

NON – STATE ACTORS, TERRORISM AND HUMAN SECURITY IN NIGERIA: AN
ASSESSMENT OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY 2009 – 2019

By

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the activities of the extremist Boko Haram sect between 2009 – 2019, possible factors facilitating the menace of BH insurgency and its relative impact on human security in Nigeria. This is intended to highlight the social implication of the crisis along with its national security implication and relative threat to human security in Nigeria. Employing the Structural Violence theory, the study highlights the nexus between structural violence such as political marginalization, poverty, unemployment etc. and violent extremism. The paper recommends the complementarities of human security to military operations if the war against violent extremism in Nigeria must become history as military campaigns alone have proven partly successful in stemming the tide of BH insurgency evident from the recurrent attacks on hard and soft targets up until now.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Human Rights, Human Security, Insurgency, Non-State Actors, Terrorism

INTRODUCTION

There is no gainsaying the fact that Post–return to Democracy in 1999, Nigeria has experienced diverse forms of internal security challenges across the 6 geopolitical zones in the country – South/East, South/South, South/West, North/Central, North/West and North/East – instigating security threats such as recorded in the recent past from or between activities of groups like the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South/East; Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), and other like-minded militant groups in the South/South; kidnapping, hostage taking and herder crisis, a major cause for concern in the South/West necessitating the establishment of '*Amotekun*' – a South/West regional security outfit; farmer-herder crisis in the North/Central; Banditry and kidnapping in the North/West along with Boko Haram insurgency in the North/East region.

From 2009 to 2019, Nigeria has been embattled in a series of national security challenges including those of the Boko Haram insurgency in the North/East; the resurgence of militant activities in the South/South Niger Delta region; the clamour for secession in the South/East by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and recently, within the South/West, stemming from the incessant kidnapping, hostage taking and herder crisis in the region; the farmer – herder crisis in the North/Central region and the carnage occasioned by banditry in the North/West zone.

Since the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, the sect has wreaked havoc across Northern Nigeria including the Federal Capital, Abuja – orchestrating attacks on soft and hard targets including government buildings, security operatives, schools, markets, churches etc. gaining widespread attention in August 2011 after the United Nations compound in Abuja was attacked with explosives leading to the loss of twenty-three lives and many more reported injured (Walker, 2012).

Although Nigeria has since recorded her share of civil unrest and security challenges including direct threats to her sovereignty and territorial integrity, these challenges seem to persist as observed with the trend of BH insurgency in Northeast Nigeria.

Nacos (2016) notes that Boko Haram employs indiscriminate violence in pursuit of its political, religious, and ideological goals. Concurrently, rights activists and organizations like the Oxford

Committee for Famine Relief(Oxfam) have maintained the narrative that Boko Haram activities have a direct impact on the development of children in Northeast Nigeria (Oxfam, 2015); suggesting the threat of grave humanitarian crisis. According to Abdu and Shehu (2019), the impacts of BH insurgency on women and girls were in the form of abductions, sexual and gender based violence, deplorable living conditions in the IDPs camps, psycho-social problems etc. All these highlight the outcome of insurgency in Nigeria relative to BH.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Boko Haram rose as a jihadi organization against westernization under the leadership of Muhammed Yusuf with the primary goal of establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria and has infamously propagated violent extremism post-2009. The attacks in 2011 on the police headquarters in Abuja, the United Nations compound in Abuja and the kidnapping of over 200 girls in 2014 from their school in Chibok, Northeast Nigeria eliciting global attention with several campaigns advocating for the release of the girls, whose mass kidnap became the hallmark of Nigeria's brutal conflict against terrorism and violent extremism are one too many cases of BH insurgency in Nigeria as reported by the BBC (June 17, 2011), BBC (August 26, 2011) and the Punch Newspaper (January 15, 2018). This is in addition to a host of security challenges ranging from armed banditry to kidnapping and hostage taking, farmer-herder crisis, militancy, among others within the last decade. Based on data from the European Asylum Support Office (2021) Country of Origin Information Report, over 7000 lives were lost in 2020 alone from Boko Haram attacks, communal clashes, farmer herder crisis and pockets of violence across the nation suggesting a threat to national security posed by non-state actors like Boko Haram in Nigeria. Hence, a direct assault on the economy through reduction in local and foreign direct investments (FDI) along with the attendant cost on human security.

Amalu (2015) observed that as an offshoot of BH insurgency, human security continues to deteriorate as many individuals suffer untold hardship and gross violations much of which has negatively impacted on the fundamental human rights of women and children visible in cases of child and forced marriages, rape, lack of access to adequate health or educational facilities, mass displacements, kidnappings, arson, murder and other despicable acts orchestrated by the sect lending credence to the threat of BH insurgency on human and national security in Nigeria.

According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2021), over 2 million IDPs were registered in North East Nigeria as at December 2020, with 1 683 044 in

Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States as a result of BH insurgency. This is in addition to conflict-induced food insecurity and severe malnutrition.

Given the infamous record of atrocious misadventures orchestrated by BH post-2009 and despite government's efforts at curbing the menace of insurgency in the country, the insurgents have somewhat resurfaced with their attacks – picking up soft targets in markets, churches, mosques, including industrial and residential areas (Ajibola, 2015). Hence, this paper examines the BH insurgency in Nigeria and its impact on human security between 2009 and 2019.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology adopted for this study is the qualitative method of data analysis. The study depended on empirical data relative to the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Specifically, the content analysis approach was used in the analysis of relevant data presented in the study. Data was mainly drawn from secondary sources viz: international and local media reports, academic journals, newspapers, and books relevant to the subject. These were evaluated to highlight the impact of violent extremism orchestrated by non-state actors such as Boko Haram on Human Security in Nigeria. The literatures reviewed are of high academic research standards and imbued with data relevant to the research variables. The scope of the study encapsulates the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria between 2009 – 2019 and its attendant outcome on human security. Beginning with a complementary abstract, the study kick-starts with a brief introduction, and afterwards a statement of the research problem. The succeeding sections examine the methodology used for the study along with a brief conceptualization of concepts. Furthermore, the theoretical underpinning of the study is presented with an evaluation of the concept of BH and its structural composition following shortly after. More so, the activities of BH insurgency and its impact on Human Security between 2009 – 2019 are reviewed in the succeeding section. Finally, the study draws to a close with a concluding segment and practical recommendations on how to contain insurgent groups like Boko Haram as well as win and maintain the peace in Northeast Nigeria.

CONCEPTUALIZATION

Boko Haram

‘Boko’ according to Liman (1968) is a native Hausa word, originally meaning sham, fraud, inauthenticity, and such which came to represent western education and learning. Hence, ‘Boko’ came to symbolize Western education or Westernization while ‘Haram’, according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary is an Arabic word which means ‘forbidden’, ‘ungodly’ or ‘sinful’. Put together, the term Boko Haram literally translates thus, ‘Westernization is sinful’, ‘Western education is forbidden’ or ‘Western influence is a sin’. Barna (2014) notes that Boko Haram is the name commonly associated with the organization ‘*Jama’atu Ahlis-sunnah Lidda’Awati Wa’l-Jihad*’, or ‘the people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and Jihad’.

Human Rights

This study will adopt the definition of human rights established by the United Nations (1948), thus, human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more. Everyone is entitled to these rights, without discrimination.

Insurgency— O’Neil (1990) in Amalu, N. S. (2015) defined insurgency as a struggle between a non-ruling group and ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics. According to Curtas (2006), the main objective of insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control and requires the active support of some segment of the population as insurgencies do not happen if the population either supports the government or sees nothing to gain from fighting.

Human Security – The 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defined human security as people's safety from chronic threats and protection from sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. Consequently, seven types of security were listed as components of human security: economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal (physical) security; community security; and political security.

Terrorism – The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) defines terrorism as:

criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (United Nations 2004).

Although this definition incorporates the concept of terrorism; it would suffice to note that terrorism is at variance with such tactics as guerrilla attacks, criminality or robbery, often exploited by extremists in furtherance of their objectives. The UN definition underscores the fundamental characteristics of terrorism such as ideology, political intent, deliberate action, violence, multiple actors/supporters, and an enabling group. Although there are variations in the definition of terrorism as observed ab initio, these features all lend credence to the fact that the core of terrorism is the inducement of fear. Whereas the concept of terror has long been established to be a piece in the fabric of society, Avi-Yonah (2013) attributes the rise of religious terrorism in Africa to the Libyan state sponsored terrorist bombing of Pan AM Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988 leading to the death of 270 passengers; noting the spread of Libyan terrorism to other African states in the wake of Muammar Gaddafi's ouster in 2011.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

For the purpose of this study the theoretical framework is based on '*structural violence theory*' dating back to the 1969 '*Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*' work of Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung. The phrase '*structural violence*' introduced to peace and conflict studies by Galtung connotes violence experienced by individuals or groups of people as a result of prevailing social, political or economic structures. Thus, distinguished from direct person on person violence where there is an identifiable actor committing a violent act; structural violence is embedded in societal structures where there is no direct individual perpetrator. Although the concept of '*violence*' is often limited in perception to active physical conflict, it is expanded by Galtung (1969) to include structural violence which connotes the harm done to victims manifesting not just in physical attacks but also in unequal access to given resources and

opportunities. The relevance of structural violence theory to this paper is better appreciated when viewed against the outcome of Boko Haram insurgency on human security in Nigeria.

CONCEPTION AND STRUCTURE OF BOKO HARAM

As observed by Soyinka (2014) BH has a very long history; whether described as an army of the discontent or as marginalized or feeling marginalized, the movement relies on religion as a fuel for their operation, mobilization, and augmentation of any other legitimate or illegitimate grievance that they might have against society.

Although Boko Haram is often viewed to have emerged in 2002, Onuoha (2014), traces the origin of the sect to the *Ahlul sunna wal' jama'ah hijra* (a Muslim Youth Organization) founded in 1995 by Abubakar Lawan – who eventually departed for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia – in Maiduguri; heralding the emergence of an unorganized movement made up of pockets of religiously-inclined individuals at the Mohammed Indimi Mosque in Maiduguri. Onuoha (2014), notes that the Muslim Youth Organization founded by Abubakar Lawan excelled as a non-violent movement until the appointment of Mohammad Yusuf as its leader in 2002 drawing members from the unemployed and disadvantaged youth population in Yobe and Borno States along with others from neighbouring countries like Chad and Niger at which point the group's name was the *Yusufiyya* movement. Mohammed (2014), recounts the exodus of a group self-identified as the 'Nigerian Taliban' from Maiduguri in 2003 to a rural area called *Kanama* in the Yunusari local government area of Yobe State contiguous with the Nigerian border from where the group launched attacks on police stations and government buildings between December 2003 and January 2004 although these and related activities were eventually contained by the Nigerian Military. More so, Mohammed (2014) reports the reunification of surviving 'Nigerian Taliban' members from the Kanama offensive with Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri and its environs – then operating under the cover of the *Yusuffiya* movement.

According to Aliyu, Moorthy and Idris (2015), whereas the eventually unified sect, under the leadership of Muhammad Yusuf initiated the process of raising its permanent Mosque named *Taimiyyah Masjid* on a land donated by Yusuf's father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed, the group courted high powered patronage from prominent members of society. Aliyu, Moorthy and Idris (2015) report that in the years between 2000 – 2003, the sect supported the gubernatorial candidature and actively contributed to the electoral victory of Senator Ali Modu Sheriff owing

to the erst while government's seeming resistance under the leadership of Mala Kachalla towards total implementation of Sharia in the State.

Walker (2012) notes this point as the watershed in the sect's existence, morphing into a State within a State. Hence, Pham (2013) highlights the defiance of the group towards the Nigerian State and its seemingly emboldened nature during the government of Governor Sheriff in Borno State. Thus, their ideology spread across the Northeastern States of Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe and other States in Northern Nigeria viz Niger, Kano, and Kaduna.

Nwolise (2017) succinctly categorized BH campaign in Nigeria into six phases, viz:

- 2003 – 2009: Sporadic attacks on Police stations and against Borno State government
- 2009 – 2010: Temporary withdrawal, Underground recruitment of students from North-East Nigeria and Military training in Libya, Mali, etc.
- 2010 – 2013: Resurfacing, experimental coordinated attacks on the Nigerian state via guerrilla tactics, massacres and attacks on Churches etc.
- 2013 – 2015: Full scale war using conventional tactics, occupation of territories, hoisting of flag and establishing caliphate system in occupied areas.
- 2015 – 2016: Demystification of BH, capture of BH Headquarters (camp zero) at the Sambisa forest and dispersal of BH leadership cum fighters to different towns.
- 2016 – Present: Return of BH to traditional terrorists' tactics of attacks on soft targets, Intelligence gathering and mop up operations by the Nigerian military.

According to Mohammed (2014), the 2009 violence in Maiduguri and Bauchi which launched Boko Haram into limelight rose out of a squabble with the Salafist Izala group concerning the use of a mosque in Maiduguri, the subsequent arrest of 67 Boko Haram members, including Abubakar Shekau; harassment of the sect's members upon return from '*dawah*' (an invitation, summon or call in Arabic representing the preaching of Islam/exhortation to submit to Allah) and the attempted enforcement of the bike-helmet law in Maiduguri; a development ultimately perceived as premeditated against the group. However, Mohammed (2014) reported the immediate cause of the 2009 uprising as the direct shelling of members of the sect – returning from a cemetery after a burial in Maiduguri – by security forces and the subsequent refusal to grant access to healthcare facilities for all who sustained varying degrees of gunshot injury leading to the attack on Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi State and eventually escalating to four States within the span of 4 days. As noted by Maiangwa (2012), members of the sect in

Bauchi and Maiduguri were mobilized for reprisals against security forces; building up to the 2009 violence – involving Yusuf’s capture and extrajudicial killing by the police – leaving around 800 people dead including Buji Foi, a former commissioner in the Borno State government and sponsor of the sect.

More so, Mohammed (2014) reports the evolution of BH from non–violence to radicalization and extremism in three phases viz:

- Kanama Hijra (exodus of the acclaimed Nigerian Taliban from Maiduguri to Kanama Village, Yobe State – Northeast Nigeria) between 2003 – 2005 where the radicals aspired to establish an Islamic puritan community away from the seeming corruption of mainstream society.
- Heated confrontation over fishing rights at a local pond in Kanama Village and eventual escalation of violence against the Nigerian Police Force although contained by the Nigerian Army. Thus, the retreat of surviving Nigerian Taliban members to Maiduguri, building further momentum through extensive dawah (preaching), debates with opposing Ulama (clerics), mass recruitment of new members, intensive proselytizing and radicalization of members.
- Extra judicial killing of BH leader, Mohammed Yusuf by the Nigerian Police in 2009. Thus, the eventual retreat and re–emergence of the sect in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau to avenge the death of Mohammed Yusuf and other members of the sect

According to Onuoha (2014), after the death of Mohammed Yusuf, BH regrouped, mobilized, recruited, radicalized its members and advanced in sophistication of attacks, deploying tactics including hit-and-run assaults, targeted assassinations, drive-by shootings, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS), suicide bombings, attacks on security formations and civilian targets, kidnappings (such as the infamous 276 Chibok girls kidnap), gruesome executions etc. Peters (2017) noted the introduction of the Ansaru faction of BH which broke away over discontent with the brutal style of Abubakar Shekau and operating mainly between 2012 and 2013. According to Peters (2017), Ansaru debuted under the leadership of Khalid al-Barnawi and also included the hitherto third in command to Shekau, Mamman Nur. However, in spite of portraying a strategy influenced by al-Qaeda and courting the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, the faction became moribund towards the end of 2013.

According to Jacob and Akpan (2015), Mohammed Yusuf set up Islamic schools (*madrasah*) and organizations that offered many a disadvantaged Muslim youths a sense of belonging – although, affluent and gainfully employed members of society reportedly identify as members

of the sect. Hence, it is pertinent to note that while the devastating impact of poverty may influence mobilization of the teeming youths, poverty is not a lone factor of motivation for allegiance to terrorist organizations. According to ICC (2015), Boko Haram's strategy of offering financial assistance to low income, artisans and needy individuals earned the sect a considerable level of support in the Northeast and encouraged the youth's involvement in terrorist activities. The sect reportedly induced families with cash to release their wards – minors – who are deployed as soft tools for intelligence on the activities of military personnel; making an effective strategy as children are assumed benign; thus, pose no security risk.

Furthermore, the northern Almajiri system has proven to be a catalyst for the activities of BH, producing a great population of BH foot soldiers. According to Zenn (2013), given the teeming population of young boys introduced into a largely unregulated system of education where the Arabic language Qur'anic recitation from Islamic scholars form the overall basis of education, there may be propagation of religious sentiments culminating in radicalization as these minors are vulnerable to violent and extremist interpretations of the Qur'an. Danjibo (2009) contends that the preference for Qur'anic education over Western education increases the Almajiri's susceptibility to the manipulations of extremist ideologies by dishonest clerics and other such authority figures.

BOKO HARAM, TERRORISM AND HUMAN SECURITY IN NIGERIA (2009 – 2019)

Globally, there has been a surge in the activities of extremist groups and irregular combatants – with examples from the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and United States Pentagon (Bonilla, 2020), Al Shabaab's deadly attack in 2013 on Nairobi's Westgate shopping mall which reportedly killed 67 people according to the BBC (September 20, 2014), and those of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which launched more than 100 attacks in August, 2020 in Iraq (McKay, 2020) to name a few – often accompanied with severe implications as they seek to pursue their objectives which include but not limited to the establishment of an Islamic State ruled by Sharia (in the case of Boko Haram) in Nigeria; expansion and capture of territory in the Muslim world for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) sect; rebellion against regimes considered infidels – particularly America and her allies – albeit established with intent to provide combatant support and funding to the resistance against Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the case of Al-Qaeda (Byman, 2015) and rebellion against the Western-backed Federal Parliament including acts of brutality against “enemies of Islam” among the Horn of Africa's Christian and Sufi Muslim population in the case of Al-Shabab, a fundamentalist sect which began as the militant arm of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) – an alliance of hard-line Sharia courts in southern Somalia – with a goal to administer Somalia in accordance with strict Sharia principles (Sommerlad, 2019).

Paul, Clarke & Grill (2011) submit that insurgency has assumed the foremost expression of global conflict culminating in loss of lives and property in addition to instigating fear and trauma to peoples and communities Post-WWII. Hence, deducing from Paul, Clarke & Grill (2011), all insurgent groups including the Zealots of Antiquity, Assassins of the 11th through 13th Centuries, Hukbalahap of the Philippines, Ku Klux Klan (KKK) of the United States, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of Peru, the Italian Red Brigades, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), Al-Qaeda, the Japanese Red Army, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Hezbollah of Lebanon, Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) of Canada, Movimiento de Liberación Nacional - Tupamaros (MLN-T) of Uruguay, to nascent terror groups such as Boko Haram, assume a measure of uniqueness in their modus operandi. Thus, carnage, fear and trauma evident through BH activities.

Beyond ideology, the root causes of terrorism according to Abi-Hashmen (2004) and Franks (2006) include poverty, economic exploitation, poor healthcare and educational infrastructure

as well as the influence of foreign culture. Debunking the position that low socio-economic status sanctions the vulnerability of the poor to terrorism, O'Brien (2010), argues that some terrorists–cum–Jihadists have relatively comfortable backgrounds and high social capital – a case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 25 year old ex-engineering student at the University College London who attempted to blow up a commercial plane as a planned suicide mission for al-Qaeda in 2009 (BBC, 2012) – often espousing a misconception of Westernization or focus on negative aspects of Western values, assumed antithetical to Islamic doctrines. In the same vein, Crenshaw (1981) notes that terrorism is not necessarily due to inequality or poverty; hence, it is not always a tool of the oppressed but of the advantaged as economic conditions do not necessarily explain membership of a terrorist group.

Boko Haram like other extremist groups have launched irregular warfare on the Nigerian State and her neighbours in the Lake Chad Basin resulting in countless loss of lives, property and displacements in addition to a heated polity raising safety concerns for Nigeria and her neighbours. Amalu (2015) examined the threats of Boko Haram insurgency on human security in Nigeria revealing that insurgency has claimed a lot of lives and property; compounded the food and nutrition insecurity situation in the country; aided the spread of infectious diseases; denied millions of children and youths access to education; increased the number of internally displaced persons with dire need of shelter and has caused people to live in constant fear and anxiety.

Amalu (2015) concludes that Boko Haram Insurgency has negative impact on human security; noting that, counter-insurgency can only be effective when issues of poverty, corruption and bad governance are effectively addressed. Concurrently, Mohammed, NT (2020) argues that BH terrorist attacks evidenced by abduction and killing of people; destruction of homes, classrooms, health centres, churches, mosques, and farms has plunged the nation into a persistent state of insecurity. The thesis submits that BH insurgency has threatened the basics of food, safety, shelter, education and defence which primarily constitute security for the human person; thus, constituting a threat to human security. The study reveals that BH insurgency has culminated in a horrible humanitarian situation evident from human deaths, human rights abuses, population displacement, economic crisis, and general insecurity. Furthermore, the study argues that BH insurgency has claimed many lives and property; exacerbated the country's food and nutrition insecurity situation; helped spread infectious diseases; denied access to education to millions of children and young people; increased the

number of internally displaced persons in desperate need of shelter, and more importantly forced people to live in constant terror and uncertainty.

Alhaji, Zakuan, and Ahmad (2018) found that BH insurgency has amplified the number of IDPs in the country, making it one of the highest IDP populations in Africa. They noted that several women and children have been psychologically traumatized by the activities of Boko Haram along with the abuse of power by the military, police, and civilian Joint Task Force (JTF). As corroborated by other scholars noted in this study, these negative experiences such as gruesomely losing a parent, child or relative paves the way for a myriad of real life challenges including child abuse, rape, trauma, etc. among others which take a huge toll on the individuals affected, particularly women and children. The case of trauma as a result of stigmatization is noted by Bloom and Hilary (2016) where women and girls hitherto in the captivity of Boko Haram escape and successfully make it home, only to be greeted with stigmatization and considered unworthy of marriage as families and communities prove unwilling to receive them. Hence, providing fodder for the BH sect in terms of ready lieutenants to perpetrate violent crimes in Nigeria. Thus, those adversely affected by BH insurgency may engage in social vices to fill the vacuum occasioned by the insurgency leading to the grooming of irresponsible members of society who will in turn pose an existential threat to their immediate environment and the larger society if left unchecked.

Williams and Istifanus (2017) revealed that access and inclusion in education in the Northeast of Nigeria has been threatened by BH insurgency citing barriers such as damage to school facilities, emotional disorders, fear and insecurity, stigmatization, poverty, unwanted pregnancy, forced marriage and lack of teachers as stumbling blocks to the education of the girl child in the region. This is in consonance with Ajibola (2015) who asserts that the BH insurgency has had physical, social, psychological and economic impact on women and children in Northeast Nigeria including physical attacks, abductions, bomb blasts, kidnappings, destruction of property, attacks and destruction of schools etc. killing thousands of students and their teachers; adversely affecting school enrolment and attendance as parents restrict their wards from school for fear of terror attacks.

Ajibola (2015) noted the social and psychological implication of BH insurgency on women and children in the Northeast to include sexual abuse, trauma, displacements, hunger, starvation, forced marriages to their captors, forced religious conversion, trafficking, drug abuse etc. with some like the chibok girls subjected to rape (unprotected, endless and unwanted

sex) by their captors, becoming pregnant in the process and giving birth to children who according to Ariyo (2013) cited in Ajibola (2015) are groomed to become child soldiers and effect the wishes of the insurgents; suggesting an imminent threat to the security of society at large. The study further argues that children who have been rendered homeless and separated from their families due to the insurgency have resorted to begging, stealing and prostitution in order to survive; further straining the moral fabric of society. In terms of health, the study notes that women and children in the Northeast have been deprived of basic medical facilities as some children have not been immunised against basic infant diseases, while some have become vulnerable to fleas and scabies as well as air-borne diseases and some others exposed to risky sexual behaviour leading to the transmission of HIV and STIs.

Bala and Tar (2019) documented several violations of human rights by the sect using special case boxes. In box 1, Sesay, Duthiers, and Carter (2014) noted that BH insurgents attacked a busy outdoor market in Gamboru Ngala, Borno State; opening fire on the market, launching grenades/improvised explosive devices and burning unfortunate victims alive in shops where they had sought refuge from the attacks. In box 3, Sanghani (2014) documented the experience of women forced to cook, clean, wash the bloodied clothes of insurgents killed in violence, transport pillage from villages along with providing military assistance via transporting ammunition and forceful engagement in murder. Peter, E. (2018) documented the ordeals of two teenage girls forcefully abducted from their home by the insurgents after killing their parents; eventually taking them to camps inside Nigeria's dense sambisa forest where they were forcefully married to insurgents and raped repeatedly by their new husbands and other men in the camps. In the same vein, Searcey (2016) highlighted the experience of a BH victim abducted by the insurgents along with her 4-year-old baby after their village was sacked and her husband killed. The victim was subjected to forced marriage to which she expressed displeasure although eventually complying with the terrorists' demands; violated and raped by the insurgents.

According to the Human Rights Watch (2014), while BH has arbitrarily captured victims, it seems to target students and Christians in particular; threatening them with whipping, beating or death unless they convert to Islam, quit school and wear the veil or hijab. As reported by HRW (2014) in Bala and Tar (2019), a 19-year-old female secondary school student along with five others were captured on their way home from school by BH insurgents and held captive within the 518-square-kilometer sambisa forest for two days and only released after pretending

to be Muslims in addition to renouncing western education via a pledge never to return to school. This is without tell of other victims abducted from their homes and villages, while working on their farms or selling items on the street.

Zakari (2019) noted that the violence unleashed by BH on communities in Borno State instigated a mass exodus of people from their original places of habitation in different parts of Borno State to Maiduguri town unannounced for safety of their lives and properties making them not only internally displaced persons but also destitute; consequently mounting additional pressure on already stretched social infrastructures such as hospitals, schools, electricity and shelter in the town. This development is noted to have necessitated the establishment of resettlement camps across Maiduguri metropolis to cater for the displaced persons not only in terms of protection from the BH insurgents but also to provide shelter and other social amenities resulting in the presence of sixteen (16) official and unofficial internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps in Maiduguri metropolis at the end of 2017 housing over 40,000 IDPs, grouped into over 6,000 households.

Ogbonna and Ruiz Jiménez (2017) observed that the activities of BH insurgency in Nigeria has been unravelled in food shortages and hunger, forced migration and displacement of people as well as dwindling local and foreign investment in the affected regions of BH attacks. According to a report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2015) cited in Ogbonna and Ruiz Jiménez (2017) 91.98% of forced migration and internal displacement from the Northeast region are caused by Boko Haram activities. They further observed the disproportionate attention on and increased security vote by the Nigerian government in lieu of allocating resources to developmental projects, resulting in economic instability, leakages and the attendant problem of infrastructural decay; a claim substantiated with the case of Colonel Sambo Dasuki (rtd.), National Security Adviser (NSA) to former president Goodluck Jonathan investigated by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) over the diversion of US\$2 billion allotted for the purchase of 12 helicopters, four fighter jets and other ammunition meant for the Nigerian military campaign against BH insurgency (Ogbonna and Ruiz Jiménez, 2017). Thus, they submit that as many more Nigerians benefited from the infamous arms deal, BH activities appear to be strengthening corruption among Nigerian political elites.

Awojobi (2014) cited in Ebonyi (2019) argued that the socioeconomic and psychological costs of BH insurgency were evident in the reduction of commercial activities in the Northeast particularly the areas of finance noting that the incessant attacks had drained human capital and

investment which have hindered economic development in the region. For example the thesis observed that the Maiduguri Monday Market adjudged the biggest in the city had reportedly lost its bubble as hundreds of shop owners halted their businesses for fear of insecurity. Concurrently, Ovaga (2012) observed that the incessant attacks by BH insurgents severely impacted the economic lives of individuals in the affected areas citing the forced review of operational hours by commercial banks from 9.00am to 12.00 noon as against the regular banking hours of 8.00am to 4.00pm in a bid to safeguard their business premises. Thus, creating untold hardship for traders and other intending customers who would usually turn in their proceeds for safe keeping; leading to a spike in shop burglaries and the attendant loss of resources as traders were forced to deposit monies in their shops.

Whereas violent non-state actors such as Boko Haram have unleashed extreme brutality on untold numbers of Nigerians and foreigners alike, the Nigerian Security forces have largely received accolades via stemming the tide of insurgency particularly in the Northeast region. This is the hallmark of a July 2021 assessment tour by Security Watch Africa (2021), highlighting the prevalent trend of security in the hitherto ravaged BH stronghold of Maiduguri, the capital and largest city of Borno State. The tour to evaluate the level of security and rate of return to normalcy included a visit to the popular post office intersection and busy Maiduguri GSM market along Damaturu road where some traders and passers-by made up of indigenes and residents of the State were surveyed. All 7 respondents interviewed by Security Watch Africa (2021) including an ex-Youth Corps member from the South-eastern part of the country turned resident and business operator reported an impressive level of improvement in security and sense of normalcy in the Capital, Maiduguri, hitherto a hotbed of extremist activities. More so, the theatre commander of the Nigerian Army troops (Operation Hadin Kai) stationed in Maiduguri, Maj. Gen. Christopher Musa revealed the budding synergy between security forces and the State government geared towards resettlement of displaced communities to Security Watch Africa (2021). These suggest an upward improvement on human security in Maiduguri, an indicator of relative peace and security. Furthermore, Security Watch Africa (2021) notes a surge in infrastructural development within Maiduguri amidst the realities of containing insecurity in the Northeast region.

To further explore the measure of extremism orchestrated by BH, Appendix I of this study highlights violent acts perpetuated by the insurgents in Nigeria between 2009 and 2020.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The ideological position of the structural violence theory corroborates the spate of terrorism ravaging Northeast Nigeria as the Boko Haram insurgency may be adjudged an outcome of socioeconomic and political marginalization, deprivation, and unequal access to opportunities. This premise is fairly consistent with the status quo in the Northeast where the population is reported as largely illiterate and in extreme poverty according to the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (2020) survey report on the standard of living in the country. Using the structural violence theory as a tool of analysis, it can be argued thus; Boko Haram insurgency stems from such factors as neglect of the masses, the accumulation, diversion and misappropriation of the commonwealth by the political class culminating in widespread inequality which may degenerate into untold hardships and sporadic attacks on several targets. Hence, BH insurgency in Nigeria corroborates the alternate hypothesis of this paper which submits that there is significant relationship between BH insurgency and human security in Nigeria. To effectively address the BH insurgency in Nigeria, the following recommendations are advised:

- i) Introduction of socio-economic empowerment initiatives for the idle youths to address the alarming rate of poverty and unemployment which often provide fodder for extremist groups like BH as a ready pool for recruitment.
- ii) Introduction of rigorous educational reforms to tackle the high rate of illiteracy which places the uneducated at a disadvantage, thus, vulnerable to extreme ideologies.
- iii) Government must establish a strong presence in the affected areas to give the people a sense of belonging. This can be achieved by intensifying effort toward infrastructural projects, healthcare as well as provision of basic amenities like safe and running water, electricity, affordable housing etc.

Appendix I: Selected Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria between 2009 and 2020

NORTH EAST

- July 27, 2009 Yobe State: Attack on Postiskum, Yobe State Divisional Police Headquarters. Three Policemen and one fire service officer died.
- September 8, 2010 Bauchi State: Bauchi Central Prison set ablaze and over 700 members of the sect freed. Killed 5 people
- May 30th, 2011 Borno State: Bomb exploded early morning in Maiduguri, Borno State. Killed 13 and injured 40.
- September 13th, 2011 Borno State: Attacked soldiers shortly after the arrest of 15 sect members during military raids on Boko Haram hideout. Injured 4 soldiers.
- November 4th, 2011 Yobe State: Attacked Damaturu the state capital. About 15 people killed.
- January 22nd, 2012 Bauchi State: Attacks at two churches and the headquarters of Tafawa Balewa LGA in Bauchi State. Killed about 10 people
- January 30th, 2012 Borno State: attack in Maiduguri the state capital. Killed 6 including 2 air force officers
- April 30th, 2012 Jalingo: Bomb explosion in Jalingo. Killing 11 and several others injured.
- 3rd October, 2012 Adamawa State: Massacred people in the town of Mubi. Killed about 25 – 46 people.
- June 9th, 2013 Yobe State: Attacked students and teachers in Damaturu. Killed 13 people
- July 6th, 2013 Yobe State: Boko Haram gun men attacked a school. Killed more than 42 people
- September 12th, 2013 Borno State: Ambush of soldiers by Boko Haram. Killed 40 soldiers

- September 29th, 2013 Yobe State: A massacre in Gujba College. Killed more than 50 students
- February 16th, 2014 Borno State: Massacre in Izghe village. Killed 105 people
- February 24th, 2014 Yobe State: Mass murder of college students. Killed 43 people
- March 2nd, 2014 Borno State: Bomb blast in Maiduguri. Killed 300 and left 250 people injured
- April 15th, 2014 Borno State: Abduction of 276 Chibok school girls.
- May 5th, 2014 Borno state: Attacked Gamboru and Ngala towns. Killed 300 people
- May 27th, 2014 Yobe State: Buni Yadi attack. Killed 49 security personnel and 9 civilians
- June 1st, 2014 Adamawa State: Bomb blast at Mubi. Killed at least 40 people
- June 2nd, 2014 Borno State: Gwoza massacre killing mostly Christians. Killed 200
- July 18th, 2014 Adamawa State: Book Haram attack in Damboa. Killed 18
- September 19th, 2014 Borno State: Attack at a busy market in Mainok. Killed about 30 people
- October 31st, 2014 Gombe State: Explosion at a bus station. Killed at least 4 people and left 32 injured
- November 10th, 2014 Yobe State: Twin suicide bombing. Killed 61 people
- November 25th, 2014 Borno State: Suicide bomb blast in Maiduguri. Killed over 45 people
- December 11th, 2014 Borno State: Massacre and destruction of houses in Gajiganna. Killed 30
- December 13th, 2014 Borno State: Abduction of people in Gumsuri. Killed about 35 people
- December 22nd, 2014 Gombe State: Bus station bomb blast. Killed at least 27 people

- January 10th, 2015 Borno State: Female suicide bomb blast at a market in Maiduguri. The suicide bomber and 19 others killed
- January 24th, 2015 Borno State: Boko Haram gunmen attempt to burn down the village of Kambari near Maiduguri. Killed 15 people
- February 2nd, 2015 Gombe State: Suicide bomb blast after the President of Nigeria leaves an election rally in the city of Gombe. Killed 1 and left 18 injured.
- February 15th, 2015 Yobe State: Suicide bomb blast in Damaturu. 16 Killed and 30 left injured
- February 24th, 2015 Yobe State: Suicide bomb blast at bus station in Potiskum. At least 27 Killed
- February 28th, 2015 Yobe State: Suicide bomb blast near Damaturu. Killed 4 civilians
- July 1, 2015 Borno State: Boko Haram militants raid three villages in the North/Eastern state of Borno. At least 145 people killed, according to witnesses.
- February 19, 2018 Yobe State: A faction of Boko Haram raids the Government Girls Science and Technical College in the northeast Nigerian town of Dapchi, kidnapping 110 students of the college.
- March 1, 2018 Borno State: Boko Haram militants attack a displacement camp in Rann, Borno State, killing at least three Nigerian aid workers and injuring three others. Three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) aid workers were abducted in the attack. On September 17, 2018 the ICRC reports on the killing of the abducted aid worker Saifura Hussaini Ahmed Khorsa and abducted midwife Hauwa Mohammed Liman, executed after a deadline for negotiations expires.
- June 9, 2020 Borno State: At least 81 people are killed in an attack on a village by suspected Boko Haram militants in northeast Nigeria, where seven people, including the village head, children and women, are abducted.
- November 22, 2020 Borno State: Boko haram attack Governor Zulum's convoy. Kills Seven Soldiers, two others.

- November 28, 2020 Borno State: United Nations report the killing of at least 110 farmers by Boko Haram in Zabarmari village.


NORTH CENTRAL

- October 1, 2010 Abuja: Explosion near Eagle Square, Abuja. Claimed 12 lives, leaving many injured.
- December 24, 2010 Plateau State: A bomb attack, in Barkin Ladin, Jos, Plateau State. Killing 8 people
- December 31, 2010 Abuja: Explosion at Mogadishu Mammy Market, Abuja. Killed 10 people
- April 8, 2011 Niger State: Bomb at INEC office in Suleja, Niger. Killed eight corps members and the suicide bomber.
- July 9th, 2011 Niger State: A bomb targeted at a church in Suleja, Niger State. Killed 4 and injured many others
- August 26th, 2011 Abuja: A suicide bomber drove into the United Nations building in Abuja. Killed 25 and injured 60
- December 25th, 2011 Niger State: Christmas Day bomb blast in Madalla, Niger State. Killed about 40 people and wounded over 5 dozens more.
- March 11th, 2012 Plateau State: Bomb blast at St. Finberr's Catholic Church, Rayfield, Jos. Killed 11 people and several others injured
- April 14th, 2014 Abuja: Twin bomb blast attack. Killed over 88 people
- May 1st, 2014 Abuja: A car bomb blast. Killed 19 people
- May 20th, 2014 Plateau State: Twin Car bomb blast in Jos. Killed 118 and injured many others.

NORTH WEST

- March, 2011. Kaduna State: Attack on the residence of Divisional Police Officer at Rigasa area of Kaduna State. Killed two policemen

- June 20th, 2011 Kastina State: Attacked Kankara police station in Kastina State. Killed seven policemen and two security men.
- March 18th, 2013 Kano State: Bus bomb blast. Killed about 65 people
- November 28th, 2014 Kano State: Bomb blast. Killed at least 120 Muslims



Source: Culled from Danjibo (2009), Nwolise (2017), Nigerian Dailies, Local and International media reports on the activities of BH in Nigeria from 2009 through 2020.

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