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CAERT, B.P 141 Bureau Poste El-Mohammadia Alger, Algérie, Tel +213 21 520 1 10 Fax +213 21 5203 78
Email : admin@caert.org.dz

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L'UA condamne fermement les attaques terroristes contre la Côte d'Ivoire et réaffirme sa détermination à poursuivre et à intensifier la lutte contre le terrorisme

Addis Abéba, le 14 mars 2016: La Présidente de la Commission de l'Union africaine (UA), Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a appris, avec une très profonde consternation, les attaques terroristes perpétrées, le dimanche 13 mars 2016, à Grand Bassam, près d'Abidjan, en Côte d'Ivoire.

La Présidente de la Commission condamne fermement ces attaques terroristes ignobles et lâches qui ont fait de nombreuses pertes en vies humaines et des blessés parmi les populations civiles et les forces de défense et de sécurité ivoiriennes. En cette douloureuse occasion, elle présente ses condoléances les plus attristées aux familles des victimes, souhaite un prompt rétablissement aux blessés et exprime l'entière solidarité de l'UA avec le peuple et le Gouvernement de la République de Côte d'Ivoire.

La Présidente de la Commission souligne une fois de plus l'impératif d'efforts collectifs africains et internationaux renforcés et toujours mieux coordonnés face à la menace croissante que constituent le terrorisme et l'extrémisme violent en Afrique. Elle réitère son appel aux États membres pour qu'ils renforcent leur coopération dans le cadre des instruments africains et internationaux pertinents, y compris à travers des cadres de coopération et de coordination élargis, notamment le Processus de Nouakchott. À cet égard, elle réaffirme la vitalité que revêt la mise en place rapide d'une force d'intervention à déployer dans le nord du Mali, pour combattre les groupes terroristes et criminels opérant à partir de cette région en direction de tout l'espace de l'Afrique subsaharienne.

The African Union Commission commends the United Nation's listing of the Lord's Resistance Army and its leader, Joseph Kony, as subject to sanctions



Addis Ababa, 11 March 2016: The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), H.E. Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, commends the United Nations (UN) Security Council for designating the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and its leader, Joseph Kony, as of 7 March 2016, as subject to sanctions imposed by UN Resolution 2262 (2016), including the measures contained in paragraphs 5 and 8 of the same Resolution, pertaining to travel ban and asset freeze, respectively.

The Chairperson applauds the steps taken by the United States (US) Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, on 8 March 2016, to complement the UN listing of Joseph Kony and the LRA for sanctions by imposing a freeze on any LRA assets within U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting US persons from engaging in transactions with the group.

The Chairperson calls upon all AU Member States to ensure that funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available for the benefit of Kony and LRA, by their nationals, any individuals or entities within their territories. She once again recalls the **Communiqué on the 299th Meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council which, on 22 November 2011, authorized the AU Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) and designated the LRA as a terrorist organization.**

The Chairperson of the Commission remains optimistic that the UN sanctions will contribute to dismantling the LRA's network through which the group has been re-supplying itself by trafficking minerals looted from the eastern part of the Central African Republic and ivory poached from the Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to exchange for weapons and other essential supplies. She

stresses that, this will, in turn, hasten the elimination of the LRA, leading to the creation of conditions conducive for the security, peace, stability, and development of the affected region.

Union africaine : Idriss Déby veut faire entendre la voix du continent

9 Mars 2016



Un mois après avoir été nommé à la tête de l'Union africaine, Idriss Déby se montre déterminé à défendre les intérêts de l'Afrique, à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur des frontières. Figure de proue de la lutte contre le terrorisme en Afrique centrale, le président tchadien souhaite que les dirigeants africains se mobilisent pour assurer la sécurité du continent, à l'image des efforts récemment fournis par le Tchad pour combattre Boko Haram.

Samedi 30 janvier, Idriss Déby a parfaitement endossé son nouveau rôle de leader de l'Union africaine (UA), lors du 26^e Sommet de l'institution à Addis-Abeba (Ethiopie). Succédant au président zimbabwéen Robert Mugabe, le président tchadien a clairement affiché sa volonté d'agir efficacement pour combattre la menace terroriste et permettre à l'Afrique de poursuivre son développement socio-économique. Nommé par ses homologues d'Afrique centrale, à qui revenait cette année la tâche de désigner, pour un an, le président, Idriss Déby est le premier Tchadien élu à la tête de l'organisation panafricaine ; créée en 2002 en remplacement de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine, l'UA a pour mission de promouvoir la démocratie, les droits de l'Homme et le développement socio-économique de l'Afrique à travers la coopération de ses 54 États membres.

[Attendu sur le terrain de la lutte anti-terroriste](#), le nouvel homme fort du continent africain a marqué les esprits lors de sa première conférence de presse, dénonçant le traitement réservé par la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) aux dirigeants africains. Alors que le procès de l'ancien président ivoirien Laurent Gbagbo s'est ouvert le 28 janvier à La Haye (Pays-Bas), Déby a fermement affirmé la position réprobatrice de l'UA sur la politique du « deux poids, deux mesures » de la CPI. « La CPI s'acharne beaucoup plus sur l'Afrique, sur les chefs d'État africains, [...] alors qu'ailleurs dans

le monde beaucoup de choses se passent, beaucoup de violations des droits de l'Homme flagrantes, mais personne n'est inquiété » a-t-il déclaré aux journalistes.

Prendre en main le destin de l'Afrique

Outre cette incartade visant à « déstigmatiser » le regard extérieur, souvent moralisateur, sur la politique africaine, le président tchadien a exhorté, lors de son discours d'investiture, les dirigeants africains à prendre en main leur destin en combattant eux-mêmes le terrorisme sur le continent. « Notre organisation fonctionne toujours comme il y a 20 ou 30 ans, a-t-il déploré. Nous nous réunissons souvent, nous parlons toujours trop, nous écrivons beaucoup, mais nous n'agissons pas assez, et parfois pas du tout. Nous n'anticipons pas assez, nous attendons tout de l'extérieur. Cela doit impérativement changer si nous voulons faire changer le cours de l'histoire de l'Afrique. »

Dénonçant « les crises parfois insupportables au Soudan du Sud, en Libye, en Somalie, au Burundi, au Sahel et dans le bassin du lac Tchad », Idriss Déby a appelé les chefs d'État africains à y mettre fin « par la diplomatie ou par la force, selon leur nature ». Le président tchadien a également plaidé pour la mise en place d'une force armée africaine, qui permettrait d'intervenir en prévention des crises dans les zones vulnérables. « Étant donné que le terrorisme se nourrit de la pauvreté, notre organisation doit consacrer l'essentiel de ses efforts sur ces régions, qui constituent le terrain fertile à l'expansion du phénomène » selon lui.

Prévention et répression, combinaison gagnante contre Boko Haram

Pour donner du poids à son discours, Idriss Déby peut s'appuyer sur [les résultats tangibles obtenus par le Tchad](#) pour faire reculer Boko Haram en Afrique centrale. Situé à une position géographique stratégique entre le Niger, le Nigéria, le Cameroun, la Centrafrique, le Soudan et la Libye, le pays s'est affirmé comme un acteur-clé de la lutte contre le terrorisme dans la région depuis trois ans. Ses principales armes : la prévention auprès de la population pour éviter que le terrorisme ne devienne une échappatoire à la misère économique ; la répression avec l'intervention de plusieurs milliers de soldats tchadiens hors des frontières du pays, comme au Mali en février 2013 ou au Cameroun en janvier 2015. Après avoir mis sur pied une force régionale de 9 000 hommes, Idriss Déby est devenu le nouvel ennemi déclaré de l'organisation terroriste, qui s'en prend maintenant directement à lui dans ses vidéos de propagande. Véritable centre névralgique sécuritaire, la capitale tchadienne, N'Djamena, abrite non seulement le quartier général de la coalition d'Afrique centrale, mais aussi l'état-major de l'opération française Barkhane, qui lutte contre le terrorisme au Sahel.

Pour assurer la sécurité de la région, le président tchadien mène également depuis plusieurs années un autre combat d'envergure : la préservation du lac Tchad, dont la taille a été divisée par 10 ces dernières décennies à cause du réchauffement climatique. Craignant que la désertification de cette importante zone d'échanges frontalière en fasse un terrain de jeu pour les terroristes, Idriss Déby a débloqué 4,57 millions d'euros pour venir en aide à la région et réclame 6,4 milliards de dollars à la communauté internationale pour sauvegarder les eaux du lac. À l'approche des élections présidentielles tchadiennes le 10 avril prochain, l'homme de 64 ans posséderait-il, du fait de son bilan et de sa nouvelle stature internationale, une sérieuse longueur

d'avance sur tous ses concurrents ?

<http://www.ladiplomatie.fr/>

Idriss Laâllali. Directeur du Caert

«Dans le cas de la Libye, les opérations militaires sont contre-productives»

le 07.03.16

Directeur du Centre africain d'étude et de recherche sur le terrorisme (Caert), Idriss Laallali évoque la situation en Libye, exprimant sa crainte de voir le chaos s'installer définitivement en cas d'intervention militaire à laquelle se préparent certains pays occidentaux. Dans l'entretien qu'il nous a accordé, il évoque les 5000 membres de Daech présents sur le sol libyen, qui tentent de rallier à leur cause destructrice les autres groupes terroristes comme Boko Haram et AQMI, mais aussi des factions armées libyennes qui pourraient lui faire allégeance en cas d'intervention étrangère.



Idriss Laâllali. Directeur du Caert

-Après la frappe militaire américaine contre un présumé refuge de Daech à Sebrata, en Libye, des sources diplomatiques évoquent d'autres attaques similaires sous le slogan de la lutte contre le groupe Daech. A votre avis, est-ce la solution pour résoudre la crise libyenne ?

La situation en Libye est un sérieux souci non seulement pour la sous-région et le continent en entier, mais aussi pour la stabilité de la Méditerranée et même au-delà. Ces frappes ne sont pas la solution. Elles vont aggraver davantage la situation. Elles interviennent au moment où le monde était satisfait de la signature de l'accord et où nous nous attendions à la constitution d'un gouvernement d'union nationale. Elles ne sont pas les premières du genre. A mon avis, elles ne seront pas les dernières. Le choix du timing n'est pas adéquat parce nous sommes toujours en phase de négociation pour la création de ce gouvernement d'union nationale...

-Voulez-vous dire que le timing n'était pas fortuit ?

Ces frappes ont été menées au moment où les discussions autour de la constitution d'un gouvernement d'union nationale étaient engagées. Mais, je peux comprendre que des fois l'urgence opérationnelle prime sur l'action politique. Je crois que l'opportunité était là pour éliminer ce groupe important de terroristes avec un de leur dealer comme cela a été affirmé. Néanmoins, il est important de préciser que la lutte contre le terrorisme doit s'inscrire dans le cadre de la légalité internationale et le respect de la souveraineté des Etats...

-Même si le bilan officiel de cette frappe américaine n'est pas connu, des sources crédibles évoquent des pertes dans les rangs des civils. Qu'en dites-vous ?

Toute frappe militaire, cause nécessairement des victimes collatérales. Les opérations chirurgicales ou ciblées menées par les drones américains en Irak, au Pakistan, au Yémen ou en Afghanistan se sont toujours terminées par la mort de civils. Malheureusement, la population libyenne est en train de subir la même chose. Est-ce qu'il s'agit d'une défaillance du renseignement ou des équipements techniques utilisés ? Ces frappes ne font qu'alimenter la menace et renforcer les rangs des djihadistes.

La population civile n'a pas choisi d'être au milieu de ces derniers. Elle a besoin d'être protégée. Si d'autres frappes vont avoir lieu, non seulement, elle fera un plus grand nombre de victimes, mais il faudra s'attendre à ce qu'un large pan de cette même population rejoigne les rangs des terroristes.

Raison pour laquelle, je dis que dans le contexte actuel, où tous les efforts sont consentis pour unir les rangs autour d'une sortie de crise politique, les opérations militaires sont contre-productives. Elles vont discréditer le processus politique mis en marche et rendront difficile toute unification des rangs militaires. Il est important de signaler que le gouvernement d'union nationale n'est qu'une étape dans un processus qui sera suivi par une autre unification, celle des factions armées...

-Ces milices armées qui se sont partagé le terrain sont-elles prêtes à se délester du pouvoir qu'elles détiennent, sachant que certaines d'entre elles sont au service des Etats ou de lobbys qui les financent ?

Après la mort de Mouammar El Gueddafi, la crise libyenne a créé un vide sécuritaire. Nécessairement, des milices et des groupes d'autodéfense se constituent pour protéger la tribu et le territoire sous leur contrôle. Par la force des événements, ils ont fini par avoir du pouvoir et de l'influence. Ils ont un rôle constructif à jouer parce qu'ils ont des capacités de contrôle de leurs territoires. Il faudra du temps pour les ramener à se mettre sous un seul commandement.

J'espère que le processus d'unification de l'armée impliquera tous les acteurs sans aucune exclusion, afin de faire face à cet ennemi commun, Daech, qui est une force multinationale terroriste, constituée de 4000 à 5000 combattants. La Libye fait face à une agression terroriste étrangère, qui doit rassembler et non pas diviser.

-Comment ces contingents de combattants de Daech pourchassés par une coalition de nombreux pays occidentaux et arabes ont-ils pu rejoindre la Libye sans être repérés ?

C'est une question que tous les spécialistes se posent. Par route ? Cela semble invraisemblable. Par voie maritime ? Aérienne ? Honnêtement, je n'ai pas de réponse.

-N'ont-ils pas bénéficié de l'aide d'Etat ?

Je ne dirais pas de l'Etat, mais peut être d'individus. Le nombre de migrants clandestins qui traversent la Libye, la Tunisie pour aller vers l'Europe, prouvent l'existence de réseaux et de filières qui organisent ce flux. Les terroristes ont dû utiliser les mêmes réseaux et emprunter les mêmes circuits pour se déplacer vers la Libye. Ce qui démontre l'interconnexion entre le crime organisé et le terrorisme.

-Certains analystes accusent des pays comme les Emirats, le Qatar, l'Arabie Saoudite et la Turquie d'avoir joué le rôle de pyromanes dans ce pays. Quel est votre avis ?

Je ne le pense pas. Si l'intérêt est le partage des richesses, celles-ci ne peuvent être exploitées sans la stabilité. Je pense que c'est dans l'intérêt de tout le monde que la Libye retrouve sa stabilité.

-L'Algérie a amené tous les acteurs à se réunir mais en cours de route, le processus a été court-circuité pour lancer un autre, au Maroc, avant que les Américains ne décident de bombarder, fragilisant davantage toute solution politique. Pourquoi, selon vous, la voie militaire prend-elle à chaque fois le dessus sur celle du dialogue ?

Quel que soit le pays qui aide à la solution politique, celle-ci ne peut être que bénéfique. Dans tous les cas de figure, l'Algérie a toujours demandé à est-ce que le dialogue se fasse sous l'égide de l'ONU. Je ne dirais pas que le processus a été court-circuité, mais plutôt que le représentant de l'ONU n'a pas compris la dynamique locale et l'aide qu'il pouvait avoir de la partie algérienne. Peut-être qu'il voulait délocaliser le dialogue pour donner l'impression de l'éloigner de l'influence de l'Algérie. Malheureusement pour lui, il a eu ce qu'il a eu. Le processus lui-même était influencé par des centres de recherche.

On ne peut pas être le médiateur censé rapprocher les parties et en même temps avoir des objectifs et des intérêts qui discréditent le processus. Ces influences extra-processus et extra-régionales ont fait perdre beaucoup de temps. Encore une fois, signer un accord est une chose et le mettre en œuvre en est une autre. Il va falloir passer à une autre étape encore plus difficile, pour mettre en œuvre ce qui a été signé et qui nécessite le soutien de tous les pays, afin que leurs efforts ne viennent pas entraver le processus engagé.

-Peut-on dire qu'il y a convergence de points de vue entre les pays voisins de la Libye en ce qui concerne le processus de résolution de la crise ?

Il y a toujours eu convergence des avis sur la crise. Néanmoins, certains ne s'entendaient pas sur la priorité des actions. Ils sont tous convaincus de la nécessité d'un dialogue politique pour aider la Libye et la soutenir dans son combat contre les groupes terroristes. A l'époque, ces derniers n'étaient pas bien connus comme aujourd'hui.

Il y avait cette confrontation entre les brigades du général Haftar et le groupe Fajr Libya, et tout le monde multipliait les contacts pour arriver à un cessez-le feu, afin d'éradiquer les petites poches terroristes, notamment à Derna, puis à Benghazi. Aujourd'hui, la situation est tout autre. Les groupes terroristes sont identifiés. Ils constituent la menace principale qui doit susciter l'unification des rangs, seule solution qui évitera le chaos.

-Beaucoup de spécialistes craignent justement un ralliement de Daech aux autres groupes terroristes, comme Boko Haram et AQMI, mais aussi aux tribus du sud de la Libye où prolifèrent les trafics en tout genre. Est-ce votre avis ?

Ce scénario n'est pas exclu et de nombreux analystes l'affirment en se basant sur des informations assez crédibles. Nous avons des indicateurs qui montrent que Daech

tente d'avancer vers le Sud libyen pour avoir accès à l'Afrique de l'Ouest et l'Afrique centrale. Les dernières vidéos, montrant un Targui qui appelle les Touareg à rejoindre les rangs de Daech sont révélatrices.

Daech veut ouvrir un nouveau front de djihad. Il fera tout pour provoquer une intervention étrangère sur le sol libyen. Il ralliera à ses troupes les groupes armés libyens, l'Aqmi et Boko Haram. Entre Daech et Boko Haram, il y a une coordination opérationnelle. Au nord du Niger, par exemple, Daech peut mener des attaques et exercer des pressions sur le pays, alors que BoKo Haram fera la même chose au sud.

Le même scénario est valable pour le Tchad, où Daech tente de rallier à ses rangs les tribus Toubous. Il utilise tous les moyens possibles et profite de toutes les situations de vulnérabilité pour s'infiltrer et recruter au nom «de l'injustice, de la pauvreté, de la religion», etc. Il veut transformer la Libye en un Etat-faillite et provoquer l'intervention étrangère. J'espère que le gouvernement d'unité nationale qui sera constitué ne subira pas de pressions pour arriver à une telle intervention qui ne fera que délégitimer tout gouvernement qui sortira du processus d'union nationale...

-Quel impact aura ce scénario chaotique sur la région, sachant que les pays qui entourent la Libye — Egypte, Tunisie, Mali, Niger et Tchad — vivent des crises assez graves ?

Les conséquences seront terribles pour toute la sous-région et je ne parle pas uniquement de l'Afrique du Nord et du Sahel. La menace concerne y compris la Méditerranée et l'Europe.

-Comment faire pour mettre un terme à l'expansion de Daech ?

Il faut renforcer la sécurité au niveau des frontières maritimes, terrestres et aériennes...

-Comment est-ce possible puisqu'il n'y a pas d'Etat en Libye ?

Je parlais des partenaires de la Libye, qui possèdent toute la technologie nécessaire pour assurer ce contrôle aux frontières. Je parle des drones qui survolent le territoire libyen. Il y a bien eu une frappe aérienne américaine avec ce genre d'avion. Les Américains sont présents dans le périmètre. Ils ont des capacités de recueil de renseignements au même titre que d'autres pays, qui sont également présents et qui peuvent contribuer dans la localisation des groupes terroristes. Le problème n'est pas dans les 5000 membres de Daech qui sont en Libye, mais plutôt dans les milliers d'autres qui risquent de les rejoindre. Vous n'allez pas trouver un Libyen qui pourrait accepter de se faire exploser pour tuer ses compatriotes.

Et c'est cette fibre nationaliste que Daech va tenter de détruire. Il faut que tous les acteurs se réunissent autour d'une table et décident du sort de leur pays. Sans la Libye, les Libyens n'auront pas d'existence. Les interventions étrangères n'ont jamais réglé les situations de crise. Elles n'ont fait qu'aggraver les conflits. Au niveau du Caert, nous ressentons une volonté de reconstruire le pays. Nous avons des relations aussi bien avec Tobrouk qu'avec Tripoli et des deux côtés, il y a cette volonté d'aller de l'avant. L'émergence de l'«Etat islamique» devrait unifier les rangs. Faisons en sorte que ces groupes extrémistes soient isolés et que leurs capacités de nuisance soient affaiblies au maximum.

-Sont-ils réceptifs à cet appel à l'unification ?

La volonté d'aller vers la paix existe. En menant des opérations conjointes, contre les groupes terroristes, ils arriveront un jour à un commandement unifié. Je vous donne l'exemple de la compagnie pétrolière libyenne, qui vend du pétrole et partage les revenus entre Tobrouk et Tripoli. Pourquoi ne pas avoir cette entente entre les groupes armés et les politiques dans l'intérêt de l'unité du pays? L'objectif n'est pas d'avoir un gouvernement, mais d'aller progressivement une Libye forte qui se prendra en charge avec des institutions et une armée qui la protégera de toute agression.

<http://www.elwatan.com/international/>

Terrorism in Africa

Daech faiblit en Syrie et en Irak, mais se renforce en Afrique

8 MARS 2016



)08.03.2016 21:49mis à jour 22:04 08.03.2016) [URL courte](#)

Le chef de l'United States Central Command (Centcom), le général Lloyd Austin, a annoncé que le groupe terroriste Etat islamique (Daech) avait élargi ses activités à différentes régions du monde, y compris à l'Afrique, à l'Asie et même à certains pays du Pacifique.



© REUTERS/ ESAM OMRAN AL-FETORI

Daech fait cap sur la Libye

Bien qu'il soit contraint de reculer en Syrie et en Irak, l'Etat islamique regagne du

terrain dans d'autres régions du monde, notamment en Egypte, en Afghanistan, au Pakistan, au Yémen, en Libye, en Afrique de l'Ouest et même dans certains pays du Pacifique, a indiqué mardi le général Austin lors de débats au Congrès américain.

"Daech a élargi son influence à d'autres régions du monde, notamment à l'Egypte, à l'Afghanistan, au Yémen, à la Libye, à l'Afrique de l'Ouest et à certaines parties de l'océan Pacifique", a déclaré le

Il a fait savoir que les activités de Daech avaient des conséquences importantes sur un grand nombre de conflits régionaux et risquaient de déclencher une guerre régionale d'envergure.

"Pour cette raison et pour de nombreuses autres, Daech constitue la menace sécuritaire la plus grave pour les intérêts et pour ceux de nos partenaires et alliés", a souligné le commandant du Centcom.



© AP PHOTO/ RAHMAT GUL

Afghanistan: Daech gagne du terrain

Les Etats-Unis combattent Daech sur de nombreux fronts en Irak et en Syrie. A cet effet, ils utilisent la tactique qui consiste à affaiblir ce groupe terroriste en éliminant ses chefs et en détruisant ses ressources économiques.

L'Etat islamique est une organisation armée qui a envahi de vastes territoires en Syrie et en Irak. Elle est interdite dans de nombreux pays du monde, y compris aux Etats-Unis et en Russie.

<https://fr.sputniknews.com/>

Africa: Countering Violent Extremism - How Human Rights and Good Governance Help Prevent Terrorism

Washington, DC — *Remarks*

1 March, 2016

Hello everyone, and thank you Deborah for the kind introduction. And thanks to the Josef Korbel School of International Studies for inviting me to speak with you all today and for honoring me with this award. I am very grateful.

This school has produced more than its fair share of "Engaged Policymakers," and I have no doubt that many of you students will go on to continue that tradition.

But look, being a policymaker is a real burden. Now that I'm at the State Department I have to deliver tough messages every day. Right now, for example, I have to swallow my New England pride and congratulate Denver on its big win at the Super Bowl.

But there are also big pluses. One of them is being able to speak with bright young people like you all -- the next generation of policymakers -- about some of the greatest challenges we face.

And that's what brings me from here today: to describe one of those challenges in particular -- the scourge of violent extremism.

Violent extremists are not a new threat; they have raged against civilization as long as we have tried to build it. What is new is how the United States and our partners around the world are pushing them back - with a more comprehensive, preventive, and civilian-centered approach we call Countering Violent Extremism, or CVE.

How did we come to embrace this new approach? The answer is simple: learning.

Learning from more than a decade since the searing experience of 9/11. Following those horrific attacks, the U.S. arrayed a range of counterterrorism tools to keep Americans safe: from airport security and intelligence collection, to military operations, and security assistance.

Yet as the U.S. targeted al-Qa'ida, its remnants dispersed and adapted. They and other terrorist groups exploited local grievances about insecurity, unemployment, sectarianism, or marginalization to merge with militias, criminal networks, and insurgencies. In doing so, they created affiliates and inspired savage new groups like Boko Haram and the so-called Islamic State, or Daesh.

The rise of these groups revealed that while traditional, "hard" approaches to counterterrorism remained critical for protecting us from immediate threats, they were ill-equipped at preventing new ones from emerging. That called for a broader approach, one that not only took the fight to violent extremists around the world, but prevented people from taking up violent extremism in the first place. That is the rationale for CVE.

CVE begins with understanding what motivates individuals and communities to align with violent extremist groups. And as you can imagine, there is no simple an-

swer. The motives are complex, overlapping, and context-specific.

To untangle them, I've found it useful to think about psychologist Abraham Maslow's famous hierarchy of needs. At the bottom are needs like physical security, food, and shelter. Further up are more abstract needs for community, identity, and purpose. When these go unmet, they can act like "push" factors that make people vulnerable to the "pull" of violent ideologies.

Each case of radicalization to violence results from a complex and context-specific interaction between these "push" and "pull" factors, helping to explain how violent extremists have been able to draw recruits from such diverse backgrounds. This complexity necessitates a longer-term approach that is at once broader and more creative, but also more targeted and contextual.

CVE attempts to strike that balance in three important ways by expanding the "who, what, and where" of our counterterrorism approach.

Concerning "the what" - CVE broadens the focus to address the "push" and "pull" dynamics that can fuel violent extremism. In doing so, CVE seeks to both reverse the growth of active violent extremist groups and better prevent the next generation of threat.

Dealing with "push" factors essentially means addressing the underlying grievances that violent extremists exploit. President Obama explained that when "people - especially young people - feel entirely trapped in impoverished communities, where there is no order and no path for advancement, where there are no educational opportunities, where there are no ways to support families, and no escape from injustice and the humiliations of corruption - that feeds instability and disorder, and makes those communities ripe for extremist recruitment."

Addressing the "pull" factors means challenging the twisted narratives and recruitment tactics violent extremists wield to influence communities and target vulnerable individuals.

But if you think about the tools we typically associate with counterterrorism - drones, soldiers, spies - it's clear that, as important as they are to keeping us safe, they are ill-equipped to address these push and pull factors. After all, you can't wire-tap a grievance, or bomb away a hateful ideology.

Which brings me to the "who" - CVE calls for an integrated and holistic approach to address the "push" and "pull" factors that can fuel violent extremism. While governments have a critical role in this work by ensuring security, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, they cannot effectively address these complex factors on their own.

That requires a broader set of actors, including civil society, business, religious leaders, women, youth, international bodies and former violent extremists. This is what we are calling a "whole of society" approach.

At the same time, an integrated CVE approach depends on coordination among these various stakeholders. That often requires building trust and repairing fraught relationships between the government and actors in civil society or marginalized communities, as well as safeguarding space for these actors to operate and peacefully express their views.

And finally, concerning "the where" - CVE calls for broadening our focus to upstream risks by supporting communities actively targeted by terrorist groups. These places are often on the periphery of conflict and terrorist operations, where individuals are highly vulnerable to large-scale radicalization and recruitment.

For example, we've seen how Daesh, from its base of operations in Iraq and Syria, has targeted communities in countries like Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. By broadening the focus to these at-risk but largely peaceful communities, CVE seeks to prevent the expansion of terrorist networks by proactively addressing the grievances they try to exploit and keep vulnerable communities on a path to stability.

Obviously, we cannot fully address all grievances or structural inequities, so the success of CVE efforts depends on getting the "who, what, and where" right - determining which communities are most vulnerable, what underlying forces are most prominent in fueling violent extremism, and which interventions or local actors are best positioned to help.

We still have much to learn, but we are making progress. In just the past year, the Department of State established an in-house unit to analyze the underlying drivers of violent extremism in different global contexts. We're also experimenting with a new approach to programming using pooled funds to incentivize collaborative problem diagnosis and integrated program design.

Using this approach, the Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) analyzed communities across East Africa to better understand al-Shabaab's efforts to recruit and expand in areas beyond its control.

Now, teams in the field are identifying the most at-risk communities to distill key factors that contribute to both their vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism. The team will then design programs tailored to address those factors and provide funding to actors in government best suited for the job.

This approach is a pilot project for what we hope will be a growing element of U.S. foreign assistance through a new Global Counterterrorism Partnership Fund.

Governments, communities, and international organizations are also looking to independent actors, like the Korbel School and the broader University of Denver community, for contributions to research and analysis in the burgeoning field of countering violent extremism. We all have a responsibility to bridge research and policy, to ensure that what we know is reflected what we do -- much in this spirit of today's Denver Dialogue.

So we welcome new ideas from outside government and look to support cutting-edge analysis and scholarship to strengthen how we tackle violent extremism and a host of other complex challenges before us.

Last September, I attended the launch of RESOLVE, a new network for researchers, especially at the local level, to share their findings and resources as they work to uncover both what can drive and what can prevent violent extremism in communities around the world. This is a new platform to engage and assist non-governmental actors, and I encourage the Institute to support its development, for example by contributing scholarship or mentoring local researchers.

The RESOLVE network is part of a broader global movement behind CVE, cata-

lyzed last February by the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. That summit launched a comprehensive CVE effort that now encompasses over 100 countries, 20 multilateral bodies, and 400 civil society organizations across the globe.

As a result of this effort, foreign governments are developing national CVE strategies that provide meaningful roles for those outside government. Many of those actors - like young people, mayors, and women - have launched their own global networks to learn from each other's experience countering violent extremism in their communities.

And last month, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon released a Plan of Action for Preventing Violent Extremism, which provided a framework for how all member states and bodies like UNESCO and the U.N. Development Program can contribute to this common effort.

As Under Secretary of State responsible for both fighting terrorism and promoting human rights, I have been intimately involved in this effort to encourage a proactive and affirmative approach to reducing the threat of violent extremism. And I have been able to see firsthand how countries around the world have benefited - or could benefit - from embracing a broader approach to violent extremism in the spirit of CVE.

In countries as diverse as Nigeria, Egypt, Burma, and Kenya, I have seen similar forces combine to create fertile soil for violent extremism to take root.

When police abuse communities, or when security forces harass or detain entire neighborhoods on mere suspicion, they leave a trail of grievance and mistrust that violent extremists eagerly exploit.

When prisons mix petty criminals with hardcore terrorists, governments literally create captive audiences for hateful ideologies -- needlessly expanding the threat. Additionally, instances of government abuse and torture push prisoners further down the path of radicalization.

When corruption goes unaddressed, citizens may conclude that government exists not to serve but to exploit. Secretary Kerry called corruption a "radicalizer," because it "destroys faith in legitimate authority." In such a vacuum, violent extremists that portray themselves as pious and untainted can offer a seemingly seductive alternative.

When there are no jobs and prospects for a better future, when people struggle to feed and house their families, feelings of hopelessness and indignity can be openings for violent extremists peddling false promises of a better deal.

And finally, when governments respond to terrorist propaganda by strangling freedoms of speech and assembly, they risk silencing the voices most needed to fight violence and hatred. Clamping down on political opposition under the guise of fighting terrorism has become all too common, yet it can backfire spectacularly by radicalizing the non-violent individual and confirming violence as the only route to political change.

Time and again, nations around the world - including ours - relearn the harsh lessons of framing security as a zero-sum tradeoff with fundamental human freedoms. A

comprehensive CVE approach recognizes this as a false dichotomy and highlights the importance of good governance and human rights protections in preventing the next generation of violent extremism.

But even in places with a strong history of democracy and human rights, like Western Europe, the United States, and India, violent extremism remains a real issue. Take India for example, which has proven quite resistant to recruitment attempts by terrorist groups like Daesh - in large part thanks to its tradition of religious tolerance, which has been a powerful antidote to its poisonous perversion of Islam.

But recent events, like the religious conversions coerced by Hindu extremists, or open speculation by some public officials about the loyalty of Indian Muslims, fuel bigotry and open the gateways to violence. In their wake, speaking out for religious freedom is critical - not just as a universal value, but as a source of resilience against extremism.

That's also true here in the United States, where we struggle with our own issues of intolerance. What matters, though, is how citizens and leaders respond. When a teacher mistook a Muslim student's science project for a bomb and sent him to the police, President Obama welcomed him to the White House. And in a time of heightened anxiety following the attacks in San Bernardino, he reminded the country that Muslim-Americans are our neighbors, co-workers, and soldiers on our front lines.

But when citizens do fall prey to violent ideologies, governments increasingly face tough questions about how to respond. Countries like Denmark have found creative ways to answer that question by pioneering efforts to de-radicalize and rehabilitate violent extremists.

In Denmark, if violent extremists renounce their ideology, they are given a chance to receive mental counseling and learn vocational skills. These programs reduce the risk that they return to violence. Equally important, the rehabilitated extremist can become a powerful voice against radicalization to violence.

By contrast, when there is no possible path to reintegrate back in society, the violent extremist may perceive no choice but to keep fighting. For all of these reasons, de-radicalization and rehabilitation efforts are proliferating around the world.

The multiple dimensions of countering violent extremism - protecting rights, providing economic opportunity, mentoring youth, holding security forces accountable, supporting families - go beyond a military response to take a citizen-centered approach to the threat.

This is not the work of soldiers and spies, but of mayors and moms, of communities and faith leaders. This is not altruism. Investing in this approach is essential in order to defeat and contain the current terror threat.

And let's be clear: CVE is a long-term effort. Jobs and bright futures won't appear overnight; trust between communities and security forces can take years to build; and local leaders and citizens must find their own routes to reach youth and vulnerable individuals and confront violent extremist propaganda. This work will likely continue across generations.

At the same time, we can look to the future more confident that we have the right approach. Instead of being reactive and destructive, CVE is fundamentally positive and proactive; it empowers new states and actors, emphasizes preventive action, and advances our collective security while championing universal values. And most importantly, it shows us how to make sustained progress against this threat and increase the odds that you all will see the shadow of violent extremism recede in your lives.

Thank you.

<http://allafrica.com/stories/201603030429.html>

Inclusive Security For The Muslim World – Analysis

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By Husain Haqqani*



A sign in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia stipulates that women are not allowed to enter a hotel gym. Photo by JPatokal

At 1.6 billion, Muslims comprise one-fifth of the world's population. By 2050, that number is expected to rise to 2.76 billion.

Sixty percent of the world's Muslims fall between the ages of 15 and 59 years, with the median age being 24 years. 317 million of the world's Muslims live in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) and 344 million in India and Pakistan. The security of the Middle East and South Asia is inextricably linked with Muslim views of self and the world.¹

The Three Deficits

Muslim countries, however, have been late in embracing the notion of inclusive security, which was described by former U.S. ambassador to Austria, Swanee Hunt, as "not just political sovereignty and military strength, but also economic security, education, and personal safety."² In 2002, the first Arab Human Development Report identified three fundamental deficits that plague the Arab world: the freedom deficit, the women's empowerment deficit, and the knowledge deficit.³ These deficits remain prevalent not only in the Arab world, but also in the greater Muslim world, and serve as impediments to inclusive security.

Of the 57 member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), only 4 countries are rated by Freedom House as "free;" 24 are rated "partly free" and 29 as "not free."⁴ A number of these had or are still under authoritarian rule and have built extensive national security apparatuses. More resources are spent on defense than on social development, like education and health.

During the Cold War, massive amounts of military aid from western countries—including the United States—flowed in; but donors were seldom asked to invest in human security or development strategies that would improve social indicators and eliminate gender and other imbalances.

The OIC countries collectively account for approximately 20 percent of the world's population, but only 7 percent of global output. The 23 Arab countries had a combined GDP of \$1.9 trillion in 2010, compared with the European Union's GDP of \$17.5 trillion. Spain alone produced \$1.43 trillion in GDP, without the benefit of natural resources, such as oil and gas.⁵ The wealth of Western nations comes from manufacturing and innovation, neither of which has found much favor in Muslim-majority countries.

The Muslim world's knowledge deficit also remains unaddressed. Roughly half of the world's illiterate adults are Muslims, and two-thirds of that number are women. Greece, with a population of 11 million, translates more books from other languages into Greek than the entire Arab world, which has a cumulative population of 360 million, does into Arabic. More books are published in Danish, the mother tongue of 5.6 million people, than in Urdu, which is the language of at least 300 million South Asian Muslims. Since the 9th century, when the Abbasid rulers of Baghdad patronized learning and built a huge library for its time, only 100,000 books have been translated from other languages into Arabic. The same number of books are translated from other languages into Spanish every year.⁶

A thousand years ago, Muslims led the world in the fields of science and mathematics. Today, they are noticeably absent from any list of recent inventors and innovators in science and technology. Since 1901, only two Muslims have won a Nobel Prize in the sciences, and one of them (Pakistan's Dr. Abdus Salam, Physics, 1979) is not deemed a Muslim in his home country because of his association with the Ahmadiyya sect.

The current weakness of the Muslim world is by no means the fault of Western colonialism and postcolonial machinations, as is widely believed by Muslims. For a century or more, overcoming that weakness has been the driving force behind almost every major political movement in the Muslim world, from Pan-Arabism to contemporary Islamism. Nevertheless, Muslims have made less effort to understand the causes of their decline over the past 300 years. Outrage and resentment—and the conspiracy theories that inform them—are poor substitutes for comprehending why Islam's lost glory has proved so difficult to resurrect.

Islamists see the world as polarized between the Ummah (the community of believers, whom they describe as one nation) and the rest. The West's rise, rather than the Ummah's decline, receives far greater attention from Islamist scholars and leaders. Their worldview is summarized in the Arabic-language title of a book by the Indian Islamist scholar Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi. Its English-language version is unremarkable enough—*Islam and the World: The Rise and Decline of Muslims and Its Effect on Mankind*—but the Arabic edition's title translates literally as, "What the World Lost by the Decline of Muslims."⁷ The civilizational narcissism is clear. "Our decline is the world's loss," it suggests. "We do not need to change anything. The West needs to fix things for us so that it does not lose the benefits of our civilization."

An open discourse among Muslims about their decline might identify the reasons why the Ottoman and Mughal empires refused to accept the printing press for more than two and a half centuries after Johannes Guttenberg invented movable type. It might also explain why Muslims failed to embrace the Industrial Revolution, modern banking, insurance, and the joint stock company, even after these had emerged in Europe. Instead, most of the discussion focuses on real or perceived historical injustices. “We are weak because we were colonized,” Muslims tend to say, instead of recognizing that Muslim lands were colonized because they had become weak.

The most glaring insufficiency across the Muslim world is the gender gap, or the gender deficit. Women are excluded from the workforce in many countries around the world, but the practice is far more visible in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. Most countries with Muslim-majority populations tend to place less emphasis on women’s rights and issues.

The Pew Forum’s 2013 study entitled “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society” illustrates that traditional views of women’s roles have deep roots in most Islamic countries. Most Muslims in countries surveyed say that a wife should always obey her husband. In 20 of the 23 countries where the question was asked, at least half of the Muslims surveyed expressed that belief. Muslims in South Asia and Southeast Asia overwhelmingly held that view.⁸

In all countries surveyed in these regions, roughly nine in ten say that wives must obey their husbands. This includes 94 percent of those polled in Afghanistan and 88 percent in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Similarly, in all countries surveyed in the Middle East and North Africa, about three-quarters or more say the same, including 93 percent in Tunisia, 92 percent in Iraq, and 74 percent in Lebanon. The views of women are often not different from those of men even though the issue affects them directly, most likely because of religious and/or cultural issues. Only 34 percent of Muslims in a more liberal, but still predominantly Muslim, country like Kosovo agree with the notion of female subordination to men, but in absolute numbers, and as part of the global Muslim community, Kosovo is less influential than Afghanistan.⁹

Islamic countries tend to have weaker democratic norms, making it difficult to change entrenched cultures of discrimination through education and public debate. Of 131 countries with which the United States has military-to-military ties, 46 are Muslim-majority countries.¹⁰ A majority of these countries remain hostage to traditional views on gender issues. While some Muslim-majority countries have inducted women into their armed forces, at least at a symbolic level, most of them are unable or unwilling to accept gender equality as a critical factor in inclusive security.

Women of Jihad

As the international community gears up for a defining struggle against Islamist extremism, the worst manifestation so far being the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), it is important to examine how an inclusive security approach might help defeat both the extremist ideology and the terrorist groups that embrace and exploit it. While conventional militaries have hesitated in bringing women on board, terrorists across the ideological spectrum have used women for a wide range of tasks, ranging from logistics and recruitment to a frontline role, say as a suicide bomber.

In a majority of Islamist and jihadi groups, women's roles were traditionally limited to the spread of propaganda and incitement of husbands and male relatives to jihad. In the last few years, the leaders of some groups are responding to both the change in context, as well as women's requests to play a larger role in offensive combat. This is reflected in the fact that between 1985 and 2010, there were over 230 suicide bombing attacks conducted by women.¹¹

There are many reasons why terrorist groups use women operatives, especially in the Muslim world. Women provide structural support, which can include inculcating in their children how to be defenders of the ideology, maintaining the household for the fighters, encouraging other women to join them in their task and in other tasks that can be done at home, such as producing or translating extremist propaganda. Women are also seen as being critical in encouraging or shaming their male relatives into joining the jihad. Women terrorists have an advantage in traditional societies as their concealing clothes, such as the burqa, provide them relative freedom from scrutiny. Women also provide an element of surprise when they participate in a terrorist operation and, according to experts, female terrorists have a four times higher kill rate than their male counterparts.¹²

In recent years, a larger number of women living in western countries has joined extremist Islamist groups, a phenomenon that can be traced to factors such as grievances about the Muslim world being under siege, belief that joining these groups gives them a goal in life, and a sense of contribution to a cause in which they believe deeply. In her book, *Bombshell: Women and Terrorists*, scholar Mia Bloom points out that there are also personal motivations, such as the desire to marry a true Muslim, existing bonds with other women who have joined these groups, the sense of community membership provides, and, finally, a belief in having an obligation to provide support for jihad.

The recruitment of women as terrorists runs contrary to the traditional wisdom of Islamist ideology. Abul Ala Maududi, an ideologue respected by the Muslim Brotherhood and similar groups, argued that Islam desires complete segregation between the sexes, a position that is endorsed by most Islamist scholars. In his book, *Islam, Purdah, and the Status of Women in Islam*, first published in 1972, Maududi stated that, "the problem of men and women's mutual relationship is indeed the most fundamental problem of civilization."¹³ Maududi and other Islamist scholars insist that a society's progress is determined by defining the "appropriate" behavior of women. In the final chapter of his book titled, "Divine Laws for the Movements of Women," Maududi makes it clear that women may leave the four walls of their house only if absolutely necessary. He further asserts that permission to leave the house is strictly limited, as women are forbidden from mixing freely with men in social situations. Exceptions are made, however, for the exigencies of war.¹⁴

Even the most conservative of Islamist scholars, like Maududi, say that the purdah or hijab restrictions may be relaxed so that women may offer adequate support to male warriors. This includes administering first aid to the wounded and cooking food for them. While women are not obliged to wage armed jihad themselves, if the occasion demands, they may serve the fighters in the way of Allah.

ISIL has argued that the fundamental function for women is "in the house with [their] husband[s] and children," but that they may go out to serve the community in a number of situations, the most important being jihad. This is allowed, "if the ene-

my is attacking her country and the men are not enough to protect it and the imams give a fatwa for it.”¹⁵ Building on that argument, ISIL announced, in February 2014, the creation of its al-Khanssaa Brigade—an all-female brigade “whose purpose is to detect male activists who attempt to get through ISIL checkpoints by wearing women’s clothing.” Single women between the ages of 18 and 25 can join ISIL and are paid a monthly salary of 25,000 Syrian liras, the equivalent of about \$114 USD.¹⁶

In January 2015, a document titled “Women in the Islamic State: Manifesto and Case Study” was floated by online supporters of ISIL. The three-part document rebutted Western civilization on issues like women’s rights, provided eyewitness accounts of life in the Islamic State, and also offered a comparison of how women living in the ISIL regions are better off than their counterparts in the rest of the Muslim Middle East.¹⁷

Ironically, most independent sources suggest that ISIL fighters are “committing horrific sexual violence on a seemingly industrial scale.”¹⁸ The United Nations has documented that ISIL forced some “1,500 women, teenage girls, and boys into sexual slavery.”¹⁹ An Amnesty International report noted that ISIL “abducts whole families in northern Iraq for sexual assault.”²⁰ “In the first few days following the fall of Mosul in June 2014, women’s rights activists reported multiple incidents of ISIL fighters going door to door, kidnapping and raping the [city’s] women.”²¹

In October 2014, a female-specific jihadi media group calling itself al-Zawra’ announced its establishment and stated its aims as preparing “women for the field of jihad by teaching lessons in Islamic Sharia, weapons use, media creation, and sewing and cooking for male fighters.”²² The announcement said, “We call upon our sisters the female supporters, those garrisoned on the frontlines of the media, to follow the work of this foundation that was established specifically for them, so that benefit comes to them and their brothers, by the power of Allah.”²³ It exhorted female Muslims to be distinguished by not being concerned with bridal gowns, homes, or clothing, but by [their] wish and “life consideration” for “the explosive belt.”²⁴ It urged women to pursue “martyrdom-seeking operation[s] that [afflict] the enemies,” and promised they would then be “immortalized among the joyous martyrs.”²⁵

ISIL is not alone in trying to recruit women. Between 1998 and 2003, the Pakistan-based terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, published a three-volume book, *Ham Ma’en Lashkar-e-Taiba Ki* (“We, the Mothers of Lashkar-e-Taiba”). Compiled by someone calling herself Umm-e-Hammad, the books were published by Dar-al-Andulus in Lahore. The three volumes carry the same cover, depicting a large pink rose with blood dripping from it, superimposed on a landscape of mountains and pine trees. They comprise a combined total of 1,410 pages, aimed at awakening “the fervor for jihad in the breasts of our mothers and sisters.”²⁶

Women at the Margins

It is clear that jihadi extremists have built a narrative for including women in their agenda, interpreting religious tradition in a manner that suits their objectives. The governments in Muslim-majority countries, however, are still not as ready as their enemies to fully embrace inclusivity. According to the World Bank, the percentage of women in the population of the Middle East North Africa region, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia nears or surpasses the 50 percent mark. Job creation in these

countries already faces the challenge of absorbing the large and growing number of young jobseekers, and women cannot compete on an equal footing in slow-growing economies. For example, young women face unemployment rates as high as 40 percent in many countries in the MENA region.²⁷

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD):

The average median age in the MENA countries is 25 years, well below the average of other emerging regions such as Asia (29 years) and Latin America and the Caribbean (27.7), and well below the average of developed countries in Europe (40.2) and North America (36.9). These young populations represent a tremendous opportunity, both as a market and as a labor force. Currently, the ratio of people aged 0–14 to those in working age (15–64), or the child dependency ratio, is very high at 48.7.²⁸

The youth bulge does not guarantee economic and social development and can easily become a threat instead of an opportunity, especially if half the youth bulge—women—have nothing to look forward to. OECD recommends that governments and civil society create well-functioning institutions and implement effective policies to promote employment, health, education, and housing in the Middle East and North Africa. It is equally important to spread these opportunities across genders to ensure that women are productively engaged, rather than being left to be recruited by extremist Islamists.

As the major supplier of military equipment to Muslim-majority countries as well as the major donor of economic aid to several of them, the United States could play a key role in influencing changes in outlook and policy throughout the greater Middle East as well as South and Southeast Asia. In several cases, U.S. support has put the militaries of these countries in charge of most public policymaking. During the Cold War, strong militaries ensured that Muslim-majority countries were by and large inoculated against communist takeovers by a conservative national security apparatus.

In the current environment, however, national security states need to transform into prosperity oriented democracies that can protect their peoples from the ideological lure of Islamist fantasies. For example, Pakistan has the world's sixth largest army, which is also the largest force in the Muslim world and the only one possessing nuclear weapons. The country's per capita GDP ranks 147th out of 183 countries, while its nominal GDP ranks 42nd in the world. Pakistan's ranking in the World Economic Forum's 2013 Gender Gap Report, 135th out of 136 countries, reflects how its neglect of women is part of the reason for the country's oft-cited dysfunction. The United Nations Gender Inequality Index, which measures gender inequalities in reproductive health, empowerment, and economic status, ranked Pakistan 123rd out of 148 countries indexed.²⁹

Women comprise 48.6 percent of Pakistan's population of 200 million. Of a labor force of 61.5 million, the female participation rate as percentage of total population of females was only 22 percent.³⁰ More significantly, 62 percent of girls in Pakistan between 7 and 15 years old have never spent time in a classroom.³¹ At the same time, there are a mere 4,000 women serving in Pakistan's armed forces, including a few female fighter pilots who joined Pakistan's Air Force in 2006.³²

Economists have often pointed out that female employment has a positive impact on a country's economy, in addition to improving the wellbeing of women and families.

Labor force data from the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics and the World Bank indicate that labor force participation of women in Pakistan is much lower than international standards.³³ A majority of the 22 percent of women who do work are found in informal sectors, such as subsistence agriculture.³⁴ The labor force participation (LFP) of women in Pakistan is one of the lowest in the world, well below the global average of 51.2 percent. Countries like China and some regions like East Asia have LFP of women as high as 67.7 percent and 63.1 percent, respectively.³⁵

Gender discrimination in Pakistan, and other Muslim majority countries, is said to be ingrained in political, legal, economic, and cultural factors. The approach to national security might, in fact, be a greater contributing factor. In building one of the largest armies and nuclear arsenals in the world, Pakistan has ignored its women as well as its economy. An authoritarian, top-down approach to governance in Pakistan (and other Muslim countries) has resulted in conferring disproportionate power on conservative religious leaders who exercise a virtual veto against women's empowerment. The authorities, eager to have the clerics on their side in maintaining hard power, concede far too much ground to them on social questions. Other policies, combined with social and economic failings, have made Pakistan a major incubator of jihadi extremism.

Pakistan has received \$40 billion in economic and military assistance from the United States since 1950, of which \$23 billion in mainly military aid and reimbursements has flowed since September 11, 2001.³⁶ Pakistan's military, in particular, often looks to the U.S. for training, education, and equipment even though its worldview does not often coincide with that of the United States. This dependence gives Washington leverage over Pakistani policy that has not always been effectively used.

An inclusive approach to security, nudged by the United States, could result in Pakistan paying attention to women's inclusion in the workforce, as well as policies that produce sustained economic growth. This has to go beyond symbolic gestures, like token women in uniform showing up at military parades. It would require raising women's workforce participation in general and ensuring that women are an equal part of Pakistani society.

Other U.S. allies and major aid recipients in the Muslim world are not particularly better off than Pakistan. Women constitute only 24.1 percent of the workforce in Egypt, one of the largest recipients of U.S. assistance—\$76 billion in the 35 years up to 2015, including \$48 billion in military aid.³⁷ Egypt's population stands at 89 million, of which 49.5 percent are women.³⁸ Of the total number of children that are out of school, 44.2 percent are boys and 55.8 percent are girls.³⁹ In the 2012 Egyptian legislature, women held only 10 seats, or two percent of representation in the national parliament.⁴⁰

Women constitute 30.5 percent of the workforce in Turkey and 15.42 percent in Saudi Arabia. Jordan, often cited as a progressive Arab monarchy, reflects a similar pattern. It has a population of 6.6 million, 48.7 percent of whom are women. But women comprise only 16 percent of Jordan's 1.7 million workforce.⁴² Of the total number of children that are out of school, girls outnumber boys 15,545 to 9,382.⁴³ Additionally, women hold only 12 percent of the seats in Jordan's national parliament.

Arms and Influence

These statistics point to a policy error dating back to the Cold War era of building national security structures in most Muslim countries while neglecting social development, particularly gender equality. Governments from the Middle East and North Africa to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia have invoked religion and tradition to avoid key social and economic reforms, including expanding literacy and education and involving women in the workforce.

The conception of security and power of most U.S. allies in the Muslim world depends almost exclusively on a hard power framework. The rise of terrorism and insurgencies fueled by radical religion-based ideologies is forcing a rethink of the primacy of hard power as the instrument to deal with the threat. Jihadist ideologues can replenish the ranks of their fallen fighters relatively rapidly. Thus, it is not enough to kill the foot soldiers; the tide of the beliefs that help recruit them must be stemmed.

The fight against Islamist extremism poses a challenge to social change in the Muslim world, but it also creates an opportunity to combine countering extremist ideology with major social change. Just as the radical Islamist groups have involved women in recruitment, education, motivation, and training of terrorists, states and governments must involve women in systemic efforts to counter extremism. Women are an influential voice in keeping male relatives out of violent extremist groups, and can be for other men as well.

Empowering women to deradicalize would-be jihadis at a community level could increase the flow of intelligence from families about radicalized individuals. Several terrorist plots have been foiled due to tips from family members about the errant behavior of a relative. In 2009, the father of a Nigerian man charged with trying to blow up a transatlantic jet on Christmas Day had voiced concerns to U.S. officials about his son well before he tried to engage in a terrorist act.⁴⁴ The father's concerns in the Nigerian case were supported by his wife, the mother of the would-be terrorist.

Methodical information operations could target mothers and other family members to encourage them to inform authorities about extreme beliefs and plots, characterizing it as a way to save their family member and serve society, rather than as "giving him up." Women activists, in particular, can dissuade people from extremism as in the case of Pakistani activist Mossarat Qadeem, who works with mothers to keep young men from joining jihadis. Qadeem, a political scientist who left her teaching position at the University of Peshawar 13 years ago, lives in Islamabad. She drives "through checkpoints and dark mountain roads into the northern region of the country" to meet, at the invitation of mothers, with children who have joined radical groups.⁴⁵ "Qadeem is fighting extremism in Pakistan one child at a time," explained an article about her, adding that she meets "with mothers and their children to discuss the dangers of radical groups."⁴⁶

Once Qadeem meets radicalized young people, she asks them to help her understand why they joined these groups. She responds to their economic, political, and theological arguments and warns them that they would not be able to help their families if they were killed. Qadeem cites the Quran against suicide, as well as killing others. Her arguments have persuaded 78 young men to turn away from the path they have been led down by distorted religious texts and false promises. Her experience ad-

vances the case for creating “a nonviolent army of women promoting collaboration over confrontation as they lift up the moderate voices drowned out by radicals.”⁴⁷

The case for including women in fighting jihadists was made by Ambassador Hunt on the basis of her work in Afghanistan. “It’s not just [about] bringing in more soldiers,” she observed, “More soldiers are going to bring in, yes, one kind of security, but with tremendous resistance from terrorists. But if you were to take that money and instead give crash courses to support women leaders in every village, you would be fighting a bad idea—the Taliban—with a good idea—women’s empowerment—which is much more powerful than fighting a bad idea with guns.”⁴⁸

About the author:

***Husain Haqqani** is a Senior Fellow and the Director for South and Central Asia at the Hudson Institute. He served as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States from 2008-2011.

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
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Changing Africa, one equation at a time: Maths and science the keys to unlocking continent's greatness

01MAR 2016 13:04

Across Africa, maths is often viewed as an impractical, ivory tower pursuit - but a new initiative is trying to change that



Nathan Wangusi, Ph.D, a Research Engineer at IBM Research Africa's lab in Nairobi, Kenya. From big data to artificial intelligence and smart cities, the gears of prosperity are increasingly powered by mathematical algorithms. (Photo/ IBM Research).

NEXT week on March 8, more than 500 bright scientific minds and international leaders will gather in Senegal for the inaugural Next Einstein Forum, organised by the African Institute for Mathematical Sciences (AIMS). The three-day summit will highlight emerging scientific and technical talent in Africa and elsewhere, and fuel collaboration which puts this talent to work in the cause of human development.

The summit's theme is "Connecting Science to Humanity". It will be an occasion for the most enlightened African and international scientists and leaders to strengthen their commitment to helping young people help Africa.

The continent admittedly has deep-rooted problems, including poverty, corruption and war. Could these be tackled through mathematical science, as the Forum envisions?

The long view

Such a proposal might sound unnecessary while so many people still lack basic necessities like food, clean water and medicine. In the long view of history, however, mathematics and science have served as the foundation of modern society because they underlie every technology – from plumbing to telecommunications, medicine to satellites.

But the continent has another problem. It is largely a consumer rather than a produc-

er of the technologies it needs. If this doesn't change, Africa will remain dependent and subject to outside control, its economies dominated by others' exploitation of its resources.

Computers, mobile communications, and medical technologies are the modern engines of commerce, prosperity and public health. Africa will remain sidelined in these areas unless it nurtures its own experts, pioneers, and innovators.

This is the motivation behind AIMS, a network of training centres across the continent created to empower brilliant young Africans to become agents of change through advanced maths and science.

Our slogan – that [the next Einstein should be African](#) – is a signal of how high we are aiming.

It is not an easy task. As a native South African, I have travelled widely in many parts of the continent. Across Africa, maths is often viewed as an ivory tower pursuit, an impractical study with little connection to the real world. University maths departments are often the shabbiest on campus.

Rote learning

Many students only take the subject as a second choice. From primary school onwards, maths is all too often taught by rote learning and memorisation. But it is critical analysis, independent thinking and creativity that are the [real keys](#) to maths and science excellence.

These attitudes linger even beyond school and university. Elsewhere in the world, the most successful companies – Google and Facebook, for example – recruit top maths graduates straight out of university to write the complex codes that define our experience of the digital world. From big data to artificial intelligence to intelligent cities and communities, the gears of prosperity are increasingly powered by mathematical algorithms.

AIMS is a pan-African initiative. There are five centres so far, in Senegal, Cameroon, Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa. Ten more are planned over the next decade, creating a powerful network that will span the continent.

Every centre has a fantastic, highly motivated, pan-African student body. AIMS' classes are incredibly diverse – a mosaic of languages, ethnicities, languages and religions. More than 30% of the students are women.

Through their common interest in maths, science and the future of Africa, the students are able to transcend the cultural and other differences that have historically divided them.

Magnet for return

Over the past decade, AIMS has graduated a thousand students at Masters and PhD level. But its centres don't just train brilliant young Africans in Africa. They also serve as a magnet attracting those who have studied abroad back to Africa, to work as scientific researchers.

Wilfred Ndifon from Cameroon is one: he took his PhD at Princeton but has returned to AIMS as a junior research chair. Wilfred has just [solved](#) a 70-year-old immunological puzzle called original antigenic sin, which has implications for improving vaccines.

AIMS also brings top international scientists to Africa to share and propagate their knowledge. This international reach is important, because the whole globe has a stake in Africa's future.

Our globalised, interconnected world means that Africa's challenges – whether migration or diseases like [Zika](#) or [Chikungunya](#) or terrorism – quickly become chal-

allenges to all. These problems will only worsen with climate change, population growth, unemployment and insecurity unless Africans are encouraged and empowered to improve their countries' conditions.

The problems facing Africa are complex and there are no easy answers. But one of the lessons we've learned in science is that the hardest problems are the ones that eventually yield the most important – and the most wonderful – solutions.

-Neil Turok is the Director and Niels Bohr Chair, Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics

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Cameroon

Cameroon : menaces terroristes, Yaoundé sous haute surveillance



Au Cameroun, depuis l'annonce, le week-end dernier, de la menace terroriste par le ministre délégué à la présidence de la République chargé de la défense, la capitale, Yaoundé, est sous haute surveillance, de même que plusieurs grandes villes de ce pays d'Afrique Centrale.

Yaoundé, la capitale camerounaise est sous haute surveillance. Il en est de même dans plusieurs grandes villes. Ces dispositions interviennent après l'annonce le week-end dernier, de la menace terroriste par le ministre délégué à la présidence de la République chargé de la défense, relève *Koaci*.

Le site révèle que dans les marchés, écoles, églises, magasins, ambassades, administrations, hôtels, agences de voyages... tout visiteur est minutieusement passé au scanner. Munis de détecteurs de métaux, les vigiles ou les différents agents de sécurité, passent au peigne fin les entrées et sorties des bâtiments administratifs, églises, marchés, et grands hôtels. Les sacs des voyageurs sont systématiquement fouillés dans les agences de voyages, comme dans les aéroports avant embarquement.

Le site ajoute que les forces de sécurité ont renforcé les contrôles, et leurs positions dans les coins stratégiques de la capitale camerounaise. Les forces spéciales de la police sont visibles dans des véhicules banalisés. De leur côté, les populations vaquent à leurs occupations. Les Camerounais avertis évitent les lieux de grands rassemblements.

Aux côtés des armées nigériane, nigérienne et tchadienne, le Cameroun fait face à la menace terroriste et poursuit sa traque contre le groupe Boko Haram qui sème la terreur dans la région. L'armée camerounaise parvient à infliger de lourdes pertes

aux combattants de Boko Haram qui n'ont d'autres choix que de procéder à des attaques surprises et autres attentats kamikaze à défaut de faire face à la combativité des forces armées du Cameroun.

<http://www.afrik.com/cameroun-menaces-terroristes-yaounde-sous-haute-surveillance>

Le sud du Cameroun se développe sous haute sécurité, alors que le nord peine à survivre

MARIE CHRISTINE TROTTIER

Boko Haram sème la terreur au nord du Cameroun depuis un peu plus de deux ans. Des villages entiers ont été pillés et des attentats kamikazes frappent régulièrement les lieux publics, ce qui freine le développement du pays.

«Les gens meurent chez eux, simplement parce que les routes sont fermées ou les couvre-feux les empêchent d'aller se faire soigner», explique Fadimatou, une commerçante du nord du pays qui a été forcée de migrer vers le sud à la suite d'un attentat suicide qui a ravagé le marché où elle se trouvait.

Les raids et les enlèvements perpétrés par Boko Haram au nord du Cameroun se sont multipliés ces deux dernières années. On compte, depuis juillet, une cinquantaine d'attentats kamikazes dans cette région, ce qui a causé la fuite de milliers de familles.

En mai 2014, le président du Cameroun, Paul Biya, a déclaré la guerre à Boko Haram et il s'est lancé dans une opération coûteuse, que le pays peine à assumer financièrement.

«Toutes les dépenses que nous avons mises dans cette guerre, ce sont des dépenses dont nous avons besoin pour le développement de notre nation qui en a drôlement besoin. C'est une saignée de notre trésor public», de déplorer Issa Tchiroma Bakary, le ministre des Communications du Cameroun.

Créer de la richesse

La guerre que mène le Cameroun contre Boko Haram divise littéralement le pays en deux. Au nord, l'économie est minée par l'insécurité et, au sud, le pays se démène pour développer de grands projets et atteindre le statut de pays émergent d'ici 2035.

Accusant des dettes de plus en plus imposantes ces dernières années, le Cameroun s'est lancé dans un vaste programme de réinvestissements dans ses infrastructures pour attirer des investisseurs étrangers.

«On s'est dit qu'il fallait créer la richesse plutôt que de lutter contre la pauvreté», explique Louis Paul Motaze, ministre de l'Économie du Cameroun.-

Projets d'envergure

Le Cameroun mise sur deux projets principaux afin de relancer son économie. Le complexe industrialo-portuaire de Kribi, qui a l'ambition de devenir le plus important port d'Afrique centrale, et le barrage hydroélectrique de Lom Pangar, qui devrait pallier le manque d'énergie du pays.

Ces immenses projets ont le mérite d'impressionner les visiteurs étrangers. En effet, en circulant sur la plateforme toute neuve du port de Kribi, il est difficile d'imaginer

qu'à quelques centaines de kilomètres au nord, des milliers de familles fuient l'insécurité de la guerre.

En plus de mettre à mal l'économie du nord en minant le tourisme, le commerce et l'agriculture, cette guerre apporte son lot de conséquences difficiles à quantifier.

«L'économie, c'est la confiance. Si vous êtes dans un environnement où vous avez peur de tout, ça a des conséquences en matière économique. Si vous voulez investir et que demain on vient poser une bombe, qu'est-ce que vous faites?» demande le ministre Motaze.

Contrats résiliés

Des entreprises ont résilié leurs contrats à cause des enjeux sécuritaires. Par exemple, en janvier 2015, les entreprises chinoises Syno Hydro et Jiangsu ont préféré abandonner les travaux de la route reliant Maroua à Kousséri après que 10 ouvriers chinois eurent été enlevés en mai 2014. Cette route est le principal lien entre le Cameroun et le Tchad, et cela limite donc les échanges entre ces pays.

Le Cameroun regorge toutefois de ressources diversifiées et ne manque pas d'ambitions. Il devra toutefois sécuriser son territoire pour les mettre en œuvre.

BOKO HARAM AU FIL DU TEMPS

2002

Fondation de la secte islamiste au nord-est du Nigéria par Mohamed Yusuf

2009

Première insurrection armée au nord-est du Nigéria et mort de Mohamed Yusuf

2010

Le nouveau chef de Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, prend la tête du mouvement

2011

Première vague d'attentats-suicide dans des lieux publics

2013

Massacre de Baga, où l'armée nigériane est accusée d'avoir tué 180 civils dans une attaque contre Boko Haram

2014

De nombreuses villes sont prises au nord-est du Nigéria. Environ 275 lycéen-nes sont enlevées à Chibok en avril, et il y a une mobilisation internationale autour du mot clic #bringbackourgirls. En mai, le président camerounais, Paul Biya, déclare la guerre à Boko Haram. En août, Shekau proclame un califat sur le territoire occupé par Boko Haram, au nord-est du Nigéria.

2015

Second massacre de Baga en janvier, où 1500 à 2000 civils auraient été tués par Bo-

ko Haram. En mars, Shekau prôte allégeance à l'État islamique et Boko Haram devient, cinq jours plus tard, la «province» ouest-africaine du groupe terroriste. Les villes prises en 2014 sont presque toutes reprises par la Force multinationale mixte, composée des armées camerounaise, nigériane, nigérienne, tchadienne et béninoise.

2016

Boko Haram multiplie les attentats-suicide au Nigéria et au Cameroun.

BOKO HARAM AU CAMEROUN

Boko Haram est un des groupes terroristes les plus meurtriers au monde.

Depuis 2009, il sème la violence en Afrique, frappant principalement dans le nord du Nigéria et du Cameroun. À la fin janvier, le journal *24 Heures* est allé pendant deux semaines au Cameroun afin d'observer les défis des Camerounais dans leur lutte contre Boko Haram, qui seront présentés dans une série de reportages publiés aujourd'hui et au cours des quatre prochains jours. Le voyage de *24 Heures* a été financé par Afrique Expansion.

Depuis janvier 2015

- ✦ 315 incursions armées
- ✦ 50 attentats kamikazes
- ✦ 12 accidents sur mine

Depuis 2013

- ✦ 1200morts camerounais

Se développer sous la protection de l'armée



Pouvant être la cible des terroristes de Boko Haram ou des rebelles de Centrafrique, les différents chantiers, dont celui de la centrale de Lom Pangar, sont



Pouvant être la cible des terroristes de Boko Haram ou des rebelles de Centrafrique, les différents chantiers, dont celui de la centrale de Lom Pangar, sont placés sous haute surveillance par l'armée camerounaise.

Depuis l'entrée en guerre du Cameroun contre la secte djihadiste Boko Haram, des mesures de sécurité ont été décuplées partout au pays. Avec les contrôles routiers et les patrouilles de soldats, les armes semi-automatiques et les uniformes ne sont jamais bien loin.

Patrouillant sur le chantier du barrage de Lom Pangar, une trentaine de soldats camerounais, armés de leurs kalachnikovs, surveillent les installations d'un air impassible. Sur la côte, à quelques centaines de kilomètres à l'ouest, des membres du Bataillon d'intervention rapide (BIR), l'armée d'élite camerounaise, sont postés tout autour du complexe industrialo-portuaire de Kribi (CIPK).

«Les enjeux sécuritaires sont de premier ordre à cause de l'actualité», affirme Patrice Melom, coordonnateur du CIPK.

Susceptibles d'être la cible des terroristes de Boko Haram et des pirates du golfe de Guinée, ces grands chantiers sont placés sous haute surveillance de l'armée camerounaise.

«Au Cameroun, on s'habitue de plus en plus à certaines contraintes liées à la sécurité. Ça entre un peu dans notre culture. Les populations se sentent sécurisées quand elles voient des contrôles autour d'elles. De plus en plus, l'armée est en symbiose avec la population», explique M. Melom.

Sources d'insécurité

Les attentats kamikazes de Boko Haram au nord du pays ne sont pas les seules sources d'inquiétude des Camerounais. Ces dernières années, des pirates ont régulièrement attaqué des navires de marchandises et des pêcheurs dans le golfe de Guinée. Des membres du BIR ont d'ailleurs été postés dans quelques ports du pays, dont ceux de Kribi, Limbé et Idenau. Au nord, les soldats du BIR sont passés de 1600 à 2400 en novembre dernier.

Criminalité en hausse

Plus à l'est, des centaines de milliers de réfugiés de Centrafrique ont fui la guerre civile qui a déchiré leur pays en 2013 et 2014. Cet afflux de population dans la région a causé une augmentation de la criminalité, notamment sur les routes.

«Ça ne se passe pas toujours calmement», admet Théodore Nsangou, directeur général d'Electricity Development Corporation (EDC), l'entreprise camerounaise qui est derrière le projet de Lom Pangar. C'est la raison pour laquelle «des mesures sécuritaires additionnelles [ont été prises] pour protéger des sites sensibles comme Lom Pangar».

DJIHADISTES QUI EST QUOI ?

État islamique

Connu sous le nom de Daesh ou les acronymes ÉI, ISIS/ISIL (en anglais), l'État islamique a été fondé en 2006 en Irak lors du regroupement d'Al-Qaïda et d'autres djihadistes. Ce groupe profite de l'instabilité de l'Irak et de la Syrie pour y étendre son territoire. Ces dernières années, son influence s'est étendue dans d'autres pays musulmans. Il a aussi commis des attentats dans des pays occidentaux, comme ceux de Paris en 2015.

AQMI

Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique est un groupe terroriste fondé en 2007 en Algérie qui opère surtout au sud du Sahara, soit au Mali, au Niger et au Burkina Faso. AQMI a profité de la chute de Kadhafi, en 2011, pour augmenter ses effectifs et s'armer en puisant dans les réserves d'armes de la

Libye. Ces derniers mois, AQMI a commis des attentats dans des hôtels à Bamako (Mali) et à Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), ciblant principalement des Occidentaux, dont six Québécois.

BOKO HARAM

Fondé en 2002, Boko Haram a progressivement étendu son influence au nord du Nigeria. En 2009, une première insurrection armée a eu lieu. Dès 2013, il s'est progressivement étendu au nord du Cameroun et il procède à des enlèvements d'étrangers, dont des touristes français, des ouvriers chinois et une religieuse québécoise. Le groupe est aussi responsable de l'enlèvement de plus de 275 lycéennes en 2014. Il a proclamé son allégeance à l'ÉI en août 2015.

<http://www.journaldemontreal.com/>

Lutte contre Boko Haram: La Turquie propose son appui au Cameroun

Le général de division turc, Saban Umut, Sous-secrétaire d'Etat chargé de l'industrie au ministère turc de la défense était à cet effet en visite de travail, lundi dernier au Secrétariat d'Etat chargé de la Gendarmerie.



Ils partagent tous un destin commun, celui d'être des victimes des attaques terroristes. Mais, le Cameroun qui fait en ce moment face aux assauts répétés de la secte Boko Haram n'a pas la même expérience que la Turquie qui combat ce phénomène depuis des lustres.

Le Cameroun a donc tout à gagner de l'expérience turque dans ce domaine. C'est là toute l'importance accordée à la délégation turque en visite de travail en ce moment au Cameroun. 237online.com Une délégation conduite par le général de division Saban Umut, Sous-secrétaire d'Etat chargé de l'industrie au ministère turc de la défense.

Lors de sa visite lundi dernier au Secrétariat d'Etat à la Défense, chargé de la gendarmerie, c'est le locataire des lieux, Jean Baptiste Bokam qui est monté le premier au créneau pour souligner l'importance de cette visite de travail, au moment où le Cameroun mène la guerre contre la secte Boko

Haram. Preuve que les aspects sécuritaires étaient au centre de cette visite. D'ailleurs, l'ambassadeur de Turquie au Cameroun Murat Ulku ne démentira pas Jean Baptiste Bokam, en annonçant que la délégation de son pays est composée des opérateurs économiques opérant dans l'industrie de la défense, et que les séances de travail qu'ils auront avec les autorités camerounaises auront pour objectif de voir

comment approfondir la coopération sur le double plan de la sécurité et de la défense entre les deux pays, lesquels sont confrontés au phénomène du terrorisme, il n'y avait de doute que la lutte contre le terrorisme constituait le nœud gordien de leurs échanges. 237online.com Pour la partie turque, ce partage d'expériences entre les deux pays peut être bénéfique.

En dehors de la vente par la Turquie des équipements militaires au Cameroun, il y a également des possibilités d'investissements conjoints entre les deux pays. Le Cameroun, selon l'ambassadeur Turc au Cameroun, étant le pays pivot de la sous-région Afrique centrale, la Turquie voudrait donc pénétrer ces pays à partir du Cameroun.

Le tour fait par la délégation turque au Service central de la recherche judiciaire (SCRJ) est révélateur du domaine dans lequel l'appui de la Turquie pourrait être porté pour ce qui est de la Gendarmerie. C'est ce service qui est en ce moment sollicité après un attentat pour faire des prélèvements pouvant aider à la recherche de leurs auteurs. C'est également ce service qui mène des enquêtes contre les éléments de Boko Haram, afin de les traduire en justice, de même qu'il s'occupe entre autres de la lutte contre la cybercriminalité, la grande criminalité, en même temps qu'il appuie les autres unités en matière de police judiciaire.

L'on a compte déjà plus de 1200 Camerounais tués par le groupe terroriste en l'espace de deux ans. Dans le détail, depuis 2013 jusqu'en 2015, le recensement des actes d'enlèvements de personnes, y compris des enfants, organisés par Boko Haram sur le territoire camerounais fait ressortir 2 enlèvements de personnes en 2013, 11 enlèvements en 2014 et 5 en 2015, soit au total sur cette période 18 enlèvements. 237online.com En 2014, 1 160 têtes de bétail ont été la secte islamiste.

En 2015, selon une estimation faite par Boko Haram lui-même, le nombre de bœufs volés en territoire camerounais s'élèverait à 4200, sans compter les petits ruminants. En 2014, 37 attaques Boko Haram ont été perpétrées contre les unités des Forces de Défense camerounaises et 23 en 2015. Toujours en 2015, 21 attaques ont visé les comités de vigilance. Sur la même année, 28 attentats-kamikazes ont été enregistrés, et je le disais tantôt, pour ce tout début de l'année 2016, déjà 04 attentats de ce même type ont été perpétrés.

<http://www.cameroonvoice.com/news/article-news-22837.html>

L'Afrique centrale..., en brève

Mardi 8 Mars 2016

La société de gestion de déchets Averda gagne du terrain au Gabon

Première année de contrat pour Averda et premier bilan pour ce cabinet international de recyclage des services environnementaux, qui a collecté plus de 208 000 tonnes de déchets à Libreville. En décembre 2014, il a signé un contrat de cinq ans pour la gestion des déchets à Libreville, avec renouvellement automatique pour une période de deux ans, jusqu'en 2021. «*Nous sommes le premier groupe de gestion intégrée des déchets à avoir été formellement contracté pour assurer la propreté de Libreville...* », s'est félicité le directeur du projet pour le Gabon, Zaher Mansour.

Ce succès, l'entreprise également présente à Brazzaville le doit en partie à son personnel, fort de 680 personnes, et à un service assuré 24/24h. Selon Zaher Mansour, en plus de la collecte des déchets, l'une des réalisations majeures de la société a été le changement d'attitude des populations.

Angola : le président Dos Santos remanie son gouvernement

Le président angolais, José Eduardo dos Santos, a démis par décret le week-end dernier de leurs fonctions, les ministres de la Culture, du Commerce, de la Santé, de l'Urbanisme et Habitat, ainsi que le gouverneur de la province de Cuanza Norte et des secrétaires d'Etat à l'Hôtellerie et Tourisme, à la Santé et à la Pêche pour l'Aquiculture. Des nouveaux fidèles ont été nommés à leurs places.

Cameroun : l'armée annonce avoir tué 120 terroristes de Boko Haram

Quelque 120 combattants de la secte terroriste nigériane Boko Haram ont été fait prisonniers au Cameroun alors qu'ils venaient de franchir la frontière camerounaise où ils s'apprêtaient à commettre des attentats, a-t-on appris de sources sécuritaires. Selon les mêmes sources, ces terroristes ont franchi la frontière par le département de Mayo-Danay, dans l'Extrême-nord du pays, autour du 4 heures du matin, au moment où des fidèles musulmans se préparent pour la prière du matin. Des assaillants étaient armés de fusils, d'armes blanches et d'explosifs, ce qui laisse croire qu'ils préparaient une attaque d'envergure, a indiqué un responsable du ministère de la Défense (MINDEF).

Les matchs Centrafrique -Madagascar reportés

La CAF (Confédération africaine de football) a dévoilé depuis plusieurs jours les dates officielles des matchs des 3^e et 4^e journées des éliminatoires de la CAN 2017. En raison de la tenue d'une manifestation le 29 mars, la partie centrafricaine a demandé l'avancement du match. Ainsi, Madagascar a accepté accueillir le match aller, le 24 mars. Puis les Fauves recevront les Barea à Bangui, le 28 mars.

<http://adiac-congo.com/content/lafrique-centrale-en-breve-47155>

Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire : 16 morts dans une attaque terroriste

13/03/2016



L'hôtel "L'Etoile du sud" à Grand-Bassam est très fréquenté par les Occidentaux. (photo DR)

Après le Burkina et le Mali, la Côte d'Ivoire a été la cible dimanche d'une attaque jihadiste, un commando armé faisant 16 morts dans la station balnéaire très populaire de Grand-Bassam, le premier attentat de ce type dans le pays.


Le président Alassane Ouattara, qui s'est rendu sur les lieux, à une vingtaine de kilomètres à l'est d'Abidjan, a dénoncé une attaque « terroriste », qui a été revendiquée dans la soirée par Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi).

L'attaque rappelle celle d'un hôtel à Sousse (Tunisie) qui a fait 38 morts le 26 juin et revendiquée par le groupe État islamique (EI) et fait suite à plusieurs attaques en Afrique de l'Ouest visant des lieux fréquentés par des étrangers, à Bamako (20 morts dont 14 étrangers le 20 novembre) ou Ouagadougou (20 morts le 15 janvier).

Les assaillants sont arrivés par la plage et ont ouvert le feu au hasard, selon plusieurs témoins. L'un d'eux a affirmé qu'un des hommes criait « Allah Akbar » (Dieu est grand en arabe).

« Le bilan est lourd, les terroristes ont réussi à tuer quatorze civils et nous avons perdu deux membres des forces spéciales », a déclaré M. Ouattara qui s'est rendu sur les lieux quelques heures après l'attaque, ajoutant que six assaillants avaient également été tués.

Le président français François Hollande a dénoncé un « lâche attentat » dans lequel « au moins un Français » a été tué.



« La France apporte son soutien logistique et de renseignement à la Côte d'Ivoire pour retrouver les agresseurs. Elle poursuivra et intensifiera sa coopération avec ses partenaires dans la lutte contre le terrorisme », a-t-il ajouté.

Auparavant, le ministre de l'Intérieur, Hamed Bakayoko, avait indiqué dans un communiqué que trois hôtels avaient été la cible des assaillants. « Les forces de sécurité ivoiriennes sont intervenues immédiatement et ont pu neutraliser six terroristes », avait-il ajouté, soulignant que « les ratissages » se poursuivaient pour retrouver d'éventuels autres jihadistes.

Un photographe a indiqué avoir vu sept corps sur la plage et un autre dans l'hôtel Etoile du Sud, un des établissements attaqués. Un des corps lui a été présenté comme un assaillant tué.

Ces assaillants « puissamment armés et portant des cagoules ont tiré sur les occupants de L'Étoile du sud, un grand hôtel pris d'assaut par les expatriés en cette période de canicule », a expliqué un témoin.

Kalachnikov et grenades

« On était sur la plage, on a entendu des coups de feu et on a vu des gens fuir, on a compris que c'était une attaque », a raconté Braman Kinda, en montrant les photos de sept cadavres, dont au moins une femme, gisant sur la plage. Selon lui, les assaillants étaient quatre et « parcouraient la plage en tirant des coups de feu ».

Abbas El-Roz, un ressortissant libanais qui séjournait à l'Etoile du Sud, a également raconté que l'un d'eux portait un fusil d'assaut Kalachnikov et une ceinture de grenades.

Un autre témoin, Kouamena Kakou Bertin, transporteur, a indiqué que trois assaillants s'étaient enfuis à pied par la route.

L'attaque a provoqué des scènes de panique sur le pont séparant la zone touristique visée, le Quartier France, et la partie moderne de la ville. Un journaliste de l'AFP a vu une dizaine de personnes, dont une femme blessée, évacués dans un camion militaire alors que plusieurs autres, transportant des mitrailleuses lourdes, se dirigeaient vers le lieu de l'assaut. L'armée ivoirienne contrôlait strictement les personnes quittant la zone.

Ville historique et ancienne capitale de la Côte d'Ivoire sur la côte du Golfe de Guinée, Grand-Bassam abrite plusieurs hôtels fréquentés par une clientèle d'expatriés le long d'une plage où afflue la population abidjanaise en fin de semaine. C'est la première fois que le pays est la cible d'une attaque contre une zone touristique, alors que le secteur se remet lentement de dix ans de crise socio-politique.

La Côte d'Ivoire a également été jusqu'ici épargnée par les attentats jihadistes visant des touristes qui ont touché le Burkina Faso et le Mali ces derniers mois.

Le Quotidien / AFP

<http://www.lequotidien.lu/>

Attaque à Grand-Bassam: le changement de stratégie d'Aqmi

14-03-2016



Les agents de sécurité français et ivoiriens montent la garde devant l'hôtel Etoile du Sud après une attaque à Grand-Bassam en Côte d'Ivoire , le 13 Mars 2016. © REUTERS/Joe Penney

L'attentat revendiqué par Aqmi à Grand-Bassam constitue l'attaque la plus éloignée jamais menée par al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique, dont les bases traditionnelles se situent surtout en Afrique du Nord, au Sahel et au Sahara. Aqmi, qui souhaite s'en prendre aux intérêts français, a adapté ses modes d'actions. Une stratégie permettant de marquer les esprits, tout en refusant le combat contre les forces armées françaises qui opèrent dans le nord du Mali.

Depuis l'an dernier Aqmi a revu sa stratégie. Plutôt que s'attaquer aux militaires français, l'organisation terroriste s'en prend à des cibles civiles. Les jihadistes évitent le contact avec les forces armées dans le Nord du Mali, et ont décidé maintenant de frapper au cœur des grandes villes du Sud, parmi la population.

Bamako, Ouagadougou et Grand-Bassam. Les forces locales, comme les militaires français, ne semblent pas en mesure de contrer ces attaques, même si régulièrement des attentats sont déjoués.

Depuis l'an dernier, toutes les grandes capitales francophones d'Afrique de l'Ouest et de la zone sahélienne sont état d'alerte. Contrôles routiers, sécurité dans les hôtels, opérations transfrontalières... Visiblement, les terroristes parviennent à passer à travers les mailles du filet.

L'opération anti-terroriste Barkhane n'a pas officiellement mandat pour intervenir en ville. « *La sécurité des capitales reste du ressort des forces de sécurité intérieures* » des pays concernés, rappelle un général français.

Si les terroristes marquent les esprits avec ces attaques, les militaires français rappellent aussi qu'une bonne centaine de jihadistes ont été tués depuis 2014 dans la zone Sahel-Sahara, 90 autres faits prisonniers et une petite vingtaine de chefs éliminés par les forces spéciales françaises, d'après des décomptes faits à partir de coupures de presse, puisque ces informations ne sont que très rarement confirmées de sources officielles.

Le Sénégal menacé ?

Le Sénégal est encore plus menacé que la Côte d'Ivoire pour une raison : contrairement à la Côte d'Ivoire, **le Sénégal a de nombreux ressortissants qui sont dans les rangs jihadistes**. Certains sont déjà morts en Syrie et en Irak, mais plusieurs dizaines au moins pour ceux qu'on connaît, combattent actuellement dans la ville de Syrte au sein de l'organisation Etat islamique en Libye. Ils ne cachent pas leurs intentions terroristes au sein de leur pays d'origine, ils l'ont dit plusieurs fois. Et le Sénégal compte aussi de nombreux ressortissants dans les rangs de Boko Haram, mais aussi d'Aqmi.

En plus de cette réalité, qui est cette présence jihadiste sénégalaise, il y a cette menace qui est la même que celle de la Côte d'Ivoire et des autres pays de la région, la menace Aqmi. Aqmi va très probablement mener ce type d'attaque contre le Sénégal, qui là aussi est un pays allié historiquement de la France, qui est un pays où la communauté française est extrêmement présente, il est très probable que le Sénégal et Dakar soient la prochaine cible.

<http://www.rfi.fr/>

Libya

Analysis: US airstrikes in Libya won't deter ISIS

01MAR 2016



On 19 February 2016, the US launched airstrikes in Libya, targeting an Islamic State camp in Sabratha, killing an estimated 50 Islamist militants. Such short-sighted counterterrorism operations will have dire implications for the rest of Africa. By JASMINE OPPERMAN.

In an escalation of its counterterrorism operations in Africa, the US is conducting airstrikes in Libya. On 19 February, about 50 alleged Islamist militants were killed by US planes in an Islamic State (IS) camp in Sabratha. The operation was hailed as a success by US officials.

“We will continue to take actions where there is a clear target in mind,” said US President Barack Obama, justifying the operation and confirming that it is unlikely to be the last.

Such a strategy is at best short-sighted. At worst, it fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the IS presence in Libya, and could exacerbate the situation.

The IS presence in Libya has always been confined to relatively small territorial pockets. Sirte, the late Muammar Gaddafi’s home town, is a stronghold. But the group’s territorial ambitions are hampered in Libya by the already heightened alert on terror-related activities, with regional and international governments, especially Morocco and Algeria, spending vast amounts of money on counterterrorism.

Consequently, instead of expanding territory, IS has focused on simply maintaining a presence in Libya, while extending its reach south. The goal is to create a north-south axis of IS-aligned groups that reaches as far down as southern Africa.

In this context, Libya is not the beginning and end of IS in Africa. Yes, it is a stronghold, but its expansion in Africa does not rely on territorial control. Instead, IS will rely on amplifying its already effective propaganda operation on the continent. Its efforts will only increase as pressure mounts in Syria, Iraq and now Libya.

And the US airstrikes in Libya, far from damaging the group, are only likely to make IS propaganda even more effective. IS and al-Qaeda groups flourish in environments where there are no effective government controls, and where conflict already exists (even if the conflict is not necessarily related to Islamic extremism). Bombings and drones might destroy a camp and kill a few leaders, but it does not provide a quick fix to these existing vacuums.

Bombings also increase anti-Western sentiments. Civilian casualties in Syria and Iraq are well reported, and if the new US airstrikes follow a similar pattern the same can be expected in Libya. In Africa, we've already seen how al-Shabaab uses civilian fatalities inflicted by the African Union Mission in Somalia as a potent recruiting tool.

Already, groups like Boko Haram and al-Shabaab rely on asymmetrical warfare and not territorial control. In Africa, everything indicates that IS is following the same pattern. This means targets to bomb will be few and far between, and may even solidify the group's legitimacy in the eyes of local populations.

There is credible evidence to suggest IS has established presences further south in Africa, even outside of countries like Somalia and Nigeria that have a history of Islamist extremist movements. This extends as far as South Africa, where the propaganda effort (coupled with the likely presence of IS recruiters) has resulted in scores of young people travelling to Syria to join IS.

Central and southern African countries faced with the presence of IS cells and recruiters have a difficult question to answer: how to respond to these "soft threats" posed by IS? The reality is that a mindset focused on responding only to "hard threats", such as terrorist attacks or attempts to assert territorial control, won't work. Arrests and prosecutions are all well and good, but unless they are accompanied by some kind of effort to counter IS propaganda — to respond to the undeniable appeal of the group to certain vulnerable portions of populations — it won't be enough to halt the group's expansion.

By the same token, neither will US airstrikes. These fail to address the power and stability vacuums which allow IS to flourish, and they may actively deter attempts to instil law and order in the country. At the same time, the airstrikes risk increasing the group's appeal in other African countries where it already has a presence, by amplifying its propaganda and reinforcing the legitimacy of its anti-western message.

Jasmine Opperman is the Africa Director for the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium.

Photo: An undated handout picture made available by the Australian Department of Defense on 24 September 2014 shows a Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18F Super Hornet taxiing down the runway after flying from Australia, at Al Minhad Air

Base in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. EPA/AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

<http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/>

Mali : Le monde vu de Bamako : Niger et Benin : Déliçats manoeuvrages

9mars 2016

NIGER : LA TACTIQUE DE LA TERRE BRULEE. Si le tout sauf Issoufou pouvait prospérer à Niamey, l'opposition ne se serait pas retirée du second tour de la présidentielle dont la première manche a été largement remportée par le président sortant, à défaut du coup KO voulu par les sympathisants de ce dernier.



Adam Thiam

Un objectif réaliste même s'il ne fut pas réalisé et réaliste en raison d'un bilan plus qu'honorable pour un pays sahélien

dont la sécurité alimentaire passait jusqu'en 2011 par l'aide d'urgence des humanitaires. Le schéma d'un candidat seul à aller à ce qui devait être une compétition n'est pas fier en démocratie. Mais ce n'est pas de surprise pour qui a suivi les péripéties du mandat finissant.

Car autant Issoufou Mahamadou pouvait se féliciter d'un bilan physique difficile à réaliser dans les conditions d'un Sahel agressé par le climat et le terrorisme, autant les voyants du tableau politique s'emballaient avec l'approche de la présidentielle : crispations révélatrice sur des points de droit ou de simple logistique ; éclatement de la majorité présidentielle qui annonçait une météo politique chahutée ; multiples tentatives de blocage institutionnels ; validation surréaliste d'un candidat prisonnier qui arrivera second au premier tour, pour ne rien arranger.

Ce qui est à l'œuvre et qui a pris hier la tournure attendue d'une décision de boycott est simplement une phase de la stratégie de dé-légitimation de Issoufou Mahamadou. Celui-ci peut la vaincre avec un taux de participation qui frise le plébiscite. Mais a-t-il le temps de cet exploit ? Et les moyens, compte tenu de la sociologie particulière de l'élection sous nos tropiques ?

BENIN : SUR LE FIL DU RASOIR. Il y a l'exception Wade dont les adversaires avaient crié en son temps à la fraude électronique. Mais dans les démocraties plus ou moins rodées, en Occident comme en Afrique, là où existe le scrutin majoritaire à deux tours, passer au premier tour relève décidément de la gageure. Le Niger l'a démontré en fin février. Le Bénin le confirme depuis hier. Ce pays, vitrine fortement léchée des fragiles processus démocratiques africains, révèle également que le défi organisationnel n'est jamais gagné d'avance. Mais la principale leçon béninoise

est que l'on peut être candidat de l'establishment, celui du président sortant, de quelques grands ténors de la scène politique locale ainsi que d'une importante frange des supporters de la gouvernance de changement et coiffer ses adversaires seulement d'une courte tête. Car elle n'est pas impressionnante, l'avance de Lionel Zinsou, Premier ministre sortant, venu exprès pour tenter de succéder au président Boni Yayi frappé par la limitation constitutionnelle. Le Franco-béninois, bébé-éprouvette des officines désabusées par les piétinements structurels du continent le plus retardataire de la planète, est même talonné par... Talon. Et ce n'est pas qu'un jeu de mot mais la préfiguration d'un second tour sanglant qui se jouera ou se perdra sur les alliances. Celles-ci, pour la perspective d'une victoire coûte que coûte appelle aussi et hélas les contre-alliances et les mésalliances, comme c'est trop souvent le cas en Afrique. Alors, tout sera de savoir qui viendra avec Zinsou au second tour et s'il est élu, ce qu'il fera pour ne plus être un otage mais un président venu pour opérer le changement attendu plutôt que pour donner le...change

Adam Thiam

Source: Le Républicain

<http://maliactu.net/>

Niger : uranium, terrorisme et immigration. Cocktail d'un chaos annoncé

Ne pas se soucier du Niger serait une erreur. Ce vaste territoire contrôle trois entrées : celle du Maghreb et de la Méditerranée, celle de l'Afrique centrale vers le Tchad et celle de l'Atlantique. Dès lors, 90 % des migrants d'Afrique de l'Ouest passent par ce pays pour rejoindre l'Italie via la Libye. Le résultat du second tour des élections présidentielles fin mars, déjà controversé, ne sera pas sans incidences chez nous. Décryptage.

Quatrième producteur d'uranium au monde, mais 136^e sur 187 pour la corruption et dernier pour le développement humain, le Niger est l'un des pays les plus pauvres, malgré ses gisements gardés par les forces spéciales françaises, présentes aussi à Madama, en plein désert, pour contenir la pression terroriste.

L'uranium est exploité par Areva, qui s'en gave. Le Niger n'en tire que 5 % de ses recettes. Areva, évidemment, nie ces chiffres et attend des remerciements de toutes les bonnes choses qu'elle fait là-bas, tout particulièrement pour le président en ballottage, Mahamadou Issoufou. Succédant à trois militaires, Mahamadou, ingénieur diplômé de l'École des mines de Saint-Étienne, a été l'employé d'Areva. Ça aide. Vice-président de l'Internationale socialiste, il tutoie Hollande. Ça aide. Sauf que les Nigériens, une fois Areva servie et les dirigeants locaux récompensés, aimeraient eux aussi un peu du gâteau. Du coup, Mahamadou, pressé par l'opposition, a tenté de renégocier le coup. Mais Areva ne l'entend pas de cette oreille. Un accord laborieux, signé le 13 janvier 2008, prévoyait l'exploitation du gisement d'Imouraren, le plus grand en Afrique. À la clé, une renégociation pour de meilleures retombées. Mais depuis, Areva ne bouge plus, histoire de bien montrer qui est le patron.

Conséquence : Mahamadou est accusé d'inefficacité et, accessoirement, de corruption par son challenger Hama Amadou, ex-Premier ministre. Soucieux de simplification et pour éviter des débats fastidieux, Mahamadou l'a fait coffrer sur une accusation de trafic d'enfants, hélas pas assez convaincante pour le discréditer. Notre ambassadeur, Antoine Anfré, s'en est d'ailleurs ému et a tout plaqué en juillet 2015. Depuis, en prison à Filingué, Amadou, avec son mouvement (ARDR/Alliance pour la réconciliation, la démocratie et la république), rejette d'ores et déjà le déroulement du scrutin et ses résultats.

Pressentant des lendemains difficiles, Mahamadou, tirant prétexte de la COP21, est venu sentir le vent auprès de Hollande en novembre, mais est reparti guère rassuré. Englué dans ses audaces écologiques, Hollande ne peut défendre l'uranium, Areva ne se sort pas de son déficit et de ses cuves merdiques, enfin la filière nucléaire classique issue des besoins militaires va être supplantée par les nouvelles centrales au thorium, moins coûteuses, moins polluantes, qui n'utilisent pas l'uranium.

Reste peut-être une ouverture côté migrants. Car l'Union européenne, jamais en panne d'imagination, trouve que créer des camps de rétention dans le désert serait une super idée ! Proposition audacieuse, mais qui engendre un enthousiasme très moyen côté autochtones. Heureusement, face à Boko Haram au sud et AQMI au nord, la France, pour garantir sa présence militaire et son uranium, soutient Mahamadou et sauve les apparences. Il sera donc vraisemblablement réélu. Élections à

l'africaine, certes, mais quasiment honnêtes, et personnalité la moins pire pour les généraux nigériens qui peinent toujours à comprendre la démocratie.

Bien sûr, les populations resteront pauvres, Imouraren abandonné et la pollution continuera, mais Areva est notre fierté nationale. Alors...

<http://www.bvoltaire.fr/>

Nigeria

Re-evaluating the Boko Haram conflict



Introduction

Many political analysts had projected that if Muhammadu Buhari, a Fulani Muslim won the March 2015 Nigerian presidential election, it could lead to the [deceleration of the Boko Haram conflict](#) because the local grievances into which those terrorists tap would be removed. Unfortunately, despite President Buhari's victory at the polls, the Boko Haram conflict has failed to abate. In fact, it has been estimated that between the time Buhari was sworn in as president on May 29, 2015 and the end of October 2015, more than [2,000 Nigerians have lost their lives to Boko Haram](#). These tragedies have occurred despite the fact that fighting the terrorists has clearly been one of the Buhari regime's top [priorities](#).

In September 2015 Buhari gave the army a three-month deadline to defeat Boko Haram. That deadline clearly has come and gone, but Boko Haram has not. Though the Buhari government continues to argue that "technically" it has defeated Boko Haram, ostensibly because the group can "[no longer mount 'conventional attacks'](#)" against security forces or population centres," several Nigerians—including myself—[have scoffed at the government's triumphalism as rather premature](#). Indeed, while the government claims that the terrorists no longer control any territory in Borno State—the epicenter of Boko Haram's activities—Senator Baba Kaka Garbai, who represents Borno Central in Nigeria's Senate, claims that the [terrorist group still controls "about 50 percent"](#) of his state.

Boko Haram is well-known as a plague on the security of the Nigerian state since the group became radicalized in 2010. Officially it is estimated that between 2010 and July 2015, [over 15,000 people lost their lives](#) to the Boko Haram conflict—though some estimate the actual death toll between 2010 and 2014 could be [anywhere between 100,000 and one million](#). In addition, the 2014 report of the

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council have estimated that over [3.3 million people have been displaced](#) in the northeast part of Nigeria—or 10 percent of the 33 million internally displaced persons worldwide.

Over this time Boko Haram has evolved from being a small-time terrorist organization, hidden in the civilian population and using guerrilla strategies to a sophisticated, well-motivated group that overpowers the police and military for weapons, seizes territory, and engages the Nigerian military in conventional battle. Indeed, by January 2015, the sect had succeeded in [establishing a mini Islamic state the size of Belgium](#). The continued resilience of Boko Haram under the Buhari government calls for a second look and re-evaluation of some of the earlier rumors and notions about the sect.

Death of conspiracy theories

The continued resilience of Boko Haram under Buhari's administration is debunking some conspiracy theories about the sect.

Indeed, before Buhari came to power a conspiracy theory popular in the southern part of the country was that the group was being sponsored by eminent northern politicians to [make the country "ungovernable" for former President Goodluck Jonathan](#) because he is a Christian and from a minority ethnic group in the south. If this theory were true, Buhari's victory over Jonathan would have mellowed the group. But it hasn't.

Another conspiracy theory was that [Boko Haram was being sponsored or ignored by former President Jonathan](#)—either to depopulate the north ahead of the 2015 general elections or to make Islam look bad in order to enable the former president to use religion as a tool of mobilization for his candidacy. Boko Haram's continued mayhem long after Jonathan's loss of power negates any suggestion that he was sponsoring the group—or the similar claim that he deliberately did not do enough to stop them because it was a "northern problem." In fact, recently the army accused some influential indigenes of the northern state known as Borno of [deliberately undermining their efforts to defeat Boko Haram](#) because they were profiting from the situation.

These theories undermined any attempt at collective action against the sect. For instance, when Jonathan first declared a "state of emergency" in the northeastern states of Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno in May 2013 in a determined bid to fight the terrorists, some eminent northern elders declared that the measure, which included the imposition of curfews, the mounting of several roadblocks, and the shutting down of the states' communication infrastructures, [amounted to a declaration of war against the north](#). In the same vein, when the Chibok girls were kidnapped, some key Jonathan supporters openly doubted the story, and believed it was part of [a grand design by the north to bring down the Jonathan government](#).

With the election of a Muslim ruler and the death of such conspiracy theories as the above, the expectation is that Buhari has the social capital for a united action against the sect—so why is Boko Haram still posing a threat?

Underestimation of the strength and resources of Boko Haram

The resilience of Boko Haram under the Buhari administration suggests that there has been a gross underestimation by the government of the numerical strength, organizational efficiency, and motivation of the sect members. For instance, in October 2015, government leaders were shocked when a failed suicide bomber claimed that the sect was [planning to attack Maiduguri with as many as 8,000 fighters](#)—far more than what many people estimated the entire numerical strength of the sect to be. At one point, Theophilus Danjuma, a retired lieutenant-general and former defense minister, claimed that [Boko Haram's ability to gather intelligence was 100 percent better than that of the Nigerian military](#). In fact in 2014, when Governor of Borno State [Kashim Shettima claimed that Boko Haram fighters were better armed](#) and more motivated than the Nigerian army fighting them, he was criticized by many Nigerians, [including President Jonathan](#). These portrayures of Boko Haram contrast heavily with the former image of the sect in the popular imagination as a group of rag tag snipers, and poor and uneducated youth that probably did not number more than a few hundred.

Indeed, the underestimation of Boko Haram helped fuel the narrative that the Nigerian army fighting the terrorists was under-equipped, ill-motivated, cowardly, or heavily compromised. This underestimation also probably explained why the army, which Buhari vowed to better motivate and equip with more sophisticated weapons than Jonathan did, was given only three months in September 2015 to defeat the terrorists. In retrospect, that deadline was counterproductive because it unduly raised public expectations and put enormous pressure on both the military and the government. As Boko Haram's attacks have continued long after the expiration of the deadline, the government continues to try and save its face with the rhetoric that the sect had been “technically defeated.” The truth is that terrorism is rarely easily defeated in any country.

What is clear is that what Nigeria needs first is a realistic estimation of the numerical strength of Boko Haram, its organizational forms, and intelligence-gathering methods to enable the government to devise realistic strategies for confronting and containing the sect. The idea that Boko Haram could be defeated within any specified time frame should be abandoned.

The continued resilience of Boko Haram

Like a phoenix, Boko Haram has shown incredible capacity for regrouping after suffering setbacks. There have been at least three occasions when a successful anti-Boko Haram strategy led to a lull in the group's murderous activities that was erroneously interpreted as a sign of the group's imminent annihilation.

The first time a lull in the group's activities was misinterpreted was in 2013 during the war against some al Qaida-linked insurgents in northern Mali, which was also thought to be a training base for Boko Haram and other terrorist groups. It was believed that many Boko Haram fighters relocated to northern Mali to [fight with the insurgents against the combined troops from Benin, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, and Niger](#). When the French later intervened and routed the insurgents, the general belief was that Boko Haram had been dealt a deadly blow because of the suspected high number of casualties of its members and the destruction of their training bases. But Boko Haram lived on.

The second occasion a lull in Boko Haram’s activities was mistaken for imminent victory against the sect was [when a “state of emergency” was declared in 2013 in the three northern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe](#)—believed to be the three foci of Boko Haram’s activities. With the emergency rule, there was an increase in the number of troops deployed to the affected states; more road blocks were set up to search people and vehicles; and telecom networks were shut down to prevent the terrorists from using mobile telephones to communicate with one another and their informants. The general consensus was that [the emergency rule was initially very successful](#) in that it led to a sharp drop in the sect’s murderous activities. However, like the previous occasion, Boko Haram quickly regrouped and hopes that the solution lay in a “state of emergency” quickly faded.

The third occasion Nigerians thought that Boko Haram was a minute away from complete destruction was after the [joint military operations with Chad and Cameroon in February 2015](#). The initial successes of the joint operation goaded a euphoric Jonathan, who had then already conceded defeat in the March 2015 presidential election to boast in April 2015 that “the ongoing military operations in the northeast had already recorded huge successes, [with two states completely free from the control of terrorists while operations in the third state had reached a concluding stage.](#)” However, long after Jonathan made this statement, many people, such as Senator Baba Kaka Garbai of Borno State, insist that [Boko Haram still controls half of his state](#).

Conclusion

One of the main lessons in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria is that the sect has shown an incredible capacity for regrouping after major setbacks. It is not clear if the Buhari government, which has shown a single-minded determination to militarily defeat the terrorists, appreciates this fact. The truth is that terrorists, because of their methods, are not easily defeated. They can be contained in the short to medium terms—not completely routed as Buhari seems to believe. It is important that the government does not mistake a lull in the group’s murderous activities as a sign of imminent defeat.

In the same vein, in its single-minded desire to be seen as defeating Boko Haram on record time—something the preceding government was unable to do for years—this government seems unmindful of the many potential ‘Boko Harams’ that are breeding across the country. [Elsewhere](#) I argued that a major explanation for the emergence of Boko Haram is the crisis in the Nigeria’s nation-building, which has led to several alienated groups de-linking from the state into primordial identities, often with the Nigerian state as the enemy. Rather than deliberately engaging other alienated groups such as [the new agitation for a Republic of Biafra](#) or [the regrouping of ex-Niger Delta militants](#), Buhari appears to regard such groups as deliberate plans to undermine his government. It was essentially the same mistake former President Jonathan made with Boko Haram.

Overall, while the Buhari government must be lauded for its determined fight against Boko Haram, it needs to be encouraged to expand the tools of such fight beyond securing quick military victory to putting the servicing of Nigeria’s nation-building process in the front burner. It is in fact by re-energizing the country’s nation-building process that it can [win over several “de-Nigerianized” Nigerians](#) (i.e., Ni-

gerians that have de-linked from the Nigerian state into other primordial identities). This will ensure that other “Boko Harams” do not emerge across the country if, and when the present Boko Haram is defeated.

***Note:** This blog reflects the views of the author only and does not reflect the views of the Africa Growth Initiative. Dr. Jidefor Adibe is associate professor of political science at Nasarawa State University Keffi. He is also the editor of the quarterly academic journal, *African Renaissance*, co-editor of the bi-annual *Journal of African Foreign Affairs* and a columnist with *Daily Trust*, one of Nigeria’s leading newspapers.*

For more on the wider state of Nigeria and thoughts on President Buhari’s first nine months in office, see the recent Brookings event, [“Examining the current state of Nigeria.”](#)

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2016/02/29-reevaluating-boko-haram-conflict-adibe>

NEWS ANALYSIS: Assessing the gains of Buhari's visit to Saudi Arabia

By News Analysis by Sani Adamu

Analysts observe that one of the gains of President Muhammadu Buhari's recent visit to Saudi Arabia is the commitment obtained from King Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to arresting the falling oil price in the international market.

They note that the commitment will boost the efforts of the Buhari's administration by revamping the nation's economy because 70 per cent of Nigeria's national income comes from oil and gas sales.

Buhari and Al Saud, at a bilateral meeting held in Riyadh, expressed their commitment to a "stable oil market" and a "rebound of oil price".

Malam Garba Shehu, Senior Special Assistant to President Buhari, said the two leaders accepted the fact that Nigeria and Saudi Arabia's economies were tied to oil.

"They, therefore, committed themselves to doing all that is possible to stabilise the market and rebound the oil price," he said.

Beside this, the two leaders agreed that terrorism posed a common threat to their states and stressed the need for close cooperation on fight against terrorism.

Although Buhari applauded the Saudi Arabia for spearheading the coalition of Islamic States against terrorism, he said Nigeria would not be able to join the coalition.

"Even if we are not a part of it, we support you. I must thank the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the recent creation of a coalition to address the menace of international terrorism.

"Nigeria will support your efforts in keeping peace and stopping the spread of terror in your region.

"This is in consonance with our own commitment and ongoing efforts in seeking to stamp out Boko Haram terrorists from the West African sub-region and Lake Chad Basin Commission," Buhari said.

He thanked the Saudi government for its continuing support to Nigeria in the fight against terrorism.

Speaking on the ongoing crisis in Libya, Buhari regretted that the late Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi recruited, trained and armed citizens of many states in the Sahel region.

"With his fall, these mercenaries have returned to their countries, doing nothing but to shoot and kill," he observed.

He cited Burkina Faso and Mali as the main victims but expressed delight that the countries neighbouring the Lake Chad had tightened their ranks to void the Boko Haram threat.

“Luckily, we have cultivated our neighbours. We are now working together against Boko Haram, otherwise the problem would have become worse,” he added.

Al Saud commended the progress made by Nigeria in combating terrorism and promised to give further support.

The king pledged his support and cooperation for Nigeria and directed all agencies of his government to follow up on the discussions.

“I now instruct my team to go and sit down with your relevant agencies to push forward cooperation between our states,” he said.

Mentioning some of the achievements of his administration so far, Buhari said his administration had introduced policies and programmes aimed at saving the nation’s economy from collapse.

He cited the Treasury Single Account (TSA) and the Zero-based budget as some of the meaningful financial policies introduced by the Federal Government to check fraud in the system, saying it had started yielding fruitful results.

According to him, the nation has so far realised more than N2.6 trillion from the newly introduced TSA.

He, therefore, expressed optimism that with the introduction of the single account, the 2016 budget implementation might not record any form of deficit at the end of the financial year.

On the ongoing fight against Boko Haram insurgency, Buhari said that his administration was determined to tackle the menace.

“As you are all aware, insecurity has been a serious challenge for us in Nigeria, however, our armed forces have done a great job in dealing with the Boko Haram.

“We have also intensified collaboration with the Multinational Joint Task Force to handle the threats within the sub-region.

“These renewed efforts helped to decimate the capacity of the insurgents and as I speak to you, the group is not in control of a single territory in Nigeria,” he noted.

Buhari also restated the determination of his administration to tackle the problem of corruption in Nigeria, noting that the present administration had zero tolerance for corruption and other unethical practices.

“This government will do everything within the provision of the constitution to recover stolen funds and put an end to corrupt practices.

“This will be done by empowering relevant government agencies and institutions to carry out the task of nipping corruption in the bud and dealing decisively with anyone found wanting,” he said.

He said the Federal Government was working to fully diversify the economy, which in essence, would open up new opportunities for Nigerian entrepreneurs and foreign investors.

On the request for the establishment of an international school to cater for Nigerian

children in Saudi Arabia, the establishment of a branch of Nigerian bank and provision of passport machine in Riyadh, Buhari pledged that relevant authorities of government would look into the issues.

He then directed the Nigerian Embassy in Riyadh to make necessary contacts with the relevant ministries with a view to addressing some of the challenges raised at the meeting.

He said that government had begun addressing the challenge of unemployment, insisting that the objective of his administration was to take steps to address these challenges and restore the confidence and trust of Nigerians including those in the diaspora.

Buhari commended the Charge' D Affaires, the Consular-General and all the members of staff of the Nigerian Embassy and the Consulate for working tirelessly to ensure the success of his visit.

He said the Federal Government would work with the government of Saudi Arabia to solve some challenges they might be facing.

Charge' D Affaires Tijjani Hamman-Joda thanked Buhari for finding time to visit and address members of the Nigerian community in Saudi Arabia.

Observers are hopeful that Buhari's visit to Saudi Arabia will also strengthen the existing cultural and economic ties between Nigeria and Saudi Arabia for the overall benefits of both countries. (NANFeatures)

<http://naija247news.com/2016/03/news-analysis-assessing-the-gains-of-buharis-visit-to-saudi-arabia/>

Are Drug Cartels Financing Boko Haram's Bloody Attacks In Nigeria?

March 9, 2016



www.almanar.com.lb

Islamic group Boko Haram has since 2009 terrorized civilians living in the northern part of Nigeria and have carried out numerous bloody raids on villages around the region's largest city, Maiduguri.

It still remains a mystery how the ISIS-linked jihadist group has managed to finance its operation for this long without fizzling off.

According to an [Africa Intelligence](#) report, the group could be getting a lot of its financial support from drug traffickers who are using Nigeria's strategic location as a crossroad for global narcotics transport.

A [BBC](#) report cited findings by the International Crisis Group saying that the group had forged ties with arms smugglers and drug traffickers who use their territory as a transit route.

[A 2012 report](#) from the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies alleged that Nigerian terrorist groups are financed by drug cartels in Latin America.

While it looked farfetched, an Italian journalist and terrorism finance expert, Loretta Napoleoni, said the Nigerian route opened up as far back as 2001 when the [Patriot Act made it difficult to transfer drugs through the U.S. to Europe](#).

"Nobody wants to admit that cocaine reaches Europe via West Africa," Napoleoni told [IBTimes](#) in 2014. "This kind of business is a type of business where Islamic terrorist organizations are very much involved."

But that's not the only way Boko Haram get their funding.

They use other tactics such as kidnapping of local businessmen and foreigners and charging arms smugglers from the Sahel region who use this established drug routes to move their goods.

It is estimated that group gets as much as \$1 million to release wealthy Nigerians and about \$3 million in ransom for the release of foreign nations like a French family of seven they seized in northern Cameroon in Feb. 2013.

They are also involved in the billion-dollar rhino and elephant poaching industry, according to a [report](#) from US-based wildlife conservation organization, Born Free.

UK-based finance and security analyst Tom Keatinge estimates that Boko Haram makes an annual net income of about \$10 million, which is more than enough to run their low-cost insurgency that consist of crude bombs and young people from rural areas.

“What is certain about Boko Haram is that the organization is very well funded; without an ever-increasing cash flow, the movement would have died out long ago,” the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, a research initiative of the reference publisher Beacham Group, said in [a report](#).

-See more at: <http://afkinsider.com/120996/does-drug-money-fund-boko-harams-bloody-attacks-in-nigeria/#sthash.MzDkiQho.dpuf>

Somalia

Somalia: Failure to Build Somali Forces Blocks Amisom Exit, New Study Says

By Kevin J Kelley

The African Union Mission in Somalia will remain unable to achieve its objectives until Somali national forces become far more effective in securing the country against Islamist insurgents, a new study concludes.

At present, Amisom "alone cannot defeat al-Shabaab," states the analysis published on Friday by a Mogadishu-based think tank. And there is little short-term prospect of the national army and police developing into a "cohesive, legitimate and inclusive set of Somali security forces," adds the report co-authored by Paul Williams, a US professor with expertise on Somalia, and Abdirashid Hashi, director of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies.

It identifies political in-fighting among the various Somali factions as the main factor blocking movement toward providing Amisom with a capable partner. The political stalemate also prevents realisation of the ultimate goal of transitioning security operations in Somalia from military-led to police-led, the study says.

Despite the AU mission's breakthrough in pushing Shabaab's main units out of Mogadishu, the militants control much of the countryside in southern Somalia and retain the capacity to carry out large-scale and deadly operations, the authors note. They point to Shabaab's bloody attacks on three Amisom bases in recent months, along with the carnage it has inflicted on civilians inside Kenya.

Amisom is severely handicapped by a lack of military resources that would potentially equip it to decimate Shabaab, the study says.

Amisom's effectiveness is further hampered by the suspicions with which it is viewed by many Somalis, states the report, titled Exit Strategies for the AU Mission in Somalia.

The contingents from Kenya and Ethiopia are particularly seen in that way because the governments of those neighbouring states "have repeatedly pursued counter-productive policies in Somalia that sought to retain their influence over local and national dynamics," the authors say.

Kenya is further thought to be operating in accordance with ulterior motives due to allegations of KDF involvement in illicit charcoal and sugar exports from Somalia, the proceeds from which are said to benefit Shabaab indirectly, the authors observe.

Amisom's standing is additionally undermined by its documented killings of Somali civilians and the sexual exploitation carried out by some of its personnel, the analysis states.

The multinational force deployed in Somalia could also suffer in the coming months

from an erosion of morale, adds the report.

Soldiers could soon see their pay reduced, the report warns.

The European Union has said it would, as of last month, implement a 20 per cent cut in the funding it provides for Amisom members' allowances. Rank-and-file personnel currently receive monthly payments of about \$828 after their respective national governments have deducted roughly \$200 from the per capita sums the EU channels through the African Union.

The AU mission in Somalia costs international donors around \$900 million a year, prompting the study's authors to speculate briefly as to whether Amisom can remain financially sustainable over the long term. They note, too, that some critics have charged that Amisom troop-contributing countries may regard the operation in Somalia as a money-making enterprise and thus have little incentive to head for the exit.

But the military undertaking has clearly involved enormous sacrifices on the part of the countries that have assigned personnel to Amisom, Mr Hashi and Prof Williams acknowledge.

They note that neither Amisom nor national authorities divulge casualty figures, but Prof Williams, an international affairs professor at George Washington University, estimated in an earlier study that the war against Shabaab has cost the lives of over 1,000 African soldiers.

The AU mission in Somalia ranks, the new report says, as "probably the most deadly peace operation undertaken in the modern era."

<http://allafrica.com/stories/201603010457.html>

Another terror target for the U.S.

Mar 10 2016



This car was used for a suicide bombing Wednesday, March 9, 2016, in Somalia. U.S. airstrikes Monday killed more than 150 at an Al-Shabab military training facility. Al-Shabab, which is an affiliate of al-Qaida, has been trying to take over Somalia. (AP Photo/Farah Abdi Wasameh)

Add the Horn of Africa to the terrorist hot spots where U.S. military forces are engaged and in harm's way. On Monday U.S. aircraft and drones operating from a secret base in Djibouti attacked troops of the East African affiliate of al-Qaida while they were lined up in formation at a remote training camp in Somalia.

The Pentagon, announcing the attack, estimated that more than 150 fighters were killed, a remarkably large number for a single attack.

A Pentagon spokesman said the fighters at the Raso Camp had just completed training for a "large scale attack [that] posed an imminent threat" to U.S. and African Union forces — mainly from neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia — stationed in Somalia. Details of the threat were not available.

The fighters belonged to Al-Shabab, the al-Qaida affiliate that is trying to seize control of Somalia and turn it into an Islamist nation. A spokesman for the group said the Pentagon's casualty estimate was greatly exaggerated. But given the care that the Pentagon takes in its post-attack analysis the Al-Shabab claim is open to question and may simply represent an effort to reassure its followers by minimizing the extent of the damage.

They may need reassurance. Over the past several years African Union forces advised by the United States have succeeded in regaining control of large areas of So-

malia from Al-Shabab, though they have not yet been able to set up a stable government for the country.

In an effort to regain the initiative Al-Shabab has launched numerous terrorist attacks on aircraft and government officials in Somalia. In 2013 it sent four gunmen to a large mall in Nairobi, Kenya, where they systematically killed 67 and wounded 175.

Presumably the reported “imminent threat” posed by the troops at the training camp means that Al-Shabab is preparing to raise the level of its operations in Somalia.

The scale of the U.S. response can be gauged by the apparent intensification of drone strikes in Somalia, as estimated by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Last year, 120 people were reportedly killed by such drone strikes.

In past years the strikes were targeted mainly on Al-Shabab leaders, including the mastermind of the Nairobi mall attack, who was killed by a U.S. strike in 2014.

Indicating the escalating role of U.S. military operations in support of the African Union military mission there the number of drone strikes rose markedly in 2015 after the deployment of Special Forces and aircraft to neighboring Djibouti, which strongly supports the U.S. and African Union operations in Somalia.

U.S. military operations in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, date back to 2002. Given the resilience of Al-Shabab, they are likely to continue for the indefinite future. Such is the nature of the war on terrorism.

<http://www.postandcourier.com/>

International Organizations

G20

Terrorist Financing and Information Sharing: A Little Less Conversation, a Little More Action Please

Tom Keatinge

10 March 2016

The most recent G20 communiqué repeats the need for high-level commitment to greater information sharing for tackling terrorist financing. But without action to address the real and perceived barriers to effective sharing, little will actually be achieved.



In recent months, and particularly since November's terrorist attacks in Paris, no multilateral gathering has been complete without calls for greater collaboration between states in the fight against terrorism – especially in the effort to disrupt terrorist financing.

These calls for information sharing have become a mantra, repeated by all who urge that more must be done to combat terrorist activity. The value of greater information sharing between states themselves and between states and their financial services industries is unquestioned. However, the way in which this information sharing should be achieved is not explained; and the barriers to such information sharing, whilst occasionally acknowledged, are entirely unaddressed.

Consider the evidence. In the immediate aftermath of the Paris attacks of November 2015, the communiqué of the G20 meeting in Turkey expressed commitment to 'tackling the financing channels of terrorism, particularly by enhanced cooperation on exchange of information'. This was followed by an emergency gathering of the global anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist-finance standard setter, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), that undertook to adapt its strategy to enhance 'operational information sharing' to counter terrorist financing. It also boldly committed to work with the Egmont Group (the unifying body of national financial intelligence units – FIUs) 'to overcome information-sharing obstacles and consider up-

dating the international standards on effective information sharing.’

Next, at the special meeting of finance ministers at the UN Security Council in December, the Council passed Resolution 2253, which recognises ‘the importance of information sharing within and between governments’ and encourages member states ‘to exchange information expeditiously’. At that same meeting, the president of the FATF, Je-yoon Shin, underlined the findings of its emergency meeting noting that ‘Our most important conclusion is that there is a need for better, more timely, information sharing: between agencies within jurisdictions; between jurisdictions; and with the private sector.’ Importantly, he highlighted that ‘different data protection laws mean that one of our largest sources of intelligence, the banks, are often prevented from sharing information across borders within their own organisations, let alone with each other or with the authorities.’

The Egmont Group has also underlined the importance of information sharing, committing to work ‘closely with the FATF to overcome information-sharing obstacles and consider updating the international standards on effective information sharing’, ‘supporting the improvement of the information-sharing aspect of cooperation between FIUs and domestic agencies mandated to combat terrorist financing’, and ‘improving cooperation among FIUs internationally by removing existing obstacles to information sharing and developing tools and practices to facilitate multilateral exchanges and joint analysis.’ Most recently, the latest meeting of G20 finance ministers and central-bank governors in Shanghai committed to intensify efforts ‘to tackle all sources, techniques and channels of terrorist financing and... enhance our cooperation and exchange of information.’

This sentiment is entirely understandable. Terrorists and their financing seemingly move effortlessly across borders, paying no heed to the national barriers that appear to prevent the free flow of information between those seeking to disrupt them. Laws drafted to combat terrorist financing often seem to conflict with those created to protect data and personal privacy. Whilst carve-outs for security exist, interpretations vary and guidance is lacking. And, where the private sector is concerned, reputation and client confidentiality are often favoured even when pathways to sharing appear clear but voluntary.

As things currently stand, well-intentioned though calls for information sharing might be, global leaders must realise that without the support of a dedicated, properly resourced initiative to determine and address barriers; reconcile security and privacy demands; and facilitate sharing between states, between national governments and their financial institutions, and within the private sector itself, such calls from global leaders will remain unanswered.

So what should be done? As a number of multilateral fora have suggested in recent months, it is the FATF that holds the key to advancing this most challenging and most consistently neglected aspect of enhancing the effectiveness of the global effort to combat terrorists and their financing. The FATF has already completed a rapid review of 199 jurisdictions to determine the extent to which they have implemented the basic FATF recommendations related to countering terrorist finance. But as the FATF well knows, technical compliance does not guarantee effectiveness.

The FATF has also announced its intention to conduct an analysis across all its members in order to review the challenges faced in sharing information. One of the

FATF's key responsibilities is to review the anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-finance capabilities of its member states. Given the universally agreed importance of information sharing in tackling all forms of illicit finance, and the emphasis placed on information exchange and co-operation in the FATF's existing recommendations, the lack of such an existing analysis seems an unfortunate oversight.

Whilst such an analysis is a start, the FATF needs to be supported by the leadership of its members, by the G20, and by global representatives of the financial services industry (such as the Wolfsberg Group) to take its analysis further and undertake a rapid assessment not just of challenges but also of the extent to which information sharing actually occurs at all levels. Good models exist already, and bodies such as Europol assist, but even a cursory review reveals that systematic and effective sharing of information to disrupt terrorist finance remains rare.

The identification of inefficiencies and national and international barriers (perceived or real) to information sharing is urgently needed if the repeated calls from global leaders are to become more than simply paragraphs in grand yet meaningless communiqués.

<https://rusi.org/commentary/>

Terrorism in the World

Afghanistan

Afghanistan: Reeling Under Foreign-Backed Terror – Analysis



Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

MARCH 8, 2016

By Ajit Kumar Singh*

At least 15 people were killed and another 31 were wounded when a suicide bomber detonated an explosive vest in a pedestrian area between the Ministries of Finance and Defense in the Pul-e-Mahmood Khan area of national capital Kabul on February 27, 2016. Most of the victims were civilians (though the numbers are yet unspecified), in an attack that apparently targeted Government employees.

Earlier the same day, a suicide bomber killed at least 13 persons, including an anti-Taliban local militia commander identified as Malik Khan Jan, outside the Governor's compound in Asadabad, the provincial capital of Kunar. Provincial Governor Wahidullah Kalimzai said, "Most of the victims were civilians and children who were either passing by or playing in the park." At least 40 people were injured in the attack.

On February 21, 2016, at least 14 people, including nine civilians, were killed and another 19, including 17 civilians, were injured in a suicide bombing in a crowded market in the Sia Gerd District of Parwan Province.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) at least 140 civilians have already been killed in Afghanistan since the beginning of the current year (data till March 4, 2016).

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) which began systematically documenting civilian casualties on January 1, 2009, has recorded 58,736 civilian casualties (21,323 dead and 37,413 injured) up to December 31, 2015. Through 2015, UNAMA recorded 11,002 civilian casualties (3,545 civilians dead and 7,457 injured) as against 10,534 (3,701 civilians dead and 6,833 injured) in 2014. More disturbingly, women and children constitute a rising proportion of the victims of this violence. While overall civilian casualties increased by four per cent in 2015 in comparison to the previous year, casualties among women increased by 37 per cent (1,246 women casualties, including 333 dead and 913 injured) and by 14 per cent among children (2,829, including 733 dead and 2,096 injured).

Moreover, the battle between the Security Forces (SFs) and the Taliban to establish effective control over areas across Afghanistan further intensified through 2015. According to a December 2015 United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD) report “from January 1 through November 15, 2015, there was a 27 percent increase in ANDSF [Afghan National Defense Security Force] casualties compared to the same period last year [2014]”. The report did not provide specific numbers. However, a Washington Times report on December 27, 2015, claimed that “as of last month (November 2015), about 7,000 members of the Afghan Security Forces had been killed this year [2015], with 12,000 injured, a 26 percent increase over the total number of dead and wounded in all of 2014”.

On the other hand, fatalities among the NATO Forces continued to decline – 27 fatalities in 2015 as against 75 in 2014. A total of 3,515 NATO Forces, including 2,381 US troops have been killed so far since 2001. The increase in fatalities among ANDSF, on the one hand, and simultaneous decline in NATO fatalities, on the other, is primarily because NATO Forces have ceased operating as combat Forces (barring few specific operations) since the beginning of 2015, and ANDSF has taken the pole position in fighting the insurgents. ANDSF includes the Afghan Army, Afghan Air Force, and Afghan National Police. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) also helps. Explaining the reason behind rising losses among the ANDSF and ALP, Afghan Interior Minister Nur al-haq Ulumi stated in May 2015, “Our National Police and the Afghan Local Police are the first line of defense. They are always fighting the insurgents. That’s why we have so many casualties.”

Though there is no specific data on number of militants killed in Afghanistan, according to partial data compiled by the SATP, 10,628 militants were killed through 2015 as against 6,030 such fatalities in 2014. Most of the militants killed belonged to Taliban.

Evidently, Afghanistan is in the midst of an increasing bloody war. Despite losing large numbers of their cadres, the Taliban is surging. According to the December 2015 DoD report, “with control of — or a significant presence in — roughly 30 percent of districts across the nation, the Taliban now holds more territory than in any year since 2001, when the puritanical Islamists were ousted from power after the 9/11 attacks”. The Taliban have proven capable of taking rural areas and contesting key terrain in areas such as Helmand, while continuing to conduct high-profile attacks (HPA) in Kabul, the report added. From January 1 to November 16, 2015, there were 28 HPAs in Kabul, a 27 percent increase compared to the same time period in 2014. On January 4, 2016, summing up the security scenario, Zamir Kabulov, the Russian President’s special envoy for Afghanistan, stated that Afghanistan remains tense, with “high or extraordinary” security threats present in 27 of 34 Afghan

provinces.

At this juncture an attempt is being made to bring Taliban to talks table. The fourth meeting of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG, comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and China) on the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation process was held in Kabul on February 23, 2016. QCG member states invited all Taliban and other groups to participate, through their authorized representatives, in direct peace talks with the Afghan Government, which were expected to take place in the first week of March 2016 in Islamabad. Even before the specific dates were finalized, however, the Taliban declared that they would not participate in international peace talks, citing what they claimed were increased US air strikes and the Afghan Government's military operations.

Media reports indicate that Afghan and Pakistani Government officials remain hopeful that the talks would continue, despite the Taliban statement. "This is just public bargaining on the part of the Taliban. They did it last time, too. They put out a statement of denial, and then they showed up to talks," an unnamed official, close to President Ashraf Ghani, argued on March 5, 2016.

The first round of official peace talks between the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan Government had taken place in the intervening night of July 7 and July 8, 2015, in Murree in Pakistan, with an agreement to meet again on August 15 and 16, 2015, in the Qatar capital, Doha. Before, the second round of talks could take place, the Afghan Government disclosed, on July 29, 2015, "The government ... based on credible information, confirms that Mullah Mohammad Omar, leader of the Taliban, died in April 2013 in Pakistan." Subsequent disclosures indicated that Omar died while he was under treatment in Karachi.

The Taliban soon split into two factions – one led by Pakistan's nominee, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor and another by Mullah Mohammad Rasool. The next round of talks failed to materialize. Reports now suggest the possibilities of rapprochement between the two factions. Abdul Rauf, a Taliban 'commander' close to Rasool, said senior Taliban figures who had objected to the rapid and secretive succession are now reluctantly returning to the fold: "We all took a stand against Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, but now one by one we are joining with him without demanding any changes." While both Islamabad and Mullah Mansoor lost tremendous credibility among the Taliban for their conspiracy to suppress the truth of Mullah Omar's death, and to manipulate his persona for the past years, the tremendous support the terrorists receive from Pakistan remains critical to the survival of their movement, and a forced reconciliation appears inevitable.

In the meantime, in an attempt to represent itself as the most effective player in the peace process, Pakistan willingly or unwillingly made an admission which confirmed its destabilizing role in Afghanistan, for which it had long been held responsible and about which SAIR has written consistently. Sartaj Aziz, Foreign Affairs Advisor to the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, admitted on March 2, 2016, "We have some influence on them [the Taliban] because their leadership is in Pakistan and they get some medical facilities, their families are here. So we can use those levers to pressurize them to say: 'Come to the table'."

Pakistan's enduring game plan remains committed to the installation of a Government in Afghanistan in which Taliban elements have an important, if not dominant,

role. Islamabad believes such a Government would help its larger strategic and economic interests and, in the process, would obliterate Indian interests in Afghanistan. Increasing attacks on Indian consulates across Afghanistan in recent times are part of this wider powerplay. In the latest of the series of such attacks, on March 2, 2016, six terrorists carried out a suicide attack targeting the Indian Consulate in Jalalabad, the provincial capital of Nangarhar Province. Two Afghan civilians and an Afghan Policeman were killed in the attack. While two terrorists blew themselves up near the consulate building initiating the attack, the remaining four were killed in the subsequent gun battle. Though no group has claimed responsibly for the attack so far, the role of the Pakistani establishment has been established in such attacks in the past. Soon after the Jalalabad attack, former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, stated, "Each of those (previous) attacks has originated from across the border, from neighbouring Pakistan. That's where the origin of this trouble is..."

While the Taliban has regained significant lost ground, it has now entered into a fratricidal turf war with its own splinters now cleaving to the flag of the Islamic State (IS, aka Daesh). The December 2015 DoD report notes, "IS-KP [Khorasan Province] has progressed from its initial exploratory phase to a point where they are openly fighting the Taliban for the establishment of a safe haven, and are becoming more operationally active. IS-KP has successfully seized pockets of terrain from the Taliban in Nangarhar Province. The group continues to recruit disaffected Taliban and formerly Taliban-aligned fighters, most notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which publically declared allegiance to IS-KP in August 2015." The coalition officials estimate that around 1,000 to 3,000 IS fighters are trying to establish a base of operations in the rugged mountains of Nangarhar Province.

Reeling under the terror exported from across its Southern borders, Afghanistan now has 315,764 ANDSF personnel in position (against an authorized strength of 352,000). 28,000 ALP personnel are also in position, as against the sanctioned strength of 30,000. Despite having performed reasonably well, the Forces need dramatic augmentation to contain and reverse the surge in militant activities across Afghanistan. US Army General Lloyd J. Austin III observed, on March 2, 2016, "This fighting season was the first where [Afghan Forces] were in the lead and responsible for the security of the country. And they faced a determined enemy that continues to attempt everything in its power to cause the Afghan security forces to fail. But they haven't failed. They are holding their own. Afghanistan's special operations forces are becoming the best in the region. And the Afghan air force is enabling those ground elements."

Nevertheless, Afghan Forces are reeling under circumstances created by the withdrawal of an overwhelming proportion of NATO Forces, though the small remaining contingents continue to provide active support. As of December 2015, there were 12,905 NATO Forces from 42 contributing nations, including 6,800 US Forces stationed in Afghanistan. The US, which had earlier said that it would reduce its presence to a maximum of 1,000 personnel in Afghanistan by the end of 2016, to provide security for the US Embassy in Kabul, has already changed its plans, recognizing the increasing threat. On October 15, 2015, US President Barack Obama stated that he would keep 5,500 US troops in Afghanistan into 2017, arguing "Afghan Forces are still not as strong as they need to be... Meanwhile, the Taliban has made gains, particularly in rural areas, and can still launch deadly attacks in cities, including Kabul."

It is expected that the US will make some further adjustments in its plans for deployment of troops in Afghanistan. Gen. John F. Campbell, who handed over command of the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan to Gen. John W. Nicholson Jr. on March 2, 2016, stated on February 17, 2016, “I think we have to look at conditions on the ground. I think when the decision was made for 5,500, there were some assumptions that were made and some of those may not have come true. I think there are some adjustments we have to make on that number, and I’ve provided those to my senior leadership, and hopefully we’ll make some changes there. I’m also going to make sure [successor Gen. Nicholson] has that, and he’ll come in and make his own assessment.”

Unless the Taliban is defeated militarily, and the spread of IS is contained, no stability can be brought into Afghanistan. At a time when the Taliban is rampaging across the country, the talks process can only confer legitimacy on the extremists and cede undue leverage to the external forces that have long been guilty of aiding and abetting terrorism. It is now critical time to bring to account the powers – both state and non-state – that have been responsible for the enduring suffering of the people of Afghanistan.

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France

Daesh Shifts Course after Paris, San Bernardino Terror Attacks

March 7, 2016

ISIS calls these groups wilayat, Arabic for provinces. The terrorist organization uses the same term for administrative divisions inside Syria and Iraq. “Anyway, If, as recent events suggest, ISIS’ far-flung provinces have begun closely aligning their actions with those of the group’s core leadership in Iraq and Syria, then ISIS’ geographic scope has expanded vastly,” Byman adds.



AhlulBayt News Agency - The crash of the Russian passenger jet in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula in October, 2015, for which the ISIS terror group has taken responsibility, could at the end of the road be more horrifying than Paris and then California’s San Bernardino terrorist attacks.

Daniel L. Byman, a director of research and a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, in an analysis published by Brookings has written that “Western security officials had long worried that their countries’ own citizens would conduct attacks after returning home from Iraq or Syria or strike out as “lone wolf” terrorists. But the Russian plane crash, which killed 224 people, was caused by a different beast: neither lone wolves nor ISIS itself but an ISIS affiliate that had pledged its loyalty to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS’ self-declared caliph.”

ISIS calls these groups wilayat, Arabic for provinces. The terrorist organization uses the same term for administrative divisions inside Syria and Iraq. “Anyway, If, as recent events suggest, ISIS’ far-flung provinces have begun closely aligning their actions with those of the group’s core leadership in Iraq and Syria, then ISIS’ geographic scope has expanded vastly,” Byman adds.

Although worrying, ISIS’ expansion was not unexpected. Now ISIS has gone beyond Al-Qaeda terror group in terms of gaining territories and securing power. The wilayats are now posing serious threats to the Western interests. Such wilayats

would enable ISIS to expand its sway over territory, transforming the local groups in fatal forces for its own regional battles. Therefore, if the West is intending to defeat ISIS, it must fight all of the terror group, including its affiliates and not solely the visible part of the organization.

ISIS terror group's expansion

It is certainly known that the heart of ISIS terror group lies in the Sunni-inhabited regions of Iraq and Syria. However, the group claims that it is the legitimate ruler of the whole Muslims and thus it is active across the Muslim world. So far, the terror organization has declared that it held affiliates or wilayats in some parts of Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Caucasus. The terrorists and forces who claim links to ISIS terror organization have carried out attacks also in Bangladesh and Kuwait. Meanwhile, the most worrisome ISIS' provinces are those in Egypt and Libya. "Today, the Libyan affiliate poses a particularly serious threat to Western interests because its fighters, unlike their counterparts in Egypt, do not face strong government opposition," continues Daniel L. Byman.

Meanwhile, it could be highly difficult to figure out where ISIS group has formally established its strongholds. In such places, the foreign fighters play a great role in keeping the links between the local fighting groups and the operation centers.

Feeling the bonds

A variety of factors are influential in attraction of the local groups to ISIS. One of the most significant is the most obvious: Genuine conviction. "As nauseating as ISIS is to most Muslims, it has tapped into the beliefs of an important subset of Sunni Muslims, particularly young men. Trumping sectarianism, the terror group paints itself as the defender and avenger of the Sunni Muslims worldwide," says Byman.

Moreover, the group's slick videos and social media campaigns attract even young Sunnis who lack real religious knowledge or conviction by playing into their desires for adventure and a sense of purpose. As General David Rodriguez, the commander of the US' forces in Africa has noted "the groups link themselves to ISIS terror group to elevate their cause."

Still, some other groups are joining ISIS for instrumental goals, including enjoying financial and technical aids. On the other hand, ISIS helps the local affiliates to improve the quality of their promotions. "After strengthening ties with ISIS in 2014, for example, Boko Haram was able to elevate its outreach from grainy videos taken on hand-held cameras to more polished productions distributed via Twitter," says Byman.

On the other hand, the provinces have benefits for the center of ISIS' governance as they attract other groups to the terror group's body, enhancing the image of ISIS as a strong and attractive organization. Furthermore, the affiliates provide ISIS' leaders and fighters with shelters once the group is defeated or pushed back in Syria and Iraq.

Moving towards radicalism

As ISIS grows beyond Iraq and Syria, so, too, does it spread its harsh brand of reli-

gious intolerance. In 2015, the followers of the group have attacked the Shiite mosques in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Also they beheaded the Christian Ethiopia's and Egypt's nationals in Libya and attacked the security forces and the Shiites. Not only are such attacks tragic in their own right; they also risk setting in motion a cycle of retaliation. Such cycle, which would lead to attacks, would only lead to strengthening of ISIS which sees itself as the defender of the believers.

The doubled problem

Despite the fact that the provinces carry benefits for the terror group, they also carry some troubles for ISIS. First, "they weaken the jihadist movement as a whole. Second, many of them exist because of local rivalries: members of rival groups spend their time killing one another rather than fighting their supposed enemies, "maintains Byman. Third, when a group comes under ISIS' brand, its enemies would be transferred to be ISIS' enemies. Such a process would lead to unity of the opposing front in the face of ISIS.

A fresh strategy

Last year, the US' and its allies' lack of an apparent strategy for battling ISIS' provinces did not look significant. Washington and allies are not interested in engaging in another war in West Asia. In fact, it seems, for them, that targeting ISIS' affiliates would backfire, but bombing the Russian passenger jet has clarified the risks of such US' notion.

Any strategy which aims at undermining ISIS' provinces would need two parts: Disconnecting the affiliates from the command centers and making efforts to weaken, contain and finally defeat the affiliates. Thereby, Washington and its allies should target the command centers of ISIS' provinces as well as those who hold contacts with the organization's main leaders in Syria and Iraq. To fight ISIS, the US would need to establish military bases in many remote points of the world. Besides, showing flexibility is very vital in this course because it is hard to predict which provinces would expand and draw attention most. Furthermore, for scaling down the costs and achieving the right for geographical access, the US needs to collaborate further with its allies.

<http://en.abna24.com/cultural/archive/2016/03/07/739405/story.html>

Transnational Radicalism: A Global Islamic State? – Analysis

MARCH 13, 2016

By Maria Anna Rowena Luz G. Layador and Andrea Kristine G. Molina*

On 14 January 2016, central Jakarta was rocked by a series of well-orchestrated terrorist attacks involving suicide bombings and shooting. Jakarta police identified ISIS-affiliated Indonesian Bahrun Naim, who is currently based in Syria, as the mastermind behind the attack. This fuels fear that ISIS has already reached Southeast Asia.

The unexpected sudden emergence of the ISIS may have caught the world unprepared but its rapid territorial and ideological expansion should not come as a surprise. ISIS not only has the machinery and bureaucratic structures to run the quasi-state it has carved for itself but it has also the ability to tap the cyberspace in recruiting fighters and influencing social media-savvy radicals from around the world. Despite great territorial losses in 2015 amid counter offensives by various governments and coalition forces, it is undeniable that ISIS has incredible staying power.

Non-state but with territory

Since its rise in 2014, ISIS has captured and controlled tracts of lands in Syria and Iraq and has allied groups in Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Radical groups in Southeast Asia, including the Abu Sayyaf and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in the Philippines, have also pledged allegiance to ISIS, although the nature of ISIS' involvement is still subject to speculation. It has also so far been able to recruit thousands of fighters— including women – across the Middle East and North Africa and other parts of the world.

ISIS is primarily concerned with the creation of an Islamic caliphate, which requires territories with a highly bureaucratic organizational structure. It does not recognize the laws of states much less the laws of the international community; it only recognizes the strict interpretation of the Koran as the only law. It controls all the aspects of daily life in the areas it controls in Syria and Iraq, including running schools, mosques, banks, and courts. The United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry even went so far as to say that ISIS “seeks to subjugate civilians under its control and dominate every aspect of their lives through terror, indoctrination, and the provision of services to those who obey”.¹ Its source of power is being an entity not accountable to anybody or any institution, using all available means to instill fear and committing violence and atrocities unmindful of existing conventions.

ISIS is highly bureaucratic and has transformed itself from a military force to a quasi-state with systems in place to provide services and incentives to residents in its controlled territories. It also provides an attractive compensation package to its mercenaries. The rapid expansion of ISIS is made possible by its massive wealth reserves accumulated from diverse sources such as illegal oil trade, trade of looted historical artifacts, extortion and tax collection, bank looting, kidnapping, and the slave trade.

But since April 2015, ISIS has lost a significant percentage of its captured territories, including its oil infrastructure and key supply routes, as a result of local and international efforts. A leaked ISIS document exposed early this year also suggests that ISIS is cutting its fighters' salaries by half due to "exceptional circumstances".

However, ISIS's weakening power is coupled with its increasing terrorism abroad. Since its self-declaration as an Islamic caliphate in June 2014, its mercenaries have expanded the organization's operations outside its captured territories in Syria and Iraq. In a survey by CNN, there have been over sixty attacks in twenty countries committed by ISIS-affiliated and ISIS-inspired individuals outside the Levant, killing an estimated 1,160 people and injuring 1,700 others. This goes to show that its ideological appeal has not waned and, in fact, has inspired more radicals to commit terror attacks in the name of Islam.

ISIS's ideological appeal

While the majority of Muslims do not share ISIS's interpretation of Islam, the organization's revival of a historical political entity governed by Islamic laws and traditions provides a sense of belonging to Muslims and individuals who may have felt alienated in their countries of residence that are deeply divided along sectarian, ethnic, tribal, and socioeconomic lines. This challenges the

imperialist-imposed European state system in the predominantly Muslim Middle East. ISIS appears to be providing the ideological force under the banner of "global jihadi ideology" to unite the Islamic world. Its espousal of Islamic extremist narrative, ideological opposition to the West, and its expansionist project also appears to them as an alternative to Middle Eastern states' failed attempts at nation-building.

Possessing soft power with sufficient military resources, ISIS suasion is based on its ability to strike force and violence and utilize social media platforms for propaganda and recruitment of potential jihadists from all over the world. After the Arab Spring in 2011, the world has witnessed the growing desire of the younger generation to search for identity, belongingness, and change in a hostile environment, which has spurred various movements demanding to accommodate their ideologies and grievances. These, coupled with high youth unemployment rates, general lack of education, and weak governmental structures, ensure a fertile ground for radicalism. Its rhetoric of 'jihad' provides an identity anchor for those alienated and disenfranchised by their society and by their own governments.

Spread of ISIS terror

ISIS has so far succeeded in attracting individuals – especially Muslim youth – from Europe, North America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Many ISIS supporters have traveled to Syria to fight for the group and some carry out coordinated and planned attacks in their home countries. Others are also exploiting the Syrian refugee crisis to slip into target countries to attack such as the ISIS suicide bomber in Istanbul's historic Sultanah met Square on 12 January 2014, who entered Turkey as a refugee from Syria. Governments should also be concerned about the threat of citizens who have traveled to Syria and returned radicalized. Some perpetrators of the series of coordinated attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, which killed 130 people are European citizens who returned from Syria. ISIS members, in their social media accounts, also threaten to carry out attacks in Europe, US, Southeast Asia, and else-

where. It is not far-fetched to assume that more sophisticated operations will be carried out by ISIS-affiliated and ISIS-influenced individuals and groups in the near future.

“There should be focus on improving political and socioeconomic conditions from which radicalization stems in the first place and be cautious in employing counter-terrorist measures so as to avoid provoking intensified retaliatory attacks.”

The weakening of ISIS in Syria and Iraq does not diminish its ideological appeal. The growing transnationalization of ISIS’s terror operation is but one of its consequences. Recent events have shown that ISIS is getting more dangerous as a terrorist organization abroad, possibly to compensate for its huge losses of its quasi-state last year; it has, in fact, constructed an image of being a global actor.

Addressing issues of mal-governance, failure of state institutions to provide security, unemployment, and lack of education could curb radicalization in the long term. But the recent attack in Jakarta has just provided solid evidence that ISIS has already reached Southeast Asia and may intend to carry more attacks. The Philippines is not exempted from this. In the short term, governments should avoid being complacent with ISIS’s waning power in the Middle East. Instead, there should be focus on improving political and socioeconomic conditions from which radicalization stems in the first place and be cautious in employing counterterrorist measures so as to avoid provoking intensified retaliatory attacks.

About the authors:

***Maria Anna Rowena Luz G. Layador** is the Chief Foreign Affairs Research Specialist of the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service Institute. Ms. Layador can be reached at mglayador@fsi.gov.ph

***Andrea Kristine G. Molina** is a Foreign Affairs Research Specialist with the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service Institute. Ms. Molina can be reached at akgmolina@fsi.gov.ph

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Notes:

1 “Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria”, UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, 14 November 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/HRC_CRP_ISIS_14Nov2014.pdf (accessed 1 September 2015).

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<http://www.eurasiareview.com/13032016-transnational-radicalism-a-global-islamic-state-analysis/>

Time for transparency in overseas military aid and financing

March 07, 2016, 06:00 am



The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has gained a 150-mile stretch of the Libyan coastline. The head of U.S. Special Operations in Africa has called for America to train and equip Libyan troops to root these terrorists out. But will it work? The track record suggests not. And that presents a much bigger problem than ISIS alone.

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The U.S. can't be everywhere at once: We need a way to build partners overseas who can tackle military problems on their own. Therefore, since 9/11, Congress has increased the authorities and programs under which the Department of Defense (DOD) can engage other militaries. It's time to start tracking that money and evaluating what's working, and what's not.

The DOD now spends between \$8 billion and \$10 billion a year on scores of separate programs — atop the money already spent by the State Department, which formerly controlled all of our overseas military aid and financing. Altogether, these programs are costing taxpayers around \$20 billion annually. But even the amounts are opaque, and none of the effects are known. While the DOD has fought every attempt to evaluate the efficacy of these programs, studying some of the more high profile attempts is sobering.

After spending \$25 billion and nearly a decade, U.S. attempts to train and equip Iraqi troops ended with a whimper when those soldiers melted away the moment ISIS attacks first began a few years ago. The U.S. training mission in Mali was heralded — until some of those we trained backed a coup and partnered with al Qaeda in the Sahel. Saudi Arabia, a major recipient of U.S. military training and equipment for

decades, is mired in a war with little Yemen that is only getting worse. Burundi, also a recipient of U.S. military aid, threatened to turn its police on its own people, using the same code words that unleashed the genocide in neighboring Rwanda.

Why do we keep getting it wrong?

I've spent the last three years traveling to every settled continent to study countries that succeeded in freeing themselves from extreme, compounded violence such as what we face in Iraq, Libya or Yemen today. The lessons were clear.

Conventional wisdom assumes that countries facing extreme internal violence from terrorists, militias and other armed groups are simply too weak to fight back. The U.S. solution is to "build partner capacity" through training and providing equipment.

But the diagnosis is wrong. In the vast majority of countries facing extreme internal violence, like Iraq or Yemen, the problem is not weakness; it is government illegitimacy. These governments don't serve all their citizens: They are perceived as privileging a few. Their corruption renders their security services ineffective and disgruntled. Often, security services act as a praetorian guard to cut some countrymen out of their piece of the pie.

It shouldn't be a surprise that, faced with a brutal and corrupt government they can't trust, citizens turn to violent groups for succor — as Sunni Iraqis turned to ISIS. In other cases, well-trained militaries see themselves as more professional than the venal politicians, and launch a coup, as in Mali.

But it's a surprise to us. Over and over again, we provide training and equipment to governments, believing that they are just too weak to fight well. Most of our military assistance is focused narrowly on tactics and trigger pullers. Only two tiny Pentagon programs, known as DIRI (Defense Institutional Reform Initiative) and MODA (Ministry of Defense Advisers), even try to address the problems of legitimacy that are the way to fight violence.

In Colombia, the U.S. military believes it got things right: Plan Colombia was expensive, but it is credited with transforming Colombia from a near-failed state to a tourist destination today. But the popular story leaves a lot out. The U.S. provided military training and aid to Colombia off and on from the mid-1960s. It took more than 30 years, skyrocketing guerrilla recruitment, a new constitution and the disbandment of a deep well of corruption between parliamentarians and paramilitaries before Colombians created a government legitimate enough to use U.S. aid well.

The U.S. gives military aid and training to over 180 countries each year. We need it to work. It's time to require the DOD and State Department to measure and evaluate these programs, and learn from what worked, so that we can stop engaging in failed strategies and start succeeding.

This piece has been corrected on Monday, March 7, 2016 at 10:50 a.m.

Kleinfeld is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, whose next book is about countries that succeeded in ending extreme violence.

<http://thehill.com/>

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