such as economy, security, human rights abuse, displacement of populations, proliferation of militias, politics and food production. Such effects constitute a humanitarian crisis involving the continent and demonstrate how the phenomenon of terrorism represents one of the greatest obstacles to the development of Africa in the 21st century (Hussein & Usman, 2018, p. 91).

The factors most commonly referred to as causes of terrorism involve deficient education, political instability, economics and government structures (Fleischmann, op. cit. p. 13). It is also possible to gather historical evidence to understand the origin and consolidation of the phenomenon: there is literature demonstrating how the affirmation of authority through violence has been recurrent in the African continent since the times when some of their countries conquered independence, which can incite the reaction of opposing groups which also use force to assert their positions. It is also explained that there is a culture of violence and resistance inherited from the region's colonial past, which can stimulate aggressive mobilizations against constituted authorities. In addition to these factors, it is still possible to discuss the problem of classifying certain acts as terrorists, since this term can be used by governments to label groups that offer resistance to their sovereignty (Okereke et al. op. cit. p. 79).

There are authors mentioning the series of interventions carried out by the counterterrorism strategy adopted by the United Nations in 2006 as a factor that contributed

to the establishment of the phenomenon on the African continent. The operations have caused extremist organizations to move to regions in Asia and Africa that have certain characteristics that can facilitate installation in these places. Territories with little state presence, which have poorly supervised and protected borders and coasts, attracted the mobilization of terrorist groups fleeing conflicts in the Middle East, serving as new operational bases. The region that comprises the Sahel is an example of a destination sought by combatants, being known for its political instability and the existence of armed conflicts (ibid, p. 91).

Although there are research centres and organisations such as the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime that seek to undertake policies to combat it, terrorism continues to represent one of the greatest security challenges on the African continent. Several variables were listed as obstacles to the proper functioning of such strategies, among them: limited resources, destructive criticism by other international agents, wide territory, little technological development, inefficient intelligence service, poverty and illiteracy. However, it is important to understand that terrorism is a complex problem that involves a region of extensive territory and that has multiple socio-cultural, political and economic characteristics (Hussein & Usman, op. cit. p. 91). In addition, the continent is used as a space for the implementation of various policies being carried out simultaneously and involving different countries, which makes the analysis of the region's configuration and dynamics even more complex. Thus, generalizing problems and their respective solution strategies can be quite difficult and potentially dangerous, as explained by Desai (2018, p. 1).

For example, some empirical data demonstrate that investments in education have the effect of reducing violence and the participation of people in terrorist actions. However, there is evidence that this relationship is more complex: as demonstrated by Heyworth (2017, p. 11), improvements in education do not have a guaranteed positive effect on the proliferation of peace. Although education theoretically develops in the individual an awareness of the high cost and the serious consequences of joining a terrorist organization, there is no guarantee that this will be achieved in a practical context. In fact, the opposite can happen: people who have had greater access to studies may develop certain expectations that will not be met by the reality of the place where they live. This can generate a sense of frustration directed at certain political groups, which is capable of triggering acts of extreme violence. In addition, there are situations in which the curricular structure of an educational system can be a vehicle for the proliferation of positions that encourage or justify violent acts, in addition to being able to be used as a tool of indoctrination. Finally, there are records of individuals with

a high educational level among members of terrorist groups. These are some examples that illustrate the difficulty in determining the degree of influence that education has on reducing violence and how terrorism is a complex phenomenon caused by multiple factors (ibid, p. 68; Fleischmann, op. cit. p. 13).

2. Dabiq and The Islamic Propaganda in African Countries

In this way, this article delimits the object of study as being the content of recruitment advertisements used by the IS and how it can influence certain cognitive mechanisms in its target audience. It also intends to investigate how these tools can stimulate the enlistment of native members of the African continent in the organization. The IS is a terrorist group that is based on extremist concepts to commit attacks, with the aim of consolidating a caliphate (Islamic system of world government) (Ponder & Matusitz, 2017, p. 40). The IS is one of the most violent, fastest growing and most financially powerful extremist organizations on the planet. He has mastery over large territorial extensions in Syria and Iraq, as well as regions in Asia and in African countries like Libya and Nigeria (ibid, p. 39).

There are records of South African individuals traveling to territories dominated by the IS to join the group, which indicates the international reach of the organization and demonstrates that it has an influence on the African continent (Cachalia & Schoeman, 2017, p. 1; Shorer, 2018, p. 93). In addition, one can quote a statement by the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram swearing loyalty to the IS in 2015. The IS leader at the time referred to members of Boko Haram as “jihadist brothers”, encouraging the group to change its name to Islamic State in West Africa Province (Onuoha, 2016, p. 3). However, this alliance was weakened in the following year, an event in which a portion of the members withdrew from the movement under the pretext that its leader, Abubakar Shekau, failed to adhere to the guidelines of the IS (ibid, p. 3). There is also evidence of the influence of IS in other African countries. The organization has already published a video that sought to recruit new members to establish a base in Somalia, in addition to taking responsibility for an attack that took place in 2017 in the city of Bosaso, the country's main port area (Shay, 2018, p. 3).

A strategy widely used by IS and other terrorist groups to attract new members is its strategic communication campaign (Ponder & Matusitz, op. cit. p. 40; Taylor, 2017, p. 2; Speckhard et al. 2018, p. 2). Convincing narratives have been developed that aim to attract young people, motivating them through promises of short-term rewards and also in the supposed afterlife. In addition, the narratives use religious concepts to amplify their impact

and legitimize the attacks committed (Ali, 2018, p. 57). According to Speckhard et al (ibid., p. 3), there are several attractions present in recruitment advertisements, such as promises of marriage, sex, money, honor, sense of purpose, adventure and the opportunity to contribute to the establishment of a caliphate.

One of the official vehicles of propaganda used by the Islamic State is Dabiq, its electronic magazine of international reach through the internet. This resource is a tool designed to impact the public in three ways, mainly: seduce new recruits, attract supporters and terrorize enemies. Its reach is virtually unlimited, as its messages are made available on various websites and social networks, in addition to being translated into several languages (Khalil op. cit. p. 31). As Khalil (ibid, p. 32) demonstrates, Dabiq contains images that glorify violence: corpses covered in blood, destroyed buildings and explicit scenes of beheadings. In addition to the graphic strategy, the magazine also exposes verses from the Koran to justify atrocities through Islam. Such a device still has the power to inspire new recruits, making them believe that they are following a mission assigned by Allah himself. It is estimated that Dabiq has attracted at least 12,000 fighters from more than 74 countries (ibid.). Despite its influence and importance for the IS, there are few studies aimed to analyze the magazine's content and how it influences its audience.

3. Meta-Cultural Threats

For the purpose of this article, it is important to present two theories that will be used to interpret the reported phenomena: Meta-cultural threats and Moral Disengagement. Meta-cultural threats (AMC) treat the representation of a group as being a symbolic threat to the culture of the members of another group. This perception can trigger certain inclinations for violence or for the justification of polarizations between societies. This approach is one of the ways of understanding ideological differences between Islamic cultures and Western countries, as there is a history of negative labeling between members of the two groups. For example, seeing a culture as a meta-threat can also lead to an assessment of it as being inferior or retrograde, which, as has been recorded in other studies, has the potential to generate hostility and positions that support the reduction of freedom and safety of its members (Obaidi et al. 2018, p. 2).

In addition, perceiving a group as a meta-cultural threat is a stronger predictor of violence between Islamic and Western countries than real security threats (ibid, p. 2). An underlying mechanism is the meta-dehumanization, where one group believes that the other

sees its members as being "less than human". This phenomenon favors the use of violence among the communities involved in this process, and it is important that such phenomena are investigated in order to better understand the polarization between cultures and how this can result in violent actions. The relationship between Western and Islamic civilization is characterized as one of the greatest socio-political problems of this time, showing the importance of studying this type of relationship between countries. In addition, it is pertinent to highlight a strategy used by several international agents and terrorist organizations: to intentionally provoke the meta-cultural threat mechanism by targeting rival states (ibid, p. 4).

Analyzing this phenomenon also brings conclusions that can be alarming: some counterterrorism strategies can be ineffective in terms of reducing the incidence of the phenomenon, if the motivation of the act has a strong identity foundation. The sense of belonging to the group can be intensified by the aversion to agents who aim to combat this behavior, which shows that initiatives to combat terrorism can fail (if they do not consider the psychological roots of this type of problem) or even contribute to its proliferation in some cases (Eswaran & Neary, 2018, p. 7). As Walker (2016, p. 96) reports, sacred values can generate a feeling of superiority, which in turn encourage a collective narcissism among members who share the same sacred ideology. Consequently, this group narcissism makes individuals more likely to dehumanize members of other groups. The feeling of belonging is an essential mechanism to understand the cohesion of cultures and how people are more willing to fight in order to defend them, depending on the intensity of the feeling of connection to their partners (ibid, p. 101). This polarization can happen between groups residing in the same country, since most terrorist attacks are committed by their own citizens, characterizing the domestic terrorism (Eswaran & Neary, op. cit. p. 2). Countries such Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria and Libya have a much larger history of attacks than Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, demonstrating that terrorism affects regions in the Middle East and Africa with greater intensity. It is estimated that only 3% of the terrorist attacks occurred in Western countries since 2000 (Ejikeme, op. cit. p. 46).

Other authors also refer to the meta-cultural threat mechanism as being of importance for engaging in violent behaviors between groups. Ali (op. cit. p. 56) describes how ideologies that aim to exclude the legitimacy of different cultures and demonizing them as being constituted of potential aggressors increases the likelihood that discrimination and attacks will occur. The author cites a survey where the motivation for enlisting in terrorist organizations was investigated. It was found that 87% of young Kenyans who decided to join the groups did so because they felt a need to protect Islam, while 61% of the members of the

Al-Shabaab group continue to struggle because of a feeling of "religious responsibility" with their community (ibid, p. 56). Among all the combatants surveyed, 97% said they believed that Islam was under threat and needed to be defended. The concept of Meta-cultural Threat can be represented by these motivations (ibid, p. 56).

4. Moral disengagement

Moral disengagement can be described as a set of cognitive maneuvers (self-induced or provoked by external stimuli) that make an individual capable of blocking or altering his moral judgment, allowing him to commit cruel and inhuman acts with little or no guilt (Abraham et al 2018, p. 4; Khalil, op. cit. p. 52). The practice of moral disengagement makes possible an increase in the intensity of aggressive acts, a process that occurs in the performance of groups such as the IS. First, the practice consists of executing aggressions that are within the moral judgment of the subject, so that later that judgment can be gradually relaxed. This escalation model presents a more detailed view of the phenomenon, since in most cases people do not suddenly commit merciless acts. As the violence intensifies, actions that were initially morally reprehensible can become routine activities (ibid, p. 51). Also according to Khalil (ibid, p. 52), moral disengagement can be subdivided into 7 processes by which the moral judgment of individuals can be altered: moral justification, euphemistic labeling, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, distortion of consequences and dehumanization.

5. Meta-cultural threats and Moral Disengagement in Dabiq magazine

The magazine uses the 7 mechanisms that make up moral disengagement and a rhetoric that influences its audience to see other civilizations as meta-cultural threats. IS often portrays the world as being polarized among the members of its ideology, judged to be correct and faithful, and everyone else, labeled unbelievers, corrupt and hypocritical (ibid, p. 117). As a solution to international differences and conflicts, the IS encourages the annihilation of groups seen as opponents. According to its message, this is the path to unification and the proper establishment of the caliphate. By labeling other cultures as being disbelievers and a threat that needs to be exterminated, IS manages to unify its members and supporters while also providing a stimulus for the process of moral disengagement, allowing its members to unite under the same ideology and to support atrocities committed (ibid, p.

81). These are not the only factors involved in attracting new members. The propaganda used by the IS also targets a feeling that already exists in certain Islamic groups: the feeling of discrimination and segregation, both religious and cultural, coming from Western populations. These resentments can generate a sense of connection between supporters and members of terrorist organizations (Taylor, *op. cit.* p. 2).

The displacement of responsibility is very present in Dabiq publications. This strategy strongly favors moral disengagement, as many people feel guilty when they feel responsible for the damage caused. However, the IS shifts the responsibility for the destruction caused to external agents such as religion, the chain of command, its enemies or even Allah. In this way, its members have one more cognitive resource to mitigate the feeling of guilt, and their supporters have reason to believe that enlisting may not be something morally reprehensible (Khalil, *op.cit.* p. 123). The displacement of responsibility is present in 94.2% of the publications of Dabiq magazine (*ibid*, p. 155). In addition, dehumanization is encouraged by the labeling of groups: enemies are characterized as “dirty beasts” or “irrational savages”, as well as deserving of annihilation for being disbelievers. At the same time, IS fighters are portrayed as lions, saviors, protectors and divine warriors. The classification of opponents as a threatening external group and at the same time culturally inferior was used in 100% of the Dabiq editions surveyed, while the positive labeling of IS combatants was present in 87.3% of the copies (*ibid*, p. 115). With regard to the diffusion of responsibility, the divine figure is used to amplify this effect. The narratives presented in the magazine portray the achievements and victories as being reached by the will of Allah or with his help. The divine blessing is also mentioned in order to shield violent actions against moral reproaches. The judgment of those involved is changed when they believe that their God wants them to commit violent acts. At the same time, responsibility for the attacks is also shifted to the victims themselves. The idea spread is that, for being disbelievers and supporting policies opposed to the ideals of the IS, they deserve to suffer the consequences. In this way, members of the organization believe that it is fair to punish their victims with death. Such cognitive strategies can also trigger mechanisms such as moral justification. In 97.1% of the Dabiq issues, mentions were found that sought to justify the attacks through divine will and portray the punishment of opponents for their positions and actions as being fair (*ibid*, p. 153). Religion has great importance in the justifications used by IS and can also serve as a tool for group cohesion. The sense of connection between members is heightened by the ideas that they are fighting together to protect Islam and that they are protected by Allah, which increases their determination to complete the missions assigned to them (*ibid*, p. 123). The

psychological effects of using religion as a tool to unify a group can be illustrated by the fact that religious terrorist organizations are more successful in achieving their objectives than laic ones (Eswaran & Neary, op. cit. p. 6).

Despite the feeling of fear spread by terrorism, it has been shown that it is not an efficient way of causing political or social change. Given this fact, it is concluded that the rewards that motivate the perpetuation of this phenomenon are other, such as the psychological satisfaction of having a purpose, protecting the community and retaliating against cultures that are seen as enemies (ibid, p. 6). This highlights the analysis of terrorism at the cognitive level as an extremely important approach so that in the future it will be possible to understand the motivations for enlisting and acting under the command of groups such as the IS, in addition to clarifying how the propaganda carried by it is able to persuade its public (ibid, p. 6). To combat the effectiveness of the recruitment strategies used by IS, counter-narratives were developed. These refer to stories elaborated with the intention of opposing pre-existing narratives, appearing as alternatives that aim to replace radical or extreme views. The purpose of counter-narratives is to disseminate more adaptive ideologies with which the public can identify, so that they can adhere to positions that do not justify violence and segregation (Doosje & Eerten, 2017, p. 83).

6. Radicalism, Extremism and Enlistment

It is important to discuss the use of the terms "extremism" and "radicalism". Although they are constantly used as synonyms both in the media and in the scientific literature in several cases, these terms do not necessarily have the same meaning. Radicalism can be defined as the act of following a religious conduct in an extremely rigid way, adopting its dogmas as universal truths without necessarily acting in a violent way (Ali, op. cit. pp. 51-52). Extremism is about a psychological state in which individuals believe that their worldview (contrary to dominant positions) needs to be imposed on others who do not share it, and that this imposition can (or should) be realized through force (ibid.). Finally, violent extremism can be named to characterize the phenomena in which extremism actually turns into violence or threat to coerce other groups. In conclusion, cognitive mechanisms related to the enlistment process in terrorist groups can involve multiple levels of psychological commitment and there is no guarantee that adopting a radical view will move people towards extremism or the use violence as an instrument (ibid.; Taylor, op. cit. p. 2).

Despite the interest and sharing of the discourse of terrorist groups does not guarantee that supporters will become combatants, investigating the recruitment process is of utmost importance so that one can think about how to mitigate its effects. Considering these parameters, the implementation of counter-narratives uses strategies with specific objectives: to reveal incongruities in the speeches of terrorist groups, to break analogies used to mask real events, to break polarizing speeches and to disclose alternative forms of ideology. In practical terms, counter-narratives seek to deconstruct and demystify terrorist messages by exposing their contradictions and hypocrisies, in addition to using religious texts to incite more peaceful conducts (Speckhard et al. op. cit. p. 6).

In conclusion, the counter-narratives could be used to undermine the discourse used by the IS in its media. The ideas spread by Dabiq aiming to stimulate the mechanisms of Meta-cultural threats and moral disengagement can motivate individuals to enlist in the organization, so policies focusing on mitigating these effects can be promising. This article brought some details about how these cognitive phenomena occurs so that it is possible for researchers and other professionals to work together in order to analyze how to apply strategies to educate the population about the risks, social impacts and negative effects of joining a terrorist group.

7. Conclusion

For the strategies mentioned in this article to generate better results, it is necessary that more knowledge is produced about the cognitive processes that enable the great influence of the IS advertising on its audience, in addition to understanding the psychological phenomena that generate terrorism. Measures aimed at curbing the spread of this behavior are most effective when they are based on information of this nature, but there is still a small number of researches aimed at understanding such psychological processes involved in enlisting in terrorist groups. This scientific gap needs to receive more attention and be gradually filled with new research in order to build counter-narratives and other more strategically designed policies (ibid, p. 24). It is not sufficiently clear what reasons lead individuals to be seduced by propaganda, to decide to attack their countries of origin or to join groups to fight in other regions. Studying the psychology involved in the enlistment process can make great contributions to the fight against terrorism. The need to analyze this

problem from new perspectives is urgent, since it will be extremely difficult to overcome this challenge through military force (Ali, op. cit. p. 64).

8. Recommendations

Based on the information gathered in this article, the following recommendations are listed for a better understanding of the complex dynamics of terrorism and for a more strategic formulation of counter-terrorism policies:

1. Production of more studies focusing on the propaganda used by the IS, investigating the maneuvers to seduce new members present in the material shared by the organization.
2. Continuity in research that intends to explore the psychological factors involved in the participation and enlistment on the IS and other terrorist groups.
3. Deepen the knowledge about the Meta-cultural Threats and the Moral disengagement approaches producing more experimental studies to support the theories.
4. Encourage the dialogue between researchers and law enforcement professionals with the objective of approximating the scientific area to the reality of the security activities in Africa.
5. Elaborate more scientifically based counter-terrorism strategies such as counter-narratives focused on minimizing the psychological factors that motivate individuals to join the IS.
6. Evaluate the effectiveness of the policies that are already being used with objective and scientifically based criteria in order to invest financial resources in a more rational way.
7. Continue to stimulate the international cooperation in research on terrorism. The transnational impacts of the phenomenon requires a combination of powers from multiple countries to study it and oppose it.

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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE INDUCED RESOURCE SCARCITY AND ARMED CONFLICT IN NIGER

ANALYSE ECONOMIQUE DE LA RARETE DES RESSOURCES INDUITE PAR LES CHANGEMENTS CLIMATIQUES ET CONFLITS ARMES AU NIGER

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PLAN

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ABSTRACT:

The link between environmental resource constraint and conflict has been debated by many scholars. Their arguments are sometimes diametrically opposed. This paper analyses pathways through which climate change may affect armed conflict in Niger. The work aims specifically to estimate the effect of climate variability and associated agricultural income losses on the likelihood of outbreaks of armed conflict. The prime intended contribution of this research is its policy relevance. We employ the theoretical model, developed by Chassang & Padró, (2009) to illustrate potential channels of violent conflicts. Empirically, we separately used the fixed effect decomposition and the instrumental variable techniques. This research contributes also to the microeconomics and of the empirical literature that has been dominated by cross-country studies. The cross-country nature of previous studies, leaves regional (subnational) heterogeneity unobserved and thus limits the ability to derive context-specific recommendations for effective strategies and national policies of conflict

prevention. The hypothesis we formulated in this chapter, climate variability and associated agricultural income losses do not have significant effect on the likelihood of occurrence of conflict, is infirmed.

Keywords: Climate Change, Scarcity, Armed Conflict, Niger

JEL Classification : D74, F52, H56, N47, Q15

Introduction

Niger is a Sahelian landlocked country, located in West Africa, whose geographical position, climate and natural environment are harsh. Rainfall is low and characterized by strong inter-annual and space-time variability. Visible signs that show intensification of water scarcity and grazing land include the river Niger, hitherto flowing running dry, wells going deeper to reach water, lakes (Chad, Komadougou, Dallol-Bosso) shrinking causing problems for herders, diminishing rainfall and shrinking arable lands for farmers. The agricultural lands (both for crop and pasture) are becoming further degraded from year to year because of traditional farming methods (tillage) and population growth, notably near the urban centres (Bello and Maman, 2015).

This study seeks to deepen our understanding of how climate change can trigger armed conflict between actors (rebels, terrorists and state and between farmers and herders) in Niger. Conflicts are increasingly concentrated in the poorest portion of the world's countries. For about three (3) decades (from 1990) Niger is facing many insecurity problems starting from rebellion, terrorism (Boko Haram, AQMI) to repetitive conflict between farmers and herders. Though climatic conditions per se, do not cause conflict (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015), but changes in climate parameters can alter the conditions under which certain social interactions occur and thus have the potential to change the likelihood that conflict occurs. According to Homer-Dixon, (1995) poor countries will be the first to experience conflict caused by environmental degradation. Also, given the characteristics of the country, we believe that it is part of the bottom billion as defined by (Collier and Hoeffler, 2007). Niger is one of the poorest countries as shown in the recent (last position from 2008-2015) Human Development Index (HDI) classification. Thus, any efforts to address armed conflicts will go a long way to ensuring food security. The losses occasioned by armed conflicts may not be compensate by schemes such as subsidizing food price, redistribution programs or by developing crop insurance given the poor nature of the country. Economic productivity

in areas with predominantly rain-fed agriculture, such as Niger, could be inherently sensitive to climate variability and extreme weather events. Accordingly, the opportunity cost of joining violent action to compensate potential losses would decrease in periods with unfavourable climatic conditions. To redress their grievances individuals may be motivated to join and/or support an active opposition movement or a terrorist organization, thus increasing the likelihood of violence escalation.

✓ **Research Objective**

The main objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of how resource scarcity due to climate change causes armed conflict in Niger. It specifically aims to: Estimate the effect of climate variability and associated agricultural income losses on the likelihood of outbreaks of armed conflict in Niger. We made the hypothesis that climate variability and associated agricultural income losses do not have significant effect on the likelihood of occurrence of conflicts.

Literature Review

This section reviews the empirical literature on climate/environmental change and intrastate conflict, with special attention to intergroup conflict. It focuses on how precipitation and temperature anomalies may lead to conflict.

There are three effects of climate change (natural disasters, sea-level rise, and increasing resource scarcity) that are frequently assumed to lead to loss of livelihood, economic decline, and increased insecurity, either directly or through forced migration. Interacting with poor governance, societal inequalities, and a bad neighbourhood, these factors in turn may promote political and economic instability, social fragmentation, migration, and inappropriate responses from governments (Theisen et al., 2013). Likely, this will motivate individuals or groups to fight in order to redress their grievances. It is then clear that climatic conditions never cause conflict alone, but changes in climate can alter the conditions under which certain social interactions occur and thus have the potential to change the likelihood that conflict happens. In other words, climatic conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for conflicts to occur, but changes in climatic conditions could have measurable impact on the probability and intensity of conflict, holding other conflict-related factors fixed (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015). To date, the central

empirical challenge addressed by the literature has been to quantify this effect. Since our study area, Niger, is a landlocked country, we reviewed only works dealing with natural disasters and resource scarcity and our interest is not in reviewing work on sea level rise.

✓ **Changes in precipitation and temperature**

There is highly publicized quantitative literature that links hot temperatures to individual aggression, including violent crime and riots. According to Anderson (2001), global warming may increase violence. But the causal mechanism proposed in this study is different from the scarcity thesis that is at the core of the relationship proposed in the literature on climate change and armed conflict (Reuveny 2007; Burke, et al. 2009), and the type of conflict is also different. Other researchers focused on mechanisms through which abundant rainfall ruined harvests and lead to property crime (Mehlum, et al., 2006) in Bavaria. In studying witch killings in a rural Tanzanian district, Miguel (2005) concludes that both positive and negative extremes in rainfall increased its frequency. Lecoutere, et al. (2010) also used a field experiment from semi-arid Tanzania, and they find that water scarcity drives conflict behaviour, particularly for poor and marginalized households. According to Hidalgo, et al. (2010) rainfall deviations (used as an instrument for agricultural economic shocks) lead the rural poor to invade large landholdings in Brazil, and particularly in municipalities with a highly unequal land distribution. From these works, one can expect that when climatic conditions are worse it will coincide with more armed conflict.

Some quantitative studies of conflict in Africa have found social violence and communal conflict to be most likely in or following wet periods (e.g. Raleigh and Kniveton 2012; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Theisen 2012). Other scholars found that the risk of violence increased in dry years (Fjelde and von Uexkull 2012). Qualitative researchers, especially anthropologists, found that in Africa death rates in years with abundant rainfall are higher than in dry years (Adano and Witsenburg 2009; Adano, et al. 2012) or in seasons with less vegetation (Meier, et al., 2007). The argument is that dry periods are associated with cooperative behaviour (Eaton, 2008). According to Homer-Dixon decreasing access to renewable resources increases frustration, which in turn creates grievances from individuals against the state, weakens the state capacity to satisfy basic needs, and increases the opportunity for instigating an insurrection. This

author identifies three types of environmental scarcity: (1) supply induced scarcity, it is the reduction of the availability of renewable resources due to consumption and degradation that develop faster than regeneration; (2) demand induced scarcity, which is a consequence of population growth and/or increased the consumption per capita; and (3) structural scarcity caused by an unequal distribution of access to natural resources (Homer-Dixon, 1994; 1999). These components may give room to groups facing resource scarcity to migrate into areas that are already ecologically stressed. Thus, increases the risk of violence between natives and migrants¹.

The optimists (e.g. Gleditsch, 1998, de Soysa, 2002a, 2002b; Matthew, et al. 2003; Barnett and Adger, 2007; Salehyan, 2008, Koubi)² summarize the arguments as follow: even though environmental changes exacerbate resource scarcity, violent conflict is not a foregone conclusion. Moreover, even if violent conflict occurs, resource scarcity is unlikely to be the main cause. In this paper we defend the point that resource scarcity in a very weak state and world record in total fertility rate is likely one of the main reasons of conflict escalation. The literature is more on cross-country studies and this could probably explain some inconsistency of conclusion. We conduct our work at country level and do not consider the population to be constant as in the original model of Chassang and Pedro-i-Miquel (2009).

From this review, it is clear that there is no consensus on empirical findings linking climatic conditions to conflict. This is partly because of the diversity of indicators applied, differences in samples, time periods, type of conflict studied, and estimation techniques. Broadly speaking, the econometric literature summarised above suggests that different classes of conflict, in different contexts and at different scales of analysis, have a general argument that their likelihood of occurring is influenced by climatic conditions.

¹The neo-Malthusian arguments, in majority, are in fact motivated by observations of low-intensity communal disputes over scarce natural resources.

²The majority of Cornucopian do not believe that resource scarcity leads to major violent conflict, but they do acknowledge that smaller-scale violent conflict over scarce resources is possible, though not unavoidable. Therefore, the main disagreement between neo-Malthusians and cornucopian appears to concern primarily the deterministic character of the neo-Malthusian argument and the expected frequency of larger-scale violent conflict.

✓ **The Empirical Problem**

As with most of economic problems, studying the climate change and conflict nexus is not straightforward. The ideal situation would be to observe two identical populations or societies, change the climate of one, and observe whether this treatment will lead to more or less conflict relative to the control group. Given that climate cannot be experimentally manipulated, researchers have relied on natural experiments in which plausibly exogenous variation in climatic variables generates changes in conflict risk that can be measured by an econometrician (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015).

Methodology

To achieve the objective of this work (which is to determine how climate change interacting with socioeconomic parameters may cause violent conflict in Niger) we applied the Padro-i-Miquel (2009) modified model.

✓ **Theoretical Model**

In the original model, Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel (2009) considered two actors who have to decide whether to engage in costly conflict and redistribution when bargaining fails. We will also consider the Baysan, et al. (2014) enrichment on the basic model with additional mechanisms that have been proposed but, were not in the original analysis.

Consider two groups $i \in \{1, 2\}$ sharing territory of size N . For instance, land is used to produce crops for farmers and to feed animals for herders. Each group uses land for production purposes. Groups cannot commit to not attacking one another in an infinite number of periods, indexed by t . Each group begins each period with the landholdings they controlled at the end of the previous period. If a transfer exists between groups that avoids conflict, it is implemented. If such a transfer does not exist, a conflict takes place. The winning group appropriates the land and the output of the losing group. The losing group receives a payoff of zero, and the game concludes. Each group has assets with productivity θ_t that produces $\theta_t l$ output when combined with l units of labour (Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel (2009) set $l = 1$). We follow the Burke, Hsiang, and

Miguel (2015) specification to enrich the model to account for a population n_t (not all of whom must be labourers) that consume this output for a per capita, per period consumption of $\theta_t l/n_t$ under non-conflict conditions. We believe that this consideration of population in the model is more realistic than assuming $\left(\frac{l}{n_t}\right) = 1$ in the context of Niger, which leads the world in terms of total fertility rate. If one of the agents attacks the other first, then it gains a first-strike advantage and captures all of the opponent's output and assets with probability $P_t > 0.5$. Such an attack costs both the aggressor and defender a fraction $c > 0$ of output because both groups divert c units of labour from production to fighting. If both groups choose to attack simultaneously, they are each considered to win with probability of 0.5. Following Baysan et al. (2014), an attacker is assumed to have a non-rival psychological consumption value of violence γ_t ; if the attacker dislikes being violent, then $\gamma_t < 0$, and $\gamma_t > 0$ if the attacker derives positive utility from violence.

In the original formulation, if a group loses the conflict, then it is removed from the game. If there is no attack in the current period, then each group expects a peaceful continuation value V^P , which is the discounted per capita utility of expected future consumption from the group's initial assets and which captures expectations about the future values of all parameters. Similarly, if an attacker wins, then it has a continuation value of victory V^V , which is the per capita expected utility from consumption of both the attacker's initial assets and the assets the attacker captures from its opponent. Let δ be the per period discount rate.

Considering the modification (n_t and γ_t) of the original model of Chassang & Padro-i-Miquel (2009) the condition for no conflict is as follows:

$$\underbrace{\frac{\theta_t l}{n_t} + \delta V^P}_{\text{value-of-peace}} > \underbrace{P_t \left(2 \frac{\theta_t l}{n_t} (1 - c) + \delta V^V \right)}_{\text{value-of-attacking}} + \gamma_t \quad (1)$$

Simply put, it means a group finds it privately beneficial not to attack, if the per capita value of consuming all output with initial assets plus discounted expected utility under peace δV^P exceeds the expected utility of consumption from both the groups' original assets and captured assets, minus expenditures on the conflict, plus the expected continuation value $P_t \delta V^V$ and the consumption value of violence γ_t , which is

experienced with certainty.

Because we are dealing with intergroup conflict (between state and terrorists, farmers and herders, rebels and state), we are not assuming that $l = n_t = 1$. Then when rearranging the inequality (1) we have:

$$\frac{\theta_t l}{n_t} (1 - 2P_t(1 - c)) - \gamma_t > \delta (P_t V^V - V^P), (2)$$

where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the marginal value of peace in the current period weighed against the discounted marginal expected utility from attacking on the right-hand side. For expositional purposes, we will assume that initially this inequality is satisfied, and thus there is no conflict. From that baseline, we will then consider how marginal changes in parameter values driven by climate might cause this inequality to be violated.

✓ Empirical Model

To test our hypothesis on the climate change increasing resource scarcity and armed conflict relationship we used panel data from all regions (eight in number) of the country for the period 1990–2016. In practice, we used a combination of the two common techniques (Two stage method and Instrumental variable method) in the literature to deal with our hypothesis.

- We first follow Koubiet *al.* (2012) and Bergholt and Lujala (2012) in not using an instrumental variable approach merely as a technical solution, as previous studies have done (e.g. Miguel et al., 2004). Indeed, we hypothesize that climate variability may indirectly affect the probability of armed conflict via its effect on agricultural income. Given that conflict escalation and the state of the economy are not independent of each other (see Blomberg and Hess 2002; Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker, 2006), as shown by our descriptive statistics (in result section), we employ a two-stage procedure. We use measures of precipitation and temperature deviations to estimate per capita agricultural income in the first stage of the model.

$$Agricom_{it} = \beta_{1i} + \beta_{1,0} prep_{it} + \beta_{1,1} temp_{it} + \gamma_1 X_{it} + \alpha_1 yeartrend_{it} + \varepsilon_{1it} \text{ (Eq. 1)}$$

where locations are represented by i , observational periods are represented by t , β is our parameter of interest, and ε is the error term. Precipitation and temperature are our measure of climate variability. Time fixed effects *yeartrend* flexibly account for other time-trending variables such as gradual demographic changes or economic growth that could be correlated with both climate and conflict.

To investigate the underlying mechanisms, we include interaction terms between agricultural income and the national governance indicator in the baseline equation. These interaction terms capture the effect of latent tensions and shed light on factors that create a spark which fuels tensions and can lead to armed conflicts (Couttenier and Raphaël, 2011). We then estimate the following equation:

$$Agricom_{it} * Governance_{i,t} = \beta_{1i} + \beta_{1,0} prep_{it} + \beta_{1,1} temp_{it} + \gamma_1 X_{it} + \alpha_1 yeartrend_{it} + \varepsilon_{1it} \quad (\text{Eq. 2})$$

We then estimate the effect of predicted agricultural income and the predicted interaction term on armed conflict in the second-stage equation:

$$Conflict_{it} = \beta_{2i} + \beta_{2,0} percagricom_{i,t} + \beta_{2,1} governance_{i,t} + \beta_{2,2} (agricom_{i,t} * governance_{i,t}) + \gamma_2 X_{it} + \alpha_{2,1} fatalities_{it} + \varepsilon_{2it} \quad (\text{Eq. 3})$$

Equation (1) is estimated using the fixed effects vector decomposition (fevd) estimator by Pinner and Troeger (2007). This estimator allows us to include time invariant variables, we also correct for autocorrelation.

Equation (3) is estimated using logit regression with bootstrapped standard errors. This approach acknowledges that the likelihood of armed conflict onset at present depends strongly on conflict that occurred in the years before and thus controls for time effects.

- We secondly used the Instrumental Variable approach in estimating the impact of agricultural income losses due to climate variability on armed conflict in Niger. We followed the model as in Miguel et al. (2004) panel data approach:

$$conflict_{it} = \beta * prep_{it} + \theta_i + \psi_t + \varepsilon_{it} \text{ (Eq. 3.4)}$$

where locations are represented by i , observational periods are represented by t , β is our parameter of interest, and ε is the error term. We used precipitation deviation because we believe that agriculture in Niger is more driven by precipitation than another climate parameter. If different locations in a sample exhibit different average levels of violence, because of any number of cultural, historical, political, economic, or geographic, differences between the locations, then it will be accounted for by the location-specific fixed effects θ_i . Time fixed effects ψ_t flexibly account for other time-trending variables such as gradual demographic changes or economic growth that could be correlated with both climate and conflict.

Data


a) Conflict data

The conflict data is from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2010). ACLED is a detailed and widely used conflict dataset developed by the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO). It has the advantage in specifying the exact location, date and other characteristics of conflict based on news and reports within unstable states. Given that the data is not based on survey, it might be affected by selection in reporting, a drawback common to conflict datasets. However, such reporting bias is not likely to be systematically correlated with our weather indicators (Maystadt and Ecker, 2014) and should not constitute a major problem for our identification strategy. Focus is on armed conflict events, comprising rebellion, terrorism and intergroup (farmers and herders) violence. About 535 violent events with two thousand and eighty-three (2083) fatalities were reported in the ACLED dataset from 1997-2016 for Niger. Our period in consideration is from 1990 to 2016 and we completed the database of ACLED by using the one from UCDP/PRIO (1990-1995).

b) Climate and Governance data

Weather data are from the National Institute of Statistics (INS). This dataset provides monthly mean temperature and precipitation from 1990 to 2016. Niger and its neighbouring countries' governance indicators are from the World Bank dataset.

c) **Study Area**



Realization: 2017

Author: GARBA HIMA Maman Bello

Figure 1: Map of Niger showing its 8 regions

Results and Discussions

A- Descriptive Statistics:

✓ *Climate and Resource Scarcity Relations in Niger*

Figure 2 shows how important precipitation is in determining the country's agricultural income. From these statistics, one can easily understand that income curve followed almost the same pattern than the precipitation's one. Whenever precipitation is low (below the average), the agricultural income is also below the average over the period considered. However, sometimes precipitation goes beyond the average and the income remains below the average, probably because of damages link to flood and lost after harvest.




Figure 2: Precipitation and Resource Scarcity

Source: Based on INS Climate data and Data from the Ministry of Agriculture dataset

✓ *Climate and Armed Conflict Relations in Niger*

In general, precipitation variation is a recurring feature of climate in Niger, and it affects all form of livelihoods and all regions of the country.

The following descriptive statistics in figure 3 help us to read how much role climate parameters played in conflict escalation in Niger. The relationship between climate variability and armed conflict is complex but can be traced within certain limits, through agricultural production /supply changes, which may lead to food price inflation and increase vulnerability of rural population. With the hypothesis that vulnerable people tend to be frustrated and more accessible to be recruit for violent organization, it is possible that in Niger conflicts being explain by precipitation decrease because agriculture is of rain-fed type. However, from figure 3 we can also see that precipitation abundance fit period of conflict therefore the hypothesis of cornucopian seems to be satisfied in the case of Niger.




Figure 3: Precipitation and Number of Deaths due to Conflicts

Source: Based on ACLED dataset and INS Climate data

In the early 1990s, a decrease of precipitation coincides with a decrease of conflict escalation. Such relation is explained in the literature as a result of cooperation between actors instead of fighting. The decrease of precipitation from 1994 to 1997 coincides with an increase of violence and this is conformed to the result found by Miguel et al. (2004). Importantly, from 2012, precipitation is chowing a decreasing trend and conflict escalation went at it highest pick in the country. Therefore, it is worth to study in depth using more sophisticated tools the causes of conflict in Niger.

✓ *Resource Scarcity and Conflicts Relations in Niger*

The relationship between climate change and conflict has been at the centre of research recently. Wirth (1998) stated

that “At an intuitive level, it is reasonably obvious that in some cases certain kinds of environmental stresses might somewhat exacerbate the risk of armed conflict”. The salient questions, however, are which types of cases, what kinds of stresses and how probable the risks?

We therefore look through the figure 4 whether environmental resource constraints have an effect on armed conflict in Niger? As in the literature, the later question does not deny that local and global political economies play an important role in driving the environmental degradation and resource scarcity that persistently plague communities. In this section, we used descriptive statistics to read Homer-Dixon (1994, 1999) hypothesis of that the depletion and/or degradation of renewable resources increases the probability of violence between competing

roups.

In general, from the figure 4, whenever the agricultural income is below the average conflict escalate over that period. After 2009 when income went beyond the average we observed a decrease of death (close to zero) due to conflict. From 2012, agricultural income has a decreasing trend and conflict escalation went at its highest level in 2015. In reading this figure, we can expect that in Niger, resources have a role in explaining conflict escalation in Niger.




Figure 4: Resource Scarcity and Armed Conflicts

Source: Based on ACLED dataset and Data from Agricultural Ministry

✓ *Governance in Niger and in its Neighbours*

Collier and Hoeffler, (2004) claim that countries with bad governance and surrounded by bad neighbours are more likely to register violence escalation compare to countries with good governance and good neighbours. We used data from the World Bank dataset of governance to understand through descriptive statistics the case of Niger. The following figure 5 shows that the entire seven (7) countries bordering Niger are badly governed. Indeed, we used the Government Effectiveness indicator which captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE INDUCED
RESOURCE SCARCITY AND ARMED CONFLICT IN NIGER





Figure 5: Governance in Niger and its Borders

Source: Based on World Bank dataset (2017).

We also read the political stability of Niger's bordering countries using the World Bank dataset. The figure 6 below is the description of the Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism for the seven (7) countries. This indicator measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. The estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. It is only Benin Republic which is politically stable during the period considered. This means that Niger and its neighbouring countries are politically instable and badly governed. From the literature, these indicators are part of triggers of armed conflict in a given country.



Source: Based on World Bank dataset (2017).

✓ *Governance and Conflicts Relations in Niger*

The two curves in figure 7 are perfectly fitting each other meaning that armed conflict in Niger has to do with bad governance or vice versa.



Figure 7: Armed Conflicts versus Governance

Source: Based on ACLED dataset and the World Bank dataset (2017).

In order to understand the possible direction between armed conflict and governance, we drawn figures 8 and 9, using the governance indicator from World Bank and the number of death due to armed conflict.




Figure 8: Governance and Armed Conflicts

Source: Based on ACLED dataset and the World Bank dataset (2017).



Figure 9: Armed Conflicts and Governance

Source: Based on ACLED dataset and the World Bank dataset (2017).

In general, from these figures, whenever governance is “ameliorated” conflict escalation will decrease in Niger over the period considered. However, even when there is no conflict, Niger is still badly governed. It is also readable from figure 9 that armed conflict also explains some percentage of bad governance in Niger.

B- Econometric Regressions

❖ *Results I: Two Steps Analysis*

Table 1 reports the results from the regression of the per capita agricultural income on climate variability and some control variables described above. It does so for two different methods: simple panel model and the fixed effect vector decomposition. We conduct such separate analysis because in the literature some authors argued that the inconclusive result regarding the climate and conflict nexus is due to methodological differences. The reason for focusing on the per capita agricultural income is that we do not assume population to be constant when dealing with the most important sector in the national economy and the highest population growth rate in the world.

Table 1: Panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition (Fevd)

	(1) Model PanelSimple	(2) Model Fevd
Percincomagri		
Prep	0.0355*** (0.00981)	0.0446* (0.0185)
Population	0.0000274*** (0.00000215)	0.0000515*** (0.00000649)
Trend	1.318*** (0.327)	-0.236 (0.517)
Tempdevi	2.729 (4.290)	8.009 (4.351)
Eta		1.000 (.)
Constant	-35.24386***	-55.3918***
Observations	216	216
R-squared	0.63	0.70

Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses

(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In contrast to Koubi et al.'s (2012) findings, our results show that there is a statistically significant impact of climate variability on agricultural income. The analysis supports the argument that income from agriculture is affected by climate variability. Both temperature and precipitation used as climate parameters are positively impacting the agricultural income. However, the positive impact of temperature is not significant. In contrast to Malthusianism thought, we found that population growth contributes positively and significantly to the per capita agricultural income. This is probably due to the fact that in Niger, agriculture is still function of labour and land. Thus, the more a household is big the more the man power is.

In **table 2** we present results on the likelihood of armed conflict escalation when agricultural income affected by climate variability has changed.

Table 2: Resource and Armed Conflict in Niger

Conflict	Model ArmedConflict
Percapagricom	-0.348* (0.167)
Badgovernance	5.851*** (1.517)
Population	9.09e-09 (0.000000300)
Fatalities	4.091*** (1.139)
<i>N</i>	216
R-squared	0.53

Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses

(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Our results suggest that climate variability, measured as deviations in temperature and precipitation from their past (1990-2016), affects armed conflict through agricultural income. This result is important because the causal pathway leading from climate variability via (decreasing resources) to conflict is a key part of most theoretical models of the climate conflict nexus.

Though our empirical results provide support for the climate change-resource scarcity-conflict pathway, further research is required before we can move towards closure of the debate. In particular, it would be very useful if we had regional adaptation measure to climate variability. For instance, in the absence of appropriate indicators for adaptation it remains difficult to estimate the effect of climatic variability on agricultural performance and hence on the probability of armed conflict.

The findings also suggest that bad governance affect positively and significantly the probability of conflict escalation. This is in accordance to the argument of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and many other authors. Importantly, we found that fatalities (number of death) is significantly contributing to conflict escalation. This is very crucial for policy recommendation for the country. Indeed, it means whenever people died due to a conflict then the probability of retaliation is very high and it will become a vicious circle. This is very common in Niger especially when dealing with farmer-herder conflict. One could also read this result to be an incapacity to resolve conflict after one

party is being attacked or even to prevent conflict. Though from our result population contribution to conflict escalation in Niger is not statistically significant, we think that it is contributing to shrink the per capita income from agriculture.

❖ *Results II: Instrumental Variable Method*

The aim of this study is to analyse how resource changes triggered by climatic variability determine the likelihood of armed conflict escalation. Our previous estimations have shown that a decrease of agricultural income increases the risk of armed conflict escalation in Niger. From this, it follows that climate variability may increase the probability of armed conflict through their negative impact on agricultural income.

Table 3 summarizes key results from our instrumental variable analysis. In section A regression we found that climate variability to be relevant for agricultural income in the first-stage equation and to be exogenous in the second stage. A potential problem is that climate variability might affect the potential of conflict through channels other than agricultural income. In case of the existence of other channels, the second stage regression could give us biased coefficients. Hence it is not feasible to rule out the possibility that climate variability triggers armed conflict only through agricultural income, we then instrumented precipitation in the regression.

Results show that climate variability has a significant direct effect on the likelihood of armed conflict onset. Indeed, the coefficient of the per capita income is negative (point estimate equal to -0.0107), that is, the confirmation of our hypothesis. When the agricultural per capita income increases by one percentage point, the likelihood of armed conflict onset is reduced by 1.07 percentage points. This result is significant at the 10% level. Control variables such as fatalities and bad governance have their expected signs and are significant at the 5% level. However, the population variable has the expected sign, when it increases conflict escalation probability increases, but not significant at 10% level. In summary, we find support in our data for the argument that climatic variability affects conflict onset not only through agricultural income changes.

Table 3: Instrumental Variable Method

	Instrumental Variable Method
Percincomagri	-0.0107 (0.00561)
Population	0.000000205 (0.000000177)
Badgovernance	1.220 *** (0.318)
Fatalities	0.000952* (0.000451)
<i>N</i>	216

Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses

(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Conclusion

The hypothesis we formulated in this chapter, climate variability and associated agricultural income losses do not have significant effect on the likelihood of occurrence of conflict, is infirmed. The fundamental argument of whether increasing local or regional climate variability due to large-scale, human-induced changes is associated with an increased risk of conflict remains contested, both among policymakers and in academic circles. In this paper we contribute in two ways to the existing literature on the climate change–conflict nexus. First, in studying the nexus between climatic variability and the probability of intrastate conflict we used the per capita income from agriculture, and where these effects may be contingent on the quality of governance system. Second, the cross-country nature of previous studies, leaves regional (subnational) heterogeneity unobserved and thus limits the ability to derive context-specific recommendations for effective strategies and national policies of conflict prevention.

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Understanding the ISIS Threat in the Lake Chad Basin

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Nigeria and her immediate neighbours in the Lake Chad Basin—Cameroon, Chad, and Niger—have faced serious security challenges for a decade now. Arising from the Boko Haram insurgency, a terrorist organization which although began in Nigeria, has since internationalized, extending its influence across Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. On March 7, 2015, under Abubakar Shekau's leadership, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Sanni, 2016, p. 30), promising to advance its global agenda. As the United States-led coalition forces tighten their noose on ISIS, decimating the group, their surviving fighters, including the foreign terrorist fighters, a good proportion of whom are Africans, are forced to return or redeploy to other terrorists' battleground. This article argues that the Lake Chad Basin's historical antecedents, its geopolitical influence, and the emotional fixation of the Islamic world on Caliphate systems, makes the Lake Chad region strategically crucial and attractive to the terrorists. There are indications that, some of these foreign fighters are likely to return and redeploy to the Lake Chad Basin where the Boko Haram has created an enabling environment. For Nigeria and her immediate neighbours, there is a genuine concern that, a fusion of Boko Haram (including its breakaway faction Islamic State in West Africa Province [ISWAP]) and ISIS' RFTFs could result in a formidable team with enormous resources, tactical and technical knowledge, and capability to heighten the security crisis. This study has outlined possible trajectories towards actualizing this dream, and recommended policy options to address this challenge.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Foreign fighter, Islamic States, Lake Chad Basin and Terrorism.

Introduction:

Since 1999, the peace and stability of Nigeria, and the Lake Chad Basin had come under severe threat by the *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad*, also known as Boko Haram. A terror group whose origin remains contested among scholars, Boko Haram's stated objective is self-evident—to dismantle the Nigerian state and replace it with a caliphate. In pursuance of this agenda, as at 2015, Boko Haram had temporarily declared a caliphate over more than 20,000 square miles in northeastern Nigeria; killed over seventeen thousand (17,000) people and displaced more than 1 million others (see Eji, 2016). Similarly, Boko Haram declared allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in March 7, 2015 (Sanni 2016), and since then collaborates with the group. ISIS's remarkable success in the battle, coupled with its rallying call upon Muslims around the world for a unified jihad against the West and its commitment to the creation of global caliphate “drew more than forty thousand (40,000) Muslims from about one hundred and ten (110) nations, including African states, who flocked to Syria as foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) (United Nations, 2017, p. 1). For many African Muslims, particularly citizens of

states currently beset with pseudo-jihadi insurgents, the idea of a caliphate rekindles memories of the glorious days of past caliphates and promotes detest for the underperforming post-colonial state. Thus, making Africa most attractive and a favorable region for ISIS and its global caliphate agenda. Since then, the US-led global coalition forces have mounted counter terrorism measures against the group, shrinking its Caliphate, and forcing its fighters to either fight to death or retreat. The group seems to be retreating. As ISIS retreats, there have emerged growing apprehension that the group's foreign fighters, estimated at forty thousand (see United Nations, 2017), over six thousand (6,000) of whom are Africans, with considerable knowledge of the art of war and terror are returning home. For states like Nigeria and its neighbours in the Lake Chad Basin, the fear is that these Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (RFTFs) possess capabilities and resources to threaten the precarious security situation further.

"ISIS, a religious organization with a political goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate" (Lewis, 2014, p. 10), "is a direct outgrowth of Al-Qaeda in Iraq" (Fawaz, 2016, p. 51). The group has been engaged in the Syrian conflict since around 2014 and controlled more than 34,000 square miles in Syria and Iraq, from the Mediterranean coast to south of Baghdad over which it declared its Caliphate" (CNN, 2019, p. 1). As the coalition forces tighten the noose on ISIS, forcing the FTFs to return home or move on to other jihadist battlefields (Entenmann et al., 2014, p. 14), the concerns over possible threats from RFTFs heightens. For the Lake Chad Basin, particularly Nigeria, the concern is that, a fusion of Boko Haram (including its breakaway faction Islamic State in West Africa Province [ISWAP]) and ISIS' RFTFs could result to a formidable team with enormous resources, tactical and technical knowledge, and capability to actualize their dream. Or at the very least, extend their terrorism to entire Lake Chad Basin, especially Nigeria, and thereby threaten its currently contested legitimacy further.

While many African states have implemented various measures, including multilateral arrangements, such as the France-led 'Operation Barkhane' with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger, inaugurated in August 2014, and Multinational Joint Taskforce (MJTF) team entered into by Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria in February 2015, all of which engage terrorists in the region, yet, terrorist activities in the region seems not to be deescalating. Given that, Zelin (2018) warns that, "more-serious threats could emerge in the middle to long term following the return and redeploy of FTFs from Libya and Syria are effectively forgotten" (Zelin, 2018, p. 10). It appears that, more efforts and nuanced approaches are needed to counter terrorist groups activities in Africa, and the likely consequences of FTF returning from Syria.

For Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, the most crucial questions arising from the RFTFs phenomenon relates to the nature and magnitude of the threat they portend: (a) Why are Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin so strategic to Islamic jihadists? (b) What are the likely threats? (c) How should Nigeria and her neighbours within the Lake Chad basin respond? As IS lose grounds in Syria, locations, and structures to support their organization to reinvigorate their global campaign is essential. Boko Haram provides a great opportunity. Therefore, pseudo-jihadists are likely to seize this momentum provided by RFTFs to extend their presence to the region, to regroup, and relaunch their global campaign. Therein lies the threat.

Conceptualizing Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (RFTFs)

Dominant literature views the phenomenon of foreign fighter from two contentious perspectives—the legal and academic (Holmer and Shtuni, 2017). Lack of unanimity among scholars stems from the fact that FFs "are a specific and often-misunderstood actor category" (Skidmore, n.d., p. 10). Taken loosely, FFs describes "individuals who travel to a state other than their own to

participate in an insurgency within a conflict-afflicted state” (Watanabe, 2018, p. 1). These individuals are “driven mainly by ideology, religion, and/or kinship who leave their country of origin, or their country of habitual residence, to join a party engaged in an armed conflict” (Andre De Gullry (2016) as cited in Holmer and Shtuni, 2017, p. 2). Hegghammer defined FFs more broadly to include individuals who “(a) has joined and operates within the confines of an insurgency, (b) lacks citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (c) lacks an affiliation to an official military organization, and (d) is unpaid.” (Hegghamer T (2011) as cited in Skidmore, n.d., pp. 10–11).

Hegghamer and Gullry definitions distinguished mercenaries motivated to fight by financial gains from foreign fighters inspired by ideology. They also show that FFs may not necessarily engage in terrorism, instead, in some cases, FFs affiliate with a localized insurgency. The case of FFs who affiliated with the Free Syrian Armies (FSA) as an example suffices. However, Hegghamer’s criterion that an FF must lack kinship affiliation with the group s/he joins seems to lack some merit. Indeed, people can be ethnically affiliated, yet are from different states and geographical locations. The example of an Iraqi and Egyptian Arabs suffices. However, Holmer and Shtuni argue that these definitions are helpful only when FF is “understood to be a legitimate combatant, bound to the international laws and norms of war, and afforded the protections and rights outlined in the Geneva Conventions” (Holmer and Shtuni, 2017, p. 3). Holmer and Shtuni’s observation is critical because it brings to the fore a vital element of the focus of this study which is omitted by the above definitions—*terrorist*. It also reminds us that today’s FFs often join groups that are not necessarily bound by the Geneva Conventions on combat but are instead classified as terrorists.

To address this gap, the United Nations Security Council adopted the term *foreign terrorist fighters* (see Holmer and Shtuni, 2017). Thus, UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (September 24, 2014) defines FTFs as individuals “who travel or attempt to travel to a state other than their state of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training” (UN Security Council Report as cited in Holmer and Shtuni, 2017, p. 4).

The last component of the critical concepts yet to be defined is ‘returning.’ As the definitions on FTFs indicate, individuals travel across a state line to join terror groups. Although some of these individuals die in combat, there is evidence that the majority of them do survive—Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Somalia are good examples (Entenmann et al., 2014). When the battle ends, or the group is decimated in a particular battlefield, survivors return to their country of residence or of birth, while others, whose participation in terrorism and insurgencies have rendered them stateless, redeploy to other terrorist battlefields. This paper refers to surviving foreign fighters who return or redeploy as returnees. Broadly, returning terrorists are defined as individuals who have migrated to another state, and joined a terror group in battle, and who are re-migrating to their initial point of departure, or are moving on to another theatre of terrorism or battlefield due to conditions in the present frontline.

Therefore, in this article, RFTFs refer to individuals “who traveled or attempt to travel to a state other than their state of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and who are re-migrating to their initial point of departure or are moving on to another jihadist battlefield due to conditions in the present frontline.

Why is Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin so strategic to radical Islamic terror groups?

Attempts to understand the centrality of Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin to the Jihadist expansionism is better located on its historical antecedents, emotional attachments, and geopolitical significance.

❖ Historical backgrounds:

The Lake Chad Basin region constitutes of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Entities whose history predates colonization in Africa, belonged to two distinct civilizations—Sokoto Caliphate (1804 – 1903) and/or the Bornu empire—which existed as part of the central Sudanic area, made up of numerous, independent states, including the Habes (Hausa) and Kanem Bornu (Kanuri). Historians assert that Hausas settled in the region around the 10th century, and quickly intermingled with the autochthons. Politically, Hausas operated centralized city-state structures the Berane, governed by Sarakuna (kings). Sarakuna oversaw statecraft and economic activities.

Unlike Bornu empire, who due to its proximity to Lake Chad basin, had developed extensive commercial links with northern Africa, trade among the Hausas was mostly intra and interstate. Historians avow that, while the Bornu empire had accepted Islam in the 11th century, owing to their commercial contact with North Africa, Hausas retained traditional African Religion, worshiped Iskoki spirit” (Lenshie et al., 2013, p. 4). Islam was later introduced to Hausa states in the middle of the 14th century through the trans-Saharan trade which connected the group with Tuareg, Berbers, and Arabs in northern Africa; but remained fundamentally elitist religion.

Two key developments in the history of the Hausa states are that in the 16th century, Bornu empire under Mai Idris Alooma (1571 - 1603) invaded and brought Hausa states under its sphere of control (Low, 1967). This was facilitated by the fact that prior to the jihad, the Hausa States had witnessed the influx of large number of Fulani who over the centuries migrated from Futa Toro areas of Senegal and settled in the northwestern Hausa land (Lenshie et al., 2013). “Many of them, mainly Muslims, settled in towns and villages and intermarried with the Hausa population” (Hunwick (1965:269) as cited in Lenshie et al., 2013, p. 7). Through their teachings, Fulani later became the conduit through which Islam expanded in Hausa land, as a veritable vehicle of social change—jihad. It is believed that, by integrating Islam with traditional beliefs, between the 14th and 18th centuries, the Hausas practiced a corrupt version of Islam. That partly gave impetus for the Jihad.

A key figure in the 18th-century Islamic teaching and later jihad movement was Uthman Dan Fodio, a Fulani descendant, whose ancestors had settled in Gobir, Gombe state in present Nigeria. In Gobir, he established his Jama‘a (community), which over time transformed into a militant group and executed the Jihad (1804-1817). Lenshie and Ayokhai assert that “the call for jihad took the pattern of contemporary civil society mobilization” (Lenshie et al., 2013). For which

Dan Fodio had to mold men and women who would subscribe to his ideas and share his aspirations to bring an Ummah dedicated to Islam in order to transform society. [This he did by establishing] a school, trained his students and created a community of scholars, teachers, and saints. It was through these students, the Talaba, that he spread his message; it was from these students that he formed the inner core of the movement, and it is they who spearheaded the prosecution of the jihad (Sulaiman as cited in Lenshie et al., 2013, p. 7).

The Jihad brought to an end the suzerainty of the Hausa states and replaced it with a Caliphate in Sokoto (1804-1903). Between 1804-1817, the Jihadists continued their conquest and expanded the Caliphate throughout Hausa land, extending their rulership across the Chad basin. In 1903, however, the British, the French, and the German colonial armies conquered the Caliphate. The British brought a more significant portion of the Caliphate into Nigeria as the northern part, making Hausa-Fulani British subjects (see Asa 'ad (1980) as cited in Lenshie et al., 2013). The remaining portion of the Caliphate became parts of northern Cameroon and Niger.

In Cameroon, Martin noted that the “religious activism that animated the Sokoto Caliphate continued, and to some extent took a more radical turn as Muslims in those territories vehemently opposed the split and the subsequent secular regimes in Cameroon” (Ewi, 2016, p. 4). “However, the bone of contention among Muslims shifted from liberalization of religious life to protection of Islamic traditions from the consequences of European rule” (Njeuma, n.d., p. 98). For instance, in 1907, there were two insurrections; the battle of Gudumgudum led by Mal Alhadji in July, and the battle of Garoua led by Goni Wadai. Both of which were squashed by the German colonial army (see Njeuma, 1994). However, Njeuma remarked that, “although many Muslims lost confidence in their ability to resist European invasion, the dominant feeling among most Muslims was that European rule was temporary” (Njeuma, 1994, p. 112).

“Borno has its origins in the ninth century to the north of Lake Chad in the southern Saharan region of Kanem” (Austen, 2009, p. 514). “Its political structure grew out of rival states coming under the control of the Zaghawa” (Bilow, 2008, p. 1). Low asserts that, “the long epoch of civil war and local resistance, first in Kanem and then in Bornu, was finally brought to a close in the reign of Mai Ali (Ghaji) Dunamani (1473-1507), who centralized state powers under his office” (Low, 1967, pp. 65–66).

Bornu maintained independent Islamic states from 11th century to 14th and became center of Islamic intellectual excellence distinct from the Sokoto Caliphate (Sanni, 2016). Sanni noted that by 1380, Bornu states had formed a strong empire which “prospered until 1893 in territories that included today’s northern Cameroon, Chad, Niger and northeastern Nigeria” (Sanni, 2016, p. 13).

By 1890s, Britain, France and Germany which had established their presence in the Lake Chad Basin region struggled for influence in Bornu. However, the Bornu empire resisted the invaders. Cohen reported that “in 1899, Rabi (Bornu king) fought at least two battles with the French, winning both but suffering many losses on his own part. But, in April 1900, the French under Major Lamy engaged Rabi decisively, killing him and defeating his forces. Those remaining fled to Dikwa, which soon fell to the French” (Ronald Cohen in Turner, 1971, pp. 80–81). European conquest ended the Bornu empire, and divided her people into Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and northeastern Nigeria (Sanni, 2016).

While colonization and subsequent independence partitioned Sokoto Caliphate and Bornu empire among European powers and ceded its people to various states—Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria—these states and people are “intimately linked by language, ethnicity, religion, and economic activities” (Maiangwa, 2014, p. 21).

❖ *Emotional Attachments:*

The significance of northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin to the Islamic community, particularly the Hausa-Fulani for whom it provides a locus for chosen glory and chosen trauma cannot be overemphasized. Significant progress in the field of peace studies has been the development of the ‘chosen glory and chosen trauma’ theory. Chosen glory reflects “a large

group's mental representation of their ancestor's past triumphs and the heroes and martyrs associated with them" (Volkan, n.d., p. 7). Volkan argues that this produces a heightened sense of 'we-ness' among the group, which binds them together in a shared sense of collective identity. Thus, providing the group with a strong tool to compare and consider themselves better than others—out-groups. For the Hausa-Fulani, the jihad history, the triumph of the Sokoto Caliphate, and the heroism of Dan Fodio provide a high sense of identity and pride vis-à-vis others—out-groups. Volkan posits that chosen glory are generationally transmitted through caretaker-child interaction and by participating in ceremonial reenactments of past success. Most importantly, occasionally, in every society, people arouse feelings of past glorious events to galvanize followership (Volkan, n.d.). This is observable in the leaders of Boko Haram Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau, who in a bid to spur followership and support from the locals, both have linked themselves and their vision to the tremendous jihadist reformer—Dan Fodio.

However, more than chosen glory, "a shared mental representation of a negative event in a large group's history in which the group suffered catastrophic loss—chosen trauma" (Volkan, n.d., p. 7) influences group act. Because these experiences are laden with heavy emotions of "humiliations, dehumanization, helplessness, vengeance, hatred, and inability of mourning" (Volkan, n.d., p. 7). In that perspective, given its associated history of Sokoto Caliphate, including traumatic experience generated by the disastrous loss of the caliphate, and the accompanying humiliation and helplessness following the British conquest of the region in 1904, northern Nigeria is essential to Hausa-Fulani.

As Vamik Volkan noted, the importance of the events of the shared memory, in this case, reminiscences of the Europeans' defeat of the Sokoto Caliphate and the Bornu empire coupled with their split into various states is that it binds the people together. Thus, enabling them to mourn over their loss as a group, and to attempt to reverse the humiliation and helplessness, or generationally transfer the image of the wounded selves and burden of a psychological task that needs to be accomplished. For Muslims within the defunct Sokoto Caliphate and Bornu empire in their various Lake Chad Basin states, this generationally transferred psychological burden of a task they ought to accomplish provides compelling ideology which fuels the yearning for a return to Salafi (authentic) Islam and in some cases the demand for Sharia Islamic code. To these people, this emotional feeling seems to be similar and their reactions are almost the same. Ewi (2016) corroborates this assertion. He reported that, "the end and the split of Sokoto Caliphate, and indeed Bornu empire were met with same violent reactions in Cameroon and Nigeria" (Ewi, 2016, p. 4).

The traumatic experience and reactions towards the end and split of these civilizations seat deep in the minds of the victims. Its significance is evident in the desire, and in some cases attempts of each generation to recreate this memory among Muslims across the Lake Chad Basin states. For instance, Tanchum noted that, during the decolonization struggle, "a pan-Kanuri nationalist movement based in Borno (Nigeria) sought to assert Kanuri interests as part the broader anti-colonial struggle" (Tanchum, 2012, p. 75). According to Tanchum:

The movement's maximalists called for a "Greater Kanowra," an approximately 534,460 km² territory that included Cameroon's Extreme North Region [Région de l'Extrême-Nord] Niger's Departments of Zinder and Diffa, and the prefectures of Lac and Kanem in Chad. Today, this greater Kanuri region—Northeastern Nigeria, Northern Cameroon, Southeastern Niger, and Southwestern Chad—constitutes the extended base of activity of Boko Haram (Tanchum, 2012, p. 76).

In Nigeria, this emotional attachment partly explains the enactment of Sharia Islamic code in most states in northern Nigeria beginning with Zamfara under Governor Ahmed Sani Yerima in October 27, 1999, as well as huge support for the policy among northern Muslims (Pérouse, 2014, and Katrin Gänslar, 2019). The leaders of Boko Haram have tapped into this support to advance their goal to recreate the Caliphate.

This craving for the return to the glorious days of the Caliphate is well enunciated by Sheikh Gumi and El-Zakzaky whose messages resonate with sizable population of the northern Muslims. In fact, at one point, Sheikh Gumi had preferred and advocated for the partitioning of Nigeria so that the north could return to their glory days of the caliphate and Islam rather than remain in a secular Nigeria (Cohen and Kennedy, 2005). Similarly, El-Zakzaky had referred to the secular Nigerian state as "the illegitimate child of the secular constitution, and to overthrow the state, it is necessary to overthrow the constitution that gave it birth. Only so can Muslims save themselves from what El-Zakzaky calls the idolatrous worship of the secular state" (Birai as cited in Cohen and Kennedy, 2005, p. 219). Unfortunately, this author knows not of any northern Muslim who challenged these ideas. Note that, the intent of the author is not to vilify anyone, instead, to point to the fact that, espousal of extremist ideologies, Sharia advocacy, and nostalgia for the caliphate, all of which produce "passive terrorism," are all consequences of shared traumatic experience among northern Muslims.

The above narrative therefore partly explains how Mohammed Yusuf exploited the emotional attachment of northern Nigerian Muslims to Sharia Islamic code and the return to Caliphate to draw a considerable buy-in to Boko Haram's ideology from the local population. It is because of the proliferation of such Salafist ideology which:

Contribute to passive terrorism, which occurs when moderate segments of the population decline to speak against or actively resist terrorism. Islamists suppress critical thinking and desensitize the population to violence, which can lead some people to become passive terrorists. They disseminate propaganda to incite hatred and increase support for their cause. A tiny fraction of passive terrorists develops into active terrorists. However, while they do not conduct terrorist attacks, passive terrorists fail to denounce active terrorists. Because they agree with the strict implementation of Sharia law and reject the secular rule, the growth of passive terrorism can be seen as a threat to free societies (Tawfik Hamid in Fenstermacher et al., 2011, p. 76 ed).

Given their affiliation with IS, Boko Haram has ceded themselves, the territory under their control, and their dream of restoring the caliphate to IS. Studies have shown that "the idea of the caliphate was a crucial motivator for expanded foreign fighter mobilization, resonating especially in East and West Africa" (ZELIN, 2018, p. 2). In this context, by becoming IS' West African Province (ISWAP), Boko Haram has given IS the legitimate access to the Lake Chad basin for its Wilayat (governorate).

The extent to which this interconnectivity between these states and their people, the peoples' aversion for the end of their civilization and their split to various states, as well as their emotions towards their loss contribute to conflict in these regions is not yet well understood or well explored.

❖ *Geopolitical importance*

Nigeria's population and geographical location in the Lake Chad Basin makes the region attractive to global jihadists. Since its introduction to West Africa, Islam prospered greatly,

demonstrating the potentials of the region towards the actualization of the Ummah—"a universal community based on shared Islamic faith and implementation of its law"(Hassan, 2003, p. 1). In part, this potential relates to both the population of the sub-region and zeal of the new converts. However, historical evidence reveals that, across West Africa, for instance, the former Sokoto Caliphate, communities of converts often blend their traditional practices with Islamic tenets, thus practice 'hybrid Islam.' Hassan argues that there are considerable variances in the regional practices of Islam globally. Hybridity in Islam, he opined, may have contributed to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist movements who seek to replace it with 'authentic' Islamic way of life (Hassan, 2003).

To be successful in West Africa, the struggle to enforce authentic Islam on the Ummah must begin in Nigeria due to its population, or at least, capture it at the early phase. Al-Qaeda's interest in Nigeria is not unconnected with this fact (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2017). "In an audiotape message in 2003, Al-Qaeda's leader Osama bin-Laden identified Nigeria as one of the six Muslim countries "ripe for liberation" (Neil Mac Farquhar, as cited in Tanchum, 2012, p. 81). Implied is liberating Nigeria from Islamic hybridity. Like the views and demands of Gumi and El-zakzaky, Bin Laden's call may reflect the wishes of the majority of the Talakawa (commoners) in northern Nigeria who feel rigged out of the Nigerian state and abandoned by their leaders who have deviated from Dan Fodio's vision for his Caliphate—authentic Islam. The "ISWAP represents a process of replacing the values rooted in local African Muslim traditions (*hybridity*) with the Salafi values purveyed by al-Qaeda's global terrorism discourse" (Tanchum, 2012, p. 76).

Thus, to establish 'authentic' Ummah, and heal the traumatic experience of the Fulani, Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin is essential to the Islamic extremists. The implication of the preceding is that, as the US-led coalition forces continue to devastate and dislodge IS from Syria, African FTFs, particularly the dark-skinned, are likely to be heading towards Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. In fact, "leaders of IS are already sneaking battle-hardened extremists from Syria into Nigeria to train terrorists there for possible attacks in Britain" (David, 2018, p. 1).

Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (RFTFs) threats: The Strategic what and how?

Terrorism researchers have established that Foreign Terrorist Fighters pose grave security threat to their home or permanent residential states if they return or redeploy (see David, 2018; Zenn et al. 2017; Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). What remains unknown is the nature of the threat and what strategies these RFTFs might employ to execute them. While scholars and policy makers debate about 'what' forms RFTFs threats might be and 'how' these returnee terrorists may pursue these goals, there seem to be a consensus that the threats are likely to be generic as well as specific. Generics speak of likely threats with universal characteristics such as "increase in disillusioned and bloodthirsty foreign fighters returning 'home' and either perform terrorist acts immediately on successful arrival at home soil ... or become sleeper cells only to strike at unexpected moments with unanticipated tactics when directed to do so by what will be left of Daesh leadership command (Otto, 2017). Specific 'what' addresses those likely threats specific to particular states and regions.

For instance, Gartenstein argues that, for the Lake Chad Basin, RFTFs "could reinforce ISWAP, and serve as a bridge between ISWAP militants in Nigeria and Niger and networks outside of the Lake Chad region" (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2017, pp. 7–8).

These debates of "what" threats RFTFs might bring and "how" they could accomplish them are herein referred to as the 'strategic what' and the 'strategic how'. With focus on Nigeria,

and the Lake Chad Basin, the next section will address this debate about strategic what and strategic how of the RFTFs.

❖ *The Strategic what of RFTFs Threats?*

To a large extent, whichever course of action taken by an RFTF will depend on his/her motivation for returning or redeploying. Studies found that "motivations of RFTFs are diverse. While some are disillusioned with terrorist practices and life in conflict zones, others may return with the aim of carrying out terrorist attacks" (Reed et al., 2017, pp. 5–6), others may have been instructed or even compelled to redeploy. These individual motivations of RFTFs, more so the redeployees may as well be tied to the overarching interest of the terrorist group. Moreover, since the terrorist group's strategic interests vary across regions, reports suggest that IS' interest in Africa could be more of establishing Wilayats from where to regroup, re-strategize, and relaunch itself more fiercely.

The literature on foreign fighters of Nigerian or Chad basin origin is scanty. Nonetheless, Zelin estimates that, within the Lake Chad basin states, there are one hundred and twenty (120) FTFs—Nigeria 20, Chad 50, and Niger 50 (Zelin, 2018). Furthermore, Zelin's estimation shows that, by 2017, about one thousand (1,000) dark-skinned Africans FTFs have deployed to Syria. Otto suggests that given the porosity of borders and ability to effortlessly blend with the population due to sameness resulting from physiological appearance, Nigeria, and the Lake Chad basin is likely to be the destination of dark-skinned RFTFs who Africans are (TGS Security and Intelligence Consultants, n.d.). Given that, RFTFs are believed to possess battle experiences, sophisticated skills, extensive networks and access to IS 'enormous wealth; motivated either by their disillusionment with the jihadist group or group support; two threats are likely: Organized crimes and territorial conquest—recreating the caliphate.

❖ *The Strategic How of RFTFs Threats?*

There is credible evidence that not all FTFs are returning home to commit acts of terror. In fact, some returnee fighters do so with great satisfaction of having fulfilled their Islamic duty. Others may be because they were not satisfied with their experiences at the frontline such as indiscriminate killings of harmless innocents, women, and children. Other studies found that some of the RFTFs who disengaged or defected, sometimes with significant risks to their lives, eventually began to support or return to the group (Speckhard et al., 2018). The position taken here is that, given the instability situations in the Lake Chad region, arising partly from socio-economic and structural dynamics, resulting in mass disillusionment against their states and governments, the case of Lake Chad basin could be slightly different. RFTFs have more incentives to engage in security-threatening activities in various ways and may so do.

Reports indicate that harsh socio-political and economic conditions at home often drive this category of RFTFs to crime and extremist groups. When they chose to do so, this group could use their extensive network, knowledge of the travel route, and source of arms to facilitate illicit arms and drug trade, human trafficking, and terrorist recruitments. So, by joining criminal gangs, specialized in the illicit arms trade, robbery and kidnapping, and human trafficking, this group will constitute a security threat. Besides, this group of RFTFs may choose to support the operation of jihadist groups by providing logistics. Given the presence of transnational criminal gangs, operating across the borders of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, the disillusioned RFTFs could most probably constitute security threats if they are not effectively disengaged, deradicalized, rehabilitated and reintegrated.

The second form of a possible threat from RFTFs in Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin is recreating the Caliphate. For this purpose, the jihadists may apply two distinct, but interrelated approaches. First, in the realization that total Islamization of Nigeria and the imposition of the caliphate may not be feasible, ISWAP and their RFTFs may opt for the dismemberment of Nigeria in order to enforce the caliphate on the Muslim-dominated northern region. In this context, given that, southern Nigerians have expressed worries over the herdsmen terrorism as a northern ploy to Islamize the country, and which they (the south) would vehemently resist if need be by breaking up Nigeria. The jihadists may facilitate Nigeria's disintegration by deliberately escalating the ongoing herdsmen-farmers conflict through posing as or collaborating with herdsmen. The escalation may take the forms of coordinated, multiple attacks of communities in southern Nigeria, and the advancement of herdsmen killings into the heartlands of the southern region. Further, ISWAP and the RFTFs may carry out Mumbai-type of multiple attacks (November 26-29, 2008) at targets in the commercial cities in southern Nigeria, for instance. Any of this scenario may trigger reprisal attacks, or more forceful demands for the disintegration of the country from groups like the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASOB), or the Odua People's Congress (OPC) who are currently agitating for that.

Third, they may wish to gain more support for the strict application of the Sharia Islamic code leading to the caliphate across northern Nigeria. In this case, the strategy of the jihadists would be to win the mind, soul, and support of the locals, with the intention to radicalize and recruit fighters. While their focus would be in phases—short-term, medium-term, and long-term. In Pursuit of these objectives, the jihadist would use two key battle strategies: overt and covert approaches to establishing their presence and relationship with the locals:

❖ Overt methods

As foreign fighters return and redeploy to Lake Chad basin, we may begin to see a proliferation of non-governmental organizations providing social services. An essential element in the operational structure of jihadist technology has been the Dawa (evangelization) practices. Dawa goes beyond preaching and teaching Qur'anic messages to include providing social services to the communities. Zelin noted that Islamic extremist groups "use their overt dawa activities for cover considerably well" (Zelin, 2018, p. 5). According to Zelin, in March 2011, the Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) offered various assistance to refugees on the Tunisia-Libya border. However, under that smokescreen, AST traded military equipment and heavy weapons in their preaching tents, unbeknownst to the refugees (Zelin, 2018).

Considering that, governmental abandonment of the region, resulted in the absence of, or broken-down infrastructures which sustained widespread chronic poverty, illiteracy, and ill-health, that spawned general discontent against the government are significant drivers of radicalization and terrorism in the region, providing these services will endear the terrorists to the locals. Moreover, given its enormous wealth, estimated at over US\$12 billion (Allison, 2014), the IS could fund ISWAP and their social services delivery to communities in this region with relative ease, using RFTFs as bridges. It is important to note that, the group had applied this strategy to gain support from the local population during its evolutionary stage (1995-2005) under its founder abubakar lawal. Amidu Sanni (2016) noted that, Boko Haram's "attraction for youth and those in society who were financially and socially disadvantaged meant that the movement assumed education, social welfare services and economic empowerment instead of the government. Movement leaders provided these services and more, including affordable marriage

arrangements and sustained feeding schemes which further enhanced its growing influence” (Sanni, 2016, p. 22).

In this regards, the Islamic extremist groups understand the strategic importance of community services in furthering their agenda, they may likely apply it in Nigeria and Lake Chad Basin. What is more, given the entrenched corruption in Nigeria, the possibilities of getting politicians, clerics, NGOs, and other CSOs to collaborate with is very likely and frightening. Some empirical evidence supports this assertion. For instance, during a public broadcast in 2013, President Jonathan Goodluck admitted, somewhat grimly, the infiltration of Boko Haram sympathizers and patrons in all-tier and level of governments and likely every sector of Nigeria (Sanni, 2016). This became evident when “Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir, a Lebanese cleric, wanted in Beirut for acts of terrorism” (Sanni, 2016, p. 26) was arrested while he was trying to “board a plane to Nigeria using a fake Palestinian travel documents with an authentic Nigerian visa” (Shaheen, 2015, p. 1). The extent to which al-Assir case confirm the likely collaboration of terrorist groups with some Nigerian sympathizers remain uncertain, however, it seems to support the overt dawa thesis advanced above.

Accordingly, by inserting themselves into the communities through social services and humanitarian supports, ISWAP/Boko Haram may present themselves (the caliphate) as a credible alternative to the ‘absentee’ state. Winning the hearts and minds of the local population risks further support for the group from the people. This would then give the terrorist the coverup, to engage in illicit trade in various commodities including weapons and narcotics, as well as human trafficking. It also avails the group time to attack their targets both within the Lake Chad Basin and beyond.

❖ Covert methods

Covert approaches to terrorism relate to forms of insurgent activities, including recruitment, training, intelligence gathering, and strategizing. As the lifeblood of every terror organization, recruitment ensures that groups continuously draft in new followers not only to replace fallen fighters but also to enlarge the group's base. However, to a significant degree, recruitment depends on, among other things, the prevailing environment, such as the availability of passive terrorists, and its ability to facilitate radicalization in the communities. Skidmore suggests that RFTFs manipulate a civil conflict, presenting it to appear as a threat to a shared collective identity. “The recruiters target vulnerable individuals who are closely affiliated with this identity, with the aim of inspiring them to fight in defense of the so-called identity” (Skidmore, n.d., p. 16). Having cultivated the communities for harvest, injected radical messages into the society and aroused the chosen trauma identity through the dawa and social services, thus, created enabling environments, it is a lot easier for RFTFs to appeal to vulnerable members of the communities.

With an enlarged base and guaranteed recruitment, RFTFs would create cells within the Lake Chad basin, commence training and intelligence gathering from the locals. That will also avail them the opportunity to maintain links with their members within West Africa and beyond. With that, the group could begin to select their targets and plan their attacks. However, with that also comes the challenge of West Africa becoming ground zero for the global war on terror in the long run.

Returning Foreign Fighters Threats: How Should Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin Respond?

Between the state and the IS' RFTFs, the battle ahead is about winning the minds and support of the locals. To be victorious, Otto suggests that the starting point is to identify these RFTFs (David Otto TGS Security and Intelligence Consultants, n.d.). Identifying RFTFs and associated threats require a detailed and suitable risk assessment, to enable policymakers to categorize RFTFs, understand the dimensions of possible threats, and be able to craft necessary policy options to address the challenges. For this purpose, the typologies enunciated by Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn may be helpful: "the martyr, the veteran, the reintegrated fighter, and the terrorist" (de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2014, pp. 62–63). In line with the UNSC Resolution 2178, which required member states to implement measures to address foreign fighter challenge, most states, have pursued legislative approaches, others have implemented comprehensive methods. This study favours a three-pronged approach towards effective and sustainable management of the RFTFs threats. That includes RFTFs reintegration, community engagement, and economic imperative.

❖ *The Reintegration Approach*

Facilitating the reintegration of terrorists, including RFTFs into the society has emerged as another counter-terrorism approach. It involves complex psycho-social processes designed to "engineer cognitive shift away from a commitment to violent extremism, and unwind intricate interactions of individual traits and circumstances, social dynamics, and external enabling conditions" (Holmer and Shtuni, 2017, p. 5) that drive individuals to extremism and help these individuals re-enter society. In its current form, the re-integration component of Nigeria's National Counter-terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) which encompasses disengagement, de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and re-integration, runs a prison-based de-radicalization programme.

However, it is hard to imagine applying this plan for the RFTFs. There is increasing fear that mixing domestic terrorists and RFTFs in one scheme stands the risk of being counterproductive. The fear is that, with their seasoned battlefield experience, RFTFs would likely toughen domestic terrorists, and deter them from abandoning their jihad dream. In this context, Watanabe advocates for states to create separate de-radicalization and re-integration projects tailored explicitly to RFTFs needs (Watanabe, 2018).

In the light of the above, this paper recommends the creation of a separate, similar scheme for the RFTFs. Although it is a prison-based, Nigeria's de-radicalization programme is unique. By situating it in a separate self-contained building, with specially trained deradicalization staffs, the project addressed the culture and state specifics. Similarly, the RFTFs deradicalization ought to be positioned in separate housing units, and in a different prison. For this purpose, the staff team must be trained to understand not only the domestic ISWAP's terror threat, but also the global jihad agenda of radical groups, and how these, together with the global war on terror, especially the Syrian crisis might impact domestic and regional security. Since RFTFs phenomenon is relatively new for which global best practices are yet to emerge, this project could borrow from other exit programmes that have proved successful, for instance, the French model. If well designed and executed, such a programme could nurture RFTFs to disavow and disengage from extremism and provide pathways for stepping away from every engagement with terror groups and into the community, and regular life after.

Since, quite a few Nigerians are foreign terrorist fighters, taking these measures may seem unnecessary. One may argue that arrest, prosecute, and imprison RFTFs may be more profitable. The danger is that "lucking up RFTFs without accompanying measures aimed at their de-

radicalization and re-integration may prove short-sighted” (Watanabe, 2018, p. 3). Similarly, given the premise that most dark-skinned African returnees would be drawn to re-deploy to battlefields in West Africa, more so the Lake Chad basin, it makes more sense for Nigeria being the most prominent state within the sub-region with an enormous capacity to take these steps. That would avail her the opportunity to appropriately deradicalize these returnees and re-deployed, rather than merely arresting and extraditing them to their states where they probably could be let loose for lack of capacity.

In this regards, governments of the Lake Chad Basin states are encouraged to “establish a regional working group to increase cross-country learning beyond military collaboration” (Bukarti and Bryson, 2019, p. 5).

❖ *Counter-radicalization Approach*

Counter-radicalization entails programmes designed to dissuade individuals from associating and imbibing extreme ideologies. Such programmes target the beliefs and ideas that influence people and their sources to neutralize with counter-ideologies and counter-narratives. Designed to educate both extremists, including RFTFs and the entire community concerning various viewpoints, the goal of counter-radicalization programmes is to “make people question the beliefs and values in radical ideologies” (Qamar-ul Huda in 2011, p. 157 ed). Huda suggests that counter-radicalization programmes must not only adopt and effectively use jihadists desired means of communication—social and the traditional media, but also civil society actors or civil messengers.

- Social media

Since 2012, the population of Nigerians who subscribe to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, has more than doubled. As FTFs return and redeploy to Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin, these people might use social media to reach their target audience. While ISWAP has perfected their YouTube messaging, a fusion of RFTFs with technical capabilities will see the group broadcast well-crafted, emotionally laden, image-driven, messages, rooted in soft Islamic music, the Hadiths, and Qur’ān in Hausa across the region.

As part of their counter-terrorism measures, Lake Chad basin states need to create a counter-radicalization unit under their Office of the National Security Agency. A good counter-radicalization team should be composed of information technology (IT) experts, psychologists, and Islamic scholars, equipped with state-of-the-art technology, responsible for monitoring ISWAP’s online discourse, messages, propaganda movies, and materials. Counter-radicalization team should always strive to identify extremist’s social media networks and groups and anonymously infiltrate and follow those groups, including Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, and YouTube. As Speckhard suggested, they will aim to understand the compelling and persuasive elements behind ISWAP’s ideologies and emotions that persuade individuals to imbibe extreme views and draw recruits to the group. Armed with such understanding, and applying all those persuasive techniques, counter-radicalization team would produce materials that interfere and offset ISWAP’s propaganda materials, and which challenge extremists’ underlying assumptions, justifications and false interpretations of facts relating to the religious texts.

The counter-radicalization team would occasionally inject the materials they developed into the jihadist social media feeds, to alter and show the falsehoods, and gaps in the extremists’ interpretations and conclusion and to provide an alternate, more accurate perspective of these issues. That will always challenge their followers to critical thinking and to ask questions.

Critical thinking and well informed, evidence-based, theologically supported answers to complex questions on misinterpreted issues inhibit the growth of passive terrorism. Ultimately, it will “reduce the supply of people willing to become active terrorists and lead to fewer terrorist attacks” (Hamid 2011, p. 76).

- **Citizen Messengers**

The availability of passive terrorists and misperception of the teachings of the prophet, particularly as they relate to contemporary, socio-political issues among the Ummah are significant factors that jihadists exploit with their messages. ISWAP has taken significant advantage of this and will continue to, especially with support and capabilities from RFTFs. Recently, some programmes designed to counter radical narratives of terror groups are woven around influential members of the societies. ‘Citizen messenger programmes’ aim to prevent individuals from adopting and spreading extreme worldviews. They also motivate already radicalized citizens to jettison their views through proactive messages by well-known, influential members of the community broadcasted continuously through the traditional media—radio, and television. These peace-messengers, drawn from various works of life and class also “help disseminate mainstream thinking and beliefs in their faith and traditions, and encourage people, particularly the aggrieved to accept the rule of law, governance, and legal methods of dispute resolution” (Huda in 2011, p. 157). Furthermore, they have the responsibility to challenge their governments to ensure that the rule of law not only guarantees equality before the law but must also be equally guaranteed to every citizen.

Within Nigerian civil society, there are lots of high-profile individuals, highly influential people, whose words and lifestyle resonate and appeal to a wide variety of audience—these include movie and sports stars, clerics, as well as community and opinion leaders, some of whom are also moderate Muslims. The government needs to identify and incorporate such individuals in its anti-radicalization crusade. Have them regularly communicate well-crafted messages on national and local television and radio. Also, the government needs to create a forum (the inquiry) where intellectuals, clerics, people from every facet of the civil society will come to debate such issues as national security, and extremism broadcasted live on national and local television and radio, with opportunity for people to call in and ask questions. These will generate critical thinking around issues of Islamic teachings and violence and close the knowledge gap which ISWAP and RFTFs are likely to exploit and reduce people’s buy-in to extreme views.

- ❖ *Development Paradigm*

For the state to win the battle of the mind, souls, and support of the local communities ahead of the jihadists, it is imperative to address the socio-economic and structural drivers of radicalization. Although, studies indicate that, there is no correlation between socio-economic conditions and extremism or terrorism, where they exist, such conditions create black holes from which perceptions of inequality which triggers the propensity to extremism arise. In the preceding paragraphs, this paper established the likelihood of RFTFs and jihadist groups exploiting the provision of social services to gain the sympathy and support of the locals. Governments of states within the Lake Chad basin ought to confront economic backwardness of their region with development projects to ensure that, their citizens do not fall prey to jihadists. Fundamentally, development deals with building the capacity of individuals and institutions for optimal performance.

Education is one significant aspect of human life that makes a considerable difference in enhancing individual capacity. Unfortunately, though, it is one institution that ISWAP targets. Prior, there are indications that northern Nigeria is very much educationally backward. Some may argue that northern Nigeria may be backward in Western education but is doing excellent in Eastern/Arabic education. On its surface, this argument may seem logical. However, given that the essence of education is to create in an individual life-saving knowledge, skills, and habits needed to solve problems for oneself and his community and produce wealth, in its current form, Eastern education in northern Nigeria falls short. Therefore, there is a need to modernize the madrasa system. Specifically, its *almajiri* practice which subjects' pupils to a life of servitude and begging, without instilling in them any skill whatsoever, save Qur'an memorization, thus, condemning them to adult lives of chronic poverty.

Education has three distinct categories: formal, informal, and nonformal. Unstructured learning in which habits, knowledge, and skills such as crafts making, trading, various forms of services are inculcated into an individual is also necessary. It is possible to have a fusion of Arabic and Western education, as is the practice among Yoruba Muslims in western Nigeria. The Mosques and madrasas should begin to incorporate vocational training and capacity building in various areas of life into their services to their members to enhance their capacity to fend for themselves. The long-term effects of these will see a reduction in the poverty level in the region.

Similarly, governments at all levels must earnestly pursue development projects primarily at the grassroots to uplift their people from poverty and bring them to the mainstream of global capitalism and thinking. Belo-Osagie noted that Dutch-disease syndrome associated with the oil boom of the 1970s had distracted Nigeria government from investing in the agricultural sector, in which the north has a competitive advantage. Unfortunately, too, successive governments never built alternative industries in the region due to the dearth of human capital and infrastructure (Belo-Osagie, 2015).

Substantial investment in infrastructure will ensure that the gains individuals made in self-development are sustained, and creativity promoted through small and medium scale enterprises. Furthermore, northern Nigerian elites and the government must guarantee security by reducing the population of passive terrorist in the north to attract both local and foreign investors to the region. Constant conflict in northern Nigeria discourages would-be investors from the region. Unfortunately, northern leaders who are passive in their criticism of unnecessary, willful, killings of non-Muslim, economic migrants to the region by Muslim youths are as harmful to the region's economic development as their youths. Northern leaders must educate their people to understand that violence is detrimental to their economy.

Conclusion

Ali Bongo Ondimba, the Gabonese president, noted in May 2016 that, "most of us [West Africans] do not have the experience to fight terrorism. It is new to us" (David Pilling (2016) as cited in Zelin, 2018, p. 17). Concerning terrorism and other security issues, President Ondimba may have stated the sordid reality of West African states. However, what he did not say is that most of these states, especially Nigeria, has an immense capacity to develop its security sector and guarantee security for its people. What is lacking is political will, however. If the governments of the Lake Chad basin region, and Africa at large, will muster the political will, and create a well-coordinated programme, they can surmount the challenges of terrorism and the threats of RFTFs. That must be a collective effort which begins with identifying the weakness and strengths of each member state vis-à-vis terrorism and RFTFs, and then tackle these challenges collectively

through a well-coordinated African counter-terrorism strategy. In this context, this paper has presented ways in which the Lake Chad basin states could address security threats by RFTFs collectively. The hope is that Nigeria and her neighbours in the Lake Chad basin would take proactive measures towards addressing issues of RFTFs and protect their population and sovereignty from the threats of RFTFs and the jihadists' caliphate ambition.

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA (AFCFTA) TREATY ON AFRICAN UNION'S POLICIES ON TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM.

By

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Abstract

During the twelfth extra-ordinary summit of Heads of State and Government held in Niamey, the capital of Niger, on 7 July 2019, the African Union (AU) launched the operational phase of the African Continental Free Trade Area, (AfCFTA). While officiating the launch, the sitting Chairperson of the African Union, President Abdel Fattah El Sisi of Egypt stressed both the importance of the AfCFTA to the development of the continent and the importance of peace and security on the continent. This paper, picks this concern and examines the implications of the AfCFTA to peace and security on the continent through the lens of terrorism and transnational organized crime.

Key Words: Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime, Regional Trade

Introduction

During the twelfth extra-ordinary summit of Heads of State and Government held in Niamey, the capital of Niger, on 7 July 2019, the African Union (AU) launched the operational phase of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The treaty was adopted and opened for signature on 21 March 2018 in Kigali and entered force on 30 May 2019, thirty days after having received the twenty-second instrument of ratification on 29 April 2019 in conformity with legal provisions. During the launch, the sitting Chairperson of the African Union, President Abdel Fattah El Sisi of Egypt stressed both the need to open borders to other Africans and the importance of peace and security on the continent, stating that, “it would be a delusion to talk of trade and development without peace and security”. This paper, picks on the concern expressed by President Abdel Fattah El Sisi and examines the implications of the AfCFTA to peace and security on the continent through the lens of terrorism and transnational organized crime. The first section gives a brief overview of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) highlighting its core objectives. The second and third sections discuss AU policies on terrorism and transnational organised crime. The fourth section explores the relationship between trade, terrorism and transnational organised crime. The fifth section examines some policy implications of the AfCFTA on peace and security in Africa as it relates to terrorism and transnational organised crime. The sixth and final section concludes the discussion and makes recommendations for policy that authorities at the AU and in member states charged with the responsibility of implement the AfCFTA can consider.

Overview of The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Treaty

The African Continental Free Trade Area, AfCFTA is a regional treaty aimed at boosting intra-African trade among member countries of the African Union. It is also intended to foster a common regional approach to trade with countries from other regions of the world. The objectives of the AfCFTA as stipulated in article 3, are to (a) create a single market for goods, services, facilitated by movement of persons in order to deepen the economic integration of the

African continent and in accordance with the Pan African Vision of "An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa" enshrined in Agenda 2063; (b) create a liberalised market for goods and services through successive rounds of negotiations; (c) contribute to the movement of capital and natural persons and facilitate investments building on the initiatives and developments in the State Parties and RECs; (d) lay the foundation for the establishment of a Continental Customs Union at a later stage; (e) promote and attain sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development, gender equality and structural transformation of the State Parties; (f) enhance the competitiveness of the economies of State Parties within the continent and the global market; (g) promote industrial development through diversification and regional value chain development, agricultural development and food security; and (h) resolve the challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships and expedite the regional and continental integration processes.

Since the signing of the constitutive Act by all the 53 member states of the African Union on 11 July 2000 in Lomé, Togo, the AfCFTA is arguably to date, the most important development for the African continent. This is because, besides increasing the prospects of continental trade, by adopting a common voice and policy space in global trade negotiations, it promises to boost Africa's trading position in the global market. This prospect is proved by data (see table 1) from the World Trade Organisation (WTO). According to this data, African countries import more goods than they export to the rest of the world as indicated by the negative balance of trade (BOT).

Table 1: Africa trade in Merchandise by product group – annual (Million US dollar)

Partner Economy	2015	2016	2017	2018
World Exports	388, 406	356, 104	421, 344	478, 640
World Imports	554, 549	488, 973	516, 685	573, 914
Balance of Trade (BOT)	-166, 143	-132, 869	-95, 341	-95, 274

Source: World Trade Organisation <https://data.wto.org/>

This trade imbalance can partially be explained by factors such as weaker economies of most African countries characterized by poor value addition to commodities due to slow-growing manufacturing and agricultural sectors and unfavourable trading terms such as tariff and non-tariff barriers. Thus, by adopting a common voice and policy space in global trade negotiations, the AfCFTA promises to improve Africa's bargaining power in global markets. This is important

for the region because, according to the United Nations Population Division mid-year estimates for 2018 (UN, 2019), Africa's population of ca. 1.2 billion people, with a projected growth to 2.5 billion by 2050 places the continent as the second-largest trading block and market for merchandise after Asia. Such a huge market is not only significant for global trade relations, it is also, and perhaps more important for intra-Africa trade and pan-African development. With an internal market of over 1.2 billion people, the AfCFTA offers potential opportunities for start-ups and small and microenterprises to grow and expand beyond their territorial borders. This would in turn increase employment opportunities both in the formal and informal sectors. In the long run reducing overall poverty levels. The main beneficiaries of such growth would be the youth who make up the bulk of Africa's population and who are most vulnerable to recruitment into Transnational organised crime (TOC) and terrorism.

Overview of African Union Counter-Terrorism (CT) Policies.

Terrorism remains a highly contentious subject, despite its long history. This is important to note because, the controversy often spills over to counter-terrorism policies. The reason for the controversy is because, terrorism as a concept and empirical fact is plagued by indeterminacy, subjectivity and political disagreements influenced by doctrinal, ideological and jurisprudential arguments over whether some forms of violence should be included within the definition of terrorism (Saul, 2008: 196; Khan, 2016: 7; Kielsgard, 2005: 281; Hoffman, 2004: 936; Hoffman, 2006: 936; Jawad, 2015: 104; Warbrick, 2004: 1003; Kozera, 2018: 11-12). In the academic literature, most scholars consider terrorism to consist of at least three core elements i.e. (1) the use of violence, or (2) the threat of violence; (3) against civilians or non-combatants in pursuit of political or ideological goals (Kozera, 2018: 11-12).

Here, the definition of terrorism derives from the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. According to this convention, the AU defines a "Terrorist act" as (a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment

thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or (iii) create general insurrection in a State; (b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii). Based on this definition, the continental CT framework consists of three overlapping and mutually reinforcing mechanisms: (1) the regional mechanism led by the African Union; (2) national mechanisms and (3) the international mechanism.

In this section, the discussion is limited to the African Union mechanism which represents the broad CT policy framework for the continent. The foremost CT policies of the AU are contained in two Organisation of African Unity (OAU) resolutions i.e. resolution **AHG/Res.213 (XXVIII) on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States** of 1992 adopted at the 28th Ordinary Session, held in Dakar, Senegal and resolution **AHG/Del.2 (XXX), on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations** of June 1994, adopted at the 30th Ordinary Session of the OAU, held in Tunis, Tunisia. These two resolutions denounce among others, extremism and terrorism particularly based on political, sectarian, tribalism, ethnic or religious motivations as undermining the moral and human values of peoples, particularly fundamental freedoms and tolerance and condemn, as criminal, all terrorist acts, methods and practices, and express the continental resolve to enhance cooperation to combat terrorism (AU, 2015). According to Ewi and Aning (2006: 35-36) this declarations are important continental CT policy statements because they not only criminalize any actions that organize, instigate, facilitate, finance, encourage, or tolerate terrorist activities, they also provide a framework for interstate cooperation based on common standards for combating terrorism. The **Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism** adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Summit, held in Algiers, Algeria, in July 1999, addresses concerns over protecting civilians against certain forms of violent offences by individuals or states, state security, state jurisdiction over terrorism-related offences (Ewi and Aning, 2006: 36; Kagwanja, 2006: 79-80; Sturman, 2002: 103-104). The convention requires that States Parties criminalize terrorist acts under their national laws as defined as therein, outlines areas of cooperation among states, establishes state jurisdiction over terrorist acts, and provides a legal framework for extradition as well as extra-

territorial investigations and mutual legal assistance(AU, 2015). An additional **Protocol** to the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted by the 3rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Addis Ababa in July 2004 (Ibid)outlines further measures for the suppression of terrorist financing, mitigating the risks of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the protection of human rights (Ewi and Aning, 2006: 38). An important element of the 2004 protocol is that it recognizes the growing linkages between terrorism and transnational organized crimes. To give effect to these cardinal conventions, the **AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism**established, in 2004, the**African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism** (ACSRST), which centralizes information, studies and analyses on terrorism, terrorist groups and develops continental CTcapacity building programs(AU, 2015). The Plan of Action also provides for the appointment of a **Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation**to overseethe mobilizingof support for the continent CT policies in conjunction with national authorities. The Special Representative also serves as the director of the ACRST. In terms of legal guidelines, the **African Model Law on Counter-Terrorism**adoptedby the AU Commission on its 17th Ordinary Session held in Malabo, in July 2011,provides the legal standard to assist member states in drafting their own national CT laws,in line with the provisions contained in various continental and international CT instruments. In terms of structure, the **Peace and Security Council of the AU** launched in May 2004,bears the overall responsibility to coordinate and ensure the implementation of continental CTpolicies. Two other institutions, the **African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR)** and the **African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Court)** are designed to ensure that continental and country CT policies adhere to international human rights standards. In certain special circumstances, especially when the territorial integrity and sovereign authority of a member state is under serious threat, specialized and combinedmilitary and humanitarian interventions complement overall CT policies and strategies. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)is one such intervention which was established to counter-terrorism, stabilize the state and spearhead humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

Overview of African Union Policies on Transnational Organised Crime.

Similarly, the controversy surrounding the conceptual definition and empirical manifestation of transnational organized crime (TOC) is not only as old as the history of governments and international trade, it also continues to persist (Edwards and Gill, 2002: 205; Laqueur, 1977; Woodiwiss, 2004; Miraglia et al., 2012: 6). The problem as Finckenauer (2005: 64) and Miraglia et al. (2012: 6) observe, comes not from the word 'crime', but from the word 'organized'. This is because, they note, offenses can be committed by a criminal acting entirely alone, or by criminals acting in groups that would otherwise not be regarded as being criminal organizations. According to Finckenauer (2005: 65), the basic elements that identify TOCs include: ideology or lack thereof, structured/organized hierarchy, continuity, violence or the threat of violence, restricted membership/bonding, illegal enterprise, penetration of legitimate business, corruption and an international dimension (dealings must happen through at least two countries). The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, also known as 'the Palermo convention', defines an organized criminal group as a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. The Palermo convention further considers an offense to be transnational in nature if: (a) It is committed in more than one State; (b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another State; (c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or (d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State. Most sources, both in academic and policy circles, consider transnational organized crime to include but not limited to: trafficking in humans, illegal trafficking in and transporting of migrants; illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts, components and ammunition; money laundering, corruption, trade in human body parts, piracy, environmental crimes such as dumping toxic waste; trafficking of flora and fauna, art and antiquities etc. (Edwards and Gill, 2002: 208; Williams, 1997: 10; Woodiwiss, 2004; Nations, 2004: 9; Miraglia et al., 2012: 6). International terrorism also fits within the scope defined by the Palermo convention.

To the best of the authors knowledge, there is no AU definition of transnational organised crime neither is there a specific policy instrument or document dedicated to addressing the problem. At best, what can be considered as AU policies on transnational organized crime are scattered across several continental legal and policy instruments. Articles 3(4) and 5 of the **African Union**

Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation¹, identify security, cross-border crime, terrorism, piracy and other forms of crime as areas of cross-border cooperation in terms of sharing of information or intelligence. Article 1(2) of the **OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa**², defines the crime of mercenarism as act(s) committed by an individual, group or association, representative of a State and the State itself, who with the aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination, stability or the territorial integrity of another State, that practises any of the following acts: a) Shelters, organises, finances, assists, equips, trains, promotes, supports or in any manner employs bands of mercenaries; b) Enlists, enrolls or tries to enrol in the said bands; c) Allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried out in any territory under its jurisdiction or any place under its control or affords facilities for transit, transport or other operations of the above-mentioned forces. Though the convention does not expressly refer to TOC, it is important in the discussion of TOC in Africa because state sponsored and non-state sponsored armed groups often get involvement in organized criminal activities. See (Forest and Giroux, 2011: 7-8; Howard, 2010: 967; Kimunguyi, 2011: 6-8; Ousman, 2004: 77; Sturman, 2002: 104). For example, in Mali, militia (Ganda Koy, Ganda Iso and the GATIA) suspected to enjoy state support in the fight against Islamists and the Tauregs rebels in the north of the country, have not only been accused of human rights violations, but also of taking control of smuggling routes, and profiting from illegal criminal activity as the state kept its end of the bargain by remaining complacent (Kone, 2017: 58; Kozera, 2018: 20; Thurston, 2013: 5; Chauzal and van Damme, 2015: 40; Sow, 2018: 24). The preamble of the **OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism** recognizes the growing link between terrorism and organized crime. Articles 4 and 5 of the convention highlight areas of cooperation. As noted earlier, Ewi and Aning (2006: 38) observe that **the additional Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism** outlines among other further measures, the suppression of terrorist financing which may include funds generated from organized criminal activities. Articles 3(b)(d)(e) and 4(d)(e) of the **Statute of the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL)**³ outline the objectives and the functions of AFRIPOL to include preventing and combating of organised crime through cooperation with national police and law enforcement agencies in sharing and exchange of information or intelligence, detection and investigation of organised crime. Articles 3(a)(d), 4(a), 5(a)(b), 16, 17 and 32-34 of the **African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter)**⁴ outline the objectives, scope, measures and areas of cooperation in

preventing and combating organised crime at sea including trafficking in human beings and smuggling of immigrants, drug trafficking, piracy, robbery against ships and pollution at sea. Despite the fact that TOC networks generally seek to neutralize or nullify government through bribery (Miraglia et al., 2012: 10; Finckenauer, 2005: 67), the **Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption** only vaguely refers to private sector corruption in article 11(1), and requires states to adopt measures to prevent and combat acts of corruption committed by private agents. Other than this single article, there is no other provision in the convention that may be construed to address corruption between TOC and state agents.

Relationship Between Trade, Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime.

Terrorist groups often operate in small, clandestine informal hidden networks that harbor ideological, political and religious etc. views, often considered to be millenarian, unachievable and idealistic (Shinn, 2003; Rabasa et al., 2007: 3; Cilliers, 2003: 100; Howard, 2010: 965; Boeke, 2016: 917). They seek to achieve their aims through acts of violence or the threat of violence against civilians or non-combatants, often designed to cause mass fear that travels far and wide. TOC networks consist of tightly knit, highly organized rational actors, within a hierarchical power structure that spans across countries and regions, in pursuit of common goals and objectives, usually to provide goods and services that are either illegal, regulated, or in short supply, primarily for purposes of economic gain i.e. making a profit, through whatever means considered necessary, including violence, at the lowest risk possible (Woodiwiss, 2004; Williams, 1997: 1; Finckenauer, 2005: 66-67; Edwards and Gill, 2002: 207).

There are operational and structural similarities between terrorist and TOC networks that link the two together. Both terrorist and TOC networks are structured or organized hierarchically; exhibit much resilience or continuity; their use of violence or the threat of violence is unreserved; their membership is often restricted; they engage in illegal enterprise or activities but may also penetrate legitimate business and they rely on corruption to nullify government in order to operate unhindered (Finckenauer, 2005: 65; Miraglia et al., 2012: 6). The only difference between terrorist and TOC networks is that, whereas, both may exploit markets to provide goods and services that are either legal/illegal, regulated, or in short supply to generate incomes, terrorist groups do so in pursuit of ideologically defined goals and not motivated by financial

gain, while TOC networks do so in pursuit of economic gain without any particular radical, liberal, conservative, or other political ideology, their only interest in government being its nullification-through bribery, payoffs, and corruption (Cilliers, 2003: 91; Ignatieff, 2002: 1146; Finckenauer, 2005: 65-67; Edwards and Gill, 2002: 207; Williams, 1997: 1). However, over time, this distinction blurs, as TOC and terrorist networks may collaborate for security, logistical or operational purposes (Finckenauer, 2005: 72). TOC networks acting rationally to maximize profits and terrorist groups seeking to finance their terrorist activities. The principal factors that sustain the collaboration between terrorist and TOC networks include: a public that demands certain goods and services that are defined as legal/illegal, regulated, or in short supply; an organization of individuals who produce or supply those goods/services; capacity for violence; bonding mechanisms that provide a basis for trust and helps to guard against infiltration by law enforcement agencies and the existence of corrupt public officials who turn a blind eye or look the other way for their own gain (Finckenauer, 2005: 72; Williams, 1997: 7). Williams (1997: 8-10) observes that over time, corruption increasingly makes it difficult to distinguish between criminals and officials who are supposed to be fighting them. Both terrorist and TOC networks tend to thrive in "failed/weak" States with vast ungoverned spaces (Piombo, 2007: 3-5; Cilliers, 2003: 102). This is because, in such States, governments are hardly capable of effectively maintaining a monopoly on violence; training and equipment for security forces is insufficient; corruption and criminalization of law enforcement agencies is far advanced; there is a general lack of institutionalization; provision of essential public goods and services is generally wanting or absent in some instances, creating viable markets for legal/illegal ventures; the shadow economy is able to execute capital transactions enabling trafficking and clandestine business and there exists mass grievances etc. (Cilliers, 2003: 98; Danjibo, 2013: 20; Forest and Giroux, 2011: 7-9; Glickman, 2003: 167; Howard, 2010: 960-982; Kimunguyi, 2011: 3-4; Mair, 2003: 3; Omotola, 2008: 44; Shinn, 2003; Miraglia et al., 2012: 12). Given the reliance of both terrorist and TOC networks on the weakness of the State, it is particularly worrying that Africa is home to many weak and failing states than any other region in the world (Cilliers, 2003: 96-100; Howard, 2010: 963; Kingebiel, 2005: 37; Mair, 2003: 3; Sturman, 2002: 103). This grim fact is confirmed in Table 2: the Fragile States Index (FSI) produced by The Fund for Peace, FFP (Peace, 2019), which shows that in 2018, out of the 25 top fragile states in the world, 18 were located in sub-Saharan Africa.

In the literature, some instances of the link between trade, terrorism, and transnational organized crime in Africa have been highlighted. For examples, Hezbollah, Taliban, Al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Shabab etc. have long been suspected of involvement in organised criminal activities such as money Laundering, trade-in minerals, piracy, charcoal, trafficking in humans, poaching, illicit manufacture of and trafficking in firearms, illegal trafficking in and transporting of migrants, trade-in cocoa and smuggling of drugs through West Africa to Europe and the middle east etc.(Danjibo, 2013: 20; Glickman, 2003: 167; Hübschle, 2011: 10; Mair, 2003: 3).

Table 2 Fragile states index, 2018

Country	Rank	Total	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	Group Grievance	Economy	Economic Inequality	Human Flight & Brain Drain	State Legitimacy	Public Services	Human Rights	Demographic Pressures	Refugees and IDPs	External Intervention
1. South Sudan	1st	113,4	10,0	9,7	9,7	10,0	8,9	6,3	10,0	9,9	9,2	10,0	10,0	9,6
2. Somalia	2nd	113,2	9,7	10,0	9,0	8,9	9,3	9,5	9,1	9,3	9,6	10,0	9,7	9,1
3. Yemen	3rd	112,7	9,9	10,0	9,5	9,6	8,2	7,2	9,7	9,7	9,8	9,6	9,5	10,0
4. Syria	4th	111,4	9,9	9,9	9,9	8,5	7,8	8,1	9,9	9,3	9,9	8,2	10,0	10,0
5. Central African Republic	5th	111,1	9,1	9,7	8,8	8,8	9,8	7,4	9,4	10,0	9,4	9,3	10,0	9,5
6. Congo Democratic Republic The	6th	110,7	9,1	9,8	10,0	8,1	8,5	7,0	9,6	9,5	9,8	9,6	10,0	9,7
7. Afghanistan	9th	106,6	10,0	8,6	8,1	8,3	7,8	8,1	9,1	10,0	8,2	9,2	9,9	9,4
8. Zimbabwe	10th	102,3	9,1	10,0	7,0	8,6	8,2	7,6	9,7	8,9	8,5	8,9	8,2	7,6
9. Iraq	11th	102,2	9,0	9,6	9,3	6,3	7,0	7,4	9,2	8,3	8,4	8,7	9,6	9,4
10. Haiti	12th	102,0	7,4	9,6	6,2	8,4	9,5	8,7	8,7	9,4	7,4	9,0	7,7	9,9
11. Guinea	13th	101,6	8,9	9,6	8,9	8,9	7,6	7,4	9,7	9,4	7,4	8,8	7,9	7,1
12. Nigeria	14th	99,9	8,9	9,6	9,3	8,0	8,3	7,2	8,3	8,9	8,6	9,1	7,5	6,2
13. Ethiopia	15th	99,6	8,7	8,4	8,8	6,7	6,8	7,6	8,5	8,5	8,7	9,5	9,0	8,4
14. Guinea Bissau	16th	98,1	8,6	9,6	5,2	8,0	8,9	7,8	9,2	9,2	7,5	8,8	7,0	8,3
15. Kenya	17th	97,4	8,4	9,6	8,9	7,0	7,6	7,5	8,1	8,3	7,3	8,9	8,0	7,8
16. Burundi	17th	97,4	8,5	7,9	7,6	8,1	7,0	6,0	8,9	7,7	8,9	9,4	8,7	8,7
17. Eritrea	19th	97,2	6,9	8,1	7,4	7,8	8,1	8,6	9,4	8,1	8,7	8,7	8,0	7,4
18. Pakistan	20th	96,3	8,8	8,9	9,7	6,6	6,2	7,1	7,8	7,9	7,7	8,1	8,4	9,1
19. Niger	21st	96,2	8,4	8,9	7,7	7,3	8,2	7,6	7,0	9,4	6,8	9,1	8,0	7,8
20. Myanmar	22nd	96,1	9,0	8,3	9,8	5,6	7,4	6,9	8,6	8,6	9,0	6,3	9,2	7,4
21. Cameroon	23rd	95,3	8,0	9,1	8,4	6,7	7,5	7,5	8,5	8,4	7,6	8,1	8,0	7,5
22. Uganda	24th	95,1	7,1	8,6	8,6	6,0	7,3	7,6	8,3	8,0	7,9	8,9	9,0	7,8
23. Libya	25th	94,6	9,3	9,4	7,8	8,0	5,3	6,3	9,8	6,7	9,4	4,6	8,0	10,0
24. Cote d'Ivoire	25th	94,6	7,7	9,1	7,8	6,8	7,7	7,3	7,6	8,5	7,6	8,2	7,5	8,7

Source: Fund for Peace. Retrieved on 9 March 2019 from: <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/>

The rise of terrorism in Mali and its spread, in recent times, across the Sahel-Sahara is particularly illustrative of the evil axis that linkstrade, terrorism, and transnational organized crime. In 2012, a recurrent Taureg armed insurgency led to a breakdown of democracy, overthrow of the Malian government by a military junta and occupation of the north by a coalition of jihadi terrorist comprising of Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA, a.k.a. MUJAO after its French acronym) and Ansar al Deen or, Ansar al Dine. Both the armed insurgency and the terrorist networkare strongly rooted in criminal networks that roam the Sahara desert,mainly consisting of trafficking of drugs, humans and arms; smuggling of cigarettes and other contrabands; kidnapping for ransom, mostly Western nationals etc.(Briscoe, 2014: 20-22; Francis, 2013: 4-5, 12; Dowd and Raleigh, 2013: 506; Marchal, 2013: 493; Boeke, 2016: 923, 927; Arieff, 2013: 2; Stigall, 2015: 2; Diarra, 2012: 1-2; Wing, 2013: 481). The staying power of the terrorist and criminal networks is facilitated by the Sahara'shistorical reputation as an international corridor for illicit trade characterised by large swathes of ungovernable spaces, vast desolate stretches of desert sand, rock, rugged mountain ranges, porous borders and the general weakness or absence of the state(Stewart, 2013: 27; Francis, 2013: 4-5, 9; Dowd and Raleigh, 2013: 499, 507; Stigall, 2015: 2; Diarra, 2012: 1-2; Boeke, 2016: 927; Venter, 2018: 26).Another illustration is to be found in the Horn of Africa, where,pirate gangs, Somali warlords and Al Shabaab militants control trade in illegal weapons and goods such as sugar along the Somali coast often finding easy flow into the lucrative Kenyan market, aidedby a vast porous Kenya-Somali boarder(Howard, 2010: 966; Kimunguyi, 2011: 6; Mair, 2003: 3).Since its inception in 2006, Al Shabaab has exploited criminal ventures to finance its terrorist activities in the region, mainly in Somalia and Kenya.Weaknesses in international financial systems have allowed the group to tap international financial resourcesfrom individuals or even possibly criminal organisations abroad, enabling it tofundits clandestine operations (Busher, 2014: 1). It is not surprising therefore, that Kenya has urged the UN to list Al-Shabaab under the same sanctions as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State citing informal finances through international financial systems such as formal banking and money transfer systems,illicit taxation and protection rackets of thousands of businesses and many of the humanitarian organisations in Somalia⁵.

Rapid developments in information and transport technologies and increasingly de-regulated economies resulting from the construction or reconfigurations of international, regional and continental trading blocs have facilitated the growth, development, and interconnectedness of TOCs and terrorists groups (Edwards and Gill, 2002: 205; Williams, 1997: 2-4). Their collaboration being motivated by the need to maximise profits or to finance their activities while exploiting weakness in the system.

Implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area will either promote or prevent AU Policies on Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism

During the launch of the AfCFTA, the sitting Chairperson of the African Union, President Abdel Fattah El Sisi of Egypt stressed both the need to open borders to other Africans and the importance of peace and security on the continent, stating that, "it would be a delusion to talk of trade and development without peace and security". Nothing can be further from the truth. The Protocols on Trade in Goods and Trade in Services call for open borders and increased liberalisation/deregulation of markets to expand trade between Africa states.

Open borders enable the free movement of persons and in the most open policy, the free movement of goods. Opening borders to trade will stimulate the growth of businesses, especially small scale businesses along border regions. These communities will reap immediate dividends and develop much faster. Overall, as demand and supply markets expand across frontiers resulting from free movement of entrepreneurs and investors, economic growth will be stimulated. Expanding business opportunities and thriving businesses will expand tax brackets and increase taxable incomes to generate more government revenues. Besides, related benefits such as savings in government spending. Government revenues will thus increase and so will government expenditure on public goods and services such as welfare, development and security. Open borders will also reduce the cost of border control, which would free more budgetary allocation to other areas of public expenditure. Open borders will also accelerate social and cultural integration, making doing business across border easier as well as hasten political integration stimulated by converging economic interests met through trade. This is the ideal "laboratory" situation. However, open borders also portend certain threats to peace and security. Terrorist and TOC networks operating in Africa already exploit vast swathes of porous borders to enjoy unrestricted movement between states for purposes of their licit and illicit enterprises. As African states move to open more borders to facilitate the

AfCFTA, it is logical that, open borders will also be open to TOC and terrorist networks, giving them additional freedom of movement albeit clandestine. To illustrate this point, let us consider the DusitD2 complex terror attack in Nairobi on 15 January 2019 in which 21 people were killed by four Al Shabaab gunmen. According to Kenyan authorities, some of the men who carried out the attack entered Kenya through the Dagahaley Refugee Camp in the larger Dadaab Refugee Camp, posing as refugees, before being facilitated and brought to Nairobi by criminal networks operating from the camp to execute the attack⁶. Refugees entering Kenya from Somalia undergo some level of security screening before being registered. However, this screening is usually not as rigorous as would be undertaken at a regular controlled border crossing. Hence, chances that terrorist elements can filter through refugee screening and join their cells inside camps are realistic. Thus, if Kenyan authorities are correct that the DusitD2 attackers filtered through the less stringent refugee screening while entering Kenya, then we can postulate that the same strategy used by DusitD2 attackers can as well work in the context of open less controlled borders aimed at facilitating the implementation of the AfCFTA. The same deductive logic applies in the case of smuggling and trafficking in humans across the continent and beyond. Because of strict controls at designated border crossing points, human trafficking and smuggling networks rely on porous borders and ungoverned spaces. With free movement of persons, open less controlled borders will provide extra opportunities for criminal networks to smuggle and traffic both suspecting and unsuspecting persons in addition to their traditional routes afforded by porous borders and ungoverned spaces.

Increased liberalisation/deregulation of markets conjures certain security threats that may arise from terrorist and TOC networks. Liberalisation/deregulation is likely to increase competition, spur innovation, growth and diversification of goods and services. Informal small businesses are likely to tap into emerging new markets lifting many out of poverty. In short, the positive elements of liberalisation/deregulation predicted by the AfCFTA can be summed up as 'increased opportunities for legitimate trade across frontiers'. However, like in the case of open borders, the increase in such opportunities would cut across all groups without exclusion. The negative externality implies that, since terrorist and TOC networks also engage in legitimate business from time to time, they will also access any increased opportunities for legitimate trade in goods and services as envisioned by the AfCFTA. Article 2(3b) of the AfCFTA defines services to include any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority. Terrorist and TOC networks can hide

behind dubious companies purporting to offer services either to smuggle and traffic both suspecting and unsuspecting persons or to gather intelligence intended for future attacks. This reasoning is not far-fetched. Several studies and media reports have highlighted the exploitation, mistreatment and abuses of African domestic workers in the Middle East who migrate there from Africa both legally and illegally, facilitated by dubious employment agencies in collaboration with networks of smugglers. See (De Regt, 2010; Moors et al., 2009: 251-254). The worst-case scenario would be if terrorist organizations, posing as legitimate service providers, exploited increased opportunities in service markets to infiltrate their targets and gather information useful for planning attacks. The suicide bomb attack on July 24, 2019, claimed by Al Shabaab on a government building in Somalia, killing the mayor of Mogadishu and six others⁷ can illustrate this argument. According to Somali authorities, the suicide bomber was a blind, female employee of the municipal government who was assisted by a fellow worker⁸. Nothing in the books precludes Al Shabaab and other transnational terrorist organizations from replicating the same strategy modified to mimic legitimate private service providers. Based on such a strategy terrorist groups may have the capability to execute successful attacks both locally and abroad, more so if increased deregulation allows foreign companies to offer more services in local markets.

Conclusion and Recommendations

There is no doubt that the AfCFTA predicts dividends that will stimulate rapid social, economic and political development for the continent. However, this will only be possible if implemented judiciously by the AU collectively and individually by states to minimize negative externalities. These externalities are likely to arise out of increased opening of borders to free movement of persons and goods which imply decreased border controls. Negative externalities are also likely to accompany increased liberalisation/deregulation of markets for goods and services. This realisation calls for the AU and governments of member states to implement policies meant to give effect to the AfCFTA with due regard to the overall security, peace and stability of the continent.

AU policies on transnational organized crime are scattered across several legal or policy instruments. There is a need to consolidate all these policies in a single policy instrument and perhaps designate an officer to coordinate efforts to prevent and counter transnational organized crime in all its facets. Because of the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and

transnational organized crime, such an officer should ideally be domiciled within the ACSRT. The scope of responsibility for officer should go beyond coordination of policy interventions, to include the production of actionable empirical research to inform policy and practice within the continent.

The Institutional Framework for the Implementation of the AfCFTA, in conjunction with other relevant bodies, must develop mechanisms that ensures proper continent-wide integrated border management systems. Such systems must incorporate modern population management and individual identification technologies. Investments in integrated identification technologies is important, especially considering that, the **Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment** provides for an African passport. Based on this passport, it is desired that African citizens will freely be able to enter any state in Africa without the requirement of a visa. This means that the passport will eliminate additional scrutiny that accompanies usual visa application processes. It is envisioned that by 2020 the African passport will be ready for use worldwide. By investing in modern integrated individual identity technologies, the AU and member states of the AU will not only improve the quality of security that would otherwise be compromised with open borders, but will also strengthen the African passport as a travel document for Africans globally. Such an outcome will enhance the position of the continent and its people in the global society. It is important that useful lessons on contemporary integrated border management are drawn from other regional bodies with considerable experience, such as the European Union⁹.

The Institutional Framework for the Implementation of the AfCFTA must also endeavor to put in place mechanisms that detect and or frustrate legitimate trade intended for criminal purposes. However, care must be taken to avoid collateral damage. Such damage may occur if genuine trade in goods and services is erroneously profiled and criminalized. The danger is that, in the quest to block legitimate trade carried out by terrorist and TOC networks, defining legitimate trade and or actors as illegal, is likely to open flood gates for TOCs and terrorist groups to thrive in the newly defined illegal markets (Williams, 1997: 1, 6; Finckenauer, 2005: 66-67; Edwards and Gill, 2002: 207). According to Edwards and Gill (2002: 211) and Miraglia et al. (2012: 22) continuous careful in-depth research, expertise on the regulation of "black" (sic) and "grey" markets and continuous negotiated relationships between regulators

and traders may help in the identification and smoking out of trade practices intended for criminal purposes by TOC and terrorist networks.

Since TOC and terrorist networks often depend on the co-operation of local officials and security agents to neutralize or nullify government through corruption, implementation of the AfCFTA must mainstream anti-corruption at all levels. Regional, national and even sub-national. Generally, the AU must pile pressure on member states to individually and collectively deal firmly with the menace of corruption in all its forms, shapes and colours. To be effective, continent wide anti-corruption mechanisms must be genuine, sustainable and able to travel across borders. Such mechanisms may include but not limited to the development of effective judicial mechanisms to prosecute illicit trade and transnational corruption, recovery and repatriation of proceeds of corruption; greater investment in regional cooperation in law enforcement (sharing of information and intelligence; prosecution and arrest; complementary legislation; training and research to support customs and border security operations); dealing firmly with nepotism and cronyism etc. (Edwards and Gill, 2002: 205; Miraglia et al., 2012: 21).

Overall for the AfCFTA and other AU policies to collectively change the fortunes of the continent, the AU must decisively eliminate ecosystems that facilitate the continued existence of terrorist and TOC networks. This means that, the AU must take bold steps to deal with state weakness and poor health of political systems that have for a long time characterised the political economy of the continent. This includes shaming leaders and governments that perpetuate state weakness and unhealthy political systems at home and abroad. Generally, governments in the region must exercise and be seen to exercise their sovereign authority and monopoly over violence in all corners of their territorial boundaries. This includes but not limited to: reduction in large swathes of ungoverned spaces; increased governmental and administrative efficiency; sufficient training and equipping of security forces and trade officials; strengthening of financial sectors to prevent shadow economies from executing capital transactions that enable trafficking in weapons and illicit trade in goods and services; dealing firmly with nepotism, cronyism, political marginalisation, oppression, human rights violations, impunity, civic lethargy etc. However, in exercising sovereign authority and monopoly over violence, governments in the region must proceed with caution. They must always act in the interest of the public and not for purposes of state preservation. They must endeavour to maximise the space occupied by human rights. Failure to do so is likely to

engineerwidespread grievances that may play into the hands of terrorist organisations. In which case, terrorist will most likely use widespread grievances as justification for their course, gain sympathy, popularise recruitment and attract clandestine financial and non-financial resources. It is obvious that as the space occupied by terrorist increases, so does the potential nodes that link TOCs and terrorist organisations.

Lastly, the role of continuous policy research cannot be overemphasized. Existence of the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) is a strong factor. Continuous research on transitional organised crimes and terrorism can be strengthened by incorporating into the structure of the ACSRT a senior officer in charge of research and study of transitional organised crime on a full-time basis. In this way, implementation of the AfCFTA and other AU policies will benefit from better coordinated and comprehensive empirical evidence relating to transitional organised crimes and terrorism on the continent.

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Insurgency and counter-insurgency in Africa: Discussion In Africa statehood dilemma

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Abstract:

The circumstances surrounding African state suggested transformations in the struggle between weak government and insurgent challenges in several parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Several factors explain that insurgencies will play important role in African politics for the future regional, ethnic, and religious cleavages within and between countries.

This article analyzes the main challenges to African statehood related to how collapsed or weak states deal with insurgency through emphasizing the positive aspects of ethnicity of each unique case. The article argues that Sensitivity should be paid to the complex and contradictory ways in which global and regional dynamics impact are fundamentally localized conflicts with deep histories, while avoiding simple mono-causal explanations for the occurrence of such violent conflict challenges, that risks involved in the exercise of the state and the non-state authorities 'converting' different forms of power between different realms of governance .The hypothesis is put forward that the poor leadership has fertilized the African soil for easy recruitment of its youth into militia groups for many of them; the alternative is to flee from the continent, and the most state power declined the most it might contribute to the reproduction of insurgent violence. So, Institutionalization of practice for the sake of 'peace' by providing rebels with a share of state power has important demonstration effects to solve and decreasing this phenomenon across the continent.

Key words: Africa instability, counter-insurgency, insurgency, state building.

Introduction:

Since the end of the cold war insurgencies have dominated the range of violent conflicts in Africa and have become a critical element in rapid social change in most of the continent's sub-regions. Aside from their quantitative expansion, the significance of insurrections is also noteworthy at the qualitative level. More important for the purpose of this article, an increasing number of insurgents eventually find themselves in the government of the state they seek to conquer. Over

the past decade, such as, in both Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), two successive governments were either displaced by insurgents or forced to share power with their rebellion. The steady recurrence of insurrections in some of countries, as well as their increasingly frequent inclusion into governments, thus seems to indicate that would be leaders have some reason to conceptualize the organization of violence as a viable path to occupying at least parcels of state power. Taking this assumption as a starting point, this article aims to explore underlying factors that contribute to the proliferation of insurgencies as well as their often successful outcomes — success being defined as the taking of state power or parts thereof – in state future role and existence.

To date, careful analysis of the significance of the insurgency phenomenon has been an exception. Arguably, this is to some extent due to the deeply rooted tradition of state-centered analysis in political science and its sub-disciplines, then, the weakening of state capabilities has been identified as a major explanatory factor of high levels of internal conflict and insurrection in Africa, and discussion of counterinsurgency in Africa has linked to what has come to be known as the 'New Wars' thesis; that is qualitative changes have taken place in the nature of conflict in Africa, 'new wars' that are distinct from earlier forms of conflict (Themner and Wallensteen 2014; Burbuck and Fettweis 2014).

Contemporary African armed insurgencies are the essential, but by no means only, manifestation of these multiple and competing networks of power and rule. That new technologies, strategies, ideas and theories about the state, the life people live and pathways to resistance emerge, existing insurgencies adapt while new ones emerge.

So, as the interest in the topics of insurgency and counterinsurgency has been far from consistent. Several times insurgency has been declared dead and buried; Steven Metz wrote in 1995 that: "the insurgents of the world are sleeping". Walter Laqueur concluded in 1998 that guerrilla war may not entirely disappear but, seen in historical perspective, it is on the decline. The interest in counterinsurgency has suffered a similar fate. The techniques of an insurgency evolve with the societies from which it arises. Since the Cold War the pace of social change has accelerated dramatically, not just in the rich, secure nations of the northern hemisphere, but also in developing and African countries as they have become gripped by global change.

Our argument is straightforward: over the past fifteen years government in Africa's states unable or unwilling to effectively counter the violence inflicted by an insurgent movement, introducing forms for facing or countering the insurgents that not dealt with main causes to rebel driven from state structure factors but produce solutions that creates incentive structures which turn the rebel path into an appealing option in the pursuit of otherwise blocked political aspirations, If valid this hypothesis important implications on state role and future.

So, the first section of the study briefly sketches theoretical discourse related to insurgency and counter insurgency in African realm, which illustrate that according to elite approach the forms of modernization associated with elite dominance systems in colonial African States are similar to the type that Remmer called "comprador bourgeoisie" , a kind of modernization that is dependent on international economic forces and has its roots in colonial, political, and economic domination (Remmer, 1976,pp.25-27). Second section we examine the extent to which these policies have contributed to ever-more violent politics on the continent through referring to spread of insurgencies all over the continent. As we shall analyze in the third section, these inconsistencies have pushed some African countries into a vicious cycle that corroborates the reproduction of insurgency-induced violence, and threatened state ability to act as national identity formulation entity through studying book haram case in Nigeria.

Defining Insurgency and the Literature:

The definition of insurgency in this context is not the same as that presented in law academic descriptions. Therefore, before peeling back the layers of various divisions and camps within the literature, it will be helpful to provide the ontological definition of insurgency to be used throughout the rest of this study. An insurgency is a condition of formalized resistance or revolt against a governing authority in which the perpetrating parties are not initially recognized as belligerents, Rather, at the outset they are insurgents and as such act without the protection of or subjection to the laws of war that govern the behavior of state forces. A governing authority may include "an established government, a military occupation government, an interim civil administration, or a peace process (joint chef staff, counterinsurgency, 2013, p.1)

Insurgent goals are political and focus on influencing who makes political decisions and who has access to political power within a given constituency. For example, an insurgency may renounce allegiance or subjection to a government; challenge political control; demand participation in the political process; or attempt to end the rule of one government and start a new one. Insurgencies “attempt to modify the existing political system at least partially through the unconstitutional or illegal use of force.

Numerous areas of academic literature contribute to explaining insurgency in addition to the nationalism; dissertation in this study focuses specifically on the nationalism literature because the model requires insurgencies to define their desired end as a nation state-building tool (many literature deals with nationalism, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 1983); Mark Ashley, “It Takes a Victim: The Construction of National Identity and the Narrative of National Victimization, 2001); Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” 1993); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1983); Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, 1997); John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism*, 1994). As will be further explored in section one. This literature links measurable variables to the onset of domestic conflicts at various thresholds of casualties or fatalities. It also looks at specific social movement mechanisms and limited insurgent strategies of controlled or uncontrolled violence.

So, insurgents' term often denotes the "good guys" more than bad ones in African context; that they aim to destroy or topple the political authority of the defending authorities and to take control of the government. And By qualitative method which is fundamentally interpretive. The study will use inductive reasoning. The findings resulting from the detailed analysis of the cases will be generalized to sub-Saharan Africa. Since the analysis will be conducted through the main insurgencies actors in East /West Africa.

Section 1- Insurgencies and counterinsurgency: A theoretical framework

The study of the phenomenon of insurgency calls for two observations: First, is the fact that each insurgency is unique in one or more aspects? The reason for this difference is where it took place and the factors that led to its emergence. Secondly, despite the elements of uniqueness in each insurgency, there are a number of common

features such as: the nature of the organization, the strategies used the violence, persuasion, coercion, internal complaining, and the influence of the external environment (*Ibid*, p.345).

By connecting literatures of insurgency, we may begin to see broader general patterns across the insurgency landscape. Existing literature does not emphasize enough the constituting processes associated with political mechanisms. It also fails to incorporate the connectivity between violent and passive anti-regime activity necessary to insurgent practice (Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works, the Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, 2013, pp.11-15). Most of political scientists, insurgency begins with a threshold of violent behavior. It starts after the guerrilla force or terrorist organization is already in play. It doesn't illustrate how youth groups, social-patriotic organizations, economic organizations, trade unions, political parties, and families connect by design or by chance to the official political and violent mechanisms of the insurgency (Roger D. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion*, 2005, p.480).

Political theory regarding revolution also speaks to causes and consequences of insurgency, addresses the complexities of constituting a new political framework. It does so, however, on an individual state basis or without a systemic perspective. Hannah Arendt, for example, addresses the choices and tensions during revolution between developing a political solution that safeguards participation in the resulting political process and the dominance of the revolutionary party. Will the insurgency lead to true reforms and a new governmental system? Will it represent simply regime change or decapitation with new rulers? Or will the new environment remain socially unstable and political fragile through the violent enforcement of insurgent norms? (Van Evera, *Guide to Methods*, 2011, p.30) Another category of literature that needs to be addressed includes military doctrine and international legal perspectives to clarify increasing levels of violence for growing insurgencies than the collective violence literature.

Insurgency theory:

For theoretical importance a better understanding the anatomy of insurgencies needed, the current literature is divided into two broader perspectives: academic and operational approaches as follows:

Academic literature of insurgency:

Academic definition regarding ideas needed for a broader conceptual understanding of the politics of insurgency; establishes the inaccuracy and inadequacy of understanding regarding the concept. For example, Fearon and Laitin explain insurgency as “a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas.” According to this definition, insurgency is an operational tactic limited to and conflated with rural guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, however, is distinct from insurgency because it focuses on military objectives and may be practiced by state forces or by insurgents in urban or rural environments. Insurgents are more than guerrillas. They “fight to attain political, not military ends” and are not confined to rural environments or defined by military measures alone (Fearon and Laitin, *Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War*, 2015, p.75).

Operational Perspectives of Insurgency:

This category introduces the prevalent academic definition regarding insurgency. It immediately establishes the inaccuracy and inadequacy of understanding regarding the concept. first *the classical approach*, emerged and flourished during the Cold War era, with many studies being the result of direct interaction between academics, thinkers and politicians, refers to theories that dealt with how to confront the revolutionary wars that emerged as a result of the spread of anti-colonial movements and wars of liberation during the period from 1944 to 1982, (Drew, 1988, Pp.12-15) Main contributions in this approach are, Liddell Hart notion of "Strategy " to solve the fundamental problem of modern warfare: how can a decisive outcome be achieved in a short time and without loss (Gibish, 2010, p.52) which means: "the distribution and operation of military means to achieve political objectives and in the latter know tactical action as the implementation of the strategy at a lower level", Where Hart's supports the idea of an approach based on suddenness and rapid movement, leading to the reduction of battles to the smallest possible size. Hart supported his dissertation on military history to demonstrate the importance of popular support for successful guerrilla operations.

So, His argument based on the so-called indirect approach based on principles such as flexibility of the plan and the system, the choice of targets and the avoidance of renewal of the attack in the same line of combat, and the reluctance of the military

commander in the face of the most natural conditions strongly to provide the element of surprise, The balance of the enemy, as happened by the German armored vehicles that entered the French territory through the Ardennes Forest, which the French considered impossible to cross.

Worthy mentioned that this theory dominated the ideas of the military in the world. One of the most prominent international experiences that passed through and adopted these ideas was the work of the German army chiefs of staff during the Second World War, especially with regard to the tactical structure between air force and aviation (*Hart*, 1991, p.25).

During the 1960s, many scientific works related to classic counterinsurgency were published, notably the David Galula book, "The Counterinsurgency War," published in 1964, and served as the basis for a counterinsurgency perspective. This book is an organized work of the rebellion is composed by the French Colonel Galula, and focused his thoughts on the factors that explain the different results of the various control campaigns. Galula also outlined the requirements for successful guerrilla warfare, with the formulation of the most important counterinsurgency strategies and tactics. So, he introduced to four points - some called the Gallula Laws - that combine politics, social and military action with regard to dealing with the insurgency or guerilla warfare (*Reid*, 1996, p.67).

As a result to the recent development that phenomenon of insurgency witnessed, a new trend has emerged to study its new dimension; **contemporary theories** presented in a lot of practical tactics that applied in recent wars such as strategic communications, field manual, beat cop, boots on ground, cultural awareness, flexibility and adaptability, Mainstream theories appeared in this approach such as **three pillars theory**: it is at the heart of modern theories, the work of David Kilcullen(see Kilcullen, the Three Pillars of *Counterinsurgency*, 2006; '*Counterinsurgency Redux*') , His most notable contribution was *Counterinsurgency*, 2010, which included 28 scientific articles defining the rules of counterinsurgency management and implementation in the era of globalization, to fit his vision with the changing and complex nature of the insurgency. At the beginning of his work he rejected and refuted the thesis of the classics that the rebellion is characterized by bad performance and its resistance is through strengthening the state in the face of it. Pointing out that the modern insurgency may occur in failed states. He stressed that

the objectives of the insurgency is not always to eliminate and destroy the governments and control of the political sphere, there are cases, as experienced by Afghanistan has been the rebellion of the government to control the country. In other words, there is no conflict between insurgency and counterinsurgency in goals. Also he presented a new counterinsurgency formula, noting that the data of the classic counterinsurgency vision is no longer sufficient; so he asserted that current Counterinsurgency operations were based on three pillars: security, political, and economic, all based on a database of different types to gain control of power (Gallula, 1964, p.25)

Zamernardi presenting a series of aims to be achieved during the counterinsurgency, he drew up a vision of the impossible trinity that he used in his study of economics to point to the impossibility of achieving protection of armed forces, the state, complete elimination of the rebellion in any battle. Using the practical experience in Afghanistan as example of this, The United States Government has faced the dilemma of maintaining and protecting its forces, defeating the insurgency and protecting the local population. It had to sacrifice one of those considerations, which was achieved in 2006, when it was forced to sacrifice some soldiers during the battle (Kilcullen, 2005, Pp.597 – 617; 2010, pp.5-13).

It can be said that the current era is witnessing a conflict between two opposing intellectual directions. There is the first school of thought that supports the centrality of the goal of eliminating the enemy. Another one supports the importance of protecting the civilian population. So, Counterinsurgency is treated as a kind of state war. The insurgency is developing and expanding to become a substitute for the government that opposes it, so this enemy should be defeated as a primary and primary objective.

Types of insurgencies and COIN in Africa:

By identifying the methods and strategies used to suppress the insurgency in the world, different types of insurgencies can be mentioned; African peoples have done everything they can to resist colonialism. Indeed, they have sometimes succeeded in bringing real setbacks to these colonial powers. But by 1914, the Europeans and their followers controlled 84% of the world, compared to 35% in the 19th century. Certainly, no one can deny that the growing technological and

technological progress in the military affairs enjoyed by Europe has cost non-Europeans their independence, but also we cannot neglect that non-Europeans have pursued strategies more consistent with their limited sources, which would have delayed the hegemony of Europe. For years, if not for decades, and endured huge losses even if these movements did not succeed in the end (Zambarnardi, 2010, Pp.25-34). Main types of insurgency in Africa first appear against traditional colonial powers as follows:

1- Insurgency against British colonialism:

During the 19th and 20th centuries, the British entered a continuous series of border skirmishes, internal security operations, and large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns. They have conducted these operations in different places around the world. During this period, the British designed a flexible approach to combat based on three general principles: Use of minimum force; adopting the military-civilian cooperation approach; Decentralization of the operation against the rebels (Reno, 2011, p.111).

This approach resulted in the successful confrontation and deterrence of conflicts and rebellion against the British presence, especially on the African continent. It is worth mentioning here that despite the performance of the successful British counterinsurgency method, British experience did not attract the attention of researchers, especially in the United States, where British victories were totally criticized or rejected. (Mockaitis, 1990, Pp.15-20).

2- warfare era:

After the fall of the British Empire, the guerilla-style insurgency took a different turn. Between 1959 and 1979, the golden age of left-wing insurgent movements took place, with Fidel Castro taking power in Cuba. However, there have been a few wars against colonialism and quite a few wars that were ethnically opposed to colonization (in the Congo and Biafra in Nigeria) which represented the postcolonial countries, but it can be said that the main motive of these wars was socialist ideologies. The rebellions at this stage are the pattern of rural guerrilla warfare and popular terrorism. Some governments have been able to suppress and counter insurgent movements, leading to the publication of a number of instructional books in the 1960s, such as *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Between Theory and*

Practice, by the French officer David Gallula, And Defeating Community Insurgency, which was written by the British officer Sir Robert Thompson. (McCuen, 1966, p.25)

3- insurgencies in the 1980s:

The 1980s, witness the end of colonialism, the excesses of the postcolonial rulers, and the spread of capitalism, guerrilla warfare subsided, as one of the most important sources of funding for the rebels and the arms trade stopped. As a result of these developments and the political and ideological changes that the world witnessed, Religious and Ethnic insurgencies. That is, the transition from politically motivated insurgencies to religious-led insurgency. The origins of this transition can be traced back to the 1950s and 1960s with the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, and the Wahhaby movement led by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab in Saudi Arabia, Which created the phenomenon of guerrilla religious movements, or what is known in the political and military literature as "jihadist". Since then, the threat of extremists has been kept secret until the events of September 11, 2001, when Al-Qaeda carried out its terrorist attack, in which reshaped the scene in the world. During this period, new counterinsurgency strategies emerged, which adopted the strategy of terrorism. (O'Neill, 1990, p.55)

4- insurgency nature in the millennium:

In 2001, the United States overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in response to the September 11 attacks. But this victory was quickly followed by the emergence of a violent insurgency, with the Taliban and the Islamic Party, this insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan has become the focus of security policies in the world from here began search to find the most appropriate ways to deal with the new form of rebellion.

By the rapid evolution of technology and militarism, modern insurgencies have become complex matrices with informal actors with very diverse objectives. These movements often lack a centralized command structure, but are usually linked to horizontal dynamic networks. Ideology plays a pivotal role in these movements. The motivation for the insurgency is that some of the main ideological actors, or at least those who claim it, do not extend this ideology to the entire rebel network (Cordesman & Al-Rodhan, 2006, Pp.6-10).

5- main features of African counterinsurgency :

There is a significant gap in the literature in terms of contextualizing African counterinsurgency operations and a more complete understanding of what experts actually taught movements like the civil defense militia in West Africa. Given the prevalence of conflict on the continent, the lack of analysis of African military combat effectiveness may, perhaps, be surprising. However, the political history of the continent is very much one where the military has become increasingly politicized and involved in government. Scholarly work on African militaries and insurgent violence focus on the means available to Africa armies and the motives of rebels and do not provide a full picture of why regimes choose different approaches or why civilian populations are relatively marginal to the wars between these actors, even if civilians experience significant consequences of these wars. The dominant approach of analyzing African insurgencies is 'out-governing the rebel' evolved from a doctrine based on experiences from past wars and across armies. Military officers from the late 19th and early 20th centuries wrote foundational works on counter-insurgency in contexts where their armies fought and helped set up government administrations in the places they controlled (Rid & Thomas Keane(eds.),2010,pp.75-86).We can say that the main features of COIN operations in African context are:

- 1- The Contemporary African warfare not only a resurgence of old practices, But also, has been influenced by insurgency and counter-insurgency doctrine, developed in Europe, America, the former Communist bloc and the former racist regimes in southern Africa.
- 2- These doctrines have been rigorously tested in the field and refined through experience. The legacy of Maoist theories of 'people's war' remains significant in Africa context.
- 3- A whole generation of guerrilla fighters was followed Maoist practice and its Cuban variant. Socialist ideology and Maoist practice were, for the most part, intimately linked.
- 4- Soldiers fight for ideology and ideology is in turn central to effective discipline, were to be found in cases such as Eritrea, Tigray (Young, 1996, p.178)
- 5- Parallel to strategies of insurgents there are a new military doctrines that developed in turn to counter rebellion methods.

- 6- A sharp decline of vital interests and changes at the international level, the domestic level, or sometimes both was accompanied by the rolling back of Western involvement in the domestic affairs of African states.
- 7- Armed non-state movements were more readily integrated into the international relations of sovereign states as outsiders attempted to solve violent conflict in war-torn countries. Because of limited interests, Western actors turned to the instrument of power-sharing to terminate the fighting, an approach that requires by definition the recognition of all the conflict parties, including the insurgents.
- 8- Thus, it entails a major adjustment in the domestic balance of power, since external actors level the political playing-field in favor of insurgents at the expense of state leaders: Instead of regarding one party as representing the state, and the others as opposing it, external mediators came to conceive all the parties as subsisting on a more or less equal footing; their function in turn was no longer to protect those who could represent the state but giving recognition to all warring parties (waal,1996,p.13)
- 9- COIN field in Africa witnessed another change that the neighboring countries of insurgency-affected countries, often showed more hostility towards insurgencies even more than the Western-led international community itself. Evidence derived of cases includes the military interventions of Senegal in Guinea-Bissau (1998), and the joint intervention by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho (1998).

After reviewing how theories perceives insurgency in Africa, coming section highlights on scope of phenomenon in Africa's real context:

Section 2: Nature of instability in sub-Saharan Africa: models of jihadist insurgencies in West /East Africa

In spite of that Sub-Saharan Africa has made important peace and security gains. But other forms of political violence have increased; countries are more at risk of instability and violent conflict, each with their own unique set of pressures and potential paths to instability. For example, entirely different factors drive the civil war in South Sudan, election violence in Kenya, the farmer-herder conflict in Nigeria's Middle Belt, and armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

And the recent rise of jihadist movements in West Africa, including Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its affiliates in the Sahel-Saharan region, has puzzled many observers. The easy spread of the jihadist ideology, the jihadist movements' success in massively recruiting followers among local populations as well as their ability to conquer and administer territories, are unprecedented in the region's contemporary history. (Ibid,p.15)

For a wide range of reasons, certain regions of Africa have experienced weakened state capacity and increased local conflict, and it is in these areas that jihadist insurgencies have emerged. At the individual level, the process by which African individuals decide to enroll in jihadist groups include ideological, situational, and strategic motivations, and these have all been facilitated by deteriorating conditions of life in marginalized areas. In the next section, we will address the most prominent extremist group's examples:

1- The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin (east Africa):

The movement has announced its public appearance since 2007. Prior to that, the military wing of the Union of Islamic Courts was at the time of confronting the Ethiopian troops that entered Somalia in 2006 and then broke away from the Islamic courts Union after the leaders of the Union accepted negotiations with the Somali government. The movement confirmed in its statements its steadfastness on its jihadist principles, its quest for the establishment of the Islamic state in the Horn of Africa, its continued fighting with government forces, movements that are incompatible with its ideology. The movement was able to achieve successful attacks controlled by about 85% of the territory of Somalia in four years, before declining in 2011 after the strikes received from the forces of the African Union Mission of Somalia. Al Shabaab movement attacks were not confined to the Somali interior but extended to neighboring countries. Such as, 2010 blew up in the Ugandan capital Kampala and, in 2013 launched an attack on a commercial mall in Kenya and in 2015 attacked the campus of the University of Hargeysia, Kenya, killing at least 147 students. (Meredith,2005,pp.9-12)


The danger of this movement is still strong, especially as it has proved its ability to absorb the blows directed at it, and develop its combat strategy, and help them to dominate the situation in Somalia.

2- lord resistance army in Uganda LRA (east Africa):

A fundamental movement based on a Christian background, emerged in Uganda in 1986 to fight the forces of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, one of the most violent militant movements not only in Africa but worldwide, It has caused the death and displacement of tens of thousands of citizens of East and Central Africa, where it has spread in Uganda, southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, and thus far represents a threat to the security and stability of these States(McGregor,pp.9-12)

Despite the military operations and the confrontations carried out by Ugandan official forces and the international community to confront and destroy the LRA, they have not been able to eliminate this movement or arrest its leader Joseph Kony, the one of international war criminals (see following map regarding LRA main operations during December 2008- April 2010)(Fisher,2014,p.318)

Map (1) LRA main operations during December 2008- April 2010



Source: wafula okumu& augastine ikelegbe(eds.), **militias rebels and Islamists militants: human insecurity and state crisis in Africa**(Pretoria: institute for security studies,2010),p.302.

3- Anti-Balaka militias in central Africa republic (central Africa):

Emerged in Central Africa, in its war against the Seleka movement in 2013. Anti- Balaka took up arms, carried out acts of sectarian revenge against the Muslims and reached the point of extermination, and succeeded in targeting the sites of the Seleka movement in the Islamic-oriented capital of Bangui, Most Central African Muslims fled as refugees Many mosques have been closed down and destroyed, and Muslim civilians have been subjected to the most violent and persecution of Christian militants. Since then, a spiral of violence between rival groups along both religious and ethnic lines has left thousands dead, and CAR is de facto partitioned – anti-Balaka in the southwest and ex-Seleka in the northeast, Nearly 700,000 people are displaced, 570,000 have fled the country and 2.5 million are in need of humanitarian aid, according to the United Nations (*Ibid*, p.330)

4- Ansar Dine (Defenders of the religion) in Mali:

The 2012 outbreak of insurgency in Mali was not a detached phenomenon, but the predictable consequence of long-term political neglect and economic underdevelopment in the country's northern region. Implementing a successful COIN strategy in Mali will require a thorough understanding of the underlying seeds responsible for cultivating insurgent activity. The nature of recurrent conflicts in northern Mali, peace and prosperity appear distant prospects at best that Race and Islam have historically significant roles in discourses of power in northern Mali. All northern Malians and almost all southern Malians are Muslim. Arabs and Tuaregs, generally speaking, consider themselves to be "white," whereas the other communities—the Songhay, Peuls, and several others, including the Mandés—regard themselves as "black." Racial identities are based less on skin color than on ethnic and religion. Inter- and intra-communal competition in northern Mali often leads to conflict and plays an important role in the several "northern rebellions" that Mali has experienced since its independence (*Ibid*, p.70).

A number of leaders of the Salafist groups, in Algeria went towards the desert and the mountains of Mali, taking refuge there and engaged in interrelationships between them and The Tuareg people tribes to be the movement after that, and its founder is Ayad Ag Ghali, a Tuareg leader (International Crisis Group,2014,p.25).

Although their presence in the centre of the country plays out in different ways, radical armed groups have imposed a number of rules on virtually every community they have gained access to. The movement tried from the outset to adopt a different approach to al-Qaeda-related groups when it prevented kidnapping and targeting foreigners in the areas it controls. It also sought to free hostages held in the area. There are signs of a direct relationship between Ansar al-Din and Boko Haram, in the areas of the spread of Ansar al-Din in northern Mali, as Boko Haram declared support for Ansar al-Din during the French war against terrorism in Mali (Shurkin; Pezard; Zimmerman, 2017, pp. 11-15)

5- Al Mourabitoun group (northern and western Africa):

The return of Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar to Central Sahara that he has negotiated an agreement with Droukdel. In 2014, Bel Mokhtar managed to unify the jihadist groups Moulattamoun, the movement for unity and jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Al Mouwakious Bi Dimaa – ‘Signatories by blood’ - into a single Katiba (Term used to denote a group of fighters in Arabic): Al Mourabitoun. However, a fraction of Al Mourabitoun, headed by Aboulwalid Sahraoui pledged allegiance to the IS. This triggered a race between AQIM and the IS in North Africa. The IS calls on the AQIM Mujahideen to join the Caliphate of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi¹⁵. The return of Iyad Ag Ghali, the head of Ansar Eddine in Mali, and the linkage between this group and AQIM also explain the terrorist attacks that occurred in Bamako in November 2015 and in Ouagadougou in January 2016, (This term is referring to a transnational religious-political ideology based on a belief in "physical" jihadism and the Salafi movement of returning to what adherents believe to be true Sunni Islam . so it refers to the righteous predecessors of the first three generations of Muslims, philosophy that believes in progression through regression. But this term have different implications in political thought studies see mher, 2016, p.44)

After the preview of the most important challenges in sub-Saharan Africa in the context of the insurgency we can refer to the following points:

- 1- This part sheds light on the factors and processes that contribute to the emergence of these movements. It argues that the phenomenon of jihadist insurgencies in West Africa emerges as a result of a series of processes at internal and external arena, but the state factor or internal ones plays the important role in explaining the transformation this insurgent witness.

- 2- Globally, there is the formation and dissemination of the global ideology of jihadist, conceptualized by Muslim activists and scholars based on a particular understanding of Islam and the challenges that are facing contemporary Muslim societies. At the local level, the appropriation of jihadist ideologies by “Muslim activists” who then use it to formulate a discourse which taps into local social and political demands in order to mobilize followers is a key.
- 3- The first step in answering questions relating to how weak states in Africa counter such threats aiming to destroy and replace state authority is by an effective diagnosis of the problem. However, diagnosis is difficult in Africa’s context which have occurred over a variety of issues — land, resources, political power, profits, security, religion and identity. In most cases, these issues intersect. Conflicts that start as elite struggles for power quickly turn into identity-based violence, as members of one religious or ethnic group target members of other groups.

All this problematic needs special attention from African states in order to maintain its existence, Here comes the next part on counterinsurgency in Africa and its impacts on the future of the African states.

Section 3- Boko Haram: Basic Insurgency Modeling

Following section will analyze boko haram insurgency in light of two comparative phasing theories on insurgency the work of Mao Tse-tung and David Galula that both make significant contributions to a meta-theory on insurgency. Addressing and deconstructing their work is important to use as a foundation for new ways to approach related operations. Discussions will focus on the evolvement of African state and main issues relating to state nature which undermine its future ability to survive:

The term ‘Boko Haram’ literally translates to ‘western education is forbidden’. It refers to the notorious terrorist group based in northeastern Nigeria, whose official name is Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’awatiwal Jihad (meaning: people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad). The Jihadist group was founded in 2002 in Maiduguri, Borno State, by a radical Islamist cleric, Mohammed Yusuf. The group’s ideology is based on extremist jihadism, with strict observance of Islamic law (Sharia) in Nigeria (Okoli and Iortyer 2014:39–40). In the


early 2000s, the insurgents were active in the greater part of northern Nigeria, almost overrunning states like Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. The intensification of counter-insurgency operations of the Nigerian forces and allied civilian Joint Task Forces in the 2014/2015 period forced the insurgents to withdraw from its city cells and circuits into the Sambisa forest. Since then, the forest has become the safe haven and sanctuary for the insurgents (International Crisis Group, 2013, p.52).

Its principles are based on the following:

- 1- Islamic rule and expiation of any positive rule and democracy and considering it to be contrary to Islam and out of it.
- 2- Prohibition of Western education from schools to the university.
- 3- The necessity of establishing the "Islamic State" and the allegiance to the Imam.
- 4- Loyalty to other sectarian trends such as Sufism and Shia.

Following the escalation of terrorist acts and attacks by Boko Haram in 2014 (see chart (1) Boko haram relations), the African Union (AU) decided at its summit in January 2015 to form a regional force to fight Boko Haram, consisting of the countries of Lake Chad (Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad) In addition to Benin, where it began its work in July 2016, and achieved clear successes in the face of "Boko Haram" (The term Boko Haram was derived from the Hausa word boko which means Western education. Haram is an Arabic word which literally means 'forbidden'. Therefore, Boko Haram means Western education is forbidden. Ideologically: 'Boko Haram not only opposes western education but also rejects western culture and modern science. See, Ekanem, 2005, p.189).

**Chart (1) main relations of Boko-Haram regionally and internationally
(1998-2013)**



Source: International Crisis Group.(2014).Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency.Belgium.p.25.

As result to the spread of scope and operations executed by the movement Nigeria military lunch the counter-insurgency operations against it between 2011 and 2017. Based on extensive fieldwork conducted with military units in Nigeria, this Counter-Insurgency operation has two main aims. First, to provide an understanding of the Nigerian military's internal role - a role that today, as a result of internal threats, pivots towards counter-insurgency. Second: is to examine the efficiency of Nigerian military campaign against Boko Haram insurgents - specifically, plans and operations within this period time and battlefield innovation and the reorganization within the Nigerian military since 2013, as the Nigerian Army and Air Force recalibrated themselves for COIN warfare (Adesoji, 2011, p.98)

The significance of forests as an existential threat to national security in Nigeria has been underscored in the phenomenon of Boko Haram insurgency. The occupation and apparent 'weaponisation' of Sambisa and the adjoining forests by Boko Haram insurgents have continued to pose an enervating tactical challenge that complicates the ongoing counter-insurgency efforts in northeast Nigeria.

The instrumentalisation of forests as an operational and defensive stronghold by the insurgents in the lower Lake Chad Basin has been enabled by the existence of large expanses of dispersed, uninhabited and un-policed forested spheres in the area. This study examines the imperative for transnational forestland governance in the lower Lake Chad Basin, in the light of a continual incidence of Boko Haram insurgency in that context. Drawing discursively from the 'ungoverned spaces' (territorial un-governability) hypothesis, the study posits that the prevailing vacuum of effective forestland governance in the region must be filled in order to mitigate the security challenge, such as a strategic trans-territorial forestland governance regime whereby Nigeria and Cameroon synergies efforts in bringing about effective reclamation and occupation of the volatile forested landscapes.

Insurgency: weaken African state dilemma:

Although African countries have achieved political independence, the independence is a token one, and is insufficient. In particular, the maintained colonial economic structures have not allowed African countries to be economically

independent and kept them in a continuing colonialist situation. According to this view, the theory of neo-colonialism (Kwabata 1980), these African countries are called “neo-colonial states.” Leys published a volume entitled *Under development in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism* (1975). Mafeje’s paper in the co-edited *African Social Studies: A Radical Reader* (Mafeje; Gutkind and Waterman eds. 1977) points out that a formally independent country, owing to the fragility of its economic structures.

In recent years, attempts to revise and expand theories and concepts of statehood have increased as it has become gradually clearer that the idea of the state as a Western type of governance the background to the emergence of the African state theory in the early 1980s is due to the several circumstances: a new trend in research into African politics in Europe and United States (Jackson and Rosberg 1982a; Kohli ed. 1986) and France in 1980; the international financial institutions’ visions regarding the role of the state in economic development; the collapse of the state, or what we can call the state theory with negative images such as the failed state, the collapsed state, the shadow state, the criminal state, and the disorder state erupted onto the scene, overwhelming the debate on the theory of the African state with pessimism (Minocal, 2009, p.32).

Trends in the Theory of the State up to the early 1980s goes into three pathways, that is, Afro-Marxism, people’s socialism, and African capitalism. While some classify it into two approaches: leadership theory and Marxist theory. In the 1990s, African states had been forced to change by democratization and increasing conflict and the theory of the African state focused on three debate issues: the state and politics, the state and society, and the state and development (see Doornbos and Marshall, 1990), and that it is critical to shed light on the stateness of the African state (Villalón and Huxtable eds. 1998), offering that the vulnerability of the African state, which now stands at a critical point, shows itself in five different types: the client state, the personalized state, the centralized state, the prebendal state, and the extractive state (Chazan et al. eds. 1999).

The African State in Social Science Discourse in the Twenty-First Century” articulation of the post-colonial state and Forrest’s theory of the inverted state, and gives an analysis of the emergence of the criminal state and the corporatist state

resulting from the dissolution of the international safety net at the close of the Cold War (Mohan and Zack-Williams eds. 2004) .

So, it is difficult to predict what the African state will take in the future, especially in light of the challenges facing the country, the most important of which is the phenomenon of insurgency. However, two key factors can be identified for the development of Africa's state: first of which is the extent to which social development within the African state itself, and the likelihood of the development of its own power and its ability to influence the form and nature of the system of government. Secondly: the effect of international factors.

An infinite number of scenarios according to the possibilities of the development of any of the two elements, however, two scenarios are most likely to be imagined given the persistence of negative trends in the international environment and within African countries:

1. The African State will continue as the State / mediator between its inhabitants and the international system, enabling the Western States to control the trends of the development of the State and to complete the enforcement of the Western culture and model therein, despite all the indications that this application has failed to remedy the deficiencies of African reality. Continuing distorted development of the state without clear and ineffective engagement with the crisis of identity or loyalty(Minocal,2009,p.32) In other words, the breakdown of the African state on the pattern of what is happening in Somalia now and the collapse of what was similar to society in it, and its transformation into a subject for international aid and a source of periodic threat to stability.
2. Bringing the State into the Spotlight; the touchstone is to reshape the formal and informal institutions of the state in order to build more legitimate and representative states that serve the public good, not the narrow interests of those in power. It is a long-term effort aiming to Restructuring the perceptions and arrangements underpinning the system of government and linking the state and society, and requires reaching the entrenched traditional power structures. This task is likely to be extremely difficult and sensitive, especially since the

dynamics of State-building, particularly in countries experiencing conflict, lie in negotiation and compromise, not in substantive transformation.

State-building is a process originating within the country that the international community cannot support. In other words, the term "state-building" deals with building the legitimacy of state institutions, their ability to provide basic services to their citizens, such as security, justice and the rule of law, as well as education and health that meet the aspirations of citizens. Recognize that the state cannot be treated in isolation, avoiding fragile state situation which lacks effective process (*Ibid*, p.45).

The weakness of state institutions is linked to empower Social and cultural elements that support state institutions which distorted by ethnic and religious ties, and the absence of public participation in political decision-making.

The weakness of the state does not mean the absence of societal mechanisms to manage political and security risks and to achieve justice. . In circumstances such as spreading Feelings of mistrust in the state, practices have shown that there is no such thing as a security vacuum, even in cases where state structures have completely collapsed. Indeed, most Security and justice services in weak states are not provided by the state police (e.g. Somalia or eastern DRC) and their jurisdiction, but by non-state security and justice groups, these groups provide part of the state's functions, even in a way that is deficient in function.

Community efforts to reduce security threats from the proliferation of small arms or to reintegrate former combatants and rebuild trust between them and communities

(The Socio-Economic Approach to Counterinsurgency) emphasize the role of local values and the intangible elements of local cultures in building Sustainable institutions. In Mozambique and northern Uganda, traditional communities have helped reintegrate former child soldiers into societies. These actions have demonstrated the success of reintegration strategies in the social and cultural context. Counterinsurgency strategies of African states are therefore endogenous to regime politics. This means that the ways in which rulers manage domestic rebellion correspond to the ways in which they deal with threats to their authority.

the role of Africa's collective security system:

The AU plays an important role in promoting and maintenance peace and stability in the continent especially in relation the areas of peacekeeping, conflict prevention and crisis management. In the context of counter-insurgency, the failure of AU member States to ratify some of the protocols aimed at combating all kinds of violence against state is an indication of the paucity of political cooperation in the continent. Although the AU seeks to achieve its policy goals through the adoption of treaties, it does not have the power to force member states to ratify its treaties and comply with their provisions. Furthermore, while the AU commits itself to the global war on insurgency and terrorism, some of its member countries condones activities that run contrary to this commitment. Some countries hosted leaders and militia of radical movement. Main Challenges of Regional Cooperation and Implications for AU's counter-insurgency framework are:

- (1) Adequate Funding for deterrence Efforts; Funding plays a crucial role in at the national, regional or global level particularly in relation to police training, gathering intelligence, research, joint military operations, peacekeeping, peace-building, tracking rebellion finance or passing legislation on such acts.
- (2) Norm of Compliance: levels of compliance with the rebellion regime in Africa observes that even under international pressure, some African governments have seized the anti-insurgency rhetoric while others have either been reluctant or resisted the imposition of the regime. The lack of political cooperation among AU member states tends to affect the level of norm compliance with legislation.
- (3) Border policing: The weakness of government along with the problem of corruption among security agencies, saddled with this responsibility, makes it easy to use border smuggling sophisticated weapons and drugs and money. In other word, Porous borders represent a major challenge to ensuring security and stability for national governments in Africa.
- (4) East and West Africa a priority area for radical Islamist organizations and movements for a long time. Such as Al-Qaeda which set up a base in Sudan in the early 1990s after the successful military-Islamist coup in 1989. Al-Qaeda made several attempts to create

operational links with Somali militants after Dictator Mohammed Siad Barre was ousted.

Finally, Insurgencies Threatens the security of the Africa's weak state that linked to structural problems African states suffered. The goal of the rebel is not the seizure of power, but the threat to the entity of the state that does not feel belonging to the continued loyalties to tribe or ethnic group and the absence of the concept of state loyalty. Hence the suitable COIN of the African situation is determined by the following variables:

First: Counter-insurgency in Africa presents a very different picture. It is rare to find contemporary African regimes competing with rebels to out-govern non-combatants as part of a counter-insurgency strategy, because noncombatants are not central to struggles over the control of patronage networks and their resources. Most African states lack the institutional capacity to launch extensive counter-insurgency programs to out-govern rebels. There are numerous 'ungoverned spaces' in which rebels can seek refuge, particularly in the hinterlands of Africa's porous boundary. With these things in mind, Africa's institutionally weak states should be especially vulnerable to rebel challenge.

Second: very few of African rebels have succeeded in overthrowing governments. Only about 10% have been victorious, like the recent Seleka rebellion of the Central African Republic

Third: Effective counter-insurgency in Africa also fights and co-opts rebels simultaneously, erecting few boundaries between 'rebel surrender' and incorporation into the state's authority structures. Nearly 40 % of Africa's insurgencies have ended in ceasefires or peace agreements. Some involved international mediation, others like the 1988 Peace Accord that ended the Ugandan People's Democratic Army's (UPDA) rebellion, were home-grown affairs.

Fourth: regime counter-insurgency strategies in many African states are extensions of patronage-based regime strategies for exercising authority outside of warfare; common factor to Africa's counter-insurgency strategies is the striking scarcity of population-centric approaches. An extreme example was Sudan's campaign in Darfur in the 2000s, which did not include efforts to out-govern rebels by

providing non-combatants with services or protection. Instead, the campaign included civilian repression and selective mobilization of local militias, which developed in symmetry with increasingly fragmented rebel forces.

Fifth: Rebels that pose the greatest threat to incumbent regimes are those drawn from the very political fabric of regime-run patronage networks. These political insiders are met with the least coercive and most co-operative counter-insurgency strategies. And the most coercive, militarized counter-insurgency strategies are reserved for rebels that comprise political outsiders, or those that arise from outside regime-based patronage networks. We find that regimes in Africa are shrewd, innovative and flexible in how they fight rebels and thus prove to be much more durable than most observers would expect against their rivals.

Sixth: Many African militaries pose considerable threats the regimes that they are supposed to protect. Even so, military power in the hands of patronage based regimes in Africa is capable of undertaking counter-insurgency campaigns. But as extensions of the politics of incumbent regimes, their behavior reflects the dependence on non-institutional means of exercising power, and reliance on controlling channels of patronage and the distribution of these resources.

Seventh: A key point in African context of analysis is that rebellions that involve groups with formal and informal historical linkages to regime networks will be treated differently from rebel groups that do not. Incumbent regimes will seek varying levels of accommodation with rebel leaders, or try to eliminate them, according to these historical institutional positions within the state.

Eighth: by examine the structure and spatial patterns of violent extremist organizations in east -West Africa, a region characterized by growing political instability over the last 20 years. However, conflict management should not build on overall aims o f armed groups alone. The relationship with the state and society and the different social contexts of the different members of armed groups are also highly relevant for a comprehensive approach to conflict management.

Conclusion:

Separation of military and executive functions in African government have become the exception rather than the rule - a trend that started in the 1960s and

accelerated during the 1970s to the extent that only really Botswana, out of all African countries, has escaped military intervention in government. Whilst literature is lacking in terms of combat effectiveness, there is a literature on the military and politics.

Culture and Symbolism a key characteristic of African wars has been the extensive use of symbolism in terms of the adoption of 'traditional' symbols with modern twists. In particular, the use of symbolism as a form of control over predominantly youthful followers has been a defining feature of most combat groups in the continent. Whilst leaders may be older, the majority of fighters are in their teens or twenties, having enlisted young. The LRA in northern Uganda has a deliberate policy of kidnapping children either just before or in their early teens, which allows a more complete indoctrination and control.

Economic crises and increasing poverty contribute to the growth of armed groups' recruitment potential so many people and especially young men are willing to join militia and rebel groups is critical for academic analysis, peace and development policy. But assuming a causal relationship between marginalization and militia membership seems too simple: rank and file members of militia and rebel groups are indeed frequently marginalized in multiple ways, but usually they are no more marginalized than their peers.

Regarding to the scope and nature of insurgency in Africa we may conclude that:

Insurgency forces may include a combination of the following: an ideology-based movement that fights to overthrow the current form of the countries; government and to establish a different regime; a personality-based movement driven to install its leader as the ruler of the country; a religious movement that wishes to defend its religious freedoms or to establish a religion based regime in the country; an ethnic minority demanding greater rights or independence; a regional movement demanding secession or a greater share of the country's resources; an ethnic majority fighting against the rule of an ethnic minority or a colonial power. While Counterinsurgency forces also take a variety of forms: a democratic state that enjoys the support of a majority of the population; a dictatorship that relies on coercion to maintain its rule (most of African cases showed in study); a state that receives a

limited support of a foreign power but is independent in its actions and could conceivably survive on its own (such as Mali, Somalia); a state largely reliant on resources and support of a foreign power (Uganda).

counterinsurgency in contemporary Africa stands in contrast to conceptualizations of rebel challenges as emanating from leaders and followers who are marginal to and distinct from the regime politics that they seek to overthrow. Political outsiders are found among Africa's contemporary rebels (like the LRA), many groups contain key former insiders from the prevailing political establishment. For future successful COIN in Africa It is almost impossible for any country in West Africa to have complete control of its borders. The cooperation between neighboring countries becomes vital to develop a global strategy to secure the borders. The existing ECOWAS, and its military component ECOMOG, can be used as a basis to develop global security cooperation with all security forces. African countries need to put a very high premium on good governance, as the main variable which will ensure political, social and cultural cohesion – as well as economic prosperity and stability.

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Co-existence in Boko Haram's Caliphate: Making a Living in Militant Controlled Areas in Rural Borno, Nigeria.

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Abstract

This paper explores how locals make a living in militant-controlled areas in rural Borno, northeast Nigeria. In mid-2014, Boko Haram hoisted the Rayat al-Uqab (Black Standard) flags in its self-proclaimed Islamic caliphate in some agrarian communities in northeast Nigeria. The acquisition and control of territories heightened threats from the militant group—forcing many farmers to abandon their livelihood activities as they fled to safe locations. However, while many people moved away from areas held by insurgents, some households remained to carry on with their lives while co-existing with the militants. This article explains how farmers lived with Boko Haram in rural Borno categorized into pre-Boko Haram coping strategies; risk reduction strategies; livelihood coping strategies and co-existence in insurgent-controlled areas.

Key Words: Co-existence, Boko Haram, Farmers, Livelihood, Coping, Nigeria

Introduction

This article analyzes how households survive in Boko Haram controlled areas in rural Borno, Nigeria. According to Cherbib (2018:1), jihadist implantation in rural areas has permitted blending with the local population for exploitative or symbiotic purposes. In the Sahel, the International Crisis Group alleged that jihadists settled in rural areas after being forced out of major towns, filling the security vacuum left by the central government in rural communities. Militants exploited local grievances and disorders to thrive in neglected agrarian areas in central Mali, northern Burkina Faso and western Niger (ICG 2017a). In Algeria, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) relocated to the north of Sahel to escape the military onslaught and formed alliances with local communities through marriages (Salem 2014).

Similarly, in northern Nigeria, the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) unlike its faction, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) is making inroads to win hearts and

minds of local communities in its operational areas. ISWAP is following Al-Qaeda's rules for success--building relationships with locals and taking advantage of the ties to exert influence on how it functions (Obaji Jr 2019). The militant group has learned that implanting and blending into local communities is critical to its success. Boko Haram had ignored this strategy since the resumption of its deadly campaign.

Beginning in 2009, Boko Haram waged violent attacks on security agencies, civilians and livelihood capitals in northeast Nigeria. The insurgents later began appropriating and holding territory in the predominantly agrarian areas in rural Borno. According to Ladbury et al. (2016), the militants moved from looting livestock, kidnapping, and preying on the local population to total territory control and state-building. The insurgents raised the Rayat al-Uqab (Black Standard) flags in seized areas as a symbol of the Islamic caliphate. In early 2015, Boko Haram had captured and controlled about 52,000 square kilometers of Nigerian territories, the size of Belgium, or twice the size of the state of Maryland. These areas were predominantly agrarian settlements consisting of 70 percent of the total land area of Borno state (about 16 Local Government Areas), four LGAs in Adamawa, and three LGAs in Yobe State. Some of the captured areas were renamed, for example, Gwoza an agrarian town was renamed "DarulHikma" or House of Wisdom, whereas Mubi was renamed "Madinatul Islam," or the City of Islam. These changes alluded to the vulnerability of rural communities to the militant occupation.

As the Boko Haram's caliphate expanded, and the implementation of sharia law enforced in the territories under the militant group's control, the number of people killed by the organization increased. According to the Institute for Economic and Peace (IEP), the number of deaths from terrorist groups reached an unprecedented level in 2014, with an 80 percent increase from the previous year (IEP 2015). Seventy-eight percent of the global deaths from terrorist attacks in 2014 occurred just in five countries: Syria, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq (Ibid). Boko Haram has been attributed to the most significant terrorist impact in 2014; Boko Haram killed 6,644 people, whereas the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) was attributed to 6,073 deaths. In 2015, the number of deaths from Boko Haram was over 20,000 deaths, with about 2.6 million people internally displaced and 170,000 refugees (UNOCHA 2015). As a result, the IEP concluded that Boko Haram was the deadliest terrorist group in the world in 2014 (Ibid).

In addition to the challenges posed by insurgents occupation, rural households faced systemic and continuous livelihood destruction and food crisis due to military restrictions and insecurity. The State of Emergency (SoE) imposed in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states restricted movement, stifles food production, and limits access to livelihood assets. Farming was restricted to a few kilometers' radius of settlements. Fishing and trading were proscribed as Boko Haram levies cross-border fish traders in the Nigeria-Niger border. The cultivation of 'tall' crops such as sorghum was stopped because it decreased military visibility and acted as shields for the insurgents. Farming and grazing animals in areas suspected to be affected by landmines and improvised explosives devices (IEDs) were suspended. The use of fertilizers with ammonia or urea contents was discontinued because it was used by Boko Haram to manufacture bombs. These restrictions hurt agricultural activities and food security; a local farmer who corroborated the effects of security restrictions on their livelihoods, said, "the government has stopped access to farmland due to security situation; people have been stopped from cultivating what they will eat, sell and feed animals" (cited in Ogbosor 2018:191). The continued enforcement of these ban prevented people from engaging in their livelihood, thus aggravating violence and food insecurity (ICG2017b).

Although prior to the onset of Boko Haram activities, households in rural Borno have coped with poverty and threats from the environment. Since the beginning of Boko Haram insurgency, locals relied on existing coping strategy and responded to new threats using both reactive and pro-active capacities to survive and protect their livelihoods. Local coping strategies are an essential component of people survival in many conflict situations (De Waal 1979). This article explains how households survive conflict in rural Borno, structured into the pre-Boko Haram coping strategies, risk reduction strategies, livelihood coping strategies, co-existence with insurgents, and the conclusion.

Pre-Boko Haram Coping Strategies

Before the escalation of militant activities in northeast Nigeria, threats from poverty, environmental degradation, drought, and desertification were prevalent in the region. The strategies used by households to cope with environmental challenges and crop failure included

engaging in subsistence agriculture, livelihood diversifications, seasonal migration, cultural adaptation strategies, and the protective care of a religious education system. These strategies included both positive and adverse strategies employed by households to mitigate environmental and socio-economic threats.

Subsistence agriculture (fishing, farming, and herding) is a major livelihood activity of the rural poor. Households engage in subsistence activities as a way of coping with resource scarcity and environmental variabilities. Bunu et al. (2014) note that environmental factors are the primary production constraint in semi-arid regions such as northeast Nigeria with an average rainfall of 550mm and temperature of 30°C. Due to a short rainy season, usually four to five months per year, the crops grown are often those with a short life cycle that could be supported during the flooding period or water availability. Most households cultivate crops like millet, sorghum, maize, groundnut and guinea corn whose lifecycle does not extend beyond one planting season (about three months), due to water scarcity and erratic rainfall. Subsistence livelihood fits within the flexible and strongly seasonal matrix of diversified activities of the rural poor (Neiland et al 2000). Thus, engaging in subsistence agriculture is a way of coping with limited resources and environmental uncertainties.

Livelihood diversification is another way of coping with erratic rainfall and limited resources. Most farmers in rural Borno engage in activities such as driving, carpentry, tailoring, trading, and other off-farm activities as secondary activities. These activities have gone a long way to support households during off or lean planting seasons. The livelihood strategies of many households in northeast Nigeria consisted mainly of subsistence agriculture during the rainy season and trading during the dry season. Mekonnen (2016) notes, household's employ alternative livelihood activities such as farming, fishing, livestock rearing, trading, and handicraft making to secure revenues. USAID (2005) add livelihood diversification is key to survival; people adopt multiple and varied livelihood strategies, including opportunity-seeking migration.

Seasonal migration is also an essential coping strategy among many groups in northeast Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. According to Gleditsch and Urdal (2002), migration can occur either

because the environment quality of a habitat has become unlivable (push factor) or, more commonly, because the migrant's economic outcome is likely to be better in areas with greater resources availability (pull factors). These two scenarios apply to Northeast Nigeria. Some households migrate due to harsh environmental factors during a certain period of the year, whereas some pastoralist migrates to areas with greener pastures for their livestock. The Lake Chad Basin Commission statute and the Treaty of the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) recognize and facilitate interstate migration of citizens. Migration across borders within the Lake Chad Basin is a pre-colonial seasonal practice, and it has continued over the years as a strategy of coping with environmental changes. The WFP (2016) concluded that economic migration is a common characteristic of individuals and households within the Lake Chad Basin's population as a strategy to cope with changing livelihood patterns.

Cultural adaptation is a strategy of coping with plurality and diverse makeup of northeast Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. According to WFP (2016), before the current insecurity from civil conflict, the Northeast region of Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin has long been diverse. The pluralistic makeup of the area has made linguistic adaptation an important survival strategy of households in the region. To WFP (2016), despite the international borders, people of the Lake Chad Basin, including parts of northeast Nigeria have maintained cultural ties of kinship, language, trade, and religious interaction. In the region, relationships govern the people rather than rights or obligations that typically determine social control in rural communities (van der Meeren 1980, cited in WFP 2016).

In contrast, a strategy used by some poor, uneducated households who are unable to provide for their dependents is to send them to Koranic schools. Those who make this decision, entrust their children into the protective care of the religious education system to offer a chance of survival at the cost of family separation. This strategy was widely practiced in Northeast Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin long before the beginning of the insurgency. However, in the absence of parental supervision, Koranic students often fall victims of ideological beliefs and teachings imparted by their teachers. According to WFP (2016) some students of Koranic schools were alleged to have been radicalized to join Boko Haram.

Risk Reduction Strategies

Households use various livelihood assets (cultural, physical, economic, and social) to reduce their exposure to violence in rural Borno. Although livelihood capitals do not entirely mitigate or insure against attacks; assets are likely to be destroyed or may become key targets for militants, security officials or looters (Justino 2009). Nevertheless, the strategy used by households to prevent militant attacks includes prayers, livelihood diversification, asset sales, and migration.

Prayer is a cultural capital and the first line of response used by individual and households to prevent Boko Haram attacks (Ogbozor 2018:216). Many households resort to prayer to invoke the wrath of God before the enemy strikes, and to cope with a tragic event. The strategy has been employed by both Christians and Muslims alike to prevent attacks or deal with the devastating impact of the insurgency. A widow, Dr. Umma Mani, and wife of Late Professor Aliyu Mani, Director of Veterinary Sciences, University of the Maiduguri Teaching Hospital, who was killed by a teenage suicide bomber while observing morning prayer, said, "she feels honored and proud for her husband to have died while observing prayers in the mosque." Prayer is a resilience feature of many households threatened by Boko Haram (Ibid).

Livelihood diversification has been used by locals to move out of the agricultural sector entirely (Westbury et al. 2014:20). The insecurity associated with cultivating farmlands and the military restrictions that limits access to agricultural livelihoods led to a switch to less risky income-generating activities by households. A survey by Westbury et al. (2014) found that some farmers switched to selling phone rechargeable cards, kerosene, and other non-agricultural products. This strategy is useful when there are alternative livelihood opportunities, but ineffective when there are limited alternatives. In rural Borno, many households have limited livelihood capitals, which makes diversification difficult in predominantly subsistence communities. In the absence of diversification opportunities, some households rely on asset sales as self-insurance measures against income losses in the event of Boko Haram attacks.

Assets are essential mechanisms of self-insurance but are likely to be destroyed in battles or may become key targets for militants (Justino 2009). Unlike in periods of conflict, assets are useful self-insurance against income losses in non-conflict situations. Livelihood assets like houses, food stores, livestock, and equipment have been targeted, burnt, or destroyed by Boko Haram. A farmer summed up the patterns of Boko Haram attacks "Boko Haram often aim to kill everyone or strip them of their assets so that survivors would not have anything to live on" (cited in Ogbozor 2018:219). Selling off assets are ways of preventing a total loss of capital in the event of militant attack. However, in rural Borno some households reportedly could not find people to buy their livestock because almost everyone wanted to dispose of their assets. Some ended up selling at a meager price to prevent a total loss. The sale of an asset is a strategy used by households to minimize the complete loss of capital and to generate liquid income.

Migration to safer areas is often the last option available to households before the militant strike. To some households, the process of migration is gradual, starting with the evacuation of family members or the relocation of children and spouse to stay with relatives before the final migration of the head of households. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) notes that while the low-income groups of persons have relocated to safer Local Government Areas and state capitals, the high-income groups have migrated to neighboring state capitals including the Federal Capital City. Ghorpade (2012:6) argued that migration is often a choice made under extremely compelling conditions.

Livelihood Coping Strategies

In "How we lived with Boko Haram as neighbors" and "Borno market where Boko Haram trades," Abubakar (2015) narrates strategies used by farmers in Gudumbali village and Bida market in rural Borno where farmers lived with Boko Haram. The strategy employed by the farmers according to Abubakar includes not leaking information to security agencies, acceptance of high prices under strict trading regulation, offering a gift to insurgents, pretending to be an insurgent or at least a sympathizer, and recruitment into the militant group.

Looting and stealing

Some households in rural Borno have benefited from stolen items either directly or indirectly through the purchase of looted items or participation in the activity. A returnee to Mubi following the retake of the town by the Nigerian military said that “Boko Haram advocated for households to remain instead of fleeing” after the militants captured the town. According to the respondent, some residents in Mubi participated in looting and stealing. The period of Boko Haram’s occupation of Mubi was characterized by massive looting of public and private properties including eight banks. Although Boko Haram was attributed to most of the lootings and destructions, some of the returnees maintained that the lootings were also carried out by individuals who were disguised as Boko Haram members. Boko Haram works with some criminal syndicates, informants, and intermediaries to carry out illegal activities. These intermediaries were rewarded in cash or kind for their participation and loyalty to the group.

No leaking of information to security officials

Boko Haram is opposed to communities providing information to security officials about their movement and activities. Not leaking information to security officials is a necessary strategy to prevent the wrath of the insurgent among households living in militants-controlled areas. According to a rural farmer “When you report, the soldiers arrest the insurgents and take them away, resulting in other insurgents going to the villages to attack, usually in a very nasty, vengeful manner” (cited in Ogbozor 2018:227).” Another farmer who trades in Boko Haram controlled areas notes that many village heads (refers to as Bulamas and Lawans) that provided information about the insurgent movements to the security agencies between 2010 and 2011 were all killed. Most farmers trading in Boko Haram controlled areas maintained that it is safer not to leak information about Boko Haram to the security agencies.

Acceptance of high prices under strict trading regulations

According to Abubakar (2015), Bida is a community in Monguno local government, Borno state previously hosts a market famous for livestock and agricultural produce before Boko Haram militants expelled residents making the market their very own. The motivation for trading at Bida despite the risk involved is the acceptance of high prices because of the difficulty of trading in the area. For example, 20 liters of petrol sells for N12,000 (40 USD) instead of the N3,000

(10 USD) it goes for in Monguno town (Ibid). Prices of food commodities like rice, tomatoes, and other vegetables are very high due to the security concerns in the area. Also, there is a particular time for business activities; every Sunday from 11.00am to 1.00pm, and only bulk purchases are allowed. (Ibid). Traveling outside the area is not usually permitted. Approval to trade is often based on a recommendation by merchants or at one's risk. Insurgents take out strange faces daily as they patrol the area. Households that trade in Bida accept high prices in return for abiding by the strict trading regulations of the militants.

Offering a gift to the insurgents

Offering a gift to insurgents is another strategy used by households to cope in militant-controlled areas. In Gudumbali village, some farmers coped with Boko Haram by offering gifts of food and livestock to the militants. According to one of the farmers, whenever they hear sounds of strange vehicles and motorbikes, it is a signal that Boko Haram members were around. This usually prompted the men to run away or hide but leave some food items and livestock with their spouse and children to give to Boko Haram when they come. Another farmer said that the militants usually pay homage to the leader of the group in the village, known as 'Amir' before they start operating. While paying the courtesy call to Amir, it gives heads of household's opportunity to flee to the neighboring villages after they had left gifts of food items and livestock for the Boko Haram members to take when they came. The farmers maintained that leaving food items behind for Boko Haram is a way of preventing them from looking for the items themselves. On the risk to women and children, unlike in some areas, Boko Haram does not rape in Gudumbali but kills heads of households and loots.

Pretending to be insurgent or at least a sympathizer

A good number of rural farmers also pretend to be insurgents or at least sympathizers to stay alive in Boko Haram controlled areas. This is a very risky strategy, though it may be useful in preventing attacks from the militant group. According to Abubakar (2015) a trader who comes to Gudumbali to buy pepper to take to cities for sale said that his friend asked him 'to play along,' to pose as an insurgent so that they can leave the community safely. Posing as a member of Boko Haram enabled them to escape from Gudumbali. Another trader who has been selling pepper said, "I have been in Gudumbali for eight months now, pretending to be an insurgent so

that they will not kill me.” The farmer further said, “I’ve been into the trading of pepper from here to Maiduguri and southern Nigeria for 11 years now. The last time I came here, I realized I could not leave because insurgents have taken over everywhere.” The trader maintained that you have to pretend to be insurgent to exit the area.

Recruitment into Boko Haram

In addition to pretending to be insurgents to stay alive, some locals joined the militant groups as there is limited livelihood opportunities. Abubakar (2015) notes that most young men engaged in farming and marketing of pepper in Gudumbali village joined Boko Haram. All the young pepper farmers and traders reportedly joined the insurgents because there was nothing else to do as insurgency activities disrupted farming and trading activities. In Yobe state, Haruna (2015) pointed out that many youths joined the militant's group as an alternative livelihood activity after the state government banned the use of motorbikes for commercial purpose. The policy to prohibit the use of the motorcycle for business purposes was meant to reduce the rate of accidents, ease traffic in the city capitals, and reduced the use of motorbikes for criminal activities. However, it negatively increases the rate of joblessness, crime, and radicalization. Recruitment into Boko Haram were responses to declining livelihood activities in the communities. According to the International Crisis Group, those that live under Boko Haram's control faced enormous significant difficulties as the insurgents taxed communities, plundered and forcefully recruited fighters among them (ICG 2016).

This analysis suggests that households employ adverse strategies to survive in the militant-controlled areas. Looting and stealing as a household strategy corroborates Korf et al. (2001) assertion that war can be both a threat and opportunity and strongly agrees with Schafer's (2002) emphasis that “certain livelihood strategies are part of the dynamics that can contribute to and sustain conflict and instability.” Not leaking information about the militant movement is a way of maintaining loyalty to the benefit of the militant as it prevents the security agencies from tracking insurgent movement, militant reciprocate by offering protection to locals. This corresponds strongly with Justino (2009) observation that the relationship between households and armed groups plays a vital role in the sustainability of conflict making the organization of

the conflict a symbiotic relationship between the militant group and the households living in insurgent-controlled areas.

In contrast, offering a gift to the insurgent for protection purposes disagrees with the notion of voluntary and involuntary support for armed groups through provision of shelter, food, and information (Nordstrom 1997; Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2003). The gifts from households is linked to household protection, not as an aid in support of the insurgency. Likewise, the recruitment of young pepper traders into Boko Haram at Gudambali village was due to the disruptions of livelihood as there are little livelihood alternatives. It disagrees with Kalyvas and Kocher (2007), who states that civilians may collaborate with armed groups to avoid direct attacks as non-participation may be costlier than participation. Although it agrees with Humphrey and Weinstein (2008), fighters recruited based on a promise of jobs, provide basic needs and security for their families. Nevertheless, these are risky strategies for coping with livelihood threats; it contributes to fueling the conflict and exposes the participants to dangers of military operations.

Co-existence in militant-controlled areas

Boko Haram factions relate with locals in different ways. Whereas the relationship of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and local communities could be described as predatory and exploitative, the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) has established a symbiotic relationship with locals. ISWAP adopted mutual beneficial relationship as a means to win the hearts and minds of local communities in its areas of operation (Obaji Jr 2019). The militant ensured locals of the safety to live and do businesses so long as they do not cooperate with the Nigerian military (Ibid). In contrast, JAS raids rural communities for critical infrastructure and livestock, kidnaps and abducts young girls, carries out mass torture and killings and burns homes, markets, churches, and Mosques.

According to Reuters, the jihadis' system involves taxing of communities, enforcement of sharia law, punishing offenders, and offering protection for loyalists (cited in Bukarti 2018). The Shura council is a top decision-making body that advises the lead Imam (Wali or Governor), who oversees various layers of fighters (including Quid, Munzir, Nagib, and Amir) and the departments (Hisbah, Dawa, public engagement, weapons, welfare, food supply, recruitment, and

finance). ISWAP's administration is structured along this line, but the group's primary target is the security forces and to some extent, civilians perceived as working with security and local officials (ICG 2019a). Conversely, JAS is brutal as it kills indiscriminately and does not discriminate between security forces, civilians, Muslims and non-Muslims.

It can be inferred that civilians feel safer in ISWAP operational areas than areas held by JAS or the local government. According to Cherbib (2018:1), jihadists' implantation in rural areas has rendered military operations difficult as it has become complicated to distinguish civilians from terrorists. The question then is whether locals could be punished or held responsible for failed military operation in tackling insurgents. On the one hand, it can be argued that there are allegations of grave rights violations and heavy-handed responses on communities by the Nigeria security forces in attempts to contain extremist groups. On the other hand, Boko Haram ruthlessly targeted and singled out communities that set up vigilante forces or helped the military; killing civilians, destroying livelihoods, and forcing communities to flee (ICG 2016). In November 2014, Boko Haram raided Damasak, killing 50 people in what locals believed to be a retaliation against the town's vigilante group and alliance with the military (Global Security 2017). Similarly, Baga, a fishing town witnessed several violent incidents from Boko Haram, likely due to the presence of the fishing community's active vigilante group (Ibid).

Due to brutal attacks from militants, unlike in Nigeria, in Mali, rice farmers adopted direct negotiation with rebels through an intermediary 'comité de crise' (Westbury et al. 2014:12). The farmers agreed to give about 40 percent of the value of subsidized fertilizers to the rebels, whereas the rebels guaranteed farmers protection by providing buses for farmers' safe transportation to and from their rice fields (Ibid). As part of the deal, the locals accepted to dress as required by the militant, tune to Islamic channels on television and radio only, and refrain from using alcohol, cigarettes or playing soccer—prohibited under rebel interpretations of Islamic law (Ibid). Farmers benefit from al-Shabab reforms – by not taxing farmers for their land, but for what they produce, al-Shabab encourages people to farm, provides rent-free premises for restaurateurs who serve only locally sourced food, making the residents self-sufficient, and reducing the opportunity for relief aid.

Likewise, locals do not see reasons to regret loyalties and allegiance to militants since local authorities do not offer services provided by the insurgents. Reuters alleged that locals spoke favorably of ISWAP, said, if you are a herder, driver or trader, they won't touch you as long as you follow the rules and regulations governing their territory. Another said, They are friendly and kind to strangers who come to the area, and they provide motorcycles for those who want to join them (cited in Bukarti 2019). ISWAP returned the kidnapped Dapchi girls, digs wells, police cattle, provide health care services, disciplines its personnel who abused civilians and opposed to killing Muslims. The locals are happy with the symbiotic relationship with militants as opposed to limited or non-existent government services.

Similarly, al-Shabab provides services to generate support among local Somalis, such as constructing infrastructure and distributing money to the poor (Obaji Jr 2019). Al-Shabaab uses goodwill to win control over many rural areas, using the opportunity to set up checkpoints, stepping up attacks on security, disrupting supply lines, targeting military convoys, and assassinating leaders who cooperate with foreign forces (ICG 2019). In central Mali and western Niger, jihadists protect herders' cattle from bandits, enforce various forms of Sharia-based justice, and provided youth from marginalized communities with weapons and training (ICG 2017a).

In the absence of an effective government, some locals have relied on jihadists rather than show loyalty to an uncaring government. Cooperation with militants to make a living may be illegal, but whether it constitutes a reason for people to be punished for a regrettable behavior is a question that requires further research in the case of rural Borno.

Conclusion

This article sought to explain how locals survive in militant-controlled areas in rural Borno, northeast Nigeria categorized into pre-Boko Haram coping strategies; risk reduction strategies; livelihood coping strategies and co-existence in insurgent-controlled areas. Whereas some insurgents implant and blend into rural communities for predatory, exploitative or protective purposes, others engage in symbiotic and mutually beneficial relationships with local communities.

In rural Borno, since the beginning of militant activities households have relied on an already established culture of social connectedness that they had developed over the years to deal with environmental threats now transferred to cope with militant activities. However, extremist events differ as it destroys coping capacities and limits abilities to address future threats. In response to threats from Boko Haram, households used both adverse and positive strategies including co-habiting to make a living and protect their livelihoods.

Co-existence enable locals and insurgent groups to live together for their mutual benefit. Militants offer protection and services that local governments could not provide as inducement for the loyalty and enlistment of members from the rural population. Locals feel safer under militant occupation than in territory controlled by a neglectful central government or unprotective security forces. This strategy has been introduced by the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) to make inroads into the heart and minds of locals in its areas of operation. ISWAP uses the opportunity presented by its close ties with local communities to wage a deadly campaign against Nigerian security forces. Since mid-2018, the militant group has successfully targeted several military bases in Northeast Nigeria—a development that has generated ill-will for rural communities in the militant-controlled areas.

Based on this analysis, the following recommendations should be considered:

1. Security of lives and properties should be prioritized as an entry point to stability in the areas affected by the insurgency in rural Borno.
2. There is a need to address rural livelihood and service delivery issues to dissuade the locals from relying on militants for critical services.
3. A robust livelihood recovery program targeting agricultural production and marketing should be launched to address the livelihood challenges and food insecurity issues in the communities.
4. Military restrictions should be relaxed for normal activities to resume in all militarized areas in rural Borno.

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PREVENTING THE FLOW OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS IN WEST AFRICA: A CASE FOR BORDER CONTROL

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ABSTRACT

Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) pose a significant threat to peace and security in West Africa. Particularly, FTFs have established, sustained and expanded terrorism among other forms of violent conflicts in West Africa. Several initiatives have been proffered by scholars and experts ranging from the prevention of radicalization, dealing with the root causes of terrorism, maintaining hard counterterrorism measures, disrupting the flow of terrorism financing etc. Borders Control have emerged as an important element of economic, socio-cultural, political and security relations of States and regional blocs. Consequently, it has attracted significant interest from scholars alike. However, little scholarly attention has been given to interrogate the significance relationship between border control and FTFs in the context of West Africa. Hence, the need for the work.

The task here is not to go over the entire measures for preventing the flow of FTFs but rather to examine FTFs through the prism of border control. At the end a list of recommendations will be carted to improve policy formulations and implementations.

The focus of this work therefore is to underscore the relationship between border control and foreign terrorist fighters. The approach of this research work is descriptive. Both primary and secondary data were collected in the course of this research work. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with Key informants (KII) as well as journals, newspapers, books, and relevant online materials etc. respectively. The data collected were interpreted critically using content analysis to arrive at an objective conclusion.

Key Words: Border Control, FTFs, Security, Terrorism, West Africa

1. Introduction

Emmanuel Hansel once said that “Peace is a universal desideratum yet the most elusive”. This is a bias reinforced by the prevalence of global insecurity; violent armed conflicts, far-right extremism, Islamic extremism, natural disasters, poverty and epidemics across the globe. The threat FTFs pose is of global concern especially as it compounds national, regional and global insecurity¹ demonstrates the extent of FTFs threat to global peace and security. In West Africa the case is no different.

Several initiatives have been proffered by scholars and experts alike from the prevention of radicalization, addressing the conditions that feed terrorism, maintaining hard security measures, cutting terrorism financing to effective border control etc.

Border as a concept has been widely researched. This is due to its relevance to State sovereignty, economic, socio-cultural, religious and political relations among nations. More so, it has gained prominence global security trajectories especially after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Unfortunately, little scholarly attention has been paid to interrogate the nexus between border control and FTFs, especially in the West African context. It is on this backdrop that this research work is conducted.

Consequently, to achieve this, the following research questions will be addressed in this paper; to what extent are FTFs a security threat in West Africa? What is the relationship between Border control and the prevention of FTFs flow in West Africa?

The first part will attempt a general introduction, conceptual clarification of terms and theoretical assumptions of the work. The second section will be dedicated to ascertaining the threat of FTFs in the sub-region as well as the “state of the Arts of border control in West Africa and the imperative for border control. The third section will be the conclusion and recommendations.

1.1 Conceptual Clarification

1.1.1 Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs)

The concept of FTFs cannot be completely understood without examining the phenomenon of terrorism. The definition of terrorism has generated a gulf among scholars and policy makers. Two forms of questions are asked; is it the methods used or general objective of using violence that defines terrorism? Also important to highlight is the context of the contemporary

state system in which the state is the “only” legitimate actor that can employ violence, where non-state actors use of violence is deemed illegitimate and thus labelled terrorist “act”.

According to Miller, terrorism is described as violent actions inflicted upon secondary targets that may be conducted by clandestine or semi-clandestine individual, group or government with the wider purpose of attracting attention, gaining support or forcing concession from the primary target on personnel or political issues. For terrorists, the direct target of violence are not the main target, the immediate human victims of terror violence are generally chosen randomly or selected from a target population to serve as a message generator. The victims are used to manipulate the main target, to force it to accede to the demand of the primary target. These tactics include; kidnapping and hostage taking, bombing, hijacking, killing, destruction of personal properties and national infrastructure². This definition captures both state and non-state actors as possible perpetrators of terrorism.

In another vein, Crenshaw defines terrorism as a deliberate and systematic violence performed by a small number of people, purposely to intimidate watching popular audience by harming only a few, being pre-eminently political and symbolic, and clandestinely resisting authority. The expectation of such acts of terrorism is to trigger a response from the primary target (the state) which will in turn draw public attention and support to its grievances or issues³. This definition is opposed to state terrorism-where a state supports or condones acts of terrorism. In this regards international terrorism denotes supra-national entities that perpetrates violence without being limited by national or geographic space. For the sake of this research work, Crenshaw’s definition will be adopted. This is because it captures the typology of actors of interest to this work. Specifically, non-state actors. In retrospect, it can be observed from the previous definition captures both state and non-state actors. These non-state actors in West Africa include Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Islamic State West Africa etc.

Similar to the term ‘terrorism’, there has been little consensus on the meaning of FTFs. According to Malet cited in Deborah Basileo, the word “foreign fighter” first appeared on 21 March, 1988 in The Times of London. Accordingly, it was an account of the victory of Afghan mujahedeen with the help from foreign fighters from Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia against Pro-Soviet forces⁴. There are two broad schools of thought regarding the definition of Foreign Fighters. One school ties foreign fighters to civil wars whereas the other links it to religious extremism. To illustrate, Lasserre in the first category, defines a foreign

fighter as “the individual who joins an insurrection during a civil war, but who is not a citizen of States in conflict”⁵. In a similar sense, Hegghammer describes foreign fighters using four criteria. “The foreign fighter is an individual who has joined an insurrection and who operates within it, who does not have citizenship or of kinship with the parties to the dispute, which is not affiliated with an organization, official military and who is not paid”⁶.

Gradually shifting from the first school, Moore and Tumelty focusing their study on Chechnya define foreign fighters “as non-indigenous, non-territorialized combatants who, motivated by religion, kinship, and/or ideology rather than pecuniary reward enter a conflict zone to participate in hostilities”. Although in a civil war context, the emphasis here is on religion, kinship and ideology⁷. In a similar sense, De Guttery defines foreign fighters as “an individual driven mainly by ideology, religion and/or kinship, who leave their country of origin or country of habitual residence to join a party engaged in an armed conflict”⁸.

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the term “foreign fighters” have transitioned from foreigners fighting in civil wars to those fighting for religious belief especially Islam and Kinship. This alchemized form of “foreign fighters” has informed such definition employed by the United Nations Security Council. It thus defines FTFs as “individuals who travel to a state other than their states of residence or nationality for the purpose of perpetrating, planning or preparation of, or participating in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict”⁹. For an operation definition of the term FTF, the UNSC definition will suffice.

1.1.2 Border Control

To understand the term “Border Control”, it is germane to first unravel the concepts border and boundary. These are two related terms that will aid our understanding of Border control. Etymologically, border can be traced to the French word “*Bordure*” which means an outer edge of something, like margin but, belongs to this something. The Collins Dictionary defines Border as “the dividing line or frontier between political or geographic regions” Francis Ikome conceives borders as ‘imaginary or real lines that separate two land area from each other’. In this sense, it is called international borders when these lines stretch through two or more national states¹⁰. In a technical sense, it is a point 12 nautical miles from where government agencies perform their duty of controlling ‘who’ and ‘what’ comes in and out. Border effectively defines a State’s sovereignty, where its jurisdiction begins and end by

determining its physical and geographic territory. In a non-technical sense, borders determine individual, community and national identities¹¹.

Border control is about asserting territorial sovereignty. This means that state must have the capacity to trace and track the movement of people, goods, and data that come in and out of the country through its border. It is a term commonly used interchangeably with border management and border security. It resonates with the key function of a government, which is about the security of its citizens. It primarily involves the services of government agencies such as immigrations, customs, police, armed forces, quarantine agency etc. But also in recent times has expanded to other stakeholders such as other States, border communities, the business community, and civil society organizations¹².

1.2 Theoretical Framework

1.2.1 Coordinated Border Management

Border as earlier mentioned has emerged as a critical factor of State political, economic and security relations. O'Dowd opines that Borders are places of economic and political opportunity for nations and states as well as for a host of other interest groups and agencies, legal or illegal¹³. Although States primarily and historically represent state sovereignty, there has been a gradual shift with borders becoming bridges for mutual relations and a significant element of national and regional security. In the former, the case for the European Union in successfully integrating its borders and the latter, for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the United States. With these came the need to promote effective and efficient border crossing for human, goods and conveyances as well as for standardized security measures. For instance, the US perspective on borders shifted to the country of export and not necessarily at its geographic border space. In other words, there was need for coordination and cooperation between states for the twin goal of economy and security¹⁴.

According to the World Customs Organization (WCO), Coordinated Border Management (CBM) "represents an approach to manage borders involving public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries in a coordinated manner to achieve a shared goal thus providing a cohesive government response to the challenges of border management". CBM can be referred to as meaning a logical way to manage border operations to ensure efficient and effective processes and procedures used by all regulatory agencies who are involved in border security and regulatory requirements that apply to travelers, goods and conveyances

crossing international borders. The objective of a coordinated border management system is to facilitate trade and the clearance of travelers at the same time ensuring secure borders¹⁵.

In a precise term, the European Council defines Coordinated Border Management as “national and international coordination and cooperation among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation to establish effective, efficient and coordinated border management in order to reach the objective of open, but well controlled and secure borders¹⁶. The underlying assumption of this theory is that to guarantee economic trade flow and security in a dynamic border system there is need for coordination and cooperation within national agencies, between neighbouring states, and at the global level of its border related activities. The need for coordination and cooperation is founded on the changing nature of border on one hand and the need for expanded roles of relevant stakeholders on the other.

At this juncture, it is germane to observe that the term Coordinated Border Management has been developed differently by other organizations to mean ‘Integrated Border management’, ‘Comprehensive Border Management’, and ‘Collaborative Border management’. Although they all represent a common meaning, they emphasize differing aspects. For instance, the European council emphasizes integration, whereas the World Bank emphasizes collaboration.

The theory of CBM has informed joint mobile teams, hot pursuit, joint risk management, targeting centres, information sharing, juxtaposed office, One-stop-border-post (single office). These arrangements have been jointly carried out within a country, among neighbouring countries and at the global level. For instance, Sweden, Norway and Finland at the level of neighbours have developed a one-stop-border-post which have helped in easing crossing by undergoing several stops by different border agencies in both the exiting and entry countries and also for enhancing security checks. In another case, Switzerland and France have employed ‘the juxtaposed office’ in the country of import to ease documentation and validate information. Several other examples abound, especially the case of the EU, the US and Canada just to mention but a few. In recent times the theory have been expanded to include a myriad of stakeholders ranging from the business community, civil society organizations (CSOs) and Border communities¹⁷.

2. Foreign Terrorist Fighters in West Africa: Historical Synopsis

Before delving into the discourse on FTFs in West Africa, it is pertinent to briefly describe the region of West Africa. Basically, it is the westernmost region of Africa, bounded by the

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Atlantic Ocean in the West, by the Gulf of Guinea in the south, by the Sahara and Sahel in the North. According to the Nation Online project, there are seventeen (17) countries and one British Oversea territory in West Africa. These include; Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, and the United Kingdom Overseas Territory of Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha, several islands scattered in South Atlantic Ocean. All countries excluding Sao Tome and Principe and the UK overseas territory are members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), originally an economic cum political bloc to promote economic development and regional integration but whose mandate have expanded to the area of Peace and Security. West Africa occupies an area of approximately 8 million Km², about one fifth of Africa¹⁸.



Figure 1: Map of West Africa. Source: Nations Online, 2019

2.1.1 Mali: AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Eddine and MNLA

Whereas it is arguable that FTFs threat has recently drawn global concerns, in West Africa FTFs threat can be traced to the dawn of the 21st century. According to Filiu, as early as 2004

Mauritanians had joined the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) based in Algeria. The group later morphed to al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, Mali, were Malians, Nigerian, Chadians had a fair membership besides Algerians who maintained the leadership in the group¹⁹. The above claim is supported by the 108 blacklist of members of terrorist organization in AQIM published by the Algerian government in 2011. Accordingly, 21 Algerians, 34 Mauritanians, 5 Moroccans, 3 Tunisians, 6 Libyans, 14 Nigerians, 7 Chadians, and 21 Malians. Also the former Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga in May, 2011 while commenting on the threat of AQIM claimed that most of the Al-Qaeda mujahedeen were foreigners who only collaborated with locals for their knowledge of the terrain and logistics purposes²⁰.

Historically AQIM depended on FTFs for its activities in West Africa. According to a study published by the al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, AQIM in 2007 carried out a major organizational restructuring. The group was divided into 2 Katibas equivalent to a battalion and 2 Squadrons. For the first Kabita, consisting of about 300 fighters, Mokhtar Belmokhtar sometimes called Belaouar (One-Eyed) was the leader. He is of Algerian nationality, and fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The second Kabita was headed by another Algerian, Abdel-Hamid Abu Zayd. In the ranks of the two Kabitas Algerians, Malians, Mauritanians, Chadians, Nigeriens, and Nigerians were part of the unit. Also, in the second division of the AQIM command structure, the first squadron was headed by Algerian Jamal Akasha whereas the second squadron was led by a Malian, Abu Abd al-Karim al-Tariqi. The latter was the only non-Algerian leader in the AQIM command structure. His squadron was accordingly made of Malians and Nigerian Tuaregs²¹. It can be observed that apart from the second squadron, all the administrative positions were reserved for Arabs, specifically Algerians. Furthermore, this was part of the frustration which led to the establishment of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad (MUJAO) and Ansar Eddine by dissident members who were opposed to an all Arab leadership of the group when Africans contributed to its growth. Consequently, MUJAO emerged as a splinter group mostly led by Malians and Mauritanians, while Ansar Eddine was led by Malian Tuaregs²².

It is worthwhile recalling that in 2012 Northern Mali fell into the hands of armed militant groups composed of the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) mainly composed of the Tuaregs, AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Eddine. Except for the MNLA, which sought an independent State of Azawad in the northern region of Mali, the other 3 groups sought to impose a form of Islamic State in Mali. This cooperation between the four groups was

however short-lived as the three other Jihadist groups pushed the MNLA out of northern Mali²³. By January, 2013 the French intervention had flushed the jihadist militants out of Northern Mali with support from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)²⁴.

1.1.2 Nigeria: Boko Haram and ISWA

Niger

Although foreign fighters can be said to be an old phenomenon in Nigeria, FTFs can be arguably traced to beginning of Boko Haram. As far back as the Maitatsine armed movement in the 1980s, several Nigeriens were involved in the armed conflict that lasted for 5 years (1980-1985) and the Izala movement in the 1990s. There exist a complex bond between Northern part of Nigeria and Southern Niger along economy, socio-cultural and religious and ethnic lines. For instance, most members of both regions are from the Kanuri ethnic group. Nigeriens had joined Boko Haram with some being sympathetic to the movement. The region of Diffa, Maiine-Soroa, Zinder and Koumadougou River with its large Kanuri ethnicmake-up remain a major source of FTFs for Boko Haram²⁵.

Cameroon

Another source of FTFs in Nigeria is Cameroon. A country which shares a lot with Nigeria. Varying from culture, common border, long historical and political ties and of course religion. Mamman Nur, a founding member of Boko Haram and a mastermind of the 2011 UN building attack in Abuja was a Cameroonian. This is akin to the founder of the Maitatsine movement in Kano, Muhammadu Marwa. In the infamous attack, he was accompanied by other Nigerians (Habibu Bama and Babagana Ismail) trained with AQIM in Algeria. Nur himself had received training from Somalia with Al-Shabaab²⁶. In another report, the Cameroonian Deputy Prime Minister Amadou Ali noted that 470 youths from Kolofata had joined Boko Haram²⁷.

Omar Mahmoud in understudying the transition of Boko Haram to a global jihadist group, highlights three phases of such evolution. The first accordingly were nationals from neighbouring countries with historical, cultural, and religious ties. The second phase with members of neighbouring countries holding significant leadership positions and thirdly, the phase with more regional membership including citizens of Northern Africa²⁸.

Senegal

Makhtar Diokhane, a Senegalese was arrested along the Niger-Nigeria border in November, 2015. After several investigations, it was discovered that Abubakar Shekau had commissioned him to establish a cell in Senegal with the sum of \$20,000. Previously, 4 Senegalese were arrested for possessing counterfeit money while crossing from Nigeria into Maine-Soroa, Niger. It was learnt that both Diokhane and the four other suspects who had fought in Sambisa forest, Borno State, were returning home to establish a cell in Senegal. Diokhane was sentenced to 20 years in prison in August, 2018 alongside 12 others by criminal association. Out of the 12 all but one had joined Boko Haram, while the other joined Katiba al Furqane, a division of AQIM in Mali. Similarly, nationals from Malian Tuareg, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and other North African countries have been reported in Boko Haram²⁹.

Another Senegalese Momodou Ndiaye (Abu Yusuf) was a member of Boko Haram. Between 2014 and 2015, he fought in the battle of Gwoza and Mubi in Borno and Adamawa state respectively including his late country man Moussa Mbaye. After a period in Nigeria, Abu Yusuf fought in Libya with the Islamic State, then returned to Mauritania through Algeria where he met with Moustapha Diatta who also fought in Libya as well. In fact, for Zenn, the membership of Senegalese who have little command of English in Boko Haram, is indicative of the presence of Cameroonians, Chadians, and Nigeriens with whom they could communicate with in French³⁰.

There is a lack of reliable data on the number of FTFs in West Africa. However, a few estimates have been made in recent times. Col. Craig Miller, a Special Operations Command Africa, US Airforce estimates that Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa fields about 1,500 and 3,500 foreign terrorist fighters respectively. He cites the collapse of IS central and thus the flow of FTFs to other affiliate groups in the continent³¹. Reports further indicate the membership of FTFs in Boko Haram from Sudan, Libya, Algeria, and Mali with highly recognized leadership roles as enforcing Sharia punishments (beheading, amputation, flogging), as well as tank repair men³².

On the reverse flow, reports have shown that nationals of Nigeria, Mali, and Senegal have become FTFs in North Africa and beyond. This up-north movement is underscored by Captain Isaac Subi, the Nigerian Air force Commander. Accordingly, he observed that Boko

Haram and IS, Libya have developed a kind of military exchange programme that allows for fighters from both sides to share personnel, knowledge and expertise³³.

3.1.3 The Case of Libya

One cannot successfully describe the FTFs phenomenon in West Africa without contextualizing Libya. As will be seen, Libya has become a major conduit for FTFs entry and exit West Africa. Zelin in his seminal work on FTFs “The Others: Foreign Fighters in Libya” while highlighting the number of FTFs in Libya, raised concerns on the security threat of FTFs to the Middle East, Europe, the United States of America, North Africa and by extension West Africa from within Libya. In retrospect, it should be noted that since the 2011 uprising that deposed the regime of Muammar Gadhafi, Libya has been in a protracted civil conflict till date. It will be recalled that the United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 allowed for the use of all means necessary to protect civilians in Libya. Subsequently, the military of France, the US, the United Kingdom (UK) and other willing states under the aegis of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened in the civil conflict in Libya³⁴. And with the disposition of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIL), the violent state of Libya offers a strategic based (safe haven) for the terrorist group to hide, train, plan and operationalize attacks³⁵.

Accordingly, Libya has attracted the fourth highest number of foreign terrorist fighters in the history of global jihadism only falling behind the current war in Syria, Afghanistan in the 1980s and Iraq 2003 war. Unfortunately more so, it is the first time, East and West Africans have joined the jihadist course. In 2017, the data set on the number of FTFs in Libya was estimated at 2,600-3,500 with West Africa having approximately 250-700 fighters. These data set were sourced from official reports from the Libyan Ministry of Defence, the US data base on FTFs in Libya and on open sources such as news media. These included the nationals of the following countries; Chad, Ghana, Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania and Nigeria. Also, important to note is the sheer number of female FTFs in Libya who numbered about 300 across Africa including females of West African origin³⁶. The diagram below shows the major flow of FTFs in the sub-region.




Figure 2. Compiled by the author

3. Border Control in West Africa: State of the Art and the Way Forward

From existing literatures, it can be arguably said that FTFs pose a significant security threat in the sub-region. These fighters have moved within the continent and beyond crossing borders. On some occasion they have been identified but at other occasions unidentified by security agencies. It is this very movement that has aroused the sentiments for border control among other preventive measures.

Afua A. Lamptey observed that the 35 international borders in West Africa are porous and far from government control³⁷. In fact, Willie Eselebor noted that borders in West Africa can be described to a large extent as “porous and poorly controlled”. Citing Nigeria, he noted that there are 1000+ illegal routes into and out of the country³⁸. The Libyan-Niger-Nigeria axis is thought to have the least controlled borders in the sub-region³⁹. These porous borders have facilitated the movement of bandits, criminal syndicates, and terrorists among other contraband good such as small arms and light weapons, drugs, sub-standard foods and

pharmaceuticals. This movement of terrorists in West Africa resonates with the weakness of West African border governance⁴⁰.

As seen above, FTFs generally impact negatively on armed conflicts especially terrorism. Firstly, FTFs contribute to terrorism financing. This has made the task of countering terrorism daunting, as terrorists use such funds to acquire weapons, support logistics and general administration. In Senegal for instance, two of its nationals arrested in 2016 and sentenced to prison were involved in the financing of Boko Haram in Nigeria⁴¹.

Secondly, FTFs contribute to manpower resources and recruitment for terrorist groups. In West Africa and beyond, FTFs have contributed to the number of manpower resources as combatants and cheerleaders. The latter role which have been reserved for women FTFs. Notwithstanding, some women still train as combatants and suicide bombers. FTFs constitute a reliable source of recruitment for terrorism in West Africa. Nigeriens for instance have been identified as constituting a significant recruitment base for IS in West Africa and Boko Haram. This is also the case for Chadians, Mauritians, and Senegalese⁴².

Thirdly, FTFs contribute to training and capacity building of recruits. FTFs who have received training elsewhere, comes back home to train local combatants and new recruits. Thus, expanding and sustaining terrorism. Training can be in form of religious radicalization, the use of weapons and/or in carrying out operations. Such training rationalizes all forms of violence in the prism of religion on one hand and build the efficiency and effectiveness of attacks on the other hand. To illustrate the above, the Nigerian Boko Haram cleric, Khalid al-Barnawi arrested in Senegal in 2016 was accused of recruiting young Senegalese in the capital Dakar⁴³.

The case for effective border control in the sub-region is thus founded on the need to limit the flow of FTFs among other preventive mechanism. David Thompson shares this view with Willie Ezelebor. He notes that border control can help prevent the movement of FTFs and to a large extent reduce terrorism in the sub-region. He emphasized cooperation among States in West Africa, North Africa, the Middle East and European, who are facing the same threat. This he noted is borne of the uniqueness of border as region straddling two or more States⁴⁴. This view resonates with that suggested by Frowd for joint border patrol, effective communication and intelligence sharing, common security risk evaluation, joint training of border control personnel, joint funding of operations, and international legal assistance among

States. The implication which is to shore up the needed capacity to deal with the threat of FTFs' movement across borders to perpetuate violence⁴⁵.

There imperative for improved border control in West Africa cannot be overemphasized. This demands leadership and strong political will to actualize. This cuts across national, regional and global level. At the national level, there is need for a national action plan that recognizes the need for synergy with neighbouring countries. In West Africa, ECOWAS offer the best regional institution for such coordinated border control. Much has been achieved in terms of conflict management. Yet, there is more to be done in terms of a comprehensive border control framework especially in the face of FTFs threat⁴⁶.

4. International Legal Framework and Border Control

The United Nations lays credence to the threat of FTFs. The UNSC resolution 2178(2014) regards FTFs as threat to international peace and security and calls on States to take all necessary measures to address it. These measures include preventing radicalization to terrorism, stemming recruitment, inhibiting FTFs travel, disrupting financial support of FTFs and countering extremism. In addition to this, the UNSC resolution 2396 (2017) emphasized the need for states to take actions in the area of effective border security, information sharing and cooperation⁴⁷.

Although not specifically recognizing the threat of FTFs, the African Union (AU) in its draft AU Border governance strategy (2017), establishes a comprehensive border security framework for the region. This is anchored on 5 pillars; Development of Capabilities for Border Governance; Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Border Security and Transnational Threats; Mobility, Migration & Trade Facilitation; Cooperative Border Management; Borderland Development & Community Engagement. Accordingly. It recognizes the need for regional integration but also the need to secure borders from the threats of terrorism and other crime syndicates. It calls on state to incorporate the practice of cooperate border management(CBM), which will allow for inter-agency and interstate cooperation on border security including border community and civil society groups⁴⁸.

ECOWAS, the recognized sub-regional economic and security bloc has no comprehensive border control framework. However, what seem apparent is a robustconflict prevention protocols that passively make reference to border control. To illustrate, the 1999 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) Art. 46 highlights the need to control cross-border crimes. Also, the ECOWAS convention on small and light weapons (2000) Art. 22 also

mentions the need for cross-border crime control. The same can be said of the ECOWAS counterterrorism strategy and implementation plan⁴⁹.

5. Conclusion

Foreign terrorist fighters constitute an emerging security threat in West Africa. They make the task of countering terrorism onerous and herculean for the government, the citizens and the international community at large. Their engagements in terrorism financing, recruitment and training of terrorists, and combat. This has had an overarching impact on terrorism in the sub-region. Among the plethora of preventive measures, border control is critical since FTFs use these borders to perpetuate violence.

Borders in the sub-region which has been described as porous resonates with the need for enhanced border control in West Africa. Border control especially in the lens of CBM underscores joint problem-solving between States in the sub-region. This includes joint patrol, information and intelligence sharing, common training and funding of operation, international legal assistance. Although there is no comprehensive border policy framework in the sub-region of West Africa, the UN and the AU offers such a leaf to borrow from.

6. Recommendations

Border control among other initiatives will help prevent the flow of FTFs in the sub-region. Hence, the following recommendations;

1. There is need for policy makers in West Africa including States and regional bodies to implement the theory of Coordinated Border Management. It offers context driven solutions to the challenges of border control especially in tailoring areas of cooperation and coordination between state's agencies and also within a state. This will help correct the risk of corruption by border control personnel, better improve human resource and other logistical support, enhance information and intelligence sharing, improve the demarcation of international boundaries and control border porosity.
2. Governments of West African States should implement the one stop border post. This will significantly reduce corrupt practices by border personnel. This is because the presence of multinational border personnel will act as a check to corruption.
3. Border security personnel should be highly motivated through adequate funding, training and capacity building, provision of logistical support.

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3. There is need to improved intelligence, and information sharing within and between border security agencies such as the police, army and customs. This is especially relating to individuals of security threat. Such levels of communication will not only better inform decision making, but also build trust and relations among such agencies.
4. The role of other relevant stakeholders should be expanded to include CSO, the business community and the border community.
5. There is a lack of reliable quantitative data on FTFs in West Africa. Hence, further research should be conducted in this area.

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TERRORISM IN AFRICA: FUTURE TRENDS

By

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this work *Terrorism in Africa: Future Trends* is to project the main variables that will determine dynamics of terrorism in Africa, taking into account the development of: Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its related groups, as well as Boko Haram (BH) and Al Shabaab (AS). This study was carried out using the prospective method, that allows to determine the direct and indirect influences among the variables identified. As a result, the security landscape in the Sahel zone remains very unstable due to the actions of terrorist groups. One of the epicenters will continue to be located around the Lake Chad: northern Nigeria and the neighbouring countries. In East Africa, Al Shabaab continues to represent the most potent threat to security not only for Somalia but also for Kenya, especially the counties of Dabaab, Wajir and Mandera, affected by their cross-border actions. The terrorist groups have been militarily degraded and weakened significantly. This has forced the terrorist groups to reconfigure their operational and tactical strategies, resorting to re-organizing into smaller groups and cells.

KEYWORDS:

Al Shabaab (AS)

Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Boko Haram (BH)

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

Terrorism

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this work is to project the main variables that will determine the trends of terrorism in Africa by 2025, taking into account the development of organizations such as: Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its related groups, as well as Boko Haram (BH) and Al Shabaab (AS). This study was carried out using the prospective method through the methodological tool of the Matrix-based Multiplication Applied to a Classification (MICMAC), created by Michel Godet. This tool allows to determine the direct and indirect influences among the identified variables. It also makes it possible to identify a greater number of relationships between the variables and which of these would be the determinant ones.

For these reasons, its study requires not only a depth analysis of the historical reasons that led to the formation, development and sustainability of terrorism through the exacerbation and exploitation of fundamentalism, but also the study of the projection of political behavior of this phenomenon in the short and medium term. There is a set of internal and external economic, sociopolitical, ideological, psychological, religious, cultural and environmental variables, related to national and international interests that could explain the trends that this problem presents in the Sub-Saharan region.

The definition of the variables, their nomenclature and conceptualization was carried out in a first phase. In a second phase: the quantitative evaluation of the variables was defined through the matrix of direct potential influences. A total of seven variables were determined, which contain the dimensions of each one. Variable selection does not correspond to a theoretical conceptualization, but to the elements taken into account for its analysis: what is to be understood by each of them. In this identification-selection-definition process, a prior diagnosis of the situation of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa was made. Its also important to underline that this research implemented a combination of methodologies, not only those coming from the scenarios building but also from history, international relations and political science.

LIST OF VARIABLES (NOMENCLATURE) AND DESCRIPTION

- 1) *Dynamics of the international system (InternationalSystem)*: This dynamics are understood as the geopolitical and geo-economic environment that impact on the development of terrorism, as well as the regional economic and social situations that influence the evolution of terrorism.
- 2) *Level of institutionalization (Institutionalization)*: It is conceived through the functioning of the internal structures, the capacity of spread them to other regions and the organizational stability achieved by terrorist groups and organizations.

3) *Level of financing (Financing)*: It refers to the self-financing capacity of the group (tax collection, bribes, or ransom payments for kidnappings) and to other income resulting from its connection and / or control of transnational organized crime (use of drug trafficking networks, routes of migrants and weapons). It is also referred to resources coming from political and private actors, as well as for the illegal commercialization of commodities.

4) *Recruitment capacity (Recruitmentcapacity)*: Level of manipulation of ideological factors, including religion, to attract adherents to its cause, using the Technologies of Information and Communications (media influence) and / or other means to promote fanaticism. This capacity for recruitment is expressed through the support of certain sectors of the population - exchange of information - that identify with their objectives and see their affiliations to them as a means of subsistence. For this reasons they are integrated into the group.

5) *Leadership (Leadership)*: Capacity of influence of their individual leaders and / or incidence of the group/organization at local, regional or international level.

6) *Relations between groups/organizations (Relationsgroups)*: Dynamics of connection between them or level of autonomy and dependence through the exchange of information, logistical support and ability to train its own members or to train terrorists from other cells.

7) *Violent actions: (Violentactions)*: Availability of armaments, means of combat and military technology for the execution of their terrorist actions and / or the confrontation against regular forces or against civil populations.

These variables are only a proposal for doing the analysis and any of them could be understood in different ways. During the investigation several methodological difficulties were presented related to the nature of the studied phenomenon, the number of organizations and the geographical variety where they operate. There were several possibilities for addressing the issue: perform the analysis of the variables and the matrix for each terrorist organization, do it at the level of the subregions, or the third variant, related to the general analysis of the phenomenon. Of these three possibilities, the third option was chosen to emphasize the common elements of terrorism in each region and then indicate the general trend in the short term.

In this way, with the results offered by the MICMAC, the analysis of these data was made considering the particularities of each terrorist group/organization in their specific scenarios. It was decided to apply the method from the general to the particular to see how each of the general tendencies offered by the method fitted the specific case or not. This implied that the results obtained after the application of this prospective tool - related to certain variable - were not always in

accordance with the specific evolution that the group / organization will present. Undoubtedly, the results offered by the MICMAC allowed a better validation of the main trends of terrorism in Africa.


TABLE 1. MATRIX OF DIRECT INFLUENCES (MDI)

Variables	<i>International system</i>	<i>Institutionalization</i>	<i>Financing</i>	<i>RECRUITMENT CAPACITY</i>	<i>Leadership</i>	<i>Relations groups</i>	<i>Violent actions</i>
1. <i>INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM</i>	0	2	3	2	2	3	3
2. <i>INSTITUTIONALIZATION</i>	1	0	3	3	3	2	3
3. <i>FINANCING</i>	2	3	0	3	3	3	3
4. <i>RECRUITMENT CAPACITY</i>	2	2	3	0	3	2	3
5. <i>LEADERSHIP</i>	2	3	3	3	0	2	3
6. <i>RELATIONS GROUPS</i>	3	1	3	3	3	0	2
7. <i>VIOLENT ACTIONS</i>	3	3	3	3	3	2	0

The Matrix of Direct Influence (MDI) describes the relations of direct influences between the variables defined in the system. Influences range from 0 to 3, with the possibility to identify potential influences, in this case: 0 means no influence; 1: weak; 2: moderate and 3: strong influence. These values were adopted after several meetings with a group of experts. The MICMAC program showed the following graph where the variables are located in a plane of influence / dependence, which allow the analysis to be carried out based on the relationships between the variables and their importance within the object of study.

Taking these results into account, an analysis of each of the interrelationships of these variables is proposed, according to the trends that the three most active terrorist organizations in the region will present by 2025: AQIM, BH and AS. In this work only one of the multiple variants that the MICMAC can offer is shown. It is important to notice that this result can not be literally taken, because each group behaves in different ways. This graph is only a general proposal according to the values that the expert adopted and it can be modified depending on the context.

GRAPH. POTENTIAL DIRECT INFLUENCE/DEPENDENCE MAP



MAIN BODY

The phenomenon of terrorism will continue to be subject of political manipulations by different actors - Western and regional powers - in order to promote their own interests and agendas in the areas in which these groups / organizations act. In this sense, there is no consensus among scholars about the global responsibility in the emergence and manipulation of this problem. The security mechanisms of the United States of America (USA) and its allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) "engaged" in the "search" and "capture" of the possible suspects of terrorist acts, have fostered on one hand the islamophobia and, on the other, the rise of fanaticism in very small sections of the Islamic population.

The development of events related to economic, socio-political and military nature, unveiled the intention of the USA governments to manipulate terrorism in their favor. The international relations will be affected by the impacts of terrorism, which will continue to be at the center of the attention of politics. The regions of North Africa, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are also immersed in these dynamics, nuanced by different interests and geopolitical objectives, which vary from one region to the other.

Terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa presents different characteristics from those that occur in the Middle East region. In this sense, the most extreme variants, which have later become terrorists, have been perceived as foreign elements, exogenous to African realities, and they have had an almost generalized rejection from the population and have not been able to spread to other regions, except by the way of force. For this reasons is not possible that certain cells in Democratic Republic of Congo and in northern Mozambique could intensify its military actions. It should be noted that a distinctive element between the radical groups that act in the Middle East from those that operate in SSA is the fact that in their origins, the second one, did not used terrorist methods.

This means that groups like BH and AS started out, in its early beginnings, as groups that made political and socio-economic demands to the local governments and later became radicalized. In the case of AQIM, its Saharan branches did not have a Black-African origin, but within the Algerian Arabs, which is why it is presented as a non-genuine organization of the sub-Saharan region. Among other differences can be mentioned the fact that they have not been financed by Western powers or regional governments as others have in the Middle East. Its prominent interethnic character has been a factor that limited a greater propagation of its networks.

AL QAEDA OF THE ISLAMIC MAGREB AND HIS TRANSAHARIAN ACTIONS

The permanence of terrorist activism in 2025 still remain a particularity of the Sahelo-Saharan zone. Although the stabilization attempts of governments such as Algeria, Mali and Niger can gain recognition and effectiveness in the area, the relative autonomy of this organization suggests that insecurity and instability will continue to be a condition desired by groups that maintain their control over the main vulnerable zones.

Although it is not possible to deny the traditional impact of the dynamics of the international system, even in Sub-Saharan Africa, these have not had a direct impact on the rise of AQIM, except in conjunctural contexts, from which it has benefited, as those occurred after the intervention of NATO in Libya in 2011. In this sense, the political situations of the subregion have more influence on the development of the organization, because the greater or lesser coordination of the governments of the area will enable their weakening or strengthening. If policies are maintained by ECOWAS the possible scenario will lead to a reduction of this group. The tendency points to a greater articulation of the antiterrorist policies of the governments of the area to confront this transnational group. On the other hand, the relations between the different terrorist groups that operate under the AQIM umbrella will remain diffuse. However, the great fragmentation experienced by the organization in recent years corresponds more to a strategy than to a greater weakening, since the constant recomposition of its internal forces hinders its effective eradication.

Therefore, the organization will continue to lead a broad and increasingly volatile group of cells and terrorist groups operating in the wider Trans-Saharan region. In turn, it will maintain the line established by Al Qaeda, while the splits of leaders linked to the remnants of the Islamic State (ISIS) do not have a positive development in the area. Only in this sense can be understood that the level of institutionalization and leadership of the organization work as very influential variables in the development of terrorism in the Sahel.

The leadership within this group is dispersed, which responds to the levels of fragmentation of the organization. This continues to be exercised fundamentally by component of Arab origin,

although there is an increase in the emergence of Black-African origin leaders, especially in the smaller cells. This fragmentation can't be confused with a low level of institutionalization, since each one of the cells will continue to respond to the central command of AQIM in the Kabylia region.

Likewise, the recruitment capacity of the organization is produced as a highly dependent dimension with little influence. The units that make up AQIM seem to subordinate the recruitment to the needs of expanding its membership as a result of the military offensives launched by the governments of the area that have undoubtedly affected their activism. In the recruitment of this group will continue to have a fundamental weight economic factors and not so much the ideological conviction of its new members. Its means that Islam, contrary to popular belief, will not be the main factor for this recruitment. The socio-economic crisis in the regions where it operates remains the main reason why potential new recruits are linked to AQIM networks, as a form of "work" and obtain "income" because of its link with other transnational crime networks.

TERRORISM AROUND LAKE CHAD: BOKO HARAM

The security landscape in the Sahel zone remains very unstable in 2025 due to the maintenance of the actions of the terrorist groups - most of them reconfigured - so this phenomenon will remain within the agendas of the governments direct or indirectly affected by their actions. One of the nerve centers of this terrorism will continue to be located around the area of Lake Chad with an epicenter located in northern Nigeria and with specific ramifications towards the bordering countries. In the case of the Sahel region, the dynamics of the international system do not have a direct influence on the development of terrorism, because its solution is not within the priorities of the Western powers, despite the rhetoric that is used by France and the United States regarding the "fight against terrorism".

Despite the adverse socioeconomic situation in this regions, this variable will not have a direct influence on the development of this issue due to the rejection they generate in local populations as a result of the negative consequences that their actions have generated in recent years. This economic context also does not allow them to extend to other regions to "legitimize" their "antisystemic" political discourse. Their social support is considerably reduced and they can't "satisfy" the demands of the populations in economic terms. The discourse of the leaders of BH fails to add new followers. They can do that only by the use of coercion.

In this sense, the MICMAC program showed that the recruitment capacity is a strongly dependent variable, which translates into the need for this group to perform forced recruitments of the civilian population through kidnapping (1), compulsory marriage and the use of women (2) and children (3) as "suicide bombers". Their inability to recruit is also related to the loss of social support,

as it was mentioned before. Nevertheless, the group will maintain this tactic of forced recruitment, which will have an indirect impact on the future evolution of terrorism. Mercenarism, fueled by other actors, as another way to enter their terrorist cells, is not representative in the case of BH, nor will be the use of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) to foment religious fanaticism or strengthen the "support" of other sectors of the population. The broad social bases formed around this group is further dismantled and do not have the same characteristics as it enjoyed in the initial years of its creation.

The MICMAC offered as result that the *relations between the groups* and the *level of institutionalization* are autonomous variables that have an indirect influence on the development of terrorism, especially the case of institutionalization. This is explained by the fact that, in most cases, if the groups are more fragmented and supposedly "disarticulated", it will be more difficult to be able to implement accurate policies for their final eradication. This fragmentation within the group - of which BH has also appropriated - responds more to a strategy to operate with a greater capacity than a sign of weakening.

The links between the organizations (Boko Haram - Islamic State or ISIS, Boko Haram - AQIM) in terms of information exchanges, logistical support and ability to train terrorists from their cells have not been effective and therefore were not a guarantee for the success of their actions. This fact reaffirms the tendency that, in the face of a greater fragmentation and des-institutionalization of the group, these links will be increasingly smaller and will be more in the level of discursive rhetoric. The different cells that make up Boko Haram reach a greater level of autonomy to the extent that the group tends to its "disintegration" (4), but this process can't be associated with its disappearance.

The dispersion of the terrorist cells and the little social link of the "insurgency" with its leaders hinders the control over the group. According to the Nigerian professor Mohammed Kyari, of the state of Adamawa, BH is a group of cells operating under a single banner and that the fractures within the group correspond to the way they operate (Matfess, 2016, p.1). This trend will continue, so the "factionalization" of the group has a negative impact on the possibility of completely eradicating them. This is due to the fact that the emergence of rival factions also causes confrontations between them and between these and the regular forces. Apart from the challenge of dispersion, factional fighting is an additional problem, especially if an attempt is made to produce a negotiation process. Hilary Matfess, American researcher on issues of governance and security in SSA poses three scenarios related to the process of division within Boko Haram:

- 1) Development of violence between factions (Shekau vs Barnawi). Contrary to what is thought, these contradictions will not mean the end of the "insurgency" but will be more deadly clashes for the civilian population.
- 2) Greater division before its complete elimination: This scenario is held in the fate of Ansaru - Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa - when it was separated from Boko Haram in 2012. In April 2016, the Nigerian government announced the capture of Khalid al-Barnawi (Watkinson. W., 2016, p.1), after several years without major terrorist operations, so it was assumed the end of their activities
- 3) Coexistence and duality in the terrorist insurgency: in this scenario the faction linked to the Islamic State consolidates as a group and develops its capacities to carry out military and terrorist actions (Hilary Matfess. *Ob.cit.*, p. 1).

In all three scenarios, the idea of fragmentation and reconfiguration of BH itself as well as the cells or factions linked to the group is present. None of these three scenarios suggests the end of terrorist actions around Lake Chad. Therefore, it will continue to be a security problem for the area. The level of institutionalization - understood as the correct functioning of internal structures and organizational stability - is a variable that has a strong relationship with the financing of the group, because it allows the creation of new structures and the strengthening of existing ones. Although its leaders manage to reverse this process of group regression, in organizational matters, this variable will not have a strong influence on the evolution of terrorism, because institutionalization, *per se*, is not a guarantee of success. Similarly, BH does not have the capacity to export its organizational structures, that is, to expand its network to other regions beyond its traditional areas of operation.

The tendency in terms of financing terrorism in the Sahel zone points to the continuity of its dependence on the control of international trafficking networks - arms, drugs and people. In the case of BH, its resources have been reduced in order to maintain its military and logistical capabilities, but this does not mean that they do not yet have the capacity to "self-manage" (5). The resources coming from political and private actors - related to their tactics - do not reach the figures shown in the initial years of the group. This situation must also have repercussions in the decrease of their recruitment capacities or in the increase in desertions, which have already taken place. They have also been promoted by the authorities (6).

Leadership, understood as the ability from its leaders to influence, is another of the driving variables and depends on the charisma of the people who are in charge of the cells that make up the group and of the highest levels of leadership. If this component is maintained, BH leaders will continue to have a strong influence on the development of the group, despite the internal interest

struggles that point to personal positions. Therefore, leadership is exercised at different levels. For example, at the local level, it is very small, while at the regional and international level it is practically non-existent, even with the "disclosure" of the videos showing their actions and the postulates of their political program. At the same time, there are still strong contradictions between the leaders of the different BH factions. The physical elimination of the terrorist leaders does not mean a weakening of the group since the tendency indicates that they are replaced immediately.

Violent actions have a strong dependence on the military capabilities of the group and have a considerable influence on their positioning - control of villages and areas - through military actions. With respect to BH, the reduction of its military operations theater and the loss of effective control of territories and towns will continue. The group will maintain its tendency to retreat and dispersion. In the near future they will lost capacity for confrontation against the regular forces from Nigeria (7) and others local armies coming from the neighboring contries such as Niger (8) or Camerun. They also will lose it ability to carry out large-scale operations in the areas recovered by those national armed forces. This situation has led them to strengthen attacks against easier targets – like civilian population - through the use of suicide attacks, avoiding direct confrontations against regular forces. Therefore, it can be argued that the military offensives of local governments have reduced their capacity to carry out conventional armed actions against the security forces, the transnationalization of their actions is increasingly minor and sporadic, an example of their retreat in the military order. Despite this and the inevitable process of internal fragmentation, they maintain their military power.

THE HORN OF AFRICA AND THE TERRORISM OF AL SHABAAB

The region of the Horn of Africa by 2025 continues under the threat of terrorist actions by the Somali organization Al Shabaab (AS). The most affected countries will continue to be Somalia, where the bulk of the organization is concentrated, but also Kenya is one of its main objectives. The situation in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea is substantially different, but in the case of Ethiopia, although they have not carried out attacks on their territory, it remains a challenge to their national security. This situation explains that the geopolitical environment of the subregion will continue to be nuanced by the issue of the fight against terrorism and the instability that this causes. Similarly, the subregional geopolitics will have a remarkable influence on the evolution of terrorism, because the actions of the governments of the area that contribute by one hand to their eradication, but on the other, they legitimize the discourse of combating the external interferences in the area, that the group promotes. One of the points within the political program of AS is the "struggle" against foreign troops, among which are those from Ethiopia and Kenya as part of AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia). Therefore, contrary to the result offered by the MICMAC regarding the variable

international situation, the subregional political dynamics here do have a paramount importance in the evolution of terrorism.

An element that has been characteristic of this type of groups has been the fact of "swearing" allegiance to larger organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. In this sense, AS's relations with central Al Qaeda by 2025 are not strong enough to "boost" the organization and increase its sub-regional projection. Al Qaeda itself is going through a period of institutional crisis and lost of leadership within terrorist organizations, so this will have a negative impact on its ability to unite other groups such as AS. There is a reduction in the dependence of AS on Al Qaeda, as well as the ability to carry out information exchanges, logistically support and train members of their cells. Relations with Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are stagnant, especially in terms of mutual support in training its members, as it existed before.

On the other hand, relations with other groups or organizations are equally weak, precisely because of the process of decline that is taking place within terrorism in the region. The organization of the Islamic State (ISIS) doesn't manage to incorporate AS to its axis of influence but it has created fissures within the group (9). In this sense, AS is forced to achieve a greater degree of autonomy in terms of its "strategy" of struggle as the only way to "strengthen" its political program and do not show an image of exclusion or marginalization within the networks of international terrorism.

There is an evidence that there may be more supporters of the ISIS in southern Somalia, but the control exercised by AS has not allowed them to be articulated. This indicates the inability of AS to neutralize ISIS supporters within the organization. To this end, the "secret services" of AS - *Amniyat* - have been making "arrests" of members of the group on suspicion of having an inclination towards ISIS. The *Amniyat* continues with its ability to perform intelligence work, through a wide network of supporters, informants and spies that are scattered throughout the country. They also have the possibility of infiltrating government structures, as well as the Somalia National Army, SNA (Danish Immigration Service, 2017, p. 10).

The contradictions have led AS to execute the accused of being pro-Islamic State (10). There is no clarity regarding the possibilities that this faction will continue to evolve, nor the number of members that may be available. As is often the case, the links with ISIS in the Middle East are not direct, but are part of the rhetoric made by this insignificant cells to attract international attention. This weakness of its international "projection" is also a reflection of the problems within the group. AS continues to present serious difficulties in the functioning of its management structures due to the struggles among its leaders regarding the strategies, the methods and objectives to be followed. AS is not in a position to externalize these structures outside Somali borders, precisely because of the

policies adopted by the main regional actors in fighting against terrorism: like Ethiopia and Kenya. In the Kenyan border and due to the strong presence of Somali refugees, it is where they manage to transplant some of their cells and support networks, but they are not significant either. As a consequence, the group does not have an organizational stability, which is evident in the continuous transformation of its commands and leaders, as a result also of the elimination of them, by the selective drone attacks carried out by the United States and by the actions of AMISOM (11).

One of the problems AS continues to face is that of desertions. The main ones are taking place among the younger militants as part of a growing discontent in leadership, especially from those non-Somali militants. The group needs these members to give greater legitimacy to their "jihadist" struggle (Kriel. R., & Duggan. B., 2017, p.1). Those who leave the group also do so for the amnesty policies which have been implementing for the Somali government as another way trying to dismantle them (12). This variant will not have a generalizing effect due to the retaliation of AS against all those who resign from the group (13). The institutionalization process experienced by the country after the 2012 and 2016's elections have also facilitates the reduction of AS (14). This also will contribute with the consolidation of the local and regional authorities.

The alliances are very diffuse due to the complexity of the clan and sub-clan framework. As part of the support networks of AS, there are also a relation with the heads of minority clans and their respective militias, mainly in the southern part of the country. These links allow the advancement of the group, access to supplies and recruitment. At the same time, there are militias that oppose the military presence of AS. This element must be seen region by region and is modified with the passage of time. The foregoing indicates that the contradictions between these actors will not be eliminated in the short term. These also act as an element to stop further progress of AS in certain regions, although their military strength remains. In military terms, AS will be superior to these militias that have only a very local character and smaller "national" scope.

The MICMAC indicated that leadership is a driving variable due to its levels of influence. In the specific case of the situation of AS the capacity of influence of its new leaders is very weak, as well as the incidence of the group at local and sub-regional level. This translates into their inability to serve as a "reference" to other smaller organizations. At the international level they have no impact since their military potential does not allow them to carry out cross-border actions beyond the sub-region in which they traditionally operate. In this way, the reduction of leadership has a positive effect on the decline of the group in the short and medium term, but even so, it receives the support of important sectors of the population.

Their social base is not reduced and a lot of people see AS as an alternative for their subsistence. A large part of the population in rural areas under their control, "prefer" the "security" that is offered by AS, since they manage to "organize" social structures according to their conceptions. The levels of coercion that the group exercises in these areas will also continue to play a fundamental role. This situation is related to the recruitment process, which is characterized by the combination of voluntary and compulsory factors. Reducing their leadership does not necessarily imply a decrease in their recruitment capabilities. The adverse internal socioeconomic context in Somalia - 64% of young people between 14 and 29 are unemployed -, also exacerbated by the same actions of AS, favors the attraction of new adherents to their cause (15).

The manipulation of ideological factors, including religion, through the use of a well-structured network of propaganda and dissemination: the radio, the social networks, internet and medias (16) are effective in achieving the incorporation of new combatants. One of the incentives for recruitment remains the possibility of receiving a salary, social status and even a wife in the territories they control. Another way of recruitment also occurs through mosques and inter-clan rivalries. AS uses these rivalries to integrate members of minority clans with the promise of greater status. (*South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups*. Ob. cit., p.20.)

Forced recruitment will remain characteristic of areas that are completely under their control. If a person refuses to be recruited, he must pay some compensation. Denial often has negative consequences. The phenomenon of the use of children as combatants is also occurring in AS. In 2014, 437 child soldiers were reported and 555 in 2015, and in 2016 there were about 1,560 reported cases (*Íbidem*, p. 21). The average age for recruitments is between 14 and 25 years. AS also continues to recruit women for logistics work, serve as wives, attract other women, collect information and use them as suicide because of their facilities to move from one place to another. (*Íbidem*, p.22.)

Financing terrorism remains the most influential variable for the continuity of groups and their programs. In this sense, AS maintains the capacity for self-financing through the collection of taxes and bribes. In the same way, it continues to receive other income because of "donations" from its Somali supporters in the diaspora and those who have become delinquent due to their transnational criminal activities (use of drug trafficking and weapons networks). The group's sources of self-financing are given by the tax system and the work of the Sharia Courts. The system of collection of taxes is part of the administrative order in the regions that control and is considered as more "fair" than the government. At the same time, they manage a judicial system based on Sharia and due to the

malfunction of the legal system in the country, many people turn to the Courts of AS when they are not satisfied with a ruling by a governmental (Íbidem, p.11.) and secular court.

Despite the organizational problems, the group still has weapons, means of combat and military technology for the execution of its terrorist actions and the confrontation against the regular forces, the AMISOM troops or the local security militias and the SNA. Their military actions will continue to be focused on the attacks on facilities, bases and convoys of AMISOM and against the Kenyan forces in the Gedo and Juba regions (BBC, 2017). Their civilian objectives will be concentrate in the assassination of political figures, local leaders and clan leaders (elders or clan elders) who support the federal government. Part of the attacks against the civilian population have been due to reprisals by AS for "collaboration" with foreign military forces. In this sense, there have also been retaliatory actions by AMISOM troops, the SNA or the ENDF (Ethiopian National Defense Force) when they have resumed a village or area (*South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups*. Ob. cit., p.8.). This is a factor that further influences the support that AS has in certain areas as "guarantors" of "security".

Its modus operandi will be maintained through the use of car bombs, improvised explosive devices, ambushes, placement of mines and attacks against checkpoints on roads (17), hotel facilities and government buildings. In general, they will continue to avoid direct confrontation against military forces and instead privilege asymmetric warfare. In particular, the regions of Kenya, along the border with Somalia, will be the most affected (18).

After a period of clear withdrawal from the group, the trend suggests that AS continues to gain ground in the south-central areas of the country,(19) in a war of constant positions against the forces of AMISON and the SNA. Therefore, the presence of AS in south-central Somalia is consolidated, despite the actions of the AU peacekeeping troops, which only control certain areas during the day, while at night, AS can be easily moved. The military situation is imprecise due to the advances and setbacks that occur: captures of towns and villages on several occasions, clashes between militias and rival clans to AS for control of the regions, for example in Lover Shabelle and Jubaland.

The security situation in the capital continues to be deteriorated. Although the group can't regain control of Mogadishu and establish military bases, the city remains under constant threat for the actions of AS. Most of the attacks are still centered in the capital. Despite being "expelled", they still have the ability to continue collecting taxes and participate in legal disputes. For its part, in the Lower Juba region, AS is in control of rural areas, while the Jubaland administration is "effective" in urban centers. The port of Kismayo is still controlled by AMISOM and SNA forces. In Middle Juba, AS controls the entire territory.

In the Hiraaan region, the group is less active - subclanic confrontations prevail here. In the Bay region, the main urban centers - Baidoa - are under the control of AMISOM / SNA. In the Galguduud region, the situation is more diffuse due to the number of actors involved: Galmudug Regional Forces (GIA), Al-Shabaab and the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama militia (ASWJ). In the Mudug area there are clashes between AS and local forces (*South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups*. Ob. cit., p. 11-16). The security situation in general does not improve, but this insecurity can't be attributed exclusively to the actions of AS because other militias fighting for control of the land or for political power are also acting.

CONCLUSIONS

Spite of a certain increase of terrorism actions in bordering areas of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the territorial settlement of terrorism tends to weaken in short-term, as well as its dominance and mobility in SSA. It could be forecast that in 2025 will be a drastic reduction of the operating capacity and the areas of these groups if the current policies adopted by the AU continues to be implemented. Everything seems to indicate that the joint international offensive that takes place within the framework of the fight against terrorism is forcing them to carry out more covert and punctual actions. Therefore, it is in the presence of a systematic eviction of the territories that it usually occupied. This forces them to change their strategy and tactics by having to move to different forms of organization through smaller groups, not concentrated in the same territory, which significantly reduces their military strength, making them move into a situation of greater concealment, as well as regroup in lighter cells.

In terms of leadership, the systematic elimination of "emirs" at different levels affects the internal articulation of the groups due to the emergence of new figures of lower level and that would alienate the majority of those recruited from the leaders, which could cause antagonisms within the cells/groups/organizations. The absence or frequent changes of convincing leaders to higher levels, trained to exercise power, but with little charisma, religious, psychic and political control, also influence on the erosion and loss of legitimacy in front of others. The group-organization relationship and the levels of institutionalization are not determinant variables in the evolution of terrorism, because in the first case what has happened is more a declaration of principles between both structures than a real collaboration in practical terms. This is influenced by the geographic separation that exists between the areas where they operate. In the second case, the institutional weakening can contribute to a greater dispersion of the group/organization and increase the difficulty for its eradication. International terrorist organizations

such as the Islamic State and Al Qaeda continue to rival in Africa to achieve supremacy within the different groups linked or not to them.

These antagonisms will be expressed in the ideological, propagandistic and territorial domain. This will cause a constant reconfiguration of the alliances between these organizations and the groups, as well as the internal fractioning of the smaller groups. However, the relations between them tend to crack, although they do not go beyond the rhetoric. Geographic distances and anti-terrorist actions prevent greater contacts between these organizations and groups, as well as the preparation of strategies to carry out joint tactical operations of greater impact. Both organizations also face financial problems that make it difficult to extend their logistical "support" to the vast network of cells that are operating in Africa, which most of them have lost contact. In this sense, the influence of the ISIS in the region has weakened and fails to adequately articulate a strong movement in its favor, but some cells linked to ISIS will go on its actions in the Sahel.

The fact of paying homage to organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, becomes a strategy for those leaders with less influence and who seek to break relations with their immediate leaders and thus achieve greater international legitimacy using the media and attracting attention to build its own leadership. According to the behavior of the different terrorist groups/organizations, it can be observed that the relations established between them are not in a positive stage, due to which there are lower levels of cooperation among the different groups.

This groups are moving towards a recomposition of alliances and inter-terrorist influences, because of the backward they have suffered in the military and propaganda fields. Despite the few links that exist between them, they maintain an apparent degree of autonomy and military capacity to be able to continue with their political agendas through the use of force and to resist the anti-terrorist actions adopted by the world community. The maintenance of an international policy of double standards by some powers in the treatment of this problem, as well as their antagonistic positions on how to eliminate terrorism, will tend to favor the activity and resistance of these groups.

The most influential variable and, at the same time, the most dependent, is the level of financing of terrorism. Its dependence obeys to the ability of each group to attract new financial resources. Once acquired, these are necessary to buy armaments, means of combats and military technology for the execution of their terrorist actions, becoming a determinant way for the impulse of the group. It is concluded that the level of self-financing and resources to be obtained by these organizations could be affected as a consequence of the coordination process between the countries and the security mechanisms to face terrorism internationally. However, their capacities for obtaining resources through organized crime remain and will continue to be one of the main allied in supplying

terrorism. In particular, the groups that operate in the trans-Saharan corridor are among those that most rely on the multiple smuggling networks, overlapping between themselves. This connections does not tend to disappear, helping its existence in the near future. For that reason one of the most important actions must be cutting all sources of financing that could encourage them to go on.

Regarding the progressive failure of Al-Qaeda's performance the situation has been somewhat different due to its attrition for more than a decade due to the confrontation with Algeria's forces, which leads the fight against terrorism in the subregion, and whose special troops and security agencies have been systematically eliminating them. Despite this, AQIM remains the organization with the greatest territorial dispersion due to the persecution of which they are mainly subject by the Algerian forces. The organization tends more and more to the decentralization, as they integrate different dispersed groups. They also lack from a fixed headquarter and have to move constantly because of the military response.

In the rest of the area BH continues to be the main terrorist actor in comparison with other groups that act almost autonomously in northern Mali and Niger, and that do not have the level of institutionalization reached by BH. In East Africa and the Horn area, the Somali organization Al Shabaab will represent the most potent threat to security and the leading exponent of terrorism in this part of the continent. In Somalia, ALS has its greatest dominion and control in the south-central territories of the country and continues its actions against regional actors present militarily in the country. In particular, the Kenyan region of Garissa in the northeast and especially the counties of Dabaab, Wajir and Mandera are the most direct targets of their cross-border actions (Cummings. R. (2017, p. 1.)

The trend points to a decrease in the violent actions of the terrorist groups in SSA, which is verified after the reduction in the number of civilian victims (20), as well as the low intensity and systematic nature of the terrorist attacks. However, BH and AS remain the most lethal in their respective subregions. Another feature points to a greater geographical concentration of their shares. The phenomenon of terrorism will continue to affect the African continent, directly or indirectly, through indiscriminate violence, the generation of forced migrations, the increase and use of transnational organized crime.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- ❖ The governments of the region must identify the most conflictive territories to be able to concentrate in these areas all the necessary resources to combat the recruitment process of these groups.

- ❖ Local development programs must continue to be implemented to counteract the recruitment capacity.
- ❖ Encourage greater integration of youth sectors into licit economic activities to discourage the process of radicalization and recruitment.
- ❖ Redouble intelligence efforts in order to counteract the possibility of terrorist acts.
- ❖ Increase levels of coordination among national security agencies, following the experiences of the Multinational Joint Task Force to strengthen cross-border military and counter-terrorism actions by mutual agreement, but military interventions is not the final solution, because this could be also a source of more instability and a lack of security.
- ❖ Incorporate civil society organizations in the fight against terrorism.
- ❖ Strengthen the financial mechanisms that allow the control of money laundering, illegal transactions and organized crime of which terrorist networks are financed.
- ❖ Continue with the study and dissemination of the phenomenon of terrorism to raise public awareness of its negative consequences.

ENDNOTES

(1). According to Human Rights Watch, Boko Haram has kidnapped 2,000 girls and women since 2009, who have been subjected to rape, forced labor and marriage. However, these figures are only approximate because you can't determine how many have been kidnapped. According to the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), since 2014 there have been at least 123 "suicidal" women linked to BH, most of them forced. See: *The women of Boko Haram: Driven to extremism*. Available in: <http://www.dw.com/en/the-women-of-boko-haram-driven-to-extremism/04>

(2). A United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) report indicates that the number of children who are used by Boko Haram as suicide bombers have increased between 2014 and 2015. As of February 2016, one of five bomb attacks has been carried out by a child, for 19%, while 18% has been taken performed by women. The report also gives an account of the problems related to the reception of women who have been raped, abducted or forced to marry a member of the group. These women are rejected in the communities when they try to rejoin their daily activities. (Duvillier, 2016, p. 2, 3-4).

(3). According to the UNICEF report, BH employs more and more children as suicide bombers. In the first quarter of 2017 the figure has tripled compared to the same period of the previous year, to reach 27, according to Marie-Pierre Poirier, UNICEF regional director for West and Central Africa. During the past three years, 117 children were employed to carry out bomb attacks in the Lake Chad basin. Around 80% of the attacks were perpetrated by girls. (Cubadebate, 2017, p.1)

- (4). Boko Haram had called itself Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) in 2015, as a proof of its links with the Islamic State. At the beginning of August 2016, the Islamic State had nominated Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the new "wali" of the group, "replacing" Abubakar Shekau. This provoked a strong polemic inside the group in the matter of leadership and the emergence of two antagonistic factions.
- (5). According to a report presented to the United Nations Security Council, the two main BH factions present serious financial difficulties and are not in a position to "pay" their fighters their monthly "salaries". Most of the recent attacks are motivated by the need to purchase supplies, including food. The report concludes that the group as a whole is facing a severe financial crisis. See: Gaffey. C. (2017). *Boko Haram Factions 'Cannot Pay Fighters' Salaries: U.N.*
- (6). The Nigerian Army launched the Operation Safe Corridor with the aim of allowing repentant BH militants to enter the rehabilitation camps as part of a program to reintegrate them into society. See: Gaffey C. (2016). *Boko Haram: 2,000 Captives Freed by Regional Force as Nigeria Launches Rehabilitation Program.*
- (7) The Nigerian armed forces have increased their presence in the Sambisa Forest area in the state of Borno and have dominated the area since December 2016.
- (8). Military successes by national armies continue to occur. One of the examples was the defeat of BH in April 2017 by the Niger Army in the southern region of Diffa on the border with Nigeria, where as a result of the Army's counter-offensive, 57 BH members were eliminated and a large military park was seized. The Minister of Defense congratulated the Security Forces. See: Sridharan. V (2017). *Niger forces kill dozens of Boko Haram Islamists in counteroffensive.*
- (9). On October 25, 2015, Abdiqadir Mumin, who was one of the "spiritual leaders" of AS, left the group to pay homage to the ISIS. This new franchise led by Mumin has its operations center in the Galgala Mountains in the Puntland region in northeastern Somalia, outside of the traditional zone of influence of ALS. In April 2016 they became official as Jahba East Africa and in October of the same year they carried out their first major attack against Qandala, a port city in Puntland. See: Reid. G. (2017). *Militants Rising: Islamic State's East African Ambitions.*
- (10) Sheikh Hussein Abdi Gedi was a veteran AS commander and "governor" of the Lower Jubba region who was killed after trying to recruit AS militants and form a pro-IS militia in the Kismayo area. See: Platt. S. (2017). *Al-Shabaab update: february 2017.*
- (11). According to AMISOM reports, several AS leaders have been eliminated. See: Reuters. (2016). *AU mission says several al Shabaab commanders killed in Somalia.*

- (12). One of the ALS leaders, Hussein Mukhtar surrendered to the Somali National Army in Baidoa in March 2017. See: Agutu. N. (2017). *Al Shabaab top leader Hussein Mukhtar surrenders to Somali army*.
- (13). The defectors are one of the main targets of the group because they can have information that affects them. AS uses all its informant networks to locate and eliminate those who leave the group, even if they relocate to areas controlled by AMISOM and the government.
- (14). The last presidential elections took place between November 2016 and February 2017, when the 328-member Parliament elected former Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as President of Somalia. Farmajo won the presidency 184 votes against 97 in favor of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in the presidency since 2012. See: Nor. O., Sevenzo, F., & Masters, J. (2017). *Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo elected Somalia's president*.
- (15) 50% of AS dropouts have declared joining the group for economic reasons. See: *South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups*. Ob. cit., p. 20.
- (16). *Shahada News Agency* is a broadcasting media belonging to AS.
- (17). In the course of 2017 - until April - some 337 people have been killed or injured as a result of 87 explosive incidents. The civilian victims of this concept have increased by 50% since 2015. See: *Somalia: 337 civilians killed and injured in Al Shabaab attacks in 2017*. (2017).
- (18). In April 2017 the Kenyan government was forced to decree the curfew until June 28 in the border region of Mandera and within a radius of up to 20km from the Somali border, this includes the town of Mandera, Omar Jillo, Arabia, Fino, Lafey Kotulo and Elwak. See: *Somalia: Kenya Extends Curfew in Border Over Al Shabaab Attacks* (2017).
- (19). AS has been carrying out a strong offensive in the center-south area of the country since mid-2016. One of the factors of this advance was the withdrawal of part of the Ethiopian forces from several towns. There is no clear demarcation of which areas are under the control of AS and the clan militias, while there are other areas in which there is a duality in the actors that control them. In the regions of this part of the country, AS controls the main supply routes by road through checkpoints in which taxes are charged to those who are in transit. See: *South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups*. Ob. cit., p. 6.
- (20) The civilian victims caused by BH have been reduced from 11,519 in 2015 to 3,455 in 2016. In the first six months of 2017, these two groups have experienced a 29% reduction in the number of victims. ALS has caused 1,831 victims in the first half of 2017. See: Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2017). *Setbacks and Realignments: The Continuing Evolution of Militant Islamist Groups in Africa*.

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COMBATING DRUG TRAFFICKING IN NIGERIA: DYNAMICS POSSIBILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

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Abstract

The involvement of Nigerians in the illicit trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances has since the 1980s gained global attention. Despite punitive measures adopted by various governments to discourage drug trafficking, the involvement of Nigerians in the illicit trade still persists. This paper examines the scourge of drug trafficking involving Nigerians and the efforts at combating the challenge. It specifically focuses on the trends, dynamics as well as possibilities and constraints associated with the anti-narcotics operations of the Nigerian government especially in view of recurrent official complicities and operational contradictions associated with the anti-narcotic war in the country. The paper further identifies the push-pull factors facilitating the involvement of Nigerians in the illicit trade in narcotics including some international linkages that facilitate the trade. It contends that drug trafficking will continue to constitute a threat to security and stability within Nigeria so long as the demand for drugs in destination countries and profits from the illicit trade remains attractive and alluring while strong social values are widely overlooked in preference to materialism. Finally, the paper examines the role and capabilities of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency in prosecuting the anti-narcotic war in the country and subsequently makes a prognosis on the challenge of combating drug trafficking in Nigeria.

Keywords: *Decree, drug control, drug policy, drug trafficking, narcotics*

Introduction

The contemporary global community is increasingly confronted by the menace of transnational organised crimes such as drug trafficking, smuggling, cross border robberies, money laundering, illicit trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) and human trafficking. While these crimes may seem distinct on their part, they are however sometime interwoven as the perpetration of one is often connected to, or depend on, another criminal act. In other words, cross border robbery kingpins and gangs are known to use or consume hard drugs and other psychotropic substances to garner courage for their operations. Similarly, drug traffickers sometimes engage in more than one form of illicit activity in the execution of drug operations. They could engage offer bribes to state officials to facilitate their trafficking operations or launder its proceeds. They can also deploy arms and weapons to protect and

sustain the drug businesses, thereby heightening insecurities. For instance, in July 2008, the Sierra Leone police arrested eight (8) foreigners following the seizure of a plane at the Luigi International Airport loaded with 700kg of cocaine worth US\$35 million at New York street value alongside five automatic rifles and 350 rounds of ammunitions (Reuters, 2008; Oke-reke, 2010). The seizure was described by the crime services Assistant Inspector-General Francis Munu as “the biggest catch ever” (Reuters, 2008).

Generally, illicit trade in drugs accounts for significant portion of annual proceeds of transnational crimes industry. It is estimated that the value of annual global drug trade is as high as US\$1 trillion in the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crimes, World Drug Report (Standing, 2010). Afghanistan alone is estimated to produce about US\$50 billion worth of heroin annually while about £1.5 billion (Pounds sterling) amounting to about US\$1.84 billion is spent on cannabis in the United Kingdom (ibid.). Furthermore, about US\$40 billion worth of cocaine is sold in the United States annually and another US\$30 billion sold to other parts of the world (Standing 2010). The 2017 World Drug Report indicates that drug trafficking accounted for one-fifth of total organised crimes and about one-third of the income of transnational organised crimes of which between 60% and 70% of drug proceeds are laundered to conceal the source (UNODC, 2017). The report also indicated that one-third of proceeds from the drug trade could be moved through illicit financial flows, suggesting that drug trafficking damages economies in the long term.

The enormous financial benefits accruable from illicit drug trade have become a major source of funding for groups like the Taliban and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) (UNODC, 2017). In addition, drug trafficking has also become a major threat to public health in various countries and has been linked to the spread of diseases such as tuberculosis, mental health disorders, Hepatitis C and HIV/AIDS. This has informed national and international measures to address the challenge of illicit trafficking in drug (Volkow et al, 2017:213). In November 2000, the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crimes and related Protocols (Palermo Convention) was adopted in Sicily, Italy as part of measures to combat drug trafficking. Nigeria subscribes to this Convention and sustains measures undertaken by the NDLEA towards combating drug trafficking. This paper therefore examines the scourge of drug trafficking in Nigeria with a view to making useful recommendations. It will dwell largely on primary and secondary sources drawn from official

documents, interviews and author's knowledge of the geography of hotspots in Nigeria as well as available secondary documents on the subject matter.

Understanding Drug Trafficking

The United Nations defines drug trafficking as the global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances which are the subject to drug prohibition laws (UNODC, para 1). Put slightly differently, what constitutes drug trafficking is legally defined with specific penalties. Part II Section 11 (a-d) of the NDLEA Act outlines the offences for consideration as constituting drug trafficking importation and exportation as well as the sales and purchases of cocaine, heroin, LSD and similar drugs (NDLEA Act, 1989).

Different types of drug crimes and charges have been identified to include continuing criminal enterprise otherwise referred as kingpin, conspiracy to distribute, distribution, trafficking, transportation and possession, including possession with the intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia as well as possession of medical marijuana (Justia 2018). Others include minor in possession, sale/dealing, drug cultivation, grow houses, manufacturing, meth labs, importation, drug sale near a school zone and drug charges pre-file investigation (ibid.).

The outline of drug offences is enumerated by the Crown Prosecution Services (CPS). The CPS notes that in handling cases relating to drug trafficking, the knowledge of unlawful possession of prohibited drugs and related substances is considered vital and that the suspect or suspects are involved are engaged in the sale, transportation, importation or delivery of prohibited drug substances (CPS, 2019). Specifically, in case of suspected drug trafficking, the prosecution is needed to prove that the defendants are in possession of the said prohibited drugs considered beyond the value for personal use but for commercial purposes (ibid.). The possession of business cards relating to the trade, plastic baggies, large volume of cash as well as the confessions of persons who either bought or sold these prohibited substances from the accused are necessary requirements to distinguish between drug usage and illicit trade in drugs and related prohibited substances (ibid.).

Nature and Trends of Drug Trafficking in Nigeria

The origin of drug trafficking in Nigeria has been traced to the return of ex-service men who fought on the side of British colonial enterprise in the First and Second World Wars. Some of the former soldiers returned with marijuana seedlings known locally as "grass" or "Ìgbo" from Asia to plant and grow for local consumption in Nigeria after the World War I. (Uk-

wayi, Okpa & Akwaji, 2019). Subsequently, many young people were arrested for cannabis related offences in the 1960s as some Nigerians got involved in the cultivation, exchange and consumption of cannabis. Marijuana addiction expanded across Nigeria during the civil war (July 1967 to January 1970) and remained the most commonly visible and used prohibited drug item till the late 1970s when Nigerian traffickers were exposed to cocaine, heroin and other narcotic substances prohibited by local and international laws (Tolani, 1977).

Following repeated arrests of travelers with cocaine and heroin at the Lagos airport from the mid-1980s running into the 1990s, Nigeria became a country of global concern on issues of drug trafficking. Attempts at explaining the rising incidences of drug trafficking by Nigerians at this stage, attributed it partly to the erosion of value system due to the harsh economic realities of the austerity measures (Nwannennaya & Abiodun, 2017).

It is important to note that the drug challenge in Nigeria has varying features. Cannabis or marijuana (commonly called “Igbo” in Southwest Nigeria or “Goof” in Southeast Nigeria) is widely consumed in Nigeria despite existing ban on the production and utilisation (Ojewale, 2019). The 2019 Reports of the New Frontiers Data estimated that the cannabis trade stimulates a market trend of \$15.3 billion as about 20.8 million Nigerians consume cannabis annually in the country (ibid.).

It is usually planted largely in the Southern parts of the country where there also exist high consumption demands for it. Yet, huge quantities of marijuana are distributed to other parts of Nigeria where there also exists high demand for the substance. This explains why the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) mounts control check points in Oturkpo (Benue State); Auchi in Edo State and Abaji-Gwagwalada in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) among others to enhance interception the distribution of marijuana between Southern part and northern parts of Nigeria (Field Observation 2019). Other such internal checkpoints are located at Lokoja in Kogi State, 9th Mile Corner in Enugu State, Jere in Kaduna State and Forest Checkpoint en-route Jos, Plateau State (ibid.).

Nigeria serves more as a transit route through which cocaine and heroin are trafficked to other countries mostly in Europe and to a minimal extent, the United States. Nigerian drug traffickers usually use air transportation as the means for the trafficking the prohibited drugs and narcotics substances through Nigeria to target destinations. However, as drug control and anti-narcotic war intensify and arrests of couriers are made by NDLEA personnel at various airports, traffickers sometimes resort to using sea routes and land borders to avert detection (Interview Report, 2018).

Another intriguing dimension to the drug trafficking racket in Nigeria is the influx and involvement of foreign elements in illicit drug production in recent times in Nigeria. This has led to the establishment of laboratories producing methamphetamine for local consumption and export to some countries in Southeast Asia. Between 2012 and 2016, four Mexicans and three Bolivian drug barons were arrested at Asaba and Satellite Town in Delta and Lagos States respectively (Ofoyeju, 2016). The discovery of clandestine local laboratories operating in partnership with foreign Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTO) was stimulated by the arrest of traffickers attempting to leave Nigeria with the substance at the Lagos airport in 2009 (ibid.). The fact that there were no corresponding inward seizures of the substance stimulated suspicion of local production. This was further heightened by the discovery of a meth production recipe on a Nigeria deportee from China. Subsequently, several personnel of the NDLEA have been exposed to requisite capacity building programmes to counter such eventualities (ibid.).

Official Measures against Drug Trafficking in Nigeria

Multi-pronged approach has been adopted by the Nigerian government to combat drug trafficking in Nigeria and this involves various socio-economic and legal measures as well as international cooperation. These efforts are governed by extant international documents that are adapted to domestic realities of drug challenge.

Legally, Part 2 (Section 11) of the NDLEA Act unequivocally outlines the offences relating to drug trafficking in Nigeria (NDLEA Act LFN). The checklist of domestic legislations adopted by Nigeria to strengthen its commitment to combating drug trafficking and abuse include:

Table 1 List of Relevant Legislations relating to Illicit Drugs in Nigeria

S/N	LEGISLATION	REGIME/ADMINISTRATION
1.	Dangerous Drug Ordinance of 1935	British Colonial Administration
2.	Indian Hemp Decree No 19 of 1966	Major General Aguiyi Ironsi
3.	IndianHemp (Amendment) Decree No 34 of 1975	Major General Murtala Moham-med

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4.	Indian Hemp (Amendment) Decree, and Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) Decree No. 20 of 1984	Major General MuhammaduBuhari
5.	Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) (Amendment) Decree of 1986	General Ibrahim Babangida
6.	Poison and Pharmacy Act Cap 535 of 1990	General Ibrahim Babangida
7.	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Decree No 48 of 1989 (as amended by Decree No. 33 of 1990)	General Ibrahim Babangida
8.	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Decree No 48 of 1989 (as amended by Decree No. 15 of 1992	General Ibrahim Babangida
9.	Money Laundering (Miscellaneous Offences) Decree No.3 of 1995	General Sani Abacha
10.	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Decree No 48 of 1989 (as amended by Decree No. 62 of 1999	General Abdulsalaam Abubakar
11.	Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 7 of 2004	President Olusegun Obasanjo
12.	Food and Drug Act, CAP F32 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004	President Olusegun Obasanjo
12.	National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) Act CAP D1 LFN 2004	President Olusegun Obasanjo
13.	Dangerous Drug Act CAP D1 LFN 2004	President Olusegun Obasanjo

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14.	Counterfeit and Fake Drug and Unwholesome Processed Food (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act CAP C 34 LFN 2004	President Olusegun Obasanjo
15.	Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act of June 2011	President Goodluck Jonathan

Source: author's compilation 2019

The Indian Hemp (Amendment) Decree No 34 of 1975 reduced the penalty for drug trafficking from life imprisonment to 6 months jail term while the Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) Decree N0. 20 of 1984 prescribed death penalty for illicit traffic in narcotics drugs (NDLEA online). In 1986, the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida amended the Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) Decree by reintroducing the life imprisonment for drug traffickers thereby replacing the death sentence introduced through Decree 20 of 1984 (NDLEA online). All the decrees highlighted in Table 1 above have been harmonised as Cap. N30 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 that established the NDLEA.

Nigeria's anti narcotic policy derives from a 1998 National Drug Control Master Plan (NDCMP). In 2014, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) led a project funded by the European Union that culminated in the review and eventually formulation of the NDCMP 2015-2019. Nigeria has also collaborated with international drug enforcement partners such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of the United States in joint operation to combating the drug challenge in Nigeria. This collaboration resulted in the seizure of two large marijuana farms with one estimated at 25km square with about eight (8) million grown plants yielding some 6,000 metric tons of cultivated marijuana at Ikoyi area of Osun State in October 2014 (US Department of States, 2015).

The country also subscribes to various international instruments relating to drug trafficking such as: International Opium Convention, 1912; First Geneva Convention, 1931; Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drug, 1936; Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, 1961 and Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971 (NACMP 2015-2019, 2014). Others are the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotics Drug, 1972; Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 adopted

(also referred as Vienna Convention, 1988; United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crimes and its Three Protocols, 2003; and the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2005 (ibid.).

The bid to effectively discourage the scourge of drug trafficking in the 1980s resulted in the passage of Decree No. 20 of 1984 which prescribed death penalty for drug traffickers and under the military regime of General Muhammadu Buhari (31st December 1983 to 26th August 1985). The implementation of Decree 20 was backdated leading to the pronouncement of death sentence by the Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) chaired by Justice Adebayo Desalu on Bartholomew Owoh (26), Bernard Ogedengbe (29) and Akanni Lawal Ojuolape (29) who were arrested in 1984 (Oredein, 1985). The trio were subsequently executed on 10th April 1985 at the Kirikiri Maximum Security Prisons in Lagos for offences which had a penalty of six months imprisonment as at the time they were arrested for drug trafficking (Oredein, 1985; The Citizen 2015).

The regime further prosecuted and executed other convicts like Lasukanmi Tajudeed Awolola, Jimi Adebayo, Moronike Fausa Lawal and Gladys Caroline Iyamah, mother of a toddler and two paraplegic deformed girls (ibid.). Shola Oguntayo delivered a baby boy while in detention and was saved from execution following the overthrow of the Buhari regime through a military coup on 27 August 1985 by General Ibrahim Babangida. The new administration abolished the death penalty for drug trafficker. It was however under the Buhari's military regime that Gloria Okon, a lady arrested at the Mallam Aminu Kano International Airport (MAKIA) Kano for drug trafficking was suddenly declared dead in detention under very suspicious circumstances believed to be a major cover up for her sponsors suspected to be very senior military personnel of that regime.

In a bid to board a Nigerian Airways plane WT840 at the MAKIA on 22 April 1985, Gloria Okon, a 25-years old lady was arrested by officers of the Nigerian Customs Service and other security agencies for being in possession of 56.70 grammes of prohibited substances suspected to be heroin and other drugs. This was then an offence punishable under Decree 20 of 1984. Other sensitive items in her possession included the sum of N20,000 (Nigerian Currency), £56.70 Pounds Sterling, \$301 and 19,000 Italian Lira (Nairaland Media, 2015). The suspect was suddenly certified dead at the Aminu Kano Hospital in Kano on 28 April 1985 under mysterious circumstances that took the country by surprise leading to suspicion that it was fabricated to conceal the true identities of top public officials that constitute her trafficking syndicate. Some analysts view the alleged death of Gloria Okon as mere fabrication to enable

her escape execution, speculating that the presumed corpse was not hers as none of her family members came to claim the dead body (ibid.).

Consequently, a Judicial Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice CNO Ubaonu of the Kano High Court was established to investigate the circumstances surrounding the alleged mysterious death of the suspect. The Commission could not finish its investigation before the Buhari regime was toppled on 27 August 1985 and no further formal engagement was heard on the case.

The succeeding regime of General Ibrahim Babangida established the NDLEA through Decree Number 48 of 1989 (now an Act of Parliament) as part of his regime's commitment to combat the scourge of drug trafficking in Nigeria. The mandate of the NDLEA is spelt out in Section 3 of the Decree, but more broadly, it is tasked with controlling, interdicting and intercepting the trafficking, peddling and usage of hard drugs within Nigeria as well as exporting such through Nigeria (NDLEA Decree, 1989). Its mandate further includes public enlightenment on the implication of hard drugs on security and image of the country. Since its establishment, the NDLEA has proven to be a more structured and durable approach to combating drug trafficking. However, the scandals that have trailed its history not only reveal how entrenched and powerful actors behind drug trafficking are, but also their capacity to undermine the effectiveness of institutions through corrupt practices and exploitation of their connections with state actors (Nwannennaya & Abiodun, 2017).

Nigeria's Anti-Narcotic Operations under the Military Regime

Effective anti-narcotic activities of the NDLEA commenced in 1990 under the stewardship of Mr Fidelis Oyakhilome, a Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) who was appointed the first Chairman of the agency. The NDLEA began arresting and detaining suspected drug couriers and barons. One such arrest involved Gregory Odilibe, a suspected drug dealer. The accompanying scandal of the alleged complicity of DIG Oyakhilome, Ms Jennifer Maduiké, a Lagos socialite/President of Biofrika Network Ikeja, Lagos, and Mrs Miriam Babangida, (wife of then Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida) led to the removal of Fidelis Oyakhilome as Chairman of NDLEA who was replaced by Mr Fulani Kwajafa, another senior police officer (Octopus News, 2017).

During his tenure as the NDLEA boss, Mr. Kwajafa made initial appreciable progress in redeeming the image of the Agency battered by Maduiké's scandal. Like previous administration, Kwajafa's reign was bogged with reports of disappearances of drug seizures in NDLEA custody and the complicity of officials in suppressing evidences relating to drug cases

(Uwiagbo, 2013). Two of such high-profile incidents under Kwajaffa's stewardship resulted in the suspension of a senior officer of the NDLEA in January 1993 for masterminding the removal of 200g of cocaine exhibit vomited by a detained suspect and the conviction of an Assistant Director of the NDLEA for receiving a bribe of N100,000 (Nigerian currency-Naira) to 10 years imprisonment in May 1993 (ibid.).

In October 1993, Mr. Bappa Jama'are, another top police officer, replaced Fulani Kwajaffa as the Chairman of the NDLEA. Bappa Jama'are's tenure as the NDLEA boss witnessed the seizure of single largest quantity of heroine estimated at 248.3 kilograms which were concealed in two containers and shipped into the country through Apapa Wharf in Lagos State. The market value of the seizure was estimated at N20.8 billion Nigerian Naira (Uwiagbo, 2013). The Jama'are-led NDLEA also contended with remarkable incidents of official compromise, involving disappearances of seized substances needed for prosecution of suspects arrested for drug related offences. For instance, in February 1994, eight out of 64 wraps of heroine recovered from a suspect named Mr Joe Brown Akubueze who was later convicted were stolen from the agency's custody. In addition, some top officials of the agency were alleged to be involved in massive corrupt practices considered as spill-over of the decay that characterised the era of Fulani Kwajaffa (ibid.). It was the quest to revitalize the Agency for more effective discharge of its mandate that General Sani Abacha as Head of State appointed Major General Musa Bamaïyi as Chairman of the NDLEA in April 1994.

The Maj Gen Bamaïyi era coincided with the scourge of Advance Fee Fraud (otherwise referred to as 419) which tended to blur the real origin of sudden wealth. As a response, General Abacha's promulgated the Money Laundering (Miscellaneous Offences) Decree No. 3 of 1995. This decree stipulated for the seizure of property belonging to drug convicts. Under Bamaïyi's stewardship at the Agency, the decision-making process relating to the drug war was centralised and the Agency excluded significant external influences in its activities (Money Laundering (Miscellaneous Offences) Decree No. 3 of 1995). In December 1998, General Abudulsalam Abubakar who assumed leadership of the country following the death of General Sani Abacha on 8 June 1998, appointed Mr. Ogbonnaya Onovo, a Police Commissioner, as the Chairman of the NDLEA and he held this position till May 2000 when Bello Lafajji succeeded him.

Nigeria's Anti-Narcotic Operations in a Democratic Era

Under Bello Lafiaji, there were giant strides in the anti-narcotic engagements of the NDLEA. In 2004, he was elected President of the European Working Group of the International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) held at Lima, Peru (Terkula, 2010). His tenure was however marred by incidents of corrupt practices which resulted in his prosecution by the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission (ICPC) and conviction for illegally enriching himself with proceeds of drug trafficking (ibid.). One such prominent cases involved a certain Ikenna Onochie, a suspected drug pusher whose home at Maryland, Lagos was raided by operatives of the NDLEA and 3.2kg of substances suspected to be cocaine and heroin were recovered and the sum of €164,300 seized from the suspect was diverted to private use (Street Journal, 2005). Mallam Lafiaji was found complicity in the illegal release of Mr Onochie without due process. He was eventually replaced by Ahmadu Giade in November 2005.

The anti-narcotics war under the stewardship of Ahmadu Giade at the NDLEA left remarkable imprints in Nigeria's commitment to combating the scourge of drug trafficking in the country. Giade's tenure marked the first time since the inception of the NDLEA that a Chairman successfully completed two terms in office without scandal (Kujenga 2012). Giade began by trying to address the irregularities that characterised the anti-drug war prior to his assumption of office and by the time was leaving office in November 2015, the NDLEA had made remarkable achievements locally and globally in the fight against drug trafficking (ibid.).

In its bid to purge the NDLEA of corrupt practices, the President Obasanjo's administration inaugurated the National Committee on the Reform of the NDLEA on 17 October 2006 headed by Justice Gilbert Obayan (rtd). The Obayan Committee submitted its Report in February 2007 and observed that a total of 244 suspected drug traffickers were arraigned by the NDLEA and convicted by the Federal High Court for drug related offences between 2005 and 2006 while a total of 197 were never taken to the prison (PLAC, 2016). Of the statistics, out of 143 drug convicts in 2006, a total of 96 were never brought to prison while another set of 101 drug convicts for 2005 were not taken to prisons at all bring the total to 197 (ibid.).

Consequent on this, Hon Hassan Saleh representing Ado/Ogbadibo/Okpokwu Federal Constituency in Benue State, raised a motion on the floor of the House of Representatives on 14 March 2013 on the urgent need to investigate 197 NDLEA's convicts who are not serving

their prison terms (PLAC, 2016). The House of Representative consequently mandated its Committees on Justice, Drug, Narcotics and Financial Crimes to determine the statistics of all those prosecuted and convicted by the NDLEA and where they were serving their terms. They were also to determine the circumstances leading to the unlawful release from custody of those persons who were convicted and those behind the unlawful release, as well as recommend appropriate sanction to serve as deterrence (ibid.).

The NDLEA also embarked on search for clandestine laboratories engaged in illicit drug production. This action was informed by the seizure of methamphetamine (meth) at Murtala Mohammed International Airport (MMIA) in 2009. The Agency detected the first meth laboratory at Ojo area of Lagos State in June 2011. The United States assisted the NDLEA with two forensic experts to dismantle the laboratory. It was uncovered that Ephedrine, which is a key raw material for the manufacture of methamphetamine, is usually imported into Nigeria from China or India and diverted by the traffickers to their clandestine laboratories for the production of meth (US Department of States, 2015). Around that period, a kilo of 99 percent of pure locally manufactured meth which is estimated to cost about US\$7,500 in Lagos has a market price of US\$150,000 in Malaysia and other Southeast Asian markets (ibid.). Subsequently, the NDLEA embarked on capacity building on how to detect, dismantle and suppress the proliferation of such clandestine laboratories in the country.

The then Head, Public Affairs at the NDLEA, Mr Mitchel Ofoyeju, noted that the NDLEA apprehended 162 suspected drug traffickers at various international airports in the country with 982.424kg of meth between 2009 and March 2016 (Ofoyeju, 2016). The first methamphetamine laboratory was detected in 2011 at Ojo, Lagos State and was dismantled by NDLEA and two forensic experts from the United States (ibid). In 2012, another similar clandestine laboratory in Satellite Town Lagos in 2012 and three meth experts of Bolivian nationality were also arrested at the facility (ibid). Between June 2011 and March 2016, a total of eleven clandestine meta laboratories were discovered in the country. Lagos State and Anambra State had five of such laboratories each with production capacity of between 20kg and 50kg per cycle (ibid). The 11th meth laboratory was discovered along Ibuzo-Asaba road in Delta State. This facility described by experts as a “super’ laboratory had a production capacity of between 3,000kg and 4,000kg of meth production per cycle and operates on a very technical and sophisticated chemical synthesis process (ibid). Items recovered at the laboratory include 1.5kg of finished crystal meth and 750 litres of liquid meth. A total of nine suspects comprising of four Mexicans (Cervantos Madrid Jose Bruno, Rivas Ruiz Pastiano, Castillo

Barraza Cristobal and Partida Gonzalez Pedro) alongside five Nigerians (Chief Chibi Aruh, William Ejike Agusi, Umolu Kosisochukwu, Anthony Chukwu Emeka Umolu and Izuchukwu Aniето) were arrested in connection with the meth laboratory in Delta State. The suspects were subsequently arraigned before Justice AO Faji at the Federal High Court Asaba on 25 April 2016 on a five (5) count charge of conspiracy to operate a Drug Trafficking Organisation (DTO) to process methamphetamine in Nigeria for local use and export purposes. The arrest of Bolivian and Mexican meth experts in Nigeria is considered “a reflection of the desperation of local drug cartels in forming unwholesome alliances with North American drug cartels” (ibid). In light of this, then Chairman/Chief Executive of the NDLEA Chairman/Chief Executive, Col Muhammad Mustapha Abdallah (rtd) assured Nigerians of the commitment of the Agency to track and dismantle DTOs including all meth laboratories in the country, Col Muhammad Mustapha Abdallah (rtd) assured Nigerians of the commitment of the Agency to track and dismantle Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTOs) including all meth laboratories in the country (ibid)..

Furthermore, the NDLEA in partnership with the anti-drug agencies in Ghana, namely Narcotics Control Board (NACOB) and Ghana Police Service-Drug Law Enforcement Unit (DLEU) executed “Operation Eagle” to combat transnational networks between drug barons in Nigeria and Ghana in 2018 (Adelowo, 2018). This project was supported by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) through its Response to Drugs and Organised Crimes in Nigeria (UNODC Operation Eagle). The Operation Eagle involved 129 law enforcement personnel and was executed within two periods of activities that lasted for a total period of 15 days. This operation led to the arrest of 22 suspects, the seizure of substantial quantities of drugs, namely: 15.7 kg cocaine, 9.21 kg heroin, 8.17 kg methamphetamines, 596.338 kg cannabis, 4 kg of khat, 267 tramadol pills (225 mg) and \$22,000 USD cash (ibid.). The Operation Eagle also generated intelligence relating to other forms of illicit transnational trafficking which included the identification of movement of high value assets linked to money laundering and new methods of drug concealment. The UNODC further supported Nigeria’s anti-narcotic engagements through its CRIMJUST programme which focuses on assisting partners to enhance their capacity and integrity of criminal justice institutions to detect, investigate, prosecute and adjudicate illicit cocaine trafficking cases, and to foster co-operation at the interregional level for effective action to tackle drug trafficking and related organised crime (UNODC Operation Eagle, n.d.).

Within Nigeria, the NDLEA has continued its operations with sustained seizures of hard drug at the major international airports in the country. The airport Command of the NDLEA at the Murtala Mohammed International Airport in Lagos seized 68.53kg of cocaine, 50.1kg of heroin, 146.69 of meth and 10.83kg of ephedrine between November 2013 and September 2014. Between 2009 and 2016, the NDLEA arrested 162 suspected drug traffickers at various airports in the country with a seizure of 982.424kg (US Department of States, 2015).

The Edo State Command of the NDLEA arrested 73 comprising of 60 males and 13 females in connection with the cultivation of cannabis worth 10,094.75kg between January and March 2016 (NDLEA Online). It equally raided a warehouse inside the Okpuje Forest in Owan West Local Government Area leading to the seizure of 2,590kg of cannabis which added to over 80,000kg of this drug retained in the Exhibit Room of the Edo State Command of the NDLEA (ibid.).

Furthermore, NDLEA operatives in Ogun State Command intercepted a truck load of cannabis at Odeda area of Ijebu-Igbo on 10 April 2018 leading to the arrest of two traffickers. The consignment comprising of 295 bags of dried cannabis weighing 3,542.25kg was hidden inside a white Mercedes truck being used to transport over 300 bags of biscuits and cheese balls (NDLEA online).

It is pertinent at this juncture to note that the intensification of interdiction operations by the NDLEA is part of efforts to realise the objectives of Nigeria's National Drug Control Master Plan (NDCMP) 2015-2019 assented by former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. The overarching objective of the NDCMP 2015-2019 is reducing the production and supply of illicit drugs, preventing and treating drug dependency and minimising the harm of drug use in order to enhance the health, security and well-being of all Nigerians. This Plan is anchored on three core pillars: Law enforcement; reduction of drug demand and its availability, access and control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and precursor of chemicals for medical and scientific purposes; and strengthening structures for the coordination of the implementation of the NDCMP 2015-2019 (National Drug Control Master Plan 2015-2019).

Conclusion

Since its inception, the anti-drug war in Nigeria has proved serious and delicate. Succeeding administrations since the 1980s and especially since the establishment of the NDLEA invested significantly to combating drug trafficking through policy and legal frameworks, insti-

tution building, procurement of basic equipment and requisite manpower training. These measures significantly degraded the incidences of drug trafficking and illicit drug use in Nigeria. However, the complicity of some NDLEA officials in unprofessional conducts has tended to stimulate doubts in public psyche despite that the Agency has repeatedly investigated, dismissed and secured court convictions for guilty officials as appropriate.

The anti-drug war still encounters challenges associated with poor logistics while personnel of the NDLEA suffer relatively poor welfare in a war against wealthy drug pushers which sometime results in death of anti-narcotics personnel. It is partly these constraints that have rendered several anti-narcotic personnel vulnerable to compromise and varying corrupt practices. It is therefore imperative that these anomalies need be addressed objectively and realistically to strengthen anti-narcotic operations in the country.

Recommendations

In light of the above and bearing in mind that the drug trafficking enterprise in Nigeria is still adapting to the evolving dynamics at national, regional and global levels with attendant implications for national security, the following recommendations are prescribed:

- The Nigerian Government should sustain the support to the NDLEA focusing on the specific needs of the Agency in terms of policies and legal framework, finances, logistics, personnel cost, technology and training.
- Welfare of NDLEA personnel should attract significant government intervention to ensure the retainment of personnel and reduce their vulnerabilities to overtures from the drug syndicates.
- The NDLEA should intensify mass enlightenment on the activities of drug traffickers to enhance public awareness on the dangers of illicit drugs.
- The Nigeria should strengthen collaborations with strategic partners such as the UN-ODC, United Kingdom, United States and European Union among others to effectively combat the global dynamics associated with drug trafficking.

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Information-gathering Interrogation Methods: Possible Applications for Counter-terrorism in the African Continent

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Abstract: This article brings recent bibliography (sources published between 2015 and 2020) about information-gathering methods of interrogation and its possible use as a promising tool in the fight against terrorism in Africa. The techniques Scharff, PEACE, Indicative Criteria for Assessment of Deception (ACID), Modified Cognitive Interview (MCI) and Controlled Cognitive Engagement (CCE) are exposed and listed as more effective forms of interrogation and information gathering than the methods traditionally used by security and intelligence professionals, such as the Reid method and the Direct Questioning approach. To support this claim, articles containing technical measures in experimental contexts were assembled, some involving security professionals such as military intelligence officers. Articles demonstrating experiences that simulate situations of information-gathering about alleged terrorist acts are also presented, another factor that supports the assumption that these techniques can be promising alternatives in counter-terrorism. It also stressed the importance of international cooperation in the implementation of policies to combat violent extremism, since this problem affects multiple countries and can be effectively reduced with the strategic mobilization of multiple nations. For this to happen, it is crucial that more scientific knowledge is used so that policies have really positive impacts and security professionals are trained with scientifically based techniques. The article also aims to encourage the production of studies on interrogation techniques and human intelligence, since there is little scientific knowledge about the multiple existing techniques and their respective effectiveness. Finally, it suggests that some of the techniques could be applied for training professionals from the African continent to increase their capacity for investigation and prevention of terrorism.

Keywords: African continent; Counter-terrorism; Human intelligence; Information-gathering; Interrogation.

Introduction

Reducing the number of violent deaths is listed as a guideline for sustainable development, according to the United Nations (Saadat, 2020, p. 1). Within this parameter, it is demonstrated that there are rational reasons for multiple international agents to establish cooperative relations to combat violent acts such as terrorism (ibid, p. 1). Since 71 countries reported deaths caused by terrorist actions and at least 98 nations suffer from the impacts of the phenomenon (Global Terrorism Index, 2019, p. 2), it is clear that international mobilization is necessary to effectively tackle the problem. Although the police is the main public security agency in most countries, its members have insufficient qualifications for counter-terrorism activities (Nyabira et al. 2019, p. 2). Even in territories where this type of violence is frequent, there is no adequate training for law enforcement officers to efficiently investigate and confront the activity of terrorist groups. As Nyabira et al. (ibid, p. 2) demonstrates, the counter-terrorism work fails several times to transform information collected by investigative and intelligence activity into consistent evidence for the proper condemnation of suspects. Such flaws allow individuals responsible for attacks to continue to act without receiving due legal sanctions and may encourage the activity of perpetrators.

For an effective combat to be carried out, intelligence activity is extremely important for gathering information on criminal activities (Ask et al. op. cit., p. 4) and for subsequent sharing with other agencies and states. However, security agencies do not have sufficient training to use these methods satisfactorily, since the difficulty in developing training programs that makes professionals able to meet the multiple demands in the counter-terrorism service is a reality for the police in countries like Kenya (Nyabira et al. op. cit. p. 2) and Algeria (Otieno, 2019a, p. 39), for example. According to Otieno (ibid, p. 39), the military intelligence service in Algeria is not enough to prevent the advance of the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist organization, which exemplifies the need for the implementation of more anti-terrorism squads and a better preparation of the active professionals. Thus, it is concluded that the update of public security officials through training is crucial for the quality of their services. Police routine requires officers to make important decisions that can lead to serious consequences, often in short periods of time and in high-risk situations. Due to such requirements, Nyabira et al. (op. cit. p. 1) explains the need for training programs for those working in the security area. In Kenya, there have been curricular changes in the training of police officers, covering training for investigative procedures and prosecuting terrorist activities. Members of other security institutions also

received training, such as employees from airports and borders officers (Otieno, op. cit. p. 42). In partnership with the United Nations and other entities, the African Centre for The Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) also conducts training aimed at effective actions in counter-terrorism. The center's work with the United Nations demonstrates the need and productivity of international cooperation to combat violent extremism. Otieno (ibid, pp. 17-20) and Royster (2017, p. 1066) stress the utmost importance of the collaboration and joint actions involving multiple nations in opposing terrorism.

An example of this cooperation was the workshops held in South Africa by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) partnership with the ACSRT and the Secretariat of the Southern African Development Community. The activities aimed to train participants in techniques for the prevention and investigation of terrorist acts, in addition to intelligence strategies for gathering information about crimes (UNODC, 2019). Initiatives like this can be very promising, as long as their content and ways of implementation are evaluated in order to measure their effectiveness. As Nyabira et al. (op. cit. p. 1) explains regarding the training applied to the Kenyan police, it is important that educational institutions of the security forces review the practices and curriculum structure of the courses that were taught.

It is important to discuss the differences and similarities between the reality of African countries, as terrorism may not manifest itself in the same way in all regions. Although it is crucial to understand the phenomenon according to the context of each state, it is also possible to develop strategies that can be generalized to other regions of the continent (Asongu et al. 2018, p. 1933). There is literature showing how countries close to or suffering from the actions of the same violent groups can end up showing similarities that can be exploited in the activity of counter-terrorism (ibid, p. 1934). Evidence of this kind can be useful, since it highlights the possibility of implementing policies of continental range. However, there is a lack of this type of articulation between countries to apply strategies in several territories simultaneously, and it represents a major obstacle to the fight against terrorism (ibid, p. 1932). The increase in the production of useful knowledge about strategies that could be applied at the continental level could be used to train AFRIPOL employees, for example, since the mechanism was created to act by coordinating criminal intelligence analysis and providing operational support to police in African countries (African Union, 2017, pp. 4-5).

In this sphere, intelligence activity is one of the essential tools in counter-terrorism (Webbink, 2020, p. 4; Kpeglah, 2018, p. 47; Otieno, 2019b, p. 7). It is the collection of information by legal or sometimes clandestine means and its subsequent analysis, so that the decision-making process of political groups or individuals responsible for managing a specific organ or agency can be based. The information collected by the intelligence activity may be used to develop strategies and policies of the most varied genres, including security, military and international affairs (Kpeglah, *op. cit.* p. 13; Neequaye and Luke, 2018, p. 3). This article focuses on discussing the application of human intelligence legally and ethically in the fight against terrorism. This subtype of intelligence activity can be defined as follows, according to Webbink (*op. cit.* p. 4):

Human intelligence can be defined as the collection of information from human sources by means of an interaction between two or more people (Justice, Bhatt, Brandon & Kleinman, 2010 as cited in Granhag, Montecinos & Oleszkiewicz, 2013). Gathering human intelligence is, therefore, a dynamic, reciprocal process of obtaining information from sources (Borum, 2006; Coulam, 2006). It involves not only obtaining reliable information about past, current and possible future activities, but also about networks of people (Hartwig, Meissner & Semel, 2014). The aim of collecting this information is maintaining and improving national security, protecting our own population and important institutions, supporting allies and maintaining civic order and stability (Coulam, 2006; Evans, Meissner, Brandon, Russano & Kleinman, 2010).

Despite being a crucial tool for the investigation and prevention of crimes, human intelligence is not a field sufficiently explored by research. In a world where terrorism is an global threat, it is important that ethical and efficient human intelligence techniques are developed (*ibid.*, p. 4; Granhag et al. 2019, p. 438). For this to occur, more studies need to be carried out. Such needs motivated the production of this article. Next, the article discuss some ways of collecting information through human interactions.

Many states still use torture methods as a tool for human intelligence. There is broad literature demonstrating how this is a strategy that generates information of low reliability, leads to false confessions (Dando and Ormerod, 2019, p. 1) and disrespect international human rights treaties. As already demonstrated by a history of research and also technical reviews carried out by agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Gartner and

Langlois, 2016, p. 4), methods of physical coercion are extremely inefficient for intelligence activity and can harm further collections of information, severely hampering investigations. In conclusion, it is known that the tortured individual can speak what he believes the torturer wants to hear and may be willing to confess crimes that he did not commit in order to end his suffering (ibid, p. 4).

Due to the fact that they are serious violations of human rights, torture methods used for the acquisition of information have declined mainly in democratic countries. Alongside this decline, accusatory approach techniques are used to investigate crimes and collect information through human intelligence. This questioning model is characterized by the objective of achieving a confession, and for that it uses strategies of psychological manipulation and emotional coercion (Swanner et al, 2016 p. 4). The interrogator questions the suspect on the assumption that he/she is guilty, and from this assumption he uses artifices to pressure the suspect to confess. One of the manipulation tactics involves ensuring for those being questioned that investigators have overwhelming evidence of their guilt, and so it would be useless to deny their participation in a particular crime. In this context, what is known is that the accusatory approach puts pressure on people questioned to the point that they may confess things they did not do, which characterizes the phenomenon of false confessions. In addition, questioning individuals using coercive psychological manipulation techniques generates information with a lower degree of reliability, that is, it reduces the diagnostic value of the information (ibid, p. 4; Webbink, op. cit. p. 5).

The accusatory approach has become well known for the Reid method. The technique was based in the 1940s guidelines of interrogation developed by Fred Inbau, later adapted by his colleague John E. Reid (O'Neill, 2017, p. 12). The method consists of pressuring, manipulating and persuading whoever is interrogated to obtain a confession, and inspired interrogation practices at agencies around the planet due to its popularity and alleged effectiveness (ibid, p. 13). Repeatedly accusing the suspect and denying his testimony that he is innocent are practices recommended by the technique, in addition to teaching that interrogators can infer if someone is guilty based on the observation of his behavior and body language (ibid, p. 15). However, it is known that even law enforcement officers do not have a superior ability to detect lies compared to laymen, often obtaining a performance equal to or slightly superior to chance (Denault et al, 2020, pp. 4-5; Leo, 2018, p. 11). In addition, the Reid method teaches investigators to try to convince the respondent that denying his guilt is useless (O'Neill, op. cit. p. 17). However, such practices contradict various scientific evidence obtained through research (Leo, op. cit. pp. 7-8; High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group,

2016, p. 40). Due to these problems, accusatory methods like Reid are not recommended as efficient interrogation strategies in the scientific community (Denault et al, op. cit. p. 4).

Professionals trained in the Reid method show an exaggerated self-confidence that can distort their reasoning, as the investigator is inclined to trust pre-judgments regarding the suspect's guilt (O'Neill, op. cit. pp. 27-28). On the other hand, this article encourages professionals from the security and intelligence forces to be trained with a focus on guidelines based in scientific studies of psychology and interrogation. According to Leo (op. cit. p. 34), preparing professionals in a more scientific way will bring improvements such as increasing their capacity to identify false testimonies and improve the collection of more reliable information. It is also important for investigators to learn that they cannot blindly trust their ability to infer when someone is lying and that their approach can elicit false responses (ibid, p. 34; Niland and Ortu, 2020, p. 5; O'Neill, op. cit. pp. 31-32).

Obtaining information in the investigative or the intelligence context is a very challenging task, as human interactions are extremely dynamic and are influenced by a large number of variables (Ask et al. op. cit. p. 3). In addition, there are several scientific gaps regarding to interrogation methods: lack of guidelines, training and studies evaluating the effectiveness of the techniques (Webbink, L. op. cit. p. 4). A more scientifically based claim is that hostile interrogation environments are quite inefficient compared to more collaborative configurations. Often, the source will be interested in retaining information, not cooperating with the interrogator or even trying to deceive him. Even on these occasions, it is known that threats and a coercive approach will be unproductive (Swanner et. al. op. cit. p. 9).

The Information-gathering approach

There is scientific evidence referring to the information-gathering techniques as being a more efficient approach comparing to accusatorial methods (Ask et al. op. cit. p. 4). In this modality of human intelligence, no accusatory strategies are used or aimed at emotionally coercing the interviewee. The information-gathering approach is characterized by being a set of diverse practices that have in common the intention to create a collaborative environment, asking for information instead of demanding it and focusing on gathering relevant information instead of aiming to achieve a confession (ibid, p. 4; Leo, op. cit. p 36). Open, non-suggestive questions are used in order to encourage the source to elaborate a detailed narrative, in contrast to the accusatory methodology, which seeks to control the interaction by pressing the interlocutor. In addition, the information gathering approach educates the

interviewer to look for linguistic cues of lying, which is scientifically assessed as a more reliable analysis than observing body language for signs of stress (Swanner et al, op. cit. p. 10). Accusatory-based interrogations often teach that the investigator can tell when the source is lying by observing bodily signs of stress and anxiety (O'Neill, op. cit. p. 15), which is not supported by research (ibid, p. 10; Denault et al. op. cit. pp. 4-5). There are studies demonstrating how the information-gathering approach reduces the frequency of false testimonies and increases the probability of eliciting true discourses when compared to other accusatory techniques. These results were also observed in non-cooperative contexts, where the source seeks to retain important information (Swanner et al, op. cit. p. 6).

Among the most evident examples of this approach, there is the Scharff technique. Developed by the German Hanns Scharff in the Second World War, this strategy has been showing superior results comparing to other commonly used methods (Ask, et al. op. cit. p. 4; Webbink, op. cit. p. 3). The technique was developed in contexts of interactions where the source intended to share as little relevant information as possible, and thus postulated 3 guidelines that aim to explain the mindset of the individual being questioned: 1- sharing as little as possible; 2- try to find out what information the interrogator seeks in order not to reveal it; 3- discuss only what is believed that the interrogator already knows. Such precepts are based on a way of looking at interrogation from the point of view of the source, a strategy called perspective taking (Granhag et al. 2019, p. 439). The Scharff method was studied under laboratory conditions, in which it presented promising results. In the study produced by Granhag et al. (ibid, p. 438), military intelligence officers received files on sources allegedly involved in a terrorist attack and were prepared to interrogate them using the Scharff method. As a result, the sources reported a greater difficulty in identifying what specific information the interrogators wanted. In conclusion, the referred study evaluate the technique as an efficient tool for human intelligence and counter-terrorism, since it is adequate to obtain information from semi-cooperative sources. Other studies support this claim (Oleszkiewicz et al. 2017, p. 19; Granhag et al. 2016, p. 144; Levtova, 2019, p. 2).

Oleszkiewicz et al. (op. cit. p. 3) also brought empirical results regarding the use of the Scharff technique in a simulated context of terrorism investigation. Together with their colleagues, they demonstrated that the method is efficient for interrogating sources multiple times, since not all information will be obtained in the first interview, necessarily. In comparison to the specific direct question approach, the Scharff method also performed better when it comes to hindering counter interrogation strategies that the source could use. Despite the promising results, the technique is not infallible and has certain weaknesses (ibid, p. 21).

For example, disclosing how much is known about a subject to the source can cause problems if the source has the opportunity to alert other suspects about the amount of knowledge that investigators have. This can hamper the success of the practice, as in some situations interrogators are encouraged to share information with the respondent as a form of strategy to make them believe that they know a lot about what the source want to omit (ibid, p. 22).

There are other interview models that make up the information gathering approach. Among them, there is the Cognitive Interview (CI). This technique also shows optimistic results with respect to the volume of relevant information that is collected. When compared to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) interrogation protocol, the Cognitive Interview generated 80% more relevant information (Swanner et al, op. cit. p. 8). The technique involves encouraging subjects to share more information and stimulating their memory by providing details about what is asked, in addition to not using coercive measures or threats in order to manipulate suspects. The cognitive interview showed promising results both in investigative interrogations and in intelligence contexts (ibid, p.8).

There is also the Assessment Criteria Indicative of Deception (ACID) model, which aims to train professionals in the task of distinguishing false from true discourses. It is a discourse analysis (not necessarily an interrogation method) that brought promising results when used as a lie detection tool. The technique also can be used to analyze recordings or transcriptions of testimonials, and presents a substantial improvement in the capacity of the individuals who practice it (Colwell et al. 2015, p. 226). As documented by Colwell et al. (ibid, p. 226), officers trained with the ACID model achieved a hit rate of 89%, while officers who did not receive training in the technique showed 53%. The model focuses on the analysis of linguistic signs of lies, in contrast to most practices used by police forces, which pay more attention to supposed nonverbal indicators. As already mentioned, the analysis of nonverbal language has no solid scientific basis and can lead to several biases of interpretation. Still according to Colwell et al. (ibid, p. 227), despite not being an interrogation technique, ACID can be used in conjunction with information-gathering approach methods, as the interrogator needs to use the appropriate strategies to encourage the subject to speak, so it is possible to differentiate true and false discourses using the ACID. Differentiating false from real speeches is an extremely challenging task, even for law enforcement officials (ibid, p. 227). This can lead to a series of errors, and for that it is important that more scientifically based techniques are applied to increase the presence of differences between true and false statements. In that way, discourse analysis will be more reliable (ibid, p. 227). The ACID technique is an example of a deception detection tool focused on linguistic cues.

The PEACE technique is also a form of non-accusatory interrogation that focuses on gathering information, and is used in countries like Norway, New Zealand and Australia. The method was developed in the United Kingdom, where it is widely used, and it was built to meet ethical and efficacy standards most congruent with academic knowledge about human interactions in the context of interrogation (Swanner et al, op. cit. p. 5). Dando and Ormerod (op. cit. p. 2) mention the Modified Cognitive Interview (MCI) and the Controlled Cognitive Engagement (CCE) as promising models for gathering information. In their study, MCI is said to be useful in amplifying the differences between false and true discourses, and CCE has its usefulness in adding a moral stimulus to influence the source's cooperativeness. There are several types of non coercive, information-gathering approaches. Despite their peculiarities, the techniques exposed here have common recommendations: seek to achieve information, not necessarily a confession; use open, non-suggestive questions; do not use physical or emotional coercion; do not rely on nonverbal signs of lying, to pay more attention to linguistic indicators of deception and to provoke contradictions through the strategic presentation of evidence (Swanner et al. op. cit. p. 5).

Next, a table with a comparison of the main aspects of the approaches is exposed:

	Accusatorial (Reid Method)	Information-gathering (PEACE, Sharff, CI, MCI, CCE)
Questioning	Closed, suggestive questions	Open, non-suggestive questions
Lie detection	Focus on body language and stress signs	Focus on linguistic cues of deception
Interrogator behavior	Demanding and accusing	Asking for information
Purpose	Obtain a confession	Gather relevant information
Use of psychological manipulation and coercion	Yes	No

The table shows the main differences between the approaches, and this contrast is analyzed in this article with the aim of demonstrate its importance. The collected bibliography points to the information-gathering as a superior set of techniques comparing to the accusatorial approach. According to the researched material, the information-gathering methods can help the counter-terrorism professionals in the following ways: reducing the frequency of false testimonies and increasing the probability of eliciting true discourses even in non-cooperative contexts (Swanner et al, op. cit. p. 6); making it difficult for the sources to identify what specific information the interrogators want (Granhag et al. 2016, p. 139); hindering counter interrogation strategies used by the sources (Oleszkiewicz et al. op. cit. p. 3); getting more relevant information both in investigative interrogations and in intelligence contexts (Swanner et al, op. cit. p. 8); meeting ethical and efficacy standards most congruent with academic knowledge (Swanner et al, op. cit. p. 5); increasing their capacity to identify false testimonies and discover more reliable information (Leo op. cit. p. 34).

Given the urgency and pressure to train investigators in the context of counter-terrorism, training in more effective interrogation methods can be a promising strategy. In addition to the logistical practicalities (there are sources reporting training conducted through 3 phases: expository class, video learning and practical training), a relatively small amount of time is needed to cause positive effects on the skills of professionals. As reported by Granhag et al. (2019, p. 443), a 150-minute training session was sufficient to significantly increase the performance of intelligence officers in the Scharff technique. In the study produced by Colwell et al. (op. cit. pp. 235-236), an 8-hour training in the ACID method caused a 36% increase in the ability to differentiate false and true speeches. Such studies show a certain practicality in training professionals in interrogation and lie detection techniques, since training does not require a large amount of logistical resources or time. Thus, they can be a favorable way of updating skills relevant to counter-terrorism.

Conclusion and recommendations

This article brought together some human intelligence strategies that present scientific evidence in support, and suggests that ways of applying such techniques to the context of counter-terrorism to train professionals in African countries should be studied. However, this

possibility needs to be carefully considered, as there is still no specific and detailed protocol on how to conduct information-gathering methods. There are still no detailed, science-based manuals explaining what to ask, how to ask and when to ask. What is in the scientific literature is a set of recommendations on what to do and what not to do, and these guidelines can greatly help the task of collecting information.

What is suggested in this article is that guidelines relevant to the information-gathering approach are gathered so that a way to apply such methods according to the peculiarities of the different regions in Africa is considered. Nyabira et al. (op. cit. p 1) bring evidence regarding the effectiveness of training in investigative skills for counter-terrorism, which demonstrate positive results in increasing police capacity to combat this type of phenomenon in Kenya. Also according to the authors, the growth in terrorism puts pressure on agents responsible for security to optimize their skills to be able to perform their work properly. For this to become a reality, the implementation of training is essential (ibid, p. 2).

This article was developed with the aim of discussing the problems involved in the use of the accusatorial approach and bringing together alternative methods that demonstrated scientific support. These alternative methods composing the information-gathering approach could be used to elaborate more efficient interrogation guidelines for police training in the counter-terrorism context. In addition, the article aims to incite further reflection on the scientific knowledge gap with respect to effective methods of collecting information through interviews and methods for differentiating true and false discourses.

Many interrogation practices are based on pseudoscience (Denault et al. op. cit. pp. 2-3) and they need to be revised and subsequently replaced (in case of a lack of scientific grounds) by techniques that prove to be more effective and that respect human rights treaties. The importance of international cooperation in developing strategies for the training of security professionals was also raised, as it is important that they receive resources and continually improve their ability to fight terrorism through investigation and information collection. Modern adaptations of interrogation techniques demonstrate to be an effective way to increase the skills of security and intelligence agents, however it is still necessary that such measures are properly studied and strategically applied. There is still little scientific literature on how to productively elicit information in such complex contexts, but it is possible to implement more effective and scientifically based practices to give investigators greater chances of opposing terrorist groups.

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The Civilian Joint Task Force and the Management of Boko Haram Conflict in Nigeria's North East Region

By

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Abstract

The paper contributes to the debate on community-driven responses to local insecurity. Within this context, it discusses the emergence, contributions and challenges of the *yangora* (Hausa word literally translated as 'defenders using local hockey sticks made from bamboo roots'), a local vigilante group popularly called Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), in the management of Boko Haram violence in Nigeria's North-East region. Existing studies on counter-Boko Haram responses have not sufficiently interrogated the significant role the CJTF played in the war against Boko Haram. Drawing on oral interviews and literature search, the paper demonstrates the social agency and capacity of the CJTF that made a difference in the counter-terrorism operation. Through their knowledge of the local environment, language, culture and religion, the *yangora* were able to provide local intelligence, identify and apprehend Boko Haram members. They were also able to repel, liberate and protect communities from the violent attacks of Boko Haram. Their partnership with the Nigerian military contributed in turning the tide against Boko Haram. However, there is the need to articulate an effective post-conflict role for the CJTF and ensure that its members, out of desperation or frustration, do not turn to organised crime and become purveyors of violence themselves. The community policing framework is an option in finding a post-conflict role for the CJTF. Within this framework, the CJTF as a local community watch group can continue to partner the military and other law enforcement agencies in the campaigns against Boko Haram.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Civilian Joint Task Force, counter-terrorism, local security, North-East Nigeria, vigilante

Introduction

Boko Haram emerged as a violent fundamentalist group in 2009 when it began a major rebellion against the Nigerian state. Until 2009, the group was largely quietist in nature, going about its

business of propagating its sectarian ideology and intermittently clashing with local community members and law enforcement agencies. In July 2009, it had a major conflagration with the security agencies, leading to the subsequent arrest and killing of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf and many of its members and sympathizers by agents of the state in what was widely condemned as excessive and extrajudicial killings (Onuoha, 2012; Odobo, 2017). The clash appeared to have incensed and galvanized the group as it successfully transited from being a local radical group into a ferocious jihadist entity with demonstrable capacity to initiate and execute major operations against the state, using suicide bombing and other guerrilla-type strategies (Thurston, 2016; 2018; Mustapha, 2014).

By 2011, the Boko Haram escalated its violence and continued to expand its operations. From its Maiduguri base in Borno State, the group had extended its reach beyond Borno, Adamawa, Yobe and Bauchi in the North East to other parts of northern Nigeria and Abuja, the national capital. The continued violence and lethality of its operation compelled the Nigerian government, in 2013, to declare a state of emergency in fourteen local government areas across the four affected northern states of Borno, Yobe, Plateau and Niger. This was followed by a major military operation against the sect. Nonetheless, the sect continued to expand and even declared an Islamic caliphate over captured territories (such as Damboa, Bama, Baga and Gwoza) in 2014 with a subsequent pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015. However, beginning from 2014, improved military operations by the Nigerian military, supported later by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) involving Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin noticeably limited Boko Haram's onslaught and degraded its operational capacity. By December 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari gave a State of the Nation address where he emphatically stated that Boko Haram was degraded. Though the military, indeed, recorded considerable success against Boko Haram, however, the group continued to demonstrate its regenerative capacity and ability to sustain its operations.

In the course of the war against Boko Haram, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) emerged, in June 2013, first as a community initiative, and subsequently as joint effort with the security forces to help combat Boko Haram. What began as a group of local hunters, farmers, blacksmiths, and generally civilians, predominantly male youths wielding sticks, machetes, bow

and arrows and Dane Guns, developed into a formidable civilian fighting force credited with turning the narrative against Boko Haram.

While extant literature has largely focused on Boko Haram's emergence, operations and the counter-terrorism responses of the state, the contributions of non-state actors, particularly the role of the CJTF in the fight against Boko Haram has not been sufficiently interrogated. Although the use of civilian security forces in counter-terrorism operations appears common (Omenma& Hendricks, 2018), a number of studies inadvertently gloss over their critical contributions to the management of violent conflicts. It has been suggested that non-state armed groups (NSAG) can potentially perform important roles in supporting defence and security agencies in counter-terrorism operations. As the cases of the Kamajors in Sierra Leone and Arrow Boys of Teso, Uganda have shown (see ICG, 2017), with clearly delineated roles and proper oversight by national and local authorities, civilian security forces can effectively provide local security and counter-terrorism support to governments combating insurgencies.

This paper examines the contributions of the CJTF to the management of Boko Haram violence in the North East region of Nigeria. The region is one of the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria and comprises the states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (the BAY states) have been the most affected by the Boko Haram insurgency and widely constitute the main theatres of the conflict. While the BAY states are the site of study, emphasis is placed on the CJTF activities in Borno State which is the hotbed of the Boko Haram violence. It is also the birthplace of the CJTF and where its support of the Nigerian government's counterterrorism efforts against Boko Haram have had the most profound (and noticeable) impact. The CJTF, since 2013, has become a useful ally to the Nigerian security forces in the fight against Boko Haram.

Theoretical Underpinnings

The paper draws inspiration from Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines and Bucqueroux's (1998) theory of community policing in explaining the imperative of partnership policing and community involvement in security management. The concept of community policing is based on the idea that law enforcement agencies and local communities must work together in creative ways to address contemporary security problems such as armed robbery, banditry, agro-pastoral conflicts and terrorism.

Trojanowicz et al (1998) state that community policing has three essential but related features: citizen participation, problem-solving and decentralization. By its nature, the community relies on law enforcement agencies to protect it and help neutralize threats and curb disorders in periods of emergencies. It is also the responsibility of the police to maintain law and order and ensure the safety of people. Yet, communitarian theorists of community policing, argue that the scope of this relationship between the people and law enforcement agencies have expanded. Emphasis is on greater partnership and the idea that the community must assume greater responsibility in public safety, not just working with security agencies but also dealing with problems on their own (Peak &Glensor, 1996).Rosenbaum (2003) argues in support of partnership community policing. The idea could be more effective only through the creation of partnerships that can bring distinctive but complementary skills and resources to the table. Strong community law enforcement partnership can bring about resources, and technical skills not otherwise available; it can also lead to improved communication and information sharing between law enforcement and members of the public by, devolving the powers of security management in order to respond to community needs and to develop an efficient, coordinated conflict management response (Rosenbaum, 2003).

However, critics of community policing have argued that it does not address the underlying causes of crime and it is only a stop-gap measure to address insecurity (Herbert, 2006). In addition, hostilities from the local community and resistance against the idea from within institutional law enforcement agencies may also hinder successful partnership. Nevertheless, the theory of community policing reinforces the argument that no government or law enforcement agency has all the resources to adequately address all public security concerns. Effective management of public security requires the involvement of other relevant stakeholders including the local communities.

It is within this context that the engagement of the CJTF in counter-terrorism operations in the North-East of Nigeria is examined. The CJTF can be effective in providing local security; it can leverage on its community roots to support the security forces in the counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram. As a grassroots organization, it can bolster the legitimacy of the security forces among the local population and serve as intermediary between them and the counter-terrorism forces.As Bamidele (2016) rightly argued, poor understanding, or outright neglect of

the roles and utility of civilian security actors may constrain opportunities to strengthen security mechanisms, especially in a counter-terrorism context.

Boko Haram Rebellion

Scholars have examined the evolution and ideology of Boko Haram and its rebellion against the Nigerian state (Danjibo, 2009; 2017). A central argument in the literature is that Boko Haram has its root and also draws inspiration from previous experiences of religious violence in northern Nigeria. Yet, the uniqueness of Boko Haram rebellion lies not just in its well-orchestrated attacks and killings of civilians and non-civilian targets, but in a sustained campaign of terror attacks over several years. Furthermore, no consensus exists on exactly what the group represents, to the extent that Fayeye noted that Boko Haram has “assumed the status of a chameleon or a coat of many colours” (2013, p. 40). Nonetheless, its official name, *Jama'atulAhliSunnahLidda'awatiwal-Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad) provides some explanation indicating that it is an association committed to the propagation of Islam through preaching and combat. To this end, Boko Haram is a religious fundamentalist sect desirous of establishing an Islamic caliphate governed strictly by sharia law in Nigeria (Mustapha, 2014; Thurston, 2018).

Danjibo (2009) and Onuoha (2012) suggest that the group's insurgency is driven by socio-economic and political considerations. Hence, the emergence of Boko Haram cannot be totally isolated from the situation of poverty and other socio-economic misfortunes as a result of political corruption and mismanagement of the nation's resources. Consequently, Boko Haram, in pursuit of its ideology intermittently clashed with security agencies as its activities ran contrary to the constitution of Nigeria. About a decade of Boko Haram insurgency has led to the death of more than 32,000 people with more than two million displaced persons, according to IDMC (2018)..

From 2011, Boko Haram attacks increased exponentially both in intensity and gravity. From initially utilizing crude weapons such as machetes, petrol bombs and Dane Guns and mostly operating on motorbikes, Boko Haram began to deploy sophisticated weapons including vehicle-mounted machine guns and improvised explosive devices. It successfully introduced suicide bombing as a strategy when it orchestrated its first suicide bomb attack at the police headquarters in Abuja, on 16 June, 2011 leaving close to 100 vehicles burnt (Odobu, 2017). Two months later,

it launched another suicide attack on the United Nations building in Abuja, killing 23 people and injuring over a hundred. Odo (2017) argued that the UN attack effectively internationalized Boko Haram as a transnational terrorist organisation. It has mastered the use of suicide bombing and noticeably, the deployment of children and female suicide bombers, as a weapon of psychological warfare. In March 2015, the group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The effectiveness and reach of Boko Haram made a conflict analyst to note that it would only be a short time before the group would overrun the three North Eastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa (Hassan & Pieri, 2018). The threat posed by the group to the nation's security became more visible when the Nigerian government was forced to postpone the 2015 General Elections initially scheduled for February 14 and 28 by six weeks, as the group threatened to attack during the elections (see *The Guardian*, 7 February, 2015). Boko Haram has shown resilience and demonstrated immense capacity to withstand government's counter-terrorism measures.

Perspectives on State Response to Boko Haram Terrorism

The Nigerian government has largely employed both militarized and non-militarized counter-terrorism strategies in combating Boko Haram. Government's initial response seemed to consider the group an outlaw and a religious sect whose rebellion needed to be addressed through police action. Thus, it deployed the police to contain and curtail the early manifestations of the group's activities. However, the escalation of the crisis beyond the epicenter in Maiduguri necessitated the intervention of the military. The rebellion was temporarily halted but not without allegations of widespread human rights abuses by the security agencies against suspected Boko Haram members and sympathisers (ICG, 2017). Arguably, the government's response to the early stages of the crisis mainly dealt with the symptoms and not the underlying causes of the crisis. Indeed, Boko Haram re-emerged in the fall of 2010, more ferocious and brazen in terms of the range and impact of its attacks.

In response to increased Boko Haram violence, the government, in June 2011, established Joint Task Force *Operation Restore Order* (JTF-ORO) comprising troops from the military, intelligence and policing agencies, under the coordination of the Defence Headquarters. JTF-ORO had a mandate to contain Boko Haram and restore law and order in the affected parts of the North East. JTF-ORO recorded modest success in preventing some Boko Haram attacks and restricting the

group's activities, particularly in Maiduguri, Borno State capital. Nevertheless, it was implicated in a range of human rights abuses (ICG, 2015).

JTF-ORO transmuted into *Operation BOYONA* following the declaration of a state of emergency in the BAY states in May 2013. *Operation BOYONA*, coordinated by the Army Headquarters, was mandated to destroy Boko Haram bases and restrict its ability to cause violence. *Operation BOYONA* marked the introduction of a more formidable (contain and defeat) military measures. It was succeeded by *Operation ZamanLafiya* in August 2013 following the establishment of the 7th Mechanized Division headed by Major General Obida Ethan. *ZamanLafiya*, too, gave way to *Operation Lafiya Dole* in July 2015 as the military tried to adapt to the changing nature of Boko Haram's tactics. A month later, the military established a Theatre Command with headquarters in Maiduguri to coordinate the military operations against Boko Haram.

The military campaign against Boko Haram was boosted by efforts of the MNJTF—a military alliance between countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (Cameroun, Chad, Niger, Nigeria) and Benin Republic to combat Boko Haram and other mutual menace in the Lake Chad area. The MNJTF has, since 2015, helped to internationalize the fight against Boko Haram and to curtail its activities within the Lake Chad region. It has been considerably successful in containing Boko Haram and restricting its desire to create safe havens in the Lake Chad area. However, mutual suspicion among the cooperating countries, troop inadequacy and funding issues constitute some of the impediments against the effectiveness of MNJTF as a sub-regional response to Boko Haram (Assanvo, Abatan&Sawadogo, 2016).

The Office of Counterterrorism Coordinator was created by former President Goodluck Jonathan in 2011 to provide a better counter-terrorism response to Boko Haram terrorism. The Coordinator, Ambassador Zakari Ibrahim was replaced by Major General Sarkin Yakin Bello in September 2011 following increased incidences of bombing in the country. To further enhance communication and coordination of its counter-terrorism measures against Boko Haram, the government established the Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) under the supervision of the Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) in March 2014. This represented an improved counter-terrorism approach to Boko Haram. The CTC initiated a robust and all-inclusive National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) following its establishment. NACTEST appears to depict, in addition to military operations, a carrot approach in addressing the problem of Boko

Haram. This approach is premised on rehabilitation of apprehended terrorists; de-radicalization, the establishment of the North-East Regional Initiative (NERI) and the Presidential Committee in the Rebuilding of the North-East through the provision of needed and destroyed infrastructure. Human security concerns were also central to the project.

According to Abdullahi (2015), the government's militarized counter-terrorism strategies have been more successful in the fight against Boko Haram. On the contrary, measures to address the longer-term and deeply held grievances, including poverty, inequality and other socio-economic deprivations that constitute important catalysts of the violence have lagged behind military operations against the sect. Thus, he argued that a long-term solution for containing Boko Haram terrorism along with other emergent insurgency groups in Nigeria, lies in resolving the issues of nation-building and indeed, state building. Ibegbu (2014) also posited that Nigeria was late in terms of strategizing against terrorism. He argued that the trajectory and indications were there, and security analysts had warned of the emerging threat that Nigeria would face. Yet, no discernable action was taken by the government. By the time Nigeria started paying serious attention to terrorism, Boko Haram had already established and consolidated its networks.

Methodology

The paper is based on a field work conducted in the North East in 2016. Maiduguri (Borno), Yola (Adamawa) and Damaturu (Yobe) constituted the study locations. The qualitative method was adopted in which a sample size of 33 respondents was purposively selected for oral interviews. Respondents were drawn from a study population comprising members of the CJTF, military, police and paramilitary officials, traditional and religious leaders and other relevant government agencies. Those selected represented various segments of the study population. Data from oral interviews were complemented with literature documents. The data was content analyzed.

Emergence of the CJTF

The idea of the Civilian Joint Task Force originated in Maiduguri, Borno State, when a group of locals popularly referred to as *yangora* (youths with sticks), who had become disheartened and frustrated, took it upon themselves to confront Boko Haram members within their communities. The group was known as the Borno Volunteer Young Vigilance Group (BVYVG) before it

adopted the appellation Civilian Joint Task Force. It began its operation in June 2013 following the declaration of emergency rule in parts of the North East by the government.

The emergence of the CJTF in communities of the North East could be viewed as a child of necessity. Their involvement in the anti-Boko Haram campaign was not initially part of government's counterinsurgency strategy. However, the CJTF increasingly became part and parcel of government's overall strategy to identify, contain and defeat Boko Haram. The CJTF is a local vigilante that became a NSAG collaborating with the military and other security agencies in the counter-terrorism operations in the North East region. Soon after it began operation, the Borno State government moved to streamline its activities by incorporating them into the Borno Youth Empowerment Scheme (BOYES). With the support of the army, CJTF members were provided basic military training while the state government provided uniforms, patrol vehicles and identification documents to the group. The state government also pays a monthly stipend of ₦15,000 to the CJTF members.

The CJTF whose members include hunters, farmers, village jesters, wood carvers, graduates and even princes and religious leaders, emerged out of the need to liberate their communities from the fangs of Boko Haram (Agbibo, 2015). The local people had observed helplessly, how Boko Haram killed and maimed their family members and loved ones. They also observed how persistent assaults by the terror group and highhandedness of the law enforcements conspired to suppress, emasculate and vanquish families, friends, peers and colleagues (Bamidele, 2016). The communities had endured long periods of destruction, devastation and elimination by Boko Haram.

Furthermore, their homes and communities were not only under attack from Boko Haram, they also suffered in the hands of government security force. The presence of the security forces and their perceived excessiveness in terms of harassment and profiling of community members constituted source of frustration and grievances for the local population (Hassan & Pieri, 2018). Though the community members knew who the Boko Haram members were, it was difficult initially, to pass such information to the security forces as what they considered to be a patriotic endeavour always came back to haunt community members. A respondent stated:

After the 2009 violence, we identified Boko Haram members and gave information to the police. But if they are arrested by the police, within one, two or three weeks, they are released. The next thing, Boko Haram members will come and accuse you of passing the information to the police. You will be killed. Their members will openly go from house to house identifying informants and killing them and their relatives. It got to a point that you will be in a *kekemaruwa* (tricycle) and people will be discussing Boko Haram and you are afraid to talk because the driver or even passengers could be a member of Boko Haram. If you say anything bad about them, that night they will come to your house and openly kill you and your family members and destroy your house. We know them; the military are strangers but we cannot point them out because of fear. So, the military felt that the people were not cooperating. Hence, when an attack occurred, the military would not differentiate between Boko Haram and non-Boko Haram members. They would waste everybody (Oral Interview, 2016).

Provoked by the experience, the people decided to confront the sect and voluntarily joined the campaign to liberate themselves and their villages. The State Coordinator of the CJTF in Borno State, Abba-AjiKalli provided a brief background on why the group decided to be involved in the war on Boko Haram and how members were enlisted into the group:

We were not safe in the hands of Boko Haram nor in the hands of the security forces. There were attacks and bomb blasts by Boko Haram. Again, if the military came here, they will arrest everybody, they will kill... That was how we said enough is enough. We decided to gather all the leaders, Chief Imams, the ward leaders and elders, including the youths. Anybody that wanted to volunteer will join; then we will decide who will be their leader (at the ward level). We will administer oath because we cannot control large crowd without guidelines. First, you will swear that you will not implicate any innocent person due to grudges between you and him. Second, even if it is a family member, father or your relations whatsoever, if he is involved (with Boko Haram), you will bring him out to the authority. Then thirdly, you will not use this avenue to extort or take somebody's property. If you are a Muslim, you will swear by the Quran, if you are a Christian, by the Bible because Christians and Muslims are together in this movement (Oral Interview, 2016).

Thus, the CJTF could be viewed as a community-based vigilante determined to protect and defend each other and their communities from Boko Haram attacks. Their activity falls under a typology of vigilantism defined by Brown (1975: 130) as involving "associations in which citizens have joined together for self-protection under conditions of disorder." Though their members are predominantly men, they also have women among their rank who play similar roles. In fact, Hassan and Pieri (2018) noted that women have become increasingly important to the group considering Boko Haram's increasing deployment of female suicide bombers. Thus,

the women's wing of the CJTF is tasked with conducting "pat-downs of women in churches, mosques, and other public places." They also "patrol towns and villages; gather intelligence; and arrest suspected female insurgents" (Hassan & Pieri, 2018: 78).

The initial reaction of the security agencies, especially the military, was hostile and unpleasant. The military denounced the vigilante and their activities noting that it (military) was capable of defeating the sect members without the assistance of the volunteers. The military had probably, been suspicious of the real intentions of the group and the likelihood that Boko Haram may have infiltrated their ranks. For example, when Boko Haram attacked Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri, the CJTF volunteers decided to render assistance to the army. Ibekwe (2016) observed that the presence of the CJTF at Giwa Barracks, where the attack occurred, attracted the suspicion of the military. It was observed that soldiers in the barracks viewed the CJTF members as agents of Boko Haram. They were asked to lie down and roll of the ground before being given the opportunity to explain the reason why the volunteers were at the scene of attack.

A high ranking Nigerian army officer attested to the frosty relations that existed between the military and the civilian JTF at the early stage:

During the time of the Joint Task Force, there was a lot of misunderstanding between the military and the civil populace. Civil-military relation then was absolutely at its lowest ebb; and then the populace and even some of the organized groups did not feel comfortable with the military approach in solving the problem. That created some form of schism between the military and the people. The military, at a time (during emergency rule), felt that anybody you see along the street was likely a Boko Haram member. It was so until they (CJTF) rose up to be distinguished by forming themselves into a vigilante to support the military to identify those who were the problem. That actually was a game changer (Oral Interview, 2016).

Indeed, it was a game changer. Their acts of bravery, especially in the area of intelligence gathering and deep understanding of the local terrain turned them into potential ally of the Joint Task Force in counter-terrorism efforts. Consequently, the military therefore accepted them as partners for geo-reconnaissance duty, intelligence and information gathering and in the area of winning the support of local people which according to former Defence Information Chief, Brigadier General Rabe Abubakar, constituted "very vital components in fighting insurgency or terrorism the world over" (Oral Interview, 2016). Their positive contributions endeared them to the public. For example, the success recorded by the CJTF in Borno made the Borno State

government to officially recognize them, and to donate 80 vehicles to the group (Oral Interview, 2016). Members of the CJTF were also included on the pay roll of Borno State Government under the BOYES scheme. The CJTF also received financial and material support from the local population, prominent individuals and from both public and private local and international organizations.

The concept of the CJTF spread to Adamawa and Yobe States in the North-East. Presently, the CJTF has a clear organizational structure across the states of the North-East where it operates beginning with grassroots volunteers and members at the community levels, sector commanders, state coordinators and an overall commander of the CJTF in the North East. According to Bamidele (2016, p. 132), the then overall commander of the group in the North-East, Baba Jafar, claimed that the group had registered membership strength of 15,541 spread across Borno (1,800), Yobe (670), Adamawa (10,000), Gombe (715), Bauchi (1,200) and Taraba (1,156). In communities where they operated, members of the CJTF performed patrol duties, surveillance and mounted roadblocks at identified hotspots where they conducted stop-and-search operations (Ibekwe, 2016).

The CJTF and the Anti-Boko Haram Campaign

The CJTF complemented the efforts of the military and other security forces in containing Boko Haram. There are four key areas where the CJTF contributed to the fight against Boko Haram. It acted as local guide to the military in certain operations. The deep understanding that insurgents have, especially on forests, makes it difficult for militaries across the world to effectively combat such insurgencies. Like the insurgents, members of the CJTF had first-hand knowledge of the local geography.

Thus, their knowledge of the local environment became very useful in guiding the Nigerian troops through difficult terrains in the forest regions of the North-East. According to a member of the CJTF, "our civilian JTF had taken part in almost all the operations going on in Sambisa forest." Also, "they were always the first to sight Boko Haram suspects during checks in the state capital" (cited in *Punch*, 30 July, 2017). Supporting this claim, a senior military officer commented, "their understanding and ability of leading the troops to certain locations gave a lot of strength to the forces and they did a very good job" (Oral Interview, 2016). Further confirming the importance of the CJTF in this area, the Secretary of the Christian Association of

Nigeria (CAN) in Yobe State, Reverend Father YilarApagu said: “The CJTF helped with their knowledge of the terrain as compared to the military which was just deployed to the region and was not familiar with the area. So, they led them through the inner places that the military did not know” (Oral Interview, 2016). This is consistent with Ibekwe’s (2016) claim that the Nigerian army strategically deployed members of the CJTF in the vital area of intelligence gathering resulting in multiple successful ambushes against the militants and their supplies heavily degraded.

The CJTF also helped in repelling Boko Haram attacks and assisting to liberate or recapture areas that came under Boko Haram attacks. In fact, it was widely acknowledged by local community members that the CJTF played a key role in preventing the city of Maiduguri from being captured by Boko Haram. Security forces became disenchanted with the guerrilla tactics adopted by Boko Haram which instilled fear on the operatives deployed to the area. As a result, many of them deserted their duty post; others sought transfer out of Maiduguri. Thus, when Boko Haram attacked, the CJTF became the first line of defence against the terrorists. The group’s Borno State Coordinator provided further explanation on the role of the CJTF in protecting Maiduguri from being captured by Boko Haram:

We are proud to say this, we secured the city of Maiduguri and pushed them (Boko Haram) out. There were places that the military could not enter but our men did. In 2013 or so, there was an attack around MalamBalari and about 47 people were killed by Boko Haram. We moved in and repelled their attacks and killed six of the terrorists while others ran away (Oral Interview, 2016).

Supporting the above claims, the Borno State CAN Chairman, Bishop Mohammed Naga, added: “But for the CJTF, Maiduguri, I think, would have been ashes by now because the insurgents were deadly and unrelenting. The CJTF brought calm to the state” (Oral Interview, 2016). Nevertheless, the extent to which the above proposition is true remains a debate. However, what is not in dispute is that the CJTF played a crucial role in the counter-offensive against Boko Haram in the North-East region.

The CJTF was similarly effective in countering Boko Haram in Adamawa. It is also claimed that the group was instrumental in repelling several Boko Haram attacks in the state and the recapturing of several communities that came under the control of Boko Haram. According to a high ranking official in Adamawa State, the terrorist group had captured seven local government areas consisting of several hundreds of communities in Adamawa State. Some of these

communities, including Mubi North, Mubi South, Maiha, Gombi, Song, Hong, Gulak, Michika and Madagali were liberated by the CJTF (Oral Interview, May 2018). A member of the Muslim Council of Adamawa State gave the following explanations on the CJTF role in liberating communities:

Boko Haram had ransacked Mubi, overtaken Gombi. What remains of Yola was just a matter of time. It was then the vigilante came in. It was the vigilantes who helped in clearing Boko Haram in Maiha and Mubi. It was then the Federal Government was now saying nobody asked the vigilante to come in. This statement was issued by the Army Headquarters, that they have capacity when people were being ransacked. Which capacity? (Oral Interview, 2016).

This position was corroborated by Mr. Tarfa, a retired Police officer who was the National Secretary of the Hunters. He said:

Boko Haram had captured Gulak, close to Sambisa forest and came way down to Gombi after ransacking Mubi North and Mubi South. The people in Hong and Song ran to the Mambilla Mountains leaving their communities deserted for Boko Haram to occupy. And you know Mubi was where the former Chief of Defence State, Air Marshal Alex Badeh comes from. There were more than 4000 soldiers stationed there but Mubi town fell to Boko Haram in less than one hour. We mobilized our people, I mean the local hunters and volunteers and moved to Gombi and engaged them in a fierce battle. We killed several hundreds of them and captured many that we took to Abuja. Within two weeks, we recaptured all the towns and villages occupied by Boko Haram (Oral interview, May 2018).

Furthermore, the CJTF provided local security for communities that were deserted by Nigerian security forces. Community members in Yola, Adamawa had argued that due to the intensity of Boko Haram activities, most police stations were closed down while military checkpoints were abandoned. The police moved to major towns while the villages and communities were left without security. A religious leader in Adamawa State contended: "in the villages, there was no security. The CJTF had to mobilize to provide security. But for them, there would have been total breakdown of law and order" (Oral Interview, 2016).

It was observed that one reason why the CJTF became so effective in complementing the efforts of the security forces against Boko Haram, besides their local knowledge, and the courage and determination showed by the group members, was the reliance on local charms and other forms of "supernatural powers" which worked for the group. A respondent averred:

They don't have sophisticated weapons, but they have supernatural powers. In

Gombi, Boko Haram members were captured without any gunshot. Also, when they came to Mubi, the Boko Haram members with guns did not have the strength to even aim and shoot. They were dragging their legs as if they were zombies or like they were drunk or slumbering. That is how they left the place without shooting a gun (Oral Interview, 2016).

It is difficult to empirically prove the above assertion on the effectiveness of charms and spiritual powers. However, as Owumi and Ajayi(2013) and Anderson (2014) have argued, traditional medicine, charms and other indigenous resources are commonly used for crime control across African societies and their efficacy is not in doubt. But proving them remains an area of mystery for science. Nonetheless, the CJTF was effective in complementing the Nigerian defence and security forces. Wielding local charms, swords, bow and arrow and locally made guns, the members frontally engaged Boko Haram and became a central part of local security across the North East. Their presence was evident after every few kilometres in some communities in Maiduguri and Damaturu. They equally worked side-by-side with soldiers at checkpoints in the studied locations.

Limitations of the CJTF

The initial challenge that confronted the CJTF was that of acceptance by the Nigerian military. The CJTF campaign reflected poorly on the military's ability to defeat Boko Haram. Indeed, it is symptomatic of state weakness when vigilante groups begin to perform some key functions of institutional law enforcement agencies. However, with the support it enjoyed from the local population and the Borno State government, and indeed, the familiarity with the local environment, it became clear that the CJTF was a strategic asset that the military could utilize in its counter-terrorism efforts against the sect (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2017).

There was also the problem of identification and coordination of the activities of the CJTF. When the group began to confront Boko Haram, it had no official identification prompting fears that Boko Haram militants might have infiltrated the group. This also accounted for the reluctance by the military to publicly associate with the CJTF. The inability to identify members of the CJTF resulted in harassments against them by the military (Hassan &Pieri, 2018). One way the Borno State chapter of the vigilante group dealt with the challenge of identification was to officially register with the Corporate Affairs Commission under the name of Borno Youth for Peace and Justice. Its members were equally issued identification cards and trained in vigilante

duties. As partnership with the military improved, the military trained CJTF members on low-level combats and provided them with AK-47 rifles for use during operation (Oral Interview, 2016).

The CJTF members were equally accused of human rights abuses and extortion of members of the public. The CJTF initially started operations with full commitment and respect for civil rights and the oath of integrity and honesty that they swore to uphold. A key requirement of membership, as stated earlier, was honesty and a pledge not to abuse the rights of the innocent. Over time, the CJTF members lost touch with this pledge. Centre for Democracy and Development (2017) alleged that CJTF members not only violated the rights of the locals through physical abuse, they also extorted members of the public at roadblocks and stole from the local population. Corroborating these allegations, Sheikh Goni, a Maiduguri-based cleric claimed that CJTF members connived with security personnel to commit acts of human rights violations:

Initially, they (CJTF) worked with full commitment. If you put money in their pocket, they won't collect it. But corruption infiltrated them. It was also discovered that members of the security agencies such as the Police and others connived with the CJTF to defraud innocent people. They have been contaminated. All manner of useless people—thieves, drug addicts, drunkards—are now part of the CJTF (Oral Interview, 2016).

These acts negatively affected public perception of the CJTF. It affected the trust that the public had for them prompting a number of analysts to argue that some members of the CJTF were no different from Boko Haram militants and the soldiers who had no regard for the dignity and safety of innocent civilians (Hassan & Pieri, 2018). Nevertheless, as Sheikh Goni further added, the CJTF remained useful in the fight against Boko Haram, though there was the need for reforms within the group to enable it maintain the right committed to defeating Boko Haram.

Furthermore, the CJTF activities inadvertently escalated Boko Haram violence against CJTF members and the public. By June 2017, Boko Haram had already murdered about 680 members of the CJTF in Borno State alone (*Punch*, 30 June, 2017). In a bid to dissuade the civilian population from giving support to the CJTF or joining the group, Boko Haram increased its attacks on heavily populated civilian communities. Its unrelenting attacks on Bama and Baga communities in Borno State between May 2013 and 2015 are a few examples. Boko Haram was

said to have murdered close to 2,000 civilians in Baga and environs within this period, with the intention of deterring them from joining the CJTF (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Yet, its wave of attacks had the unintended consequence of changing the people's perception of Boko Haram. Those who might have had a soft spot for Boko Haram, thinking it was fighting a just cause, and probably considered enlisting into the group, had a change of mind after witnessing the sect's brutality. In fact, Hassan and Pieri (2018) contend that rather than intimidating them, Boko Haram's viciousness prompted many civilians to join the CJTF and support government's war against Boko Haram and boosting collaborative engagements between the CJTF and government forces.

Lack of funding, poor logistics and inadequate equipment were other challenges. The Borno State Coordinator of the CJTF noted that the group was not adequately supported particularly by the Federal Government. Much of the support it got came from the State Government which provided them with about 80 operational vehicles, free medical care for members and irregular allowance of fifteen thousand naira monthly. The best the group got from the Federal Government was when about thirty of its members were employed by the Department of State Services (DSS). The Nigerian Army also employed about two hundred and fifty members of the group while providing a number of others with requisite combat raining (Oral Interview, 2016).

There was also frequent breakdown of relationship between the CJTF and security agencies, particularly, the military. The CJTF leaders identified frequent and undue arrest of its leaders and members as a major stumbling block to effective synergy between the group and the military. The military authorities occasionally accused some members of the CJTF of belonging to Boko Haram. The CJTF accused some military top commanders of deliberately sabotaging the anti-Boko Haram operation for pecuniary gains by creating problems with the CJTF. In one case, the Borno CJTF accused a ranking military commander of destabilizing the cordial relationship it had with the military by labeling their members as Boko Haram. The fractious relationship got heated at the end of 2016 when a senior leader of the CJTF was arrested by the military: According to a CJTF leader:

My Commander General was also arrested. We called a meeting of all the local governments, about 1000 members attended and were ready to go and drop our vehicles at the Shehu's Palace to give to the Governor that we will not work again. Most of our boys were ready to leave the job. They (the military) told us

that they will pick us one by one. If this man (the military commander) remains here, things will not go well. We have committed ourselves to help our country and it has now become a crime to do so (Oral Interview, 2016).

Lack of trust remained one of the biggest issues between the military and the CJTF. It hampered smooth relationship and collaboration between both parties. While it may not be out of place that Boko Haram members might have infiltrated the ranks of the CJTF, unrelenting suspicion, arrest and detention of the members by the military without coordination with the leadership of the CJTF continued to fuel discord. This in turn affected the willingness of the group to provide the military with necessary intelligence and other forms of assistance which would have been very useful in the counter-terrorism operation against Boko Haram.

Conclusion

The CJTF anti-Boko Haram campaign recorded significant success against the terrorist group. However, there is the concern about what becomes of the group as the country plans towards a post-insurgency and peacebuilding environment in the North-East. If not properly managed, the group could become a threat to peace and security in the region. Already, there are questions about its *modus operandi*. Its members have been accused of committing several acts of human rights violations including assaults, rape and extra-judicial killings. A further concern is that the group—which has hobnobbed with politicians and political parties in the past (see ICG, 2017)—could turn out to be mercenaries in the hands of politicians and used as agents of political violence.

Thus, a clear decision needs to be made regarding the future of the CJTF. Effective post-conflict plan is imperative. Deliberate efforts must be made to ensure that its members are properly disarmed, rehabilitated and reintegrated into the society. As the group is largely made up of unemployed youths and those who left their previous jobs to join the CJTF, it is imperative to ensure that they are productively engaged either in their previous occupations or elsewhere after being disengaged from their current security duties. If abandoned by the government, the CJTF combatants who believe that they won the insurgency war for the country, could become disenchanted and turn to communal violence and organized crime. With combat experience and training in weapon handling, they could prove just as dangerous as the Boko Haram insurgents.

Though the government has already absorbed a number of its members into the military and other security agencies, evidence remains lacking in terms of a concrete government policy aimed at reintegrating the CJTF. Hence, beyond absorbing some of its members into the formal security agencies, the CJTF should be formed into local community watch groups to provide local security assistance to the regular security agencies. It could function within the framework of community policing and help to watch out for crimes and other suspicious behaviours and assist in managing them. It is a strategy that can help provide the military and local law enforcement with additional eyes and ears to watch out for Boko Haram terrorists and all other criminal activities thereby promoting community security.

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ACSRT Africa Terrorism Dossier

The threat of terrorism in Africa at the time of Covid-19 Pandemic

I. Introduction

1. Understandably, many actors around the globe have used the humanitarian crisis caused by COVID-19 to call for humanity to put aside their differences and to form a unified front to better focus and combat the challenges presented by the pandemic. Specifically, they have been using the timing of the moment to call for the cessation of armed conflicts that are plaguing the globe. The theme of our Meeting today, therefore reflects the desire of the continent to give up arms and fight together against the COVID-19 pandemic.
2. The calamities linked to COVID-19 have captured the attention of governments and citizens, since its emergence in late 2019 and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. The pandemic has also become an important topic for terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida and the so-called Islamic State. Both groups have publicly commented on the virus, offered their own take on the situation and have even proffered advice on how to mitigate its effect through issuing a set of "*Sharia directives to deal with epidemics*"¹ advising their members to hand-wash and keep away from infected areas- which to some extent mirrors the social distancing and quarantining measures spelt out and advocated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
3. It is also important to note that both groups, ISIS and Al-Qaida, have issued statements urging their supporters to exploit the situation for recruitment, planning and stepping up attacks, thus ignoring the calls for peace and unity.

II. Threat Assessment

4. Reports on terrorist activity across the globe in general and in Africa in particular have indeed highlighted heightened efforts by extremist groups to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to advance their agendas, consolidate their positions, entrench their roots into communities, extend their tentacles, and attract new members to expand their support base and strengthen their ranks.

¹The group advises "followers to cover the mouth when yawning and sneezing". The group also encouraged hand-washing and said that the "healthy should not enter the land of the epidemic and the afflicted should not exit from it".

5. Groups such as Boko Haram, JNIM, ISGS, ISWAP and Al-Shabaab have undeniably stepped up attacks in their zones of operations, while terrorists affiliated to the so-called IS also claimed new territory in Mozambique. ADF also continues its deadly attacks against Civilians and Defense and Security Force in Eastern DRC.
6. Indeed, as the world's attention turns almost completely to the COVID-19 pandemic, the battle against terrorism in Africa has taken one of its deadliest turns yet. From January to April 2020, the Continent recorded a total of 508 terrorist attacks resulting in 2,938 deaths², in comparison with the same period in 2019, where 497 terrorist attacks and 2,584 deaths were recorded; representing a 2.21% increase in the number of attacks and 13.70% increase in deaths. This demonstrates that terrorist did not lose any of their operational capabilities, even more, this shows that their degree of lethality has increased.
7. While the first three months of the year 2020 witnessed consistent monthly increases in terrorist attacks and deaths, there was a drastic decline in both number of terrorist attacks and deaths in April³, whereby ninety-nine terrorist attacks that led to 529 deaths were registered, thus representing 35% and 44% declines in the number of attacks and deaths respectively. The decline in number of terrorist attacks and deaths in April could be attributed to a number of factors including vigorous counter-terrorism operations in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), the *Liptako-Gourma* region and Mozambique.
8. Since the beginning of the year, the Sahel Belt of West Africa has recorded the highest number of terrorist attacks and casualties compared to the rest of the Continent. For the first four months of the year, the region has recorded 211 terrorist attacks that resulted in 1,098 deaths. For the said period, central Africa recorded seventy-nine attacks and 557 deaths, East and Horn of Africa recorded seventy-seven that led to 243 deaths while the Lake Chad Basin recorded fifty-nine terrorist attacks and 500 deaths. Southern and North Africa regions recorded lesser numbers of terrorist attacks and deaths compared to other regions. There were sixteen attacks leading to 148 deaths Southern Africa, specifically in Mozambique and ten attacks that resulted thirty deaths in North Africa.
9. The five most affected countries in the first four months of 2020 were Mali, the DRC, Nigeria, Somalia and Niger. While Mali registered 118 attacks and 375 deaths during the period, the DRC recorded seventy-nine attacks and 557 deaths, Nigeria recorded sixty-one attacks and 415 deaths, Somalia sixty-one attacks and 211 deaths and Niger registered thirty attacks and 341 deaths.
10. Some of the high-profile attacks recorded during the period include the 3rd of January

²²Out of the 508 attacks, 299 were civilian targets, 183 targeted Military/Security establishments, 15 targeted Government Institutions/Officials while 11 targeted International Organizations. Of the 2,938 deaths, 1,459 were civilians, 815 military/security whereas 664 were terrorist.

³In January, 122 terrorist attacks that led to 715 deaths were recorded. In February there were 139 terrorist attacks and 748 deaths representing an of 14% and 5% decrease in attacks and deaths respectively. In March 2020, the number of terrorist attacks rose by 10% whilst deaths increased by 24%. They were 153 terrorist attacks and 944 deaths.

attack in *Tillaberi* Region, Niger where an unidentified group attacked a military camp killing eighty-nine soldiers. The 23rd of March ambush on a military truck in *Gorgi* village, *Borno* State, Nigeria led to the death of seventy Nigerian soldiers. The 23rd of March invasion of a military base in *Boma* Island in the Lake Chad region of Chad by Boko Haram fighters resulted in the killing of ninety-eight Chadian soldiers and injuring of fifty others. The 7th of April attack in *Xitaxi, Cabo Delgado*, Mozambique by *Al-Sunnah Wa-Jammah* (ASWJ) terrorists killed fifty-two young men who has refused to join their ranks.

11. During the first four months of the year, the most active terrorist groups were *Al-Shabaab*, *Boko Haram*, *Islamic State West Africa Province* (ISWAP), *Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen* (JNIM), *Islamic State in the Greater Sahara* (ISGS), *Islamic Central Africa Province* (ISCAP), and *Allied Democratic Forces* (ADF). While *Al-Shabaab* recorded sixty seven attacks that resulted in 135 deaths, *Boko Haram* recorded thirty six attacks that resulted in 231 deaths, *ADF* recorded seventeen attacks and 161 deaths, *ISWAP* recorded fifteen attacks and seventy deaths, *JNIM* recorded eight attacks and sixty three deaths, *ISCAP* recorded seven attacks and 107 deaths, and *ISGS* recorded three attacks that resulted in a single death.
12. Terrorists have employed increasingly sophisticated tactics in recent months as they have driven deeper into Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso whereby they attacked army bases and dominated villages with surprising force. They are destroying infrastructure, assassinating local leaders and assaulting key army posts in coordinated strikes to alienate government from the people.
13. They exploit border areas to meet in forested hideouts, to plan ambushes and attacks, share intelligence and exchange battle tips, including how to make roadside bombs, particularly near the tri state border of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.
14. To some worrying degree, it is noteworthy that despite the support from the international community, *JNIM*, *ISGS*, and other extremist groups appear to be gaining ground by exploiting longstanding grievances in the region, *inter alia*, poor governance, perceived neglect of vast areas of territory, and existing inter-ethnic tensions (often emanating from scarcity of resources).
15. While the spread of terrorism and violent extremism on the continent is worrisome, it is even more alarming to see terror groups exploiting the outbreak of COVID-19 to spread their propaganda messages as well as utilize diverse social media platforms to spread extremist ideologies and boost recruitment. They are occupying as much space as they are occupying both the physical and the virtual or cyber space.
16. Indeed, terrorist groups can seize the situation to their advantage in specifically the battle of winning the hearts and minds of populations. Where governments are already struggling in providing basic services to communities, extremists could step in to fill the "*humanitarian vacuum*" created by the COVID-19 outbreak, by increasing service provision (medical, water and food), acting as the de facto authority, and building on

that popular support, for their cause and proto-states.

17. The COVID pandemic can also offer other opportunities to terrorist and violent extremist groups. Some of which are highlighted below:

- i. **Radicalization.** The terror groups, such as ISIS and Al-Qaida have historically capitalized on natural disasters as supposed proof that God is supporting them in targeting their enemies— impressing upon followers that if a natural disaster causes this much suffering, terrorist action can bring about similar destruction using man-made methods. Indeed, the so-called ISIS had initially gloated over the COVID-19 pandemic in its al-Naba magazine, describing it as a punishment for “*crusader nations*». While we witness a rise of xenophobia acts, with some linked to COVID-19 pandemic, we also need to ponder the possibilities of the emergence of ultra-national extremist/terror groups on the continent.
- ii. **Financing.** While Kidnapping-For-Ransom and drug-trafficking continue to finance terrorist organizations, illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources are emerging as a major sources of terrorism financing in Africa. The COVID-19 pandemic can lead to an increase in COVID-19-related crimes, including fraud, cybercrime, misdirection or exploitation of government funds or international financial assistance. These new sources of proceeds for illicit actors are being exploited by terrorist and transnational crime organizations.
- iii. **Weaponizing the virus.** There are increasing worries that terrorists could try to weaponize their own virus by trying to infect other people. They might use children and women as potential carriers as well as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and Refugee Camps as contamination centers or Hubs.
- iv. **Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime Nexus:** As countries around the globe continue to maintain their borders closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, thus increasingly restricting the movement of goods and people, transnational organized crime and terrorist groups will likely increase their exploitation of the security *vacuum* created by the shift in attention. They will look for new zones of exploitation, and that will include the cyber domain, the cyber domain, money laundering, and diversion of funds to finance their operations. For example, by exploiting economic incentive measures and insolvency schemes as a means for natural and legal persons to conceal and launder illicit proceeds or misuse and misappropriate domestic and international financial aid and emergency funding;

18. Despite these challenges, our collective fight against terrorism and violent extremism has been resolute. Our Member States have not remained idle especially those at the receiving end of terrorist attacks. This is demonstrated by the continued offensive operations undertaken across the continent such as the most recent offensive against Boko Haram by the Chadian forces as part of the MNJTF and the AMISOM offensive in *Janale*; Operation *Comoé* jointly undertaken by troops from Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina

Faso to flush out terrorists and violent extremists from the border area; and Operation *Lafiya Dole*, in which Nigerian troops are battling terrorists in the Northeastern part of the country. We can only encourage the Member States to continue, with the help of the International Community, their relentless fight against terrorist groups and criminal networks, including drug traffickers, to eliminate and deny them the opportunity to further take advantage of the difficult situation posed by, *inter alia*, the COVID-19 pandemic.

III. Recommendations

19. It is our conviction that the fight against terrorism will continue unabated as we encourage our defense and security forces to adhere to necessary precautionary measures. We salute the continuous and active implementation by the Commission of the 792nd Assembly decision to support the fight against terrorism in the Sahel through the eventual deployment of 3,000 troops, which will certainly make its positive impact felt across the region. We also salute the adoption by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of a new working method to remain seized with the continued efforts of the Commission while providing guidance and the much-needed policy frameworks to better respond to both the security challenges and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
20. While the COVID-19 pandemic poses multitudes of challenges to the peace and security landscape, it also provides us with opportunities to harness our efforts towards working decisively to end violent conflicts on the continent and address their root causes. We need to think outside the box and allow ourselves the space to engage in innovative ways to Silencing the Guns in Africa, even those guns carried by Terrorists and Violent Extremists:
 - i. We need to engage terrorists and violent extremists in dialogue and encourage them to surrender, in particular those that have been forcibly enrolled into the ranks of these groups. At the same time we need to demonstrate as much resoluteness to eradicate the root causes conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism as the resolute demonstrated to combat the threat altogether;
 - ii. We need more innovation and partnerships to help prevent the spread of terrorism and violent extremism at national, regional and continental levels, using available resources;
 - iii. We need to move beyond predominantly military action to include soft approaches;
 - iv. With the multitude of security arrangements and forces operating within regions, in particular in the Sahel, we need to set-up proper and stronger coordination

between the different forces operating in the field and clarity with regard to command and control.

IV. Conclusion

21. As the burden of the COVID-19 pandemic spreads further into the Africa, the potential for terrorist groups to continue to exploit existing vulnerabilities to gain support and strength will likely increase. It is vital that neither the concerned Member States in the different regions, their neighboring countries, the RECs nor the international community turn their focus away from countering the threat that such groups pose. Continued cooperation and more comprehensive approaches that address the underlying drivers of radicalization towards terrorism and violent extremism are necessary to stop the further spread of terrorist activity in Africa. Without such concerted efforts, the spread of COVID-19 will serve to reinforce the frustrations and grievances that have allowed these groups to gain a foothold in the first place, and will render the challenge of preventing and successfully combating terrorism and violent extremism more difficult than ever. Our collective action and cooperation is needed now more than ever to silence the guns on our continent.