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Published under the authority of H.E. Ambassador Ismail CHERGUI, African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security
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Editorial

*Shaping Response to Terrorism, Violent Extremism and Related Crimes: A Perspective*

Terrorism and Violent Extremism (VE) have become twin scourges that the international community is having to deal with. In the case of Africa, a review of the unfolding situation of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in the continent presents a story of various heinous atrocities against individuals and communities. These atrocities have in large measure been ascribed to armed groups linked or affiliated to or thriving on the ideals of the so called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al Qaida and similar organizations that are now known to have a foot hold in Africa.

The Arab Spring, the subsequent escalation of activities of armed groups as well as the phenomenon of transnational and trans-border organized crime in many parts of the continent have all contributed to the creation of fear and a general destabilization and disorientation of the ways of life of various communities across the continent threatening, as a consequence, the very fabric of our societies. Terrorism and Violent Extremism have thus become a matter of grave concern on the continent.

The Arab Spring could be said to have undermined the National Security systems and capabilities of a number of Northern African and Sahel region countries, gravely disrupting the normal way of life of the local communities. This brought the efficacy and resilience capabilities of the National Security systems of a number of these countries into question. The situation indeed could be said to have served as a vehicle for the resurgence and revitalization of the same concept of operations used by the first generation of Jihadist groups of the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts. The way the Arab Spring evolved and the space the situation created could also be said to have reinforced the confidence of terrorist groups in the Northern African and Sahel regions of Africa as well as the Horn of Africa.
to confront and seek to destabilize the political status quo in these regions.

Terrorist groups continue to visit mayhem on local communities in many parts of Africa in spite of several efforts by stakeholders to address the situation. Some stakeholders and practitioners are thus of the view that unless response based on the prevention of violent extremism is properly shaped, effectively coordinated and delivered with a root cause approach that derives from the competing narratives, the whole terrorism phenomenon could become even more hydra headed and spread to new territories in Africa.

Alongside the resurgence of terrorist activity, transnational crime in the form of, inter alia, arms, drugs, commodities and human trafficking by criminal networks has tended to worsen the already precarious situation. The reliance by these international criminal networks of the operational concepts of territorial dominance the spread of fear and control of mobility corridors with control points across States, have made their trafficking activities quite lucrative and entrenched. The members of these networks have also become very influential within the communities in which they operate. The rather negative knock-on effect this could have on the vulnerable youth of these communities who are looking for opportunity, a means of livelihood or fame has become an issue of concern.

This control of community space by these criminal networks does undermine the rule of law and the confidence of the local community in the ability of State institutions to protect them. In addition, it reinforces the crave to emulate the use of extreme violence as an effective and generally acceptable means of redress and accomplishment within the community. Violence and the taken up of arms has become the norm in expressing grievances in many communities.

The historical and ideological, cultural and religious, political and governance, economic and existential drivers and enablers of these phenomena of Violent Extremism, Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime as well as their linkages have become a priority matter of grave concern to policy makers and a subject of study to practitioners and
researchers in the field of Peace and Security in Africa. A Whole-of-Society approach aimed at primarily at prevention with human security undertones has been advocated for the shaping of appropriate response. At its 2000 Summit in Sirte, Libya the African Union took human security into account in its African security policy. It entails a global approach that links security, governance and development issues.

Under the circumstances and in addition to efforts being made by the African Union (AU) within the context of its Peace and Security Architecture, as well as the efforts of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes are considered as cardinal initiatives by the AU that should reinforce AU member states’ efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism in line with the tenets of the UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action for the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE). Indeed the need to synergise efforts in order to find sustainable solutions to the various challenges posed by terrorism and violent extremism has become a very essential one.

The vulnerabilities of local communities which have become the targets/battle fields of terrorist/violent extremist groups or which are likely to fall prey to them therefore require in-depth examination for their protection and return to normalcy, their empowerment and the replacement of their vulnerabilities with the required resilience that will guarantee normal life in dignity for the affected citizenry and their communities.

The architecture and structuring of the appropriate response for the prevention/countering of this phenomenon of violent extremism is therefore key to the development of member state Plans of Action for P/CVE. No two situations are the same as to the factors that inform the thriving of violent extremism in different communities differ. The shaping of response can therefore be a rather complex endeavour entailing a calculated mix of law enforcement and military as well as root cause human security based approaches. The fact that response needs to be shaped in consideration of human rights, appropriate legislation and in line with local conditions would
thus support the need for all AU member states to ratify all the relevant international and continental legal instruments and adopt a community context driven approach in P/CVE Plan of Action formulation and indeed the involvement of the target community in such plan formulation and implementation as a sine qua non condition for success.

The UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action for the Prevention of Violent Extremism provides a formidable framework for such response formulation and implementation. In line with this framework, one could say that the concept of developing alternative/counter narratives and messages which are then persistently and consistently advocated and propagated by credible voices from within the communities that are to be protected is a very essential element in the response mix for success and in generating the required critical resilience that the community requires for success in this response formulation and implementation endeavour.

Considering that the youth are the main target for recruitment by terrorist and violent extremist groups, it would be necessary in the shaping of appropriate response to focus on the youth. A critical review of the educational curricula and activities concerned with the upbringing of the youth that seek to empower them to think independently with a basic orientation of patriotism, love of country and a motivation to preserve the way of life of the communities to which they belong could be one major area of focus. The empowerment of the youth with opportunity and the hope that they could achieve their life ambitions therefore appears to be a critical element in the response formulation.

There is also a need for a gendered approach in countering radicalization and violent extremism targeting young women who are increasingly making voluntary choices to join terrorist groups, and present themselves as Jihadi brides. Evidently there is an urgent need for concerted cooperation at community, national, regional and international levels.

As human values are put to test by disheartening incidents perpetrated by immoral people who are intentionally haunting global peace and
security, it is our duty to develop effective counter narratives by using every means available to us to create synergies that proactively confront these phenomena of violent extremism and radicalization. Surely, no single entity or individual can harness all the effort needed.

The whole-of-society approach to P/CVE requires planning that derives from the rule of law, human rights, equal opportunity and inclusiveness. The implications of this for the role and function of good and accountable governance as well as the tenets of healthy political activity based on free, fair and transparent elections cannot be overemphasized.

The political will of AU member states, particularly those who have not yet had any terrorist attacks on their territories, to take seriously the matter of developing the appropriate legislation and structures as well as formulate their Plans of Action for the Prevention of Violent Extremism is a critical existential necessity.

The ACSRT/CAERT looks forward in the coming year to continue to contribute its quota in building the capacity of AU member states in their quest to overcome the heinous phenomena of Violent Extremism and Terrorism. We also take this opportunity to express our sincere gratitude to our experts spread all over the continent for their continuous support to the Centre and for their contribution of articles to this journal.
THE WIDENING UNIVERSE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: 
AN EXPLANATORY DISCOURSE ON REVOLUTION, 
GUERRILLA WARS AND TERRORISM

Tunde Agara 1

Introduction

Right from the history of societies and organised political life, the institutions, persons and policies of rulers have often inspired violent objections in their subjects (McKay et al 2007, Craig et al, 2009). Most often, the rulers using the apparatus of the state have equally resisted every attempt against their rule. Therefore, the history of societies is the history of force begets force and thus, the twin phenomena of force and violence are not isolated nor are they new to political communities. Throughout history, these two, including terror, have represented means by which political power more often than not has been wielded. They manifest by inciting fear. So the use of force and violence coupled with terror can be said to have begun at the very birth of organised society either as a means of dissuasion, conviction or punishment. The regularity with which force and violence occur, their omnipresence, do suggest that there is a vital connection between them and the contemporary political process. Whenever and wherever it occurs, political violence or conflict signifies a disturbance in the political equilibrium of a state, a breakdown of the political system.

Perhaps more than any other arena, the political system has posited a veritable ground for conflicts and violence primarily because the political system provides the best avenue for bringing people into contact with each other to vie for access to and acquire power. This power perspective has been the focus of the Realist school which

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views human interaction as taking place within a power arena, and the possession of power becoming a scarce resource which can engender frustration in the one who does not possess or is denied it. Zartman (1991:370) has equally observed that conflict is the result of interaction among people; “an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions and an expression of the basic fact of human interdependence”. Coser (1956:121) has also argued that conflict occurs when two or more people engage in a struggle over values and claims to status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. Coser (1956:8) further explained that conflict emerges whenever one party perceives that one or more valued goals or means of achieving these valued goals is being threatened or hindered by another party or parties or by their activities. These perceived threats occur, especially if both parties are seeking to expand into the same field or physical sphere or the same field of influence or behaviours. In consonant with this, Stagner (1995:53) has observed that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always suggests the existence of frustration which always leads to some form of conflict. Thus, violence as an instrument of political power also lends itself to private use for private gains by individuals. However, as opposed to its private use, violence has been categorised into three types according to its causes; (i) those that arise as a result of or from spontaneous causes, from a chance concatenation of events, (ii) those that develop because of the breakdown of the process of law enforcement and (iii) those that occur from the deliberate result of organisation, either by government or by groups (Leiden and Schmitt, 1968:19).

While most acts of violence have negligible effects on political life, some have had enormous destructive effects on human life and corrosive of political institutions. Despite this, it still remains to be noted that political violence has oftentimes led to the creation of a better, new and more satisfying political life and communities. The aftermath of the American, Mexican, Turkish and Russian revolutions
testify to this statement. Our concern in this paper is with violence that has political connotations and aspirations. We note that the universe of political violence and the repertoires of insurgent groups have changed and become enlarged with modernity and political struggles have acquired new methods of insurgencies such that insurgent violence have now taken many forms such as revolution, coup d’état, guerrilla wars, terrorism and riots. However, while all these manifest as forms of insurgent violence, not all of them have equal potency and organisational dexterity necessary for effecting political change. It is in this respect that this paper is singling out revolution, guerrilla war and terrorism for discussion and leaving out riots and coup d’état which seem to be popular only within and among Third World nations as the preferred mode of struggle. Of course, this is not to be misconstrued as saying that guerrilla war, terrorism and revolution are alien to the Third World communities which are fast adding them to their repertoire of forms of struggle, but only to emphasise on the universality of these modes of struggles.

The paper is structured into four sections. The first section introduces the paper; the second section focuses on exploring the universe of political violence and classifying it according to the initiator of the violence and the targets of the violence. The third section looks at the manifestation of political violence and qualifies guerrilla war, revolution and terrorism as strategies of political insurgency. The last section concludes and relates these three to the African environment.

The Universe of Political Violence

In the opening page of his seminal work Why Men Rebel, Gurr (1971:3) characterised political violence as including “all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors – including competing political groups as well as incumbents – or its policies.” Political violence now serves as means of expressing
and articulating political demands or opposing undesirable policies or generally seeking for change in the personnel. Usually political violence becomes an option when all other constitutional and judicial means of articulating or expressing demands are close, unreceptive or unavailable to those to whom the demands are important. Thus, political violence provides an extra-constitutional means of expressing grievances whether real or imaginary and hence theoretically, it poses a threat to the political system in two ways; (i) it challenges the monopoly of force imputed to the state and control by it and (ii) in functional term, it is capable of interfering with, and if severe, to destroy the normal political processes of the state.

Theories abound as to the cause or causes of political violence. Gottschalk (1971:99) has defined ‘cause’ as “that from which something known as the result proceeds and without which the thing known as the result cannot happen.” From this definition, four attributes of ‘cause’ can be discerned. First, cause must be antecedent to result in chronological order, .Second, there must be a logical interrelationship or concurrence between the antecedent and the result. Third, the cause must be sufficient to bring about the result and finally, where a single antecedent suffices to explain the cause-result relationship, it alone is the cause. Although a discussion of the niceties of causation is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that analysts have attempted to proffer reasons for political violence. For instance, Davies’s (1971:177) Need Satisfaction - J-Curve theory is an attempt to combine Marx’s theory with that of de Tocqueville. In elaborating on this, Davies postulated that “it is the dis-satisfied state of mind rather than the tangible provision of adequate or inadequate supplies of food, equality or liberty which produces violence (revolution).” His synthesised theory asserts that the most dangerous time for social unrest or violent challenge of the status quo is when a sustained period of improving conditions is followed by a sudden, sharp setback. The period of improvement in the social condition of the people may give
them false hope that all is well and that they should be expecting that things will continue to improve. Thus, when conditions change and setback sets in, it causes more distress than if it had followed a period of unchanged conditions.

In the same vein, Berkowitz (1962) had identified aggression as the cause of violence but Gurr (1971) had elaborated further on this. Gurr argued that violence results principally because of deprivation and the accompanying frustration that it engenders. Based on this, Gurr formulated his famous frustration-anger-aggression theory. He argued that the magnitude of violence is proportionally related to the level of frustration-aggression that exists in the political system. Better put, the basic frustration-aggression proposition is that the greater the frustration, the greater the quantity of aggression against the source of frustration. His postulation provides us with a motivational base and cause for political violence: the greater the intensity of deprivation, the greater the magnitude of violence. Thus, intense frustration acts as both motivation and cause for men to either engage in intense, short term attacks or to more prolonged, less severe attacks on their frustraters or the source of their frustration. An extension of Gurr’s argument is the relative deprivation-violence casual relationship. Feelings of relative deprivation arise when a person compares his past, present and expected future condition. Thus, Gurr argued that the aggressive behaviour and violence arise not because people are poor or deprived in some absolute sense, but because they feel deprived relative to others, or relative to their expectations of what they should have. In axiomatic terms, this suggests that the proportion of the population that will be involved in violence is proportionate to the average intensity of the deprivation. In other words, mild deprivation will only succeed in motivating a few of the population, moderate deprivation will involve more people and very intense deprivation will push a large segment of the political community over the threshold. Therefore, in understanding the nature, extent and magnitude of political violence a state is likely
to be subjected to, certain variables have to be taken into account: (i) is the extent of people’s participation within the political system being studied (scope), (ii) the destructiveness of action (intensity) and, (iii) the length of time the violence persists (duration).

However, in the final analysis, whichever tactics is eventually chosen to prosecute the violence will depend on certain factors such as the anticipated goal of the insurgents, opportunity available to them and the level of their fear of retribution. Using the variables of initiator of violence and the targets of violence and distinguishing between states and citizens, the universe of political violence has increased to include violence perpetrated by states against states, states against citizens, citizens against citizens and citizens against states. We shall briefly discuss each of these universes of violence.

**States against States**

Violence initiated by a state against another state usually takes the form of a conventional war, two opposing regular armies confronting each other. Strategists have differentiated between regular and irregular wars (Gray, 2007:245). The history of the world societies is replete with such violence. In violence of this type between states, a plethora of means have been used to prosecute such wars and this had led to more and more mechanisation of war, what Gray (2007:115) had called “the technical development of armies, air forces and navies.” Wars between states have led to the manufacturing and hence proliferation of not only small arms but also weapons of mass destruction. However, violence between states have not always been through regular conventional wars, other lower levels of violence such as limited air strikes, command raids, or even assassination of enemy agents have been employed. However, in all instances of violence between states, these acts are characterised by being organised and planned and they reflect the capability of large bureaucracies.
Violence between states varies widely in terms of severity (the extent of casualties and destruction experienced) and scope (the number of participants and armaments involved). The conflict between states ranged over many issues and for many reasons. Holsti (1991) has identified 177 wars and major armed interventions between states between 1648 and 1989. Eriksson and Wallensteen (2004) have added to the list from 1989. Among the issues identified as causing the spates of violence that the world has witnessed from 1648 to 2003 was violence as a result of territorial disputes which had become the single most common reason since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Secondly, the wars of decolonisation following the aftermath of the Second World War. Prominent examples are Netherlands in Indonesia (1945-1949), France in Vietnam (1946-1954), Tunisia (1952-1956), Morocco (1953-1956), and Algeria (1954-1962) and by Britain in Palestine (1946-1948), the Malay Archipelago (1948-1960) and Cyprus (1955-1960) and by Portugal in Guinea (1962-1974), Mozambique (1965-1975) and Angola (1968-1974). The number of wars fought showed that decolonisation had not been a peaceful transition. Thirdly, wars related to economic issues, involving commercial navigation, access to resources, colonial competition and protection of commercial interests. The first instance of this type was the Anglo-Dutch war (1665-1667). Finally, wars fought as a result of differences in ideas and ideology. This type of conflict and violence became prominent after the Second World War. Other forms of conflict which are not discussed here are the diplomatic ones such as blockades, economic sanctions, trade embargoes and freezing of a nation’s and its’ nationals’ foreign accounts.

**States against Citizens**

The manifestation of violence by the state against its citizens can be at two levels. The first is through the overt legal process by which the state enforces its laws and ensures its citizens’ compliance with its laws, rules and regulations. By this the state is merely asserting its internal
sovereignty and power over its citizens. The power of the state in this regard includes statutory processes for sanctioning and punishing erring citizens who may infringe on any of the laws. The second means of exercising violence against the citizen is through the clandestine use of illegal violence designed to intimidate and terrorise citizens with the intention of preventing them from opposing the government and disobeying or contravening the state’s laws. Two ways have been used by states to perpetrate this kind of violence. The first is by enacting draconian laws aimed at subjecting and conditioning the citizens psychologically and physically to succumb and cajole them. The second way is by physically annihilating or assassinating opposition through the use of special security forces. For instance, “death squads” were created and manned by members of the security forces. In Nigeria, under Babaginda’s rule and later under Abacha, citizens’ assassination through bomb parcels and other means were not uncommon.

Citizens against Citizens

Apart from petty crimes, the major manifestation of this type of violence is vigilante violence and ethnic or tribal conflicts. Although over 80% of conflicts experienced in the world today are located within Asia and Africa, the violence has always been that of ethnic conflict. The vigilante type emerged primarily because of the inability of the police to control crime and these vigilante groups, at least in Nigeria, later metamorphosed into armed vanguards of their different ethnic groups. However, the most popular form of citizens’ violence against citizens takes the form of ethnic violence. In Nigeria, for instance, this ethnic conflict has been further complicated by religious motivated violence thereby making the divide between ethnic conflict and religious violence difficult to delineate.

Many reasons can be adduced for the eruption of ethnic conflicts. Prominent among these reasons are group loyalty, feelings of
marginalisation and alienation, struggle for access to state power and hence political accommodation, control of group’s destiny and resource control. The Minorities at Risk Project reports that from 1998-2000, 117 countries (about 2/3) were home to substantial ethnic groups that were politically active. In almost half of these states, ethnic groups constituted more than one-quarter of the total population. A total of about 284 groups are actively engaged in one form of violent struggle or the other while 103 groups are participating in sporadic violence against other groups (Russett et al 2006:219). The Rwandan genocide is history’s current tragic illustration of the extreme brutality of unchecked ethnic conflict.

Citizens against States

This is a form of citizens’ expression of discontent against state’s policies or its leadership and may be organised or spontaneous having neither clear political goals nor organised leadership. In its organised form, this type of violence falls under the category of insurgency aimed at overthrowing the government. Conflicts of this nature occur within states but also contain within it the possibility of provoking conflicts between states. For instance, the success of the French Revolution brought fear to other monarchs in Europe and their resentment eventually led to France declaring war against Austria in 1792. In Nigeria, the citizens’ resentment of the state of the nation led to the Biafra War from May 1967 to January 1970.

The Manifestations/Strategies of Political Violence and Insurgency

Contemporary citizen’s violence against the state and political violence can take many or a combination of forms generally known as irregular or unconventional wars such as revolution, coup d’état,
guerrilla war, terrorism, strikes, riots and “intifada”; a term that has gained recent publicity in reference to the Palestinian uprising in the Israeli-controlled territories. As Kaldor (1999:107) had explained, the terms “irregular” or “unconventional” as against “regular” or “conventional” wars, are often used to describe conflicts that do not take the form of mass armies engaging one another on the battlefield, or the traditional air and sea based military operations that support them. We shall now turn to a discussion of three of the most popular of these insurgency tactics or modes of violence.

Guerrilla Wars

“Guerrilla” in Spanish means “small war”, a form of insurgency and violence that is older than conventional war itself. In numerous instances, guerrilla war has been used as the main form of struggle whereas in other instances, it has been used as an auxiliary form of fighting, especially behind enemy lines while the main confrontation between armies in a conventional war is taking place. In both instances, guerrilla war is a diffuse type of war, fought by a relatively inferior combatant force against a qualitatively superior and stronger enemy force. Thus, as a strategy, guerrilla warfare avoids direct, decisive battles and instead, opt for a series of protracted but small clashes and skirmishes where the insurgents’ inferiority in terms of manpower, arms and equipment can be turned into an advantage by adopting flexible hit-and-run tactics and style of warfare. The purpose and the effect of this are not only to wear down the conventional enemy’s force through attrition, but to also prevent it from employing its full qualitative advantage of armaments, number and equipment in the contest. Thus, guerrilla warfare employ raids, ambushes and sabotage from remote and inaccessible bases in mountains, forests, jungles or territory of neighbouring states. Tacticians and theoreticians have however argued that guerrilla warfare should only be adopted as an interim phase of the struggle. The main aim is
that it should enable the insurgents the time to build up a necessary support base and recruitment of manpower for its cause and hence, build a regular army that will eventually win through conventional war (Mao, 1968, Lacquer, 1976). Be that as it may, insurgent groups usually resort to this mode of combat out of necessity borne out of the need to adopt the most cost-effective methods of military combat and political disruption.

Many modern states with regular army also trained troops specifically for irregular warfare. These soldiers are members of an elite group of warriors called ‘special forces’ such as the British’s Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Squadron (SBS), the Americans’ Delta Force (DF), Army Green Berets and Navy SEALS (Sea, Air and Land), and the Russians’ Spetsnaz. As a result of the special training in sabotage, explosives and selective destruction of targets and because cruelty and brutality unmodified and unsanctioned by rules of war under which regular army operates are the enduring characteristics of irregular warfare, these elite military groups actually qualify to be called terrorists-in-uniform.

**Revolution**

More than any other term, revolution has been associated with violence to achieve political means and ends. However, there are two dimensions to its usage. The first connotes it as a strategy of insurgency (means) and the second connotation is as a social or political outcome (ends). This paper is concerned with the first connotation and it is in this regard that revolution is associated with politically motivated violence. Conceptually precise definition of revolution is impossible but nevertheless, its understanding embodies “a deep-seated change, reflected invariably by alterations in the political fabric of society, often consummated through violence and ultimately accompanied by the production of ideology” (Leiden and Schmitt, 1968:3). The term
‘revolution’ as Griewank (1971) has mooted entered into the political science lexicon from astronomy where it is used to mean the oscillation of a planetary body around another and returning later to the initial starting point. Predictably, the reactionary and conservative usage of the term became popular amongst early political scientists who were the first to adopt the term (Leiden and Schmitt, 1968:4). Later conception of revolution as renovation and transformation in the “basic principles of good government” by Machiavelli became popular (Griewank, 1971:20). Marx however, adopted the term and gave it its current meaning as a strategy for effecting violent change in a political system when he asserted that “the next French Revolution will no longer attempt to transfer the bureaucratic-military apparatus from one hand to another, but to smash it,... (emphasis his) (Marx/Lenin, 1975:247)

Although the Orthodox Marxist prescription for a socialist revolution has been discussed elsewhere (Agara and Fayemi, 2005), however, the imperative here to both smash and replace the socio-economic formation with a new one distinguishes a revolution from anarchy and the charge of nihilism arises primarily because of this insistence to smash and destroy the existing system. A revolution as an insurgent strategy is distinguished from a reform, primarily, because of this insistence which seems to make violence a common denominator of revolution. As Majola (1988:100) has put it, “a change or development that takes place within one and the same socio-economic formation is called evolution or reform”. Usually, this kind of social reform or transformation occurs when “the powers-that-be resort to eliminate current contradictions in the social economic life of a country (or to create the impression of trying to resolve them)” (Yermakova and Ratnikov, 1986:153-154). Thus, social reform implies attempt at improving the social and economic life of a country but this attempt is not underpinned by a radical change in either the class character of the society or the ownership of the means of production or in the class composition of those who wield state power. In contrast, social revolution refers to a radical change or
transformation in “all the principal spheres of social life, such as the economy and politics…The principal issue as well as the main feature of (social) revolution consists in the transfer of state power from one class to another which is more progressive and advanced” (Yermakova and Ratnikov 1986: 147-148). The startling difference between a social reform and revolution can be located in the fact that while a social reform comes as a result of intra-class struggle, a social revolution is the end result of internal contradictions between antagonistic classes, that is, inter-class struggle. This is to say that no matter the scope, nature or comprehensiveness of a reform, it fails or falls short of a revolution if it does not smash the existing status-quo and replace it with a better one while at the same time resolving the issue of class antagonism and contradiction. However, as the Feierabends (1966) have noted, the presence of violence (or class struggle) in a community does not in itself mean that a revolution becomes necessarily imminent, but it does suggest that when eventually a revolution takes place, it will be accompanied by much violence.

**Terrorism**

According to Lenin, the purpose of terrorism is to terrorise. It is the only way a small country or people can hope to take on a great nation and have any chance of winning. Terror therefore, becomes a “symbolic act designed to influence political behaviour by extra-normal means, entailing the use or threat of violence” (Thornton, 1964:73). The general contention about terrorism as a weapon of the weak (Crozier 1960:159) has now become contentious with the emergence of the phenomena of state terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism. Russett et al (2006:224) have attempted to make a distinction amongst the traditional (what they refer to as “dissident”) form of terrorism, state (what they refer to as “establishment”) terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism. According to them, state terrorism is the use of terror by the state; “against their own
populations to gain or increase control through fear. Tactics (used in this case) include expulsion or exile, failure to protect some citizens from the crimes of others (as in state-tolerated vigilante groups), arbitrary arrest, beatings, kidnappings (disappearances), torture and murder”, while state-sponsored terrorism means; “...international terrorist activity conducted by states or, more often, the support of terrorist groups through the provision of arms, training, safe haven, or financial backing.”

The emergence and increasing instances of religious-motivated terrorism has equally made it compulsory to differentiate between it and its political counterpart. Although both employ the use of violence, they differ in certain important respects that make it important for a better understanding of the concept. For a terrorist action to qualify as being politically motivated, it must “challenge the state but affect no private rights of innocent parties” (Kittrie, 1981:300). On the other hand, religious motivated terrorism differs from other acts of terrorism primarily because (1) while political terrorism attempts to find a resolution within the life times of the perpetrators, religious terrorism outlives their participants. This is predicated on the belief that the rewards of those involved in this cause are trans-temporal and the time limit of their struggle is eternity. (2) Targets of religious terrorism are not chosen for their military values but rather they are chosen for the sole purpose of making an impact on public consciousness both by its brutality and suddenness. (3) The constant recourse to a ‘god’ to justify their action has the power of ‘satanising’ the enemies while making the perpetrators of religious terrorism ‘godly’. As Juergensmeyer (2004: 34-38) had noted, this is a kind of “perverse performance of power meant to ennable the perpetrators’ views of the world while drawing viewers into their notions of cosmic war”. The effect of this, as he had also noted, is “not so much that religion has become politicised but that politics has become religionised. Through enduring absolutism, worldly struggles have been lifted into the high proscenium of sacred battles”.
(4) The targets of religious terrorism and violence also have the tendency to assume and acquire a similar religious mien, explanation and perspective. For instance following the 9/11 attacks, America adopted the song, “God bless America” as the country’s unofficial national anthem thereby signifying a counter ‘religious’ phase and perspective to the anti-terrorism posture of America. As a matter of fact, the then US President, George Bush further whipped up national sentiments when he invoked the ‘religious image’ of America’s “righteous cause” as combating and bringing to an end the “absolute evil” of its enemies. (5) The ‘divine’ nature of religious terrorism, the notion that the battle is between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘truth’ and ‘evil’, the expectation of heavenly rewards for the terrorists all rule out the possibility of a compromise or a peaceful resolution. (6) The spiritual dimension of the war takes it beyond the confines of human law and ideal of morality. Society’s laws are subordinated and in extreme cases are deemed non-existent or inapplicable because of the recourse to a higher authority. The belief and perception here is that society’s laws and limitations are of no relevance when one is obeying a higher ‘divine’ authority. (7) Finally, the end result of religious terrorism is that it impacts a sense of redemption and dignity on the perpetrators. It is at this level that religious terrorism acquires a personal willingness on the part of the perpetrators who oftentimes are men who feel alienated and marginalised from public life.

From whichever perspective (whether religious or political) we look at it, terrorism as a strategy of insurgency, involves three basic components: the perpetrator(s), the victim(s) and the target(s) of the violence (Badely, 2007:1). The perpetrators are seen as fanatics, disaffected groups or minorities who employ terrorism as a tool to oppose the rule and the oppression of an established and militarily superior power (Nicholson, 2003). The victims are seen as innocent people who have no part or are directly involved in the struggle and the
struggle or target may or may not be strictly political in nature. A glaring thing about terrorism is that it involves acts of violence. Violence or the threat of violence is endemic to terrorism. The violent acts need not be perpetrated before it qualifies as terrorism. Once the threat is backed with the capacity and willingness to use force or violence then the act qualifies as terrorism.

Coupled with this is the fact that terrorist actions would be useless if not directed to attract attention, the attention of a specific audience in which a particular mood of fear is sought to be created. The violence of terrorism is not an end in itself. Rather violence is employed precisely to create a sense of fear, terror and uncertainty in the people who are the audience of terrorism. The fear or terror thus created or caused by terrorism is linked to the nature of the victims of terrorist attacks. In terrorist action, the victims cannot be specifically defined. Even the terrorists seem not to be able to determine or define who their victims or the numbers will be. The fact that they are only interested in maximising the impact of their attacks without regard to the victims further serves to intensify the mood of fear and uncertainty precisely because anyone could be a victim. As Howe (1976:14) had stated; “to qualify as a victim of a terrorist today, we need not be tyrants or their sympathisers; we need not be connected in any way with the evils the terrorist perceives; we need not belong to any particular group. We need only to be in the wrong place at the wrong time” (emphasis mine).

**Conclusion**

We have refrained from attempting to define the terms such as revolution, guerrilla war and terrorism basically because we know that these terms generally suffer from definitional crises. In relation to terrorism, for instance, Laqueur (1977:7, and 1987:11) has maintained that it is neither possible nor worthwhile to attempt defining this concept.
Schmid (1984:1) had also mooted the fact that terrorism is impervious to precise, much less accurate definition. Thus, a path available for us to understand these concepts is to attempt to make a distinction between

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Guerrilla War</th>
<th>Terrorism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit in battle</td>
<td>Medium (platoons, companies, battalions)</td>
<td>Small (usually fewer than ten persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Weapons</td>
<td>Mostly infantry-type light weapons but sometimes artillery pieces as well</td>
<td>Hand guns, grenades, assault rifles and specialised weapons (e.g. car bombs, remote-control bombs, barometric pressure bombs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Tactics</td>
<td>Commando-hit and run type</td>
<td>Specialised: kidnapping, assassinations, car bombing, hijacking, barricade-hostage etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>Mostly military, police and government establishments and personnel as well as political opponents</td>
<td>State symbols, political opponents and the public at large (indiscriminate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intended Impacts</td>
<td>Mostly military, police and government establishments and personnel as well as political opponents</td>
<td>Mainly physical attrition of the enemy Psychological coercion (especially inducing fear and a state of insecurity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base of Operation/territory</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform</td>
<td>Often wear uniform</td>
<td>Do not wear uniform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of war zone</td>
<td>Yes, if conducted by rules</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic legality</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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Source: Culled from Merari (2007:26)
them. Therefore, in concluding, we shall focus on two issues. The first is to help in defusing the academic confusion which has been nurtured by the media and government functionaries’ proclamations which tend to see guerrilla warfare as a strategy of terrorism and hence equate the two as being the same. The table above summarises these by using the parameters of unit size in battle, types of weapon commonly employed, tactics, targets, intended impact, control of territory, uniform, recognition of war zones, international legality and domestic legality.

The second issue is to relate these two modes of insurgency to the various struggles in Africa. Violent conflicts are not new to the African continent and they can be categorised according to epoch. Within the first epoch which ended with the Cold War, three variants of conflicts can be identified. The first variant is the various anti-colonial conflicts and wars of national liberation. Most notable of this were the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya and the various wars of national liberation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. The second variant was the anti-apartheid wars in South Africa, Namibia and against the racist regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The third variant was the major conflicts of the 1970s that were Cold War related, in which the African nations acted as proxies and provided the battle grounds for conflicts that were basically the East confronting the West. A good example of this was the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia (1976-83), the Angolan civil war (1975-88) in which the East took side with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against the West-backed National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA).

The second epoch of conflicts in Africa emerged from the post-Cold War 1990s period. The nature of conflict in this epoch is quite and radically different. Ibeanu (2003) has identified three types of conflicts that pervaded the continent during this period and these are; (1) conflicts that arise as a result of struggle for political participation or over political space, (2) conflicts caused by the contest for access to resources, and (3) conflicts caused by the struggle over identity. To this,
Kahler (2002:1) has added a fourth one; conflict caused “by persistent attachment to territory”. In prosecuting these wars, the African fighters have an array of insurgency methods and tactics to employ. However, the sophistication of armament, intelligence network and superior manpower available to the colonialists drastically limited the choice of insurgency options available to the African fighters. On the other hand, the familiarity with the terrain, its rugged inhospitality and the support of some of the local populace also determined the choice of the mode of struggle for the fighters. Thus, on the basis of these, the most popular form of insurgent violence employed in the struggle against colonialism had been guerrilla war and terrorism. However, contentions have arisen as a result of the then United Nations’ Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim’s proposal to the UN following the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre of eleven Israeli athletes, as to what qualifies an insurgency a terrorist act. Delegates from African, Asian and Arab states argued that “people who struggle to liberate themselves from foreign oppression and exploitation have the right to use all methods at their disposal, including force” (Hacker, 1976:174).

Vigilante violence emerged after independence with the failure of the post-colonial state system to cater equally to the different ethnic nationalism that made up the African states. In Nigeria, for example, the failure of the state to effectively accommodate the various ethnic groups have led to the formation of ethnic groups such as the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Odu’a People’s Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). There are also ethno-regional groupings such as the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) and the Middle Belt Forum. The popularity of ethnic militias’ formation to stand as vanguard for assuring ethnic survival in the face of opposition from other ethnic group is not limited to Nigeria alone. Prominent among such other socio-ethnic groupings are the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the National Democratic Alliance in
Eastern Sudan. In the Democratic Republic of Congo are the Congolese Liberation Movement (CLM) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (CRD); in Burundi are the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and National Liberation Forces (NLF). In Ivory Coast are the Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (MPCI), Movement for Peace and Justice (MPJ) and Popular Ivorian Movement for the Great West (MPIGO); the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. The reason for the prevalence of this form of conflict has been mooted by Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) when he asserted that:

Social identities are not natural phenomena. They are historically constructed and may therefore change as a result of social and political transformations. Consequently, in themselves identities do not cause conflict. A group’s or an individual’s identity is not a matter of particular concern in situations of relative calm and security. Solidarity with one’s identity is best mobilized when the group faces a threat, real or imagined, to its interests, security or its very existence as a group. This is why there is an increase in identity-based conflicts during periods of economic and political crisis. The ease with which warlords can recruit young men and boys to their armed bands in Africa today is undoubtedly a result of the large number of school leavers and unemployed youth with nothing to do and no hope for the future. Likewise, the high incidence of inter-communal violence is due to growing competition over scarce resources and persistent poverty. Insecurity and poverty are thus intertwined and their persistence can only frustrate the African integration and development process.
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


THE SÉLÉKA INSURGENCY AND INSECURITY IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, 2012-2014

By Henry Kam Kah

Abstract
This study focuses on the historical roots of the Séléka insurgency in the Central African Republic (CAR) of December 2012 to March 2013 that culminated in the overthrow of Francois Bozizé and the taking over of the mantle of leadership of the country by the Séléka union or coalition led by its leader Michel Am Nondroko Djotodia and then Catherine Samba-Panza. The roots of this insurgency and instability are traced to the past and to French administration in Equatorial Africa. The study specifically examines the internal dynamics that contributed to this insurgency as well as the consequences for internal peace and stability. The data used for analysis in this study is basically secondary and tertiary in nature. We have reinterpreted and analysed this data in the context of the continuous insurgency, instability and disintegration that this has brought to the CAR and the Central African sub-region in general. The study concludes that the Séléka insurgency that led to the change of leadership in March 2013 and January 2014 in the CAR is a result of a complex interplay of factors that have and are likely to continue to make the CAR to be a failed state with repercussions on the people of the country and its neighbours.

Introduction
Many African countries have known armed insurgency, civil unrest and instability for many years. Among these countries are Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia,

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Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the CAR (Joseph 2012: 23-25; Cilliers and Schünemann 2013: 9-10). In sub-Saharan Africa in general military power between state and insurgency appears to be shifting often in favour of the latter which has forced African states to deploy forces more frequently beyond their borders (Howe 2001:1). In the case of Ethiopia for instance, the government has been at running battles with the Oromo for a long time and in Somalia, the brutalities of Al-Shabaab are well known including also sea piracy which made the Horn of Africa insecure to sea-going vessels. All these have threatened peace and security in the Horn of Africa and beyond. In Nigeria the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East of the country bordering Cameroon and Chad and activities of armed militias in the Niger Delta have threatened the peace and unity of this colossus of Africa. In the Central African sub-region where the CAR is located, wars and conflicts, just like in the DRC and Chad, have created unfavourable socio-political and economic conditions. There is also a proliferation of internal and inter-state violence in the sub-region, especially in countries like the CAR, Chad and the DRC. In fact, recurrent political crises and military hostilities have kept the central African sub-region continuously in the headlines in the 21st century (Mwanasali 1999: 90-91; Frère 2010: 1).

The Central African Republic (CAR) which is the focus of this study is a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community known by its French acronym CEMAC. It is also a member state of the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS). This country is very rich in natural resources notably diamond, gold, copper, uranium and timber. The population of the country is estimated at 4.5 million (Miles 2013). In terms of population configuration the CAR is an amalgamation of various ethnic groups. The Gbaya people sought refuge from the Fulani of Northern Cameroon by migrating to the CAR in the early 19th century, while the Banda who fled the Muslim Arab slave raids of Sudan followed the Gbaya later in the century. The
country generally has over 80 ethnic groups each with its own language and cultural practices. The largest ethnic groups of the country include the Gbaya 33%, Banda 27%, Mandjia 13%, Sara 10%, Mboum 7%, M’Baka 4% and Yakoma 4%. Other smaller ethnic groups make up the remaining 2% of the population. There are different religious groups in the country. Of these religious groups, 35% of the population is inclined to indigenous beliefs, 25% adhere to Protestantism and another 25% are Catholics while about 15% profess the Muslim religion (Alusala 2007:11).

In terms of the standards of living in Africa, the CAR has one of the lowest in spite of its rich natural endowments. In the domain of infrastructure, the road network of the country is not regularly maintained and some communities suffer a chronic shortage of drinking water. The country is also politically unstable, corruption and highway robbery are rife and the economic climate is uncertain attracting little foreign investment. In general, the CAR has barely functioning state institutions, an economy in shambles, an impoverished population and a security apparatus in complete disarray (N’Ddiaye 2007:1; Central African Republic Country Level Information; Country Profile Central African Republic). These problems combined together have made the country vulnerable to armed insurgency and instability in the Central African sub-region giving rise to intervention and interference of various forms from gullible and self-seeking neighbouring states.

In this study we examine the road to the Séléka overthrow of the government of Bozizé in March in 2013 and the departure of Michel Djotodia who was replaced by Catherine Samba-Panza in January 2014. This is one out of many insurgencies that have taken place in the country since its independence in August 1960. The historical roots of the instability and disintegration in the country are examined to show that CAR, from its creation, had problems and these have manifested themselves in fratricidal wars time and again on the territory. The study also examines the grievances of the Séléka insurgents, the challenges
of the new Séléka led government and that of the present care-taker government of Catherine Samba-Panza which if not carefully handled are still likely to plunge the country further into chaos as was the case before the armed insurrection of March 2013 and subsequent military and counter military reprisals.

This study is significant in several ways. The fact that the CAR has been in the news for its instability, leadership crisis, coups and armed insurrection needs a study to unravel the factors that have been responsible for this. It is a country rich in natural resources such as timber, gold, copper and diamond but paradoxically one of the poorest in the world. The saga in the country only confirms the resource curse that has characterised countries with vast natural resources like Nigeria and Angola. A study of this country is a contribution to this theory of resource curse that has characterised many African countries blessed with natural resources. Furthermore, the study is important because the continuous instability of the CAR is an indication of either the failure or inability of ECCAS and CEMAC to establish peace and stability in the country. Rather, the country has been drawn into serious conflicts with two members of these blocs namely Chad and the DRC. If these regional groupings are unable to tackle this instability it is even more challenging for the African Union (AU) to achieve continental unity, peace and stability in Africa. An understanding of the Séléka insurgency in the CAR could be traced from the historical roots of the country.

**Historical Roots of Instability**

The root of crisis and instability in the Central African sub-region as a whole was a result of the French policy of assimilation which became the guiding principle for colonial administration. Forje (2005: 228) argues that the politics of assimilation pursued by the French in the Central African sub-region was seen as a betrayal of national sovereignty. This betrayal of sovereignty was compounded by the
governing elite that emerged because they converted this into a new form of hegemony. This manifested itself in the form of the transfer of state property into personal/private property, the ethnicisation of the state and the creation of a family dynasty as the legitimate source of succession. Forje also argues that the sovereignty of the people of this sub-region was greedily hijacked by this privileged elite few. They instituted the politics of exclusion in place of inclusion. The result of this kind of policy after independence plunged the Central African region into turmoil. The creation of the CAR from the period of colonisation to independence in 1960 witnessed a manifestation of hegemonic tendencies in different ways and at different times.

The numerous crises in the CAR have their roots in the history of the country from the past to its independence on 13 August 1960 from France. French colonial administration and the Arab slave trade in the area contributed negatively to the future stability of the country. The territory was initially organised in 1894 as the colony of Ubangi-Shari and subsequently united administratively with Chad in 1905. In 1910 the territory was incorporated into the French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Française, AEF) which was a federation of three colonies namely Gabon, Middle Congo (Moyen Congo) and Ubangi-Shari-Chad. Four years later, Chad was separated from the Ubangi-Shari colony and made a separate territory. The Ubangi-Shari as the CAR was called at the time, received less attention and resources from France than the other AEF territories, namely present day Republic of Congo, Gabon and Chad. Rather, thousands of its population were forced to work on infrastructure projects elsewhere in AEF and this was of little benefit to the territory. Besides, the Arab slave trade raids from present day Chad and the Sudan resulted in the decline in the population of large areas of the CAR. This eventually had an effect on development and the ethnic and religious tensions in the country today (Alusala 2007:11; Berman and Lombard 2008:3).
French colonial administration and the Arab slave trade raids laid the basis of the present mayhem in the CAR with ramifications on neighbouring countries like Chad and Sudan. The administration of the territory as an integral part of the AEF did not make the French to devote resources towards its own separate development. They channelled resources towards the development of other areas especially the Republic of Congo and Gabon at the expense of the people of the CAR. To make matters worse, the population was carted away to work on the infrastructure of other territories while their own infrastructure was unattended to. It remained poor and undeveloped throughout the period of French colonial administration. The joint administration of the CAR with Chad seemingly gave post-independence governments of Chad the justification to meddle in the internal affairs of the country and for armed groups from both countries to operate with impunity across their own borders and destabilise their governments. On the other hand, the Arab slave raids through the territory created a culture of aggression which now manifests itself in the present abductions or kidnappings, a common practice among belligerents in the struggle for the control of the CAR. The aftermath of the slave raids also led to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) that has continued to destabilise the CAR and its neighbours today.

Again, the colonial administration in Ubangi-Shari was underfinanced and mostly poorly trained. It also created a brutal and authoritarian yet ineffectual regime in the country. This administration laid emphasis on cash-cropping like cotton and used coercive means to levy taxes on the population. Besides, diamond and gold mining, which the French initiated in 1927, was the preserve of the Europeans who derived all benefits from it (Bauters 2012:9). At independence, the country was one of the poorest and underdeveloped. Its problems were compounded by the authoritarian governments of David Dacko and his successor Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Dacko and later on Bokassa, who declared himself emperor, established an authoritarian regime
similar to that of the French during the colonial era. Dacko reinforced his grip on power through constitutional reforms in 1962 and 1964. These reforms concentrated power in the hands of the executive branch of government and effectively removed the idea of political parties competing for power. The president banned independent trade unions in the country and censorship was tightened. For his part, Jean-Bedel Bokassa declared himself “President for life” in 1972 and emperor in 1977 (Polity IV Country 2010:1; Bauters 2012: 10-12). Acting like the colonial government, taxes on cotton farmers were increased making life very difficult for the peasants. The problems of the CAR can be understood against a backdrop of this ineffectual and autocratic administration of the French and the early leaders who ruled the CAR after it gained independence from France on 13 August 1960.

The road to the independence of the CAR in August 1960 from French rule was in itself problematic and sowed seeds of discord for the political leadership of the country. The head of government during the transition period leading to independence Barthélemy Boganda, a former Catholic priest, preferred to lead his party, the Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa (MESAN) with his cousin David Dacko, who eventually became the first president of the CAR at independence on 13 August 1960 after the death of Boganda in a plane crash. Another cousin of David Dacko who served under him as Army Chief of Staff Jean-Bedel Bokassa seized power from him through a coup (Alusala 2007:12; Bauters 2012:10). The ethnicisation of leadership and governance in the CAR was also pursued by General André Kolingba when he seized power in 1981. During his tenure in office that lasted until 1993, he shamelessly filled the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) with members of his Yakoma ethnic group, one of the smallest in the country. Ange-Félix Patassé who succeeded Kolingba in 1993 compounded matters further when he created militia groups along ethnic lines to support his regime. These militias were composed of people mostly from the Sara, Kaba and Gbay groups of
his home region. Even General Françoise Bozizé’s administration from 2003 to 2013 was accused of ethnic considerations in the leadership of the country (A Widening War 2007:3; Bauters 2012:14). This was a precedent set by Boganda and energetically pursued by his successors who ruled the country after independence.

Road to the March 2013 Military Take-over

The road to the March 2013 Séléka seizure of power in the CAR can conveniently be traced from the multiparty elections of 1993. General André Kolingba who had ruled the CAR as private property from 1981 to 1993 finally yielded to the will of the people and the wind of change that blew from the West across Africa. Although this election led to a change at the helm of the state, it opened the door to civil unrest, army mutinies, instability and civil war in the country (Frère 2010: 2). His defeat in the general elections of 1993 laid the foundation for numerous coup attempts on the government of Ange-Félix Patassé and eventually to the March 2013 armed insurrection and defeat of the government of General François Bozizé. Between 1993 and 2003 when Ange-Félix Patassé was overthrown by Bozizé and his men, seven coup attempts had been organised against the former’s government. This was not a mere coincidence but a result of an unreliable system of governance that was put in place by leaders, namely David Dacko, Jean-Bédel Bokassa and André Kolingba. This situation was also compounded by the very difficult economic situation that the CAR experienced in the 1990s following the world economic slump of the mid-1980s.

When Patassé was democratically elected president of the CAR in 1993, he unfortunately followed the footsteps of André Kolingba by promoting ethnicity in state governance (Forje 2005: 227-228). During his reign Kolingba had embarked on a massive recruitment of the Yakoma, his ethnic group into the army. By the time he was
defeated in the elections of 1993, 70% of the army was made up of the Yakoma who constitute only 4% of the population of the CAR. Instead of arresting this problem and giving the CAR a truly national character, Patassé rather accentuated it by exploiting his northern heritage for political gain. Ethnicisation of public space has been a common feature of countries of the Central African sub region (Fomin 2005:167) since their political independence in the 1960s. This ethnicisation of governance compounded problems for the CAR by creating a rift between the Riverain and Savaniers as the people of the South and North were referred to. President Patassé redeployed the Yakoma and most Presidential Guards were from the Sara-Kaba ethnic group of the North.

The overwhelming presence of the Yakoma in the military became a source of instability for the government of Patassé between 1993 and 2003 when his government was toppled by Bozizé (Polity IV Country Report 2010:3; Mehler 2009). In spite of this, the northern part of the CAR remained relatively underdeveloped under the presidency of Patassé who was from the North. The reform initiated by Patassé in the security services created a rift between the FACA, the regular army and the Presidential Guards leading to serious security problems for the country (Bauters 2012:13). From 1991 to the overthrow of Patassé and Bozizé, the security forces of the CAR were as divided as never before. This is one of the problems that led to the attempt by Kolingba and Bozizé in 2001 and 2002 respectively to topple the Patassé regime and culminated in the defeat of Patassé’s forces in 2003.

Although armed groups were in existence in the CAR from the late seventies and early eighties spanning from the government of Bokassa to Kolingba like the Mouvement centrafricain pour la liberation nationale (MCLN) of Rudolph Idi Lala, these were hardly considered as a pressing matter because firearms were scarce at the time. After the fall of Bokassa arms were being smuggled in from Chad and the number skyrocketed when the government of Hissène Habré was
toppled in 1990. Many more arms were smuggled into the country after the fall of Mobutu in the DRC in 1997. As many arms were smuggled, children were co-opted into fighting in the armed groups (Ayike 2005: 192; Organised Crime 2011: 7). President Patassé took over the mantle of leadership in the CAR when the number of arms and armed groups had increased in the country (Bauters 2012: 18). Many more armed groups emerged to challenge existing ones and government forces alike creating a situation of insecurity and instability. Some of them were eager to control the natural resources of the different parts of the country. Patassé was therefore faced with the problem of handling the differences between the different military services and to suppress armed groups many of whom operated with foreign support from neighbouring countries like the DRC, Sudan and Chad.

The military crisis in the CAR in 1996 was exacerbated by a serious political crisis which led to widespread public discontent over social and economic problems. Due to the prolonged non-payment of salary arrears of the soldiers, civilians were regularly attacked by the men in uniform (Internal Displacement 2007: 9; Taylor 2005: 241; IFAD Participation in the Debt Initiative 2008: 1). Even civil servants and government workers went through a decade of unpaid wages which compounded the socio-political crises of the country from 1996 onwards (Central African Republic, Country Level Information). To protect himself and continue to lead the CAR, Patassé did not only enlist foreign support from Libya and the DRC but also created a personal armed group known as karako, meaning peanut in the local Sango language (Mehler 2009; Bauters 2012: 13). The economic problems of the people were aggravated by the devaluation of the CFA franc by 50% due to international pressure which only impoverished the population further (Berman 2008: 6). Their reaction in the mid-1990s was a descent into violence against the state which threatened its very existence and stability and made the government of Patassé vulnerable
to several coup attempts throughout the period of his administration in the CAR.

The dismissal of General François Bozizé as Army Chief of Staff by President Patassé in 2001 forced the sacked Chief of Staff to flee to Chad and mobilise forces against him with a view to assuming the mantle of leadership in the country. Bozizé escaped to Chad with several hundreds of troops loyal to him. They were all determined to bring the government of Patassé to its knees (War Crimes 2003: 36). While in Chad he enlisted the support of several armed groups in the northern part of the CAR and was also given assistance by the Chadian government for strategic reasons. One of these reasons was to, presumably, secure the oil fields of Chad and make the border with the CAR safe for Chad’s economic and other interests. Had Patassé not dismissed Bozizé outright, his government might have survived beyond the 2003 military take-over that was commandeered by Bozizé. He might also have successfully organised another election in addition to that of 1999 to ensure a peaceful transfer of power and the consolidation of democracy in the country. Unable to withstand the incessant armed attacks of the Bozizé rebel group, Patassé’s men yielded to defeat when they were overpowered by those of Bozizé with assistance from Chadians. The presidential palace fell to Bozizé when President Patassé was in a meeting of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) summit in Niger (Mehler 2009). Upon his return from this summit, the president could not land and was forced to fly to Cameroon and finally took exile in Togo.

Other things which led to mounting hatred for the Patassé government included widespread mismanagement and self-enrichment by the ruling elite of the country. There was also the outright buying of members of parliament and exclusion of formerly privileged groups like the Yakoma under the previous government of André Kolingba (Mehler 2009). These grievances of the people formed the basis for the army mutinies of 1996/97, the coup attempts of 2001/2002 and
the successful rebellion of 2003 that saw power change hands from Patassé to Bozizé. The common citizen could not understand why public resources were mismanaged to the benefit of the privileged who enriched themselves whereas the underprivileged lacked basic amenities like water and electricity. The government of Patassé could also not have survived an armed insurrection against it because of the policy of exclusion and selective treatment that it adopted. This policy pitted many other groups from the South against those from the North. This was the first time that someone from the North was the leader of the country (Country Profile 2007: 4) and people from the densely populated North-West impoverished region expected improvements in their region which were not forthcoming.

The northern part of the CAR, that expected much from a president who hailed from their region, developed misgivings about Patassé’s government. President Patassé had, in an attempt to counter the cross-border raids of Bozizé’s men in the North and coupeurs de route syndrome, set up a special force outside the regular army to handle these threats from the North. It was led by Colonel Abdoulaye Miskine, a former commando in Chad. This special force of mercenaries was a mixed bunch with some having links with former President Hissène Habre and others to Goukouni Queiddeye. They committed serious atrocities on the population in the North as was reported by local human rights organisations (Bauters 2012: 13; War Crimes 2003: 36; Ghura 2004: 14). Opponents of the government criticised it for excesses in the North of the country, especially Colonel Miskine who had Chadian connections. It was however a difficult task to tackle the problems of the coupeurs des routes and the armed attacks orchestrated by Bozizé and his men because of the porous borders of this region and its numerous armed groups operating across the borders of Sudan and Chad, countries with a very long history of civil wars. Bozizé became president through seizure of power but soon after he ran into problems with his supporters which explain why
there was opposition to his administration leading to an insurgency that ousted him from power.

**Séléka Insurgency December 2012 to March 2013**

The Séléka insurgency of March 24 2013 and change of leadership from François Bozizé to Michel Am Nondroko Djotodia was due to several factors dating back to peace talks with the government in 2007. The word Séléka is a word in sango meaning union or alliance, that is, a coalition of about five separate rebel groups which include the Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR), the Convention des patriots pour la justice et la paix (CPJP) and the Convention patriotique pour le salut Wa Kodro (CSPK). Two other groups joined the ranks of the Séléka, namely the Front démocratique du peuple Centrafricain (FDPC) and a Chadian group called the Front populaire pour le redressement (FPR). These groups are mainly from the restive North East of the CAR, a region that is geographically isolated, historically marginalised and almost stateless. Within the ranks of the coalition were also Islamic jihadists from Chad and Sudan. Fighters of the LRA also joined the Séléka rebels to topple the government of the CAR (Central African Republic Conflict 2012 to Present; Miles 2013; Vircoulon 2013; Urgent Humanitarian Needs 2013; Looming Food Crisis 2013; Seleka Rebels in the Central African Republic 16 May 2013). Prior to their defeat of the government of Bozizé, they received support from armed fighters from neighbouring Sudan known as the Janjaweed which has been accused of committing atrocities against civilians in the Darfur region (Larson 2013).

The road to the Séléka rebellion is in fact an effect of the CAR Bush War that lasted from 2004 to 2007. The war started barely one year after Bozizé seized power in a military coup while president Patassé was attending a summit in Niger. This Bush War started with a rebellion organised by the UFDR in North Eastern CAR led by Michel Djotodia. The war soon escalated into a major fighting where the UFDR forces
fought against the CAR government together with other rebel groups located in other parts of the CAR. These other rebel groups included the Groupe d’action patriotique pour la liberation de Centrafrique (GAPLC), the CPJP, the L’Armée populaire pour la restauration de la république et la démocratie (APRD), the Mouvements des libérateurs Centrafricains pour la justice (MLCJ) and the Front démocratique Centrafricain (FDC). The combined attack on the new government of Bozizé from these groups led to the displacement of thousands of people for about three years (Central African Republic Conflict 2012-Present).

In spite of a peace agreement between the Bozizé government and the CPJP to end the Bush War, political violence continued, especially in the Eastern and Central regions of the CAR. It was clear that the legitimacy of the government of Bozizé was seriously challenged by the other armed groups that refused to sign a peace agreement with the government. As long as the government did not suppress these groups or ensure uncontested leadership of the country, it was clear that from its very inception in 2003, it was doomed to fail.

The insurgency of the Séléka took on a very militant phase in December 2012. Among the reasons that were advanced by the rebel groups for waging war against the government included the argument that there was no solution to the problem of the armed groups of North Eastern CAR, human rights abuses, the lack of a programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) for the fighters as well as a crippled security system in the country. The disarmament of the fighters had been planned since the Libreville agreements in 2007 and 2008 but this was never implemented due to the lack of political will of the Bozizé regime. For example, the accords between the government and the rebel groups included financial support and other assistance for insurgents who laid down their arms (Central African Republic Déjà-Vu 2008; Urgent Humanitarian Needs 2013; Miles 2013; Boas and Hentz 2013: 2; Seleka Central Africa’s 24 March 2013; Central African Republic 10 May 2013; Ngoupana 2013).
The Séléka leadership also claimed that they were fighting because of a lack of progress after a peace deal ended the 2004-2007 Bush War (Central African Republic Conflict 2012-Present). A Catholic Bishop Mgr. Aguirre Monus however argued that the main goal of the Séléka coalition was to overthrow the government and impose a regime of Islamic imprint. He contended that a majority of the people who belonged to the coalition were jihadists who spoke Arabic, killed, raped civilians, looted homes and Christian missions not mosques (Africa/ Central African Republic http://www.news.va/thepopeapp/). Although the bishop saw in the Séléka a jihadist group fighting to impose Islam in the CAR, the coalition is more complex in its objectives and membership than simply religion. Whatever the case, only time will tell if the argument of the bishop and other observers is true. Besides, only 15 % of the population of the CAR is Muslim (Azikiwe 2013). A majority of the population adhere to other religious groups notably the Protestant, Catholic and indigenous religions. This alone was enough to deter the Séléka coalition from imposing a theocratic state in the CAR and since the departure of Michel Djotodia, the Muslim/Christian conflict has continued.

In spite of the argument of the Séléka to justify the insurrection in the CAR in 2013, there are contrary opinions as to their real motivation. For example, according to Alex Vines of Catham House, a London-based institute that studies international affairs, the actions of the Séléka was based purely on ambition. He posits that “all accounts of the Séléka are that they have no development vision for CAR. It’s exclusively about redistribution of patrimony from having captured the state” (Associated Press April 1 2013). This argument could be supported by the attitude of the elite of the country. None of these elite who have been accused of war crimes or other problems has ever been killed in the process. The same elite who become government ministers today are rebels tomorrow fighting against the government and the state and going scorch free. It is also difficult to explain the impunity with which
successive governments privatise the state and its resources to members of their ethnic group or to a privileged few to the extent that after their defeat, the next government is held hostage by ethnic loyalties and previously privileged groups. With the complex interplay of issues one can only partially agree with Alex Vine’s argument that the Séléka coalition wanted participation or complete control of the redistribution of the resources of the country by leading it.

There were other reasons for the emergence of the Séléka in the CAR and the war it waged on the government of François Bozizé. For a long time there was a lack of governance in the Vakaga and Haute Kotto administrative regions of the North, the permeable borders and widespread contraband of weapons and other goods in this region constituted a perfect environment for the emergence of the Séléka coalition. Other grievances of the people that led to a Séléka insurgence on the government included Bozizé’s imposition of his relatives in the transitional government, his rearmament through the purchase of helicopters and his delay in releasing political prisoners as agreed during the accords with the opposition. Séléka militants also demanded the withdrawal of South African troops which were deployed in Bangui in 2012 due to an agreement between the South African government and that of the CAR. The rebels were also encouraged by the fact that regional peers in Central Africa during the Libreville peace talks blamed Bozizé for closing down political space and dialogue with the opposition. Prove of this was seen in the fact that the multinational CEMAC force in the CAR FOMUC did not intervene when the rebels moved towards and took over Bangui (Vircoulon 2013; Central African Republic 12 March 2013). There was therefore a generalised atmosphere of uncertainty considering the non-implementation of the Libreville Accords with each party blaming the other for failure to implement it. The Séléka coalition took advantage of this and other grievances to launch a sustained attack on the government from December 2012 leading to yet another peace deal or cease-fire on 11 January 2013.
The Séléka strong showing against the government of Bozizé from late November 2012 forced the government to the negotiation table once more in January 2013. This was, especially because between December 2012 and January 2013 the war had led to a looming food crisis because of the price hikes among other consequences. On 11 January 2013, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Libreville Gabon through the mediation of CEMAC. Following the agreement, the Séléka coalition dropped its demand for the resignation of François Bozizé. The president on his part agreed to appoint a Prime Minister from the opposition by 18 January 2013. In keeping with the agreement, Bozizé appointed Nicolas Tiangaye as Prime Minister in replacement of Faustin-Archange Touadéra. Senior Séléka leader Michel Djotodia became the Defence Minister. To enforce the cease-fire agreement, foreign troops including those from South Africa were deployed to help enforce the peace deal.

In spite of these appointments and the deployment of foreign troops to assist in bringing back the CAR to the path of peace and stability, the ceasefire was broken barely six days later with each party accusing the other of not respecting it (BBC News 21 March 2013). In March the Séléka recalled Djotodia and four other Ministers from the transitional government and asked for the withdrawal of the South African National Defense Forces (SANDF) that was protecting Bangui the capital of the CAR. This was a clear indication of the collapse of the January ceasefire agreement and also a challenge to the continuous rule of Bozizé although the coalition had agreed to Bozizé’s rule until the 2016 elections during the ceasefire agreement of January 2013. It was also an indication of the misgivings that had developed within the ranks of the Séléka. Some military commanders of the coalition felt that Djotodia had negotiated an agreement too quickly with Bozizé in his own personal interest instead of the collective interest of the fighters (Vircoulon 2013; Besseling 2013).
The withdrawal of Djotodia and four other coalition Ministers from the government was the beginning of a war of failure for the government of Bozizé and success for the rebel coalition. Things moved on rather fast and not in favour of the government of Bozizé. The coalition multiplied attacks on key towns and cities and brought them under their control. Bangui, the capital of the CAR finally capitulated on 24 March 2013 and President Bozizé escaped to Cameroon. Later that day Michel Djotodia declared himself President of the country and the constitution and the national assembly were suspended and dissolved respectively. He pledged to respect a peace deal that was signed earlier in 2013. Earlier, he had declared that he would rule the country for three years and thereafter organise elections. Following the coup, the borders of the CAR were closed with neighbouring countries. The government of Djotodia was condemned by member states of CEMAC (Global Times 2013) but paradoxically called for the formation of an inclusive transitional council and the holding of elections in 18 months and not three years as envisioned by Djotodina. The eventual putting in place of a transitional parliament of 105 members and their election of Djotodia as the only candidate who had earlier declared himself president led to the tacit recognition of the government by African leaders. Djotodia was the first CAR president from the remote, neglected and large North East.

In order to stamp his authority on the country after the ouster of the government of Bozizé, the new military leader of the CAR, Djotodia named a government on 31 March 2013. This government consisted of nine members of the Séléka. There were eight representatives of parties that opposed Bozizé while he was in office and one of the members of government was associated with the government of Bozizé. Sixteen positions were reserved for the representatives of civil society but the opposition to the Séléka government argued that these were actually disguised allies of the Séléka (Central African Republic Conflict 2012-Present). The government of Michel Djotodia found the myriad
of problems of the country a ‘hot potato’ which explains why together with pressure from the ECCAS and France his government was forced to resign. The departure of Djotodia on 10 January 2014 did not lead to a let up in the conflict in the CAR. Rather, it exacerbated the fracas between the predominantly Muslim Séléka and Christian anti-Balaka groups. This is partly because during the reign of Djotodia many Christians were targeted and when Samba-Panza took over, Christians started retaliating (Deutsche Welle 2014; Global Post 2014; Handy 2014; Krumova 2014; Neill 2014; Ottaro 2014).

Soon after the Séléka coalition took over the leadership of the CAR, its fighters went on a rampage executing opponents, raping women and looting homes. They also recruited children and also kidnapped vulnerable people. The fighters particularly targeted members of FACA and many killings occurred in the urban areas in broad daylight. Commanders of the coalition seemed unable to maintain discipline within the ranks of the Séléka fighters (Ngoupana 30 March 2013; Ngoupanana 16 April 2013; Vatican Radio 16 May 2013; Reuters 10 May 2013). Contrary to the Kimberley Process that calls for the origin of diamond sold in the world market to be made known, Séléka elements were very deeply solidifying their control over the lucrative diamond industry and were selling some of the stones (Larson 2013; Seleka Rebels Gain Control 11 May 2013) rather illegally.

In the midst of outrage against the excesses of the Séléka fighters, Djotodia created a National Commission of Inquiry to investigate and report on crimes and human rights abuses committed in the CAR since 2002 including not only the regimes of Patassé but also that of Bozizé (Reuters 10 May 2013). This can be considered as an evasive approach to the blatant human rights abuses of the coalition forces since March 2013. The establishment of a Commission of Inquiry by the Djotodia led-government was a way of buying time and laying the matter to rest. This could have been possible if this Commission of Inquiry succeeded to stamp its authority over the institutions of the state. It was
also difficult for a coalition of forces with diverse agendas to work in a coherent manner because each of them wanted to reposition itself in the decision-making process of the country.

Other social problems that emerged from the Séléka insurgency in the CAR included insecurity as regards the health of the people and malnutrition. This was because of food insecurity, soaring prices of scarce foodstuff, and scarcity of safe drinking water. During the period of tension in Bangui in April 2013, only two hospitals were functioning. Schools were closed in the whole country and civil servants could not go back to work. The closure of the borders of the country by the new government had a devastating effect on the people because goods could not be imported from the port of Douala in Cameroon. Douala is the main port for exports and imports of the CAR. One month after the military takeover in the CAR, motorbike taxi and bus drivers went on strike because of insecurity, extortion and violence against them (Africa/Central Africa Fides.org). These were some of the signals which indicated the enormous challenges that awaited the Séléka led government. These and other challenges explain why there is still unfinished business in the CAR which needs to be addressed by the government of Catherine Samba-Panza, successor of Michel Djotodia.

**Unfinished Business and Future of the CAR**

If one goes by the arguments that were raised by the Séléka fighters to justify the armed insurrection against the government of Bozizé and the arguments raised by Catherine Samba-Panza and amid the serious socio-political instability in the CAR, there is need to rethink the future of the CAR. The year 2013 ended on a negative note for the CAR and explained why during the Sixth ECCAS Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Chad from 8-11 January 2014 pressure was brought to bear on Michel Djotodia and his Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye to resign (Global Post 2014; Handy 2014). The reins of power in the CAR
went to Catherine Samba-Panza in late January 2014. In spite of this, the security situation remains fragile with undisciplined and disgruntled former rebels roaming the capital and smaller towns at night looting, raping and killing with impunity. Matters are compounded by the fact that people with Islamic sounding names pay more at roadblocks which have been erected in the southern and western parts of the country. People from the North East of the CAR increasingly find it difficult to obtain national identity documents which is frustrating (Krumova 2014). Another serious security challenge for the transitional government of Samba-Panza is the passivity of the armed forces and police in the face of the violence which has sparked popular frustration and resentment. The concerns that anti-balaka elements are infiltrating the army are bad news because this will only further polarise the security situation in this country of the Central African sub-region. Arms also continue to circulate thereby creating fear and tension among warring groups (Chignac 2014).

From 2013, child soldiers roam the streets and communities live in an atmosphere of distrust and revenge because of past grievances (CAR Chaos 2013). The fractured Séléka forces continued to pursue and eliminate former members of the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) on claims that the latter is preparing for the return of the former president François Bozizé (Briefing 2013). This claim might have been strengthened by the attacks on Bangui in early December 2013 by militias and other gunmen loyal to Bozizé. The attack resulted in the death of hundreds of people and involved the use of gunfire, machete and stoning (Hussain 2013). The security and administrative vacuum caused by the escape of the remaining FACA troops, police and gendarmerie as well as judicial and other civil authorities contributed to the settlement of scores with impunity by members of the Séléka led government of Michel Djotodia.

When Catherine Samba-Panza was elected on 20 January 2014 she therefore inherited a complex security situation which has continued.
Anti-balaka fighters is today composed of people from rural areas. They carry with them traditional weapons and home-made guns and wear grigri (magical charms) convinced that these make them invisible and bullet and rocket proof. Most of them are illiterate teenagers whose families have been killed and villages burned by the Séléka fighters. During the Séléka insurrection they virtually lost everything and are in Bangui to revenge. Apart from attacking the Séléka they want them to be disarmed and also label the latter “Arabs” (Vircoulon and Lesueur 2014; Katz 2014). This is just one out of the many human rights abuses in the country.

Other problems that have compromised a functional government in the CAR include the age-old issue of disarming, demobilising and re-integrating Séléka combatants and former FACA. The cohesion that existed within the ranks of the Séléka coalition prior to the overthrow of the former president has dissipated and today there are rival groups even after the departure of Djotodia seeking to continue to control the affairs of the CAR. The Séléka is fragmented because its irregular forces have been accused of effectively creating a parallel army and police force in areas under its control. Several of their spokesmen have repeatedly called for the partition of the CAR into two states namely a Muslim and Christian states. Concern is also arising from the establishment of the new militia Organisation of the Central African Muslim Resistance (ORMC). This was set up by one of Djotodia’s former aides (Neill 2014). These developments are not aimed at seeking a lasting solution to the insecurity in the CAR but to entrench positions and continue to plunder state resources under the cover of chaos. The visible cracks in the Séléka group have widened and each of the movements within the coalition is fighting more or less as an independent unit. The very tension between loyalists of Bozizé, those of Djotodia and what remains of the national army has only fuelled the Muslim/Christian conflict leading to killings, destruction and displacement of people within their own country (Vircoulon and Lesueur 2014).
In Bangui, over 40,000 people have sought shelter around the Bangui airport where the French established a base since 2002. Amnesty International has documented a lot of these problems which have even hampered humanitarian assistance to people in need (Briefing, 2013; Moshiri 2013). Worst of all, it is clear that the country does not have a functional government although power has shifted from Michel Djotodia to Catherine Samba-Panza since January 2014. This was aptly captured by Mossiter (2014) when he described the government as being incapable of controlling anything but its own disbursement of favours. This precarious situation which started with the overthrow of Bozizé made the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to argue that “the transitional government is not properly functioning” (Kelemen 2013).

The question of legitimacy and nepotism continues to be a serious issue in the struggle to bring peace to the CAR. Although the election of Samba-Panza was widely acclaimed for her strong personality among other factors, she has been criticised for some of her actions. She has been accused, rightly or wrongly, for appointing friends and hang-ons as ministers. Her daughter is said to be the Director of Cabinet (Mossiter 2014). The president herself acknowledged that her decision to appoint a majority of Ministers from her own Eastern Region stirred up resentment in the country (Chignac 2014). Former Presidents like Andre Kilingba, Ange Félix Patassé and Bozizé were similarly accused of nepotism and favouritism and they took these criticisms lightly only to be overthrown because of this and other factors. The country, as Samba-Panza herself acknowledges, is undergoing genuine national reconciliation but how could this be realised if people who committed reprehensible acts are not pardoned but punished as clearly stated by Catherine Samba-Panza in the same interview she granted. .

The problems of the CAR which are indications of the unresolved issues have their basis in the history of the country. Since independence, many regulations that have been enacted are not properly enforced by
the leaders. High-ranking dignitaries circumvent the rules because of the feeling that they are above the law. While the country has known internal political conflict since independence, there has been factional fighting from the late 1970s to the present. The state for a long time has been unable to guarantee the security of its citizens or its borders and armed groups freely move and act at will across the border. As a result of the numerous conflicts in the country, over 103,153 people were internally displaced by 2011. It is a common saying in the country that “the state stops at PK 12” which indicates that the official government reach and control does not extend beyond 12Km radius around Bangui the capital of the CAR. This has led to the emergence of parallel structures replacing the failing state institutions in different parts of the country (Zafar and Kubota 2003; Unicef Central African Republic 2009; Frère 2010:3-10; Central African Republic November 2011; Bauters 2012) and today Bangui itself. Moreover, in the CAR the rulers of today are the rebels of yesterday and former inner circle members who fell from grace and escaped to join rebel movements. It was clear from the beginning that the Sélèka coalition could not tackle the problems of the CAR as the groups that constitute this coalition had different agendas. Today after Djotodia, these groups are splintering and compounding the precarious security situation in Cameroon.

Another unfinished issue in the political evolution of the CAR is the differences that have existed over the years between the FACA, a small and ineffective force and made up of several branches which often perceive each other as rivals, the Presidential Guard being the best known and the Gendarmerie which operates on its own. In fact, rather than complementing the army, the gendarmerie has historically competed with it or with other government security agencies all of this for the president’s trust and support to the exclusion of the others. Since its creation shortly after independence, the gendarmerie has at times functioned independently and at other times served under the chief of staff of the armed forces (Berman and Lombard 2008:15;
Bauters 2012:24). This is compounded by the proliferation of self defense groups. Whenever there has been a change of government, the military is affected.

In the present circumstance, the Sélèka fighters and anti-balaka are locked in battle and this has an impact on the country’s security system. Former FACA soldiers and others serving the government of Bozizè were either suppressed or forced to flee with weapons. This is a very serious problem because the security of the country can neither be ethnicised as was done by Kolingba, Patassè and Bozizè nor changed at will by those who seize power with a barrel of the gun. Soon after the Séléka took over control of Bangui, they began to attack and kill regular forces. The problem for this government is how to demobilise and re-integrate former fighters and former regular forces of the country. This was one of the reasons that led to their attack on the government of Bozizè and may well be ‘a bone in the neck’ of the new government of Catherine Samba-Panza, especially as there is continuous fighting between competing forces. Although she vowed during her swearing in ceremony to “safeguard the peace, strengthen national unity, ensure the well-being of the Central African people, and conscientiously fulfil my work without ethnic, regional or religious considerations,” (Global Post 2014; The Guardian 2014) evidence points to a different situation more complex than before.

The fact that the Séléka is a coalition of groups from within and outside the CAR is a problem and is likely to be a source of disagreement between the leaders in the future. Experience shows that Bozizé’s toppling of Patassé was thanks to support from rebel forces from Chad. When he took over control of the state he made use of Chadian fighters for his security. No sooner had he taken over did the Bush War of 2004 to 2007 break out. Many of the former fighters were disgruntled with their non-remuneration to the degree that they were ready and actually fought against the government. Throughout the negotiations between the government and the rebels, the issue of disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration became a thorny one. How could people be disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated when there were no safeguards for this to take place? Armed groups that fought against the government accused it of failing to make this happen. It remains a problem today considering the emergence of different factions of the anti-balaka and the Séléka bent on excluding the other from the decision making processes of the CAR.

These problems in the last few months of 2013 resulted in the intervention of different actors. France has increased its troops in the country to provide “a minimum of security to allow for a humanitarian intervention to be put in place” (French Troops 2013). There is also a multinational force that would be led by the African Union to help restore peace in the CAR and assist in rebuilding its institutions. The United States has authorised up to 100 million dollars in support of the AU forces on the ground. It has also airlifted Burundian forces to the multinational forces in the country. Appeals have been made to the European Union and the UN Security Council to act fast to stem the tide of a catastrophe in the CAR (Pellerin 2013; Kelemen 2013). Today thousands of troops are in the CAR under the coordination of MISCA but in spite of their presence, the fracas continues in this country. Many more troops are needed to be redeployed to very volatile areas.

The formation of a government after an insurgency goes with agreements and disagreements within the belligerents and other forces eager to participate in governance. Following the military take-over in March 2013, and the transitional government that was formed, there are already dissenting voices condemning the distribution of positions. Many interpreted the government as an overwhelmingly led Séléka regime to the exclusion of others. They are also criticising the government of Catherine Samba-Panza as not inclusive enough to heal wounds of bitterness and unite the people. Other voices argued that the attempt to expand power-sharing might actually end up sharing too much power to the instability of the state (Bekoe 2013). Fears
were also expressed against Djotodia accusing him of wanting to turn the CAR into an Islamic state. The same could be said of the Christian president Samba-Panza but how the government responds to this and how the ministers serve the population will determine subsequent response to it. The onus is therefore on these ministers and the entire cabinet to rise above sectarian interests and serve the country with the aim of bringing lasting peace and stability by working with the AU and the international community.

The way out of some of the problems of the CAR is to prevent disgruntled politicians from using newly formed armed groups; originally addressing local grievances to re-launch themselves into the political scene and to develop functioning democratic institutions. There is also need to address local grievances and develop faith in elected representatives of the people while restoring their dignity. It is also important for Catherine Samba-Panza to learn from the mistakes of past leaders and then forge new networks with the existing political elite to appease different ethnic interests and rally the population towards rebuilding a country destroyed by many years of insurgencies. She recognised this when she called on all and sundry to lay down arms and help rebuild the country. Talking the talk without walking the walk will not solve the problem. Bekoe (2013) had argued that if some of these issues were considered, it would stave off a coup and also suggests that a critical partnership is necessary with the citizenry to inspire confidence and support. This can be made possible through earnest reform reconciliation and disarmament which is however a problem since the state is unable to make its presence felt in all the nooks and crannies of the country. Based on the sources of instability, the CAR government must truly engage in meaningful bilateral relations with neighbouring countries to handle the problems of refugees and other insurgent groups. This can be mutually beneficial if it establishes peace and tries to support these countries to solve their problems because by extension it will be
handling some of the complex problems associated with the instability in these neighbouring countries. In short, it will also be a way of solving some of the problems of the CAR.

Conclusion

In this study we have attempted to show that some countries in sub-Saharan Africa have a history of insurgency or civil unrest which has been a result of internal and external factors. Examples of these countries have been highlighted. While some of these countries have tried to solve these problems, others are still embroiled in insurgencies rendering them more or less as failed states. The central African sub-region to which the CAR belongs has had its own fair share of these problems which have been a source of insecurity and destabilisation not only within but also between countries of the region.

The historical roots of the insurgency in the CAR have been traced in this study. The political instability and infighting in the country were introduced by the French and the Arab slave trade raiders in the area prior to the colonisation of the territory by the French. Groups were pitted against one another and development was unequal leading to problems for the country when it achieved political independence in August 1960. The centralisation of the administration in the hands of a few elite followed the independence of the territory. The leaders ethnicised the state apparatus to the exclusion of other competent individuals from other ethnic groups. The result was frequent military coups and the problems of the country remained unattended to by successive regimes in the CAR. The grievances of the people accumulated and boiled over whenever there was an opportunity under the respective governments that ruled the CAR, especially from the late 1970s onwards. The 2012 to 2013 insurgency leading to the overthrow of the government of Bozizé like other regimes before this is rooted in the history of the creation and management of the CAR. Michel Djotodia found the potato too hot to handle and was pressured to quit and now watches the unfolding melodrama in his country from Benin.
The study discussed the events leading to the Séléka seizure of power in the CAR. Several factors were responsible for the rebellion against the government which had their basis in the unfulfilled promises of the Bozizé government and the non-respect of the Libreville accords among others. Although following a cease-fire agreement in January 2013 which saw the participation of the Séléka in the transitional government, they soon pulled out of the government in March 2013 and by 24 March they had seized power. We examined the context within which the Séléka government took over power and showed that there were still many unresolved issues in the CAR which the government of Catherine Samba-Panza must genuinely address before the country can move onto the path of peace, stability and national unity and integration. There must be a sustained and committed attempt to diagnose the problems of the country from the past regimes with a view to setting up credible institutions and conducting a decent election in February next year. Anything short of this will be considered a child’s play which will only lay another foundation for insurgency and insecurity which are now the trademarks of the CAR

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Abstract

This paper traces the nature, causes and factors that facilitate and sustain the scourge of terrorism in Africa. It argues that governance issues, religious extremism and negative extra continental influences are critical to understanding the phenomenon of terrorism in Africa. The paper also identifies state fragility, porous borders, armed conflicts and under-governed spaces as facilitators of terrorism in the continent. The paper further reviews the incidence of terrorism in Africa and observes that Africa has gained increasing relevance as a theatre for the financing of international terrorism. Finally, the paper observes that the counterterrorism initiatives across the continent are constrained by several factors including the absence of adequate legal regime and operational capacities of security agencies, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

Keywords: counterterrorism, extremism, organised crimes, terrorism, rebellion

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the global space in general and Africa in particular has become increasingly confronted by the scourge of terrorism. Virtually every continent have played host to such incidences. Like other security challenges, terrorism has engaged policy makers and academics across national and international arena in debates focusing on the causes, consequences, facilitators and measures to be adopted to address the scourge. This commitment by the world community is
not unconnected with the threats and casualty statistics associated with terrorist aggression.

The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York, remains a turning point in global appreciation of threats posed by the scourge of terrorism. Principal among the lessons drawn from the incident are that terrorist networks have enormous capability for violence. Secondly, it became obvious that terrorism preys on proceeds from organised crimes. This provides terrorist networks with huge required funds to conduct their operations. Third, a terrorist attack in one country could have devastating effects on several parts of the globe. Finally, the realisation that combating terrorism requires concerted efforts by the Comity of Nations. Consequently, it has become imperative that concerted efforts should be invested in counterterrorism.

Virtually every continent of the world has experienced the incident of international terrorism. For instance, in Latin America, an Ambassador in Guatemala was murdered by terrorists in 1968 and a year later, the US Ambassador to Brazil was kidnapped. The threat of terrorism in Latin America is also complicated by the activities of narcotic enterprise in Columbia. In 1988, an American plane carrying about 270 passengers was shot down by Libyan backed terrorist over Lockerbie, Scotland. This incident jeopardised relations between Libya and USA for close to two decades.

By 1970, incidents of terrorism occurred in 48 countries. It increased to 91 countries in 1981. The United States, France, United Kingdom and Turkey have remained prey to terrorist assaults. In 1979, nearly half of all incidents of terrorism occurred in Western Europe. This trend changed by the mid 1980s as the Middle East emerged as the theatre of some 45% of terror attacks. In Africa, terrorist attacks have been on the increase since the aftermath of 9/11. Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and other terrorist cells like Al-Shabaab and Ansar-Dine have increased their assaults by more than 500 percent to hit a thigh of 204 attacks.
in 2009. In 2011, the number of terrorist attacks in Africa remained dangerously high especially with the advent of Boko Haram and the Ansar-Dine militants in Nigeria and Mali respectively.

The 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York masterminded by the Al Qaeda Network stimulated worldwide alarm and condemnation. Other acts of terrorism like the Bali bombing (2002), Madrid bombing (2004) and London subway bombing of June 2005 had severe human and infrastructural casualties. As response, the international community intensified measures against terrorism. The United States and her allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation invaded Afghanistan and dislodged the Taliban regime which provided sanctuary for Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda Network. So far, Israel and Iraq have recorded recurrent incidences of car bombing, suicide bombing in restaurants, supermarkets, weddings and even funeral ceremonies.

It is also significant to note that political leadership under domestic and international pressures to step down have tended to label opposition elements as terrorists in a bid to justify the resort to armed suppression of such rebellion. This was demonstrated in Libya during the rebellion that ousted Colonel Ghadaffi’s regime. Ghadaffi also sought to justify his repression of the mass uprising against his regime as counterterrorism. This however did not go down with the international community. Similarly, the regime of Al Assad in Syria has also labelled the armed opposition groups against his regime as terrorists.

In view of the increasing lethality and casualty figures associated with the activities of terrorists, it is not an overstatement to assert that the scourge of terrorism has emerged as one of the fundamental security challenges confronting the international community since the advent of the 21st Century. This assertion has been captured repeatedly in several official pronouncements by various governments, international organisations, images on television, contents of newspapers, magazines
and several other medium of the media. Consequently, responsible states within the comity of nations have resolved to exorcise the spectre. The outcome has been manifested in the adoption of various measures at national and international levels against terrorism and organised crimes at various international forum. Nigeria is not left out of the global efforts to exorcise the scourge of international terrorism.

**Terrorism: Nature and Meaning**

Several attempts have been made by scholars and policy makers to generate working definitions of terrorism. Andrew Pierre described terrorism as the threat of violence and use of fear to coerce, persuade or gain public attention. Wilkinson described it as coercive intimidation, premeditated acts or threats of violence systematically aimed at instilling such fear in the target that it will force the target to alter its behaviour in the way desired by the terrorists. Similarly, Juliet Lodge conceives terrorism as the resort to violence for political ends by unauthorized, non-governmental actors in breach of accepted codes of behaviour regarding the expression of disaffection with, dissent from or opposition to the pursuit of political goals by the legitimate government authorities of the state whom they regard as unresponsive to the needs of certain groups of people. Indigenous terrorism in her views sometimes transcends national boundaries in its exercise, effects, ramifications and prosecution. Jakkie Cilliers identified the distinction between terrorism and other forms of common crime as the fact that terrorism is not motivated by financial gains.

Juliet Lodge interprets terrorism as the resort to violence for political ends by unauthorized, non-governmental actors in breach of accepted codes of behaviour regarding the expression of disaffection with, dissent from or opposition to the pursuit of political goals by the legitimate government authorities of the state whom they regard as unresponsive to the needs of certain groups of people. Indigenous terrorism in her
views sometimes transcends national boundaries in its exercise, effects, ramifications and prosecution.

Certain features accompany acts of terrorism. First, such acts are usually violent and have political objectives. Terrorist acts exert far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victims or targets. In addition, terrorist acts are usually conducted by organised non-state actors that often operate through coordinated cells. Today, the phenomenon of international terrorism has grown to become a big monster which in the views of Antonio Maria Costa “seeks to destabilise, demoralise and paralyse the apparatus of a declared adversary, create anarchy, fear or general sense of insecurity or force individuals to carry out the wishes of the terrorists.”

Generally, terrorism is widely considered an assault on the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights and peaceful settlement of disputes. However, the causes pursued by specific terror groups are in some instances adjudged to be just and defensible by adherents. This is widely demonstrated in the transformation of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) from a perceived terrorist organisation to its present recognition as the legitimate representative of the genuine aspirations of the Palestinian people. Likewise, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa which in the heat of the apartheid was labelled a terrorist organisation by the White Supremacist regime in the country has, since 1994, become the ruling political party in the country. This has given credit to the assertion that one person’s terrorist may, to another, be a liberator. O’Brien captured this in the following words:

...both government and counter government movements claim to seek liberty, and both are labelled terrorists by those they oppose. The difference between a freedom fighter and a protector of freedom often lies in the eyes of the beholder, a problem that makes the identity of a terrorist group not altogether obvious.
Attempts have also been made by international organisations to explain and contextualize the notion of terrorism. In 1999, the defunct Organisation of African Unity took measures to operationalize an understanding of terrorist acts. Its Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism identified terrorist act as:

“(a) Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
(iii) create general insurrection in a State.

(b) Any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to(iii).”

It is however important to observe that Article 3 of this Convention differentiated acts of terrorism from the acts committed by people in their struggle for self-determination. This is considered a significant achievement for a continent that was under foreign control and colonialism for centuries and which was still struggling to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its states. The provisions of this OAU Convention provide one of the frameworks that the member states of the African Union respond to the threats of terrorism in Africa.
Distinction has also been made between domestic and international terrorism. An act of terrorism is domestic when it is executed by local agents within the confines of a country’s territorial jurisdiction. Such acts may be directed specifically at a particular government by terrorists within the country or at a particular regime by opposition elements. Terrorism is classified as international when the attack has a transnational dimension. In such instances, the planning, execution, casualties and implications cuts across the boundaries of a single country. It is imperative to observe that what may however appear as strictly domestic terrorism may in actual fact have consequences beyond the frontiers of the targeted state and elicit international reactions beyond the frontiers of the victim state. For the purpose of this paper, terrorism refers to rented insecurities directed at human population, critical infrastructures and institutions of the state with objective to discredit and overthrow the existing regime and its raison d’être.

Accordingly, an operation could be planned in Asia by an Al Qaeda cell, executed in an American Airliner carrying various nationals by terrorists recruited in Africa and Middle East with weapons acquired in Europe but manufactured in America. Meanwhile, the weapons may be supplied by arms smugglers from Far East Asia while the whole operation is financed with proceeds from illicit transnational trafficking across South America, West Africa and Europe. It is against this background that Walter Lacquer likened international terrorism to the workings of a multinational corporation.

**Nature of Terrorism in Africa**

The continent of Africa has since the last decade of the 20th century experienced growing incidents of terrorism. These incidents manifest in the forms of bombing, kidnapping, torture, murder and assassination, arson, sabotage, mysterious phone calls, hijacking, intimidation and robbery. Others include hostage taking, piracy, toxic pollution,
arms smuggling, facility occupation and poisoning. These acts have combined with political instability, armed conflicts, corruption, underdevelopment, poverty and diseases as well as environmental challenges to compound the security realities on the continent. Terrorism in Africa has evolved over different phases. At a point, acts of terrorism were adopted by liberation movements in their struggle for the independence of their territories from colonial and apartheid regimes. Consequently, liberation movements like the African National Congress (ANC), Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique – FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) were at a stage considered terrorist organizations.

In the aftermath of independence, some authoritarian regimes in Africa were accused of relying on political repression and state sponsored terrorism to sustain state power. Such authoritarian regimes were experienced in Libya under Muammar Ghadaffi, Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko and Uganda under Idi Amin among others. Libya under Ghadaffi was accused of harbouring terrorists and their organisations; the Lockerbie bombing remains a case in point. It is significant to observe that the overthrow of these regimes was through subversive acts often declared as terrorism by the regimes in power. Furthermore, the circumstances and pattern of regime change in these states bred other security challenges that sustained further acts of terrorism, armed resistance and civil war. These incidents had domino effects on security across various parts of the continent.

In East Africa, the history of terrorism dates back to the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya against British colonial policies in the country. In 1977, the hijack of a French airliner and an EL-AL plane resulted in the “Entebbe Raid” and “Assault on Mogadishu” respectively. The embassies of United States in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) were attacked by terrorists affiliated to the Al Qaeda Network in August 1998. This led to bombings in Khartoum (Sudan) by US forces following the latter’s intelligence report that the chemicals
used in the attacks on the embassies were manufactured by a factory in Khartoum.

In recent times, Al Shabaab, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Al Qaeda in East Africa have emerged as major exporters of terrorism in the region extending terrorist aggression to various countries in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa. The activities of Al-Shabaab are facilitated by state collapse in Somalia. This informed earlier conception that it was an entirely Somali domestic problem. However, the group whose membership is spreading to other countries in East and Southern Africa has extended its assaults beyond the Somali borders into Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. On 11 July 2010, Al-Shabaab executed two suicide attacks in Uganda during the 2010 World Cup finals between Spain and Netherland. The first attack was in a restaurant, Ethiopian Village in Kabala-Gala neighbourhood. The second attack occurred an hour later at Kyadondo Rugby Club in Nakawa where a state owned newspaper, New Vision, was hosting a screening of the World Cup finals. The casualty figure of both attacks was put at 74 dead and 70 persons wounded. The attack on the Ethiopian Village was linked to Ethiopia’s assault on the Union of Islamic Court (UIC) in Mogadishu in December 2007 and her deployment of troops to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in support of the African Union backed government in Somalia.

Between September and October 2011, Kenya’s border towns with Somalia became theatres for kidnapping of tourists by alleged terrorists. In Kiwayu, north-east of Lamu Island, a British tourist, Judith Tebutt was kidnapped in September 2011 while her husband, David Tebutt was killed by gunmen suspected to be Al-Shabaab militants. Likewise, the two Spanish aid workers with the Charity, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) were also kidnapped from the Daadab refugee camp in Kenya where many Somali nationals fleeing drought in Somalia were camped. In another development, a French woman, Marie Dedieu was kidnapped on 1 October 2011 from her home in the
Island of Manda in Lamu Archipelago (Northern Kenya) by gunmen and taken to Somali territory. Following death of Marie Dedieu while in captivity, the Kenyan government which had blamed Al-Shabaab for these assaults declared “the kidnapping and detention of Marie Dedieu as a terror act not only against her, but also against Kenya, her home country, France and the entire world.” Consequently, Kenyan police deployed police aircrafts and patrol boats to the Island while Kenyan Armed Forces crossed the border to Somalia in pursuit of Al-Shabaab.

These kidnapping incidents had serious implications for the tourism industry which constitutes a major foreign exchange earner for Kenya. The US, Britain and France issued unfavourable travel advice to their nationals travelling to Lamu. Hotels experienced poor patronage as tourists shortened their stay and cancelled reservations. Hotel proprietors reduced workforce and tour guides saw their business fade away suddenly. The entire Lamu saw the peace of the Island fade to apprehension and insecurity.

The new threats stimulated significant concerns by the Kenyan authority. There was a renewed determination to protect the tourism industry which constitutes a major foreign exchange earner for the Kenyan economy. The Kenyan authorities were also determined to restoring confidence in the state’s capabilities towards the maintenance of law and order. Kenyan’s Minister of Tourism and the country’s Police Chief were sent to communicate the official government concerns and reassure inhabitants of Lamu that the government of Kenya was determined to eradicate such acts. It was these commitments that propelled the cross border military actions embarked by the Kenyan authorities against Al-Shabaab since October 2011.

While Kenya authorities blame Al-Shabaab for these assaults, the latter have denied complicity. Even the MSF whose doctors were kidnapped called for caution against jumping to conclusions about the perpetrators of the act. MSF further dissociated itself from any
military action and opted to secure the release of its aid workers through negotiated settlement. It is important to note that besides the 7/11 Assaults-on-Kampala in 2010, Al-Shabaab is not known to have extended its assaults outside Somalia. This has raised the suspicion that the assaults were magnified by the Kenyan authority to legitimize its quest for intervention in Somalia. Meanwhile, Kenya’s military actions against Al-Shabaab are anticipated to rally support for the Mwai Kibaki administration which was severely threatened by the 2007 Presidential election crisis. It is also anticipated to stimulate national consciousness within the country against a common external enemy engaged in terrorist assaults which threaten Kenyan economy. Al-Shabaab has since heightened assaults on the Kenyan state with more kidnapping of 4 aid workers and bomb attacks on two churches in Muslim dominated Garissa town on Friday 29 June 2012 killing 17 people- 10 women, 2 children, 4 men and 2 policemen who were guarding the church. One of the 2 policemen killed was a Muslim Imam. The act has been linked to Kenyan recruits to Al-Shabaab who because of the failing fortunes of Al Shabaab have come home. The cities of Nairobi and Mombasa have also been hit by further acts of terrorism. This has stimulated public concerns across Kenya that while Kenyan troops advance across the border in Somalia in pursuit of Al-Shabaab, Kenyans at home increasingly fall victim to Al-Shabaab. It is noteworthy to observe here that Al Shabaab’s assault on the Westgate mall in Nairobi in September 2013 marks the single most daring attack on Kenya’s soil. Like the 7/11 attack in Kampala, it further demonstrated the group’s capability to execute audacious attacks beyond Somalia. The Westgate attack resulted in the death of about 67 persons of different nationalities while several others sustained varying degrees of injuries. The Westgate attack which Al Shabaab propaganda unit linked to Kenya’s military engagement in Somalia attracted immense international publicity such that it threatened to perpetrate further attacks on Kenya unless Kenyan troops were withdrawn from Somalia.
Like Al-Shabaab, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) constitutes another organisation whose activities heighten the incidence of terrorism in East and Central Africa. The LRA emerged from the ashes of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) established by Alice Lakwena in 1985 to fight for the interests of Acholi people in Northern Uganda. Lakwena claimed the Holy Spirit ordered her to overthrow the regime of Yoweri Museveni. Following Lakwena’s defeat by Ugandan Armed Forces in 1986, she fled into exile. Joseph Kony assumed leadership of the Movement and changed its name to the Lord’s Resistance Army. Kony’s initial goal was to overthrow the Museveni government in Uganda and establish a new regime based on the Ten Commandments as stipulated in the Bible. The Ugandan Armed Forces successfully expelled LRA out of the country into Central Africa Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and parts of Sudan and Chad. The group has since embarked on pillaging attacks on villages across these countries killing innocent civilians, kidnapping children and recruiting them as child soldiers, sex slaves and couriers. LRA’s recruitment is done through the extreme violent process of initiation. Captives are forced to kill or rape family members to prevent them from returning home.

Evidently, the LRA which operates as rebels without borders has emerged as a major source of insecurity in the Great Lakes region and beyond. Consequently, its activities have attracted considerable international security concerns within Africa and entire global community. In 2011, the Chairperson of African Union Commission, Jean Ping, appointed Ambassador Jose Francesco Caetano Madeira, Director of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSR), a Special Representative of the AU Chairperson in the Fight against the LRA. This appointment was in addition to Ambassador Madeira’s position as AU Chairperson’s Special Representative on Counterterrorism Cooperation.
So far, Southern Africa as a region seems to be the most isolated from terrorist aggression on the continent. The region has however remained a transit route for terrorists and persons suspected of having terrorist tendencies. Henry Okah, a principal suspect in the Fiftieth Anniversary Bombing in Abuja, Nigeria is undergoing trial in South Africa. Southern Africa is also notorious for organized crimes which constitute a major source of funds for the financing of terrorism. Such criminal acts like drug trafficking, poaching and cyber crimes are recurrent occurrences in countries of the region. In 2000, terrorists attacked an Israeli restaurant in Cape Town, South Africa frequented by Americans. Southern Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism is heightened by the alleged existence of training camps in Northern Mozambique where Somalis and Pakistani militants are trained in acts of terror. In May 2010 World Cup, Abdullah Azzam al-Qahtani, an Al Qaeda supporter was arrested in Iraq over alleged plots to attack Dutch and Danish teams during the games. The planned attack of the Danish team was linked to cartoon images published in a Danish newspaper which purportedly mocked Prophet Mohammed in 2006.

In North Africa, countries like Algeria and Egypt experienced devastating acts of terrorism between 1990 and 2000. Algeria remained the target of militant Islamic groups that employ terror tactics to press home their demands. Prominent among them is the Algeria Islamic Foundation (FIS). In 1995, former Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak was the target of an assassination attempt by terrorists while on a visit to Ethiopia. The region experienced about 300 terrorist attacks between 1968 and 2004; of which Algeria and Egypt witnessed an estimated 83 percent of the assaults. Similarly, Algeria had the highest fatality and injury rates of 12 per incident, Egypt had 7 per incident while Libya had the lowest rate of one per incident. Further breakdown of terrorist incidents and fatalities in North Africa are shown below.
The activities of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC), that is, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in North Africa marked another phase in terrorism on the continent. The organization raises funds for its operations through money laundering, protection racket and smuggling across the international boundaries of Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Libya. In 2006, the GSPC declared its link to the Al Qaeda Network and became its katiba (cell) in the region, since, becoming known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Some of the attacks ascribed to it include the following:

i. The 15 October 2006 attack in Sidi Medjahed, Ain Delfa in Algeria

ii. Bomb explosions in the Kabylia region of Algeria

iii. The January 2007 attack at Solimane in Tunisia

iv. April 2007 attacks on official buildings in Algiers

v. September 2007 suicide bomb attacks on the motorcade of President Bouteflika of Algeria

Table 1  Terrorism indicators in the North African region 1968-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Total Fatalities</th>
<th>Fatality Per Incident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>332</td>
<td>2868</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Milken Institute 2006
vi. December 2007 attack on United Nations building in Algiers which killed 17 UN staff

vii. The abduction of UN Special envoy, Robert Fowler and his assistant, Louis Guay, near Niamey, Niger in December 2008,

viii. The February 2009 attack at Jijel, Algiers

ix. The 30th July 2009 ambush of Algerian soldiers outside the coastal town of Damous near Tipaza.

The GSPC which transformed to AQIM sought sanctuary in West Africa as North African countries strengthened their counterterrorism strategies. Parts of Northern Mali provided sanctuary for the AQIM from where it engaged in recruitment, spread of extremist religious idea, training and transnational organized crimes including protection rackets (droit de passage) for criminal elements operating across the Sahara and Sahel. Evidently, fragile state syndrome and associated weaknesses contributed significantly to AQIM’s choice for West Africa. The territories of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have since remained theatres where AQIM have continually engaged in kidnapping and hostage taking of foreigners mostly Europeans and Americans. Kidnapping, is for AQIM, a lucrative source of funding for its activities. The average ransom for the release of a western hostage between 2008 and 2009 is put at USD 6.5 million. It is estimated that the AQIM has so far generated over USD150 million from ransom to release hostages.

In addition to the AQIM, other groups that have been accused of terror attacks in North Africa include the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdullah Azzam Brigade, Jama’at al-Tawhid and Jihad Group (Monotheism and Jihad) and the Holy Warriors of Egypt. Attacks carried out by these groups include the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1982, the Luxor Massacre of 17 November 1997 in Egypt, the 7 October 2003 Sinai bombings in Hilton Taba, Ras al-Shitan and Baddiya camp, the Cairo attacks of April 2005, the Sharm el-Sheik attacks of 23 July 2005
which coincided with Egypt’s Revolution Day. Others are the 24 April 2006 bombings in the Gulf of Aqaba city of Dahab and the August 2006 overturning of a bus in Sinai. These attacks led to an official clamp down on dissident groups by the Hosni Mubarak regime in the wake of the Sinai bombings and oppositions to government’s perceived moderate stance in its relation with Israel, its alliance with the United States.

It is worth noting that since the outbreak of the Arab Spring across the Middle East and North Africa, several extremist groups have emerged in the Maghreb using terrorist acts as a means to pursue their objectives. Prominent among them are the Ansar-Sharia in Tunis and Libya as well as the Ansar Beit Al-Maqdess and Ajnad Misr in Egypt. In West Africa, extremist cells like Iyad al Ghali’s Ansar al Dine, Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad or Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) along with the Signed-in-Blood Battalion and the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA) emerged and later merged to form the Al Mourabitoun whose defined operational theatre is “from the Nile to the Atlantic Ocean.” This merger is therefore a fusion of several al-Qaeda linked elements in the Maghreb and larger Sahel.

A major epicentre of terrorist activities in West and Central Africa since the Arab Spring is Nigeria which has been confronted by acts of terrorism perpetrated by Islamist extremists in the North East and armed militants in the Niger Delta. It is important to state here that Nigeria had previously experienced a pronounced incident of terrorism in 1993 following the hijack of a Nigerian Airways plane by terrorists aligned to the Movement for the Actualisation of Democracy (MAD). The plane was hijacked and forced to land in the Republic of Niger. The MAD demanded revalidation of results of the annulled Presidential election presumably won by Chief Moshood Abiola and his subsequent swearing in as President of Nigeria. Prior to this, a letter bomb was employed to kill Dele Giwa, the publisher of Newswatch magazine on 16 October 1986. This incident remains one of the unsolved murder cases in Nigeria. Between 2005 and 2009, the attacks of militants on
critical oil infrastructures and security agencies in the Niger Delta were significant examples of terrorist acts. The militants also embarked on kidnapping and hostage taking of oil workers to finance these terrorist acts. In addition, the 50th Anniversary Independence Day (October 2010) bombings in Abuja, orchestrated by a faction of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), suggest that Nigeria is a fertile base for terrorist aggression.

While the post Amnesty peace-building programme for the Niger Delta seems to have significantly addressed tensions in the Niger Delta question, Boko Haram assaults on the Nigerian state since 2009 have continued to generate security concerns for the country. Beginning with its pronounced assault on police stations in Kanemma, Geidam and Dapchi in Bursari Local Government Area of Yobe State in December 2003, Boko Haram emerged as the most daring physical security challenge confronting the country since the advent of the President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration.

The audacity of Boko Haram became more pronounced with the introduction of suicide bombing and subsequent bombing of the Police Headquarters and the United Nations House on 18th June and 26 August 2011 respectively. Boko Haram have persisted with their attacks on the military, churches, security agencies and other government offices as principal targets. In April 2012, the sect extended the list of its attacks to include media houses and tertiary institutions. Offices of This Day newspaper in Abuja and Kaduna including the Bayero University of Kano were attacked by Boko Haram in April 2012. Further data on Boko Haram assaults on the Nigerian state are contained in Appendix 1.

It is important to note that as at June 2012, the Nigerian authorities had not gazetted Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation. Nigeria’s political leadership seem rather more predisposed to dialogue with the sect in its bid to bring an end to the raging hostilities. However, in far away Washington, the United States of America put 3 Boko Haram leaders on
its Terror List on Thursday 21 June 2012. These are Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kambar. The US Department of State declared that the designation under Executive Order 13224 blocks all of Shekau’s, Kambar’s and al-Barnawi’s property interests subject to US jurisdiction and prohibits US persons from engaging in transactions with or for the benefit of these individuals. The implication of such designation could be the use of drone strikes in the man hunt for such actors in Nigeria. This could most certainly have direct consequences for Nigeria-US relations.

**Explaining Terrorist Threats and Vulnerabilities in Africa**

Various reasons have been advanced as causative factors for terrorist aggressions in Africa. Some of these include such governance problematic like the incidence or perceived incidence of political tension, oppression and repression, socio-economic exploitation, deprivation and discrimination arising from inter-group consciousness based on ethnic, religious or class lines. Others include political instability as in Mali, a lack of direction, increasing feelings of betrayal. Such failures of governance breed deep-rooted grievances against the state and throw up gullible youths for recruitment to acts of terrorism. Some of the youth had played active roles in various armed conflicts across the continent and therefore had some technical experience in the use of arms. It is reasoned that as post-conflict peace-building measures were intensified, the shortfall in the process of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) produced willing accomplices for terrorism and transnational crimes. In addition, the failure of political leadership in post-conflict states to effectively execute the challenge of integration and reconstruction further stirred the ire of opposition elites who sometimes resort to acts of terrorism and relapse to war to redress their grievances. These factors heightened security vulnerability of post-colonial states in Africa to the scourge of terrorism.
Another explanation for the scourge of terrorism in Africa is the continent’s experience of colonial exploitation and domination. Colonialism mangled polities and coerced previously distinct and sometimes competing ethno-religious groups into clearly heterogeneous polities as new states. Such political clones needed an administrative system of hierarchies which often relied on effective state power. Oppositions to colonial rule were quite often met with brutal repression until the attainment of independence by these states. In post-independence Africa, the task of state-building borrowed significantly from the culture of violence inherited from the colonial past; likewise the culture of resistance. Consequently, the state relied often on force to assert its sovereignty. This fanned the ambers of armed resistance and acts of terrorism across Africa. In countries like Algeria and South Africa under the obnoxious apartheid regime, liberation movements were labeled terrorist organizations by the regimes they sought to overthrow.

Beside the incidence of colonialism, the growing concerns on the threats posed by international terrorism since the 9/11 attack on World Trade Centre (WTC) have contributed to the escalation of terrorism across Africa. The impact of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) as championed by the United States and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime by US forces have forced members of the terrorist Al Qaeda Network to seek for new bases in states with weak capacities to contain their activities. The strengthening of counterterrorism regimes by various countries in Western Europe, Asia and Middle East and the implementation of the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy adopted in 2006 have further encouraged terrorist organizations to shift their operation to weak and fragile states with under-governed spaces in Africa. Institutional weaknesses and huge under patrolled seashores and undergoverned land masses in these countries provided sanctuary and new operational theatres for terrorists and fighters escaping from losses in the anti terror wars in the Middle East.
Terrorist cells across Africa have exploited the vacuums created by failed states like Somalia and the inability of weak states in Africa to effectively secure their vast territories. This has heightened the vulnerabilities of the continent to terrorism. Consequently, Africa’s Sahel belt comprising of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Central Africa Republic, Sudan, and Eritrea, which is referred to as the Arc of Instability because of the scourge of armed conflicts, has remained notorious for illicit movement of persons, violent extremism and the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Figure 1.1 Map Showing Countries in the Sahel Belt

Africa still suffers the handicap of playing host to several under-governed/ill-administered spaces and porous borders in several countries. The experience of northern Mali, which is largely uninhabited, poorly patrolled and undergoverned, constitutes glaring examples. Similarly, Guinea Bissau which has about 86 Islands of which only 16 is inhabited has remained a transit route for drug traffickers operating between South America, Africa and Europe. The proceeds of drug money are utilized for the financing of terrorism. These vulnerabilities
aid illegal migrations and have provided sanctuaries and routes for organized criminal syndicates engaged in various forms of illicit transnational trafficking. As observed by Marine General James L. Jones, such large and uncontrolled areas provide potential haven for that kind of activity. Terrorist groups like the Al Qaeda Network and Forces Armees Revolutionaire de Columbia (FARC) have exploited these vulnerabilities to finance their activities.

Figure 2  Map Showing Guinea Bissau and its Islands

The presence of several extremist religious groups and Al Qaeda influenced organizations in many African countries constitute a source of vulnerability to terrorism in the continent. Of significant importance is the spread of radical Salafism, Wahhabism and other forms of extremism across the continent. It is reasoned that the severe bombardments suffered by the Taliban in Afghanistan and the defeat
of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq forced several Arab fighters of African origin who went to Middle East to assist the Taliban regime to flee back to Africa.

North African countries have had significant experiences containing various armed Islamic groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The existence of these groups has heightened radicalization and religious extremism. The extremists seek recruits beyond the Maghreb to sub-Saharan Africa. In 2006, the GSPC mutated to Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The organization subsequently embarked on the mobilisation of militants and religious extremist to its fold leading to the consolidation of diverse armed groups into, what former US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates referred to as, “a reasonably coherent organisation.” The existence of AQIM and its involvement in various forms of transnational organized crimes in West and North Africa have also contributed to render the continent vulnerable to terrorism.

It is imperative to add that the Arab Spring Uprisings in North Africa, especially Libya has to a large extent heightened the continent’s vulnerability to terrorism. This is predicated on the fact that huge volume of arms and light weapons escaped from Libya into countries in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. The renewed Tuareg hostilities in Mali have been linked to the collapse of the Ghadaffi regime in Libya. Some of the Tuareg militants constituted part of Ghadaffi’s army and had received immense training within Ghadaffi’s African Legion. The militants were also said to have escaped to West and other parts of Africa with large quantity of arms and ammunition during the last phase of Ghadaffi’s regime. These events have rendered the continent more vulnerable to armed conflicts and acts of terrorism.

The emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria and its continued assault on the Nigerian State has further exposed the vulnerability of the continent to terrorism. The sect formed to promote extreme Islamist
ideals in Nigeria, based on the strict application of Sharia law, has continuously engaged security agencies in Nigeria with acts of terror resulting in suicide bombing of the Police Headquarters and United Nations House in Nigeria in June and August 2011. Prior to Boko Haram insurrection in Nigeria, militant groups in the Niger Delta, especially the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) had adopted terrorist acts such as kidnapping and hostage taking, assault on critical infrastructures, illegal oil bunkering, armed aggression and bombings to press the Nigerian government for audience in addressing the Niger Delta question.

In the Horn of Africa (HoA), the collapse of state in Somalia, since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, has created an enabling environment for the emergence of terror groups such as Al-Shabaab Al Mujahideen. Al-Shabaab has grown in strength and network to include nationals of other countries in East Africa and beyond. The activities of Al-Shabaab serve as the nucleus of Al Qaeda in East Africa. It is significant to note that the general insecurity arising from the continued weak governance in Somalia is central to the prevalence of sea piracy off the Horn and Gulf of Aden. Al-Shabaab has also contributed to Boko Haram extremism in Nigeria. In 2011, about 75 Boko Haram extremists reportedly received training in acts of suicide bombings at a camp in El Ahmed (Lower Labella region).

**Combating the Scourge of Terrorism in Africa**

In view of the insecurities arising from acts of terrorism in Africa, the then Organisation of African Unity adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Algiers in 1999. This document spells out the responsibility of African states in counterterrorism. Article 4 (1) of this instrument clearly stipulated that:

State parties undertake to refrain from any acts aimed at organizing, supporting, financing, committing or inciting to commit terrorist acts,
or providing havens for terrorists, directly or indirectly, including the provision of weapons and their stockpiling in their countries and the issuing of visas and travel document.

Similarly, Article 5 (2) of the same instrument adjoined African states to cooperate in the seizure and confiscation of any type of arms, ammunition, explosives, devices or funds or other instrumentalities of crime used to commit a terrorist act or intended for that purpose. In 2002, the African Union adopted the Plan of Action (PoA) of the African Union High Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa. The PoA outlines measures to be adopted by member states towards the implementation of the OAU Convention. The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in 2004 to strengthen AU’s counterterrorism endeavours through research and further build the capacity of states in the prevention and combating of terrorism. The ACSRT has since its establishment entered into initiatives with several foreign governments out of Africa as well as international organizations in the sphere of counterterrorism partnerships and capacity building programmes. The ACSRT cooperates with the various National Focal Points of African Union member states on issues of counterterrorism cooperation and further serves as the United Nations continental Focal Point on counterterrorism cooperation in Africa. The Director of the Centre also doubles as the African Union’s Chairperson’s Special Representative on Counterterrorism Cooperation.

At the national levels, various African states have applied both hard and soft measures to address the scourge. In Egypt, the regime of former President Hosni Mubarak made committed efforts to ensure the passage of anti-terror laws. These included the Law No. 97 of 1992, Penal Codes and Code of Criminal Procedures for the purpose of combating terrorism. It also sustained the Emergency Law (No. 168 of 1958) and the use of military tribunals and emergency state security courts in the trial of suspects of terrorism. Like Egypt, Nigeria enacted
its Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 to give legal direction to its national counterterrorism measures. In addition to having a standing anti-terrorism legislation, Nigeria has a robust programme on deradicalization known officially as Perception Management (PM). The programme is domiciled in the Department of State Services and is deeply engaged in countering religious extremism, especially in the Northern part of the country. Under the programme, arrested religious extremists are put under surveillance and concerted efforts are made at re-orienting them with the goal of having these extremists reintegrated into the society. The programme also draws participation from traditional rulers such as loyal and respected Muslim clerics to supervise the conformity of persons who have been re-integrated into society. The PM has been utilised by intelligence agencies to track the activities of the extremist network.

In Tunisia, measures taken by the regime of Ben Ali to address the challenge of terrorism include the separation of Islamic fundamentalist with hidden political agenda from the genuine adherents of Islam. The regime also embarked on national reconciliation of estranged legitimate groups through the 1988 National Pact. In addition, Tunisian authorities encourage the sharing of intelligence and requisite information on the activities of terrorist organizations and further solicit assistance in blocking financial assets of terrorists. In December 2003, Tunisian Parliament passed a comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation which supports the international effort to combat terrorism and money laundering.

Tunisia’s neighbour, Algeria, extended Amnesty to terrorists operating within its territory in 1999 and 2006 through the Civil Concord. However, this did not eliminate the activities of terrorists in the country as some members of the GSPC were committed to the planned overthrow of the President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s regime. This informed the continued resort to military actions against the terrorists. Algeria further collaborates with countries of the Sahel through
various bilateral and multilateral initiatives. For instance, Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger have established institutional mechanisms at various levels for security in the Sahel. These include political mechanisms with regular consultations at ministerial level, intelligence mechanism such as the Algiers-based Fusion and Liaison Unit, (UFL), military mechanism such as the Joint Military Command Centre (CEMOC) based in Tamanrasset, Southern Algeria. These countries have also made significant progress in the implementation of the Strategy adopted at the High-Level Conference on Security, Development and Partnership between the core countries and the external partners, held in Algiers, from 7 to 8 September 2011. The Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL) based in Algeria was established in 2010 to collate and share relevant information/intelligence that will aid combat the activities of terrorists in the Sahel countries. The UFL model has been adopted by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to deal with emerging security threats.

The establishment of the UFL could be traced to counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and countries in the Sahel and Maghreb. This cooperation include the US funded Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) for the Saharan nations of Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The project was designed and implemented in 2004 as a 60 day training of military units within the 4 nations. The US also conducted the Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) and Operation Flintlock 2005 to build the capacities of these states in counterterrorism. The US sustains the gains of the PSI though the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Within the framework of the TSCTP, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) seek to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities by building the indigenous capabilities of the legitimate governments in the Pan Sahel countries to confront the challenges posed by terrorist organisations in the region. It further seeks to facilitate cooperation between the Pan Sahel countries and their Maghreb partners in counterterrorism.
In the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa, the Inter Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) launched the IGAD Capacity Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT) in 2006 to implement the decision of the Heads of States at IGAD’s Summit held in Khartoum (Sudan) in 2002. ICPAT’s objective was to enhance capacity building of member states in the area of border control and other counterterrorism endeavours. It also promotes information sharing and strategic cooperation among member states in the area of counterterrorism and border control. In October 2011, the ICPAT was replaced by a restructured new project known as IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP). The ISSP fosters regional cooperation while addressing capacity building in four major critical areas; counterterrorism, transnational organized crimes, maritime security and security institutions.

African countries further pledged commitments to various international Instruments against the financing of terrorism. First, several states in Africa have subscribed to the 40 Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations of the Paris Based Financial Action Task Force (FATF) against money laundering and financing of terrorism respectively. This qualifies them to be members of the Egmont Group, an informal organisation of FATF regime compliant countries. This commitment of African countries led to the establishment of various FATF-Styled Regional Bodies (FSRBs) across the continent. These are the Groupe Inter-gouvernemental d’Action contre le Blanchiment en Afrique (GIABA), that is, the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa; the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) focuses on Eastern and Southern Africa while the North African countries belong to the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (MENAFATF). In Central Africa, the Groupe d’Action contre le Blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique Centrale (GABAC) focuses its operation on Central Africa. Meanwhile, at the various national levels, virtually every AU member state has
adopted one form of laws against money laundering while efforts at establishing legislations on CFT are at various stages of completion. Many more, though lacking the human and technical capacity, have, however, established National Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) as recommended by the FATF. It is however important to observe that the persistence of low level of banking, underground economy, black markets for foreign exchange and the traditional distrust for formal financial institutions by a cross section of African populations across the continent constitutes a challenge to investments in CFT. In many African countries, the culture of direct cash transactions is still dominant. This also poses some constraints at official efforts at CFT.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has also invested in the strengthening of AML/CFT initiatives across Africa through its regional offices in Cairo, Dakar, Nairobi and Pretoria and its Country Office in Abuja. The UNODC developed a Programme of Action (PoA) 2006-2010 in September 2005. The PoA was designed to combat crime and strengthen security and development in Africa. Forty-seven African countries including several development partners and international organizations endorsed the PoA in Abuja. One of the 6 clusters of activities included in the Programme focused on organized crimes, money laundering, corruption, trafficking and terrorism. As part of its commitment to counterterrorism initiatives in Africa, the UNODC has organized awareness-raising seminars on AML/CFT for parliamentarians, specialised trainings for national Financial Intelligence Units and training seminars on Financial Analysis for FIUs in West Africa.

Finally, virtually all African states subscribe to the UN General Assembly Global Counterterrorism Strategy 2006. This strategy outlined the Plan of Action (PoA) to be adopted to address the scourge. This PoA focused on measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, measures to prevent and combat terrorism, measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and measures to
strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard. It also included measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

It is however important to observe that the efforts at addressing the scourge of terrorism in Africa is constrained by several challenges. First, several African countries are confronted by severe socio-economic problems such as unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and corruption. The porous nature of our international borders and the huge undergoverned spaces pose severe problems to counterterrorism initiatives on the continent. These problems create an enabling environment for the recruitment and spread of extremist ideas.

In addition, fragile state syndrome in Africa, political instability and the persistence of failed states as experienced in Rwanda during the genocide, Liberia and Sierra Leone during the war years and Somalia since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime constitute another challenge to counterterrorism initiatives on the continent. This heightens the vulnerability propensity of the continent to terrorism and other forms of organized crimes. Several of the continent’s fragile states are classified as Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) because elements of fragility exist alongside relative strength in such states. Many of these countries record a per capita income of about US$1 per day and are often characterized by deepening development problematic though relatively stable. This is the experience of countries like Benin, Senegal, Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Nigeria.

Furthermore, the prevailing security situations in the Sahel-Saharan belt in Africa, especially the domino effects of the Libyan crisis and the Tuareg rebellion in Mali further constitute more challenges. It should be recalled that the Tuareg fighters returned to West Africa with huge amount of weapons from Libya and are now demanding for an independent state of Azawad. The ensuing rebellion was contributory to the military coup in Mali in March 2012. The dangers is that it escalated
the proliferation of Small Arms and Light weapons (SALWs) in the region. It is further disturbing that the Boko Haram sect is allegedly linked to the AQIM and Ansar Al Din sect which are militias in the Tuareg crisis. There also exist apprehensions that the AQIM could use the growing instability to strengthen its grip in the region. On the other hand, it could also create room for the emergence of another cell of the Al Qaeda Network in the Sahel. This is strengthened by the collaboration between the Ansar Al Dine (Supporters of the Faith) and the AQIM. The probability of the emergence of AQIM member, Yahya Abou Al Hamman (Jemal Oukacha), as Emir of Timbuktu is perceived as a pointer.

The potency of the internet for recruitment and training of extremist cannot be overemphasized. The experience of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab remains glaring. It is also worrisome that bomb making formulae are readily available on the internet and terrorist organizations utilize internet facilities to advertise their activities. These developments are of utmost concern to our government. Boko Haram in Nigeria has made use of YouTube facilities to publicise their activities and demands. The seriousness is underscored by the evident lack of clear legislations on cyber infrastructures.

**Conclusion**

Evidently, the question of security in Africa is increasingly being threatened by the scourge of international terrorism. This is facilitated by the apparent weaknesses of several states on the continent and the existence of large and porous borders which are inadequately controlled. Consequently, several parts of the continent have fallen victim to hijacking, kidnapping and hostage taking, political assassinations and suicide bombings among others. These incidents have severe consequences on human security and the security of states within the continent. Besides alarming statistics on death and injuries, acts of
terrorism in Africa have adversely affected the economies and stability of states on the continent. It has adversely affected the tourism industry in Kenya, the investment profiles in Northern Nigeria and the general economies of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Various measures have been adopted at continental levels by the AU and its predecessor, the defunct OAU and its member states at various national levels with regard to the prevention and combating of terrorism. These measures are clearly spelt out in the 1999 OAU Convention and the 2002 AU PoA as discussed above. There also exists growing multilateral cooperation at various regional levels in Africa to address the scourge of terrorism on the continent. The continental and regional initiatives are further complemented with various national legislations and efforts that meet specific national requirements.

In recent times, acts of terrorism in Africa have been attributed to organizations like the Lord’s Resistance Army, Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahedeen, Al Qaeda in East Africa, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram. Other organizations that have executed terrorist acts across the continent include Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Gama‘at al-Islamiyya (IG); Algeria’s Groupe Islamique Armée and the defunct GSPC, Libya’s Fighting Islamic Group (FIG) also known as the Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya among others. It is important to observe that the scourge of terrorism in Africa has opened the continent to extra continental intervention by world powers.

Bearing in mind that the scourge of terrorism in Africa is real and having realized that the continent faces daunting challenges in the sphere of counterterrorism, it has become imperative that measures geared towards preventing radicalization and extremism be strengthened. This suggests that concerted efforts be made to ensure that measures conducive to the spread of terrorism are eliminated. Furthermore, African countries should invest in counter radicalization and deradicalization programmes across the continent. African countries should further strengthen information sharing relevant to counterterrorism on the
continent. It is also important to sustain measures that frustrate the use of African territories in the financing of terrorism. This requires strict compliance with FATF Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) standards. Furthermore, African states, the AU and various regional organizations should strengthen the measures on border control and illicit transnational trafficking. It is also important that the equipment profile of member states of the African Union in the field of counterterrorism be enhanced with modern equipment and requisite training of personnel. Such endeavour could require cooperation with relevant extra continental powers to strengthen its counterterrorism endeavours. Finally, counterterrorism initiatives will require sustained reforms and positive transformations in the structures and processes of governance throughout the continent based on the rule of law.

END NOTES


13. Reason of state here refers to the maintenance of law and order and safeguard of lives and property. This interpretation recognises the historical and ideological debates over the nature and purpose of the state and the limits of political obedience.


16. BBC News “Somali link› as 74 World Cup fans die in Uganda blasts” Monday 12 July 2010


18. Official Response of the Government of Kenya to the Death of French Hostage kidnapped from Kenyan Territory in October 2011. Marie Dedieu, 66, died most probably as a result of poor health especially as her medication was withheld. She had been treating cancer and heart problems and also used wheel chair. See BBC News online AFRICA, 19 October 2011.

19. Xan Rice” Kenya kidnap attacks by Somalis drive Terrified Tourist out of Paradise Island” *The Guardian* (United Kingdom) Tuesday, 4 October 2011.

20. The 7/11 Assaults-on-Kampala refers to terrorist attack in Uganda’s capital during the World Cup Finals in July 2010.

21. Online Discussion with Richard Barno of the IGAD Security Sector Programme, Addis Ababa on Tuesday 10 July 2012


29. Egypt’s Revolution Day is a commemoration of Abdel Nasser’s overthrow of King Farouk in 1952.


35. Ibid


38. Ibid.


43. The Egmont Group is an informal association of countries that are compliant to Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regime against money laundering and financing of terrorism.


47. Bakari Guèye, “AQIM Leader Named Governor of Timbuktu” in Magharebia 16 April 2012
AFRICA’S ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:

“Terrorism among the First Challenging Situation in this Second Decade of the New Century: Navigating into Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and Somalia”

By Omar Khalfan

July, 2014

I. Introduction

Africa has many things of general concern e.g. democratization, governance and development issues, fight against corruption, poverty problems, quality of education, etc. Terrorism is a major concern and it has developed rapidly in this second decade of the current century where it seems not only to portray Africa as having a bad image in international affairs, but also hinders the ongoing processes of different components as mentioned above. Security is the base of any country’s development; no political process can take place without stability; security first, then the country’s other life ingredients will follow.

These days, Africa encounters many and different types of terrorist acts in Somalia, and Kenya with Al-Shabaab Militia, Nigeria with Boko Haram, Libya with Ansar Al-Sharia, Mali with AQIM; etc. as I will develop one after the other to see what and how importance should be given to this new phenomenon of pandemics in Africa.

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Africa is vulnerable in many ways, she has no strong institutions, no strong economy, no strong military capabilities, not enough experts; and everything has to be re-built with external assistance, which sometimes comes with strings attached! As a result, Africa’s issues are not altogether tackled using Africa’s resources which makes the problems to linger.

It is indeed imperative and logical to deal with terrorism issues by collective and global forces, because terrorism does not affect one country, nor one continent alone, rather it affects the entire world in different aspects, especially in the areas of security, economy, and politics.

Therefore, it may be good if the African States set what they need, in terms of home-grown-solution, formulate policies in a democratic way, then seek assistance, where it deems necessary, from partners, and let the implementation be purely African in a way that there is no hidden economic or political agenda by the foreign partner states. In addition, African-States’ leaders should be accountable to all their actions in implementing policies that have been adopted by their respective relevant authorities.

II. Understanding New Trends of Terrorism in Africa

Counterterrorism has, in the last thirteen years (from 2001), come to the fore of international issues, and remains in the news almost daily. This is due in large part to the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria in Asia and Nigeria, Libya, Mali, and Somalia Africa. Some African countries that have been affected by these ongoing conflicts specifically from their respective neighboring countries such as Kenya, affected by Al-Shabaab Militia,, and Rwanda which is affected by FDLR with the ongoing conflict in DR Congo, and more recently ongoing conflicts in Central Africa Republic where Muslims and Christians are fighting one against another.
Terrorism is known to use asymmetric warfare (terrorist attacks on civilians), a highly decentralized unconventional warfare perpetrated on nation-states and civilians by paramilitaries, guerrillas, and terrorists. This leads to the death of many innocent civilians as it is the case in Somalia, Nigeria, Libya, Kenya, Central Africa Rep. etc. and in other countries outside Africa, such as Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan, etc.

Back to counterterrorism issues, which have also prompted something of a backlash against such military or “hard” approaches to countering terrorism. While “hard” approaches to counterterrorism are more militaristic — involving targeted assassinations or even warfare — “soft” counterterrorism programs seek to undo the radicalization process by engineering the individual’s return to moderate society, usually by providing them with a stable support network, probing their original reasons for radicalizing, and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs and social contacts. Other goals of deradicalization, as outlined by scholars, include reducing the number of active terrorists; resocializing ex-members; sowing dissent among terrorists; reducing the financial and social costs of imprisonment; boosting government legitimacy; and reducing dependency on repressive forms of counterterrorism.

Partly in response, states and the civil society have sought softer, often preventive, measures to deal with violent extremism, many of which have been deemed more successful than military approaches and less likely to foment a new generation of violent extremists. However, problems remain.

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1 - (See A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism, IPI, International Peace Institute, 2010)
2.1 AQIM, Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb

According to Morten Boas and Liv E Torheim (2013), AQIM was established in 1998 as the Algerian based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The group moved into Mali at the turn of the millennium. The relationship between the GSPC and al Qaeda is not easy to qualify, as the GSPC’s history has been punctuated by statements of both mutual collaboration and open conflict with al Qaeda. When the GSPC was established, the organization expressed support for al Qaeda. In 2001, it claimed to have severed ties with al Qaeda. The GSPC reaffirmed its loyalty to al Qaeda in 2003, was blessed by al Qaeda in 2006, and finally took up the al Qaeda banner in 2007 when it changed its name to AQIM. The latter decision may have been driven by ideology, though more pragmatic concerns about the organization’s branding may also have played a role. After all, AQIM consisted of men who had completely lost the war in Algeria and were on the run in the desert of northern Mali.
Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an Algeria-based Sunni Muslim jihadist group. It originally formed in 1998 as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a faction of the Armed Islamic Group, which was the largest and most active terrorist group in Algeria. The GSPC was renamed in January 2007 after the group officially joined al-Qaeda in September 2006. GSPC had close to 30,000 members at its height, but the Algerian Government’s counterterrorism efforts have reduced its ranks to fewer than 1,000.

Following its formal alliance with al-Qaeda, AQIM expanded its aims and declared its intention to attack Western targets. In late 2006 and early 2007, it conducted several improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against convoys of foreign nationals working in the energy sector. AQIM in December 2007 attacked United Nations offices in Algiers with a car bomb and in February 2008 attacked the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, with small arms.

AQIM, which operates primarily in the northern coastal areas of Algeria and in parts of the desert regions of southern Algeria and northern Mali, mainly employs conventional terrorist tactics, including guerrilla-style ambushes and mortar, rocket, and IED attacks. Its principal sources of funding include extortion, kidnapping, and donations. AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdal announced in May 2007 that suicide bombings would become the group’s main tactic. The group claimed responsibility for a suicide truck-bomb attack that killed at least eight soldiers and injured more than 20 at a military barracks in Algeria on 11 July 2007, the opening day of the All-Africa Games. In May 2009, AQIM announced it had killed a British hostage after months of failed negotiations. In June of the same year, the group publicly claimed responsibility for killing US citizen Christopher Leggett in Mauritania because of his missionary activities. In 2011, a Mauritanian court sentenced a suspected AQIM member to death, and two others to prison for the American’s murder.
In 2010, AQIM failed to conduct the high-casualty attacks in Algeria as it had done in previous years. Multinational counterterrorism efforts—including a joint French-Mauritanian raid in July 2010 against an AQIM camp—resulted in the deaths of some AQIM members and possibly disrupted some AQIM activity. In 2011, however, AQIM killed two French hostages during an attempted rescue operation, and in 2013 killed one French hostage in retaliation for France’s military intervention in Mali.

In 2012, AQIM took advantage of political chaos in northern Mali to consolidate its control there and worked with the secular Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA) to secure independence in Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu for ethnic Tuaregs.

http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html accessed on 24 June 2014

2.2 AL-SHABAAB

The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin—commonly known as al-Shabaab—was the militant wing of the Somali Council of Islamic
Courts that took over most of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006. Despite the group’s defeat by Somali and Ethiopian forces in 2007, al-Shabaab—a clan-based insurgent and terrorist group—has continued its violent insurgency in southern and central Somalia. The group has exerted temporary and, at times, sustained control over strategic locations in those areas by recruiting, sometimes forcibly, regional sub-clans and their militias, using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the Somali Federal Government (SFG), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers, and nongovernmental aid organizations. As of 2013, however, pressure from AMISOM and Ethiopian forces largely degraded al-Shabaab’s control, especially in Mogadishu but also in other key regions of the country. Moreover, conflict among senior leaders has exacerbated fractures within the group.

As evidenced by the increasing levels of infighting among leadership, al-Shabaab is not centralized or monolithic in its agenda or goals. Its rank-and-file members come from disparate clans, and the group is susceptible to clan politics, internal divisions, and shifting alliances. Most of its fighters are predominantly interested in the nationalistic battle against the SFG and not supportive of global jihad. Al-Shabaab’s senior leadership is affiliated with al-Qaeda is believed to have trained and fought in Afghanistan. The merger of the two groups was publicly announced in February 2012 by the Emir of al-Shabaab and Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qa‘ida.

Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many bombings—including various types of suicide attacks—in Mogadishu and in central and northern Somalia, typically targeting Somali government officials, AMISOM, and perceived allies of the SFG. Some al-Shabaab personalities have previously threatened the West and vowed to launch attacks in neighboring countries; associated extremists are likely responsible for the rash bombings that have occurred in Kenya.
According to Mukoma Wa Ngugi (2013), the attack on the Westgate mall in Nairobi was intended to spread terror. In that sense, it worked. But if al-Shabaab’s real motive was to terrify the Kenyan people into demanding that their government withdraw its troops from Somalia, it failed dismally. Rather, Kenyans across the political spectrum have united to condemn a group that kills innocent civilians and then tweets about it.

Amid the outrage against al-Shabaab, it’s important to recognise that terrorism does not happen outside of history. That is certainly true of al-Shabaab, which was born out of the Islamic Court Union-ICU, a loose formation of Islamic judicial systems that managed to restore some sort of civil order after years of a violent anarchy in Somalia, opening the Mogadishu airport and earning the support from a Somali majority. «The Courts achieved the unthinkable, uniting Mogadishu for the first time in 16 years, and re-establishing peace and security,» said a 2007 briefing paper by the respected Chatman House.

From the start, there was nothing ideal about the ICU; it was holding together a coalition of interests that ranged from the best of the moderates to the worst of the militants. This worried the United States so much that when George Bush was asked what he thought about the Courts, he replied: «[Our] first concern, of course, would be to make sure that Somalia does not become an al-Qaida safe haven, doesn’t become a place from which terrorists plot and plan.» Ethiopia, with the approval of the United States, subsequently invaded Somalia and splintered the ICU, with the moderates going into exile and the militants forming Al Shabaab.

This meant that what should have been a Somali problem, requiring a Somali solution to the militancy problem within the ICU, became an Ethiopian and American problem. The end result was more anarchy in
Somalia with no chance of a central authority, which led to the birth of al-Shabaab.

In the long run, the ICU might have united Somalia into a country that had the interests of the majority at heart – or one that was to become an outpost of terror. The point is that we do not know.

But that is only just part of the story in east Africa. Much of the conflict in the region can be linked to the imposition of colonial borders, whereby the Somali nation was carved up, parts of it served to Kenya and the others to Ethiopia. As a result, Somali nationalists have been calling for a country in which the people who share the same language and culture can live within the same borders. But Kenyan and Ethiopian governments, in spite of the illogical nature of the colonial borders, have stood in the way of this ideal, leading to a low intensity warfare that occasionally flares up and inevitably leads to many Somali deaths. It was only recently that the Kenya government owned up to the 1984 Wagalla massacre that killed hundreds of Kenyan Somali.

A police officer tries to secure an area inside the Westgate shopping centre. Photograph: Siegfried Modola/Reuters.

In Kenya, the ICC has accused President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy President, William Ruto of committing crimes against humanity during the 2007 post-electoral violence. In a bizarre case of multi-
tasking atrocities William Ruto, already appearing before the court, was granted a one week leave from the Hague to return to Kenya and deal with the terror attack. And true to form, their allies, according to Reuters, would like to see the «ICC suspend its ongoing prosecutions... for two to three years.»

When war and the rhetoric of war sanction and normalize the killing of civilians, we should recall Nelson Mandela’s speech during his terrorism trial: «I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.» Mandela did not say he was prepared to kill civilians to reach his ideal, rather he was ready to die for the ideal that no one group, black or white, or one people or nation, should dominate another.

2.3 Boko Haram

Boko Haram, which refers to itself as “Jama’atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad” (JASDJ; Group of the Sunni People for the
Calling and Jihad) and “Nigerian Taliban”—other translations and variants are used—is a Nigeria-based group that seeks to overthrow the current Nigerian Government and replace it with a regime based on Islamic law. It is popularly known in Nigerian and Western media as “Boko Haram,” which means “Western education is forbidden” (the word boko is a holdover from the colonial English word for book). The group, which has existed in various forms since the late 1990s, suffered setbacks in July 2009 when clashes with Nigerian Government forces led to the deaths of hundreds of its members, including former leader Muhammad Yusuf.

In July 2010, Boko Haram’s former second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau, appeared in a video claiming leadership of the group and threatening attacks on Western influences in Nigeria. Later that month, Shekau issued a second statement expressing solidarity with al-Qaida and threatening the United States. Under Shekau’s leadership, the group has continued to demonstrate growing operational capabilities, with an increasing use of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against soft targets. The group set off its first vehicle-borne IED in June 2011. On 26 August 2011, Boko Haram conducted its first attack against a Western interest—a vehicle-bomb attack on UN headquarters in Abuja—killing at least 23 people and injuring more than 80. A purported Boko Haram spokesman claimed responsibility for the attack and promised future targeting of US and Nigerian Government interests.

Since late 2011, the group has conducted multiple attacks per week against a wide range of targets, including Christians, Nigerian security and police forces, the media, schools, and politicians. Since late 2012, Boko Haram and its splinter group Ansaru have claimed responsibility for three kidnappings of Westerners, raising their international profile and emphasizing the growing threat they pose to Western and regional interests. As of July 2013, Ansaru was holding a French hostage. Also in 2013, Boko Haram expanded its activity in neighboring countries and continues to clash with Nigerian military forces trying to oust it from northeastern Nigeria.
This year (2014), the Boko Haram insurgents have embarked on a two-pronged strategy — bombing in cities and a scorched-earth policy in rural areas where they are devastating villages. Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, the central city of Jos and the northeastern state capital of Maiduguri, the birthplace of Boko Haram, all have been bombed.

This month (June 2014), a presidential committee investigating the kidnappings stressed that they did in fact happen and clarified the number of students who have been kidnapped. It said there were altogether 395 students at the school, 119 escaped during the siege of the school, another 57 escaped in the first couple of days of their abduction, leaving 219 unaccounted for.

In a week-end in the third week of June 2014, extremists abducted 60 more girls and women and 31 boys in weekend attacks on villages in northeast Nigeria, witnesses said on 24th June 2014.

2.3 Boko Haram

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2 - HARUNA UMAR and MICHELLE FAUL, Associate Press, AP of 24th June 2014
2.4.1 Al-Mulathamun Battalion

Al-Mulathamun Battalion and its subordinate unit al-Muwaqi’un Bil-Dima ("Those Who Sign With Blood"), led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, splintered from al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in fall 2012 due to leadership disputes between Belmokhtar and AQIM’s leadership.

The group claimed responsibility for the 16 January attack on the Amenas oil facility in southern Algeria, which resulted in a four-day hostage crisis in which his group held at least 132 Western captives, including several US citizens and over 600 Algerians.

The group also jointly carried out a pair of suicide attacks in Niger in conjunction with the likeminded extremist group Tawhid Wal Jihad in West Africa in May 2013. Belmokhtar claimed responsibility for a prison attack in early June in Niamey, Niger.

Belmokhtar, in December 2012, issued a public statement calling on jihadists to travel to Mali to fight against Western nations during anticipated military intervention. Belmokhtar also promised to take the fight to the West, vowing that Western nations’ interests would be threatened within their own borders.

While “Those Who Sign With Blood” is a relatively new organization, Belmokhtar has been gathering supporters and prestige in North and West Africa for almost two decades. He traveled to Afghanistan as a teenager in 1989 to fight with the mujahidin and trained with al-Qaida, where he lost an eye mishandling explosives. He returned to Algeria in the mid-1990s and joined the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), whose stated mission was to overthrow the Algerian government and establish an Islamic state. By the late 1990s, Belmokhtar seized control over lucrative trans-Saharan smuggling routes, reportedly earning millions by trafficking cigarettes. Having taken over as the GIA’s emir in the Sahara, Belmokhtar helped set up the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) splinter faction in 1998. GSPC evolved into AQIM in 2007.
2.4.2 TWJWA

Al-Tawhid Wal Jihad in West Africa (TWJWA), also known as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), was founded in late 2011 as an offshoot of Al-Mulathamun Battalion. TWJWA is led by a former AQIM spiritual adviser, Hamad el-Khairy, who has close ties to former AQIM commander and now al-Mulathamun Battalion leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar. TWJWA has coordinated and planned terrorist attacks across North and West Africa and has used local black African populations from West Africa to carry out attacks.

Since the French-led intervention in Mali began in mid-January 2013, TWJWA has conducted a majority of the attacks targeting French and African forces in the vicinity of Gao and Kidal, using suicide bombings, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and landmines. TWJWA has been more active than AQIM in targeting intervening forces because TWJWA—which is largely comprised of individuals from Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—probably perceives Western-led intervention in Mali as a threat to the sub-Saharan region, which is home to a majority of TWJWA’s members.

http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/terrorismnwafrica.html accessed on 24th June 2014

2.5 ANSAR AL-SHARIA
(PARTISANS OF SHARIA)
Ansar al-Sharia: Partisans of Sharia) is an Islamic Militia group advocating the implementation of strict Sharia law across Libya, coming into being during the fractious Libyan Civil War. A variety of news sources have identified them as a terrorist organization having deliberately targeted both Libyan and American civilians, including taking part in the 2012 Benghazi attack.

Ansar al-Sharia was formed during the Libyan Civil War and rose to prominence after the killing of Muammar Gaddafi. Made up of former rebels from the Abu Obayda Bin Aljarah Brigade, Malik Brigade and February 17th Martyrs Brigade and many more, the Salafist militia initially made their name by posting videos of themselves fighting in the Battle of Sirte.

Their first major public appearance occurred on 7 June 2012, when they led a rally of as many as 200 pickup trucks mounted with artillery along Benghazi’s Tahrir Square and demanded the imposition of Sharia law. According to the New York Times, «Western diplomats who watched said they were stunned by the scale and weaponry of the display.»

The leader of Ansar al-Sharia, Sheikh Muhammad al-Zahawi, later gave an interview on a local TV station forbidding participation in Libya’s first post-civil war parliamentary elections on the grounds that they were un-Islamic. The militia went on to provide security to some public property in eastern Libya, including Benghazi’s Al Jala Hospital. The group is reportedly the military arm of Al-Dawa wa Al-Islah, a charitable organisation.

Noman Benotman, a former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and analyst of Libyan Islamism claims that Ansar al Sharia is less an organisation than a term applied to an amorphous coalition of Islamist and Salafist groups active in eastern Libya.
Activities

Fawzi Bukatef, the leader in Benghazi of the rival Islamist militia February 17 Martyrs Brigade, claimed that members of the organisation had been responsible for the assassination of Abdul Fatah Younis, the commander of rebel forces during the Libyan civil war.

Ansar al-Sharia carried out destruction of Sufi shrines in Benghazi, which they regarded as idolatrous. In November 2011, Libyan Salafis engaged in a series of attacks on Sufi shrines all over the country.[15] Mohamed Yousef el-Magariaf, the president of the General National Congress (GNC) denounced the shrine attacks as «disgraceful acts» and said «those involved were criminals who would be prosecuted.»

Ansar al-Sharia used its online presence to denounce the 2013 capture and removal from Libya of al-Qaeda operative Abu Anas al-Libi, by American military forces.

2012 U.S. Consulate attack in Benghazi

On September 11, 2012, the United States Department of State Operations Center advised the White House Situation Room and other U.S. security units that Ansar al-Sharia was claiming responsibility for the attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi that had just occurred. Witnesses said they saw vehicles with the group’s logo at the scene of the assault and that fighters there acknowledged at the time that they belonged to Ansar al-Sharia. Witnesses also said they saw Ahmed Abu Khattala, a commander of Ansar al-Sharia, leading the embassy attack, a claim Mr. Khattala denied. According to longwarjournal.org, the group issued a statement asserting that it «didn’t participate as a sole entity» and that the attack «was a spontaneous popular uprising» to the film trailer Innocence of Muslims, widely condemned as anti-Islamic.

As of 6 August 2013, U.S. officials confirmed that Ahmed Abu Khattala (Khattalah), Libyan leader of Ansar al-Sharia, had been
charged with playing a significant role in last year's attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi. According to NBC, the charges were filed under seal in Washington, D.C. in late July.

**Temporary withdrawal and resurgence**

On 21 September 2012, after massive anti-militia protests in Benghazi which largely blamed Ansar al-Sharia for the mission attack, hundreds of protesters stormed the militia headquarters, pulled down flags of the militia and torched a vehicle inside the base. The group was forced out of its bases in Benghazi the next day.

A few hours after the attack, Martyrs of February 17, together with Bou Salim Martyrs brigade, allegedly agreed to disband. However about 150-200 militiamen moved from Benghazi to Jebel Akhdar area.

As of December 2012, the group still existed, although it had adopted a low-key position. By March 2013, the group had returned to Benghazi and began patrolling hospitals and manning checkpoints, as well as providing humanitarian services to residents. By late 2013, the group had opened up a branch in Derna, under the slogan «A step toward building the Islamic state». The group also has a presence in the Libyan cities of Ajdabiya and Sirte.

The role of General Khalifa Belqassim Haftar in the current Libyan crisis

Haftar, a Libyan exile since 1987, returned to his home city of Benghazi from the United States, and was frequently seen in the city's old courthouse, the headquarters of the revolution in the east.

Along with the former NTC Chairman Mustafa Abdel Jalil, Haftar directed and advised in the crucial months of the revolution. As a retired General, many Libyans are unsure of the longer-term motives and personal ambitions of a man who once attempted to overthrow Muammar Gadhafi.
Haftar, like the rebel militias that are still fighting for control of strategic bases in the country, is directly contributing to the instability of the country and undermining what little authority the government possesses.

From Sirte to Tobruk, and down to the border with Chad, there is no effective government influence. While elders in Benghazi want to negotiate with the Islamist fundamentalists, Haftar will not. His imposed policy is for these insurgents to surrender or be killed.


III. THE WAY-FORWARD REGARDING SOLUTION TO TERRORISM

As disengagement, and de-radicalization should be one of the ways to consider in the case of eradicating terrorism and its ideology, specifically going through de-radicalization processes, I urge the reader of this article to refer to our article entitled: ‘’Understanding Deradicalization: Definitions and Contemporary Theories of Deradicalization in African Journal, Vol.4 mentioned below in order to better understand the following component of ‘’Developing a new identity and reintegrating into society” which should be considered as a sequel to ‘’Deradicalization Processes” (see Omar Khalfan, 2013: 134, 138-144, African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Vol. 4 No. 2, December 2013).

3.1 DEVELOPING A NEW IDENTITY AND REINTEGRATING INTO SOCIETY

After exiting, the individual is physically disengaged from the extremist group but still needs to create a new identity and reintegrate into mainstream society. Although there are not enough data to conclusively
identify the factors that influence the probability of recidivism, we put forward some plausible hypotheses about the probability of successful reintegration into society or recidivism. If the former militant is able to develop a new social network that encourages moderate behavior, secure steady employment, and be accepted by the community, he or she will be less likely to reengage in radical behavior. Conversely, if the former radical cannot locate a supportive social network, find a job, or is ostracized by the community, the probability of recidivism will correspondingly increase.

Although many scholars argue that social and affective bonds often explain why individuals join and leave radical organizations, a supportive social network may play an even larger role in influencing whether a former radical remains disengaged. A disengaged radical not only needs friends and family, but the views of these people can shape his or her subsequent behavior. If a former militant leaves a radical organization and returns to a community with radical sympathies, that individual is unlikely to remain disengaged. This may be a particularly difficult problem for members of groups, such as JI, that recruit entire families and extended kinship networks. At times, therefore, deradicalization programs may need to relocate individuals out of communities that encourage radicalism to an environment that is more conducive to disengagement and moderation.

Alternatively, deradicalization programs may be able to sway the attitudes of an ex-radical’s family members by providing them with financial and emotional support. If a deradicalization program offers material support and counseling to the family of a former extremist, it may be able to develop the moderate support network needed for disengagement to become permanent. Saudi Arabia’s Advisory Council offers social support to the family and tribe of a released extremist, but it also warns that those benefits would be revoked if the former radical commits new offenses.
Since belonging to a radical group is often a full-time activity, it is important that a disengaged extremist finds employment and feels productive, independent, and capable of providing for his or her family.

Stable employment helps boost the self-esteem of former extremists and wean them off the practical support that the radical organization had offered. This, in turn, suggests that deradicalization programs should directly assist rehabilitated extremists in obtaining a job, which may include supplying additional training or education. The Singapore program’s social rehabilitation component, for instance, offers detainees and their families an opportunity to gain additional education and professional training.

Finally, the attitude of the community toward the former extremist can be a critical factor. When a community welcomes a former radical and helps him or her to find work and develop new associations, the former extremist is less likely to regret the decision to disengage.

By contrast, if a community ostracizes a former radical, that individual is likely to find it difficult to begin a career or find an alternative support network and, as a result, may gravitate back to the extremist group. For instance, the Unionist community in Northern Ireland largely shuns former loyalist militants. Unable to find employment or make new friends, many loyalists have returned to radical or, even more frequently, criminal organizations. This suggests that deradicalization programs should also aim to shape the views of society towards ex-militants.

Deradicalization occurs independently of disengagement.

The literature on cults has documented cases of ex-members who continue to follow the group’s ideology even after leaving. Similarly, former leftist terrorists have often abandoned violence only to join political parties that espoused similar ideologies.

It appears that an individual could adopt new preferences at any point along the disengagement trajectory. The current literature is
indeterminate as to when and even whether deradicalization will occur.

The preceding discussion suggests that the processes of disengagement and deradicalization appear to be more than merely radicalization in reverse. The reasons that an individual leaves a radical group are not necessarily tied to the reasons for joining the group. An individual may become a member of an extremist organization because of a strong belief in the group’s ideology; because friends and acquaintances belong to the group; for practical reasons, such as financial and other incentives provided by the group; or for a combination of these factors.

Regardless of the reasons for joining, once an individual is in a radical organization, he or she is socialized to accept the group’s ideology, develop deep emotional ties to other members, and rely on the group to provide for many basic needs. Irrespective of the reasons for the original decision to join, there are other factors that now tie the person to the group.

Level of Commitment

Although there is a general decision process that leads individuals to disengage from all types of radical organizations, clearly, some radicals are more likely to exit than others. To summarize briefly, there is an inverse relationship between the degree of commitment and the likelihood of disengagement or deradicalization. This observation has important implications for the prospects of disengagement and deradicalization from Islamist organizations and for policymakers.

1 - In a study of Colombian insurgent movements, Florez-Morris found that members who remained in the group until it collectively demobilized did so as a result of social and practical needs, shared beliefs, and the group’s role in boosting their self-identity by making them feel important. In addition to these benefits, insurgents were also deterred from leaving by the lack of other options, a result of the clandestine nature of the organization (Mauricio Florez-Morris, “Why Some Colombian Guerrilla Members Stayed in the Movement Until Demobilization: A Micro-Sociological Case Study of Factors That Influenced Members’ Commitment to Three Former Rebel Organizations: M-19, EPL, and CRS,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, No. 2 March 2010, p. 218.
designing programs to encourage extremists to change their behavior and beliefs.

It is often pointed out that the longer an individual belongs to a group and the greater his or her involvement in the group’s activities, the less likely it is that the individual will leave the group.

However, commitment entails more than just length of membership and level of participation. Demant et al. differentiate among normative, affective, and pragmatic commitment. Individuals who believe in a group’s ideology often feel a moral imperative to remain in a radical organization (normative commitment). Affective commitment is an emotional attachment to the other members of the organization and to the group itself. Pragmatic commitment refers to the practical factors that make it difficult to exit a group.

It is logical to assume that all three types of commitment increase the longer a member remains in a radical group. Donatella Della Porta argues that commitment is determined by the degree of connection between the three main spheres of life—family, professional, and political—and the radical organization. While this framework is a significant contribution to the analysis of the concept of commitment, it excludes an important part of life: religion. Considering whether the various aspects of one’s life are incorporated into the extremist organization provides an objective value that can be measured and can serve as a measure for normative (politics and religion), affective (family and friends), and pragmatic (work and compensation) commitment.

The more politics, family and friends, work, and religion intersect, the greater the degree of commitment. Conversely, if these spheres of life are farther apart, there is less commitment and a greater likelihood of defection.

Therefore, commitment depends on the duration of membership in a radical group as well as the degree to which a militant’s family, profession, politics, and religion are incorporated into the organization.
The two variables may be related because the longer a member is involved, the greater the chances that more aspects of his or her life will be woven into the organization. Taken together, these factors provide a more fine-grained way of assessing the probability that an individual will disengage from a group.

Using these variables, we can create a typology of extremists that helps identify individuals who are more inclined to disengage and deradicalize. Extremist organizations include hard-core members, activists, newcomers, supporters, and sympathizers (see Figure below). The hard core is composed of the most deeply committed members. They have been in the organization for a long period and are usually involved in planning or executing violent activities. Activists are also often involved in violent activities, but they may not have been members for as long, and not every aspect of their life is tied to the group. Newcomers are recent recruits who have belonged to the group for a short period and therefore are less likely to have as much overlap between the different spheres of their life and the organization. Supporters have even fewer areas of their life tied to the organization. They are not fulltime members but sporadically assist the radical group, for example, by harboring members or supplying them with funds. Sympathizers are not actively involved with the radical organization, but they identify with its goals and ideology and therefore may passively assist the group, for instance by not providing information to the authorities.

The longer a militant is in a radical organization and the more spheres of his or her life that are connected to the group, the less likely it is that the militant will leave the group because the costs of leaving will be too great. Nevertheless, there are a number of prominent examples of deeply committed individuals disengaging from extremist organizations. In subsequent chapters, we discuss, among others, the cases of JI branch leader Nasir Abas and of the former Hizb ut-Tahrir members in Britain who established the Quilliam Foundation to combat extremism.
IV. Conclusions

Africa as a continent has to seek a proper way of tackling the current terrorism. A method that should be based on African home-grown solution(s). In other words, see the reality on the ground first of all and refrain from applying all that is imported from the West or the Middle East as regards counter-terrorism.

All that emanates from the West should not necessarily be adopted as African solutions. Africa has her culture, civilization, and history. The West and other continents such as Asia, specifically the countries that suffer from the same epidemic, should allow African countries to evaluate their situation on a case by case basis and determine the African solution in countering terrorism. The fight against terrorism should not only be seen via militaristic or de-radicalization programs as hard and soft approaches to tackling terrorism issues. It should bring on board the political system that allows citizens equal access to justice, and to the wealth of their respective nations. A political system which respects human rights, and fights social injustice.
The arguments put forth by some scholars have a number of important implications for policymakers seeking to encourage Islamic radicals to renounce violence and the Islamist ideology. Several recommendations can be derived from these lines of reasoning: the effectiveness of deradicalization programs may depend on their timing, government actions can significantly influence the expected utility of disengagement and continued violence, and the assistance offered by deradicalization programs should continue well after the extremist is released.

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TUAREG INSURGENCY IN MALI AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE SAHEL

Ani Kelechi Johnmary

Abstract

Africa as a continent has in recent times been weighed-down by multiple forms of conflict. However, the West African State of Mali has faced Tuareg insurgency for over a decade now. This work is centred on the Tuareg insurgency in Mali and its impact on the Sahel region. It revealed that the factors which gave fillip to the insurgency include the radicalization of Islam in the North by fundamentalists, the ‘Tuareg issue’ and the democratic crisis as well as the military coup that followed in 2012. The loss of lives, properties and the destruction of the World Heritage Sites in Timbuktu were amongst the immediate impacts. Furthermore, the multiplier effect of the insurgency on the Sahel region was highlighted. The work finally called for a multidimensional approach to the counterinsurgency and peace building process in the country, especially under the leadership of the Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s (IBK) government.

Introduction

An insurgency in politics and international relations is any kind of armed uprising against an incumbent government (Calvert, 2010:4; Desai and Eckstein, 1990). Insurgency is an organized, armed political struggle whose goal may be the seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government. In some cases, however, an insurgency’s goals may be limited. For example, the insurgency may intend to break away from government control and

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establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or religious territorial bounds. The insurgency may also only intend to extract limited political concessions unattainable through less violent means (US, Dept. of Army 1990). Insurgency could start as a social protest (Gamson, 1975) from a given group of people, who feel continuously marginalized in the affairs of government.

The people of Northern Mali have over the years perceived the independent Malian government as a ‘southern agenda’ that have sustained their marginalization. This perceived sense of marginalization began to develop the feelings of insurgency in the area. Consequently, in November, 2011, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was formed. The group continued to agitate for a sovereign state and improved government presence in the North.

In the same March, 2012; the military, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo felt that President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) has not being efficient in managing the growing national crisis and toppled his government. Following regional pressure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) as well as other international actors, an Interim Government was created. To make matters worse, while the insurgents were fighting to sustain their stronghold in the North, clashes broke-out between the junta forces and the commandos loyal to deposed president thereby increasing national tension. In July, 2012, the Head of the Interim Government, Dioncounda Traore and former Speaker of Parliament created the National Committee on Negotiations. The committee had the primary mandate of promoting dialogue, negotiating peace and mediating between the government, the military and the insurgents on the quest for peace.

Unfortunately, due to their inability to quell the secessionist and insurgent mood of the North, the Tuareg insurgents declared the independent state of Azawad in Northern Mali in April, 2012.
In May, 2012 the junta leader, Captain Sanogo accepted to renounce power, while the interim president promised to conduct a democratic election in one year’s time. To the chagrin of many who believed that the rise of an interim government would begin to create a dawn for peace building, the conflict situation of the country worsened on May 22, 2012 when the Interim President was beaten-up by protesters, who were not comfortable with the general situation of things in Mali as well as his deep corrupt link with the out-gone government. The departure of President Traore for treatment in France heightened the ‘political vacuum’ in Bamako, leading to increased advantages for the insurgents. He returned in July, 2012 after two months, but the centre could no longer hold, as the ‘anarchy’ of the insurgents had fallen upon the whole world of the Malian people. In January 2013, France championed a coalition of Africa-peacekeeping troops that went for a counterinsurgency operation in the country at a time the groups that made up the insurgency were gaining more territorial and strategic advantages into the Southern part of Mali, leading to the reduction of the insurgent threats that paved the way for a democratic election.

The Background History of Tuareg Insurgency

“Timbuktu is home to nomadic Arab tribes and another nomadic people called Tuaregs (they prefer to call themselves Kel Tamashiq). The Tuaregs are a sub-branch of the Amazigh peoples who were already there when the Arabs arrived to claim the region for Islam. The Tuareg insurgency could be traceable to the 15th and 16th centuries. It would be recalled that in the golden age of the then Malian Empire, it was the troops made up mainly of the Tuareg that recaptured Timbuktu and Walata in 1434 before it fell to Sunni Ali (Ogini, 1973:46-62). Akoda and Ogo (2013:38) wrote that Sunni Ali annexed Timbuktu in 1468, after Islamic leaders of the town requested his assistance in overthrowing marauding Tuaregs who had taken the city, following the decline
of Mali (Empire). Sunni Ali notwithstanding the fact that he was a Muslim dealt harshly with the Ulama (Islamic scholars) in the then University of Sankore, Timbuktu, because they formed closer alliance with the Tuareg who were hostile to his government. Again, when their rebellion as well as the raids of the Mossi led to the weakening of collapse of the Songhai Empire, leading to the Moroccan invasion and victory in the Battle of Tondibi in 1591 (Onwubiko, 1967:24).

The Arabs and Tuaregs of Mali constitute between 10-15% of the total population” of Mali (Hashim, 2013). The Tuareg question has remained a fundamental factor in the growth of the insurgency in Northern Mali as well as in the coefficient of conflict and security in the Sahel region. The Tuareg nation is a widely spread semi-nomadic people who inhabit parts of present day Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria and Libya. The divide and rule policy of the francophone colonial government did not consider the need for the sovereignty of ethnically affiliated Tuaregs and the Arabs in the above countries. Hence after independence in 1960, the Tuareg micro nationalism began to grow. Hence, from 1962-1964, the Alfellaga (a name that is popularly used to represent the first Tuareg insurgency) was experienced. It was primarily an uprising against the Southern dominated socialist leadership of Modibo Keita. The Malian army used excessive force to quell them and send some of their kinsmen into exile in other neighbouring countries.

“An economically and politically vulnerable Mali faced a second Tuareg rebellion. By 1991, alienated by years of discrimination and by massacres in Mali and Niger, Tuaregs in both countries rebelled” (Hashim, 2013). This time, it took the Malian army an extra year to quell the rebellion that had already affected the vital city of Gao. Francis (2013) wrote that there have been five Tuareg rebellions in Mali since independence, three in neighbouring Niger and sporadic insurrections in Algeria. The years of popular insurgencies include 1962-1964, 1990-1995, 2007-2009, and the recent 2012 insurgency.
Over the years, the Tuareg in Northern Mali have progressively criticised the widespread poverty in their area, blaming it on poor governance and sometimes launching rebellions with the support of their kith and kin from neighbouring countries. Tuareg tribes of aristocratic descent saw their hitherto position in Kidal region increasingly eroded by the Malian leadership under President Toure (2002-2012). In order to maintain his Northern political elite friends, Toure relied on Tuareg militias and turned a blind eye on justice as these militias expansively engaged in the flourishing drug-trafficking market of Northern Mali. As their Northern geo-political milieu was increasingly neglected, their developmental agitation became fundamentally nationalistic. It could be recalled that in October, 2011, Tuareg combatants who went to fight in the Libyan conflict and some indigenous Tuaregs in Libya joined their kith and kin in Mali to form the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). Some Tuareg soldiers in the national military and some who were integrated into the force as part of the previous peace accord, did not waste time in answering ‘the patriotic call’ for insurgency in their region.

Consequently, the insurgents in their strategic calculation used the opportunity of the March, 2012 coup to declare the rise of the state of Azawad, which covered around 60% of Mali’s sovereign territory and included the strategically important cities of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao. Ethnicity influences insurgency and civil war (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The return of Northern Malians to join in the insurgency was widely welcomed with patriotic zeal. The United Nations Security Council (2012) showed that over 200,000 registered returnees and 400,000 unregistered migrants had crossed the Libyan borders into Niger, Chad, Mali and Mauritania by the end of 2011. And it was widely believed that amongst these unregistered migrants were armed Tuareg and Toubou ex-combatants in the Libyan civil war. While some perceived Azawad sovereign milieu as limited to Northern Mali, some of their kith and kin who were part of the insurgency saw it as an
emerging state, which would be a national homeland for other Tuareg groups in the Sahel region thereby enhancing the fear and potential threat to security due to the multiplier effect of the insurgency. There was equally the belief that following the increasing discovery of oil in the Northern region of the Sahel, the Tuareg will one day control the petro-dollar politics of the Sahel region.

**Causes of the Recent Insurgency**

The pressures exerted by population growth on limited resources is amongst the factors that gave rise to insurgents in pre-modern times that still appear to operate today (Goldstone, 1991; Foran, 1997; Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989). The history of rebellion and insurgency in that country is as old as the patriotic quest for independence. “Northern Mali had gone through several rebellions soon after the country’s independence in 1960. The most recent northern rebellion (before the insurgency of 2012) ended with the 2006 Algiers Accord brokered by Algeria. This agreement stipulated the re-integration of Tuareg rebels into the Malian army and the reduction of troops in the North. Unfortunately, the agreement was never fully implemented, which is considered to have made the situation worse and to have fuelled Tuareg grievances” (Affa’a-Mindzie and Perry, 2013:4). The agreement was historically difficult to implement because the mainstream national army was not hitherto disposed to accept their one time foes as friends and colleagues. There was equally the fear that their presence would destroy the sense of trust and comradeship amongst the military, which is a vital requirement for any successful military establishment. Unfortunately, the inability to integrate them created much security burden to the professional integrity of the Malian army and the country at large as those of northern background increasingly exhibited less faith in their professional calling.
There was the problem of the inability of the Malian liberal democracy to enthrone transformative leadership in its decades of history. While the Malian democracy promoted reasonable freedom of expression, civil society activities, entrepreneurial development and flourishing tourist industry that attracted foreign investment (Whitehouse, 2012: 17), there was the widespread life of poverty, especially in the North. There, widespread poverty amongst the masses progressively won over those faithful to the voice of opposition/ criticism against the government, hence fuelling the spirit of insurgency in that region of the country. While the apologists of the then democratic government argued that the president wanted a robust democracy following his willing declaration that he will not participate in the 29th April 2012 presidential election. However, many of the masses perceived the government as a democratic umbrella for limitless corruption. Whitehouse (2012:17) showed that a poll conducted one month after the military junta, revealed that two-thirds of Bamako residents supported the junta and its leader, Captain Amadou Sanogo. The junta searched for legitimacy by criticizing the deep-rooted corruption and failure of government to manage the recurrent cases of rebellion in the North.

The situation was made worse by the fact that politicians who wanted their selfish share of the national economy began to form alliance with the insurgent group as a fillip to their attainment of state power. It could be recalled that the Malian democracy is deeply rooted in corrupt political alliance and patronage. The post independence one party socialist leadership of President Modibo Keita was ousted in 1968 by the military coup led by Moussa Traore. Traore took over the administration of the country for more than two decades and gave fillip to military-driven corruption. The masses felt cheated and shouted-out their resentment to the leadership of Traore until 1991 when Amadou Toumani Toure overthrew Traore. Toure organized democratic election and Alpha Oumar Konare, a hard-line popular opposition voice won the election. By the time President Konare completed his two-term
democratically and constitutionally allowed period in 2002, he handed 
over to Amadou Toumani Toure, who was re-elected in 2007. It was 
this ‘Soldier of Democracy’, as President Amadou Toumani Toure 
was called, that nurtured consensus politics and democratic corruption 
to an unimaginable level as the dividend of democracy was in most 
cases shared according to political cleavages, political loyalty and other 
forms of alliances with the ruling power elite. The rich and the poor, the 
sceptre and the crown as well as the military and civilians; all engaged 
in the centripetal petty politics of sycophancy and state patronage, 
hence sacrificing the highly needed dividend of democracy on the low 
altar of multidimensional corruption.

In addition, many of the petty political elite, who were strongly 
expectant of the ‘presidential political anointing’ that would give them 
an easy move to the seat of national power in Bamako were disappointed 
that few months before the April 2012 election count-down, there was 
no official presidential-backed candidate for the seat of the presidency. 
Soon, some political elite and groups in the country began to attach 
themselves and form increasing alliance with the frontline insurgent 
ideology in order to boost their political chances. This disgruntled group 
of politicians began to re-echo the conflict in the North, thereby giving 
the insurgency more national importance and placing the insurgent 
groups at the forefront of media politics. The agenda setting role of 
the media popularised the agitation of the insurgents. Soon, Islamist 
fundamentalist network from within the country and the neighbouring 
states, began to join the insurgency like Ansar Dine (Defenders of Faith), 
which had ties to ideologically motivated external groups such as Al-
Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Mali’s democratic corruption 
and popular disenchantment of the citizenry was widely criticized (Slate 
Afrique, 2012). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
noted that “though it is not a recent phenomenon, corruption seems 
to have worsened with the democratization process, higher levels of 
development assistance and the growth of private sector... In addition,
the search for compromise, which characterizes the social, political and economic life in Mali, has generated a culture of tolerance and impunity” (UNDP, 2010).

Religion is another factor that promoted the growth of the insurgency. The Islamic popularity and its widespread adherents in Mali could be traceable to the history of the ancient Mali and Songhai Empires (Thomas, 2013). The city of Timbuktu, which was on the cross road of ancient commerce between the 12th and 16th centuries grew into a major centre of Islamic scholarship and trade. According to Al-Bakri, a ruler of Mali was converted to Islam during a period of drought at a time the traditional priests had prayed for rain unsuccessfully. Consequently, a Muslim guest of the king offered to pray for rain if the king promised to convert and have his people convert to Islam. Since the Muslim’s prayer was successful, the ruler was subsequently converted. Al-Bakri mentions that the commoners remained in their traditional religions (Levtzion and Hopkins, 1881: 82), while the members of the king’s court joined the new religion. This form of top-down conversion pattern was typical in many Islamic societies in West Africa. With this type of conversion, Islam becomes associated with the government and powerful people in the society. As Babou noted; “the association of Muslim clerics with the business of government helped to enhance the prestige of Islam and its expansion among the commoners” (Babou, 2007:22). Malian society was rigidly hierarchical at that time, therefore the divisions between commoners and the nobility served as an obstacle and filter for the expansion of Islam. Thomas (2013) wrote that in this environment, retentions from the traditional religion persisted. Over time, however, a drive toward a more orthodox practice of Islam gave birth to a scholarly community that was respected throughout the Islamic world as well as the building of mosques and the institutionalization of Islam in Mali. This means that Islam expanded slowly in Mali from an early core of believers over many years.
When Mansa Musa (1312-1337), the most famous Emperor of Mali went on pilgrimage to Mecca in 1327, he impressed the Muslim world with a display of the fabulous wealth of Mali. With his generosity, Mansa Musa also attracted Muslim scholars and artisans, architects and other skilled men and brought them to Mali. Years later, it was those artisans, who helped Mansa Musa build some of the beautiful mosques in the Empire of Mali, including the elegant mosque in the city of Timbuktu. It could be argued that Mansa Musa’s construction of an Afro-Islamic civilization base in his empire resulted from his famous pilgrimage or hajj (Thomas, 2013). History records show that Timbuktu was one of the cities that flowered during the reign of Mansa Musa. Moreover, in the 15th and 16th centuries, Timbuktu became the most famous bastion of Islamic learning in West Africa. As an expanding Empire, Mali brought Islam to surrounding areas and strengthened Islam in Muslim kingdoms. Davidson (1998:42) has shown that from what has transpired thus far, it can be said the Empire of Mali was an agent for the expansion of Islam in the region as well as a force for Islamic conformity.

Aning and Bah (2009) pointed-out that Mali is a country at crossroads due to an acute combination of the challenges of poor governance, constitutional crisis, armed rebellion and growing criminality, especially drug trafficking and illicit flows of small arms and light weapons. Affa’a-Mindzie and Perry (2013) on their side argued that the roots of the current crisis in Mali include poor governance, constitutional crisis and growing criminality in the North. The challenge of deep-rooted unemployment, widespread lack of social amenities, biting reality of poverty and drought gave fillip to the problem of insurgency and security threat in the region. The factors that led to the outbreak of an insurgency are not necessarily those that may enable it to continue to develop (Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis, 2005). Again, it is important to bear in mind that all those who take part in an insurgency do not all do so for the same reasons (Cramer, 2006). This may be the case in the marriage of convenience between the National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Islamic fundamentalist groups that initially formed an alliance with them and gradually began to assert their spheres of influence, leading to the expulsion of MNLA from their vital stronghold of Gao. “The insurgency has since fragmented along ideological lines, with extremist groups increasingly outmanoeuvring the separatists (Arieff and Johnson, 2012). There was the popular concern that AQIM high-jacked the insurgency and strategically spread its tentacles of terrorism and alliance to many al Qaida affiliate groups within Mali and the larger Sahel region thereby creating a very negative impact on the society and making counterinsurgency difficult (Lewis, 2012; Entous and Henshaw, 2012; Bloomberg, 2012).

**Funding of Tuareg Insurgency**

In the ancient times, the Tuareg funded their insurgency in Mali and Songhai empire through revenue collected from the caravan merchants and through raids/loots. Unfortunately, “the decline of the Trans-Saharan trade had far-reaching effects. It destroyed the livelihoods of the Tuaregs, who depended on what they got from their business as guides and transport agents or as raiders of the Caravans crossing the desert. The result was that they began to prey with greater ferocity than ever before on the settled agriculturists on the fringes of the desert. Bornu suffered greatly from Tuareg invasions in the 18th century” (Onwubiko, 1967:63). This made Sunni Ali to engage on jihad against the Tuareg “for political and economic reasons. A good example being the campaign against the Tuaregs of Agades. By the conquest of these Tuareg, his north-eastern border was secured and by his capture of Agades, he also gained control of an important centre of Trans-Saharan trade” (Awe, 1965:68). Francis (2013) wrote that “in economic terms, with the introduction of camels as a means of transportation in the Sahara Desert 2,000 years ago, the Tuaregs controlled the Trans-Sahara trade routes and commodities such as gold, salt and spices. But their
economic decline started with the advent of transatlantic slave trade and the switch in trade from the Sahara to the Atlantic Ocean”.

However, the contemporary economics of insurgency (Sansom, 1970) is expensive, hence the impunity with which the insurgents kidnap for ransom, loot private and public properties as well as seek alternatives of raising money. Amongst the very historic show of terror by the insurgents was the kidnapping of five Europeans by AQIM in two separate incidents in Northern and Eastern Mali, in which a German tourist was killed in November, 2011. They were kidnapped in Timbuktu in the North and two French nationals were abducted in Hombori, Eastern Mali. Similarly, “in Mali, MUJAO in particular was identified as being involved in illegal activities and using religion only as a cover for drug and cigarette trafficking. Other criminal activities that generate cash flows include human trafficking (in particular, trafficking of migrants trying to reach Europe through the desert) and hostage taking as well as the payment of ransoms. These large flows of foreign currencies, especially Euros illustrate the growing economic power of Islamist and criminal groups across the Sahel-Sahara region” (Affa’a-Mindzie and Perry, 2013:5).

Arguing further, Lacher and Tull (2013) stated that “the vast sums of ransom money that European governments paid for the release of hostages played an important role in this development. The insurgents equally held Algerian hostages for years and some Malians as prisoners of their insurgency (Agence France Presse, 2012). Ransom money created shared interests between terrorists, tribal leaders and high level decision makers. It also fuelled local rivalries, as did control of the drug trade. When Tuareg fighters returning from Libya’s civil war arrived Mali in autumn 2011, the power balance tipped in favour of Tuareg groups that had been on the losing side of Toure’s divide and rule policies”. The difficulty in separating the illegal drug-traffickers from the Islamist groups and their political allies in the North promoted the spread of trafficking and the economy of the insurgents. The heavy
ransom money was seen more as resource waste as many European analysts do not perceive ransom payment as a proper way of managing hostage-taking.

**Operational Alliance of the Insurgents**

It would be recalled that some of the actors in the insurgency were already key protagonists in the conflict within Northern Mali in the 1990s as well as the 2006-2009 rebellion. Within these decades of conflict, the government forces manipulated and sustained the pro-government militias in the North. The insurgents, which were made up of MNLA; Ansar al Dine (Protectors of the Faith), who are sometimes called Ansar/Ancar Dine or Ansar Eddine; Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA or MUJAO after its French acronym), which pulled-out of AQIM in June, 2012 subsequently came together to launch a progressive insurgency on the country. From late March to early April, 2012; AQIM leadership began to appear in public in Timbuktu to declare their support for the insurgents.

The return of Libyan fighters with all forms of arsenal, created a heavy pool of arms that gave fillip to the insurgency. Due to the increasing inability of the central government to hold these dissenting interests in check, some politicians and drug merchants joined other fundamentalist groups like AQIM, Ansar Dine and MUJAO to give the insurgency strong strategic and economic advantages, hence they manoeuvred themselves into a very formidable power and security bloc in the country. The aggression (Lorenz, 1966) of the insurgents and the mass assassination (Kirkham, Levy and Crotty, 1970) of soldiers in Aguelhok could equally be perceived as an act of terrorism (Hyams, 1975), which affected the political order of the society (Huntington, 1968) and influenced increased external involvement and intervention (Little, 1975). Extremist groups who perceived the insurgency as a war
against non-Islamic traditions did not waste time to attack government and cultural sites.

**Impacts of the Insurgency**

The impact of the insurgency has been felt in all aspects of the Malian national life; from economic, security, socio-political to other aspects of human existence. Arieff and Johnson (2013:4) wrote that while the risk of Islamist fundamentalism is most vividly on display in the North, it has also affected politics in Bamako. For example, in 2009, a draft family code that would have expanded and guaranteed a number of women’s right was fiercely opposed by Malian civil and religious groups, despite being a signature initiative of the then President Traore. Later when a revised version was prepared with inputs from religious leaders and lacking many of the progressive provisions of the first version, it was enacted in December 2011. In the course of the insurgency, the United States and other multilateral donors sent assistance, not only to cushion the food crisis in Mali but also to offer assistance to Malian refugees at a time the conflict began to unfold. Later, “direct United States assistance to the Malian security forces—in addition to several other types of foreign aid, was suspended in line with congressionally mandated restrictions triggered by the coup. The aid suspension did not include humanitarian assistance but included health and food security, of which the United States is a leading provider in Mali and the region” (Arieff and Johnson, 2012).

At that time, Margesson (2012) showed that the issue of humanitarian access could rise on the international policy agenda, if active fighting broke out among armed groups, if these groups intensify their objections to the presence of aid agencies, or if concerns arise over the potential diversion of aid to terrorist groups as the insurgents are equally much more likely to resort to terror as a technique (Weinstein, 2006:327-328). The politicians who collaborated with the insurgents no sooner than
later began to lose faith in the insurgency as their political ambitions could not be sustainably married to the rise of a Sharia-driven society, which the fundamentalists were imposing on the society.

In the course of the insurgency, the MNLA engaged in massive rape and that began to cost them their popularity and local support, thereby influencing Ansar Dine and MUJAO to increasingly distance themselves from them. They (Ansar Dine and MUJAO) introduced the protection of women to get societal support on one hand but recruited their children into the insurgency on the other hand. In July 2012, UNICEF reported the growing use of child soldiers in the insurgency. Volluz (2012) wrote that this new wave of recruits into the insurgency were 10 year old children. Children were recruited to join the insurgency and were made to believe that they are fighting a sinful human order and socio-political system, which they need to wipe away and replace with sound Islamic way of life. The children in some cases acted as informants, in other cases, they were combatants and bombers. Using them as bombers was reinforced by the fact that the unsuspecting crowd would hardly imagine nor believe that the child around them was carrying a luggage full of explosives, which would be laid for the onward maximal harvest of death amongst the people.

The quest to implement the Sharia Law and culture in the Northern region of Mali led to the reign of extra-ordinary human rights abuses. Affa’a-Mindzie and Perry (2013:4) wrote that “serious human rights violations were reported, with cases of arbitrary arrests, torture, public flogging and amputations, sexual and gender-based violence, summary executions and the use of children in armed groups. Ansar Dine also destroyed a number of ancient holy sites in Timbuktu, some of which were listed as United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Sites”.

Furthermore, the extremist members of the sect imposed Islamic dress codes and behavioural styles on the citizenry living in the territories
that they captured. The Sharia legal code was often manipulated in their interest in the areas under their control. The implementation of the Sharia law came down heavily with draconian punishments like executions, amputations, public flogging and stoning to death. Unfortunately, some casualties of these brute and naked judgements were guilty of make-up cases that has direct and indirect relationship to alcohol consumption, fornication, adultery, unholy social relations amongst youth like handshaking and hugging of the opposite sex as well as violation and negligence of dress codes amongst the residents. While these forms of brutal Sharia-based attacks were getting worse, the Christians in the North began to feel the fire of ‘holy jihad’ against them. Some were killed, while others were abducted causing the massive flight of Christians from the North (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

In January 2012, the insurgents exhibited their violent prowess through the massacre of Malian troops and civilians in the city of Aguelhok. There are different accounts of the death toll in the attack following the sect’s strategic advantage over a local military base. Al Jazeera reported 82 deaths, the Malian Association for Human Rights (AMDH) and the International Federation for Human Rights based in France gave the number of those killed as 153, while the Malian police unfortunately could not determine and provided an authoritative number of those who died in that attack (Keita, 2012). This mass sentence to death generated a lot of national and international reactions, which was heightened by ‘the Bamako March’ of military officer’s wives, in protest of the harvest of deaths and security risk faced by their husbands and relations. The insurgency weakened the professionalism of the Malian military. This was because the approximately 7,700 military personnel of the country remained in disarray and low moral due to the killing of their colleagues.

On the side of the state, it was also reported that the Captain Sanogo-led military, used excessive torture, engaged in massive sexual abuse and forcefully sentenced the soldiers who carried out the counter-coup
to death. The significant division in the security sector is between the ‘red berets’, who supported former President Amadou Toumani Toure and led the military coup against former President Moussa Traore in 1992 on one hand and the ‘green berets’, who orchestrated the March 22, 2012 coup that overthrew President Toure. Tension between the two factions further increased, following a failed counter-coup led by the red-beret paratroopers in April, 2012 (Affa’a-Midzie and Perry, 2013). This led to a reign of military-driven arbitrary arrests, widespread torture, regular clashes, which sent twenty souls to their untimely death (Human Rights Watch, 2012B). Journalists equally cried foul to the intimidations, abductions, high handedness and physical assault of their members and other civilians, who openly criticized the military (Committee for the Protection of Journalist, 2012). Thus the military became, under him, an instrument of repression and dehumanization of those who do not want them to have things their way. The fact that Captain Sanogo was made the leader of the July 2012 Committee on the Reform of Defense and Security Forces does not in any way speak well about the future rise of a professional and united military, following the fact that he was in the past, a key actor on one side of the military divide. Hence, the need for an independent leadership reform committee that would re-position the military for sustainable internal and border security with other neighbours in the Sahel region.

**Implications of the Insurgency in the Sahel**

The Tuareg insurgency has a lot of implication not only for the Malian State but also for the whole Sahel region. This was why in 2005, the International Crisis Group (ICG) predicted that while the Sahel was under the potential security bomb of Islamist terrorism, Mali “runs the greatest risk of any West African country other than Nigeria of violent Islamist activity” (International Crisis Group, 2005). In the wake of the increasing escalation of the insurgency, “regional and Western leaders warned of a rising threat to international security associated with an
expansion of AQIM’s influence and scope of operations as well as a possible spread of violent extremist ideology and state fragmentation” (Reuters, 2012). In the onset, international concern was focused on the fact that unrest in Mali was dealing a serious setback to regional stability (State Department, 2012).

There were massive international migrations, mainly internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to Algeria, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Niger Republic. The conflict in the Northern part of Mali displaced over 420,000 people (UNOCHA, 2012). Affa’a-Mindzie and Perry (2013:1) have stated that despite some early victories for the French and Malian troops in January and February, 2013, military intervention will not address the root causes of the acute insecurity that the people of Mali face. Indeed, this recent crisis is only the tip of the iceberg in Mali and the Sahel-Sahara region as a whole. Given persistent underdevelopment, recurring humanitarian crisis and entrenched terrorist and organized criminal networks in the region, short-term crisis management is unlikely to be sufficient. This is because the semi-arid nature of the Sahel region where the Tuareg insurgents and other groups that threaten security operate, remains a major advantage for them. They spread very easily and could speedily launch an attack on unsuspecting citizenry and disappear into their terror cells. Refugees International (2012) has pointed out that the underfunded international response to the Malian insurgency has added stress to Sahel food crisis.

The widespread scattering of nomads and other sedentary Sahelian inhabitants has influenced the rise of “volatile cocktail of underdevelopment and insecurity” in the region (Simon, Mattelaer and Hadfield, 2011:19). Mali, and the Sahel region in general, has faced the destabilising wind of “political and security challenges caused by weak governance and security structures, radical Islamism and religious driven violence, all exacerbated by the consequences of the 2011 Libyan crisis and growing transnational criminality”
It was estimated that between 7 million to 10 million small arms and light weapons were already traded in West Africa (Adedeji and Mazal, 2003) before the fall of President Muammar Gadaffi in October, 2011 which expanded the areas under dangerous and potential threat to insecurity in the Sahel region. By the time Gadaffi’s government came crashing, the Libyan State arms became loose for unlimited access to all forms of criminal networks, which sold and exported them to neighbouring countries and beyond where they were used to increase security threat. It is equally widely believed that the insurgents’ alliance with the Arab Movement of Azawad (AMA), AQIM, Boko Haram and Ansaru has a wider regional implication for the Sahel. Arieff and Johnson (2012) wrote that the open presence of AQIM commanders in Northern cities, along with reports of foreign fighters travelling to Mali from Nigeria, Somalia, Pakistan and elsewhere, have raised acute concerns that Mali could become a training ground and launching pad for transitional terrorist attacks.

As state authority in Mali has withered, transnational violent extremists and drug traffickers have taken advantage. This has made the conflict-torn Mali a significant and regional transit point in the flow of cocaine and other kinds of hard drugs between South America and Europe (State Department, 2012). There is equally the increasing threat on humanitarian workers in the Sahel region as they are increasingly becoming both real and potential victims of hostage-taking and kidnap-oriented killings. There were cases of attacks on soldiers that are assisting in the counterinsurgency. On Friday, 10th May, 2013, “suspected Islamists carried out three suicide attacks on soldiers from Mali and Niger in northern Mali, wounding a Malian soldier. At least five bombers died” (The Guardian, 2013: 8).

The Challenge of counter-insurgency

“Counterinsurgency is perhaps the most neutral term available for the various techniques and theories that relate to the prevention and
suppression of armed insurgencies. However, it is not entirely neutral for most of the people who are interested in counterinsurgency are military strategists and civilian agents of incumbent governments, whose duties are to maintain some sort of strategic order. Counterinsurgency has, therefore, come to mean a form of strategy which is mainly military and within the military context, one designed to fight irregular, especially guerrilla war” (Calvert, 2010: 148). Counterinsurgency is equally seen in some quarters as a form of warfare and its management (Pustay, 1965). The insurgency in Mali generated diverse international reactions and perceptions, especially as it has to do with counterinsurgency. In July, 2012, ECOWAS pushed for the deployment of a 3,000 troop intervention force in Mali (The Guardian, 2012: 9). On August 14, 2012, Mali’s military hierarchy rejected the idea of an ECOWAS troop deployment that would spread into southern parts of the country, stating that any regional intervention would have to be in the North to support the Malian troops (Reuters, 2012). On July 5, 2012, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2056 noted that the AU and ECOWAS requested a counterinsurgency mandate but called for an explicit explanation of the objectives, means and modalities of the envisaged troop’s deployment (Arieff and Johnson, 2013). The EU and France (2013) outlined the United Nation’s Security Council resolutions for the African-led International Mission in Mali (MISMA) to:

a. Support the full restoration of the constitutional order of the transition roadmap including the holding of peaceful, credible and unconditional presidential and general elections in 2013 and an inclusive national dialogue;

b. Support the restoration of the authority of the State and the rule of law throughout the country, while respecting the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Mali and support the eradication of groups affiliated to criminal and terrorist organizations;
c. Support, in this context, the restoration by Mali, of all public services and in particular of basic services by implementing a strategy that provides for short, medium and long-term measures;

d. Support the return in dignity and in freedom of refugees and displaced persons;

e. Support the revival of a dynamic economic and social development which will constitute a fundamental driver to solving the crisis of security and development in the Sahel and Mali in particular.

The corruption in the Malian state wasted no time in spreading to the military institution as the counterinsurgency preparation was on the way. It was alleged that the army “was riven by nepotism, mismanagement and corruption. Money from the USA to train and equip soldiers to fight jihadist terrorism was siphoned off by high-ranking officers with disastrous implications for the logistics of the Northern garrisons” (Africa Confidential, 2012). The Islamist groups in Northern Mali are not only armed to the teeth but are strongly linked to the local population and “have threatened to carry out attacks against governments in the region that would commit her troops to a counterinsurgency military intervention” (Agence France Presse, 2012).

Arrieff and Johnson (2013) revealed that the inter-agency Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) was conceived as a successor to the 2002-2004 Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which focused on enhancing the border security and counter terrorism capabilities of four West African states: Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. The TSCTP aims to counter violent extremism in the Sahel region through multidimensional security assistance, national development and good governance. The goal remains to design and enhance multi-faceted programs that take into account the region’s complex developmental and security problems. This goal is focused on the long run elimination of terrorism and other forms of violent insurgencies in the region.
Unfortunately, bilateral and multilateral diplomatic bottlenecks as well as divergent-ideological influenced foreign assistance have remained a problem in the coordination and implementation of their counter terrorism agenda. The program has suffered since its inception from challenges in establishing a comprehensive strategic design, transcending a more traditional bilateral style of foreign assistance, ensuring inter-agency coordination and evaluating outcomes (Arieff and Johnson, 2008). USAID in 2011 evaluated the counter-insurgency activities of TSCTP and concluded that higher-level goals, measured through surveys on attitudes towards extremism were yielding results but with limited impact and in addition, the implementation of the TSCTP coincided with a worsening of the terrorist threat in parts of the Sahel (USAID, 2011).

The truth remained that ending protracted conflict in a state that has experienced terror and insurgency (Heiberg, O’Leary and Tirman, 2007) is often not easy. It would be recalled that Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra while revealing his selfish enjoyment of power and rejection of the ECOWAS call for his resignation in July 2012, stated that “I will not resign and I cannot resign. The Islamists did not take hold of the north on March 22 or April 17, 2012 but over the last 10 years. And it’s not in three months that a transitional government will get the Islamists out. We need time to organize ourselves (The Guardian, 2012). Ogbonnaya (2013B:16) wrote that a UN peacekeeping force was deployed to replace some 3,200 French troops in Mali. “A June, 2013 agreement (by the insurgents) with the Malian government allowed elections to go ahead in the Tuareg stronghold of Kidal. In the end, however, some MNLA forces did their best to sabotage the process” (Ogbonnaya, 2013A: 16).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The Malian democratic experience has undergone different forms of turbulence, however, the recent Tuareg insurgency dealt a heavy
blow to the state. The paper has shown how the military intervened in politics as a roadmap for a new strategic leadership, which gave way to an interim government that could not immediately tackle the numerous threats to nation building thereby reducing government popularity and enhancing the prominence of the insurgents and their quest for an independent state. Tull and Lacher (2013) wrote that “first, conflict in the North is fundamentally between elites from tribal and ethnic groups, some of whom, for tactical reasons, have allied themselves with heavily armed extremists. Second, the government in Bamako has been largely paralysed ever since a military coup deposed President Amadou Toumani Toure in March 2012”. Their destruction of the UNESCO World Heritage ancient mosques and tombs generated lots of international reaction from the media (UNESCO, 2013). Many of the insurgents were raping women and using child soldiers, while looting government properties, offices and buildings in Gao and Timbuktu (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

The Paradox created by the complex and violent nature of the insurgency was that many local and international analysts criticized this conflict-based order of things in Northern Mali but there was a minority of the society, who did not only support the insurgents but saw them as warriors for a just and better societal order in Mali. The insurgency generated high level of divisiveness in the Malian national army, which remains a major threat to the growth of post-conflict peace building. There is widespread low morale and the increasing leakage of intelligence information to the insurgent groups.

The unlearned lesson of counterinsurgency (Shafer, 1988) is the need for multidimensional long-term roadmap to sustainable peace building. Amongst the roadmap to the resolution of the Tuareg insurgency in Mali include the rise of President Dioncounda Traore’s Interim Government, the ECOWAS-led mediation process and the coalition of international counterinsurgency operation. However, a more comprehensive approach is needed, one that addresses the structural causes of the
conflict in Mali, accounts for the multidimensional nature of the cross-border threats in the region and invests in the institutions and popular participation needed for long term peace, stability and development of the Malian State in particular and the region in general (Affa’a-Mindzie and Perry, 2013:1).

The UN-African report recommended that the UN and other international actors should “strengthen its security capacity and presence on the ground and develop integrated programs to fight drug trafficking and organized crimes (as well as) an overarching mechanism or framework” for the states in the Sahel to address underlying challenges (UN Security Council, 2012). The EU and France (2013) have reiterated that it is necessary to define the support measures in priority areas such as support for decentralisation and the balanced development of the region, justice, the rule of law, management of public finance, support for the private sector, agriculture and food security, employment, migrant remittances, adaptation to climate change, education, health and cultural transformation. European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso stated that the European Union will pledge to contribute more than 500 million Euros to help Malians rebuild their country at a conference of aid donors in Brussels in May, 2013. Mali stated in May, 2013 that she will ask international donors for nearly €2b to help rebuild the country and try to halt the guerrilla attacks of the insurgents. The Malian Government said it would be able to finance just over half of a €4.3b plan for 2013-2014 national reconstruction programme (The Guardian, 2013: 8). The international community is greatly needed to finance and support the Malian State with technical assistance to build on their domestic strengths in managing their national problems that have fuelled the insurgency.

Finally and just recently, the former Malian Prime Minister, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (widely known as IBK), in a run-off election beat Modibo Sidibe Soumaila Cisse, a former Finance Minister in the recent presidential election. The first election was held on 28th July, 2013 and
the peaceful run-off, was conducted on 11th August, 2013. “Despite the difficult conditions, Malian administration showed its determination to guarantee the transparency and the credibility of the elections” (Ashton, 2013:60). Keita had earlier received nearly 40 percent of the votes in the first round and endorsements from nearly all the candidates of the first round but there was still complaints of roughly 400,000 spoilt ballots, inability for voters to receive their cards (DailySun, 2013:16) and what Cisse called organized fraud (Ogbonnaya, 2013A: 16). The election is pivotal to helping Mali end a period of instability as it attempts to recover from a military coup and Islamist insurgency (Ogonnaya, 2013B:16).

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ALGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY: THE VIEW FROM THE EDGE.

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“Don’t you think Sir, that Central Barbarian State is rather particular… I do not understand… It works well with Tunis, Tripoli and the Sultan of Fez but when it comes to Algiers, it gets complicated.”

Georges Washington (1732 - 1799)

Introduction

What drives Algiers’ political policy makers?

In past years, Algeria’s diplomacy has been the subject of quantitative publications, articles and reports, particularly in the mass media and to a lesser extent, numerous think tanks. Indeed, not since Algeria’s independence in 1962, has the state been the subject of commentaries, analysis and critics. Even during the Cold War and the time of the Non-Aligned status where Algiers played a leading role, Algeria did not face as much scrutiny or find itself under the media spotlight.

Since the onset of the ‘Arab Spring’, the ongoing crises in Libya and Mali and the protracted situation in Western Sahara and the terrorist attack in the Algerian gas field of In Amenas, interest in Algeria has quintupled. Intrigued observers and researchers alike provide all manner of explanations for Algiers’s policy vis-à-vis its neighbors and the necessary strategic cooperation. However, trying to analyze Algiers’ foreign policy through the lenses of neighboring conflicts hinders a clear transparent assessment of Algeria’s position shaped by

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1 - As A. L. Strachan underlines in her study on Algeria, ‘since the onset of the ‘Arab Spring’ of January 2011, a majority of the literature [on Algeria] largely consists of policy papers produced by US-based and European think tanks’ in Conflict Analysis of Algeria, p. 4
its own legacy of revolt, independence and civil war. Indeed, it is not possible to assess foreign policy made in Algiers without looking at its own internal nation-state building and historical regional alliances and affiliations. Above all, these crises should not overshadow Algeria’s long-standing investments in regional security.

The aim of this paper is not to undermine the qualitative and quantitative work of well-established and renowned historians, professors and political analysts like French men such as Benjamin Stora, Guillaume Grandmanson, the late Bruno Etienne, Jacques Berque and Maxime Rodinson, Americans like William Quandt, John Entelis, Robert Malley and William Zartman or Brits like Hugh Roberts and Martin Evans. Rather, the author points out at the dangerously growing fashionable journalistic, Internet, TV and think-tank ‘experts’ such as the British Jeremy Keenan, the French Laurence Aïda Ammour, the Moroccan-American Anouar Boukhras or the South Africa based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) David Zounmenou, to name but a few. These ‘experts’ are through their access to mainstream media, likely to be the most influential to the general readers and viewers as well as many policy-makers. The latter, increasingly too busy to take time out to read books, have also become too impatient to draw rapid conclusions which would irremediably often lead to short-term geopolitical strategies.

In the following, the author will start by giving a brief account regarding the coverage and semantics used by many concerning Algiers and its foreign policy. He will then give a rapid background of Algeria’s history which in turn explains the country’s doctrine and ideology. Then, examples of lobbying against Algeria, which is also a pointer to the misperception of the latter and its politics, will be put forward. The active political and military role of Algeria will be the next section. Thereafter, the author will also analyze Algiers communication or lack of it. Finally, he will synthesize his paper and draw his conclusion.
**Regional policy interrogations**

During the Malian crisis and the dramatic hostage-taking in the SONATRACH-BP gas-plant of In Amenas, Southern Algeria, in January 2013, Algerians found themselves under the spotlight of the world’s media while an avalanche of analysis and comments emerged from everywhere, scrutinizing Algiers’ foreign policy.

All sorts of adjectives such as lax, indolence and nonchalant were employed to describe Algeria’s position on Mali and the hostage-taking crisis. Linking both issues, Algiers was furthermore accused of complacency vis à vis the terrorists, with some analysts and ‘experts’ questioning Algeria’s willingness to fight terrorism, suspecting and portraying the Algerian government as Machiavellian in mindset and paranoid (Anouar Boukhras), ambivalent (Laurence Aïda Ammour) and engaged in an ambiguous game with the terrorists, and even accusations of a terrorist’ sponsoring State (Jeremy Keenan). Likewise, David Zounmenou, an African ‘expert’, argued during an expert workshop in The Hague in September 2012 that ‘Algiers transformed the northern part of Mali into its own dustbin’.

Similarly, a lot has been said and written about Algiers’ position concerning the Western Sahara. However, as Jacob Mundy writes, “Algeria’s stake in the Western Sahara conflict has been one of the most contested yet little understood aspects of this three-decade old dispute between Morocco and Sahrawi nationalists. This confusion stems, in part, from the opacity of the Algerian regime, but also from numerous hypotheses that have been put forward to explain Algeria’s motivations. Yet, Algeria did not create Western Saharan nationalism generally nor Polisario specifically”.

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2 - J. Mundy, Algeria and the Western Sahara Dispute, p.3. For a historical explanation of Algeria’s policy vis-à-vis the Western Sahara conflict, see S. Zunes and J. Mundy, Western Sahara, War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution.
Psycho-History

“Last time the French aviation bombarded a North African region, it was during the War of Liberation”.

Mourad Medelci, Algeria’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs

Once the Mecca of revolutionaries, - in the words of the revolutionary Amilcar Cabral- Algeria has since its independence in 1962 played a leading political role in Africa. Algerian nationalism has been nurtured by its zeal for freedom, liberty and dignity for not only Algerians but for all Africans. Therefore, Algeria’s regional and foreign policy cannot be fully understood without a clear review of its past, and particularly its nationalism and pan-Africanism which in turn gives a clear insight into what drives Algerian policy, its motives and explains its singularity and specificity. As Robert Malley recalls, “understanding Algerian politics requires taking a step back to contemplate what is happening around it”.

Algeria’s doctrinal principles anchored in the national consciousness finds its roots in its own history which was marked by profound violence and attacks. For centuries and until its independence, Algeria was a land of conquests, attracting Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantine, Almoravids, Arabs, Turks and French. The brutal and violent imposition of French colonialism in Algeria over 132 years is also unrivaled. As an indication, when the French entered Algeria in 1830, the Algerian population stood at 4 million. By 1872, there were only 2 million Algerians. Similarly, the population of Algiers was roughly 40 000 in 1830 sharply dropping to around 12 000 four years later.

1 - N. Brahim El Mili, Le printemps arabe, une manipulation ?, p. 186
2 - R. Malley, The Call from Algeria. Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam, p. 9
3 - For a thorough account of Algeria’s history until 1830, see C. A. Julien, Histoire de l’Afrique du nord. Des origines à 1830.
4 - For a detailed description of France’s violent colonialism in Algeria, see B. C. Brower, A Desert Named Peace, The Violence of France’s Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902.
5 - B. C. Brower, Ibid., p. 4
Likewise, Algeria’s war of independence against France resulting in hundreds of thousands of Algerian casualties only finds comparison with the Vietnam War (1956-1975). Also, Algeria’s ghastly eight-year long war (1954-1962) has undoubtedly marked and shaped Algerian’s political doctrine and ideology and it is from this violent position that one may understand Algeria’s foreign policy. Hence Mourad Medelci’s reminder of France’s bombing of North Africa prior to NATO’s military intervention in Libya in 2011.

Consequently, and from the early days of its independence until now, Algeria tooled itself with the diplomatic apparatus which matched its status on the international scene. However, Algerians have conducted their diplomacy based on the core basis of their history and their principles that Algiers considers intangible.

Algeria - one of the founding members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which came into being on 25 of May 1963- initially adopted an anti-imperialist position tirelessly leading the Non-Aligned Movement and playing until the mid-1980s, an active role for the liberation of other African states and liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela’ African National Congress (ANC), Angola’s Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) or Zimbabwe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) as well as several other liberation organizations, often providing them with financial, political and military support.

The climax of Algeria’s political activism is probably the Algiers Summit of the Non-Aligned in 1973 and the special session of the UN General Assembly on the ‘New Economic International Order’ and for a system of international relations that will guarantee the right of the then ‘Third World States’. Notwithstanding the dramatic decade of the 1990s which shook the entire Algerian society affected by terrorism,

Algerian pan-African activism remains through the African Union (AU) – the successor of the OAU - where Algiers defends its own interests as well as those of its African peers keeping alive its principles, especially in this era of aggressive globalization. It is also from this perspective that after his election in April 1999, the Algerian president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, vigorously denounced during his address at the United-Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1999, foreign intervention practices such as NATO’s military actions in Kosovo. In this regard, and analyzing the current international relations system, Bertrand Badie rightly notes [that], after having accumulated all humiliations of both the colonization and the decolonization processes, who would be surprised by Algeria’s leading [political] role?

### Media and lobbying

Algeria’s political activism undeniably gave the state leadership status worldwide. As Malley writes, “it was under Boumedienne’s rule that Algeria came to be considered a ‘montreur de conduit,’ or catalyst, for the Third World. Its active role in emerging Non-Aligned Movement, the nationalization of the oil industry in 1971, support for a New International Economic Order, and solidarity with national liberation movements all pointed to an aspiration to become the ‘best, the most progressive, in a word, the Third World’s guide [aiguillon].’

However, whilst enjoying tremendous respect particularly in the then ‘Third World’, Algiers antagonized many other states, especially in the West and its political zone of influence. For instance, the former US

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1 - B. Badie, Le Temps des HUMILIES. Pathologie des relations internationales, p. 201
2 - Ibid., p. 200
3 - Houari Boumedienne, who was thirteen years-old in 1945, once declared that the massacres of Sétif and Guelma perpetrated by the French that year and which he eye-witnessed, irremediably shaped his view of the world. For Boumedienne to declare, ‘that day, the teenage I was became a man’, in Les massacres de Guelma
4 - Ibid., p. 141.
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, labeled Algeria as a ‘redoubtable animator’ during the oil crisis of 1973\(^1\). This political activism which in turn created a negative perception and image of Algeria undoubtedly remains anchored in many minds. Indeed, Algiers’ political activism during the heightened years of the Non-Aligned has led, and until today, to a misperception of Algeria, especially in the mainstream press and among numerous think tank ‘experts’.

In addition, Algerians have also since the independence of their state suffered from strong antipathy and lobbying from France which has not only led to a wide inaccurate perception of Algeria across the world but continues to this day with an active anti-Algeria French lobby nostalgia of the colonial era.

To best describe this anti-Algerian feeling emanating from France is to recall how Paris acted during the 1990s when Algiers was negotiating a loan with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Following the fall of oil price on the global market in the mid-1980s, Algeria, which derives 95% of its national revenues from oil and gas exports, found itself in a state of near bankruptcy (a debt of US$38 billion by 1995). This led the government of that time to approach the IMF\(^2\). However, when Algeria had approached the latter for a loan in 1990, France –Algeria’s first commercial partner at that time- refused to speak in favor of its former colony, declining to say a single word in Algiers’ favor when the IMF board approved the loan in April 1991\(^3\).

Moreover, when in 1991 the European Union tried to support Abderrahmane Hadj Nacer’s –Algeria’s former Governor of the Central

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1 - Z. Essedratti, Bouteflika, Jefferson et la particularité algérienne.
2 - Interestingly, the IMF at that time was headed by the French Michel Camdessus who seemed to be more acting as a representative of French interests rather than the director of the IMF.
3 - Indicatively, the representative to the fund of the Benelux countries, Jacques de Groote, privately confessed that he had never witnessed such animosity.
Bank- financial policy and reforms through a European framework, Paris and the then French president François Mitterrand, categorically refused to endorse such a plan\(^1\). But this French attitude vis-à-vis the government of Algeria may perhaps be best summarized thus: whenever, in 1990-1991, Abderrahmane Hadj Nacer travelled around the world to meet his counterparts and government officials, he was followed by a French senior official, who would attempt to tarnish the former’s work and reputation by explaining to senior officials that Algeria’s Governor of the Central Bank was incompetent and corrupt\(^2\).

Such lobbying was further endorsed by certain media such as the Qatari channel al Jazeera. For example, while Algeria was facing the ferocious terrorist attacks and massacres of tens of thousands of people during the 1990s, all sorts of rumors over ‘who kills who’ and doubts over the veracity of the identity of the perpetrators largely circulated in the media, especially the French media as well as al Jazeera. In this regard, the latter often accused the Algerian authorities of many of the killings and massacres that were taking place in Algeria. To cast even more credibility and attract more viewership, al Jazeera would give the opportunity to Islamists and other army defectors such as Commandant Mohamed Samraoui - who would then be presented as Colonel- the possibility to convey their often radical messages on TV\(^3\).

A similar position was also visible in France where many journalists and publishers showed clear sympathy to the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) Islamists and their sympathizers, contributing therefore to the

\(^1\) It is worth noting here that François Mitterrand, who presided over the destiny of his country from 1981 to 1995, was France’s Interior Minister during the war of independence between Algeria and France and was a fierce supporter of French Algeria. It must be said however that this hostility was not shared by all in Paris, especially among businessmen.

\(^2\) For a thorough account of this IMF episode and France’s hostility vis-à-vis Algiers, see F. Ghile’s, North African diversities: An Algerian Odyssey.

confusion concerning the political situation in Algeria\(^1\). With no tangible evidence, the Algerian government of the 1990s was, for example, accused of being behind the assassination of seven French monks in 1996 who lived in the mountains of Tibhirine. In 2013, however, the French TV channel France 3, broadcasted one of the few reports clearly underlining the responsibility of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) terrorists in the killing of the monks\(^2\).

Regarding al Jazeera, this channel also broadcasted, in 1998, a report showing fights and skirmishes between alleged terrorists and Algeria’s armed forces. However, it was rapidly proven that these images had been filmed in Lebanon by an al Jazeera crew\(^3\). Likewise, following the fall of Ben Ali of Tunisia in 2011, many analysts predicted a domino effect throughout the region which would inevitably affect Algeria. Furthermore, when some sporadic demonstrations occurred across the country, al Jazeera built a Hollywood-like studio in the Moroccan city of Oujda near the Algerian border with extras, actors, cameras, mobile phones and other devices. According to Brahimi el Mili, al Jazeera intended, by so doing, to broadcast images from there as though they were events occurring in Algeria\(^4\).

Similarly, in July 2013, French media such as Le Monde, Libération, France 24 and TV5 did a wide media coverage of group of around 300 Algerians of Kabyle origin –mainly sympathizers of the pro-autonomy movement, the Mouvement pour l’Autonomie de la Kabylie (MAK) - who assembled in the city of Tizi Ouzou, Algeria and ate during the day in the Holy month of Ramadhan. Yet, when a few days later, a group of more than 1000 Kabyles gathered in the same city at dusk, in order

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1 - Ibid.
2 - M. Aït-Aoudia & Séverine Labat, Le martyre des moines de Tibhirine.
4 - Ibid. p. 181
to break their fast as a response to the non-fasting group, not a single report was aired\textsuperscript{1}. By so doing, the French media seems to have clearly taken sides with this group of secular and autonomist Kabyles, often wrongly perceived by the French as less religious - if not, anti-Algerian-forgetting that the large majority of Kabyles are practicing Muslims and profoundly Algerians, despite their socio-political struggles with the centralized authorities of Algiers.

What these cited examples may indicate is that, as the French sociologist and philosopher, Pierre Bourdieu underlines, the search for hot news by the media pushes journalists to present things in a simple and short manner adopting the ‘viewership criteria’. However, this ‘viewership criteria’ strategy leaves little room for serious investigations which would in turn thoroughly inform the population\textsuperscript{2}. Moreover, as Edward Said argues, “the problem arises when journalists and ‘experts’ who, out of touch with the realities […], good sense, and intellectual responsibility, either promote [a] special interest group at all costs or put it too willingly and uncritically at the service of power” \textsuperscript{3}. But the real danger arising from such a strategy is that “the scholar would be transmuted into an ‘area expert’ […] and listened to religiously”\textsuperscript{4}. Also, and as a result, topics end up being covered up rather than elucidated or understood.

\textsuperscript{1} - The French daily \textit{Le Monde} did write a short piece on this counter-event.
\textsuperscript{2} - P. Bourdieu, L’emprise du journalisme, p. 5
\textsuperscript{3} - E. Said, Covering Islam, How the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world, p. 170
\textsuperscript{4} - Ibid., p. 19
The ANP and Algiers’ political activism

“If only that was true! We would have avoided the fiasco of Gao!”¹.

The DRS’ response (Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité) expert when asked about Algiers role in Mali.

A lot has also been written on the Algerian army, its role in Algeria’s politics as well as its willingness, or lack of it, to fight terrorism outside Algeria’s territory. For instance, Jeremy Keenan openly blames Algiers for sponsoring regional terrorism in the Sahel and Mali². Likewise, Anouar Boukhras argues that ‘despite its counter-terrorism expertise and strong and well-trained army, its effective intelligence service, close ties to the US which make it a critical strategic partner, albeit a ‘prickly, paranoid’ one, Algeria is reluctant to play the regional enforcer as its domestic priorities, fear of global terrorist reaction and distrust of its neighbors keep Algeria’s feet in clay’³. Similarly, Laurence Aïda Ammour talks about ‘Algiers’ political ambivalence’⁴. The journalist Borzou Daragahi even refers to Algeria as a giant afraid of its own shadow⁵.

However, when looking at the crisis in Mali, it is important to bear in mind Algeria’s ghastly history. Since the country’s independence, Algeria has had a clear doctrine with the role of its army well defined within Algeria’s borders: to guaranty the republican order and safeguard the territorial integrity of the country only. Indicatively, it is from this

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1 - In A. Benchiba, Ce qu’en pense Alger, p. 13
2 - J. Keenan (2012), Algerian ‘state terrorism’ and atrocities in northern Mali. Anouar Boukhras and Laurence Aïda Ammour defend a similar theory using the terms ‘lax’ and ‘ambiguous’ attitude.
3 - A. Boukhras, The Paranoid Neighbor. Algeria and the Conflict in Mali.
5 - B. Daragahi, Algeria: A giant afraid of its own shadow.
perspective that Algiers has always refused to send any of its troops anywhere on the African continent.

Furthermore, when looking more closely at Algiers’ international activism to fight terrorism and all related activities such as arms and drug trafficking, evidence indicates that Algerian authorities have been very active. Indeed, as Fiona Blyth smartly notes, Algiers has clearly demonstrated thorough leadership away from the spotlight of discussions on military intervention. In order to be more efficient on the Sahel, since the winding down of its own civil strife in the late 1990s, Algeria has also sought to marshal a coordinated regional response to cross-border terrorism, smuggling, and other armed group activity in the Sahel’s vast and under-policed border regions. The signature initiative of this effort is the ‘Tamanrasset Plan’ agreed to in 2009 by Algeria, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania, which led the establishment, in 2010, of a joint military operations center, the Common Operational Joint-Chiefs of Staff Committee (CEMOC) located in Tamanrasset (southern Algeria) and of a joint intelligence Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL) in Algiers. While progress has yet to be widely demonstrated, cooperation between the countries in conducting operations, analyzing security threats, and sharing border responsibilities is a laudable model, and the initiative demonstrates Algeria’s willingness to instigate collaboration.

Likewise, “Algeria has supported efforts to strengthen the Northern Standby Brigade of the African Standby Force, the PSC’s enforcement arm intended for rapid intervention as well as peace support and humanitarian operations”. Algiers also contributes to two out of three military regiments to the brigade and a third from the military police to the African Standby Forces, the North African Regional Capability (NARC) whose headquarters and administration is based in Algeria.

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1 - F. Blyth, « Perillous Desert » Finds Interconnected Threats and Solutions in the Sahara.
2 - Ibid.
3 - Ibid.
4 - B. Nickels, Algeria’s role in African security.
Also, and as Walid Ramzi recalls, it is undeniable that the harbouring of that key logistic base reflects Algeria’s strong commitment to the AU Peace and Security Council, affiliated to the African Union, that enables the African continent to play its role in managing peace and security.\(^1\)

It is also under Algiers’ initiative that the AU inaugurated, in 2004, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT or CAERT under its French acronym), a think-tank dedicated to the study and analysis of terrorism which also aims to guide and coordinate counterterrorism efforts across Africa.\(^2\) Furthermore, the global fight against terrorism since 9/11 has led to numerous regional partnerships, military cooperation and joined exercises and activities such as the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) in which Algeria plays a leading role.

Finally, the cabinet reshuffle of September 2013 whereby Ramtane Lamamra –dubbed Mister Africa-, former Peace and Security Commissioner of the AU, a highly respected and experienced diplomat with a massive knowledge of African affairs was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs is another indication that Algiers intends not only to remain pro-active in Africa but to also continue playing a major and significant role in the international concert of nations.

In the fight against terrorism and drugs, Algiers has, moreover, spared no efforts in convincing the ‘international community’ and the United Nations (UN) to follow the path of the African Union which has endorsed the principle that ‘terrorism is a threat to human rights’ and ‘cannot be justified under any circumstances’.\(^3\) Algiers has, moreover, been lobbying for the UN to explicitly put a ban on the payment of ransoms which continues nurturing terrorism and terrorists activities.\(^4\) In this respect, in 2013, Algiers also considered drug trafficking in North-West Africa as a top national security threat linked to militancy.

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1 - W. Ramzi, Algeria to host rapid reaction force.
4 - Contribution of Algeria to the panel on the ransoms payment issue as a source of financing terrorism.
in the region and has consequently charged its army with fighting the scourge\(^1\).

Having said that, and regarding regional cooperation, it may also be important to underscore that despite the Tamanrasset framework, the Sahel states (Mauritania, Mali and Niger) have maintained and sought to expand their security cooperation with external powers such as France, the United States and have on occasions even worked with each other in joint military operations instead of coordinating through and with Algeria only. France has even conducted at least two direct military operations to free French hostages held by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel, both of which failed. Since its military intervention in Mali in 2013, France, in order to facilitate rapid deployments in Africa, is furthermore reviewing with a number of African countries such as Djibouti, Chad, Mali and Niger, its military orientation on the continent. In Niger for instance, Paris is reinforcing its military co-operation with Niamey by extending its military base in Niau Sahel\(^2\).

Regarding the Algerian National People’s Army (Armée Nationale Populaire or ANP), which has since Algeria’s independence played a major role in the stability of the country, it would be erroneous to believe that it still is, in 2014, in charge of the political affairs in Algeria. The aim of this paper is not to analyse the role of the ANP\(^3\). However, a brief account of it may help to understand the political dynamics in place in Algeria today.

The old days whereby the ANP was the ‘faiseur de roi’ or had its say in the political command and on the designation of the president are undoubtedly over. Until the late 1980s, the army was indisputably the major player in Algerian politics, pulling the strings behind the curtains of a civilian government with nominal authority. However, after the political opening up in 1988, the situation dramatically changed while the

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1 - L. Chikhi, Algeria puts army in charge of fighting drug trafficking.
2 - A. Abderrahmane, Françafrique and Africa’s Security.
3 - A thorough analysis of the Algerian army is beyond the scope of this paper.
1990s bloody decade saw the ANP play a pivotal role in the stability and defense of the country. As a result, the ANP which was seriously involved in the fight against terrorism throughout most of the 1990s, has come to the firm conclusion that its main and sole role was the safeguard of the country and its sovereignty. Above all, the ANP is not a homogenous body, that advocates the pensée unique or mainstream thinking. It is rather a heterogeneous body with numerous and different streams and strategists, Arabophones and Francophones –and increasingly Anglophones, young and old, all with a different vision for Algeria.

Moreover, the bulk of the ANP’s young officers are fully aware of the paradigm shifts that have occurred since independence but most significantly since the cancelation of the electoral process in January 1992 as well as the onset of the ‘Arab uprisings’. As a result, they intend to solely concentrate on their primary role which is to remain in the barracks and focus on the defense of the country. In this regard, as Abderrahmane Hadj-Nacer, former Governor of the Central Bank of Algeria -who cannot be suspected of any sympathy for the military- probably correctly underlines that ‘since Algeria’s independence, the ANP has been the backbone of the country and consequently, its essential role in the stability and security of Algeria is unquestionable and it is therefore paramount to preserve it’. In other words, as the pivotal state of North Africa and the Sahel, it is essential for this unstable region that Algeria remains strong with a professional and efficient army not only for the Sahel and the Maghreb but the entire Mediterranean region as well.

Finally, and as a further indication of the army and the Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS) inability to overpower the politics, since he came to power, Abdelaziz Bouteflika has, through a combination of forced retirements, ambassadorial assignments, resignation and the age-related deaths (biological clock) of many top-level officers such as Larbi Belkheir, Mohamed Lamari, Khaled Nezzar, Bachir Tartag

1 - A. Hadj-Nacer, La martingale algérienne. Réflexion sur une crise, p. 238
2 - See R. S. Chase, E. B. Hill, & P. Kennedy, Pivotal States and U.S Strategy, p. 33
and many others, been able to concentrate ultimate power within the executive office with him at its helm. The cabinet and ANP reshuffling of September 2013 which saw the creation of a post of vice-Minister of Defense held by Bouteflika’s close collaborator, Major General Gaid Salah, further confirms the growing empowering of politics over the military in Algeria.

In short, and as Geoffrey Porter perfectly puts it, while the military was once a prominent political force, Algeria’s current president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has professionalized the army, moving it out of the halls of the presidential palace and back into the barracks.

Algiers’ communication or lack of it

“We do not talk much, but we are always here”

Ramtane Lamamra, Algeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs

This aforementioned lobbying-media acquaintance has nonetheless also been possible due to a rather poor communication on the part of Algiers. The dramatic hostage-taking of In Amenas and the limited information released concerning the hospitalization of Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 2013 are two examples which clearly show that Algerian officials do not master the communication means and tools available and necessary in this modern world.

A popular French saying recalls that ‘pour vivre heureux, vivons cachés’ (to live happy, live discreetly). And Algerians like it that way. Nevertheless, Algeria is increasingly under the world’s spotlight and has become an important component of Washington which is well aware of Algeria’s centrality and would therefore like it to play a greater regional role.

1 - J. P. Entelis, Algeria: democracy denied, and revived?, p. 667
2 - G. D. Porter, Fortress Algeria
role. As the pivotal state in the region, Algeria does little, however, to openly publicize its numerous political endeavors and even successes.

For instance, besides its activism before the UN to try to persuade member states to stop paying ransoms for individuals kidnapped – which is also inscribed in the AU’s charter-, Algeria is also the architect behind the resolution forbidding the unconstitutional seizure of power (Res. 142) during the OAU summit in Algiers in July 1999 which was eventually adopted at the OAU Summit held in Lomé in 2001. Algiers was also among the strongest supporters of the 2002 Durban Declaration on Democracy, political, Economic and Corporate Governance and not only did Algerians support the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), but they were among the first African countries to volunteer for evaluation by peers.

It is Algeria’s Said Djinnit, the AU Peace and Security’s first commissioner (2002–2008) and currently the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa who led numerous African peace processes. Said Djinnit also helped design the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the framework through which the AU now addresses and handles peace and security on the continent. Therefore, and as Nickels reminds us, “Algeria’s long-term investments in the APSA pursued by Ramtane Lamamra from 2008 to 2013 [and Ismaïl Chergui since October 2013] seems to contradict the image of an insular Algeria uncomfortable with regional and international cooperation”.

Likewise, following the Parliamentary elections in May 2012, women account for 32% of Deputies in the Algerian Parliament, which means that Algeria complies with the UN 1325 Resolution which stipulates that Assemblies must consist of a minimum of 30% of women. In spite of its imperfections, this political configuration is not only unique in the entire Arab world but it is also a target many Western democracies have

2 - Ibid.
yet to match. Yet, despite the fact that Algeria is pushing the boundaries, nothing has hardly been said and commented on this either from Algiers or the majority of external media and analysts.

A dramatic consequence of this poor communication and silence is that not only is Algeria often damagingly portrayed by the outside world, but the country’s own historical figures can also be hijacked by its neighbors. Indeed, very often Moroccans or Tunisians use the names of Massinissa, King Abdelmoumen, the Fatimid Kingdom, the Almohade dynasty as their own historical figures despite the fact that they are part of Algeria’s History.

A view from the edge

“Algeria: when you think you know her, you have yet to discover her; when you have discovered her, you have to understand her once more.”

Malek Haddad, Algerian writer

The Central Barbarian State which fascinated President Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) and puzzled George Washington (1732-1799) more than two hundred years ago remains an enigma to many across the world.

It nonetheless also appears that Algeria has always been loyal to King Massinissa’s motto (238 BC-148 BC) who while nurturing cordial relations with Rome without falling into any counter-productive compromise, declared once that ‘Africa belongs to Africans’. Spokennation for the poor and the oppressed, Algeria has a cardinal value of non-interference and sovereignty of the States.

2 - The term ‘barbarian’, from the Greek Barbaros (βάρβαρος) literally means “whoever is not Greek is a barbarian”. In ancient times, Greeks used it mostly for people of different cultures. In the Roman Empire, Romans used the word “barbarian” for many people, such as the Berbers, the first inhabitants of North Africa.
“No one knows what is going on. To be honest we are talking about a country, which a few days ago, most of us may not have found on a map”¹. Such was the BBC’s journalists, Nick Robinson’s statement who observantly concluded while covering the dramatic hostage-taking of In Amenas. And indeed, there is little doubt that within the journalistic milieu, and those of intellectuals and other ‘experts’, only a few know Algeria, its sociology and History thoroughly. In this regard, and as Andrew Hussey intelligently notes, “Algiers is probably the most known unvisited capital in the world”². Yet, in this era of thirst for more news and commercial scoop for the media, most analysts largely avoid complexity in presenting their views. But as Erik Orsenna says, [those] ‘general ideas always mislead those who believe they are quick to understand’³.

A dangerous form of researchers and journalists –often branded as ‘experts’- who have no in-depth background of a country but at most a one-week long ‘field research’ and then reproduce blindly what has already been written prevails today. In doing so, they opt for the safest way to publish in mainstream journals and newspapers but sadly, with little exhaustive and rigorous explanation of the complexity of the subject treated. Duncan Clarke perfectly highlights this new form of analysts in an excellent piece on ‘experts’⁴ on Africa, where he explains that in order for them to be heard, it is important for those ‘experts’ to ‘remain ideologically fashionable, avoid complexity and above all, never consult the vast body of literature on the continent, and in this case the literature on Algeria⁵. However, and as Edward Said rightly underlines, “no matter how gifted the individual, he or she cannot hope to report complex places without […] a lengthy term of residence in

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1 - In Natalya Vince, “In Amenas – a history of silence, not a history of violence”.
2 - A. Hussey, Algiers: a city where France is the promised land – and still the enemy.
3 - E. Orsenna, “Nous avons besoin d’Afrique”. “Les idées générales trompent toujours les paresseux, ceux qui veulent comprendre trop vite.”
4 - The inverted commas are in the original text.
5 - D. Clarke, Africa: how to be an expert. As a French civil servant working for the European Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, told the author during an informal conversation in November 2012 over the crisis in Mali, ‘experts on Mali have suddenly mushroomed overnight’.
the place” 1. It is therefore paramount to remember that “although one depends on them a great deal, television, newspapers, radio, and magazines [as well as blogs and Internet articles] these are not our only source of information. There are books, specialized journals and lecturers available whose views are more complex than the essentially fragmented and immediate things delivered by the mass media”2.

In this regard, prior to Algeria’s presidential elections of April 2014, the renowned French historian and specialist of contemporary Algeria, Benjamin Stora, was asked what he thought of the fierce verbal battle that had taken place between the candidates and their respective partisans, which was relayed by the national press. Facing genuine difficulties in understanding what was happening, Benjamin Stora had the humility to respond thus: ‘I do not understand anything about what is happening. I do not know. I do not know anything […]’3. Such was the humble response of a man who has dedicated his entire professional life to the study of contemporary Algeria.

Concerning Algeria, it is undeniable that this country suffers from a, not necessarily founded, negative image. A representation conveyed by certain powerful lobbies able to propagate that particular perception of the largest country in Africa, which does not correspond to what Algeria and its politics really ‘is’ but which as such becomes more prevalent and more present than any other. Yet, as Edward Said recalls, “all knowledge […] rests upon judgment and interpretation. For interpretations depend very much on who the interpreter is, who he or she is addressing [and] what his or her purpose is in interpreting” 4. Arguing further, the author of ‘Orientalism’ underlines that “there is never understanding, nor knowledge where there is no interest […]. The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias”5.

2 - Ibid., p. 48
3 - « Benjamin Stora ne comprend pas ce qui se passe en Algérie ».
4 - E. Said, op. Cit., p. 162
5 - Ibid., pp. 165-166
The source of the negative vision of Algeria is well captured by French historians Jean-Claude Vatin and Philippe Lucas who argue that the conveyed [negative] image of Algerians and Algeria finds its source in the French colonial era¹. And indeed, the regular look on Algeria and Algerians today is undoubtedly a recurrent fantasy which finds its roots in the colonial period and which continues to irrigate our representation of this country, its people and its government. These are images initially conveyed by Paris but which have since gone beyond the frontiers of the French Alps’. But as Robert Malley rightly indicates concerning the analysis of Islam which may be transposed to Algeria’s perception, “Western observers are so entranced [with Algeria], that they tend to confuse reality with their phantasms” ².

For long, Algerians chose to remain silent and discreet rather than ask for rewards for their political and diplomatic actions. This is probably best explained through the Arabic adage: ‘la shokran alaa wajeb’ (No thanks on duty). As a result, and in a pure Goebbels style cynicism and lies whereby if you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it, this poor communication from Algiers and Algerians has allowed countless outsiders to nurture all kinds of rumors, write everything and more dramatically anything on Algeria and its people and with time it has become the norm, not to say the ‘truth’.

Nonetheless, in this crucial era where fierce diplomatic battles are fought across the African continent, it may be urgent for Algiers to openly explain and defend its diplomatic position to enable authentic researchers and experts to write about Algeria. However, in order to do so, the Algerian authorities ought to rapidly review their communication strategy.

In this era of unlimited communication, international channels, as well as social media such as Facebook and Twitter, play a major

¹ - P. Lucas & J. C. Vatin, L’Algérie des anthropologues.
² - R. Malley, op. cit., p. 60
communicating role\textsuperscript{1}. However, what this fierce battle of communication underlines is that it is symptomatic of Algeria’s [and the South, without a doubt] increasing inability to control the communicational and informational flow\textsuperscript{2}. Moreover, concerning Algeria, and as Kader Abderrahim notes, rather than control communication, the authorities prefer to allow rumors to spread, which to some extent, increases the State’s risk of destabilization\textsuperscript{3}. Also, in this era of continuous flow of information, Algerian officials would be well advised to adapt their communication strategy to that of the twenty-first century.

As William Zartman stresses, “Algeria occupies a key position in the region; it is the only state to border on more than two others (Maghreb countries) and indeed the only one to be contiguous with all the states in the region, and some others as well”\textsuperscript{4}. Also, and as the current Algerian president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika once said, ‘Algerians must be aware of the importance of their country for peace and security and make the most of this geo-strategic advantage in the region as well as in Europe and therefore play their part’.

But perhaps the Algerian authorities have become aware of the urgency to review their communication strategy as this issue is increasingly debated in the Algerian press while many diplomats privately acknowledge the communication deficit their country is suffering from. As an indication, Algeria’s Minister of Communication, Hamid Grine stated in May 2014 that ‘it was necessary [for Algeria] that its voice is heard beyond the national borders, underlining the progress and achievements made by Algerians which in turn would support the Algerian diplomacy’\textsuperscript{5}.

\textsuperscript{1} - The role media play can also be subjective and instead of thoroughly and genuinely informing, media may misinform.
\textsuperscript{2} - Ibid., p. 193
\textsuperscript{3} - K. A. Abderrahim, « Plutôt que de maîtriser cette communication, le régime préfère laisser courir les rumeurs et, d’une certaine manière, alimente la déstabilisation de l’État ».
\textsuperscript{4} - W. Zartman, The Ups and Downs of Maghrib Unity, p. 172
\textsuperscript{5} - « Il faut faire entendre la voix de l’Algérie ».
Having said that, a key hurdle to Algiers’ communication is probably also its absence of modern tools of communication such as think tanks and English speaking specialized press. It is indeed extraordinary that Algeria should not boast of one think tank worthy of the name at a time when events across the world need, more than ever before, to be analyzed by independent experts. Needless to say, the rather poor command of English by Algerians in general, the de facto lingua franca, further penalizes Algiers, its diplomats, academics and researchers.

**Conclusion**

As demonstrated in this analysis, throughout its history, Algeria went through tumultuous periods of invasions, wars and colonialism. After one hundred and thirty two years of harsh French colonial rule, Algerians fought a ghastly eight-year long liberation war (1954-1962) to gain their independence. Since then, they have been the subject of lots of criticism due to their political stands and [non] alliances. Yet, it is only through these historical lenses that one may get any close to understanding Algeria’s foreign policy. History bears out the players in nation building, its doctrine and principles and Algerians are no exception to this reality. This is undoubtedly why Robert Malley argues that “present and likely future developments make an understanding of [Algeria’s] past all the more necessary” ¹.

It appears therefore that Algerians are not atypical but rather coherent and most importantly, constant in their foreign policy. They are first and foremost jealous of their sovereignty and deeply concerned with the stability of their country and the tangibility of its frontiers for which Algerians paid a very high bloody price. Unless outsiders take this highly and extremely important component of the Algerian society into consideration in any of their political analysis, they will never genuinely understand Algerians and Algeria.

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¹ - p. 116
Regarding its regional and continental political involvement, the crises in Libya, Mali and in the Sahel in general should not overshadow Algeria’s long-standing investments in regional security. Algiers has undeniably been very active but has also always preferred discretion rather than open publicity of its endeavors. And indeed, as demonstrated in this study, Algerian diplomats have, for more than fifty years, spared no efforts in contributing to peace and security across the African continent.

More than two centuries since Washington’s perplexing question to Adams, there is little doubt that the world, the mass media and a large number of ‘experts’ present Algeria in a very superficial manner which surely does not help in the understanding of this multiple and complex country and its foreign policy. Furthermore, as the former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard perfectly reminds us, ‘since our collective way of thinking is now dictated by images and by what we hear on the radio, and no more by what we read and analyze ourselves, we have lost the sense of the long-term as well as the sense of what is complex’¹. However, and to conclude, one may meditate on the wisdom of Claude Cheysson, the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 1980s who once advised his diplomats posted to Algeria, that ‘after many years living in Algeria, you will think that you understand this country [and its people]; yet, it will always surprise you’. Indeed, Algerians are chess players and it surely does not help to have a short term vision when analyzing their politics.

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¹ - ‘Depuis que la manière de penser collective est régie par l’image et par la radio, et non plus par l’écrit, nous avons perdu dans nos échanges le sens du long terme, perdu aussi le sens de ce qui est complexe’.
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