

AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الإفريقي



UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

CAERT, B.P 141 Bureau Poste El-Mohammadia Alger, Algérie, Tel +213 21 520 1 10 Fax +213 21 5203 78
Email : admin@caert.org.dz

ACSRT / CAERT

African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism

Terrorism

Bi-weekly Press Review

1 - 15 July 2015

Review no. 96



Press Review
1—15 July 2015

Table of Contents

	Pages
African Union	
- The African Union strongly condemns the terrorist attack that took place in Cameroon	4
- L'Union africaine condamne énergiquement l'attentat terroriste au Cameroun	6
Terrorism in Africa	
- A la Une: le terrorisme frappe encore en Afrique	8
Chad	
- Un arsenal attribué à Boko Haram découvert à Ndjamena	11
Côte d'Ivoire	
- Advancing Islamist Militant Attacks Put Ivory Coast on Alert	13
Egypt	
- The Egypt bombing wave: Why did ISIS now pick Italy?	15
- Egypte : la loi antiterrorisme contre la liberté de la presse	17
Kenya	
- Islamic Radicalization In Kenya – Analysis	20
Libya	
- Why Arabs must resolve the Libya and Yemen crises now	30
Mali	
- Lutte contre le terrorisme au Mali: Pourquoi la vigilance s'impose face aux manœuvres du Quai d'Orsay	35
Mozambique	
- Dhlakama Again Threatens to Rule "by Force"	38
Nigeria	
- Extrême-Nord: le ramadan sous le signe du couvre-feu	40
- 5 Key Issues Concerning Nigerian Welfare Benefit System	43
- The Point in Terrorism We Are Missing	46
Tunisia	
- Face au terrorisme, la Tunisie entame un virage sécuritaire délicat	48
- Pourquoi la jeunesse est-elle si perméable aux sirènes salafistes ?	51
- Lutte contre le terrorisme - Pourvu qu'ils ne passent pas au plan C	55

International Organizations

- Towards More Effective Global Security Governance Through UN@EU Cooperation – Analysis 57

Terrorism in the World

- Arab political thought must overcome ambiguity 65

France

- Lutte contre une dérive sectaire 68
- Lettres au Monde de Monsieur et Madame toulemonde, après Charlie 70

Iraq

- Here's The ISIS Recruitment Hub You Aren't Hearing About 78
- ISIS A Response To Conditions Where State Has Collapsed, MGIMO Expert Says 81
- To Defeat Daesh Start with Their Strategy 83
- Is the July 4th terror threat hyped? 85
- Abandon 'recent-ism' in fighting ISIS 88

United Kingdom

- How young will help us defeat radicalisation of their peers 92
- Opinion: The Terrorist Challenge—Understanding and Misunderstanding 95

USA

- Obama's counterterrorism policy facing mounting criticism 98

Yemen

- War Without Mercy in Yemen. US Engineered Humanitarian Crisis 102

African Union

The African Union strongly condemns the terrorist attack that took place yesterday in Cameroon



Addis Ababa, 14 July 2015: The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, strongly condemns the terrorist attack perpetrated yesterday in Fotokol, northern Cameroon, causing the death of more than a dozen people and wounding several others. She expresses the AU's full solidarity with the people and Government of Cameroon, conveys her condolences to the bereaved families and wishes speedy recovery to all the injured.

The Chairperson of the Commission stresses that this terrorist act and the attacks perpetrated recently in Chad, Niger and Nigeria, are a tragic illustration of the fact that in spite of the significant progress made in the fight against the Boko Haram terrorist group, there are still many challenges to be addressed. In this context, the Chairperson of the Commission encourages the member countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Benin to strengthen their efforts aimed at fully operationalizing the Multinational Joint Task Force joint (MNJTF) mandated to eliminate the Boko Haram terrorist group. She reaffirms the AU's commitment to continue working closely with the countries of the region to attain the agreed objectives, and

assures them of the AU's continued solidarity.

The Chairperson of the Commission reiterates the AU's call to the other Member States and to the international partners to provide all the necessary financial and logistical assistance in support of the efforts of the countries of the region. More generally, she, once again, emphasizes the need for all Member States to make renewed efforts to address the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. In this regard, particular emphasis should be placed on the signature and ratification of the relevant AU instruments by the countries that have not yet done so, as well as on the effective implementation of measures contained therein, including exchange of information and intelligence and operational coordination.

L'Union africaine condamne énergiquement l'attentat terroriste qui a eu lieu hier au Cameroun



Addis Abéba, le 14 juillet 2015: La Présidente de la Commission de l'Union africaine (UA), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, condamne fermement l'attentat terroriste intervenu hier dans la localité de Fotokol, au nord du Cameroun, causant la mort de plus d'une dizaine de personnes et blessant plusieurs autres. Elle exprime la pleine solidarité de l'UA avec le peuple et le Gouvernement camerounais, présente ses condoléances aux familles éplorées et souhaite prompt rétablissement à tous les blessés.

La Présidente de la Commission souligne que cet attentat et les attaques récemment perpétrées au Niger, au Nigeria et au Tchad sont une illustration tragique du fait qu'en dépit des avancées significatives enregistrées dans la lutte contre le groupe terroriste Boko Haram, de nombreux défis restent à surmonter. Dans ce contexte, la Présidente de la Commission encourage les pays membres de la Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad (CBLT) et le Bénin à renforcer les efforts qu'ils ont engagés pour rendre pleinement opérationnelle la Force multinationale mixte (FMM) mise en place pour éliminer le groupe terroriste Boko Haram. Elle réaffirme l'engagement de l'UA à continuer à travailler étroitement avec les pays de la région pour atteindre les objectifs fixés, et les assure de la solidarité constante de l'UA.

La Présidente de la Commission réitère l'appel de l'UA aux autres États membres et aux partenaires internationaux pour qu'ils apportent tout le soutien financier et logistique nécessaire en appui aux efforts des pays de la région. D'une façon plus générale, elle souligne encore une fois la nécessité pour l'ensemble des États membres de déployer des efforts renouvelés pour faire face au fléau du terrorisme et de l'extrémisme violent en Afrique. À cet égard, un accent particulier devrait être mis sur la signature et la ratification par les pays qui ne l'ont pas encore fait des instruments pertinents de l'UA, ainsi que sur la mise en œuvre effective des mesures qui y sont contenues, y compris en ce qui concerne l'échange d'informations et de renseignements et la coordination opérationnelle.

Terrorism in Africa

A la Une: le terrorisme frappe encore en Afrique

30 juin 2015



« Le septentrion malien récupéré des mains de ses occupants islamistes et Boko Haram fortement amoché par la troïka tchado-nigéro-camerounaise, on pensait que le continent africain bénéficierait d'un petit répit, relève le site guinéen Ledjely.com. C'était sans compter la détermination et l'envie irrésistible de semer la désolation et de verser le sang qui anime des terroristes aujourd'hui pilotés par l'Etat Islamique. En Tunisie vendredi dernier, au Tchad très tôt hier et en Egypte un peu plus tard dans la journée, les islamistes semblent avoir voulu démontrer que leur capacité de nuisance n'est nullement affectée. »

Pour ce qui est du Tchad, hier lundi, donc, relate *L'Observateur Paalga* au Burkina, « un nouvel attentat a fait dans un quartier de N'Djamena onze morts : cinq policiers et six terroristes présumés. Aux environs de 7 heures, une unité de la police effectue une descente dans une concession où, selon des informations, serait installé un groupe d'individus suspects. Au cours de l'opération, une forte détonation, due à l'activation d'une ceinture explosive, se fait entendre, tuant donc terroristes et policiers. Cette attaque intervient deux semaines, jour pour jour, après le double attentat toujours à N'Djamena contre un commissariat central et une école de police et dont le bilan s'est établi à au moins une trentaine de morts et une centaine de blessés. »

Commentaire de *L'Observateur* : « ainsi donc, le ver est dans le fruit. Par l'entremise d'une cellule dormante, qui vient d'être activée, la secte islamique Boko Haram s'est implantée au Tchad. Une funeste stratégie visant sans nul doute à faire la nique au président Idriss Deby dont l'intervention est décisive dans la traque conjointe contre Abubakar Shekau et sa bande dans la zone du Bassin du lac Tchad. »

« Le ver est déjà dans le fruit, insiste également *Le Pays* au Burkina. L'en extirper est devenu maintenant un devoir pour les forces de défense et de sécurité du pays. Mais

c'est plus facile à dire qu'à faire. Car, s'interroge le journal, comment traquer et neutraliser efficacement des individus endoctrinés et prêts à aller jusqu'au sacrifice suprême ? Comment stopper ces islamistes aveuglés, qui croient aller au paradis en accomplissant leurs basses besognes ? C'est là une tâche herculéenne. Face à de tels extrémistes, aucune armée n'est suffisamment préparée. Il suffit de regarder les difficultés de l'armée américaine et des pays alliés des Etats-Unis en Afghanistan, pour se convaincre des difficultés qui entourent cette guerre asymétrique. L'ennemi se fond dans la foule des innocents pour jaillir au moment opportun, et frapper de toutes ses forces dans le tas, avant de s'évanouir dans la nature. »

Des élections à quel prix ?

A la Une également, les élections locales au Burundi... « *Bujumbura, ville fantôme* », hier, relate le site d'information de l'hebdomadaire burundais *Iwacu*. « *La ville était quadrillée, il n'y avait que des policiers et des militaires qui circulaient avec une présence renforcée dans les bureaux de vote notamment à l'Athénée primaire, à la place de l'Indépendance, à la place de la Révolution et à l'ancien marché central.* » « *Le président Pierre Nkurunziza voulaient 'ses' élections législatives et municipales, en ce jour du 29 juin. Finalement, il les a eu, soupire Guinée Conakry Infos, mais à quel prix ? Un vote à deux visages : celui du boycott et de la relative participation.* » Et le site guinéen de s'interroger : « *à quoi finalement vont servir ces élections, sinon qu'à légitimer, d'une manière toute relative, un régime aux abois, droit dans ses bottes, un président armé mais isolé, dont l'aveuglement et l'entêtement politiques feront encore des dégâts.* »

Beaucoup de questions aussi pour le quotidien *Aujourd'hui* au Burkina : « *que fera-t-on d'élections dont les résultats sont jugés déjà peu crédibles par le commun des mortels, parce que marqués dans des conditions qui ne garantissent pas la transparence ? Le nouveau médiateur pour le Burundi Abdoulaye Bathily a été clair : ces scrutins sont tout sauf crédible. Les députés qui siègeront dans la future Assemblée nationale pourront-ils affirmer agir au nom du peuple, sans éprouver quelque gêne ? (...)* Ces élections tronquées sont l'antichambre de la présidentielle du 15 juillet prochain, pointe encore *Aujourd'hui*. Solitaire, Nkurunziza ira à cette élection, et seul il sera élu, mais par combien de Burundais ? Sans doute, un corps électoral famélique. »

Enfin, *Le Soleil* à Dakar ne prédit pas un grand avenir au président burundais : « *il ne reste au jusqu'au-boutiste que la fuite en avant pour s'éloigner du périmètre de la justice internationale en se maintenant sur le +trône+. L'après-pouvoir, pour un chef d'Etat dans le viseur du droit international, est une perspective plus intimidante que l'isolement dans la gestion du pouvoir. Il y a bien longtemps que ses collaborateurs, qui veulent garder leur honorabilité, ont libéré leur conscience en quittant ce bateau fou, relève encore *Le Soleil*. Ils n'ont pas attendu le tiers de tour de la présidentielle que représentent les législatives. Eux, ont compris en un quart de tour la grosse menace sur leur démocratie ! »*

<http://www.rfi.fr/emission/>

Tchad

Un arsenal attribué à Boko Haram découvert à Ndjamena

03-07-2015



Des ceintures d'explosifs avaient déjà été découvertes dans une maison de membres présumés du groupe Boko Haram, pris d'assaut par les forces de sécurité tchadiennes le lundi 29 juin 2015. AFP PHOTO / BRAHIM ADJI

Deux semaines après les attentats-suicides commis à Ndjamena, le 15 juin dernier, les forces de sécurité tchadienne ont découvert une cache d'armes destinées à Boko Haram. Obus, roquettes et munitions de Kalachnikov étaient cachés dans une maison occupée par des membres présumés du groupe d'Abubakar Shekau.

L'enquête progresse sur les deux attentats-suicides simultanés qui ont **ensanglanté la capitale tchadienne**, le 15 juin dernier, tuant 36 personnes en plus des trois kamikazes et en blessant une centaine d'autres.

Une cache d'armes a été découverte jeudi dans l'une des maisons de Ndjamena où les forces de sécurité ont lancé une opération dans la soirée de **dimanche 28 et dans la matinée de lundi 29 juin**. des opérations lors desquelles les services tchadiens ont fait face à de fortes résistances, se soldant par la mort de onze personnes, dont cinq policiers. Plusieurs membres présumés du groupe islamiste Boko Haram avaient alors été arrêtés. Des ceintures munies d'explosifs avaient également été découvertes, ainsi que des cartes SIM de téléphones mobiles.

Munitions et faux papiers

Cette fois, ce sont des obus de mortier, des roquettes, des chargeurs de Kalachnikov pleins et des caisses de cartouches de canons qui ont été découverts dans la cour de

la maison. Un véritable arsenal de guerre - de quoi mettre en déroute tout un régiment - enfoui dans le sol. Des faux papiers ont aussi été retrouvés, notamment ceux d'un cultivateur originaire de Fotokol, qui porte le nom de « Moussa Oumar » sur sa carte d'identité nationale du Cameroun. Dans le permis qu'il est parvenu à se faire délivrer au Tchad, il s'appelle plutôt « Moussa Marou », et se déclare chauffeur.

Même si l'enquête n'est pas encore terminée, plusieurs questions sont déjà soulevées : D'où viennent les armes ? Comment les terroristes ont-ils pu en acheter autant ? Y a-t-il d'autres caches d'armes qui n'ont pas encore été découvertes ?

Jusqu'à maintenant, le groupe Boko Haram n'a pas revendiqué les attentats du 15 juin à Ndjamena, mais pour les autorités tchadiennes, c'est bien le groupe islamiste armé qui est à l'origine de l'attaque. Une analyse partagée par de nombreux spécialistes, notamment Martin Ewi, chercheur à l'Institut d'études stratégiques de Pretoria, qui juge qu'*« il n'y a pas de doute que cet acte ait été perpétré par Boko Haram. Dans la région, il n'y a aucun groupe qui a ces capacités d'avoir des engins de fabrication d'explosifs »*.

<http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/>

Côte d'Ivoire

Advancing Islamist Militant Attacks Put Ivory Coast on Alert

July 2, 2015



French and Malian soldiers on patrol in Timbuktu as part of the anti-terrorist operation in the Sahel on June 6, 2015.

Ivory Coast is the latest West African nation that's concerned it may become a target of Islamist militants in the region.

The world's top cocoa producer dispatched security forces to its northern border after an attack by suspected militants on the southern Malian town of Fakola, 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) north of Ivory Coast, on Sunday. That followed a June 10 raid on the nearby town of Misseni that killed one Malian soldier.

"In the past year, Ivory Coast has become an increasingly attractive target as it has stepped up its commitment to fighting regional terrorism," Maja Bovcon, senior Africa analyst at risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft, said Tuesday in an e-mailed response to questions.

Ivory Coast, whose \$31 billion economy is the largest in Francophone West Africa, provides a logistics base for France's Operation Barkhane, a 3,000-member force to battle militants in the western Sahel. So far it has avoided attacks that have struck Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Mali. Islamic State's gains in Libya are heightening concern the region's militant movements may coalesce behind its leadership and expand their targets.

“We have to prevent any infiltration, any contagion of this phenomenon in our country,” Ivorian Defense Minister Paul Koffi Koffi said Tuesday by phone. “It’s an alert. It’s in our interest to look at it very closely.”

Ivory Coast and Mali are discussing the possibility of setting up a joint force along their border, government spokesman Bruno Kone told reporters Tuesday in Abidjan. He described the militant threat as “close and imminent.”

‘Allahu Akbar’

During the attack on Misseni, militants brandished automatic weapons and shouted “Allahu Akbar,” an Arabic phrase meaning “God is great,” before planting a flag of the Islamist group, Ansar al-Dine, General Mamadou Lamine Ballo, secretary-general to the Malian ministry of defense, said in a June 10 e-mailed statement.

Ivory Coast lawmakers are scheduled to vote Friday on new anti-terrorism legislation to give the government greater powers, such as the use of phone tapping, to track suspected militant networks in the country, said Pierre Gaho Oulata, the head of the National Assembly’s Security and Defense Commission.

“The threat is there and closer to our border,” he said by phone Tuesday. “It is real.”

Ivory Coast, which is recovering from violence that left 3,000 people dead after disputed elections in 2010, needs to keep a close eye on its young former fighters to ensure they don’t join Islamist militant groups, Oulata said.

Mali Attacks

Neighboring Mali has been rocked by militant attacks since the overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi in 2011 flooded the Sahel region with looted weapons. While France and the United Nations sent troops to Mali in 2013 to regain control of the north after Islamists invaded the area and fought alongside separatists, sporadic attacks continue.

Six UN peacekeepers were killed and five severely wounded in an attack early Thursday between Timbuktu and Goundam in northern Mali, the UN mission in the country said in a statement.

In the past few months, Mali has been hit by attacks from Islamist militants targeting its central and southern areas. In March, an attack at a restaurant in Bamako, the first deadly assault in the capital, left five people dead.

Southern Attacks

The government and the main separatist rebels in northern Mali last month signed a peace agreement after months of negotiations mediated by Algeria. The accord may limit the Islamist militants’ operational space in the north.

Islamist militants probably carried out the recent attacks in the south near Ivory

Coast's border, according to a June 19 note from the London-based risk analysis group Control Risks, to "demonstrate an increased geographical reach."

"The recent attacks in Misseni and Fakola signal the emergence of a local militant cell intent on targeting symbols of state authority," said Control Risks associate analyst Vincent Rouget. "However, it appears to lack sophistication and extensive local support, and its operational reach is likely to remain limited."

<http://www.bloomberg.com/>

Egypt

The Egypt bombing wave: Why did ISIS now pick Italy?

12 July 2015

Yesterday, an explosion outside the nearly empty Italian Consulate in Cairo killed one person and injured seven. It's the first major bombing of a foreign diplomatic mission since the upswing in attacks against the Egyptian government since June 2014 when Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was elected to the presidency.

Many suggest the rise in attacks against the Egyptian state is mainly part of the ISIS project for Egypt.

In Egypt, the ISIS's Sinai Province formerly (Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis) is a hub of ISIS activity. But it is important to note that the cult-like ability for ISIS to recruit sympathizers and lone wolves may be strong in Egypt. An Egyptian official told me that ISIS is attracting more and more disenchanted Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) sympathizers. In other words, the nexus between ISIS as a Sunni extremist group and the Ikhwan is growing stronger to the point that the Brotherhood's revolutionary stance of violence could be matching ISIS's violent goals. That's dangerous. Thus, the attack on the Italian consulate, claimed by ISIS, is symptomatic of the current ISIS program for Egypt.

Let's face the truth: ISIS in Egypt is on a roll. For all the violence against Egyptian military personnel and police officers killed in the past year, we need to think about how ISIS in Egypt is hijacking the agenda of other Islamist militants not caught up in security sweeps. Recent attacks also have the hallmark of ISIS including Egypt's most popular tourist destinations, including the **Karnak Temple in Luxor**, threatening a pillar of the country's economy. On social media, some ISIS members say they are gunning for the Sphinx and the Pyramids of Giza. It is highly recommended to take their threats seriously.

This month's offensive by ISIS in Egypt mirrored **the attacks on France, Tunisia, and Kuwait on the 9th day of Ramadan**. Almost simultaneously, an obscure Giza Popular Resistance claimed the killing of Egyptian Prosecutor-General Hisham Barakat. A few hours before the targeted killing, Sinai Province, the local appendage of the ISIS "Caliphate" in the Levant, released a video titled "The Liquidation of Judges" which I believe served as a justification for the upcoming assassination. Simultaneously, hundreds of ISIS militants from Sinai Province attacked up to 15 Egyptian military sites in Northern Sinai including the urban area of Sheikh Zuweid and Rafah with dozens of Egyptian soldiers dead. The ISIS militants used a wide range of weapons, deploying an arsenal of rocket-propelled grenades, Kornet anti-tank guided missiles, and mortars in synchronization with roadside improvised explosive devices.

Why Italy?

Egyptian President Al-Sisi visited Italy last November. Sisi also visited Pope Francis to restore relations between al-Azhar and the Vatican. In addition, Italy's Prime Minister Matteo Renzi stated strongly that the country is seeking to build a strong defense and military relationship with Egypt because of the threat from Islamic extremists, specifically ISIS and al-Qaeda franchises. Renzi **argued** that "Italy is absolutely convinced that the Mediterranean is not the frontier but the heart of Europe, and Egypt must be considered a strategic partner in addressing together the problems of this area. The only way to avoid an escalation of them is through very strong cooperation between Egypt and Europe." Let's be clear that the primary point of impact of the Libyan situation in Europe is Italy. Italy has borne the brunt of Libyan refugees and the political fallout regarding this refugees is affecting the country's security. Perhaps ISIS and its minions see the Italian consulate as a simple statement of what comes next.

In regard to Italian targets, we need to recall ISIS's gruesome February 2014 "A Message Signed in Blood to the Nation of the Cross" when 21 Egyptian Copts were executed on a Libyan beach. It is well known that ISIS in Libya through the Derna, Sirte and affiliated Vilayet system are connected to extremists who use Western Egypt as a transit zone for weapons across North Africa. Sinai Province, demonstrating their reach, has launched attacks in this area before against Egyptian forces over the past year.

Italy is also helping Egypt in monitoring the situation in Libya through intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Italy may also be a target because of the Tripoli-based Libya Dawn-ISIS connection in turning a blind eye to that government's activity in migrant smuggling to southern Europe. Recently, an EU official recently announced that **ISIS are using these migrant routes to send its adherents to Europe.**

The key issue is now how the Egyptian government contends with the ISIS threat in the coming months. Clearly, the Egyptian air force responding with F-16 fighter jets and Apache helicopters following the Northern Sinai attack were robust and halted the onslaught. Egypt's use of its military assets is known against the so-called Derna Province in Libya. But the response is just that: a response, not mitigation.

Attacks on foreign national interests in Egypt by ISIS and their allies cannot become a norm.

Dr. Theodore Karasik

Clearly, Egyptian national security is being challenged by ISIS. The requirements to protect not only Cairo but other urban areas – including infrastructure and tourism sectors - are critical. But the Egyptian government needs to be more alert to the gaps that ISIS – as a cult – can fill in rural areas, particularly the Upper Nile. The key question is whether ISIS activity in Egypt will push Sisi to launch a campaign with the To-

brook government in Libya to clean up the militant threat together. Perhaps that time is now here.

Warning signs

The other issue is what to do about the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt's security policy needs revamping to tear down the ISIS Province that Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis established. Sinai Province launched the exact same attack on January 28, 2015, when the deviants carried out multiple, simultaneous attacks against Egyptian security forces in the vicinity of El Arish, Sheikh Zuweid and Rafah. In between the two attacks of January and July, didn't the Egyptian government learn what to expect from ISIS?

Apparently not. This fact is why Egyptian security forces need to be augmented for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations. Sisi needs to become more aggressive with the extremists on their territory in the coming days and months, including weaving the right counter voices in social media and the Egyptian press.

These repeated attacks throughout Egypt do not bode well for the country's future unless clear adjustments are made to the government's strategic and tactics. Attacks on foreign national interests in Egypt by ISIS and their allies cannot become a norm.

Dr. Theodore Karasik is a Gulf-based analyst of regional geo-political affairs. He received his Ph.D in History from UCLA in Los Angeles, California in four fields: Middle East, Russia, Caucasus, and a specialized sub-field in Cultural Anthropology focusing on tribes and clans.

<http://english.alarabiya.net/>

Egypte : la loi antiterrorisme contre la liberté de la presse

En gros, cette loi antiterroriste en Egypte interdit les journalistes de publier des informations qui ne sont pas de la propagande gouvernementale.



(Agence Ecofin) – En Egypte, le gouvernement va rediscuter le projet de loi antiterrorisme qui est très critiqué par le Syndicat des journalistes égyptiens. En effet, la presse craint pour sa liberté avec ce nouveau texte.

Selon le projet de loi, le journaliste risque la déportation, l'assignation à résidence et au moins 2 ans de prison s'il publie « *de fausses informations sur des attaques terroristes qui contredisent les communiqués officiels* ». Par ailleurs, une peine de 5 ans d'emprisonnement est prévue en cas d'utilisation des réseaux sociaux pour faire la promotion du « *terrorisme* ».

En Egypte, les journalistes dénoncent le texte qui, selon eux, ouvre la porte au contrôle juridique de leur travail. Pour le syndicat de la presse, il s'agit d'un « *recul clair de la liberté d'opinion, de diffusion et d'expression* », ainsi que d'une « *une censure du droit du journaliste à obtenir l'information de ses différentes sources* ». L'organisation Reporters sans frontières a également condamné le projet de loi.

Le ministre égyptien de la Justice, Ahmed al-Zind, a justifié ces dispositions en faisant référence à la couverture médiatique des attaques terroristes du 1er juillet dernier contre l'armée dans la péninsule du Sinaï. Il reproche aux médias d'avoir ignoré le bilan officiel de 21 soldats tués, pour avancer des chiffres plus importants donnés pas des sources sécuritaires.

Le Conseil suprême de la justice a lu le projet de loi. Tout juste a-t-il demandé la création de tribunaux spéciaux pour juger les affaires de terrorisme. Une fois que le texte sera réexaminé par le gouvernement, il entrera en vigueur après sa signature par le président de la République, Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, car l’Egypte ne dispose toujours pas de son Parlement, élu depuis 2 ans pourtant.

<http://actualite.housseniawriting.com/>

Kenya

Islamic Radicalization In Kenya – Analysis

July 12, 2015



Smoke over Nairobi, Kenya Westgate shopping mall on 23 September 2013.

In September 2013, an attack carried out by the al Qaeda–affiliated terrorist group al-Shabaab on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, drew renewed attention to the extremist threat facing that country. At least four attackers left more than 65 people dead after a multiday rampage. All four of the known assailants were Somalis who had been living in the Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh, known for its large Somali ex-patriot population. Four other Somalis have been charged with helping to plan the operation, two of whom had Kenyan citizenship and identification cards.¹ This attack was only the latest in a string of terrorist incidents stretching back to the late 1990s. It should serve as a stark reminder to the United States that terrorism remains a significant threat to its national interests in Kenya specifically and in the Horn of Africa more generally.

The first major terrorist attack to hit Kenya occurred at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi on August 7, 1998. This attack was carried out with a truck bomb, killing 214 people and injuring more than 5,000. On November 22, 2002, another set of attacks included the detonation of a truck bomb at an Israeli-owned resort and the launching of missiles at an Israeli-chartered aircraft leaving the airport in Mombasa. Sixteen Israelis and Kenyans were killed in the blast at the hotel, though no one was killed in the attack on the plane. Al Qaeda was responsible for each of these attacks.²

Since those early attacks, the government of Kenya has become an important strategic partner in the U.S. Government’s counterterrorism efforts in the broader Horn of Africa region. In October 2011, the Kenyan Defense Forces launched an offensive

against al-Shabaab called Operation Linda Nchi (OLN)—Swahili for “protect the nation”—in Somalia. While OLN enjoyed the approval of most Kenyans, it also prompted criticism from Kenyan Muslim communities.

In 2012, Kenya passed a tough antiterrorism bill called the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012. Though the passage of this bill was not as controversial as some earlier iterations, it still elicited criticism from Kenyan human rights and Muslim groups. In addition, riots blaming the Kenyan police for the extrajudicial killing of al-Shabaab-linked Muslim Youth Center (MYC) cleric Aboud Rogo³ and the growing activity of the MYC are indicative of increased Islamic radicalism in Kenya. This presents a substantial risk of terrorism against the Kenyan government, Western targets in Kenya, and neighboring countries in the region.

This article explores the development of radicalization in Kenya in recent decades and the sociocultural and political factors that have undergirded it. Additionally, it highlights four general factors influencing the rising threat of Islamic radicalism in Kenya: institutional weaknesses; increasingly acute grievances by the Muslim minority; the establishment of Wahhabi and other extremist forms of Islam in Kenya, along with attendant jihadi ideology and propaganda; and Kenya’s foreign and military policy, particularly as it pertains to Somalia.

Islam in Kenya

Approximately 4.3 million Muslims comprise a little more than 10 percent of the overall Kenyan population and about 30 percent of the coastal population.⁴ Large concentrations of Kenyan Muslims live in Coast Province, North East Province, and the capital city of Nairobi, particularly in the neighborhood of Eastleigh. Ethnically, Kenya’s Muslims are primarily Swahili or Somali, although there are also sizable Arab and Asian (predominantly Indian and Pakistani) groups.⁵

In addition to ethnic divisions among Kenya’s Muslims, there are also key differences in the types of Islam practiced. Scholar Bjørn Møller writes that the Kenyan Muslim community can be categorized as follows:

a majority of indigenous Kenyan Muslims belong to Sufi orders, especially in rural areas

reformists, more conservative Islamists, are another primary grouping, mainly in the cities and among Arabs

a small sect called the Ahmadiya, which was responsible for the first translation of the Koran into Kiswahili, probably numbers no more than a few thousand

mainstream Sunni Muslims, mainly among Asians

a small number of Shi’ites, also mainly among Asians.⁶

Muslims settled on Pate Island (part of the Lamu archipelago in Coast Province) as early as the 8th century. This presence grew considerably during the 12th century as

trade increased in the Indian Ocean in general and along the coast of East Africa in particular. The earliest Muslim settlers came primarily from what are now Oman, Yemen, and Iran, establishing communities along the Somali coast, Lamu, Mombasa, Zanzibar, and other coastal areas of East Africa.

As these settlers intermarried with each other and with local people, Swahili culture evolved over time. Islam became the core of Swahili culture, but the culture was also influenced by many traditional aspects of indigenous African religious beliefs.⁷ Lamu and Mombasa became the primary areas of Islamic learning and scholarship in Kenya.⁸ Swahili culture and Islam remained largely confined to the coastal areas where trade flourished, though Islam eventually established a foothold in the capital city of Nairobi as well.⁹ Among some of the settlers, particularly in Lamu, were sayyids, descendants of the Prophet Mohammad.¹⁰ Traditionally granted great authority within the Muslim community, that authority came to be challenged during the 20th century and remains an area of contention between different Muslim groups today.

During the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, the territories that make up Kenya today were colonized by the British Empire. The interior of the country was chartered to the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1888, became a formal protectorate in 1895, and a colony in 1920. The Muslim coastal area remained a protectorate but was administered in the same fashion as was the colony, meaning there was little practical difference.¹¹

Administratively, the British categorized people as either native or nonnative, providing different privileges to each, with nonnative receiving preferential treatment. Swahilis did not fit easily into either of those categories. As Jeremy Prestholdt points out, “most occupied the awkward position of having neither a recognized African ‘tribal’ identity nor the higher legal status of Non-Native. By the end of the colonial era, this nebulous position contributed to perceptions of Swahilis as neither completely African nor, by extension, Kenyan.”¹² The legacy of that division remains today as many contemporary Kenyans continue to see Muslims more as foreigners than as true Kenyans.

Another colonial practice that served to split Muslims from the larger society was the introduction and special treatment of Christianity. Abdalla Bujra explains that Christianity came to predominate in Kenya, and Western culture generally developed preeminence through the school system and through examples set by colonial officials and British settlers. Kenya’s Muslims became culturally isolated as the Christian Church and Western educational system became established in the rest of the country.¹³ Not only was Christianity privileged, but Islam was also denigrated. Bujra notes that “through Church activities and education, and later through the colonial education and media, both Church, Colonial Administration, and the European settler communities propagated very strong anti-Arab and anti-Islamic misinformation and propaganda. Hence Swahili/Arab political influences essentially came to

a halt in [Kenya].”¹⁴ This political disenfranchisement has never been remedied and remains a major grievance of Kenya’s Muslims to this day.

The political disenfranchisement of Kenya’s Muslims continued after Kenya’s independence in 1963. The Kenyan African National Union (KANU) immediately came to power and instituted one-party rule. KANU, strongly linked to Christian ethnic groups, was perceived as benefiting those groups disproportionately while largely ignoring problems specific to Muslims.¹⁵ Due to their marginalization in the political process and consequential lack of influence in Kenyan politics, dissent grew among Muslims. Immediately upon Kenyan independence, the Mwambao United Front movement emerged in Kenya’s coastal communities calling for the autonomy of the coastal strip of Kenya. This was seen by some Kenyan Muslims as the only way to achieve a political system that honored their religious beliefs.¹⁶ Today the Mombasa Republican Council has taken up this cause and has attracted significant support.

Other Swahilis attempted to use the more traditional political route by establishing the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) in 1992. However, explicitly religious parties are illegal in Kenya, and the IPK was denied formal political participation. The IPK complained that all existent Kenyan political parties are, if not in name at least in fact, Christian oriented and led by Christians.¹⁷ The rejection of the IPK as a legitimate political party has been perceived by many Muslims as another form of political alienation and as a deliberate suppression of Muslims’ ability to express their views through the political process.

In addition, many of Kenya’s Muslims perceived themselves as being excluded from employment opportunities available to other Kenyans. This was especially the case as Kenyans from the interior of the country began to buy property along the coast during the burgeoning tourist industry. Seeing little opportunity for themselves in Kenya, many Muslims traveled abroad to the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, for work. Authors Esha Faki Mwinyihaji and Frederick O. Wanyama note that:

The employment sector was seen as closed to many Muslims. As a result of the oil boom in the 1970s and 1980s, many young Muslims went to work as expatriates in Saudi Arabia where the remuneration was good with the minimal education they had. For almost two decades Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf served as a safe haven for some Kenyan Muslims to work and progress economically.¹⁸

One of the impacts of greater exposure to the Middle East—and Saudi Arabia in particular—was the introduction of stricter interpretations of Islam by Kenyan Muslims returning home. This provoked a conflict between older Swahili interpretations of Islam that incorporated elements of indigenous African religions and practices imported from the Middle East. This schism was also generated by Kenyan students who completed their studies in the Middle East. In so doing, they adopted stricter religious practices, which they brought back with them to their

communities.¹⁹ According to Kai Kresse:

Proficient in Arabic, the graduates returned with university degrees and the reformist doctrines of their respective host institutions, which were more radical and combative in tone and content. They applied these ideas to the East African context in their teachings and public speeches, thus radicalizing reformist discourse and polarizing Islamic debate more and more.²⁰

An individual named Sheikh Muhammed Khasim was especially influential along the Swahili coast.²¹ Khasim was most active during the 1960s and 1970s and argued that traditional Swahili Islam included impermissible *bid'a* (innovation in religious matters) and *shirk* (violating the principle of the unity of God) due to the influences of indigenous religions.²² He sought to purify Kenyan Islam and to eliminate the power of the *sayyid* (also called *masharifu*), whose power base remained centered in Lamu. Kresse explains that the conflict between Khasim and the *masharifu*

centered on the social and religious status of the *masharifu*, the descendants of Prophet Muhammad. In popular perception the *masharifu*, as holy persons with special blessings, fulfilled an important religious function of mediating between Muslim commoners and God, via the Prophet Muhammad, to whom they were said to be especially close. But Sheikh Muhammed Khasim insisted, with reference to the Qur'an, that they did not have any such special powers and, furthermore, it was up to each individual to establish a direct contact to God through special prayers (*dua*), independently.²³

Khasim distributed his teachings through pamphlets and educational books. This served to threaten the authority of the *masharifu* and represented an opening salvo in the dispute between Islam as traditionally practiced in Kenya and stricter interpretations of Islam more recently imported from the Middle East.

An illustrative case study of this rift is provided by Susan Beckerleg in her anthropological work in the coastal city of Watamu. A reformist movement called Halali Sunna took root there, which stood in opposition to the traditional *masharifu*. The adherents of this movement followed a stricter form of Islam and criticized the power of the *masharifu* as well as the indigenous elements that had long been established in their form of Islam. They also stressed participation in traditional Islamic observances such as prayer and the duty to imitate the life of Mohammed. The men grew their beards and wore traditional Islamic garb and the women also dressed more conservatively than did the typical Muslim women of Watamu. This sect was highly influenced by the conservative Tabligh Islamic movement, which originated in India in the early 20th century and which reached Watamu in 1990 by way of migrants.²⁴ The adherents of this movement were also evangelical and worked vigorously to spread their ideas.²⁵

Much of the local impetus for this reversion to a more conservative form of Islam

sprang from social changes being imposed on the community by outside pressures. As Watamu became a popular tourist destination for Westerners, the young people of Watamu became increasingly exposed to the use of alcohol and drugs; immodest dress at the beach, especially by women; and other behaviors that contradicted traditional Islamic precepts and rules of behavior. The adoption of a stricter interpretation of Islam was one way to push back against these disorienting cultural and social changes.²⁶ This phenomenon was not limited to Watamu and was in fact occurring in Muslim communities in popular tourist destinations throughout coastal Kenya in particular.

This push for the adoption of a more conservative “pure” form of Islam, as opposed to the more traditional form of Islam influenced by indigenous African religion, created a space for the development of radicalization in Kenya. The reform movement can in retrospect be seen as a first step toward a more radicalized and militant form of Islam establishing roots in the country. The rift created between traditional and reform Islam became more adversarial over time, especially as outside actors, most prominently from the Middle East and South Asia, began to increasingly influence the movement. Kresse writes that:

Differences in practice and understanding of Islam, which were once tolerated, turned to spark off strong animosities, and the intellectual center of reformist ideology shifted from an internal to an external position, as a multitude of Islamic groups from around the world have sought to increase their influence and support.²⁷

The trend toward radicalization catalyzed by the reform movement soon combined with other forces and only grew stronger during the 1990s and 2000s.

Forces of Radicalization

There are four main factors that have served to intensify the country’s vulnerability to radicalization and terrorism: structural and institutional factors, grievances, foreign and military policy, and jihadist ideology.

Structural and Institutional Factors. There are several structural and institutional factors that make Kenya vulnerable to radicalization:

the relatively advanced economy and infrastructure allows for freedom of movement and an abundance of targets

weak governance in key areas such as security, criminal justice system, and rule of law impede effective action against terrorist groups²⁸

geographical proximity to unstable states, particularly Somalia, in conjunction with porous borders.²⁹

Economy and Infrastructure. It seems counterintuitive that a relatively robust economy and infrastructural system—compared to neighboring countries—would make Kenya vulnerable. But as Raymond Muhula puts it, “Kenya’s attractiveness to terror-

ists is exacerbated by the fact that it also boasts the best infrastructural facilities in the region. It is far easier to operate a cell in Kenya than in any of the Horn countries.”³⁰ Radical and terrorist groups require resources to thrive. Infrastructure and some degree of economic stability allow for ease of travel, faster communications, and access to resources.

In terms of communications, Mwinyihaji and Wanyama point to the Internet as being particularly important:

Rapid internet diffusion has led to a mushrooming of cyber-cafes charging users less than a dollar per hour. These units have become crucial sites of Kenyan Muslims’ engagement with the global Muslim ummah, enhancing their knowledge of Islam through cyber-literacy, and networking within and between (cyber)-communities with shared interests.³¹

Such communication is much more difficult to achieve in a failed state such as Somalia.

The infrastructure also offers enticing targets for terrorist groups. Airports, hotels, resorts, restaurants, and nightclubs, as well as government buildings such as the U.S. Embassy, are easily accessible to terrorists. Furthermore, tourists themselves are possible targets either while they are in the country or during their transit to and from, as the 2002 attacks on the Israeli hotel and charter plane demonstrate.

Weak Governance. Weak governance, especially in critical areas such as criminal justice, border security, and the provision of essential services, also increases Kenya’s vulnerability to radicalism and terror. Widespread corruption, unguarded borders, and ineffective security and police organizations allow terrorist organizations freedom of movement, the establishment of safe havens, and the ability to coordinate logistical needs.³²

A weak criminal justice system can also result in impunity for terrorists. When suspects are caught, they are frequently able to evade justice through bribery or as a result of sheer incompetence in the system. This weakness not only allows terror suspects to unjustly go free but also fosters police abuses due to their inability to use the legal system successfully.

Geography. Kenya’s close proximity to unstable states (Somalia, Uganda, South Sudan, and Ethiopia), along with its inability to protect its borders, are other risk factors. This is especially true of Somalia and even more so in the aftermath of Operation *Linda Nchi*. The al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia sends adherents back and forth across the border.³³ Additionally, Kenya’s proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and the Middle East more broadly has allowed for the steady penetration of jihadist ideologies as travel between Kenya and these areas is relatively easy.

Grievances. Kenyan Muslims have several grievances, many of which have their

roots in colonial history. The structural and institutional vulnerabilities discussed above exacerbate these grievances:

lack of representation in politics

discrimination and lack of economic, educational, and other opportunities

heavy-handedness and human rights abuses by the police and antiterrorism legislation and tactics.

Political Representation. Since Kenya's independence from Britain in 1963, the country's Muslims have been politically marginalized. For most of this period the KANU held power in a one-party system. However, even after Kenyan politics became more democratic, the interests of the Muslim minority have been largely ignored in political circles.

The government established an official Muslim organization—the Supreme Council of Muslims of Kenya (SUPKEM)—in 1973. It was the only organization authorized to represent all of Kenya's Muslims, and SUPKEM leaders were closely allied with the political establishment.³⁴ Being a tool of the government, however, many Muslims viewed it more as a way to control them than to meet their unique interests. The organization was not seen as useful for expressing any political ideas, opinions, or needs that were not already acceptable to the government.

The situation has marginally improved since the end of one-party rule. There are now several national-level Muslim entities with some degree of independent political influence. These include, among others, the National Muslim Leaders Forum, Majlis Ulamaa Kenya, Kenya Council of Imams and Ulamaas, and Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya.³⁵ These are primarily interest groups and councils, however, and do not wield any direct power or authority. While they give the Muslim community an outlet to express itself, they have not led to sufficient representation within government itself or to remedies for the unique problems and interests of Kenya's Muslim communities.

Without political power, Muslims have not been able to advocate successfully for the needs of their communities and have largely been left behind in terms of economic and educational opportunities. Lacking a legitimate political path to address grievances, some Muslims turn to religious extremism to affect change. A report prepared by the United Nations Monitoring Group responsible for East Africa noted that:

During a 13 September 2010 lecture, addressing [Muslim Youth Center, an offshoot of al-Shabaab] combatants and other Swahili-speaking fighters in Somalia, Ahmad Iman dissuaded Kenyan Muslims from engaging in national politics, urging them instead to “Chinja” (cut), “Chonga” (peel) and “Fiyeka” (slash) the throats of the [Kenyan] infidels and “to hit back and cause blasts [in Kenya]” similar to the Kampala bombings.³⁶

Alienation from legitimate political institutions may continue to increase the appeal of violent attacks.

Discrimination and Lack of Opportunity. Lack of opportunity, in some cases as the result of discriminatory policies, contributes to widely held grievances in coastal Muslim communities. Fathima Badurdeen argues:

The root cause of youth radicalization in Coast stems from the region's desperate economic, social, and political conditions. Ineffective decentralization of development plans and governance issues since independence form the backbone of this situation, which is taken advantage of by an infrastructure of social networks or religious and political groups that provide communities with what the government does not and are in some instances extremist.³⁷

Unemployment is rife in the Muslim population. North East Province, Nairobi, and Coast Province, all three with high Muslim populations, had the highest levels of unemployment in the country as of 2005–2006,³⁸ as well as the highest rates of youth unemployment in 2008.³⁹ Furthermore, economic development in the tourism industry, particularly in Coast Province, has generally advanced without input from the local Muslim population and has also largely excluded them from its benefits. Fatima Azmiya Badurdeen writes, "The government's attitude toward and plans for the coastal communities have led citizens in Coast to feel that their resources are being used for the benefit of others."⁴⁰ She provides the example of a port development project in Lamu. Locals believed that the project was being forced on them and complained that they have had little input regarding decision-making. This lack of local representation is typical of the types of interactions that have led to high levels of resentment.

Disparities in educational opportunities have also been a problem, and with less access to government-run schools, many Muslim families have turned to madrassas and to foreign education. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), since the late 1970s Kenya's madrassas have been dominated by wealthy Wahhabi charities and foundations. Madrassas at the primary and secondary level have been prevalent throughout urban areas for decades and have frequently focused on teaching Arabic and Wahhabi theology. In fact, religious inculcation rather than an employable education has often been the primary aim of these institutions. The brightest of the students would then be granted scholarships to Wahhabi-oriented universities in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or other Middle Eastern countries.⁴¹

Finally, many Kenyan Muslims also say they are discriminated against by the government overall. They complain of being treated as foreigners, about the inability to get documents such as IDs and passports, and harassment of citizens from Arab countries coming to Kenya.⁴² This has been particularly difficult since the strict enforcement of passport regulations implemented in 2001. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States pressured the Kenyan government to more scrupulously examine the passports of citizens of Asian or Arab descent. In response, the govern-

ment has required that to obtain a new passport or renew a previously held one, citizens of Asian or Arab ancestry, including Swahilis, must present their grandfather's birth certificate—a requirement that few Kenyans of any group can comply with. Many Kenyan Muslims consider the enforcement of these restrictive passport laws to be openly discriminatory against them “at the behest of the United States.”⁴³ As seen below, many grievances held by Kenyan Muslims stem from such counterterrorism efforts.

Counterterrorism and Human Rights Abuses. The bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi in 1998, the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon in 2001, and the attacks against an Israeli-owned hotel and charter plane in Mombasa in 2002 brought terrorism to the forefront in Kenya. The United States pressured the government to enact various legislation and policies to fight terrorism in Kenya to prevent the country's use as a base for al Qaeda or other radical groups. However, some of these efforts have had the unintended consequence of further radicalizing elements of the population. Since the terrorist attacks in 2002, some Kenyan Muslims have complained of being unfairly targeted and of being the victims of human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrest and torture during interrogations.⁴⁴

Muslim human rights groups operating in Kenya document government abuse. Al-Amin Kimathi, chair of the Muslim Human Rights Forum, claimed in media accounts that at least seven Muslims, most with alleged ties to al-Shabaab, disappeared in 2013. He also surmised that inefficiencies within the criminal justice system had hampered legal investigations and caused security officers to act outside of the law. According to Kimathi, “They [police] reach a point where they get frustrated by the law and the court process and they have realized that the only way to deal with these people is to ‘disappear’ them.”⁴⁵

Additionally, various legislative initiatives, particularly the Suppression of Terrorism Bill first introduced in 2002, have been viewed by many Kenyan Muslims as specifically targeting them. The bill was drafted with little or no input from the Muslim community, and it was criticized for having an overly broad definition of terrorism, extensive police powers to detain people, and providing the minister for internal security with the power to label any group as a terrorist organization. The most controversial aspect, however, was the power granted to police to arrest any person “who, in a public place wears an item of clothing . . . in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a declared terrorist organization.”⁴⁶ Muslims feared that this would allow members of their community to be targeted merely because of their appearance. Due to these complaints, the bill was withdrawn. It was reintroduced in 2006, only to be defeated again.

In October 2012, the Prevention of Terrorism Act was passed. This law prescribes stiff punishments for people engaged in terrorist attacks, planning, recruiting, or other activities. It also allows terrorism suspects to be extradited to other countries for prosecution. Most of the issues that Muslims objected to in earlier versions of

Libya

Why Arabs must resolve the Libya and Yemen crises now

6 July 2015

Currently, there are two key opportunities led by the United Nations worth supporting because there are no alternatives, both in Libya and Yemen. The situation in these two countries, as well as in Syria, is heart wrenching, which requires urgent actions regardless of calculations about who wins and who loses, and who is right and who is wrong. The U.N. Envoy to Syria Staffan De Mistura is still searching for a mechanism to implement the Geneva Communiqué, which had received the unanimous backing of the permanent U.N. Security Council member states. That is, before some of them reneged on it. The communiqué calls for a transitional government that includes both the regime and the opposition, which would then prepare for elections.

De Mistura is still looking for a way to persuade Saudi Arabia to accept Iran as a key actor and as a partner in shaping the future of Syria. The U.N. envoy believes that there is no alternative to recognizing the Iranian role in Syria, regardless of Riyadh's position that this would legitimize Iran's role in Arab Syria. De Mistura is working now in the shadow of nuclear negotiations with Iran, studying his next move in light of the outcome of these negotiations, and the repercussions of either their success or their failure on the Syrian arena, and on Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

The U.N. Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, for his part, is pushing for a humanitarian truce that would pave the way for political negotiations. His efforts today are an opportunity that must be supported without arrogance and extremism. To be sure, the humanitarian tragedy in Yemen, classed by the United Nations as a "level 3" crisis which is the highest level, requires the major powers at the Security Council to impose a ceasefire and deploy international forces to Yemen. It also requires the Arab coalition to fully facilitate the job of the United Nations, and inject large sums of money and quickly to prevent famine in Yemen and stop the country from sliding into 'Somalization' or 'Afghanization', as this would affect everyone without exception. Yemen today cannot bear insisting on restoring its legitimate government or on implementing Security Council resolutions as a precondition for negotiations. It is in a state of collapse, and there is no other way than to pursue bold new political and economic decisions that would prevent a full-scale civil war that is fast replacing what was supposed to be a preemptive war. In Libya, there are indications the efforts of the U.N. envoy there Bernardino Leone are bearing fruit. Egypt has reiterated its support for his mission and the U.N. has unanimously stood behind him. The U.N. envoy has developed a fifth draft in 9 months for a political solution, and he believes that if agreed, this document would be a road map for a national unity government formed out of competencies on an equal-opportunity basis, in parallel with a ceasefire agreement and an agreement to disarm militias and

withdraw them from oil installations and cities. The success of this agreement depends on strict and serious Arab and international positions. Otherwise, it is going to take a decisive military intervention at some point before Libya irreversibly turns into a failed state fully controlled by militias and terrorists.

Let us stop at the figures released by the U.N. and aid organizations: More than 21.1 million Yemenis, or 80 percent of the population, are now in need of aid. 13 million are facing a food crisis. 9.4 million people lack access to safe drinking water, which raises the risk of diseases related to water shortage including cholera. The healthcare system faces collapse, after 160 medical centers closed down because of the security situation, fuel shortages, and lack of other basic supplies.

Farhan Haq, deputy spokesperson for the U.N. secretary general, said the third level is the highest level of humanitarian emergencies under the U.N. emergency system, and applies to the situation in Syria, Iraq, and South Sudan, requiring faster response by relief agencies and donors to meet the urgent needs of the humanitarian situation in Yemen, as he said.

The people of the Gulf are worried about the implications of the Somalization and Afghanization of Yemen on their countries

Raghida Dergham

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon described what is happening in Yemen as a “humanitarian emergency”. He said that around 3,000 Yemenis were killed in the last three months, half of whom civilians, and that more than one million people were forced to leave their homes. The U.N. chief said most of those who are in need of humanitarian assistance have not received aid yet.

Yemeni President Abdrabbu Mansour Hadi wrote to Ban Ki-moon, telling him that the Houthi militias have bombed the port of Aden indiscriminately to prevent ships carrying aid from unloading their cargoes. According to Hadi, the ships were diverted to the port of Hodeida, which is controlled by the militias.

Hadi said the U.N. must use all its powers to protect medical and other aid, and secure conducive conditions for the delivery of relief to civilians in Aden, Lahj, Taiz, and Dalea who are caught in a humanitarian catastrophe caused by militias and terrorists.

The U.N. view is that all Yemeni rivals must agree at the very minimum on an immediate truce lasting throughout Ramadan to deliver humanitarian aid. The U.N. insists there can be no military solution in Yemen.

The Security Council blames all sides as it seems to be in the process of ignoring its own resolution 2216, which put forward a conditional roadmap for a political settlement. These conditions are no longer politically viable and have been overtaken by developments on the field. Therefore, it is necessary to avoid the language of con-

ditions and obstinacy, because the war in Yemen, which started as a preemptive war, has turned into a civil war, and because the Arab coalition is not prepared to carry out a qualitative military shift that would require escalation on the field towards securing the major cities. Because Yemen is on the verge of becoming a hornets' nest for ISIS and al-Qaeda that will sting all sides involved in Yemen, the Arab coalition must consider an exit strategy from Yemen through the Security Council and by facilitating the efforts of Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed. Funds must be poured into aid and infrastructure to prevent collapse, as this would spawn thousands of ISIS 'hornets' ready to breach the border and expand operations in Yemen's neighboring countries and beyond.

Ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh will not survive the hornets of ISIS and al-Qaeda, no matter how much he might be delusional about victory in Yemen. This man is resolved to turn Yemen into another Afghanistan or Somalia, so he can return to power, but he will pay the price for this. The Houthis, who may boast of being the tribe that brought Saudi Arabia to Yemen and defied it, will be proven naïve and foolish by history. They have turned Yemen into a failed state ready to be exploited by ISIS and al-Qaeda, thinking their alliance with Iran and Ali Abdullah Saleh is an achievement. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards too are digging their own grave in Yemen like they did in Syria, alongside a grave for the Syrian people. Their plans have failed and these countries are now their Vietnam.

Somalization and Afghanistanization

The people of the Gulf are worried about the implications of the Somalization and Afghanistanization of Yemen on their countries. For this reason, Gulf leaders must be frank and must adopt pragmatic policies to get out of the predicament, regardless of whether it was right or wrong to go to war in Yemen. The correct decision right now is to leave, because of the lack of readiness to escalate on the ground in Yemen.

The people of the Gulf are worried for Iraq and see the Iraqi army fragmented, requiring the close involvement of the U.S. army from planning to execution, according to a source involved in Gulf policymaking. The people of the Gulf fear Iran could intervene to fight ISIS in Iraq, but they do not have any practical alternative. It is time for the Gulf stakeholders to engage in brainstorming to come up with measures rather than seeking aid from others.

The people of the Gulf are confused about the Turkish debate on Syria and Iraq, and do not know what Turkey has in its mind and whether it is planning to intervene against the Kurds. In fact, they fear this, because this would serve ISIS, in their view. The people of the Gulf believe all this is happening because of U.S. impotence. One Gulf source said, "There is nothing we can do about this." This is a defeatist view and a way to avoid responsibility. The Gulf has many policy tools, and all they have to do is put serious efforts into new strategies to take matters into their own hands.

The crisis of confidence between the Gulf and the United States is serious, and has

not been fixed by the Camp David Summit. Some thought engaging Russia would help, but Russia responded in the typical manner of President Vladimir Putin. Putin said the Russians have good relations with all countries of the region, and called for an alliance against terrorism instead of seeking to topple Assad in Syria.

Russia will not give Iran up no matter what tactical differences the two countries may have over Syria. They are both in a willful alliance with Assad. This is not the first time there have been voices saying Russia is involved in Syria at Iran's request. The issue for Putin's Russia is bigger and has to do with the 'bonanza' of profiteering from lifting the sanctions on Iran, as soon a nuclear deal is reached.

Change is on the way

President Barack Obama himself is still working to pull off the negotiations with Iran. The difference that emerged in the past few weeks is that Obama has now guaranteed his legacy as president, following the decisions by the Supreme Court that upheld both his healthcare reform plan and equal marriage. In addition, the Senate has approved fast-tracking free trade agreements with Asia Pacific nations, a huge achievement for him, not to mention the historical normalization with Cuba.

These achievements could serve as an incentive for the U.S. president to press ahead and seal his legacy with a deal with Iran at any price, but also an incentive for him to hold his ground and not compromise on supreme U.S. interests. This will be clear in the coming weeks, but the past two weeks have given him a boost in morale and popularity.

Something will happen. A change should be expected in Obama's Middle East policies, both in the event of a nuclear deal and in the event it collapses. Either outcome will have major impact.

It is worthwhile for Arab and Gulf leaders to implement measures and draw strategies for both outcomes. It is useless to complain about U.S. policies or seek to restore the status quo. Meanwhile, the situation in the Middle East now requires not being complacent about the humanitarian crises in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and South Sudan. The Arab leaders have real instruments at their disposal, and it is time they used them.

This article was first published in [al-Hayat](#) on July 3, 2015 and was translated by Karim Traboulsi.

Raghida Dergham is Columnist and Senior Diplomatic Correspondent for the London-based Al Hayat, the leading independent Arabic daily, since 1989. She writes a regular weekly strategic column on International Political Affairs. Dergham is also a Political Analyst for NBC, MSNBC and the Arab satellite LBC. She is a Contributing Editor for LA Times Syndicate Global Viewpoint and has contributed to: The New York

Times, The Washington Post, The International Herald Tribune and Newsweek Magazine. She serves on the Board of the International Women's Media Foundation, and has served on the Advisory Council of Princeton University's Institute for Transregional Studies of the contemporary Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. She was also a member of the Women's Foreign Policy Group. She addressed U.N. General Assembly on the World Press Freedom Day when President of The United Nations Correspondents Association for 1997 and was appointed to the Task Force on the Reorientation of Public Information by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. She moderated a roundtable of 8 Presidents and Prime Ministers for UNCTAD at Bangkok in 1991. Dergham served as Chairman of the Dag Hammarskjold Fund Board in 2005. She tweets @RaghidaDergham.

<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/07/06/Resolving-the-Libya-and-Yemen-crises-Arabs-must-act-now.html>

voulu et soutenu par le Quai d'Orsay, a contrôlé durant des mois, une partie du territoire national avant de se faire doubler sur le terrain par des mouvements islamistes tels : Al Qaïda au Mahgreb Islamique (AQMI), Ançar dine d'Iyad Ag Ghali, le Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (Mujao). Les combattants du Mnlà, pour survivre, se sont dissouts au sein de ces organisations islamistes. Il a fallu attendre l'intervention militaire de la France en début janvier 2013 pour remettre le Mnlà sur pied. A partir de cet instant, l'on assista à une floraison de groupuscules armés dans la seule région de Kidal. Parmi les groupuscules on peut citer le HCUA, (Haut Conseil pour l'Unité du Peuple Azawad), le MAA (Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad), la CPA (Coalition du Peuple de l'Azawad). Quand le mentor de ces mouvements armés, tapi au Quai d'Orsay a sifflé la fin de la récréation, quelqu'un a décidé de faire regrouper ces mouvements au sein de la Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA). Ce n'est que courant 20 Juin 2015 que la Cma a signé l'accord de paix, tandis que le gouvernement malien, les mouvements de la plateforme ainsi que la médiation ont signé le 15 Mai dernier.

« REBELOTAGE »

Ançar dine au Mali, le Mujao en Mauritanie, Boko haram au Nigeria, Al Shebab en Somalie ... notre sous-région, et au delà, c'est le monde même qui est en danger. Face à cette menace terroriste, nos armées, prises pays par pays, sont dépourvues de moyens pour faire face au péril qui la guette. S'unir ou périr, tel semble être le choix qu'il faut faire, car le terrorisme n'a pas de frontière. Ses combattants se déplacent aisément dans le désert. A partir du Mali, les terroristes essaient d'étendre leurs tentacules sur la Côte-D'ivoire. Aucun pays africain n'est à l'abri. La Côte-D'ivoire ne doit pas s'étonner. Un grand pays doit l'être sur tous les plans. Les ex-combattants de la Côte-d'Ivoire ont été laissés au bord de la route de la réinsertion. Le développement a forcément un volet sécuritaire. La Côte-d'Ivoire sort d'une guerre civile qui a fait officiellement fait 3000 victimes. Il ya lieu de rendre hommage aux armées Tchadienne, Nigériane, Malienne, etc. Nos états ne doivent pas compter sur la force Barkhane. Dans ce genre de combat, l'aspect le plus important, semble être le renseignement. Il y a lieu de mettre à la disposition de nos services de renseignement des moyens adéquats. En Côte-D'ivoire, l'ONUCI vient d'annoncer le renforcement des dispositions à la frontière entre la Côte-d'Ivoire et le Mali. Curieusement, le Mali qui a demandé à la MINUSMA d'intervenir à ses côtés dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme, vient d'enregistrer une fin de non recevoir à cette requête, de la part de la force Onusienne au Mali.

Si, sur papier, la guerre est terminée avec la signature de l'accord de paix, le plus dure reste sa mise en œuvre sur le terrain. De Janvier 2012 à Juin 2015, les ex-combattants du Mnlà, aujourd'hui à la Cma, se sont métamorphosés plusieurs fois sur le terrain, comme des caméléons. C'est pourquoi, il faut toujours être vigilant avec eux. La menace terroriste nous oblige également à être vigilant à tout moment Le Comité de suivi de la mise en œuvre de l'accord, a déjà tenu trois réunions. A la suite de la réunion du vendredi 03 Juillet 2015, il a été décidé de com-

mun accord de suspendre les travaux qui reprendront aussitôt après la fête de Ramadan.

<http://maliactu.net/>

Mozambique

Mozambique: Dhlakama Again Threatens to Rule "by Force"

7 July y 2015

Maputo — Afonso Dhlakama, leader of Mozambique's former rebel movement Renamo, has once again threatened to “govern by force”, if the government does not submit to his demands.

Renamo wants to establish “provincial municipalities” in six northern and central provinces (Manica, Sofala, Tete, Zambezia, Nampula and Niassa). As Dhlakama has repeatedly made clear in public statements the “presidents of the provincial councils” in these provinces would not be elected - he would appoint them.

Renamo would also appoint all the district administrators and heads of administrative posts.

Since the proposal would allow Renamo to take over, from top to bottom, the government structure in six provinces, it is not surprising that the Mozambican parliament, the Assembly of the Republic, where the ruling Frelimo Party holds a majority of 144 of the 250 seats, rejected the Renamo bill earlier this year.

Cited by the Portuguese news agency Lusa, Dhlakama on Sunday said he was running out of patience. He has issued several ultimatums, warning Frelimo that, unless it changes its mind about the Renamo bill, he will seize the provinces he wants anyway.

The Frelimo majority in the Assembly, and the government, have ignored these threats, and so far Dhlakama has been unable or unwilling to carry them out.

Speaking at a former Renamo base in Macoca, in the central province of Manica, at a ceremony marking the 35th anniversary of the creation of the Renamo Women's Detachment, Dhlakama threatened to expel government administrators from the six provinces. He claimed he would not need to use force to do this - although in the same speech he also promised to “govern by force”.

He threatened to use Renamo's militia to close the main north-south highway to traffic. This was a threat to revert to the tactics used in 2013, when Renamo launched a low level insurgency in the central province of Sofala. Between June 2013 and August 2014, Renamo gunmen ambushed vehicles on the 100 kilometre stretch of highway between the Save river and the small Sofala town of Muxungue. The attacks forced the government to organize military escorts for convoys of vehicles along this stretch of road.

“I shall paralyse the road and say that no vehicle passes today”, Dhlakama menaced. He would also evacuate public buildings and expel the administrators appointed by the government “without waging war or beating up anybody”. He did not say what

he would do if the administrators refused to go and the local police units resisted.

If Frelimo “continues to play around”, then Renamo “will govern by force”, he said - a threat which Dhlakama has made, in almost identical words, many times before.

<http://allafrica.com/>

Nigeria

Extrême-Nord: le ramadan sous le signe du couvre-feu

07/07/2015

A Maroua, c'est la première fois que cette période coïncide avec la mesure d'interdiction de la circulation des engins à deux roues entre 20h et 5h du matin, prise depuis août 2014 par le gouverneur

La période de jeûne du Ramadan, dans la région camerounaise de l'Extrême-Nord, est marquée par un climat d'insécurité du fait des exactions de la secte islamiste nigériane Boko Haram qui limitent les mouvements et imposent plusieurs autres restrictions non seulement aux fidèles musulmans, mais aussi au reste des populations.

A Maroua, la capitale régionale, c'est la première fois que cette période coïncide avec la mesure d'interdiction de la circulation des engins à deux roues entre 20 heures et 5 heures du matin, prise depuis août 2014 par le gouverneur Midjyawa Bakari. Ce moyen de transport est pourtant le plus répandu dans la zone, surtout aux heures de pointe où les musulmans se préparent à casser le jeûne, le soir venu.

«La circulation des motos est timide, aussi bien en journée où le jeûne fatigue les conducteurs, qu'en soirée où l'on se prépare à casser le ramadan», explique Baba Eldine, un boucher exerçant au quartier Domayo-Boulevard.

Dans cette ville pas très éloignée de la frontière avec le Nigeria, la psychose Boko Haram influence fortement le quotidien des gens qui vivent désormais sous la surveillance des patrouilles mixtes qui ont été multipliées depuis deux semaines autour des principales mosquées et des agences de voyage.

Chez plusieurs croyants interrogés autour des mosquées, les moments de prière et de prêche se vivent avec la peur au ventre, les esprits restant préoccupés par les récents attentats islamistes au Nigeria et au Tchad voisins. Reste que les mesures de sécurité, appliquées sans faiblesse par les forces de maintien de l'ordre, ne sont pas sans provoquer des grincements de dents chez les citoyens éprouvant d'énormes difficultés à se rendre à la mosquée à 20 heures et 4 heures, qui sont des heures de prêche, du fait de l'interdiction de circulation des motos.



© Droits réservés

Au plan alimentaire, Maroua se caractérise aussi pendant le Ramadan par une légère inflation sur les prix des denrées de première nécessité, le jeûne de cette année intervenant en pleine période de soudure qui va de mi-juin à août dans les régions septentrionales du pays.

Ainsi des produits tels que l'arachide, le maïs, les tubercules et même les légumineuses, ont connu une augmentation sensible de leur prix sur les différents marchés périodiques. Et, alors que les prix des produits manufacturés et de la viande de bœuf sont restés stables, le sac de maïs, par exemple, qui se négocie généralement à 18.000 FCFA, est passé à 21.000 FCFA.

En terme d'ambiance, le soir venu, non seulement les rues sont désertes mais en plus les buvettes et restaurants-bars, habituellement bondés, n'ont pas de clients depuis deux semaines et leurs tenanciers sont quasiment en chômage technique.

«Les activités tournent au ralenti. Quelques consommateurs arrivent pendant la journée, mais dès la tombée de la nuit il n'y a que quelques rares touristes qui osent mettre le nez dehors», analyse Gertrude Silikam, qui tient une gargote au centre de Maroua.

D'une manière générale, et en dehors des restrictions sécuritaires, beaucoup justifient aussi ce climat terne par une certaine solidarité de croyants appartenant à d'autres religions avec leurs compatriotes musulmans. *«Nous ne jeûnons pas, mais par ces temps où la paix du Cameroun est au cœur de toutes les préoccupations, ré-*

fréner les plaisirs mondains est aussi une manière, pour nous autres, de nous mettre en prière avec ceux qui croient en Allah», explique Jean Claude Guivanda, qui se réclame «laïc engagé».

<http://www.journalducameroun.com/>

5 Key Issues Concerning Nigerian Welfare Benefit System

2 July 2015

Editor's note: Iniobong Obong, [Naij.com guest author](#), talks about the absence of welfare benefit system in Nigeria, and the issues the federal government should consider before introducing it.

If the poor cannot sleep because they are hungry, the rich will not sleep because the poor are awake. Nigerian proverb

It is no secret that Nigeria relies on the fittest mindset with absolutely no welfare package for the poor and those with disabilities. In theory, the Nigerian political system is modelled after the blueprint of the American democracy. Paradoxically, welfare benefit system which is a key component of the American system is conspicuously missing in the Nigerian model. Given the ostentatious lifestyle of the ruling political class, in a sense, it appears as if Nigerians take care of the government whereas in the West governments take care of the people. The fallout of this crude form of capitalism not only keeps the country from attaining greater heights, but also gives birth to many social vices and miscreants. The recent declaration by the vice president concerning unemployment benefits resonated with the citizenry because of this ugly background. While the declaration is highly commendable there are short- and long-term challenges on the way to its successful implementation. Below are 5 salient points.

1. Social security and crime level reduction

"Poverty is the parent of revolution and crime," claimed Aristotle, the Greek philosopher. Although Aristotle made this observation over 2000 years ago, current empirical data across the globe agrees with that school of thought. For instance, in Nigeria large percentage of those involved in armed robbery, prostitution, terrorism come from the very poor class. However, it by no means implies that every poor person is a potential criminal. The argument rather suggests that welfare benefits may reduce crime rate among poor masses. From an economic perspective, when a person is about to die of hunger, the opportunity cost of going into armed robbery or petty stealing is far lower than the cost of dying, and crime as such becomes very attractive to them. On the other hand, when a person is sure of always having food in their stomach, the opportunity cost of committing a crime becomes much higher. Welfare system on its own cannot bring crime to an end, after all, rich men commit crimes as well, but it can reduce crime incidence. Welfare system cannot turn a bad person into a good one, but it can give a poor person something to hope for.

2. Structural challenges

Advertisement

Without accurate population figures and a real-time database containing information about all Nigerians, it is almost impossible for a groundbreaking project of such magnitude to succeed. Many often look at the challenges with the Nigerian

population census from the political lens without considering the economic implication. Welfare system success is intimately tied to the national electronic ID card project, and a dynamic and comprehensive database. If the present government truly wants this project to succeed, they have to realize that the Nigerian Identity Management Commission (NIMC) holds the key. The NIMC enrolment centres in the 36 states should be strengthened. Any other strategy will amount to putting the cart before the horse. The national ID card will be a prerequisite for voting in the 2019 election. In the same vein, it should also be a condition for those who seek to benefit from the welfare package.

3. Cost implication

It is in the habit of wise people to do the cost analysis before embarking on a project. Sixty six percent of Nigerians (112m) are classified as extremely poor based on the World Bank report. Using N 5000 benchmark, the federal government will be paying N560b per month or N6.72t per year. Taking into account dwindling oil prices and the challenges government is currently facing with respect to the payment of salaries, it will take time before the project is implemented. However, the current financial burden should not in any way kill the noble vision; rather, the waiting period should be used to crystallize the vision. A vision is like a seed: often those who give birth to it may not live long enough to see it bearing the fruit.

4. Take-off point

President Buhari will have credibility problems if he cannot deliver his campaign promises. For this reason certain aspects of the project should be kickstarted as soon as possible. Broadly speaking, those who qualify for the benefit system include people with disabilities (especially physical) and their carers, widows without any support for raising children, the sick, the elderly, the unemployed and those looking for job. I would like to propose that those with physical disabilities of such an extent that makes them ineligible for work should be given priority. However, it still depends on accurate data from the NIMC and the government's commitment to checkmate those who may wish to divert the monies for their personal use.

5. Unemployment trap

Unemployment trap is a situation in which able-bodied people deliberately refuse to work, even if job is available, because of the benefits they are getting from the government. That's why the government should not pay large benefits lest to discourage people from going to work. For instance, a gardener who earns N4000 a month will prefer to be unemployed because he will be better off financially with the proposed N5000. But the mere fact that benefits may lead to unemployment trap is a weak argument to completely do away with the benefit system. It is like saying we should close down all universities in order to prevent some university students from joining secret cults. Those pushing this line of reasoning may not be aware that "improving employment incentive" when work becomes available is one of the three points on the iron triangle of welfare. Unemployment benefits are to help those in

need, the challenges associated with it have been well-documented, and there are tested and proven economic models to mitigate the impact of the negative fallout.

<http://www.naij.com/>

Nigeria: The Point in Terrorism We Are Missing

Terrorists think in ways we don't think in conventionally; they do things we don't ordinarily do; their understanding of human nature and experiences differs remarkably from ours. They are not the ghosts or spirits they want us to believe they are, neither are they the overrated beasts we take them to be. They are mortals with fears too, who are only playing on our own fears and spreading their fears through us.

On June 26, 2015 the world watched with horror, shock and disdain the unprovoked terrorist attacks claiming the lives of about 50 people and leaving many others injured in three countries - France, Kuwait and Tunisia. This deadly act came a few days after Jens Stoltenberg, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) scribe spoke on CNN concerning the bloc's policy on containing the Islamic State - the group that has claimed responsibility for the attacks. The confidence with which Jens spoke could have lulled one to sleep with both two eyes closed, if not for the attacks on the French factory. Can we assume we are then missing the point?

There appears to be an assumption among many anti-terrorist analysts that since the Islamic State fighters are "mainly Muslims" they will honour their earlier "ceasefire" agreement during the Ramadan fast. Apart from the group's attack on a Kuwaiti Mosque negating this misguided view, we appear not to be learning from history.

The United States military got everything right in Vietnam until a ridiculous tactical blunder in 1968. The US military had erroneously assumed that the Vietcong - North Vietnamese militia - would, in fact, honour the "ceasefire agreements" during the Tết Nguyễn Đán - a day highly revered in Vietnam, when it is traditional to declare a truce during war. Needless to say, it was on that day that the Vietcong shipped in arms, using the Tết holiday as cover, to South Vietnam - an area then under full US military protection. The rest, as they say, is history. This same mistake we still make today.

One should be amazed if we cannot see a progressive return to the Cold War era. The only difference this time is that it is not between the world's super powers or ideologies, but between world's deadliest terrorist groups.

The Islamic State, which has since claimed responsibility for these most recent attacks on the three countries, could be seen as acting in direct response to the Al Qaeda Islamic Magreeb (AQIM)-linked al-Shabab recent attacks on the African Union (AU) base in Mogadishu, Somalia. The Garrissa University, Kenya attacks in April and others in East Africa may just be a direct response to the rising profile of Boko Haram's (an Islamic State ally) notoriety in West Africa. One needs to see the patterns of these attacks as battles for control of "spheres of influence" between two dangerous groups. In parenthesis, during the Cold War era, Africa was really a battleground.

To further confirm how far we have missed the point, we are paying lesser attention to the timing of these attacks. One of the issues that traditionally dominate every US presidential election is foreign policy. Shaping the US foreign policy is global security and terrorism. We must not forget that the two leading parties have been at loggerheads over what is responsible for the rise of global terrorism. While Democrats have been quick to point out the George W. Bush administration's tactless invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively as responsible for the rise in world terror, Republicans have provided the counter-argument that Barack Obama's indecision to prevent the spread of the "Arab Spring" is the reason for the rise of a notorious group like the Islamic State (ISIS). Irrespective of which side of the divide one belongs, these terror groups have much interest in US elections than most people may think.

The Vietnamese fighters or Vietcong, with their poor training and orientation, understood the simple fact that 1968 was a US presidential election year. With that knowledge, they acted promptly and took full advantage by doing all they could to shape and shift US public opinion, going into the election. This remains an error President Lyndon B. Johnson (who was defeated in that year's Democratic Primary in New Hampshire by the anti-war campaigner, Senator Eugene McCarthy) will never forget.

It is more than mere coincidence that the attacks came on the day the US Supreme Court handed its judgement in favour of "marriage right" (another way of describing homosexual, gay or same-sex marriage right). Again, this is perhaps one of the hotly debated issues in US politics presently. The Islamic State fighters are known to have murdered those they identified as "homosexuals" and "infidels" with impunity. Being an issue that is sure to generate much heat as the presidential campaigns heats up, one just needs to look well to see the connections. These attacks may not be unconnected with parts of the terrorists' intention to shape the outcome of the 2016 US presidential election.

We are either overrating or underestimating terrorists. It also appears that we lack proper diagnosis of their intentions. We need to divest emotions from our analyses of terrorism and the activities of terrorists if we are really serious about winning the war against terror. Terrorists think in ways we don't think in conventionally; they do things we don't ordinarily do; their understanding of human nature and experiences differs remarkably from ours. They are not the ghosts or spirits they want us to believe they are, neither are they the overrated beasts we take them to be. They are mortals with fears too, who are only playing on our own fears and spreading their fears through us. This is the point we are missing.

<http://allafrica.com/stories/201507020499.html>

Tunisia

Face au terrorisme, la Tunisie entame un virage sécuritaire délicat

10/07/2015



© Fethi Belaid, AFP | Un policier tunisien tenant la garde devant un hôtel de Sousse, le 10 juillet 2015.

Texte par [FRANCE 24 Suivre france24 fr sur twitter](#)

Le Premier ministre tunisien a annoncé vendredi qu'un millier de personnes avaient été arrêtées depuis l'attentat du Bardo en mars. Un coup de filet aussi massif que médiatique qui fait aussi craindre un risque pour les libertés fondamentales.

Alors que des experts de l'ONU ont appelé vendredi 10 juillet à endiguer le flux de jeunes Tunisiens ralliant le jihad à l'étranger, le gouvernement de Tunis a annoncé [de nouvelles mesures sécuritaires](#), confirmant ainsi le [durcissement de sa politique à l'égard des jihadistes](#). Le Premier ministre tunisien Habib Essid a annoncé dans la nuit du 9 au 10 juillet qu'un millier de terroristes présumés avaient été arrêtés depuis [l'attaque du musée du Bardo le 18 mars dernier](#). Une opération accompagnée de l'imposition d'une interdiction de sortie du territoire pour 15 000 individus, ainsi empêchés de rejoindre les zones de conflits.

"Ce coup de filet est massif car il a eu lieu en à peine deux semaines", estime Hamza Meddeb, chercheur au Carnegie Middle East Center, interrogé par France 24. D'après les chiffres de l'ONU, le nombre de jihadistes tunisiens, notamment en Syrie et en Libye, dépasserait les 5 500. Les arrestations annoncées par le gouvernement tunisien représenteraient donc 18 % des présumés terroristes du pays. Pourtant pour le chercheur, si le nombre d'individus arrêté est important, il ne

s'agit pas d'un "sursaut sécuritaire" de la Tunisie, mais d'un "virage" amorcé depuis plusieurs années déjà.

Ces arrestations s'inscrivent dans la ligne de précédentes opérations menées à long terme par les autorités tunisiennes, dans les milieux salafistes notamment. "Les précédents coups de filet avaient été effectués dans les mois suivant août 2013, quand l'organisation Ansar al-Charia a été qualifiée de groupe terroriste", précise Hamza Meddeb. Certaines organisations des droits de l'Homme estiment à 6 500 le nombre d'arrestations depuis 2013, sans compter ce nouveau millier.

Crainte pour les droits de l'Homme

Cette fois, très peu de détails ont encore filtré sur l'identité des individus arrêtés ou sur leur degré d'implication dans les attaques terroristes du Bardo ou de Sousse. "Suffit-il d'avoir une pratique religieuse assidue ? Ou les autorités se sont-elles basées sur les rapprochements avec des courants de pensée telle que salafisme ?", interroge Hamza Meddeb qui s'appuie sur des éléments de réponse fournis par des avocats et des organisations de défense des droits de l'Homme.

Car si il y a certainement une nécessité d'adopter des mesures sécuritaires, estime-t-il, cela s'accompagne de craintes émises par les acteurs de la société civile. Ils s'inquiètent de voir le gouvernement tunisien sacrifier une partie des droits humains et des libertés fondamentales. Avant même cette nouvelle annonce, neuf ONG, dont HRW, Amnesty International et Reporters sans frontières, ont adressé le 7 juillet une lettre au Parlement tunisien sur le nouveau projet de loi anti-terroriste du gouvernement.

"Le traitement sécuritaire ne fait qu'alimenter cette colère sociale"

D'après le chercheur du Carnegie Middle East Center, la question du terrorisme et de la radicalisation en Tunisie "mérite des réponses qui ne peuvent pas se réduire au domaine sécuritaire". Ainsi selon le dernier rapport de la Banque mondiale, 33 % des jeunes Tunisiens sont sans emploi ou sans formation, un des taux les plus élevés d'Afrique du Nord : "Nous sommes face à une jeunesse désenchantée, sans réelle perspective d'avenir, ce qui entraîne un ressentiment antisystème chez eux. Le traitement sécuritaire ne fait qu'alimenter cette colère sociale."

Manque de coordination

Par ailleurs, Hamza Meddeb pointe un autre dysfonctionnement de la lutte contre le terrorisme en Tunisie: le gouvernement tunisien ne dispose pas d'organe qui centralise cette mission, mais d'une multiplicité d'acteurs dont la coordination n'est pas assurée. L'information ne circule pas toujours en temps et en heure entre les renseignements militaires et la sécurité intérieure, ce qui nuit à l'efficacité des missions. Il dénonce également un ministère de l'Intérieur "figé depuis la chute de Ben

Ali", là où il devrait avoir été réformé pour servir les intérêts du pays et non celui d'un régime.

Depuis l'attaque de Sousse, d'autres pays mettent en doute l'efficacité des mesures de sécurité tunisiennes. Le ministère britannique des Affaires étrangères a [ainsi déconseillé jeudi à ses ressortissants de se rendre en Tunisie](#), sauf en cas de nécessité, en raison de la probabilité jugée élevée d'un nouvel attentat. Londres estime que les mesures prises par les autorités tunisiennes ne suffisent pas à garantir la sécurité de ses ressortissants voyageurs. Vendredi, le Danemark a donné les mêmes consignes à ses citoyens.

<http://www.france24.com/>

Tunisie : pourquoi la jeunesse est-elle si perméable aux sirènes salafistes ?

10 juillet 2015



Après les attentats sanglants du Bardo et de Sousse, le doute n'est plus permis : la « daéshisation » de la jeunesse est désormais une réalité tragiquement palpable. Comment en est-on arrivé là ?

Comment, moins de cent jours après la tuerie du musée du Bardo, un drame de l'ampleur de celui de Sousse a-t-il pu se produire ? Pourquoi, alors que chacun savait que les touristes étrangers constituaient une cible de prédilection pour les terroristes de l'État islamique (EI), un hôtel comme le Riu Imperial Marhaba, lieu du carnage du 26 juin, ne bénéficiait-il d'aucune protection ? Et pourquoi a-t-il fallu attendre plus de trente-cinq minutes avant que les forces de l'ordre n'investissent les lieux et ne parviennent enfin à neutraliser [le tireur, Seifeddine Rezgui](#), en le criblant de treize balles ? En pleine « guerre contre le terrorisme », alors que la saison touristique battait son plein et que l'EI avait promis de nouveaux coups d'éclat, la police tunisienne n'avait-elle pas mieux à faire que de multiplier les descentes dans les rares cafés et restaurants encore ouverts pour faire la chasse à ceux qui ne respectent pas le jeûne du ramadan ?

Ces questions, les Tunisiens sont en droit de se les poser et de les poser à leurs dirigeants, au Premier ministre, Habib Essid, à son ministre de l'Intérieur, Najem Gharalli, et à la ministre du Tourisme, Selma Elloumi Rekik. Un ensemble de dysfonctionnements, de défaillances impardonnables et d'impréparation crasse ont rendu possible le pire attentat jamais perpétré depuis l'indépendance, en 1956 (38 morts et presque autant de blessés). Les responsables devront rendre des comptes. Mais d'autres questions, plus dérangeantes encore, affluent.

Quid du fameux « modèle tunisien de tolérance » ? Comment expliquer que le pays où a éclo le Printemps arabe et qui a accompli sa transition démocratique soit dev-

enu par ailleurs le premier pourvoyeur de jihadistes étrangers en Syrie ? Comment expliquer que cette nation si profondément sécularisée du temps de Habib Bourguiba ait été à ce point rattrapée par le radicalisme ? [Et pourquoi sa jeunesse, la plus éduquée de la région, se montre si perméable aux sirènes salafistes ?](#) La « daéshisation » n'est plus une vue de l'esprit, c'est maintenant une réalité tragiquement palpable dans certains quartiers et dans certaines régions. Les dynamiques exogènes (les chaos syrien et libyen) ne peuvent, à elles seules, tenir lieu d'explication. Tentative de décryptage.

L'accaparement des ressources par Tunis et par l'État central constitue un motif de rancœur récurrent

La ville de Sousse, théâtre du carnage, a-t-elle vraiment été choisie au hasard ? Capitale du Sahel, elle reste « le lieu du pouvoir » par excellence dans l'imaginaire tunisien. Habib Bourguiba, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, ou l'actuel Premier ministre, Habib Essid, sont tous originaires de la région. Alors que la station balnéaire de Hammamet n'a jamais été visée, la ville avait déjà été prise pour cible en août 1987 (une attaque à la bombe, réalisée par la branche militaire du Mouvement de la tendance islamique, MTI, ancêtre d'Ennahdha) et en octobre 2013, lorsqu'un kamikaze s'était fait exploser sur une plage sans faire de victimes (le service de sécurité de l'établissement, le Riadh Palms, avait réussi à le refouler).

Le ressentiment des habitants des régions enclavées contre le pouvoir central et le Sahel avait été le détonateur de la révolution, à Sidi Bouzid, en décembre 2010. À l'origine spécifiquement algérienne, la notion de *hogra* (« mépris ») s'est enracinée en Tunisie. Elle s'exprime dans les textes de rap, dont Rezgui était un fervent adepte avant sa radicalisation religieuse. Les vexations et les violences policières, le dédain avec lequel l'administration peut traiter ses usagers, l'interdiction longtemps faite aux Tunisiens de fréquenter les établissements touristiques et la centralisation excessive ont contribué à nourrir un sentiment de spoliation et de « colonisation intérieure ».

La *hogra* est ressentie de manière particulièrement aiguë dans les régions riches ou supposées riches en minerais – comme le triangle Gafsa-Redeyef-Metlaoui, producteur de phosphates – ou dans le Sud (Tataouine, Médenine, Kébili), qui possède quelques gisements pétroliers. L'accaparement des ressources par Tunis et par l'État central constitue un motif de rancœur récurrent et explique le succès de la campagne démagogique « *winou'l petrol ?* » (« Où est le pétrole ? »), lancée en mai par des partisans de l'ancien président, Moncef Marzouki, et qui a entraîné de nombreuses dégradations de bâtiments publics et la destruction de plusieurs commissariats.

« Des pans entiers de la société ont intériorisé cette idée selon laquelle ils sont *mahgours* [victime de la *hogra*] », explique Hassen Zargouni. Aficionado du Stade tunisien, le club de football du Bardo, le directeur de l'institut de sondages Sigma Conseil a pris conscience du phénomène en allant supporter son équipe. « Dans les an-

nées 1980, le public hurlait « *curva, curva* », des slogans inspirés des chants des tifosi italiens. Aujourd'hui, il s'époumone en scandant « *nmoutou chouhada* » [« nous mourrons en martyrs »], avec l'accent algérien! C'est un basculement très révélateur.» Est-il besoin de le préciser: ruminée, la *hogra* fait le lit de la désespérance sociale, délie des allégeances citoyennes et engendre des pulsions nihilistes auxquelles le jihadisme peut servir d'exutoire. C'est une bombe à retardement.

Ben Ali n'était pas un parangon de démocratie, mais au moins il savait y faire avec les islamistes radicaux. »

C'est une petite musique que l'on entend de plus en plus souvent ces jours-ci : « Ben Ali n'était pas un parangon de démocratie, mais au moins il savait y faire avec les islamistes radicaux. » Attention aux faux-semblants ! Car la théorie de la dictature policière rempart contre l'intégrisme religieux ne résiste pas à l'analyse. On oublie un peu vite que c'est sous son « règne » qu'a débuté la réislamisation de la société tunisienne. Le retour du voile, qui avait pratiquement disparu du paysage au milieu des années 1990, constitue le signe le plus patent de ce phénomène, qui touchait l'ensemble des classes sociales, les plus pauvres mais aussi les plus riches, et qui allait de pair avec une religiosité ostentatoire.

Ce phénomène, qui a d'abord pris les autorités au dépourvu, a été dans un deuxième temps accompagné, voire encouragé. Transformé en entrepreneur politico-religieux, Sakhr el-Materi, gendre de l'ancien président, est celui qui est allé le plus loin dans ce mouvement, fondant successivement Radio Zitouna, exclusivement consacrée à la récitation du Coran, ainsi qu'une banque et une société d'assurance islamiques. Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali a eu à la fois tout juste et tout faux. Tout juste sur le diagnostic : l'islamisme radical et l'idéologie salafiste peuvent constituer des dangers mortels pour la société tunisienne, des dangers exacerbés par l'internet incontrôlé. Tout faux sur les remèdes : l'approche répressive n'est pas la panacée ; elle peut juguler temporairement le phénomène, jamais l'anéantir. Sa grande erreur aura été de rechercher l'accommodement en s'imaginant que l'islamisme pouvait se résorber dans le piétisme et le raidissement identitaire. En réalité, il a brouillé les repères hérités de la période bourguibienne en permettant et en encourageant le retour en force de « l'esprit théologien » que stigmatisait à longueur de discours son prédécesseur. Quatre ans après sa chute, les choses n'ont pas réellement changé.

L'État continue de naviguer à vue, sans savoir à quelle distance de la religion il doit se placer. « Comment peut-on prétendre combattre le terrorisme à sa source alors que nos radios et nos chaînes de télévision nous inondent à longueur de journée d'une idéologie religieuse prônant la violence et la terreur, avec la bénédiction de tous, pouvoir et opposition réunis ? » s'interroge le philosophe de gauche Mohamed Ali Halouani, qui fut candidat à l'élection présidentielle truquée de 2004 contre Ben Ali...

Le gouvernement de Hamadi Jebali n'a rien fait pour empêcher des milliers de Tunisiens – plus de 3 000 – de rejoindre les rangs de la rébellion contre Bachar al-

Assad

Montée du sentiment de hogra, réislamisation et reflux du sécularisme, propagande effrénée sur internet : les ingrédients nécessaires à la prolifération salafiste étaient réunis dès la fin des années 2000 en Tunisie. Il manquait le liant indispensable : les cadres et les sergents recruteurs. Car le terrorisme est un art qui ne s'improvise pas. L'amnistie générale décidée en février 2011, dans l'euphorie de la révolution, a vidé les prisons de milliers de prévenus et de condamnés sur la base de la loi antiterroriste de 2003. Une aubaine pour les radicaux : elle a permis à Ansar al-Charia, organisation matrice du jihadisme tunisien, de se reconstituer et d'étendre ses ramifications sur l'ensemble du territoire national. Lorsque les autorités comprirent, après l'attaque de l'ambassade américaine le 14 septembre 2012, les dangers de cette organisation, il était déjà trop tard.

Les cellules dormantes s'étaient multipliées, et des caches d'armes avaient été aménagées un peu partout. Les gouvernements issus de la troïka (décembre 2011-décembre 2013), dominée par les islamistes d'Ennahdha et leurs alliés du Congrès pour la République (CPR, formation de l'ex-président Moncef Marzouki), ont fait preuve d'un laxisme confinant à la complicité à l'égard de la mouvance salafiste radicale. La Tunisie a vu défiler, avec la bénédiction des autorités de l'époque, un hallucinant cortège de prédicateurs obscurantistes, à l'instar d'un Wajdi Ghoneim vantant les mérites et « l'islamité » de l'excision des petites filles ! Les mosquées sont devenues le théâtre de prêches enflammés et d'appels au jihad pour la Syrie, cautionnés très officiellement par le ministre des Affaires religieuses, Nouredine Khadmi. Le gouvernement de Hamadi Jebali n'a rien fait pour empêcher des milliers de Tunisiens – plus de 3 000 – de rejoindre les rangs de la rébellion contre Bachar al-Assad. Et, lorsque les premières informations faisant état de l'implantation de camps jihadistes sur les hauteurs du mont Chaambi, Ali Larayedh, à l'époque ministre de l'Intérieur, s'est enfermé dans le déni, préférant parler de « sportifs » venus s'entraîner à la montagne.

Conjugués à l'affaiblissement de l'État et au délitement des services de sécurité, à l'afflux des armes en provenance de Libye et à la fascination exercée par la propagande de Daesh sur les esprits faibles, tous ces facteurs laissent hélas à penser que la Tunisie n'est pas près d'en avoir fini avec le terrorisme

<http://www.jeuneafrique.com/>

Tunisie: Lutte contre le terrorisme - Pourvu qu'ils ne passent pas au plan C

Après avoir visé policiers, soldats et touristes, les jihadistes risqueraient de s'attaquer aux édifices publics, grandes surfaces et chancelleries étrangères, à coups de voitures piégées et de kidnappings

Au moment où la Tunisie est en train de panser ses blessures et de suturer les balafres que lui ont occasionnées les terroristes à Sousse, et alors que le branle-bas est à son paroxysme dans les QG des ministères de l'Intérieur, de la Défense et du Tourisme en vue de colmater les brèches et de préparer la contre-offensive qui s'impose, presque personne n'a encore posé la question de savoir ce que nous réserve Daech pour sa prochaine sortie. Et pourtant, cette question mérite bien d'être posée. L'ignorer équivaldrait à laisser l'eau couler sous les ponts et à maintenir la porte ouverte à un remake du dernier attentat. Et voilà pourquoi.

Dans la pure tradition des terroristes

En fouillant dans les archives de l'internationale intégriste depuis sa création par Ben Laden dans les années 80, on tombe sur une vieille tradition diabolique qui leur est encore chère, sous forme d'une stratégie offensive articulée autour de quatre plans principaux à réaliser par étapes, à savoir :

- Plan A : les assassinats de policiers et de soldats, dans le double but d'affaiblir ces deux corps et de semer la terreur au sein de la population. Et ce plan a été déjà exécuté, par le passé, en Afghanistan, au Pakistan, en Irak et en Algérie, et il se poursuit aujourd'hui en Syrie, en Irak, au Yémen, en Libye, en Somalie, au Nigeria, au Mali, au Niger, au Tchad et... en Tunisie. - Plan B : il vise les touristes. Des pays à vocation touristique comme l'Egypte, le Kenya, le Maroc, l'Espagne, le Yémen et dernièrement la Tunisie en furent les plus touchés.

- Plan C : il est basé sur deux options. La première consiste à lancer des attaques à la voiture piégée et à la ceinture explosive contre les édifices publics, les complexes industriels, les grandes surfaces et les chancelleries étrangères. Quant à la seconde option, elle se focalise sur les opérations de kidnapping et de détournement d'avions.

- Plan D : c'est le terminus, soit la prise du pouvoir. Ce plan extrême n'a pas, historiquement, marché pour le moment, à l'exception du Mali (occupation pour quelques mois du nord du pays par la mouvance d'Al Qaïda), de l'Afghanistan (règne provisoire des talibans), du Nigeria (le nord du pays est toujours occupé par Boko Haram), de l'Irak et de la Syrie, deux pays dont une bonne partie du territoire est aujourd'hui aux mains de Daech.

Comme on peut le constater, ce sont les plans B et C qui inquiètent le plus la Tunisie à l'heure actuelle. En effet, outre les conséquences désastreuses des plans A et B qui nous ont coûté plus d'une centaine de pertes humaines entre soldats, policiers, gardes nationaux et touristes, il faut reconnaître courageusement que, quoi qu'on

en disant, notre pays reste encore potentiellement exposé au pire des scénarios, à savoir le plan C qui est synonyme de guérilla urbaine, de rapt, d'attaques à l'explosif et de détournement d'avions, bref de panique quotidienne dont il serait difficile de prévoir la fin.

Inutile de dire que c'est là une sombre perspective mais qu'il serait suicidaire de négliger ou de prendre à la légère. Les autorités sécuritaires et politiques sont tenues de se préparer à tout imprévu. Le pays est en guerre contre le terrorisme. L'Etat est appelé d'urgence à agir en conséquence. Et cela en retenant les leçons du Bardo et de Sousse et en ne commettant plus ces erreurs impardonnables en matière de traque des jihadistes.

International Organizations

Towards More Effective Global Security Governance Through UN@EU Co-operation – Analysis

July 2, 2015



United Nations

The complexity of current security threats requires that the UN work more closely with regional organisations, including the EU, through improved cooperation and partnerships in several areas, such as conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping and peace-building.

By Jessica Almqvist*

In a UN Security Council meeting (UNSC) on the role of regional organisations and sub-regional arrangements held on 9 March 2015, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) held that the UN is unable to tackle current security threats on its own. The complexity of these threats requires that it work more closely with regional organisations, including the EU, through improved cooperation and partnerships in several areas, such as conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping and peace-building. The importance of the role of regional organisations was reaffirmed at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) High-Level Thematic Debate on Strengthening Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organisations held on 4 May. The object of the debate was to address questions such as how to strengthen UN partnerships with regional organisations and the need to improve regional capacities in the area of peace and security more generally.

Analysis

(1) Introduction

In a [UN Security Council meeting \(UNSC\)](#) held on 9 March 2015, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) held that the UN is unable to tackle current security threats on its own. The complexity of these threats requires that it work more closely with regional organisations, including the EU, through improved cooperation and partnerships in several areas, such as conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping and peace-building. The importance of the role of regional organisations was reaffirmed at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) [High-Level Thematic Debate on Strengthening Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organisations](#) held on 4 May. The object of the debate was to address questions such as how to strengthen UN partnerships with regional organisations and the need to improve regional capacities in the area of peace and security more generally.

(2) Critical steps in the development of UN-EU cooperation

The EU embraces cooperation with the UN, and reinforcing cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, in line with its medium-term priorities for the UN (2012-15) and as one of its priorities at the 69th session of the UNGA 2014.¹

For decades the EU has sought to advance a common voice of its members on matters of foreign affairs. For the most part, however, this endeavour has been impeded because of the absence of EU organs and mechanisms assigned with the task to actually work towards such a goal. The Lisbon Treaty represents a breakthrough in this regard. Not only does it call for the appointment of an EU High Representative on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (art. 18 TEU), but it also mandates the Council to establish an External Action Service (art. 27.3 TEU). The same treaty endows the EU with international legal personality (art. 47 TEU) and gives it a clear mandate to strengthen cooperation and build partnerships not only with third countries but also with 'international, regional or global organisations which share the principles' that the Union seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, human rights, human dignity, equality and solidarity and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law'. Specifically, the EU 'shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations' (art. 21 TEU). The Lisbon Treaty thus enables, even obliges, the EU to engage with the UN more deeply.

The legal empowerment of the EU as a multilateral actor has been rewarded in the UN context. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU has obtained new rights to participate in the work and sessions of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). As of 2011, EU representatives are allowed to present agreed common positions, make interventions, present proposals and circulate EU communications as official documents.² Furthermore, the UNSC has started to organise regular

meetings with regional organisations, including the EU. Since 2010, the EU High Representative on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has been invited five times by the UNSC to discuss the EU's contributions in the area of global peace and security, and the possibilities for further improvement.³

UN-EU cooperation has intensified most significantly in the area of crisis management. The first formal commitments were expressed in 2003 with the signing of the [Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management](#) in the area of civilian and military crisis management, in particular in the Balkans and in Africa. A [Joint Statement](#) was made in 2007. As of 2011, the UN has a [Liaison Office for Peace and Security in Brussels](#) (UNLOPS) to enhance its partnership with the EU, NATO and other organisations in Brussels on peacekeeping, crisis management, political affairs, conflict and mediation. In 2012, the Council of the EU adopted a [Plan of Action to enhance EU CDSPP support to UN peacekeeping](#) (*EU Action Plan*), which calls for the establishment of a list of military and civilian capabilities that EU members can potentially put at the disposal of UN peacekeeping. In the process of implementing this plan (lasting until the end of 2014), both organisations have been striving for closer cooperation. The value of UN cooperation with regional organisations, above all the AU but also the EU, was underscored in [UNSC resolution 2167 of 28 July 2014](#).

At the moment, the UN and the EU are operating side-by-side in several crisis situations. There are no less than eight parallel UN and EU missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo, Mali, Central African Republic, Somalia, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Israel/Palestinian territories.⁴ Both organisations are now seeking to strengthen their cooperation in the light of these and previous experiences. In this spirit, the UNSG recently appointed a [High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations](#) that will address a broad range of issues facing peace operations, including partnerships with regional organisations. Also, the ongoing process of drafting a new EU Action Plan for 2015 focuses on ways to better tackle practical problems faced in the context of parallel engagements. Stress is placed on the UN's lack of military capacity in challenging environments where 'soft soldiering' is deemed insufficient. In these contexts, the EU may act as strategic enabler through the provision of rapid-reaction forces, such as the EU Battlegroups, logistical assets or high-tech equipment.⁵ Also being discussed is how to overcome outdated and negative attitudes of the EU's military and political leaders towards UN peacekeeping in general. A third issue is how to deal with the reality of differing approaches to Rule of Law as well as Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR) activities.⁶ What is lacking is a shared understanding of the meaning of these concepts and how to implement them in concrete settings.⁷

(3) Political appraisals of EU contributions and actions

In its first-ever presidential statement on UN-EU cooperation issued in 2014, the UNSC lauded the EU's activities in the area of peace and security.⁸ Special mention was made to the EU's achievements as an international negotiator, including its role in the reaching of an agreement in November 2013 on a [Joint Plan of Action](#) on

Iran's nuclear programme. Also noted was the [EU-facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo](#), which led to an agreement and the normalisation of relations between the two parties in April 2013. The Council President further welcomed the EU's comprehensive approach to the maintenance of peace and security, and its role in combating piracy off the Somali coast. Another positive advance was the EU's assistance to the Central African Republic through [humanitarian aid](#), and its financial contributions and temporary operation to assist the African-led [International Support Mission to the Central African Republic \(MISCA\)](#). In addition, the President expressed appreciation of the EU's initiative to provide humanitarian assistance to the affected people in Syria and neighbouring countries, and its timely in-kind support for the rapid establishment of the [Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons—United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic](#).

At the recent UNSC meeting with the newly elected EU High Representative, Federica Mogherini, held in March 2015, the UN Secretary-General reiterated the UN's positive view on the EU's role as a negotiator, not only in the context of the Belgrade-Kosovo dialogue and the Iran nuclear talks, but also in relation to the [Middle East peace process](#).⁹ Also highlighted were the EU's diplomatic efforts in Libya.¹⁰ Ban Ki-Moon further emphasised the EU's support for mediation, including through the funding of the UN's Standby Team of Mediation Experts. In addition, he emphasised the significance of the UN-EU partnership in the management of crisis situations, such as in Somalia, Mali and the Central African Republic.

At the same meeting, however, individual UNSC members expressed concerns about the EU's aspiration to act in a more autonomous manner on matters of security and peace. Welcoming the EU's cooperation with the UN, China expressed its hope that the EU would abide by the principles of the UN Charter, particularly as regards respect for the sovereign equality of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes.¹¹ Russia conveyed its positive stance on the EU's engagement in crisis situations, but also stressed that in 'implementing its crisis-management operations, the European Union and its member States should always go strictly by the relevant decisions of the Security Council'. In this context, Russia referred specifically to the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, noting that 'despite the growing demand for an effective mechanism for organising a division of labour between the United Nations and regional associations, including the EU, the leading role of the Security Council in issues related to the maintenance of international peace and security is unshakable. It is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and cannot be subject to review'.¹² Finally, Russia expressed misgivings about the [EU's advisory mission to Ukraine](#).

The resurfacing of Cold War politics in international relations raises an awareness of the EU's ambitions and interests that can come into tension with an ever-closer UN cooperation. The EU's restrictive measures imposed on Russian and Syrian leaders in the absence of the UNSC's authorisation is a case in point. To this should be added that the EU is in the process of aligning itself with NATO. This move is not surprising

considering the changing security situation in Europe, the EU's ambition to advance a common defence policy and that the majority of EU members are also part of NATO (22). Nevertheless, the process could be perceived negatively by the UNSC's members that are not part of NATO. The EU and NATO share objectives, such as fighting against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. According to NATO's new [Strategic Concept](#), adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, other common areas are energy security issues and cyber defence. At that summit, NATO's Secretary-General stressed the importance of EU-NATO cooperation in the light of new threats and challenges, 'emanating from the east as a consequence of the behaviour of a more assertive Russia, responsible for aggressive actions in Ukraine, and from the south, in the Middle East and North Africa, through turmoil, barbaric violence, and ISIL terrorist activities close to our borders'.¹³

(4) Legal assessment of UN-EU cooperation and its limits

That the UNSC would need to count on regional and sub-regional arrangements to carry out its mandate in an effective manner is not a novel idea. In a handful of provisions concentrated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter adopted in 1945, the drafters of this founding document laid down a basic framework for governing relations between the UNSC and regional organisations. These provisions focus not so much on the rights of regional actors as on their basic responsibilities. In addition to establishing a general responsibility for these organisations to act in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter (arts. 1 and 2), the UN founders endowed them with a special responsibility to settle local disputes arising in their respective regions (art. 52). However, no 'enforcement action' may be taken at a regional level without UNSC authorisation, which, on the other hand, 'shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority' (art. 53). Also, regional organisations are obliged to fully inform the UNSC 'of their activities undertaken or in contemplation... for the maintenance of international peace and security' (art. 54).

Reading these provisions, it becomes clear that the drafters of the UN Charter envisioned a collective security arrangement that would be multilateral in character with the UNSC at its core. In order for the new institutional arrangement to be effective, regional organisations would need to shoulder responsibilities not only in relation to local dispute settlements, but also in the enforcement of UNSC decisions. Regional actors were encouraged to assume an active role in the maintenance of peace and security and in this respect act autonomously but only up to a certain point: 'enforcement actions' by regional organisations were not to be allowed unless mandated by the UNSC. If we consider that the term 'cooperation' has several literal meanings –both 'working jointly towards the same end' and to 'assist someone or comply with their requests'–,¹⁴ the spirit of the cooperative schemes foreseen by the UN founders were more akin to the second meaning.

Seventy years on, the budding legal question is how to interpret the provisions meant to govern the relationship between the UN and regional organisations to meet the threats and challenges of today. Key questions turn on what is meant by

unauthorised 'enforcement action', which defines the limit to the role of regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. A somewhat different issue is whether the strengthening of regional capacities in the area of peace and security will affect the interpretation of regional responsibilities in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and if so, how.

While Chapter VIII does not define the meaning of 'enforcement action', there is general agreement that unilateral or regional military actions, whether as part of an international intervention or a peace operation, count as such. Since the launching of the [Agenda for Peace](#) by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, peace operations may use force in their own defence and of their mandate or civilians in imminent danger and are thus seen as requiring UNSC authorisation. The sole clear exception to the prohibition against unilateral or regional use of force (art. 2.4) is the right to self-defence, whether individual or collective in character (art. 51). Nevertheless, other possible interpretations of the character of the prohibition against the use of force abound. For example, the legality of armed intervention on purely humanitarian grounds is a matter of continued debate. In addition, there is no clear prohibition against unilateral or regional economic sanctions or other similar restrictive measures. US- and EU-based international law scholars tend to view such sanctions as legal provided there are conditions for adopting countermeasures.¹⁵ Nevertheless, there is no general agreement on this approach, as indicated by the Russian and Chinese views on such sanctions.

The drafters of the UN Charter crafted a legal framework that stakes out the basic responsibilities of regional organisations in global security governance. Nevertheless, the rules that were formulated are done so in general terms and do not recognise any rights. Even if from a legal standpoint, legal vagueness or silence in the law is thought to undermine the ideals of the Rule of Law, such as legal clarity and predictability, the fact that the exact limits of the law in this area remain somewhat unsettled may have some strategic advantage in the sense of inducing a climate of toleration of differing views on the rights of regional organisations. Conflicting positions on the limits of the autonomy of regional organisations in concrete cases are to be expected. Rather than undermining the conditions for advancing schemes of cooperation, the issues under disagreement will be the object of continued dialogue in the political context.

(5) Towards more effective global security governance

The promotion of a global security governance model in which regional organisations are given a critical role has special merit in that it seeks to provide more effective global responses and management of crisis situations. The present efforts to strengthen cooperation between the UN and regional organisations are guided by this primary objective. Key questions are thus of a practical nature and centre on how to best cooperate, and who should be responsible for what in different situations. On these matters the legal framework established in the UN Charter does not provide much guidance. Instead, the relevance of organising principles such as com-

parative advantages, complementarity and burden-sharing that have been introduced to improve effectiveness in international aid is under consideration.¹⁶ So far, there is no agreed understanding of the practical significance of these principles in the context of UN cooperation with regional organisations in the area of peace and security. These are questions that still remain ahead.

Conclusions

As this comment has indicated, the furthering of a model of global security governance in which regional organisations are given a more prominent role also raises questions of principle. Of primary concern is the degree of autonomy of regional organisations to act on their own in the area of peace and security beyond the realm of dispute settlement envisioned in the UN Charter. The EU's responses in crisis situations not supported by UNSC mandates have evoked negative reactions by members. In this light, the question arises as to whether the return of Cold War politics and the changing security situation in Europe may place strains on current ambitions to strengthen UN-EU cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security. As for now, there is no indication that such strains will materialise in practice. Indeed, the multitude of crisis situations already seized by the UNSC in need of more effective governance, including funding and military assistance, speak in favour of continued reinforcement of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, including the EU, in the years to come.

About the author:

*Jessica Almqvist, Senior Research Fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute

Source:

This article was published by [Elcano Royal Institute](#)

Notes:

¹ See EU Delegation to the UN-New York, '[EU Priorities for the UN 69th General Assembly](#)'.

² UNGA res. 65/276 of 3/V/2011.

³ A first UNSC meeting with the EU High Representative was held in 2010 and has been organised on an annual basis thereafter except for in 2012 when no such meeting was held.

⁴ See Wanda Hummel & Tobias Piezt (2015), 'Partnering for Peace: Lessons and Next Steps for EU-UN Cooperation on Peace Operations', *ZIF Policy Briefing*, February, p. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.* See also Adam C. Smith (2014), 'European Military Capabilities and UN Peace Operations: Strengthening the Partnership', *ZIF Policy Briefing*, October; and Wanda Troszczynska-Van Genderen (2015), *Reforming the United Nations: State of Plays, Ways Forward*, European Parliament Study, February 2015, p. 34.

⁶ UNSC mandates regularly call for security sector reform. See eg *Securing states and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform. Report of the UN Secretary General*. UN doc. A /67/970-S /2013/480, 13/

VIII/2013, p. 7.

⁷ Hummel & Piezt, *supra* note 4, 4.

⁸ [UNSC Presidential Statement](#) (14/II/2014).

⁹ UNSC meeting, *supra* note 1.

¹⁰ Between 2011 and 2014 the EU role was led by Bernadino León when serving as EU Special Representative for Libya and EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean. In August 2014, Mr León was appointed UN Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya ([UNSMIL](#)).

¹¹ Reaffirming a strong commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter was the theme selected by China for the open debate held in February 2015 when presiding the UNSC. See [Concept paper for Security Council open debate on Feb. 23](#).

¹² For an overview of EU engagement with Ukraine, see [EU External Action Service, Factsheet. EU-Ukraine Relations](#), Brussels, 24/IV/2015.

¹³ [‘Secretary General: We can achieve more if we work more closely together’](#), 30/III/2015.

¹⁴ See *Oxford Dictionaries*, available at <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/cooperate>.

¹⁵ For these conditions, see generally arts. 49 to 54 of the ILC draft articles on the [Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts](#). Annex to UNGA res. 56/83 of 12/XII/2001, and corrected by doc. A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4.

¹⁶ These principles were mentioned in the Concept Note for the UNGA High-Level Thematic Debate on Strengthening Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations, Trusteeship Council, 4/V/2015.

<http://www.eurasiareview.com/>

Terrorism in the World

Arab political thought must overcome ambiguity

JULY 7, 2015

The frightful events that occurred week before last in Tunisia, Somalia, France and Kuwait were perpetrated, according to the culprits, “in the name of Islam”. Nobody doubts that genuine Islam has nothing to do with such a rogue misunderstanding. Many Muslim clerics have said it. But the silence of some others is deafening. Incidentally, has anyone recently heard from Yousuf Al Qaradawi?

What is heard in Europe, inversely, are the usual, biased dialectics between those who say that the terrorists “cannot be considered Muslims” — as some Imams reiterated in France and Tunisia, where 80 mosques were nevertheless shut down by the authorities — and others who make the usual connection between Islam and terrorism, through the Muslim Brotherhood or salafists or Al Qaida or Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).



Actually, many Europeans would like the Arabs to start reflecting more intensively on the links between religion and politics. An interesting example is the latest book by Lebanese Professor Georges Corm, *Thinking and politics in the Arab world*. While doing so, they would not miss the movement of extremists from Europe to Syria to fight the secular regime of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. As expected, they are

returning home (including under the guise of political migrants), and have decided to strike in such a way that local security forces can hardly prevent the attacks. One is reminded of Arab youth who were trained and sent to Afghanistan in the name of Muslim solidarity in the 1980s to fight against the Soviets at a time when Palestinians were suffering in the very heart of the Arab world.

They would also link what is happening in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere to terrorism. Is the 'Arab political thinking' prepared to discuss the matter openly, so that it can offer proper solutions? Looking at some of the ambiguities prevailing in the region, one may be tempted to answer 'not yet'. But when will the tragedies — such as those in eastern Saudi Arabia last month and in Kuwait week before last — be enough to widen the debate?

From now on, Europe cannot look away from the problems of the Arab world, which have changed in nature as a result of what has occurred in Tunisia and Libya. Europe has come under attack from some in its closest southern neighbours. What should its response be?

When France intervened in Mali, two years ago, to prevent Al Qaida from expanding in Western Africa, it sent troops on the ground and it fought hard. It did it nearly alone, and some analysts claimed France was playing its usual 'colonial game' — let us hope such commentators did not have relatives enjoying vacations in Sousse. But France cannot do that again this time.

Daesh is a mighty enemy and seems to have hardly been affected by the air campaign against it. It has huge financial means. Its presence is a threat to the entire region, as Kuwait found out last week. In Iraq, military experts say that a 10,000-strong force on the ground could probably solve the problem. But who will do that? The US has other preoccupations. In the Middle East, America is willing to make a nuclear deal with Iran and move on. At some point, one could even wonder whether they are actually willing to 'fight' terrorism or are content to just 'manage' it.

It is probably the increasing absence of the US (and Britain) from the battlefield, together with the non-existent foreign policy of the political dwarf that is Europe, that France has moved recently into two directions.

First one was a meeting organised early last month in Paris with representatives of 50 countries, aimed at "fighting terrorism". Iran was not invited. There is no need to elaborate further if one of the actors best equipped to fight Daesh is not even welcome.

The second initiative was a mission led by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, aimed at relaunching the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis. There was the usual and unsurprising answer from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: "Israel will never accept a solution imposed from outside." Even though a resolution will finally be presented to the UN in September, it cannot go ahead without

US support.

It is one thing to fill in the gap, but quite another to have an Arab policy. As analyst Richard Labeviere put it in a recent interview with Lebanese newspaper L'Orient Le Jour: "In [Charles] De Gaulle's times, France used to have an Arab policy. It now has a Sunni policy with business deals as its main feature."

Syria, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, terrorism, Palestinian-Israeli conflict ... everything is increasingly connected. "Information, by nature, goes along with lies," wrote Ibn Khaldoun at the end of the 14th century. This is why 'Arab political thinking' should try and overcome any kind of ambiguity. As long as there are enough people in the world who believe that beheading an innocent in the name of religion or slaughtering dozens of others because they do not think as you do are monstrous crimes, it remains a strong message for hope.

Luc Debieuvre is a French essayist and a lecturer at Iris (Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques) and the Facó Law University of Paris.

<http://gulfnews.com/>

France

Lutte contre une dérive sectaire

1er juillet 2015

Manuel Valls, à la suite des attentats qui viennent de frapper la France et la Tunisie a parlé d'une lutte pour la civilisation, le terme le plus adéquat serait plutôt d'une lutte contre une dérive sectaire qui touche des pays de plus en plus nombreux par une mouvance se réclamant d'une version très particulière de l'islam. Et cette lutte doit désormais être radicale.

Au sein de l'islam sunnite existent 4 grands rites juridico-religieux (Madhhab) : ces 4 écoles ont des interprétations plus ou moins ouvertes de l'islam. Le Malikisme est présent en Afrique du Nord et en Afrique de l'Ouest et représente donc 90 % des musulmans français. Le hanafisme pour sa part concerne les 10 % restant, d'origine turque. Ces deux écoles (tout comme la troisième le chaféisme, présent à Mayotte) ont une interprétation modérée de l'islam. Elles ne posent pas de problème particulier pour l'insertion des musulmans français au sein de la République (voir <http://www.christophebugeau.fr>).

D'où vient le problème de l'islam radical ? Du 4ème rite : le Hanbalisme, créé en réaction aux trois premiers. Ce rite ne représente que moins de 5% des musulmans sunnites dans le monde mais il relève bien d'une véritable dérive sectaire : les salafistes de tout bord s'en réclament : que ce soit ceux d'Al-Qaïda ou de l'Etat Islamique. Les frères musulmans égyptiens s'en réclament aussi (d'où l'hostilité à leur égard de l'Université d'Al-Hazar où sont fortement représentés les autres rites). Enfin et là réside la double tête du serpent : l'Arabie Saoudite et le Qatar sont de rite Wahhabite qui est une résurgence du Hanbalisme.

D'où le soutien de ces deux états aux prêcheurs radicaux et à certaines organisations comme l'Etat islamique à ses débuts. Il est donc temps de cesser de nous associer avec les amis de nos ennemis.

Nous devons prendre des mesures radicales avant que la situation ne s'aggrave et que l'objectif des islamistes soit atteint : séparer les populations musulmanes d'Europe du reste de la population, amener vers un nouvel islam les pays musulmans de la zone arabophone.

En France, nous devons interdire le financement d'associations culturelles par des Etats étrangers, des associations étrangères ou des personnes résidents à l'étranger. Il est tout aussi nécessaire de fermer les lieux de cultes se réclamant de cette mouvance sectaire et d'expulser les Imams radicaux étrangers (les renseignements généraux et la mission interministérielle de lutte contre les sectes ont un rôle important à jouer à ce niveau). Il faut aussi organiser un islam de France bâti sur les doctrines traditionnelles des pays d'origine des musulmans présents en France.

Il faut aussi mener une lutte plus dure sur Internet : en menant des infiltrations sur les réseaux djihadistes mais aussi en organisant des dénis d'accès des sites web et des supports internet de cette mouvance (nous avons sûrement quelques hackers qui seraient ravi de rendre leurs talents utiles).

En dernier lieu notre politique étrangère doit redevenir cohérente : nous ne pouvons vendre des rafales à un pays dont l'émir est tout puissant : le Qatar. Nous ne pouvons signer des contrats mirobolants avec un état où les femmes n'ont pas le droit de conduire (et où décapite au sabre : tradition qui s'exporte de plus en plus) : l'Arabie Saoudite. Ces Etats doivent au contraire être placés sous embargo !

Quant à la lutte au Mali et contre l'Etat Islamique, elle doit s'amplifier et permettre aux populations des zones occupées d'être libérées au plus vite. Nous ne luttons pas pour la civilisation ou pour une civilisation, nous nous attaquons à une dérive sectaire pire que la Scientologie ou les témoins de Jéhovah et nous devons le faire avec la plus grande application !

<http://www.agoravox.fr/>

Lettres au Monde de Monsieur et Madame toulemonde, après Charlie

'Le Monde' a fait un livre des courriers de ses lecteurs durant les 21 jours de janvier. Extraits.



3 février

"Citoyens aujourd'hui... Et demain ?"

L'extraordinaire mouvement citoyen que vient de vivre la France n'a sans doute pas d'autre équivalent historique que les manifestations populaires de la Libération. Après une première vague de réactions spontanées exprimant la sidération, la douleur et la révolte face à la barbarie des actes terroristes, ce mouvement a complètement submergé les rues de nos villes pour affirmer de manière forte les valeurs essentielles de notre société, la liberté d'expression, le respect de la vie, la tolérance, la paix, la solidarité. Ces valeurs dépassent très largement le cadre de notre République et constituent les fondements d'une culture désormais universelle. D'ailleurs, le formidable écho que ce mouvement a recueilli dans le monde, l'exceptionnel soutien international dont il a bénéficié, en témoignent à l'évidence.

Ce mouvement, essentiellement spontané, certes porté, amplifié, conforté par les médias et les réseaux sociaux, à travers ce beau slogan unificateur, "je suis Charlie", a réveillé et mis en branle, toutes les composantes de notre peuple, toutes les générations, toutes les régions, toutes les couches sociales, toutes les cultures, toutes les religions, unies dans une communauté de sentiments et de convictions. Il s'est montré largement autonome, aussi bien des partis politiques et des associations que de l'ensemble des autorités publiques qu'il a néanmoins généreusement soutenues. Il est apparu à la fois comme extrêmement surprenant et totalement rassurant. Il marque un moment inoubliable de conscience collective, de lucidité, de dignité, de courage et de responsabilité qui ne peut pas totalement retomber.

C'est pourquoi, deux questions cruciales se posent.

La première est de savoir si les citoyens n'ont pour fonction que de réaffirmer, une

fois par siècle, nos valeurs fondamentales dans les “grands moments” de notre histoire, de s’exprimer tous les cinq ans dans les scrutins déléгатifs ou s’ils peuvent, plus régulièrement, jouer un rôle, exercer une influence voire un pouvoir plus importants dans la vie de la cité et dans les politiques suivies ?

Car on ne peut pas oublier la crise que traverse notre démocratie “déléгатive” ni le fossé qui sépare la classe politique dans son ensemble de la majorité des citoyens et encore moins le discrédit des partis politiques rejetés par 90 % de la population qui ne supportent plus la politique politicienne ultra-médiatisée. Ce mouvement n’a en aucun cas re-légitimé le pouvoir politique, qui a été largement dépassé, même si le nouveau “commandeur” Hollande a sans doute récupéré quelques points dans les sondages. Les statuts de déléгатaire institutionnel du pouvoir et de spectateur médiatique dans lesquels les citoyens ont été enfermés sont-ils encore acceptables ? Ce mouvement met à l’ordre du jour la nécessaire refondation de la démocratie et de la manière de faire de la politique. À quoi cela servirait-il de rappeler toutes ces valeurs si elles sont ensuite, même partiellement, bafouées par les politiques ? Il faut avancer vers une nouvelle démocratie, plus directe et authentiquement participative.

La deuxième question est de savoir comment ce mouvement peut se poursuivre, comment peut-il se prolonger, dans le quotidien et dans la durée ? La réponse n’existe pas encore et personne, surtout pas les politiques professionnels, ne peut avoir la prétention de l’apporter. C’est aux citoyens, descendus dans la rue et à ceux qui n’ont pas pu le faire de la rechercher, collectivement, avec le même sens démocratique et la même tolérance qui ont prévalu au cours du dernier week-end.

Je suggère modestement que puissent se tenir, dans les jours et dans les semaines qui viennent, des réunions, des forums, dans les quartiers, dans les petites villes, dans les cantons ruraux avec, en particulier, cette préoccupation incontournable de préserver ou de réparer notre manière de vivre ensemble dans la diversité.
Michel Jouard, Lyon

29 janvier

“Laïcité à la française, cette incomprise...”

Le grand débat national sur la laïcité m’inspire plusieurs réflexions que je me permets de vous livrer. En premier lieu qu’il est pour le moins malheureux de parler de laïcité comme si ce mot était synonyme de liberté d’expression. Ce mot est en effet fortement daté, venu d’une époque où l’Église catholique était toute-puissante et était considérée comme dangereuse pour les libertés, en premier lieu celle de penser. Si l’on tient à conserver ce mot quelque peu ridicule, qu’il en soit ainsi.

Mais notre pays doit savoir ce qu’il veut. Ou bien accueillir une immigration diversifiée dont la culture et la religion sont différentes de celles des Français ou bien se cramponner, en la chérissant comme un trésor national, à une notion de la liberté d’expression quelque peu byzantine et d’ailleurs presque totalement incomprise en

dehors de l'Hexagone, qui permet d'insulter les croyances des autres. Si cette notion l'emporte aux yeux de nos dirigeants, nous pouvons d'ores et déjà renoncer à intégrer les nouveaux immigrants et à ramener dans le giron de la nation les Français de deuxième et troisième générations qui ont désespéré de la France et sont devenus les enfants perdus de la République.

La capacité à vivre ensemble, fondée d'abord sur le respect de l'autre, conditionne l'avenir de notre pays et ne doit pas occuper le wagon de queue du train républicain. À ce propos on peut s'interroger sur le vocable de République employé à tout bout de champ et décliné sous toutes ses formes.

La république n'est qu'une forme de régime politique, un moyen d'organisation de l'État. Serait-elle plus vertueuse, plus démocratique, plus protectrice de la liberté, plus égalitaire, plus transparente que les monarchies scandinaves, néerlandaise et même britannique (cette dernière dans une certaine mesure)? Les scandales politiques que les médias nous révèlent régulièrement nous montrent au contraire que notre république est du type bananier et ne saurait même songer à se comparer à ces pays.

Surtout, où est la France dans tout ça? Comment pourra-t-on intégrer de jeunes Africains et Maghrébins en ne leur parlant que de république et de laïcité et en faisant l'impasse sur le patriotisme et sur la France. Pense-t-on pouvoir y arriver en en faisant des laïcs et des républicains, eux qui proviennent d'ailleurs tous de républiques, d'Afrique du nord ou d'Afrique noire (ce qui amène à s'interroger au passage sur le contenu qu'ils peuvent associer à un tel régime et à douter fortement qu'il puisse avoir à leurs yeux quelque supériorité morale). Nous avons besoin, tout comme eux, qu'ils deviennent des Français. Avons-nous honte de ce que nous sommes (Français !) pour ne pas nous nommer et pour nous cacher derrière des mots dont l'effet fédérateur est à peu près égal à zéro quand il n'est pas un obstacle en soi à leur intégration?

Philippe Guérin, Paris

26 janvier

“Une vision microscopique d'un sujet de portée mondiale”

L'attaque mortelle des journalistes de Charlie Hebdo divise l'opinion mondiale en deux camps. Il y a ceux qui défendent bec et ongles la totale liberté d'expression même lorsqu'elle heurte les sentiments religieux les plus profonds, des musulmans en particulier; et ceux qui estiment que face à ces sentiments, il y a des limites à ne pas franchir.

Malgré ces fortes dissensions, l'onde de choc provoquée par l'attaque du journal satirique a largement dépassé les frontières françaises.

On peut se demander pourquoi la liberté de choquer les musulmans à travers la publication des caricatures de leur prophète est acceptable en France et pas partout dans le monde. Cela tient à deux raisons fondamentales. La première est d'ordre légal, le délit de blasphème n'existe pas en France, contrairement à ce qui se passe dans d'autres pays occidentaux comme la Hollande ou l'Allemagne. La seconde raison est quant à elle d'ordre historique.

En France, le déclin de la monarchie au prix de la révolution correspondait à la fin d'une époque au cours de laquelle l'Église avait présenté le pouvoir absolu, exercé non sans abus par le monarque, comme d'émanation divine. L'avènement de la République en France annonce le retour du pouvoir au peuple et nul ne devrait désormais l'exercer sans le mandat du peuple qui incarne seul la souveraineté. Pour avoir gardé un souvenir pas forcément reluisant de la coalition entre l'Église et le monarque dans la gestion des affaires publiques, les Français, par la loi de 1905, ont posé le principe de la séparation entre l'Église et l'État. Ainsi, la méfiance vis-à-vis de la religion dans cette République laïque vient de cette réalité historique qui explique en toute vraisemblance la tolérance des propos mêmes les plus extrêmes tenus à l'égard de la religion.

Les journalistes de Charlie Hebdo ont usé et abusé de cette liberté pour se moquer, à travers quelques dessins, du prophète des musulmans sans tenir compte du fait que ces images pouvaient violemment heurter le sentiment religieux des musulmans et engendrer des menaces importantes pour leur propre vie et celle des autres. Ces journalistes ont eu une vision microscopique d'un sujet de portée mondiale touchant les convictions religieuses les plus profondes de plus d'un milliard de musulmans dans le monde. Les dessins, à part le fait qu'ils tournaient en dérision le prophète des musulmans, n'apportaient rien au débat intellectuel et objectif sans préjugés, nécessaire sur l'islam à un moment où des groupes radicaux sanguinaires se réclamant de cette religion commettent des crimes abominables et injustifiables en son nom un peu partout dans le monde, y compris contre d'autres musulmans. Aussi, les nouveaux dessins publiés après l'attaque du journal ne se situaient pas dans le registre de la liberté d'expression mais plutôt dans la continuation d'une logique de confrontation inutile et contre-productive avec d'immenses effets collatéraux dans le monde.

Dans un monde peuplé que de Français partageant intimement le même bagage historique et culturel, les caricatures avilissantes du prophète des musulmans n'auraient pas eu de conséquences majeures. Par ailleurs, la différence dans la perception de ce qui est ou non admissible en matière de liberté d'expression face au fait religieux tient à la trajectoire historique de chaque société mais aussi à sa culture. En se plaçant dans un autre contexte, par exemple, celui des États-Unis d'Amérique, on s'aperçoit que le rapport que la société américaine entretient avec la religion est complètement différent de ce qui se passe en France.

Pourtant nul ne peut soupçonner les USA d'avoir des standards de moindre qualité

en matière de défense de la liberté d'expression. En vertu du premier amendement, cette liberté d'expression y bénéficie d'une protection supra-constitutionnelle qu'on ne trouve nulle part dans le monde. Ce texte interdit au législateur américain de faire une loi qui aura pour but de restreindre la liberté d'expression. Pour preuve certains courants religieux considérés comme des sectes dangereuses en France, et interdites à ce titre, sont tout à fait libres aux USA. De plus, les médias américains ont la réputation d'être en général plus offensifs que ceux de la France. Sur la question de la vie privée du personnel politique par exemple, le consensus des journalistes français d'en parler moins ou pas du tout n'existe pas aux USA.

De ce qui précède, comment comprendre alors le choix éditorial des médias américains de ne pas publier les dessins controversés de Charlie Hebdo. Les réponses à ces questionnements sont à rechercher dans la place qu'occupe la religion dans la société américaine. Comme en France, il existe officiellement aux USA une séparation entre la religion et l'État et ce principe découle du 14e amendement. Toutefois, au regard des circonstances de la constitution de ce qui est devenu les USA, la religion joue un rôle central dans la vie politique. En effet, les premiers colons protestants qui se sont installés dans ce vaste territoire cherchaient à fuir l'intolérance religieuse dont ils étaient victimes en Europe.

L'Amérique représentait à leurs yeux une terre de liberté où ils pouvaient vivre leur foi sans être inquiétés. Le facteur religieux a donc joué un rôle fondateur aux USA et cela se remarque aujourd'hui dans la vie politique américaine. On peut ainsi y relever certaines pratiques surréalistes du point de vue français. Aux USA, avant d'ouvrir une session du congrès, une prière est prononcée. Sur la monnaie américaine est inscrite la formule suivante qui réfère à Dieu: "In God we trust". Le fait pour un candidat à l'élection présidentielle de montrer publiquement son attachement à une Église est positivement perçu. Sans être exhaustif on peut encore indiquer que le discours d'un président se termine par l'appel suivant: "que Dieu sauve les USA".

Ainsi, il convient de se demander si la liberté d'expression, malgré son socle commun défini par l'article 19 de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme, peut avoir des déclinaisons différentes selon les sociétés en ce qui concerne, entre autres, son rapport avec le fait religieux. Autrement, le niveau de tolérance de toutes les sociétés est-il le même en ce qui a trait à la liberté de se moquer du fait religieux? Quelle que soit l'idée qu'on se fait de la liberté d'expression, les réactions enregistrées suite à l'attaque de Charlie Hebdo montrent à quel point les perceptions sont différentes en ce qui concerne la relation entre la liberté de la presse et le fait religieux. Il apparaît de plus en plus clairement dans ce contexte que la convergence technologique n'a nullement conduit à la convergence idéologique ou identitaire entre d'une part les composantes d'une même société a fortiori entre différentes sociétés. La diversité culturelle est une donnée majeure que les nouvelles technologies comme Internet et le développement des moyens de com-

munication dévoilent souvent brutalement à la face du monde.

À ce titre, la France, connue par ailleurs pour ses positions très avancées en matière de défense de la diversité culturelle dans le monde, notamment dans le cadre de la francophonie et du commerce international, est curieusement un pays qui vit mal sa propre diversité culturelle. Sauf exceptions rarissimes, c'est un fait incontesté que les personnes issues des minorités visibles dans ce pays n'y trouvent pas leur compte ni sur le plan de l'éducation ni sur le plan de la réussite professionnelle à cause des différentes formes de ségrégations, et d'une politique d'intégration inadaptée, fondée sur l'assimilation du français d'origine étrangère ou qui a vocation à le devenir. Cependant, nul besoin de démontrer que c'est une utopie de vouloir assimiler les personnes qui, indépendamment d'elles, ont d'autres référents culturels et historiques.

Sans perspectives d'avenir, ces personnes en rupture avec la société française finissent par ne plus croire dans les institutions de la République. Certaines parmi elles n'hésitent pas à prêter allégeance à des organisations djihadistes et autres, auprès desquelles, elles ont le sentiment de retrouver soit l'honneur perdu soit un sens à la vie. L'un des défis majeurs de la République en France est de trouver, en tenant compte des limites de l'assimilation, et des dangers du multiculturalisme poussé à l'extrême comme aux USA, une politique d'intégration de ses citoyens d'origines étrangères. Il existe dans cette quête une voie qui synchronise l'acceptation de l'autre dans sa différence et le respect des valeurs fondamentales de la société d'accueil. Il s'agit de l'"accommodement raisonnable", qui est une des grandes réussites du Canada dans la gestion de sa société multiculturelle.
Youssef Sylla, Conakry (Guinée)

21 janvier

"Passer d'une laïcité-ignorance à une laïcité-tolérance"

Je pense que les médias, surtout audiovisuels, pourraient faciliter le vivre-ensemble en passant d'une conception de la laïcité où les religions doivent rester dans l'espace privé – d'où une certaine ignorance –, à une approche de tolérance fondée sur une connaissance des autres qui suppose une expression libre et reconnue, sollicitée même, dans l'espace public.

Le paradoxe est frappant: on se demande pourquoi des jeunes (y compris musulmans) peuvent avoir une vision déformée de l'islam, or les représentants de l'islam ne sont jamais invités à s'exprimer dans la vie courante, dans les débats de société, dans les talk-shows, pour faire connaître le visage de "l'islam modéré", très majoritaire chez nous. Il faut un attentat pour que l'on invite un imam à condamner le fondamentalisme, puis on le renvoie à ses chères études jusqu'au prochain attentat, ce qui ressemble alors à un discours de circonstances.

Dans ces conditions, comment s'étonner que certains jeunes (ou moins jeunes),

par ignorance, assimilent islam et fondamentalisme fanatique, soit pour détester l'islam et les musulmans, soit pour s'adonner au fanatisme? Certes, les imams peuvent et doivent s'adresser à ceux qui fréquentent leurs mosquées, mais qui peut donner à "voir" l'islam de France aux autres, sinon les médias?

Nos hommes politiques non-musulmans qui déclarent que "l'islam est une religion de paix" n'ont aucune crédibilité en la matière, ni auprès des musulmans ni auprès des "islamophobes". C'est à des croyants assumés – dans leur diversité – qu'il revient de venir défendre ce point de vue devant tous, et au passage de débattre le cas échéant devant tous des contradictions internes à l'islam sur ce point.

Cette remarque s'applique d'ailleurs aussi aux autres religions, y compris le christianisme. En fait, vouloir exclure la religion de l'espace public revient à faire le choix d'un monde sans Dieu, donc au sens premier d'un monde "a-thée", alors que pour les croyants la foi en Dieu (et en l'homme, qui va avec) a naturellement des répercussions dans la vie en société. Pas étonnant du coup que certains croyants se trouvent mal représentés, ce qui conduit à des replis identitaires.

Qui plus est lorsque des points de vue récurrents, pour ne pas dire dominants, assimilent religion et obscurantisme, en utilisant d'ailleurs souvent des arguments qui témoignent d'une grande ignorance. Difficile alors d'être crédible, par exemple en défendant que les terroristes ne sont que des obscurantistes, à ne pas confondre avec les autres croyants...

Il est clair qu'il ne revient pas à des groupes minoritaires de régenter la société au nom de leurs convictions, et il est probable que la façon dont l'Église catholique s'est laissée assimiler au pouvoir monarchique pendant quelques siècles dans notre pays (en oubliant le "Rendez à César ce qui est à César") et a vécu de façon conflictuelle la séparation de 1905 n'a pas facilité une cohabitation sereine avec l'athéisme. Mais nous ne sommes plus au XIXe siècle! Et je pense avec beaucoup que notre démocratie gagnerait à une meilleure connaissance mutuelle: que chaque religion peut apprendre des autres y compris de l'athéisme; que les athées peuvent gagner à se rappeler que, si les régimes sans Dieu d'Hitler et Staline sont responsables des plus grands massacres de l'Histoire, ce n'est peut-être pas par hasard.

La caricature peut être utile pour faire progresser, surtout si la liberté qu'elle suppose n'oublie pas l'autre valeur de la République qu'est la fraternité.

Mais la rencontre et la connaissance mutuelle sont nécessaires pour bien vivre ensemble.

Dominique Pelloux-Prayer, Rueil-Malmaison

20 janvier

“Sortir de l’entre-soi”

Les actes terroristes font prévaloir la fureur des armes sur les échanges verbaux. Leurs auteurs s’en tiennent à quelques éléments de communication. C’est l’indice d’une profonde incompréhension, d’un enfermement dans une vision manichéenne avec des choix binaires qui ne rendent évidemment pas compte de la complexité du monde. Pourtant, tenter de poser des mots, c’est faire un pas vers l’autre, c’est marquer une volonté de débattre, de rechercher d’autres réponses à la violence que la violence antagoniste. À cet égard, les technologies modernes multiplient les outils de connexion sans que l’on puisse affirmer qu’ils facilitent l’inter-compréhension entre les hommes. La réflexion n’est d’ailleurs guère sollicitée dans tous ces messages où l’impulsivité, l’émotion l’emportent sur la distanciation. Le désenchantement et même le dénigrement qui ont prévalu pendant des mois s’estompent depuis quelques jours devant des convergences parfois improbables.

Les Français n’ont sans doute pas retrouvé tous leurs repères. Mais ils ont marqué leur rejet du fanatisme. Ils ont aussi réaffirmé le principe de la liberté d’expression. Encadrée par les lois civiles, elle ne vaut ni caution ni adhésion à son contenu. À cet égard, la provocation à la haine n’est pas considérée en France comme une opinion mais comme un délit. Devant l’horreur, il faut résister à la tentation de surréagir, notamment par un empilement de mesures sécuritaires. Elles pourraient se révéler inefficaces ou inapplicables, tout en limitant les libertés publiques.

La République laïque pose qu’il est possible, dans le respect de ses lois, de vivre ensemble au-delà des différences. La laïcité a écarté le danger que représente la confusion entre le politique et le religieux. Nous n’avons pas le droit d’imposer aux autres notre champ du sacré. L’une des priorités actuelles, c’est de sortir de “l’entre-soi” pour étendre à tous les libertés et les solidarités citoyennes, pour ne désocialiser et pour ne discriminer personne.

René Robert, Aiguilhe

Publié le 10/07/2015

<http://www.lenouveleconomiste.fr/>

Iraq

Here's The ISIS Recruitment Hub You Aren't Hearing About

07/10/2015



WASHINGTON -- It's one thing to [fight the extremist Islamic State group's recruitment within the United States](#). It's another for the U.S. to [help partners](#) tackle the group's fighters on the ground in Iraq and Syria.

But it's becoming increasingly clear that if the U.S. and its allies want to defeat the group, they will have to do more -- and that includes making visible anti-Islamic State efforts in areas of the world where Westerners, worried most about attacks at home or on their own citizens, rarely focus much of their attention.

A potent example is Indonesia, which has [the world's largest Muslim population](#).

Indonesia doesn't get mentioned much in talk about the global fight against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS. One reason is understandable: Most international news outlets report on the powerful countries that take the lead on global security, and those states' chief priority is to defend their own citizens. That's why their officials spend the vast majority of their time talking about the immediate threat ISIS poses to their own narrow national interests.

But the other likely explanation leaves a great deal to be desired. It's that focusing the anti-terror conversation on the West and the Middle East has long been the way things are done -- and gigantic supporting structures, from cottage industries of well-paid analysts to massive weapons producers, have evolved to serve that focus. In the process, of course, these interests ensure their own relevance by maintaining a comfortable status quo.

Yet this modus operandi can't last forever. A [fascinating new investigation](#) published this week by The Intercept reminds us why we need to consider the lesser-known aspects of ISIS's global rise.

The news site obtained an Australian government document that reveals Australian authorities earlier this year were monitoring two suspected Islamic State sympathizers in Indonesia -- both airline pilots who could, per the Australian Federal Police, "pose obvious threats [because of their] ... access and knowledge of security and safety regimes."

One of the pilots, a former AirAsia employee named Ridwan Agustin, may have since moved to Syria to fight alongside ISIS on the front lines of its self-proclaimed caliphate, Australian police suggested. The other, Tommy Hendratno, worked as a charter flight pilot until June 1, *The Intercept* reports, and received flight training in the U.S. just five months ago, during which time he posted terrorism propaganda on Facebook.

Both men used social media to promote ISIS and to contact other ISIS sympathizers, posting regularly about the group's claims of success and winning likes from other accounts that appeared to belong to pilots.

Tracking social media is one of the chief ways intelligence services identify potential security risks related to ISIS. FBI Director James Comey [told reporters Thursday](#) that his agency was working closely with Twitter to identify aspiring terrorists planning attacks on U.S. soil.

Australian police shared an intelligence report on the sympathizers with partners in the U.S., the United Kingdom, Jordan, Turkey and Europe, according to *The Intercept*. The report, dated March 18, is marked "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY," [a classification level the Australian government uses](#) for unclassified information whose release may risk the national interest. Australia and the U.S. are close partners on intelligence-gathering; both nations are part of [the "Five Eyes" group](#) -- the U.S., the U.K., Australia, New Zealand and Canada -- which pools nearly all information.

That the Australians are attuned to the threat in Indonesia is good news for Americans and others around the world who are threatened by ISIS. Still, the revelations by *The Intercept* underscore how international attention has largely overlooked the extremist group's successful, surreptitious spread into parts of the world far from its direct sphere of influence.

And the news Friday that the [Indonesian government was unaware of the risk from the pilots until it saw *The Intercept's* report](#) made it clear that countries working to combat ISIS have serious work ahead on coordination.

Jakarta-based analysts [told *The Wall Street Journal*](#) this year that they noted an uptick in the number of Indonesians journeying to Syria to live in the Islamic State in mid-2014, around the same time that [ISIS released a video](#) featuring an Indonesian member directly addressing his nation. Breaking off from Indonesian tour groups to the region is becoming one preferred way for recruits to do so.

The number of Indonesians living in ISIS territory had reached 514 by the end of

2014, Indonesia's counterterrorism chief [told the Jakarta Post](#). Sidney Jones, who runs Jakarta's Institute for Police Analysis of Conflict, [explained to The Intercept](#) that her organization had counted 44 Indonesians fighting for ISIS being killed from March 1 to June 1 of this year.

Beyond posing a threat on battlefields in the Middle East, those radicalized Indonesians are a risk because they may stage attacks at home. Indonesia has been a regular target of terror attacks over the past few years, with more than 200 people killed in the 2002 Bali bombing by an al Qaeda affiliate.

"We can't assume that everyone coming back from Syria is going to want to conduct violent attacks. Many went to help fight [Syrian President Bashar Assad] and have no intention of waging jihad at home," Jones [told the Jakarta Post last year](#). "But there will be some, and the concern is that these people will now have combat experience, tactical skills, weapons knowledge, deeper ideological commitment and international connections. Even if it's just a handful of people, they could provide leadership for the tiny extremist movement here."

<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/>

ISIS A Response To Conditions Where State Has Collapsed, MGIMO Expert Says

July 1, 2015

ISIS is an adaptive response to territories where the state has collapsed and which have to get by “without the state as a form of organization of society” and thus present themselves as opponents of the state as such, according to Nikolay Silayev, a specialist on security in the Caucasus at MGIMO.

It thus poses a threat to any place where the state is weak or can be described as having failed, he continues, but it is ever less of a problem in the North Caucasus where he says the state is recovering. In his view, “the state is always stronger than any bands” at least in the long run (kavpolit.com/articles/kavkaz_2020_vozvraschenie_gosudarstva-17893/).

ISIS is “not what we are accustomed to understand by the term ‘state,’” Silayev says. Rather “it is a new type of uprising organization” that perhaps can best be described by saying it is “post-modern.” It “actively hands out franchises to the leaders of radical Islamists beyond the borders of the Near East and the latter quickly unite to this movement.”

“In other words,” he says, “this is an anti-system movement to the extent it brings together people who are not included or do not want to be included in contemporary society and the world economy.”

“Radical political Islam is good as the institutional framework for the new statelessness,” Silayev continues, because “in radical Islam there simply is no category of the state, and shariat law functions as the regulatory base.” In certain respects, it is even “neo-liberal” because it seeks to reduce the state to as little as possible, although it provides no normal property guarantees.it

“In an economic crisis,” when the state cannot collect as much in taxes as it did and thus must cut back services, “ISIS looks stronger because it does not link itself to many things which are part and parcel of contemporary nation states.” It “doesn’t support infrastructure, education, health care or social security ... “in general this is a medical economic state.”

Silayev says he does “not believe that an ordination territorial state will be formed out of ISIS,” as some think given that ISIS barbarians—and that is what they are, he argues — will destroy the defenders of a state and then become the state itself only to be overthrown in turn by new barbarians.

Asked about the case of Varvara Karulova who sought to join ISIS and how dangerous that makes ISIS for Russia, Silayev replies that too much is being made of her case: “When one girl from a good family unexpectedly falls into the network of ISIS, then a hullabaloo is raised; but when hudnreds if not thousands of guys from the

North Caucasus do so, the [Moscow] press is silent.”

That means that ISIS does pose a threat to the North Caucasus, Silayev continues, but for the time being, it doesn't threaten the Russian Federation as a whole.

<http://www.eurasiareview.com/>

To Defeat Daesh Start with Their Strategy

6 Jul 2015

Defeating Daesh means more than air campaigns and counter-extremism: it means understanding, and working to counter their strategy and their resonance.



The [recent calls](#) by Prime Minister David Cameron and Defence Secretary Michael Fallon to extend British air strikes beyond Iraq into Daesh heartlands in Syria is long overdue, tactically logical, and a bandaid over a deep, gushing wound. While there is a great deal of stock put into the multi-national coalition against Daesh, there is a growing realisation in the British Government, especially in the wake of last week's atrocity in Sousse, that Daesh's threat is growing with each passing day, and they have momentum behind them.

Too Little, Too Late

The problem with this current effort is that it is too little, and unlikely to deliver the needed effects. As an entity, Daesh is strategic, able and adaptable. It has shown over and over again an ability to think at least three steps ahead, and has demonstrated clear resilience in the face of defeat on the battlefield. Daesh is so strong that it has even managed to retake ground it has lost through battles in Syria and Iraq, with the [recent massacres in Kobane](#) being a prime example. Similarly, its brand, though tarnished in the eyes of Western audience, horrified at the multitude of examples of severe brutality and barbarity throughout the world, still resonates with huge active and latent audiences.

Air strikes, whether in Iraq, Syria or beyond are completely inadequate. The main issue hinges on the confusion between degrading Daesh's tactical capability (which has had mixed results thus far), and providing a [credible alternative](#). While it is understandable why many wish to attack Daesh as being un-Islamic, it is something that is not only likely [to be ineffective](#), but fits with the same strategy as other extremist Islamic groups, like the Taliban in Pakistan (TTP) and Al-Qa'ida of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Daesh's ambitions are now growing, rather than diminishing. The [recent attacks](#) and clashes in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula are an indication of Daesh's intention to hitch their cause to one of the most emotional in the pantheon of Islamic symbolism – Palestine. If they manage to successfully graft their cause to the Palestinian situation, then it will only serve to further boost their legitimacy, authenticity and power amongst their target audiences.

Furthermore, Daesh's expansion into North Africa is evidence of wider regional ambition. Daesh's efforts in Libya (despite its recent [setback](#) in Derna), represent strategic adaptation and expansion. The Bardo Museum Attacks, the 'insider' barrack attack in [Bouchoucha in May](#), and the Sousse attack in Tunisia demonstrate its [intent to destabilise Tunisia](#) in order to shape the conditions that underpin 'radicalising' new supporters. These efforts are made easier by the [chaos in Libya](#) and the [large cohort of Tunisians](#) who are likely to have been indoctrinated into an Daesh view of the world while participating as foreign fighters in Syria.

Daesh's strategy

Daesh's narrative strength is in its appeal to the heart and the stomach: it effectively exploits the perception of say-do gaps of states that fail their citizens by providing tangible security, stability, and welfare for populations that feel isolated, unrecognised, and desperate. Its visceral appeal is not least because it knows how to make videos that look like video games. It fills empty stomachs and its propaganda argues (however inaccurately) that it alone can bring meaningful stability security to war-torn streets while looking, what Marc Sageman calls, '[jihadi cool](#)'.

There are those who claim that bombing Daesh in Syria will only lead [to increased support](#). Such arguments miss the point. Bombing Daesh in Syria may or may not increase its capability, or popularity, but it doesn't really matter. Daesh already knows what's coming, and are making alternative plans. Squeeze Daesh in the Levant, and they'll move to their beachhead in North Africa via the Mediterranean. Should Libya begin to stabilise, it will destabilise Tunisia to create base of operations there and potentially move southward in the Sahel. Should it lose all territory, Daesh has already thought to attach its brand to the Palestinian cause – thereby giving it an existential base in the minds of active and latent supporters around the globe.

The outlook is bleak, because we have, so far, failed to appreciate Daesh's strategic skill. They are more than nihilistic extremists, hell bent on causing suffering on their enemies. The game has changed, yet our responses have not – it as though we cannot move beyond fighting Al-Qa'ida in the early 2000's. Daesh's analysis is that Western responses are weak, inadequate, and without direction – constantly reactive rather than proactive and they are exploiting this. Until we fully appreciate Daesh's strategic skill and rationale (and negate it), we will continue to be on the back foot in our efforts to effectively and permanently stymie them.

<https://www.rusi.org/analysis/>

Is the July 4th terror threat hyped?



(CNN)The recent terror attacks in [France](#), [Tunisia](#) and [Kuwait](#) are a bloody reminder that jihadist violence is global, with varied targets and tactics that are difficult for even the most adept security forces to counter.

And while the front lines of Iraq, Syria and other hot spots are distant from U.S. shores, America is still a favorite symbolic target for jihadist terrorism. As is so often repeated, it seems only a matter of time before we are hit again, and some are suggesting that time is almost here.

As we approach our Independence Day celebrations, [media outlets are reporting that](#) government agencies are issuing vague but unnerving warnings about a possible terrorist threat targeting America over the Fourth of July weekend.

Instinctively, we know that we are susceptible. We know terrorists want to hit us because they say so. The question is: Are they really about to try something here in the U.S. over the next few days?

As Americans get ready for the holiday weekend, the Department of Homeland Security, FBI and the National Counterterrorism Center have issued a bulletin to law enforcement across the country warning of the possibility of an imminent strike against the United States. Intelligence agencies are watching as online chatter rises.

Perspective is important here. While they sound ominous, many of these warnings and precautions are also pretty routine. Any holiday weekend, and especially the

Fourth of July, is a ripe target for a terrorist attack since more civilians travel and there are large ceremonial gatherings. In fact, we already suffered an act of terrorism on July 4, 2002, when an Islamic terrorist shot up Los Angeles Airport's El Al ticket counter, killing two Israelis.

But there is also a growing sense that something is different right now, and more dangerous. Former senior CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell said he was "worried about this one," referring to the Fourth of July threat reporting. Other officials have made similar statements, and this comes at a time when the overall risk from terrorism, according to House Intelligence Committee Chairman Devin Nunes, is the "highest ever" in the post-[9/11](#) era.

America is in a unique threat environment largely because of ISIS' success as a global jihadist entity. [ISIS](#) has seized a large piece of territory spanning parts of Iraq and Syria and held it for more than a year. Its ranks have swelled with thousands of recruits from around the world, and its self-declared caliphate operates more like a functioning government with every passing month.

[Through social media and online radicalization efforts](#), ISIS has found a potent weapon against Western states. Plots directed or inspired by ISIS have been put into action in Europe and on U.S. soil. So far, through a combination of good law enforcement work and luck, we have not suffered a big attack at ISIS' hands inside America's borders.

Of course, that could change in a matter of days. So is the ISIS threat really higher this holiday weekend than any other?

The answer is: Probably not.

The overall odds are low that a major terrorist attack will be attempted over the July Fourth weekend. Authorities say there is "no specific, credible threat," which is bureaucrat-speak for "we don't really know" and is a strong indicator that our intensified counterterrorism posture is based more on gut instinct than actionable intelligence.

There is also a tendency in some government analysis to instinctively err on the side of caution. "Duty to warn" in a post-9/11 world is a widespread government mantra. It's always safer -- as much for reasons of politics as anything else -- to raise the terrorism alarm and be wrong, even if the threat is statistically very small and there is no intelligence to indicate an imminent plot.

Most government analysts and law enforcement personnel fall into this pattern of over warning, which is not entirely without costs. Terror alert fatigue has to be balanced against public vigilance. If not, the public is likely to distrust or ignore future elevated risk assessments. We got rid of color-coded national terror warnings for a

reason. We had five levels -- green, blue, yellow, orange and red -- until 2011, when the Department of Homeland Security got rid of the system because after a while, it all seemed grey anyway.

Ultimately, we can't allow the terrorists to dictate our behavior. Americans should, as always, celebrate our Independence Day with pride, and not let ISIS fears loom over every national holiday. We must be vigilant against the threats that are out there, but also be confident that our intelligence and law enforcement agencies are doing everything in their power to lower those risks.

Correction: An earlier version of this commentary incorrectly stated that the FBI is establishing command centers to monitor terror threats over the holiday weekend.

<http://edition.cnn.com/>

Abandon 'recent-ism' in fighting ISIS

Jul. 06, 2015



As policymakers and analysts wrestle with how to respond to the advancing ISIS extremists, there is a danger of falling victim to a pervasive disease in international politics which might be called “recent-ism.” This is the difficult-to-resist temptation to look no further back than the most recent crisis or analogy to develop policy. “Recent-ism” affects counterterrorism, too. It’s easy to get caught up in sweeping generalizations about how the threat is new and profoundly different.

Yet the actions of the group are not new nor profoundly different. Resulting policy responses can be robust, but the campaign against ISIS will likely take years, not months, to fully deliver. This is not an argument for waiting to think, but for thinking before doing.

Three pervasive myths have emerged.

The first is that the terrorist group is more dangerous than Al-Qaeda. That is not true. ISIS draws on the same ideological roots. ISIS emerged from Al-Qaeda in Iraq and was nurtured in Iraq’s sectarian trenches. Despite Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s self-proclaimed caliphate, the similarities with Al-Qaeda outnumber its differences. Both networks are vanguards of a presumed utopian revolution. Both use terrorist violence to advance their goals. Both seek to establish rule over peoples and territory, and are anchored in extremist ideology.

The differences are few. ISIS rebranded Al-Qaeda ideas into a personalized so-called

caliphate led by Baghdadi; Al-Qaeda is struggling to manage a franchised coalition under a weakening Ayman al-Zawahiri. ISIS is systematically impatient; Al-Qaeda is patient and cautious in its terrorism. The differences are mostly about tactics and leadership, not underlying strategy.

The second myth, that ISIS is the new Al-Qaeda, is too early to call and also too simplistic. ISIS may be the new fashion in terrorism, the brand for any aspiring violent extremist. But becoming the preferred background for extremist selfies is not the same as building a new, multigenerational brand. Failure on the ground will damage this loose organization. The idea is only as powerful as a persistent supply of triumphs. If Baghdadi dies, if the group's control over territories continue to be nibbled away at by coalitions of countervailing forces, the myth will crumble.

Moreover, claims that ISIS is the new Al-Qaeda play to a simplistic model of counterterrorism, in which analysts tally up who is on which side, carefully tracking statements and declarations of bayat, or loyalty. It remains too early to call amid a mixture of declarations of bayat, anti-Western and anti-establishment sentiment, and pragmatic maneuvering.

Some individuals within Al-Qaeda affiliates in Afghanistan and Yemen have even hedged, expressing sentiments that can be interpreted as supportive by both sides. Reports suggest that Boko Haram has sworn allegiance to ISIS, but will the group in Nigeria take orders from Baghdadi? That's unlikely. Does an expression of solidarity equate to full political agreement with all that the group stands for? Not necessarily.

As Al-Qaeda found under its late leader Osama bin Laden, affiliates frequently remain semidetached. That's why opponents must track how the organization evolves.

The third myth is ISIS is more violent and extreme than Al-Qaeda. Wrong again. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was particularly violent, and other groups have shown equal appetite for high-definition, filmed barbarity. Al-Qaeda affiliates in South Asia as well as the Middle East have regularly attacked and murdered minorities, filmed murders, generated digital propaganda and recruited foreign terrorist fighters. The difference is that ISIS represents the cutting edge of the digital challenge: This younger and multinational group of terrorists tweet, text and radicalize in many different languages and produce high-definition horror videos to promote twisted ideas.

There are also three truths about the changing threat from ISIS and Al-Qaeda:

First, the threat has never been more complex. This is partly due to the extensive territorial control that ISIS and other groups have gained in Syria, Iraq and now Libya. It's also a reflection of the more than 25,000 foreign terrorist fighters who have gathered under ISIS or Al-Qaeda branding from more than 100 countries. The foreign terrorist threat affects many, as individuals travel from and through countries that may not have experienced this level of terrorist threat before.

Second, the threat is complicated by the intimate links with plural local conflicts and grievances – from those in Nigeria to those in Syria and Iraq, from those in Libya to those in Afghanistan, from those in Somalia to those in Yemen and among large numbers of radicalized Europeans. The need is urgent for better evidence, detailed analysis and nuanced understanding of what emerging counterterrorism casework can reveal. Despite many day-to-day pressures, this is not optional. Such analysis is crucial for all countries to avoid being dragged into ill-considered policy responses.

Third, while the terrorism problem is about national security, it has a growing international dimension. No one country can fully respond without working with others – often many others. Such cooperation is not easy. If fixing interagency challenges within one government is hard enough, working across international borders on sensitive issues such as intelligence-sharing, passenger data-sharing and analysis quickly bump into cultural, legal and sovereignty-related boundaries. The need is great for multilateral and national responses along with effective work to bridge these various barriers. A range of countries are working more closely, not least in improved sharing of watch lists of suspects.

“Recent-ism” can have real-world negative impacts. Analogies and metaphors are powerful, sometimes helpful. Recent experience is valuable, but so too is the collective experience of policy successes and failures. If counterterrorism needs to protect against easy generalizations, international politics must protect against the ease with which one policy agenda can tower above others. The global terrorist threat from ISIS and Al-Qaeda associates is real, complex and requires a sustained counter-effort from all states.

However, terrorism is not the only challenge to international peace and security, and nations should be wary of a narrow focus on terrorism alone. The current challenge is so difficult partly because of the interplay, often deep-seated, between terrorism and conflict. Solid analysis is one step toward considered and balanced policy responses with the greatest chance of being successful. These likely include active interventions alongside strategic patience.

With foreign terrorist fighters, this means upgrading strategic communications and targeting countermessaging and interventions on individual networks most likely to be at risk of radicalization. As a first step, those closest to existing foreign terrorist fighters probably need immediate attention: family members, close friends and social network connections. Preventing “domino radicalization” requires swift interventions. Equally important is assessing, rehabilitating, and where necessary, prosecuting those who return from a conflict zone having joined or worked with terrorist groups.

With ISIS’ territorial presence the challenge is greater, simply because of their footprint on the ground. Here, bullet point solutions are more elusive – but the value of strategic patience and building effective coalitions remains. The best actions are

those that steal the rhetoric of victory from the terrorists and undermine their absurd claims to moral authority. Extravagant claims to be virtuous matter to the propagandists. Governments, communities and the media are in a position to undermine this. Such countermessaging is more convincing if accompanied by progress on the ground rolling back these groups where they hold territory, including the successful targeting of leaders.

Despite the onslaught of video propaganda, ISIS can be degraded – just as Al-Qaeda was. Like the campaign against Al-Qaeda, success will be measured in years. Governments have the advantage of years of counterterrorism experience, including the opportunity to learn from past mistakes. Evidence-based policies drawing on detailed analysis can help defeat ISIS.

Alexander Evans leads the United Nations Security Council's expert panel on Al-Qaeda. This reflects his personal views. The commentary is reprinted with permission from YaleGlobal Online (www.yaleglobal.yale.edu). Copyright © 2015, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, Yale University.

<https://www.dailystar.com.lb/>

United Kingdom

How young will help us defeat radicalisation of their peers

07/07/2015



Lest we forget: 7/7 memorial

A decade has passed since four men travelled to London and blew themselves up, killing 52 people. I was 16 and I remember it well; I remember the confusion, the anger and the shock.

When the attacks occurred in 2005 I was already conscious of my Pakistani heritage.



Video: 7/7 survivor and religious leaders walk in remembrance

source: ITN-Conor McNally

I was attending a private school where the student population was predominately white.

Following the attacks my religious identity took centre stage. The term 'British Muslim' was coined, which posed an identity crisis. Could I be British and Muslim? These questions encouraged me to look at Islam in-depth.

I hadn't done before, but I hadn't needed to. Nobody had asked me about my headscarf, or asked questions like: "Why does Allah tell you lot to go around killing us?" I found I was comfortable with my identity - and I knew that terror had no place in Islam, a religion of mercy, compassion and peace.

But, in some ways, I was also young and naive; I did not expect that the generation below me could be groomed to join a movement such as Isis.

Over the past month I have spent a lot of time speaking to people who know those who have left for Syria. A significant push factor is identity; you see many of my generation recognise that their heritage is Pakistani, Somali, Arab or Bangladeshi.

Many of us are second or third-generation children of immigrants with strong ties to our parents' birth countries. When we visit the "motherland" we do not belong because we speak the language differently, or we look and act in unfamiliar ways. Yet in the country we are born and raised we are sometimes seen as a threat.

Community workers up and down the country are doing brilliant work mentoring young people and trying to prevent radicalisation and we have to acknowledge and appreciate their work. A lot of the time that work goes by unnoticed. But there is so much more to be done by all of us.

Two days ago a relative came to my house to break his fast with me and my husband. He is a very good friend of a family member of one of the victims who died in the Tunisia attack, and mentioned casually in conversation that at first he was worried to go over to the house and offer his condolences. He asked us if it was too soon. "I worry if they will now see me as a Muslim," he said.



Video: PM David Cameron and Boris Johnson lay wreaths for July 7 victims

source: ITN-Jeremy Barnes

In that bleak moment it felt like the world had come round in a circle. I remembered the stories my parents used to tell me of enduring racism on the streets when they first arrived in the UK. I worry about what the future holds for my children, and their own identities.

I used to think my generation would never have those problems, but over the past couple of weeks I have heard of the backlash Muslims, and those that look like Muslims, have faced. It appears the focus on racial prejudice has shifted to religious prejudice.

Yet, a couple of days ago, I travelled with a group of young people from different faiths on a peace journey to London from Leeds. They took the same journey the bombers from Leeds had 10 years ago, but they were replacing it with peace.

It was a mixed group of different races and faiths and we travelled together. They paid respects at the 7/7 memorial and they heard from survivors of the attack.

Before I left for my journey home - after what was an emotionally and physically exhausting day - one young person turned to me and said: "It's all about unity. If we stand together as humans, we can defeat terror."

I walked away feeling hopeful and inspired.

<http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/>

Opinion: The Terrorist Challenge—Understanding and Misunderstanding

Faced with the growing threat of terrorism, Western officials and analysts seem hard put as to how to deal with something they find difficult to understand.

British Prime Minister David Cameron has advised the media not to use the term “Islamic State” for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—known as “Da’esh” in Arabic—because, he claims, the “caliphate” based in Raqqa in Syria is not Islamic. In other words, Cameron is casting himself as an authority on what is Islamic and what is not. At the other end of the spectrum, French Premier Manuel Valls speaks of “Islamofascism” and claims that the West is drawn into a “war of civilizations” with Islam.

Cameron continues Tony Blair’s policy in the early days of Islamist attacks on Britain. Blair would declare that although the attacks had nothing to do with Islam he had invited “leaders of the Muslim community” to Downing Street to discuss “what is to be done.”

As for Valls, he seems to forget that Islam, though part of many civilizations including the European one, is a religion not a civilization on its own. He also forgets that civilizations, even at the height of rivalry, don’t wage war; political movements and states do.

While it is important to understand what we are dealing with, it is even more important not to misunderstand the challenge.

To circumvent the hurdle of labeling the Da’esh-style terror as “Islamic,” something that runs counter to political correctness and could attract cries of Islamophobia, some Western officials and commentators build their analysis on the “sectarian” aspect of the phenomenon.

Thus, we are bombarded within seminars, essays and speeches seeking to explain, and at times explain away, the horrors of ISIS and similar groups as part of sectarian Sunni–Shi’ite feuds dating back to 15 centuries ago.

However, the “sectarian” analysis is equally defective.

There is no doubt that much of the violence in the Middle East today does have a sectarian aspect.

However, what we have is not a war of Islamic sects but wars among sectarian groups. Nobody has appointed ISIS as the representative of Sunnis, some 85 percent of Muslims across the globe. And, in fact, so far ISIS has massacred more Sunnis than members of any other sect or religion. The Internet “caliph” and his cohorts have beheaded more of their own comrades than any *kuffar* (Infidels).

At the other end of the spectrum no one has appointed the Khomeinist mullahs in Tehran as leaders of the Shi’ites. The Khomeinist regime has killed many more Shi’ites than members of any other sect or religion. (Human Rights groups put the

number of those executed since Khomeini seized power at over 150,000.)

Equally absurd is to present the Alawite (or Nusayri) community in Syria as a branch of Shi'ism, something that no Shi'ite theological authority has ever done. Even then, the Ba'athist regime led by President Bashar Al-Assad has never claimed religious credentials, boasting about a secular, supposedly socialist ideology. In Shi'ite theology, the Alawites are classified among the "*ghulat*" (extremists) with a host of other heterodox sects.

The Khomeinist regime's backing for the Houthis in Yemen cannot be explained in sectarian terms either. The Houthis belong to the Zaydi sect which, though originally exported from Iran to Yemen, has never been regarded by Twelvers (Ithna-'ashariyah), who make up the bulk of Shi'ites across the globe, as being part of the Shi'ite family.

In the 1970s Iran's Shah bribed a few ayatollahs in Qom to issue declarations in favor of Zaydis—which they did, without however providing definitive theological endorsement.

In any case, the Houthis, though representing a good chunk of the Zaydi community, cannot be equated with that faith as a whole. Tehran's support for them is politically motivated as it is in the case of Assad in Syria and the various branches of Hezbollah, notably in Lebanon. (The other night in a discussion circle in London a self-styled expert was mistaking Zaydis with Yazidis, insisting that former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh was a Yazidi!)

There is no doubt that Tehran arms and supports a number of Shi'ite groups, ranging from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Hazara in Afghanistan. However, it also supports some Sunni groups, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Tehran also did all it could to help the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, including the sending of a high-level mission with offers of billions of dollars in aid provided the brotherhood agreed to purge the Egyptian army.

In Afghanistan, Iran sheltered and, for years, financed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Sunni Hizb Islami, although it had massacred quite a few Afghan Shi'ites in the early 1990s. Since 2004, Tehran has also maintained contact with the Taliban, a militant anti-Shi'ite Afghan terror group. (At the time of this writing Iran is preparing to allow the Taliban to open an unofficial embassy in Tehran.)

Iran is also training and arming Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, almost all of them Sunnis, to fight ISIS, which casts itself as the standard-bearer of Sunnis.

At the other end of the spectrum, various opponents of the Khomeinist regime, among them some Sunni powers, have supported anti-regime Shi'ite groups at different times. Iraqi despot Saddam Hussein protected, financed, and armed the People's Mujahedin, an Iranian Shi'ite group, for decades, and at one point sent them to fight inside Iran itself.

Pakistan, a Sunni-majority country, has become a base for anti-Iran terror groups which, according to Iranian Border Guard, have been responsible for more than 80 deadly attacks over the past 12 months.

At one end of the spectrum it is not enough to be Shi'ite of any denomination. Unless you also worship the "Supreme Guide" you are worse than the "infidel." At another end, being a Sunni Muslim is not enough to let you live a reasonably human life in areas controlled by ISIS; you must also pledge fealty to the self-styled "caliph."

The Khomeinists, the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, ISIS, Boko Haram, Hizb Islami, and a whole host of other outfits may try to market their discourse with a religious narrative. They may even be sincerely motivated by rival interpretations of Islam. What they cannot claim is the exclusive representation of Islam as such or a particular sect. They are part of Islam but Islam is not part of them. These are political movements using violence and terror in pursuit of political goals. They pretend to be waging war against the "infidel" and may even be deviously sincere in that claim. But they are primarily waging war against Muslims, regardless of schools or sect.

<http://www.aawsat.net/>

Obama's counterterrorism policy facing mounting criticism

July 2, 2015



David Goldman

FILE - In this Nov. 13, 2013 file photo, a CIA is seen in Atlanta. When the CIA killed al-Qaida's second-in-command in Yemen last month, Obama administration officials celebrated. But many experts are questioning whether the demise of another senior extremist, the latest in a long line of militants to be taken off the battlefield, make the United States and its allies any safer from terrorism. (AP Photo/David Goldman, File)

WASHINGTON (AP) — At the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, it was a cause for celebration: Meticulous intelligence analysis backed by Hellfire missiles had paid off, once again.

The CIA launched a drone strike last month on a Yemeni beach at three men it determined were al-Qaida militants. One of them turned out to be Nasser al-Wahishi, about as important a figure as agency man-hunters could hope to eliminate. He had been both al-Qaida's second in command and the leader of the group's dangerous Yemeni affiliate.

American officials touted the death as a big victory. But did the demise of another senior extremist, the latest in a long line to be taken off the battlefield, make the United States and its allies any safer?

To many experts, including a growing number of former Obama administration na-

tional security advisers, that proposition is less convincing by the day.

With al-Qaida and the Islamic State group enjoying safe havens across parts of Yemen, Syria and Iraq, and with terror attacks on the rise worldwide, doubts are growing about the effectiveness and sustainability of the administration's "light footprint" strategy against global extremist movements. A template predicated on training local forces and bombing terrorists from the air is actually making the situation worse, some say. Many are arguing for deeper U.S. involvement, if not with regular ground troops, then at least with elite advisers and commandos taking more risks in more places.

"What they are doing now is making it more likely that there will be a bigger, more disastrous catastrophe for the United States," said David Sedney, who resigned in 2013 as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"Drone strikes are not creating a safer, more stable world," Sedney said, and neither is the limited bombing campaign the Pentagon is running against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria. Both are creating new enemies, he added, without a plan to defeat them.

The New York Times reported Thursday that Islamic radical Seifallah Ben Hassine, founder of the Tunisian militant group Ansar al-Sharia, was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Libya last month. Earlier Thursday, the Pentagon announced that a June 16 airstrike had killed Tariq bin Tahar al-'Awni al-Harzi, an Islamic State group leader who had facilitated suicide bombings. "His death will impact ISIL's ability to integrate foreign terrorist fighters into the Syrian and Iraqi fight," military spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis said.

But for how long, critics are wondering, including former Defense Intelligence Agency chief Michael Flynn, who accuses the administration for which he once worked of "policy confusion." Former Army deputy chief Lt. Gen. Richard Zahner says the Obama administration's policy of "benign neglect" toward strife-torn Yemen and Syria has ensured the existence of terrorist safe havens there for both al-Qaida and Islamic State militants.

Even Michele Flournoy, the former undersecretary of defense for policy who was the president's first choice to replace Chuck Hagel as defense secretary, wrote last month that the U.S. effort against the Islamic State is "faltering," and urged a more robust approach.

"U.S. counterterrorism policy has caused some intense backlash and has had a lot of unintended consequences," said Rosa Brooks, a former Obama administration Pentagon official.

Current officials dispute the criticism, but they declined to make anyone available to

speak on the record. The administration's position is that the failure of al-Qaida or the Islamic State to launch a coordinated attack on the U.S. homeland is the best evidence that the strategy is working.

Timothy Hoyt, a professor of counterterrorism studies at the Naval War College, agreed. Terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its allies have been far less lethal than past campaigns in Britain by the Irish Republican Army, he said, "which suggests that some elements of our counterterrorism strategy are working."

It's "absurd," he said, to blame U.S. policy for an uptick in sectarian violence across a Middle East convulsed by political upheaval.

Drone strikes have clearly made it harder for terrorists to plan complex attacks, he said. While the strikes create international backlash, he added, there is no evidence they are a driving force in the growth of terror networks.

A task force at the Henry L. Stimson Center took a different view in April, raising questions about the long-term effects of killing terrorists with drones.

"We are concerned that the Obama administration's heavy reliance on targeted killings as a pillar of U.S. counterterrorism strategy rests on questionable assumptions, and risks increasing instability and escalating conflicts," concluded the task force, co-chaired by Brooks and retired Gen. John Abizaid.

The Wahishi operation underscored a little-understood trend of the drone war: Most "high value targets" have been killed in what are known as signature strikes, in which a missile is aimed at a group of militants whose identities aren't confirmed until after they're dead, U.S. officials have said.

The CIA didn't know at first that Wahishi was among the men it had targeted, said three U.S. officials, none of whom would be quoted by name discussing a covert operation.

Administration officials had once signaled they would cut back on signature strikes, which pose a higher risk of killing the wrong people, including civilians. But the evacuation of the embassy in Yemen and the CIA's absence in Syria mean such strikes will be more common, the U.S. officials said.

Even when they succeed, they are insufficient, experts say.

Drone strikes "do not defeat terrorist organizations," said Seth Jones, a counterterrorism analyst at the Rand Corp. think tank.

Yet many critics of Obama's approach are calling for a deeper American involvement against the Islamic State. Many military analysts, for example, say U.S. special operations troops should be allowed to direct air strikes and embed with local units on the

Syrian and Iraqi battlefields, something they are not now doing. Others argue that U.S. should take military action to remove Syrian President Bashar Assad, a magnet for extremists who want to fight him.

The administration has resisted, citing the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, where yearslong U.S. occupations failed to defeat extremists or instill stable democracies.

President Barack Obama has acknowledged that the U.S. cannot kill its way to victory over terrorism, and has said his strategy also calls for addressing poverty and political repression, as well as training local forces.

"We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas," the president said in June 2013.

But the U.S. so far has not proven adept at any of that, counterterrorism experts say.

The more hopeful case may be in Somalia, where U.S.-trained forces pushed the al-Qaida affiliate out of some territory it once held. But the group is still mounting lethal attacks on civilians.

In Afghanistan, the jury is still out on whether Afghan security forces can keep the Taliban from re-taking major cities. In Iraq and Syria, efforts to train forces capable of ousting the Islamic State group from its strongholds have ranged from slow to ineffectual.

In Yemen, the U.S. for a while had a sympathetic government that allowed American drone strikes while deploying its own U.S. trained troops to fight al-Qaida. But a U.S. concentration on counterterrorism to the exclusion of political and social problems destabilized the country, Sedney and others argue, contributing to the government's fall.

The lesson of the 9/11 attacks, said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University, "was that these groups are the most dangerous when they have a sanctuary. The fact of the matter is they have far more sanctuary today than they had a decade and a half ago."

"It's dangerous," Hoffman added, "to wrap ourselves in this false security blanket that we've prevented them from attacking the U.S. thus far."

<http://www.thepublicopinion.com/>

Yemen

War Without Mercy in Yemen. US Engineered Humanitarian Crisis

July 08, 2015



Translated from French by Jenny Bright

Annexed: Message from Abd-al-Malik-al-Houthi to the Resistance, July 2nd, 2015 (English Subtitles)

The Saudi-American war against Yemen, led by a coalition of the richest Gulf monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, etc. along with their servants like Egypt and Morocco) against the poorest Arab country, enters its fourth month.

According to the United Nations, it has killed more than 3,100 and wounded 15,000, displaced 1 million and created 245,000 refugees, and created an unprecedented humanitarian crisis which the United Nations has declared to be on the level of maximum humanitarian alert. Ruthless and indiscriminate strikes target all civilian infrastructure, up to residential areas, markets, granaries, water tanks, hospitals, schools, mosques, and even archaeological remains and tombs— which recalls that the destructive ideology of the Islamic State takes its roots in Saudi Arabia – without sparing civilian convoys fleeing violence. A merciless siege has been imposed in Yemen, a country which imports 90% of its food, and Relief Organizations are prevented from delivering supplies to the country, and even see their workers targeted while providing humanitarian assistance.

More than 21 million people (80% of Yemen's population) are without adequate access to staples and essential services such as food, clean water, medical care, electricity and fuel. Already, it appears that Saudi Arabia has used unconventional weapons (cluster munitions, and perhaps even chemical weapons) and has committed war

crimes and perhaps even crimes against humanity.



However, this war remains largely ignored by the mainstream media, both in the West and in the Arab-Muslim world (with the exception of Iran and the media close to Hezbollah in Lebanon).

The US sponsors this illegal and criminal military intervention that they provide full support for, putting all their resources at the service of the Gulf monarchies who have acquired the most modern weapons to the tune of **\$115 billion** for the single year 2014: they can therefore destabilise the region without sending their armed forces, conforming to the Obama no-boots-on-the-ground doctrine that favours proxy wars. It is the same for the other NATO member countries – **United Kingdom, France, etc.**, which is not surprising coming from the supporters and apologists of terrorism in Syria. Regarding Riyadh, **Wikileaks** has recently **unveiled** the procedure of Saudi censorship of the entire Arab world, between corruption and intimidation. All these actors provide direct support to Al Qaeda and to the Islamic state, which has appeared on the Yemeni scene and is now on the border of Saudi Arabia, **their long-time goal**. The Saudi blindness seems to know no bounds.

The Saudi assault was not to repel an **alleged advance of Iran and/or Shiism**, but to

break the attempts towards independence of this country that historically has been a vassal of Riyadh. So far, this war has not realised any of its stated objectives. On the contrary, the Yemeni resistance has taken hold of most major Yemen cities, and it takes more and more initiative by carrying the war into the territory of Saudi Arabia, bombing its border towns and attacking its military bases and convoys, and causing dozens of casualties among the Saudi forces – of which the extent of the losses is inviolable military secret. Moreover, the attacks resulted in uniting the country – the regular armed forces of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Houthi rebels and other popular committees – behind the slogan “Death to the House of Saud”, an unprecedented development in the Middle East, and revealed both the barbarism of the Wahhabi regime and its vulnerability and powerlessness on the purely military field. Held in check despite the benefit of the steady stream of Western weaponry, Riyadh already sees its influence wane in the Middle East.



In a message to the combatants dated 1st July 2015 – that evokes those of Hassan Nasrallah to Hezbollah fighters during the 2006 war –, Abd-al-Malik al-Houthi, head of the Yemeni resistance, denounced the collusion of the Washington-Tel Aviv-Riyadh Axis, denouncing the war and the siege imposed in Yemen as even more barbaric than the Israeli crimes in Gaza. He agrees with the analysis of the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, who recalled that even the Zionists did not have a systematic policy of targeting hospitals, tombs and archaeological remains. Abd-al-Malik al-Houthi brandished nothing less than the slogan of the holy war against the cradle of Islam, equated to the “devil’s horn”, which is, according to a famous prophetic tradition, an evil heresy called to arise in the Najd region – where Wahhabism emerged. Again, this is an unprecedented development: Saudi Arabia, which, since March 2015, broke with its policy of underground action and now acts without cover, has never been so violently shaken.

Riyadh is now in an impasse: its air campaign is a bitter failure, as was predictable given the six previous offensives since 2004 by the forces of President Saleh (yesterday supported by Saudi Arabia and now allied with the Houthi rebels), which all ended up in a failure, as well as [the Israeli experiences in Lebanon and Gaza](#), which constitutes the perfect model of the Saudi aggression. As for the option of a ground operation, all data indicates that it would be absolutely disastrous and would end with a rout of Saudi forces.

But there is no question for the House of Saud, blinded beyond any possible return, of accepting a cease-fire that would be a victory for Yemen; rather it must continue this fanatic war of terror at all costs, by torpedoing all attempts of agreement or truce, at the risk of rushing towards the abyss. As for the forces of the Yemeni resistance, they are far from having exhausted all their possibilities, and multiply the incursions into enemy territory. They could even question its territorial integrity by claiming Yemeni provinces formerly annexed by Saudi Arabia. And as a last resort, they could close the strategic Strait of Bab al-Mandeb – which they are quite capable of –, one of the largest global maritime passages, especially for hydrocarbons, which would have severe global repercussions. If, like Syria, Iraq and Libya, Yemen is threatened with disintegration, Saudi Arabia itself is now on the way to becoming destabilised, and even dismantling.



Will the Saudi crusade push into the Axis of Resistance a new country, Yemen – about which Hassan Nasrallah declared that the awakening and resistant spirit of its people were such that he could without hesitation send 100,000 or 200,000 men to fight Israel? Whatever the case may be, already the Ansarallah movement has reached the extent of a new Hezbollah, and the Saudi war is doomed to failure. It announces with certainty [the inevitable fall of the House of Saud](#), whose Wahhabi ideology and foreign policy have been the cancer of Islam and of the Arab world for

decades, and ultimately, the end of the US-Israeli hegemony in the Middle East. More than one of the region's peoples will rejoice.

Sayed 7asan (contact: 7asan.saleh@gmail.com)

Message from Abd-al-Malik al-Houthi to the Resistance, July 2, 2015

Subtitled video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6oCHyD_k4lk

Transcript:

Source : <http://ansar-allah.net/news/9874>

Translation from Arabic and subtitles: Sayed 7asan

*Translation from French: **Jenny Bright***

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds, and the greetings of God be upon the Seal of His Prophets, Muhammad b. Abdillah, and on his pure and noble family, and may God be pleased with his chosen and faithful companions.

Oh, my very dear brothers, the heroes of Yemen and its honourable and worthy men, who you hold firmly in the forefront of the fighting, belonging to the army or the people's committees and to all of the sons of our dear Yemeni people! O Yemen of faith and wisdom, Yemen of perseverance and heroism, Yemen of patience and determination, Yemen of greatness and pride, peace of God be upon you and His mercy and blessings.

Please accept my congratulations on the coming of the holy and blessed month of Ramadan.

O dear honourable (fighters), persevering and steadfast in the way of God, in the way of God the Most High, and for the defence of your beloved people, of your beautiful country and precious homeland which is beset by the forces of evil and tyranny, who attacked with all their strength and all their abilities, with all the evils and crimes of which they are capable, headed by the US and Israel, and the devil's horn [Saudi Arabia; a hadith of the Prophet foretold the birth of the horn of the devil in the Najd, where Wahhabism appeared], the very heart of hypocrisy, embodied in the criminal Saudi regime, and the movement of mercenaries and foreign agents between traitors and criminals, who have neither religion nor country, nor humanity. They rallied to the criminal abuser of their country and their people, the aggressor who perpetrated the vilest and the most heinous crimes against the people, and who kills hundreds of children, women, adults and young people, and destroys the whole country and everything in it necessary for life, with the imposition of a state

of siege unprecedented throughout the Arab world, far more ruthless than the siege imposed by the Israeli criminals in Gaza and to the people of Palestine.

That's why you have to feel, oh my dear ones, very proud and honoured, and consider it sufficient a glory and dignity to face the worst criminals that be, as evidenced by their most heinous and most atrocious crimes that shame humanity, and defend a dear and oppressed Muslim people of whom the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family) has certified, as evidenced by the reality, the faith, the noble manners, and that it counts among the most worthy and noble peoples.

This oppressed people against whom the evil forces have committed crimes of injustice and oppression, so indescribable and unspeakable as they are, with all their hatred and their arrogance leading them to despise all that is sacred and to trample all human values, and which exceeds with its barbarism, tyranny and crimes the wild beasts and monsters, under the banner of the accursed Satan and the standard of oppression and aggression, may God preserve us of them.

O my very dear and noble brothers, your proud and magnificent resistance in all arenas and battlefields, on the home front, in the struggle against the enemy agents and mercenaries who have sold their souls, their country and their people, their religion and their lowly world to the foreign criminal aggressor, and on the fronts at the border, in the direct struggle against the forces of the devil's horn and all criminal offenders who support them, is truly a holy jihad towards God the Almighty and to the aid of the oppressed among His servants. And without your resistance, the forces of evil and crime of the United States, Israel and Al-Qaeda, as well as the mercenaries and agents of the enemy, would have managed to occupy the country and take total control, and then they would have perpetrated anything they wanted against the noble people of Yemen, in fact crimes, genocide and massacres, rape of sanctities and honour, seizure of the territory and looting of property.

They revealed, by their statements and the actions they have committed, that they are the vilest of God's creations, and the most evil of His servants, and they will hesitate at no crime, so great and terrible as it may be, unless we face them and prevent them from the perpetration. That is why nobody can imagine what they will do if they manage to achieve their evil aims, nor the extent of their hate, their arrogance, their barbarism and tyranny, nor the oppression, humiliation, domination, enslavement, dishonour and evil they wanted to inflict on Yemen and its people, and God is our protector.

O men and heroes of Yemen, O noble and free men of Yemen, O proud and faithful men, you are blessed by the honour and grace of closeness to God through jihad on His way, with all the blessings and grandiose rewards which follow. God the Almighty said: "Truly God loves those who fight in His Cause in battle array, as if they were a solid cemented structure." (Qur'an 61: 4). And the Most High said: "But those who strive and fight Hath He distinguished above those who sit (at home) by a

special reward, / Ranks specially bestowed by Him, and Forgiveness and Mercy. For God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” (Quran, 4, 95-96). And the Most High said: “Let those fight in the cause of God Who sell the life of this world for the hereafter. To him who fighteth in the cause of God,- whether he is slain or gets victory – Soon shall We give him a reward of great (value).” (Quran, 4, 74).

And you are blessed by the honour of loyalty to your dearest oppressed people, and you are really in the situation of the faithful in the hour of trial where the faithful are distinguished from the traitors, the liars from the truthful, the enemy agents from the genuine patriots. And thanks to your loyalty to your people, the hopes of its enemies to inflict us defeat and submission were disappointed, and you are blessed by your noble defence of our honour and our sanctities. And were it not for your loyalty and perseverance, strength and pride with which God has endowed you, but for your patience, your honour and greatness, Yemen would be in the same situation as Mosul and Anbar, where women are captured and their honour violated.

And you are blessed by your protection of our territory and our possessions, your steadfastness and glory, and your active presence on all terrains. Thanks to your stance, Yemen has always been, is, and will never cease to be the cemetery of invaders, the death of enemy agents and traitors, and the stick that will break the backs of bloodthirsty criminals and arrogant tyrants.

And know well that you are on the front of good against evil, of legitimate defence against illegal aggression, the front of humanity faced with barbaric forces of evil, the front of nobility and loyalty faced with collaborationism and betrayal, and the front of faith in the face of hypocrisy.

You are the Yemen of faith, the Yemen of Aws and Khazraj [tribes who supported the Prophet against the Meccans], the Yemen of 'Ammar [b. Yasir, companion of the Prophet] and [Malik Al-] Ashtar [companion and military chief of Imam Ali], the Yemen of humanity, the Yemen of morality, the Yemen of civilization, the Yemen of dignity, the Yemen of glory, the Yemen of magnanimity, the Yemen of perseverance facing the devil's horn and the heart of hypocrisy [Saudi Arabia], which is a puppet of Israel and a cheap slave to the US.

The front of the assault, headed by the US, the Great Satan, who have blackened the pages of humanity by their crimes around the world where they spread death, destruction and looting, going as far as the violation of honour and violation of human dignity, the symbol of evil and tyranny they embody with all they have perpetrated in every corner of the Earth, from Hiroshima to Vietnam, through Iraq and many other countries of the Earth, and its actions in [the Prison of] Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and in many other places which we could discuss at length.

And Israel, a criminal entity founded from the beginning on barbarism, tyranny and plunder, which played their role in this aggression, side by side with the devil's horn,

when they considered the attack as being in the direction of their interests, and encouraged it, bringing their help, support and blessing, then worked and participated as this was discovered and revealed, the role of Israel ceased to be secret and hidden.

Then the devil's horn [Saudi Arabia], which serves the two greatest criminals in the world, America and Israel, a docile and malleable puppet in their hands that revealed its wrongdoing and expressed its cruelty and barbarism by its heinous crimes. They did not hesitate to violate all principles of morality and humanity by targeting children and women, and did not respect the rights of civilians, but were quick to destroy crops and livestock, and worked on inflicting suffering on all children of the country, in all cities and villages. Water tanks and deposits of food stocks, petrol stations, hospitals, mosques, schools, airports and ports, roads and bridges, residential areas and rural villages, economic structures, all that has been targeted by bombs and missiles, because they want to harm all Yemenis in the country, and force suffering on everybody. Similarly, they impose a ruthless and unjust siege that strives to leverage their suffering, and they revealed their unprecedented atrocity, their true nature as monstrous criminals, strangers to humanity.

O noble and dear ones (resistants), the fight you lead today is a struggle for independence and freedom, against those who want to occupy the country and enslave its people. This is a fight for dignity and for honour, facing those who want to vilify and humiliate a Muslim people. And this is a decisive battle for our future and our history: your victory lays the foundations for a real future for your country and for the freedom of your people, and protection of their dignity and independence, of its territory and its honour, and your defeat, God forbid, would lay the foundations of an enslavement to the vilest creatures of God, an unprecedented humiliation, and pave the way to evils that have no equal from these evil criminals who are a danger to all humanity.

This is why you must persevere in your resistance, your heroism and your great tenacity, by which you have submitted the most vivid image of the faith, manners, nobility and pride of the Yemenis and the resistance of believers. Continue to obstruct criminal forces, whether the forces of treason and collaboration in the interior, or the forces of the devil's horn at the borders of the country. Ask for the help of God, who is The Best of Assistants, the Mighty and the Noble.

He said, Glory be to Him, "To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged; and verily, God is most powerful for their aid." (Quran, 22, 39). Count on Him, for He is Enough an ally and Relief. And He said, "And if any one puts his trust in God, sufficient is (God) for him." (Qur'an 65: 3). Trust in His Help, for He said, "If God helps you, none can overcome you" (Qur'an, 3, 160). Do not fear the forces of tyranny and crime, the horn of the devil, because "Feeble indeed is the cunning of Satan"" (Quran, 4, 76). You may hold your commitment to God through the use of endurance, as He said, Glory be to Him: "O ye who

believe! When ye meet a force, be firm, and call God in remembrance much (and often); that ye may prosper.”” (Qur’an, 8, 45). And help one another, as directs God the Almighty: “Help ye one another in righteousness and piety” (Qur’an, 5: 2). And one of the main applications of this verse is union and resistance against the forces of aggression and crime. And beware of discord, according to the injunction of the Most High: “And fall into no disputes, lest ye lose heart and your power depart.” (Qur’an, 8, 46). And it is sufficient injunction against discord to know that this is an act of disobedience to God the Most High, and a source of weakness and defeat, so be very careful not yield to it. And be in your mutual assistance, your camaraderie and your brotherhood in arms like a compact edifice, “Truly God loves those who fight in His Cause in battle array, as if they were a solid cemented structure. (Qur’an 61: 4). And patiently endure all the burdens and difficulties, because the promise of God and His gospel are for the patient, as the Most High says: “Give glad tidings to those who patiently persevere.” (Qur’an 2, 155). And the Most High said, “For God is with those who patiently persevere.” (Qur’an, 8, 46). And the Most High said: “And God Loves those who are firm and steadfast.” (Qur’an, 3, 146). And by patience, endurance and placing his trust in God, through perseverance and sincerity, the victory will be for you, and “Be sure that Allah is your Protector – the best to protect and the best to help.” (Qur’an, 8, 40)

I ask God to grant Mercy, Glory and Immortality to the martyrs, healing to the wounded and salvation to the prisoners and to grant you a great victory and a resounding success in all fronts and in all fields, and for evils to go to the aggressors, the arrogant tyrants and oppressors.

I send you all my love, all my affection and my esteem, and I constantly pray to God for you day and night.

May God’s peace be upon you and His mercy and blessings.

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/>

Disclaimer of Liability and Endorsement

While the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) strives to make the information on this publication as timely and accurate as possible, the ACSRT makes no claims, promises, or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of its contents, and expressly disclaims liability for errors and omissions in its contents. No warranty of any kind, implied, expressed, or statutory, including but not limited to the warranties of non-infringement of third party rights, title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or freedom from computer virus, is given with respect to the contents of this publication or its links to other Internet resources.

It should be noted that any opinions expressed are the responsibility of the authors and not of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), its publication board, its management or any funder or sponsor of the ACSRT, nor that of the African Union Commission (AUC),

Reference in this publication to any specific commercial product, process, or service, or the use of any trade, firm or corporation name is for the information and convenience of the public, and does not constitute endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the ACSRT and AUC.