

MOVING AFRICA FORWARD



# African Peace And Security Architecture (APSA)

## 2010 Assessment Study

*“With the adoption of the Constitutive Act and the Vision of the African Union (AU), African leaders set the path towards Africa’s integration and sustainable development. To achieve this Vision and objectives set forth in the Act, several Organs were established and mandated to develop and implement priority strategies and programs.”*

**H.E. JEAN PING, Chairperson**

## List of acronyms

ADB	African Development Bank
AMANI	African Military Exercise
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	African Union Electoral Support Mission in Comoros
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APF	Africa Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
Bde HQ	Brigade Headquarters
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CMD	Conflict Management Division
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COPAX	Peace and Security Council of the Central Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPMR	Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability and Development Cooperation in Africa
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
EAC	East African Community
EASF	Eastern Africa standby Force
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPF	ECOWAS Peace fund
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
ESFTF	ECOWAS Standby Force Task Force
EU	European Union
FLS	Front Line States
FOC	Full Operation Capability
FOMAC	ECCAS Standby Force
FPU	Formed Police Unit
FTX	Field Training Exercise
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IPOs	Individual Police Officers
IPSTC	International Peace Support Training Centre

ISDSC	Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
JRC	Joint Research Centre
LAS	League of Arab States
LOGBASE	Logistics Base
MAPEX	Map Exercise
MPMC	Mission Planning Management Cell
MOu	Memorandum of Understanding
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NARC	North African Regional Capability
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPP	Operational Planning Process
PLANELM	Planning Element
PoW	Panel of the Wise
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
RDC	Rapid Deployment Capability
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RMs	Regional Mechanisms
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessments
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahelo-Saharan States
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedure
SRO	Special Representatives of the Organ
SSF	SADC Standby Force
TF	Task force
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

## Executive Summary

1. This report assesses progress made by the African Union (AU), the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms in the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It tracks and most importantly, identifies progress in the operationalization of APSA by the aforementioned institutions. Additionally, it identifies specific gaps, needs and priorities with a particular focus on the key components of the APSA i.e. the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise (PoW) and the Peace Fund. The build-up of the APSA at the AU and the RECs/RMs has made varying degrees of progress and achieved a certain level of operational readiness.

2. The report makes the following conclusions and findings based on the assessment criteria developed for the study. The findings are broken down into the following categories: Vertical and Horizontal Coordination; Sustainability; Subsidiarity; Coherence and Partnership.

3. On **vertical coordination**, the report notes that the level of coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs has registered some progress, especially as it relates to the operationalization of two key components of the APSA: the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The level of coherence in the development of these components is more advanced than the other three components (the PSC, the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund). This is partly explained by the fact that the ASF and the CEWS have clearly articulated roadmaps, thereby providing more structured basis for their operationalization. Institutionally, the appointment of the REC/RM Liaison Officers to the AU has improved the communication gap and it is hoped that when the AU deploy its Liaison Officers to the RECs/RMs, it would strengthen coordination further. However, despite the improved communication, the operations of the Liaison Officers have brought to the fore some challenges that need to be addressed if they are to be fully optimized.

4. Beyond the ASF and CEWS, there appears to be limited coordination between the other APSA components. At the time of writing this report, there was no direct linkage between the PSC, Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the RECs/RMs, although this is envisaged for the future. Related to this is the feeling that APSA in its current iteration does not adequately cover all existing and emerging security challenges. For example, while the ASF is envisaged as an instrument for peace operations, the emerging security challenges such as terrorism, piracy and improving the governance of security forces in several member states falls outside the remit of the ASF. The critical point here is to ensure the conceptualization of APSA is flexible so that it can be recalibrated as and when needed. At another level, there appears to be a disconnect between the AU PSC and similar organs in the RECs. More broadly, cooperation even between the Chairperson of the AU and the Chief Executives of the RECs/RMs has been largely personality dependent, a problematic approach given the strong imperative for a more structured cooperation.

5. On **horizontal coordination**, the report notes that the various APSA components are developing at different paces, the level of horizontal coordination has been limited. For instance, the inter-locking system that is envisaged whereby the

decisions of the PSC benefit from information and analysis from other components such as the early warning systems at the AUC and the RECs has been limited. At another level, the REC/RM to REC/RM interface has been equally limited. This portends a big gap given the overlapping membership in some RECs/RMs and the practical and political implications of such a dynamic. In spite of these challenges, there are some REC/RM to REC/RM coordination initiatives on peace and security, which could provide useful lessons on how to enhance inter-REC/RM coordination. For instance, relations between COMESA, EAC and IGAD in the area of peace and security include: a Joint Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) programme for East Africa with EAC on Small Arms and Light Weapons and with IGAD on pastoralist conflicts and cross border issues. However, despite these partnerships, coordination remains a big challenge.

6. The issue of **sustainability** featured prominently at the AU Commission and RECs/RMs, primarily on account of the fact that the operationalization of the APSA has been largely dependent on partner support. This is partly explained by the fact that recruitment of staff at the AU is constrained by the Maputo Structure which limits the number of personnel that can be hired through its regular budget. This approach inevitably raises questions of sustainability, predictability and flexibility. Although this was identified as a major gap, some RECs such as ECOWAS have put in place its own resource mobilization strategy from its Members. ECOWAS has instituted a Community Levy, a percentage of which is dedicated to the ECOWAS Peace Fund. The issue of sustainability gets even more pronounced when the AU or the RECs/RMs deploys a peace operation. The AU's peacekeeping experiences in Darfur and currently Somalia, have demonstrated the risks of being heavily dependent on external support.

7. While the RECs/RMs appears to recognize and accept the principle of **subsidiarity** in their relationship with the AU, there is less clarity on its application in practical terms. Some RECs/RMs are of the view that, the AU Commission should not view itself as an implementing agency; it should rather play more of a coordination role. In other words, the AU should be willing to cede responsibility to the RECs/RMs especially on issues where they have a greater comparative strength. The unanswered question is who identifies those specific areas that the AU should be involved in implementing, and those for which it should have a coordination role? While it is not practically possible for the AU to disengage from implementing its own programs, it is equally important to note that if the envisaged APSA is to function as an inter-locking system, the AU needs to provide more strategic guidance. There is consensus among the RECs/RMs that the AU is currently not playing that role effectively due in part to the human resource constraints at the AU Commission.

8. There is a general feeling among the RECs/RMs and other actors that the APSA is not **coherent or comprehensive** enough in its current configuration. There are a number of security and related developments that do not fall within the remit of any of the APSA components. The need for improved governance of security forces on the continent through Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rising tide of terrorism, piracy, disaster management, post-conflict reconstruction and broader governance issues were identified as challenges that are not adequately addressed under the current APSA. Meanwhile, there is limited **coherence** between and among the

APSA components at the AU and the RECs/RMs. This is particularly notable with the PSC, the Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the regions.

**10. Partnership** between the AU, RECs/RMs and external multilateral and bilateral actors has emerged as a major feature of efforts to operationalize the APSA. The operationalization process is benefiting from a wide range of partner support for the various components. While the outcome of the support has varied, it has raised questions of sustainability, predictability and ownership. Overall, there was a general feeling of the need to diversify partner support for the APSA. It is currently too dependent on EU support as even the REC/RM Liaison Officers to the AU are supported through the APF. This is viewed in some quarters as a risky strategy as the operationalization of the APSA could be weakened if EU support is withheld or withdrawn. Moreover, the imposition of 'one-size-fits all' conditionalities such as the need for all RECs/RMs to spend at least 70% of their previous APF allocations before new funds can be disbursed is problematic because not all RECs/RMs have the same absorptive capacity and resource needs. Consequently, the capacity-building efforts in some RECs/RMs have been held back due to weak absorptive capacity or other factors in others.

11. The report makes the following recommendations, which are divided into strategic/cross cutting and APSA component or REC/RM specific.

## **12. STRATEGIC/CROSS CUTTING ISSUES**

13. **Provide Clear and Consistent Strategic Guidance:** The AU should provide strategic guidance for the operationalization of APSA. While the AU has done so on specific components such as the ASF, through the development of the roadmap for its operationalization, it needs to do more for the other components.
14. **Improve Staffing Levels at the AU Commission and REC/RMs:** Related to the above, the staffing level at the AU Commission needs to be significantly increased. To ensure sustainability and to enhance residual capacity, the AU needs to revise the Maputo Structure which currently limits the Commission's ability to hire staff through its regular budget.
15. **A holistic and Flexible Approach to APSA:** The AU should adopt a holistic, flexible and dynamic approach to its conceptualization of APSA. APSA should not be limited to the five components identified in the Protocol, but should be flexible to factor in emerging political and security dynamics such as governance, transitional justice and SSR. In a nutshell, the APSA should be driven by its original *raison d'être* i.e. the need to promote human security on the continent.
16. **Establish Stronger Institutional Linkage with the RECs/RMs:** The AU should strengthen its relationship with the RECs and RMs. Despite the existence of the Protocol and the MoU between itself and these entities, the institutional relationship between them remains weak. To deal with this, it

would be important to have a structured partnership between the Chairperson of the AU and the Chief Executives of the RECs/RMs.

17. **Improve Inter-Departmental Coordination and Cooperation at the AU Commission:** The AU should improve inter-departmental cooperation between its various departments at the Commission. There is limited collaboration between the various departments which hampers the AU's ability to provide the strategic guidance that it is expected to provide in the operationalization of APSA. Improving inter-departmental cooperation should be a cornerstone of strengthening and enhancing the capacity of the AU Commission. The RECs need to take similar steps to reinforce their capacities and the coherence of their programs and activities.
18. **Mainstream Gender Issues in all APSA Components:** The AU, RECs and RMs should ensure that issues of gender are mainstreamed into all the APSA components at the continental and regional levels. Although there is a commitment to do so on paper, the current staffing level of some of the APSA component is male dominated. This is a gap that should be tackled as a matter of urgency.
19. **Increase Collaboration and Partnership with Civil Society:** The AU, RECs/RMs should increase their collaboration with civil society. This is crucial as it would ensure that the operationalization of APSA is in tune with the developments on the ground. To date, several RECs such as ECOWAS have developed strong partnerships with civil society on a range of issue, most notably in the development of its early warning system. Such collaborative efforts should be replicated by the AU and other RECs/RMs.

## 17. THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

18. **Clarify PSC Relationship with Panel:** The AU should clarify the role of the Panel of the Wise and its relationship with the PSC. The relationship between the two entities has so far been very limited.
19. **Provide Fixed and Flexible Budget:** The AU should provide a fixed and flexible budget for the PSC to ensure that it can function effectively. The PSC is increasingly interested in undertaking fact-finding and other missions, but is often constrained by the absence of financial and other resources.
20. **Strengthen Role of PSC Monthly Chair:** The PSC should strengthen the role of its monthly chair by making sure that it provides the leadership role on both substantive and process issues, including the drafting of Communiqués.
21. **Enforce Criteria for Appointing PSC Members:** While it might be impractical for the AU to enforce the full range criteria for membership of the PSC, it should nonetheless engage with the RECs to ensure that their nominees meet at least the basic requirements. Appointing members that do not meet the basic criteria would in the long-run undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the PSC; two principles that should be preserved.

**22. Improve Collaboration with RECs and UN Security Council:** The AU should ensure closer collaboration with the decision making organs of the RECs and the UN Security Council. This is critical, because it is only through effective collaboration that the leverage of these institutions would be increased. The need to speak with one voice is a compelling reason for closer collaboration. In this vein, joint information sharing, planning and coordination are important first steps.

**23. Improve Synergy between PSC and other APSA Components:** Related to the above, the AU should ensure greater synergy between the PSC and other APSA components. To date, there is limited evidence of cooperation between the various entities, a gap that needs to be plugged urgently.

### **33. THE CEWS AND SIMILAR STRUCTURES IN THE RECS**

**34. Strengthen Support Systems:** The AU should strengthen the support systems including human and financial resources in AUC and all regional organizations. This is critical to ensure that the APSA can function effectively.

**35. Expand Connectivity between AUC and RECs:** The AU should work with the RECs to improve and expanding connectivity at all levels including transfer of information from all RECs to the AU Situation Room. An important first step in this direction would be to improve the existing information technology infrastructure.

**36. Adopt Holistic Early Warning Indicators:** The AU and RECs should adopt holistic early warning indicators and ensure that they are aligned with PSC protocol which calls for the indicators to include political, economic, social, military and humanitarian issues.

**37. Provide Additional Analysts for the CEWS:** The AU should increase the number of analyst in qualitative and quantitative terms. The number of analysts in the AU early warning is not adequate and they are overstretched. In the same breadth, special attention should be given to strengthening analytical capacities especially of those RECs that are still in the process of establishing their early warning systems.

**38. Broaden the Recipient of Early Warning Reports:** The AU and RECs should institutionalize and broaden the recipients of its reports and policy options. In this vein, where that practice is not already in place, early warning reports should be shared with a range of actors including, the ASF PLANELM, the Peace Support Operations Division, the PSC Secretariat, Members of Panel of the Wise and its Secretariat, AU/REC mediators, special representatives, and ongoing peace support operations.

**39. Increase and Strengthen Collaboration with Other Actors:** The AU and the RECs should increase and where it exist their engagement with other actors such as the United Nations agencies and civil society in Africa and beyond. To date there is no actual collaboration and coordination with the UN and its specialized agencies, other international organizations, this is a gap that needs to be filled.



40. **Improve Documentation of Lessons Learned:** The AU and RECs should improve and strengthen the lessons learned and documentation process. To date, there has been little effort in this direction. However, capturing lessons and best practices would go a long way in enhancing the efficacy of the CEWS and similar structures in the RECs.

#### 41. **THE AFRICAN STADNBY FORCE**

42. **Adopt Binding Legal Instrument with Member States:** The AU, RECs and RMs should adopt binding legal documents with member states for the employment of pledged troops. While there is an MOU between the AU and the RECs/RMs, it deals more with Force Generation than other more substantive issues such as accountability to the Members States, compensation and reimbursement. To date, none of the RECs and RMs have signed a formal MoU with their Members for the deployment of their troops.

43. **Harmonize Membership of Standby Arrangements:** The AU should engage the RECs and RMs to deal with the overlapping membership. Currently, several countries belong to more than Standby Force. The AU Commission should tackle this issue as part of its strategic leadership for the ASF.

44. **Improve Staffing of PLANELMs at AU and RECs/RMs:** The staffing level of the PLANELMs at the AU and the RECs/RMs should be enhanced. This challenge is particularly pronounced with the police and civilian components of the standby arrangements.

45. **Appoint Chief of Staff for the ASF:** Related to the above, the AU should ensure that a Chief of Staff for the ASF is appointed as a matter of urgency. The position of has been vacant for the past three years, following the passing away of its first Chief of Staff, General Ishaya Hassan. Adopting the proposed structure for the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is an important first step as it would help to fill some crucial staffing gaps.

46. **Address Logistics Gap as Priority:** The AU, RECs and RMs should address the issue of logistics as a matter of priority. The establishment of continental and regional depots is important first step. In order to minimize predictability and sustainability challenges associated with partner support, the AU, RECs and RMs should ensure that they provide the bulk of the resources for their logistics depots.

47. **Provide Guidance and Leadership for Centers for Excellence:** The AU should provide more guidance and leadership for the various centers of excellence in the regions. That all RECs and RMs have their own centers of excellence is commendable, however, in the interest of harmonization and coordination, the AU should engage with these centers so as to ensure that training programs and curriculum is closely aligned to the requirements of the ASF.

#### 51. **THE PANEL OF THE WISE AND SIMILAR STRUCTURES IN THE RECS**

52. To enhance the role of the Panel, the report makes the following recommendations.

53. **Clarify Role of the Panel:** The role of the Panel in the AU's preventive strategy should be clarified. It is critical to establish whether the Panel will be involved in direct mediation or it would continue to play a supporting role of mediation efforts as has been the case so far.

54. **Include Panel in AU Commission's Structure:** The Panel should be included in the AU Commission's structure so as to give it greater visibility, and most importantly, to ensure that it is supported from the AU regular budget. The current reliance on partner support does not bode well for the sustainability and ownership of the Panel.

55. **Increase Staff Complement for Panel's Secretariat:** The current staff complement of the Panel's Secretariat should be increased to at least 5 professional staff and an administrative assistant.

56. **Increase Synergy Between Panel and Other APSA Components:** Efforts should be made to ensure that the Panel is properly linked up with other APSA components at the AU Commission and the RECs. Ensuring that the Panel engages with other APSA structures and its equivalents the RECs on the issues on its agenda is an important first step in improving coordination. From a practical standpoint, there should be periodic meetings (at least twice a year or as the need may be) between Panel members and their counterparts in the RECs.

57. **Develop Robust Communication Strategy:** The Panel should develop a robust communication strategy as that would give visibility to its engagements. This is particularly critical for its pronouncement on key thematic issues such as questions of election related violence and the peace and justice dilemma. The position of the Panel on issues of this nature would help to complement and where necessary shed more light on the AU's position on some of these controversial matters.

58. **Establish Dedicated Secretariats for Panel Equivalents in the RECs:** Resources should be provided to RECs to establish dedicated secretariats to support the activities of Council members. This is critical as it would ensure that Council members are properly supported and lessons from their engagements are captured and applied to future engagements.

## Chapter 1

### The African Peace and Security Architecture: The Akosombo Spirit

#### 1. Introduction and Background

2. This report assesses progress made by the by the African Union (AU), the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms in the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It tracks and most importantly, identifies progress in the operationalization of APSA by the aforementioned institutions. Additionally, it identifies specific gaps, needs and priorities with a particular focus on the key components of the APSA i.e. the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise (PoW) and the Peace Fund. The build-up of the APSA at the AU and the RECs/RMs has made varying degrees of progress and achieved a certain level of operational readiness; the details of which are discussed in subsequent sections of this report.

#### 3. The Akosombo Decision

4. It was against this backdrop that the high level consultative meeting between the Chief Executives of the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs) and the European Union (EU), on the EU support to the operationalisation of the APSA held in Akosombo, Ghana from 10-11 December, 2009, decided that the AU, RECs and RMs and the EU would conduct an assessment of progress achieved in the operationalisation of APSA and the challenges ahead, with a view to identifying further priorities and capacity needs. The assessment was further endorsed at the meeting of the Joint Coordination Committee on the African Peace Facility (APF) held in Addis Ababa on 3 February 2010 and at the meeting of the 4<sup>th</sup> Steering Committee (Long Term Capacity Building Programme) held in Addis Ababa on 3-4 March 2010. The Terms of References for the assessment are attached as Annex I of this report.

#### 5. Purpose & Objectives

6. The purpose of the assessment is to serve as future reference for AU and the RECs/RMs to:

- I. Better apprehend what capacities (and up to which quality) still need to be built;
- II. Identify what measures of coherence need to be undertaken at the continental and regional levels;
- III. To consolidate and further develop their capacity to engage more effectively in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and peace consolidation in the framework of the APSA.

## **9. Methodology**

10. The assessment used both primary and secondary sources of information in its data collection process. The assessment builds upon existing mappings and reports, including the outcomes of the Regional Seminars with the RECs organised by the European Commission. The primary sources included policy documents, commissioned reports and interviews, while the secondary sources involved reviewing existing literature on the subject matter. The assessment team had extensive discussions with various experts and officials both at the AU Commission and in the RECs/RMs. The team travelled to all the RECs/RMs beginning with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) followed by the North African Regional Capability (NARC) and Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), followed by the Eastern Africa Regional Standby Brigade (EASBRICOM), the East African Community (EAC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), then Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and South African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The team used a set of generic and specific open ended questions for the interviews (see Annex II). The generic questions were supplemented by specific questions on the various components of APSA which were tailored to suit the specificity of the REC/RM concerned.

## **11. Background and Legal Framework**

13. In pursuance of the objectives of the Constitutive Act of the AU, the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU entered into force on 26 December, 2003. The Protocol embraces an expanded and comprehensive agenda for peace and security that includes conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace building, the encouragement and promotion of democratic practices and intervention and humanitarian action and disaster management. At its heart, is APSA which is intended to give the AU the necessary instruments to fulfil the tasks set out in the Constitutive Act and the Protocol establishing the PSC.

## **14. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)**

15. The various APSA instruments described above are depicted in the diagram below:




Figure 1: APSA architecture

16. In the preceding diagram, illustrates the interwoven relationship between the major players in the maintenance of global peace and security as the UN, AU Commission and the Regional Economic Communities and Mechanisms. Mention must be made of the fact that the APSA emerged out of a desire by African Leaders to establish an operational structure to execute decisions taken in accordance with the authority conferred by Article 5 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. At the heart of the architecture is the PSC which was established as the standing decision making Organ to be supported by the Commission, Panel of the Wise, CEWS, an ASF and a Special Fund. The functions of these as mandated in the Protocol underscore the importance of interdependence and synergy between the pillars. Hence in the operationalisation of APSA there is also a parallel process of setting up functioning systems in the RECs/RMs. For the system to function effectively, it requires interaction and synergy among the pillars. It comes out clearly from the given mandates that there is an expectation for a synergistic linkage between the pillars.

17. Article 12 of the Protocol provides for early warning information provided to the Chairperson through the Continental Early Warning System. This is meant to provide the PSC with an opportunity of taking the required action after due consideration of the issues. The Panel of the Wise could be deployed to support efforts of the Peace and Security Council (Article 11). In situations of grave magnitude as envisaged in Articles 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act could trigger some form of intervention. Hence, the African Standby Force was established to deal with such an eventualities (Article 13). Therefore, the rapid deployment capacity becomes a critical milestone in the operationalisation and strengthening of the APSA. Although the Pillars could be at differing stages of development, the build up of APSA has made progress. The Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security has placed the operationalisation and strengthening of APSA as a joint priority, leading to the Akosombo decision.

### **18. The Peace and Security Council (PSC)**

19. As stated above, the assessment of progress for each of the components is guided by a set of generic and specific questions. For example, the report attempts to address questions such as, what are the main objectives, priorities and needs in the short, medium and long-term? Are the priorities identified adequate for the requisite support? Additionally, there are questions relating to cooperation between the AU PSC and similar decision making organs in the regions on one hand and the Military Staff Committee on the other. Moreover, it addresses issues such as, what level and form of support is required to ensure that the PSC can implement its mandate. Beyond the specificity of each component there are issues concerning the relationship with Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, particularly on ways to strengthen coordination and cooperation between the AUC, PSC and RECs/RMs. For example, what measures could be adopted to improve the interaction between the AU and RECs, especially in information sharing and implementation of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Moreover, there are other cross-cutting issues that needs to be addressed. Meanwhile, partners concerns about coordination and streamlining have been raised in the past and it remains to be seen how far these matters have been resolved have.

### **21. Panel of Wise**

22. As provided for in the ToRs for this study, an attempt will be made to capture some of the salient outcomes of the recent mapping exercise on the Panel of the Wise, which was undertaken with the support of the government of the United Kingdom. The focus of this chapter would be primarily to assess how the cooperation and synergies between the Panel of the Wise and other structure of APSA at the continental and regional level could be supported or facilitated.

### **23. Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)**

24. Building on the results of the recent mapping exercise of the CEWS, this chapter would among other things; first, it assesses the priority needs (medium and long) of regional early warning structures, with a focus on ensuring the coordination/cooperation/coherence between AU and REC/RMs. Second, it delves into the nature and extent of international partners' support towards regional early warning system, identifying areas of emphasis as well as possible gaps against the framework for the operationalization of CEWS. Third, it tries to establish the extent to which connectivity between the early warning units in the regions and the CEWS is working, and how it could be strengthened. Finally, it assesses the analytical capacity of the CEWS and the level of support needed, and the level of reciprocal information sharing between CEWS and other APSA components such as the ASF.

### **25. The African stand by force (ASF)**

The full operational of the ASF will undoubtedly revolve around key challenges such as the multidimensionality of the ASF, the level of coordination and cooperation between the continental and regional level, force generation, capacity related issues in terms of planning, procedures, SOPS, logistics and equipment. In light of this, the chapter attempts to determine how the full operationalization of the ASF could be enhanced in qualitative and quantitative terms.

26. The report is divided into seven chapters, the bulk of which are devoted to each of the five pillars of APSA, namely the PSC, the CEWS, Panel of the Wise, the ASF

and the Peace Fund. The remaining chapters deal with issues of coordination and coherence, the main findings and conclusions, and a set of recommendations on strategic/cross cutting and APISA component specific issues. The recommendations will be subsequently developed into a road in consultation with the AU, RECs and RMs. It is hoped that the roadmap would serve as a framework and reference point for EU and other partner support.

## Chapter II

### **The Peace and Security Council (PSC) and Similar Decision-Making Structures in the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)**

#### **1. Introduction and Background**

2. The Peace and Security Council (PSC), the most visible component of the APSA to date, was established by the first Summit of the AU in Durban, South Africa in July 2002, as the standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.<sup>1</sup> It is meant to act as a collective security and early warning instrument for timely and efficient response to both existing and emerging conflict and crisis situations in Africa. It is supported by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund, collectively referred to as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Among other things, the objectives of the PSC are to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property.

3. The fifteen members of the PSC are elected on the basis of equal rights, 10 are elected for a two year period, while the remaining five are elected for a three year period on the principle of equitable representation of the five regions: North, West, Central, East and Southern Africa.

4. Unlike the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where the five Permanent Members wield the veto, none of the fifteen members of the PSC have a veto; all members are entitled to one vote each. However, the Protocol took account of the need for regional balance so as to minimize tensions and increase the potential for consensus in dealing with contentious issues such as military intervention. In addition, it factored in the power balance among its membership by emphasizing the need for members of the PSC to not only be willing to participate in resolving conflicts, but most importantly, to possess the necessary political, military, financial and diplomatic muscle to do so. However, so far, this particular principle has not been adhered to on a consistent basis as some members of the PSC lack the aforementioned requirements. For instance, some current PSC members do not have Defence Attaches in their missions to the AU, and as such, send civilian officials to attend meetings of the Military Staff Committee (MSC); a pivotal advisory organ of the PSC.

5. In a move designed to deal with some of the complications that rendered the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) redundant, the PSC's decision-making is vested in the Permanent Representatives Council who are required to meet at least twice every month. However, given the unpredictable nature of conflicts, the PSC has on average been meeting at least five times a month since 2006. This has added an enormous burden on the members of the Council especially those with very skeletal staff at their embassies. Moreover, it has increased the workload of the PSC Secretariat, which is increasingly being

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<sup>1</sup>See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Durban, South Africa, 9 July 2002.



requested to backstop members with limited capacity, compounding the Secretariat's already overstretched resources. The other organs of the PSC i.e. the Council of Ministers and Heads of State and Government, are required to meet at least once a year.

## **6. Regional Decision Making Structures**

7. Just as the AU, efforts are underway to develop PSC-like structures by the various RECs. For instance, since 2000, COMESA has had a Committee on Peace and Security, which meets at least annually to consider peace and security issues. All Member States are represented on the Committee at ministerial level. However, the Committee is not a decision-making structure. It can only make recommendations to the Council of Ministers which will be subsequently forwarded to the Authority for a final decision; thus, the Authority is the supreme decision-making organ of COMESA. The Bureau serves as the standing decision-making organ that ensures a regular interface between the Authority, Committee and Secretariat on matters of peace and security. It also liaises with the AU PSC and other RECs in the region. Perhaps, given COMESA's strong leaning towards trade-related issues, its cooperation with the PSC and other RECs in this area is still evolving. However, the tripartite partnership between COMESA, SADC and EAC would undoubtedly contribute to harnessing the resources and initiatives of the three RECs on issues of peace and security in particular, and more broadly.

8. Unlike other RECs, IGAD does not have an equivalent of the PSC that is distinct from its overall political organs: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and the Council of Ministers, and there are no plans to constitute one in the near future. Moreover, it does not have the equivalent of the MSC, however, an ad hoc panel of Chiefs of Defence Staff has been convened to provide advice on military issues such as its planned peace operation for Somalia which never materialized.

9. In Southern Africa, the troika of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security is the decision making organ of the institution on issues of politics, defence and security. Consisting of three members – the outgoing, the serving and incoming members, the troika of the Organ is supported by the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), whose sub-committee on Defence is the equivalent of the MSC. The Organ is one of the oldest institutions in SADC; it dates back to the Front Line States (FLS) which, was established to coordinate support for the anti-colonial struggle in the region. Unlike the PSC, decisions of the troika of the Organ are forwarded to the Summit for final approval. While consensus worked well within SADC, the true test of that consensus would only come when troika makes decisions on military intervention, a sensitive issue in the region. Institutionally, there is no formalized relationship between the troika of the Organ and the PSC, making collaboration on conflict situations such as the ongoing crisis in Madagascar problematic. There is evidence that the cooperation between SADC and the AU in finding solutions to the political crisis in that country was very rocky in the initial stages, perhaps, demonstrating lack of coordination between the two institutions.

10. West Africa, perhaps more than any other region, has one of the most robust and proactive decision-making organs, the Mediation and Security Council (MSC). It has taken very intrusive and binding decisions including the deployment of peace

operations to Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia in 2003, and has suspended several of its members from its Council for failing to comply with its norms. For instance, as at the time of writing this report, Guinea and Niger remained suspended from ECOWAS due to the military takeovers in both countries. The suspensions are inline with the ECOWAS policy of zero-tolerance for unconstitutional change of government. Institutionally, the MSC is supported by the Defence and Security Council (DSC), one of the most active components of the ECOWAS peace and security architecture. Despite the pivotal role of the MSC in dealing with issues of peace and security, its cooperation with the PSC has been sporadic and ad hoc. However, when they have cooperated as was the case with the extension of President Laurent Gbagbo's term in office in 2006, the outcome was positive in the sense that the two institutions spoke with one voice. Unfortunately, that kind of cooperation has not been replicated on a consistent basis. For instance, ECOWAS and the AU appeared uncoordinated in their response to the ongoing crisis in Niger, which was triggered by former President Mamadu Tandja's attempt to perpetuate himself in power through a discredited referendum, which subsequently triggered the military takeover.

11. For its part, CEN-SAD is in the process of establishing a Peace Council that will consist of 10 members, which like its counterparts in other regions, will meet at three levels: Summit, Ministerial and Ambassadorial. The Peace Council is to be supported by a CEN-SAD Military Staff Committee, which would serve as an advisory organ of the Peace Council. However, at the time of the visit for this report, none of these structures were operational. The creation of these structures was pending the approval of the CEN-SAD Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism which was adopted in 2004 but had only been ratified by three members by July 2010.

12. Meanwhile, the PSC equivalent in ECCAS, the Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Afrique Centrale, known under the French acronym COPAX, was established as the organ for political and military dialogue in Central Africa. Approved in February 2000, the Protocol establishing COPAX formally entered into force in January 2004. COPAX has two decision making organs, namely the Heads of States and Governments Conference and the Council of Ministers composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers in charge of Defense and Security. The Defense and Security Commission, the Political and Diplomatic Action Directorate, the early warning mechanism of Central Africa known under the French acronym MARAC and the multidimensional force of Central Africa known under the French acronym of FOMAC are the technical and action organs of COPAX. Its mandate covers a wide spectrum of issues including ensuring peace, security and stability in the region. It is also responsible for authorizing the deployment of multi-dimensional peace operations in the region.

13. ECCAS plans to establish a Committee of ambassadors along the lines of the Panel of the Wise, to augment its preventive diplomacy. Operationally, as at the time of writing this report, there was no evidence of any partnership between COPAX and the PSC or with any other REC for that matter. This exposes a fundamental gap in the emerging continental peace and security architecture especially given the fact that Central Africa plays host to a large number of conflicts and fragile states. There is no gainsaying therefore that, peacemaking efforts in the region would be

significantly boosted by a strong partnership between ECCAS, the AU and other relevant stakeholders.

#### **14. Progress, Challenges and Constraints**

15. Operationally, the PSC has been the most visible component of the emerging Peace and Security architecture. It has held nearly 250 meetings and briefing sessions on a wide range of issues, demonstrating two things. First, the growing commitment of AU member states to tackle conflicts on the continent. Second, the frequency with which it has met demonstrates the fragility of the security situation in some of its members. At another level, the PSC has convened three retreats on some key thematic and procedural issues in Dakar, Senegal in 2007, in Livingstone, Zambia in December 2008 and in Ezulwini, Swaziland in September, 2009. During these meetings, the PSC adopted its working methods, the Livingstone Formula defining its relationship with civil society organizations and how to enhance the implementation of sanctions in situations involving unconstitutional change of government.

16. In addition to the above, the PSC has authorized the deployment of peacekeepers to Burundi (AMIB), Comoros (AMISEC), Sudan (AMIS) and more recently Somalia (AMISOM). The deployment of peacekeepers in these theatres has exposed a major gap between the PSC's willingness to authorize such missions and the AU's ability to implement them. Shortage of resources -- human and material -- has emerged as a major shortfall. How the AU deals with this mandate-resource gap would determine the continued credibility of the PSC, since decisions that are not backed by resources would in the long-run erode its credibility.

17. At another level, there is a potential disconnect between the AU and the regions when it comes to electing members of the PSC, as despite the laid down criteria, election of members rests with the regions. This limits the ability of the AU to enforce its principles as the regions have adopted their own formula for nominating members to the PSC. For instance, some regions have agreed to have one of their members occupy the three year seat almost on a permanent basis, thus, creating a pseudo-Permanent member, but without any veto powers. The gap between the AU and the regions on the criteria for electing members creates a dilemma and raises profound questions. First, to what extent is it realistic for the AU to enforce its criteria for electing members to the PSC? Second, under what circumstances should the AU reject candidates nominated by their regions? Finally, what does this gap say about the principle of subsidiarity that is meant to underpin the AU's relations with the RECs?

18. Although an exhaustive response to these questions is beyond the remit of this study, the report nonetheless notes the following. While it is desirable to enforce the laid down criteria, it is unrealistic to enforce all of them given the huge resource disparities between AU member states. For instance, the capacities of members with enormous financial and human resources cannot be compared to some of the smaller and less well-resourced but equally important members of the AU.

19. Meanwhile, there was evidence that several member states have strengthened the staff complement in their missions to the AU following their appointment to the

PSC. The cases of Ghana and Uganda are glaring examples in this respect. Prior to their membership of the PSC, both countries had no defence attaches, however, they have since deployed these officials in their embassies in Addis Ababa; a practice that should be encouraged. At the heart of the challenges of enforcing the criteria for membership of the Council is the principle of subsidiarity, which is meant to be one of the guiding principles of the relationships between the AU and the RECs/RMs. The regions, which have adopted their own formulas for electing members to the PSC in some instances, appear to be driven more by political bargaining than complying with the criteria in the Protocol; a situation that exposes gaps in the application of the subsidiarity principle.

20. However, the one principle that the PSC appears to have consistently enforced is the one that bars its members from participating in decision-making on situations where they have a direct involvement. The Protocol stipulates that PSC members that are party to a conflict or a situation that is under consideration by the PSC should recuse themselves from the discussion and decision-making process on the particular case. This principle has been largely adhered to, with some few exceptions. For instance, when Sudan was a member of the PSC it was allowed to make presentations on the crisis in Darfur, it was not allowed to participate in the decision-making process. The AU needs to clarify what constitutes a party to conflict. Given the cross-border nature of most conflicts, there has been situations where some members of the PSC who were deemed to be party to a conflict insisted on participating in PSC meetings on the basis that from their standpoint they are not directly involved in the given conflict situation. If not properly addressed, this issue would in the long run undermine the credibility of the PSC as an impartial actor in conflict situations.

21. Institutionally, the PSC is mandated to work with the Chairperson of the Commission, who will assist it in carrying out its mandate. Although the Commission has been providing the PSC with regular reports on progress and challenges on issues of peace and security on the continent, what has been missing is the link between the PSC and the Panel of the Wise, which is discussed in detail in a subsequent section of this report. As the time of writing, there was no formalized link between the two organs.

#### *26. The Rotating Chair of the PSC*

27. At another level, the role of the monthly rotating chair of the PSC vis-à-vis the substantive work of the PSC was discussed during its first retreat in Dakar in 2007. Until very recently, the role of the chair has been limited to chairing PSC sessions with minimal input either to the development of the agenda, work programme or more substantive aspects such as the drafting of reports and Communiqués. Consequently, the chair has played more of a facilitation role instead of actually driving the process by providing clear guidance and input to PSC meetings. The net result has been enormous burden on the PSC Secretariat which has had the additional responsibility of supporting PSC chairs with limited staff. In the long-run, the rather symbolic role of the chair could rob the PSC of the ownership of its programs and activities. While the AU Commission appears to have filled the gap by providing administrative and other forms of support to PSC meetings, a development

that could be sustainable in the short-term, it is not sustainable in the long-term given that the Secretariat is understaffed as well.

#### *28. The PSC Secretariat*

29. At the time of writing this report, the PSC Secretariat consisted of 4 professional staff, one secretary and an administrative assistant. However, even this limited number is considered a boost from the number of staff approved through the Maputo Structure, which only provided for 2 professional staff: the Secretary to PSC, a P2 official and an administrative assistant, a figure that does not even match the more mundane responsibilities of the Secretariat such as convening PSC meetings. The skeletal staff level has been exacerbated by the growing role of the PSC in dealing with a wide range of existing and emerging security issues. Despite being overstretched, the PSC Secretariat appears to have been quite efficient in carrying out its numerous tasks. However, its continued effectiveness cannot be guaranteed with its current staff levels and ever-growing mandate.

30. Meanwhile, even if the Secretariat's proposed increased in the number of personnel from its current 4 staff posts to 13 is approved, that still pales in comparison to the UN's Security Council Affairs Division with a staff complement of over 60. Needless to say, the disparity between the two support organs of the PSC and the UNSC is quite stark. To put this in perspective, the Security Council Affairs Division which has ten times more staff than the PSC Secretariat is limited to a purely support function, while, the PSC Secretariat with its skeletal staff has increasingly assumed a broader role due to some of the issues discussed above. This situation is even more problematic because the PSC Secretariat does not have a legal expert despite the fact it is dealing with a lot of issues that require legal interpretation. This is not sustainable and needs to be addressed urgently.

31. The substantive challenges are compounded by what would ordinarily be considered mundane issues. For example, convening a PSC meeting is contingent on at least two considerations. First, is the availability of a conference room, the PSC is yet to have a dedicated meeting room with all the necessary translation equipment. Second, is the availability of translators, the PSC does not have a dedicated pool of translators, and as such has to rely on those from the Commission's Conference Services whose pool of translators is limited as well. That the Secretariat has to rely on this department is problematic because it is often overcommitted and most importantly, its working methods are not flexible. For instance, while the bulk of PSC meetings are determined by the exigencies of events, the conference services department requires prior booking of translators, an impractical situation from the standpoint of the PSC.

32. That most of the 4 professional staff of the PSC Secretariat were hired through partner support raises questions of sustainability. The reluctance of member states to approve new posts, in spite of the overwhelming evidence of the need to do so, brings to the fore questions about their level of commitment to the full operationalization of the APSA. It is obvious that competing demands for resources in the respective member states in the face of the global economic crisis, has resulted in dampened political interest especially as it relates to approving more posts for some of the APSA components and the wider AU Commission. So far, bi-

lateral and multi-lateral partner support has fielded the void however, this suffers from two defects. First, partner support is often not predictable and flexible and in the interest of the recipients, and second, it is not clear how long such support can be sustained.

### *33. The Military Staff Committee (MSC)*

34. Established under Article 13 of the Protocol establishing the PSC, the MSC is mandated to advise the PSC on questions relating to military and security issues that are on its agenda. Consisting of senior military officers of PSC members, the chair of the MSC is held concurrently by the same country that is chairing the PSC. Since its establishment in 2004, the MSC has been engaged in providing advice on the PSC's authorized peace operations in Burundi, Sudan (Darfur), Comoros and currently Somalia.

35. The MSC like the other APSA components, is confronted at least four inter-related challenges. First, and as stated above, at the time of writing this report, the MSC should have been chaired by Equatorial Guinea however; it could not because it does not have a senior military officer in its embassy in Addis Ababa. In fact, three other current members of the PSC do not have a defence attaché in their embassies in Addis. This is a critical gap as it undercuts the effective functioning of the Committee. Second, and somewhat related to the above, the MSC does not meet on a regular basis due to lack of guidance on its working methods. This is problematic given that the PSC is seized with several conflict situations that require the involvement of the MSC. Third, the MSC cannot address civilian and police issues given its pure military composition. This deprives the PSC of the multi-dimensional advice that is required when it contemplates authorizing peace operations. Finally, there is lack of clarity on the institutional affiliation of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) in operational terms. In other words, it is not clear whether the affairs of the MSC, an Organ of the PSC, fall within the remit of the PSC Secretariat, the main supporting organ of the PSC or the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). From a practical standpoint and in the interest of greater coherence and synergy, the MSC should be managed by the PSC Secretariat since it is the main interface between the PSC and the Commission.

### **36. Conclusion**

37. That the AU's PSC has emerged as the most visible component of the APSA is not in doubt, however, the interface between the PSC and similar organs in the RECs has been limited to date. Moreover, the interaction between the PSC and other APSA components has not been optimal, primarily due to the fact some of the components are still being operationalized. Institutional support to the PSC, whose agenda of activities has grown exponentially, is limited. The Secretariat is overstretched in the face of growing demands on it to support both the PSC and some of its members with limited capacity in their embassies. The structures in the RECs are confronted by similar challenges, especially with respect to support structures at their headquarters.

## Chapter IV

### The African Standby Force (ASF)

#### 1. Introduction and Background

2. The first Assembly of the African Union which met in Durban, South Africa from 9 to 10 July 2002 adopted the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council that included provisions on the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and a Military Staff Committee as well as other instruments. Article 13 of the PSC Protocol provides that '...an African Standby Force shall be established. Such force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary components with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at an appropriate notice'.

2. The ASF will consist of five Regional Standby Capabilities. The PSC is charged with the responsibility for general supervision and policy guidance of the brigades of the African Standby Force. The role of the ASF is to provide Peacekeeping forces on a high level readiness capable of rapid deployment in response to a request by the UN or the AU or a given region. It is the responsibility of the REC/RMs to prepare their capabilities as mechanisms for the AU Commission to achieve the Peace and Security initiatives with respect to peace, security and stability. The ASF should thus be able to act on an AU or UN mandate to breach the gap between the eruption of violence/conflict and the deployment of UN forces. It is the responsibility of the AU to evaluate the readiness of the regional Panelm, HQ and ASF regional brigades in consultation with REC Panelms. This involves certification which is the official recognition that the unit or force component meets the defined standards and criteria, therefore capable of performing the mandated mission.

3. The main areas of certification are manpower, equipment, training and sustainability. Member States are responsible for preparation and achievement of prescribed standards and readiness on the basis of the ASF operational standards. There is a requirement for the brigades to develop capabilities and a force generation process.

#### **4. Policy Framework for ASF**

5. The Policy Framework document for the establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee was adopted by the Chiefs of Staff on 17-18 January 2004, by the African Ministers of Defense on 20 January 2004 and subsequently approved by the African Head of State in Addis Ababa in July 2004.


6. Paragraph 15 of the policy framework outlines the following scenario:

The PSC is the sole authority for mandating and terminating AU PSO missions. Only the PSC and Summit level can authorize Scenario 6 interventions. The PSC is charged with the responsibility for general supervision and policy guidance of the brigades of the ASF.

7. At the 7<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Executive Council meeting in Sirte, Libya from 28<sup>th</sup> June to 2<sup>nd</sup> of July 2005, the Council stressed the need for the effective operationalisation of the various segments of the African Peace and Security Architecture including the African Standby Force.



## Road Map



- **Phase III:** (2009) proposes an Exercise JOINT BRIGADES to validate the procedures of the ASF, including the Continental Peace and Security Architecture, including the ASF.
- **Phase II:** (2007, 2008) proposes Consolidation of ASF Tools and Concept of Operations, identification of capacities for deployment in the interim period prior to 2010 and Capability Development.
- **Phase I:** (2003 to 2006) has successfully provided the baseline documentation Tools.

8. The ASF Roadmap required that scenarios 1 to 4 be addressed in phase 1 by June, 2006. In Phase 2 which covers the period from June, 2006 to 2010, the five regional Brigades are required to be fully operational. In this phase, the Brigades are required to fully develop capacity to address scenarios 4 to 6.

- **Phase 1** focused on individual training that was to be conducted in Member states level, PLANELM HQs level, Brigade Headquarters and LOG Base level.
- **In phase 2**, Individual Groups i.e. PLANELM, Brigade HQs, Logistic Base and units were supposed to train collectively.
- **Phase 3** culmination of collective training conducted in form of seminars, joint CPX and joint FTX.

9. The overall status of readiness of the ASF is as follows:

	Benchmarks	AU	ECOWAS	SADC	EASF	NARC	ECCAS
(a)	(b)						
1	Framework documents	√	√	√	√	√	√
2	MOU	√	×	×	×	×	×
3	PLANELM	√	√	√	√	√	√
4	Bde HQ	PSOD	√	×	√	√	×
5	Pledged Units	NA	√	√	√	√	√
6	Log Depots	×	×	×	×	×	×
7	Centres of Excellence	×	√	√	√	√	√
8	Bde Operational	NA	×	×	×	×	×
9	Civilian Components	In Process	In Process	In Process	In Process	In Process	In Process
10	Police component	√	√	√	√	√	√

## 10. The Regional Standby Arrangements

## 11. The East African States Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM)

### 12. Introduction and Background

13. The name 'EASBRIG' was changed to 'EASF' Eastern Africa Standby Force, during the 6<sup>th</sup> Extraordinary Council Ministers meeting held in Nairobi Kenya, on 18 June 2010, to show existence of multi dimensionality. However, the force traces its roots back to Jinja, Uganda 16-17 February 2004 during a meeting of Eastern Africa Chief of Defense Staff. The meeting of the Chief of Defense Staff discussed the Policy Framework for the establishment of EASBRIG as one of the regional standby forces. The Policy Framework document was approved by meeting of Heads of State and Government of the region held in Kigali, Rwanda from 9-10 September 2004. Member States agreed in 2004 that EASBRIG would operate on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Accordingly, an MOU on the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade was signed on 11 April 2005. The MOU entered into force on 11 May 2005 in accordance with article 14.




Fig 1: EASBRIG member states and Governance structure

14. Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda are the active members of EASBRIG. The absence of one Regional Economic Community (REC) covering these ten countries led the Heads of State and Government of the Region during their meeting on 28th January 2007, to authorize the creation of an Independent Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) to serve as the new Secretariat for the EASF.

### 15. EASF Overview

16. In the absence of a home REC, the **Legal Framework** of the EASF, is an MOU signed by all Members States, but not yet adopted by the EASBRICOM meeting at the Summit level. The EASF operates with the vision to contribute to regional and continental peace and stability, through a fully operational and multidimensional joint and integrated Eastern Standby Force ready for deployment by 2015, with an initial operational capability by 2010.

17. In this regard, EASF has developed a Strategic Development Plan 2010-2015 approved during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government held in Moroni, Comoros, in March 2010.

18. The Standby Force Headquarters, located in Nairobi, Kenya, is responsible for generating and preparing the Standby Brigade in liaison with the Planning Element. It is composed of military and civilian staff on secondment from Members States. The Planning Element (PLANELM), located also in Nairobi, serves as a multi-national and multi-dimensional full time planning headquarters of EASF (Military, Police and Civilian Components fully operationalized). All 10 EASF Members States are represented within the Planelm. Coordinating with the Police and Civilian components, the PLANELM plans, trains and monitors EASF in order to ensure the readiness of the different units.

19. The PLANELM has undertaken several capacity building initiatives for itself as well as within its Members States to ensure that all the multidimensional elements of the Force are on standby in their respective countries. In this regard, the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) located opposite of the Standby Force Headquarters in Nairobi, is of a great assistance. The Force when fully established will be composed of elements contributed by all Members countries. All pledged Military, Police and Civilian personnel are being trained properly. The Logistic Base (LOGBASE) located in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia remains to be operational. There is presently no storage available and the support process is being developed. The Brigade Headquarters located in Addis-Ababa, has only three professional staff. It is a very skeletal structure which is in line with the AU's vision of a peace-time Brigade Headquarters

## **20. Strengths, Challenges and Weaknesses**

21. Increase in regional internal tension such as: Internal tensions and conflicts in the Member States, Piracy in Somalia; Inadequate funding to support all EASF activities; Shortfall in regional contribution to forces due to inability of Member States to commit forces to EASF; Constraints in political, diplomatic and military regional cohesion; Inclusion of Police and Civilian representatives in the Policy Organs meetings; Coordination of the various Structures of the EASF (the Bde HQs, LOGBASE and PLANELM); and Regulating partners technical and financial support in respect to EASF strategic plans and programs. The EASF Headquarters is very well structured with all Members States equally represented. To a large extent, all the vision and missions of the EASF are consistent with those of APSA

22. First, EASF is operating with a weak Legal Frame work. Currently, there is only an MOU and a Policy Framework which are not binding. Second, there is no binding arrangement between Members States for force deployment although every year the Members States renew their troops pledged. Third, there is a big lack of communication between the AU and the EASF. Fourth, the communications with the RECs in the region (IGAD, EAC and COMESA) is also very poor. Sixth, efforts to operationalize the EASF is dogged by inter and intra States tensions. Finally, the Brigade HQ with only three persons is understaffed.

## **23. The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF)**

## 24. Introduction and Background

25. The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) is a standby arrangement made up of military, police and civilian components and which is consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Nations (UN) Charter which provides for Regional Peace and Security arrangement. Within the context of the region, it is covered by Article 21 of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of December 1999.




Fig 1: ESF members and Governance Structure

26. As stipulated by the said Protocol, the ESF should be composed of multidisciplinary contingents, with military, police and civilian components in their countries of origin, ready for deployment at appropriate notice

27. The ESF vision is consequently to define, build, organize and maintain an ECOWAS standby regional capability in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to a level of self-sustenance in the areas of personnel and logistic support, in order to respond to internal or external regional crises or threats to peace and security.

28. In 2005, a team of ECOWAS P3 Development Partners (AU, EU, USA, UK, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany and Netherlands), the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) together with the ECOWAS Mission Planning Management Cell (MPMC) met and provided an overarching framework document for the operationalisation of the ESF. The ECOWAS Operational Framework phased the process by first of all establishing a Task Force (TF) of 2773 all ranks which has been certified in 2009 in the form of logistics exercise, and the remaining 3727 of the force to complement a brigade of 6500 all ranks to be ready by 2010. The TF is structured into two infantry battalions (Western and Eastern) and a composite logistics battalion. The Western Battalion is led by Senegal while the Eastern Battalion is led by Nigeria.

29. The ECOWAS Main Force structure is based on the operational concept that the initial ESF Task Force (ESFTF) has been rapidly deployed and that a more robust,

long-term force is required. The TF is designed to mobilize quickly and deploy rapidly, and then, can be expanded and enhanced into a fully functional main force.

30. The capacity building support of the ESF is done thru three training centers of excellence in the region, the National Defense College of Nigeria for the strategic level, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KA IPTC), (located in Ghana) for the operational level, the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye, (located in Mali) for the tactical level. A formal Memorandum of Understanding, (MOU) has been signed in this regard between ECOWAS and these three Training Centres of Excellence in Abuja on 11<sup>th</sup> April 2007, for an indefinite period.

31. There is no formal MOU between ECOWAS and the different Members States for the Force generation. However the said MOU has been drafted already and meanwhile, there is a firm commitment of the different States leaders to provide personnel and facilities to facilitate any deployment of the Force. The Headquarters (HQ) of both the ESF and the ESFTF are collocated in Abuja. However, the Planning Element of the ESF is weak compared to the Task Force Planning Element. For now, the ESF has no civilian component in its Planning Element. But the military and police components are fully operational. The Logistic Depot of the Force, still to be built is planned to be set in Freetown. Land has been allocated in this regard by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United States of America's Government is providing support for the establishment of the Logistics depot.

## **32. Partnership**

33. The ESF through the ECOWAS Peace Fund (EPF) is benefiting from different partners and donors, namely the African Development Bank (ADB), the African Peace Facility (APF), the European Union, Canada, Italy, Greece, China and Japan. However, the EPF is also planned to be resourced by 0.5% of the ECOWAS annual budget.

### 34. Strengths and Weaknesses

35. The ECOWAS has already proved in the past, its capacity to undertake positive actions in conflict prevention, peacemaking and conflict management in Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire). There is a strong solidarity between the Members States, which alleviates the absence so far of a formal MOU between them and ECOWAS.

36. There is a strong commitment of ECOWAS to fund on its own budget its Peace and Security activities. The ESFTF is very well structured with the commitment of all ECOWAS Members States. There is no formal MOU between the ECOWAS and the different Members States. The civilian component is yet to be implemented. The ESF and ESFTF HQs are both collocated in Abuja, with more focus in the ESFTF, which gives a very weak ESF Planning Element. The region is lacking of a proper airlift capability. There is a need of harmonization between the different battalions of different backgrounds.

### 37. The North African Regional Capability (NARC)

#### 38. Background

39. The North African Regional Capability (NARC) was created to fill a sub-regional vacuum in North Africa. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) has been dormant since its establishment in 1989. Throughout the last two decades, revitalizing AMU proved to be very difficult due to political dynamics amongst member states. Thus, there was a need to create a regional mechanism to enable North African countries to contribute to the building-up process and operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF). In mid 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding was drafted to establish NARC.




Fig 1: NARC and Governance structure

40. In the absence of a joint secretariat to liaise cooperation amongst NARC member states, Libya voluntarily played this coordinating role during the initial phase of starting up NARC which lasted for three years (2005-2008). Later on, the 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting of NARC Ministers of Defence held in Tripoli in December 2008 approved a recommendation to establish an executive secretariat to be located in Tripoli. Subsequently, the NARC Executive Secretariat and Planning Element were

inaugurated in April, 2009; however, staffs at both the Executive Secretariat and the PLANELM are all Libyan nationals. It was however, expected that staff from other member states will join the Executive Secretariat and PLANELM in September 2010. While both Egypt and Algeria had identified staff for the two elements these countries were yet to sign the hosting agreement with Libya, and in some cases the deployment of staff was constrained by domestic considerations including promotions and retirements. Meanwhile, progress in generating the civilian officers for the PLANELM lagged even further behind; this essentially meant that the NARC PLANELM was purely military as at the time of the visit for this study.

#### **41. Challenges, Gaps and Constraints**

42. Despite NARC's potential given the strong economies of its members, the status of readiness of the standby brigade based on the AU's roadmap, indicates that it is lagging in the operationalization of the standby arrangement. Though the Brigade HQ to be located in Cairo and the two logistic depots to be located in Algiers and Cairo have been identified, they were yet to be operational due to some political and bureaucratic constraints in some member states. Furthermore, it seems that creating, rostering and deploying a civilian component is somewhat problematic due to the voluntary and individualistic nature of this component and the lack of an AU strategic guidance in this regard.

43. First, is the fact that constitutional and legal regulations in some member states have delayed the ratification of the NARC Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). For example, although Tunisia signed the MoU in June 2008, it has not been able to activate its membership and as such has not pledged any military, police or civilians due to the lengthy internal constitutional procedures in Tunisia to ratify the MoU. This challenge is compounded by the reluctance of some NARC members to sign the founding documents.

44. Second, the unresolved dispute over the status of Western Sahara is a complicating factor between members of the NARC, with significant impact on its operationalization. The fact that, four of the six members of NARC do not recognize the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (A.D.R) complicates how these states relate to it in the context of NARC and beyond. This was identified as a crucial challenge that continues to impact on the operationalization of NARC.

#### **45. The SADC Standby Force**

46. The SADC Standby Force was launched on 17<sup>TH</sup> August 2007 in Lusaka, Zambia, with initially, a military and police component. The civilian component was subsequently established. The SADC SF mission scenarios are consistent with the AU's scenarios and timelines for deployment. In institutional terms, the Planning Element (PLANELM) of the SADC SF has been established with the military, police and civilian components, but is experiencing shortfalls in staffing. For example, both the military and police components have a staffing gap of 10 personnel with the civilian component only having 1 out the required number of 4.

47. The strategic level training of the Force is conducted under the framework of the Southern Africa Defense and Security Management (SADSEM), a network of academic institutions while operational training is conducted by the Regional Peacekeeping Training Center (RPTC) located in Harare, Zimbabwe. Unlike other

RECs/RMs, tactical level training is the responsibility of member states. Other capacity building and training activities are conducted through series of exercises in the region.

58. The Main Logistic Depot (MLD) is in the process of being developed in Gaborone, Botswana and the government has allocated land for the establishment of the depot.

48. SADC unlike other RECs and RMs has limited number of partners due to a policy of self-reliance on issues of peace and security. Consequently, there are few partners involved in the operationalization of the SADC SF.

The Organ as an institution of SADC reports to the Summit. Its main structures including the SADC Standby Force are as depicted below.

49. Overall, there has been progress in the development of policies, plans, and capacities for establishing the SF. Through the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (2005/2006) (ISDSC), military planners including their police and civilian counterparts met regularly to work out the strategic details on force composition, training, finance, logistics and operations. Generally there has been good



cooperation between the defence forces through working groups of the ISDSC, meetings, workshops and exercises<sup>2</sup>.

## **50. Challenges**

51. Like its counterparts in other regions, SF is confronted by a range of challenges. Among these challenges include, the complex political dynamics in the region; challenge of Command, Control and Communication; the evolution of common or different battle procedures; lack of common training doctrines; interoperability of equipment and Language barriers.

52. Moreover, funding a stand-alone peace support operation will be a challenge in the region. In light of this, member states may have to increase their contributions to the SADC Peace Fund. At the same time, it is obvious that SADC would require some form of external support for some of the costs involved in preparing and planning for the establishment of the SF. In operational terms, the logistical challenges of setting up the SF and deploying peace missions are immense. The challenges of operationalizing the SF are exacerbated by the shortage of capacity in the majority of member states. Among other things, this includes lack of airlift capacity, lack of engineer support and lack of storage essentials and training.<sup>3</sup> Issues of inter-operability and compatibility of the different national armies and systems remains a big challenge. Additionally, like other Standby Forces, issues of Command and Control, Mandate, the roles of the Force Commander and the Special Representatives of the Organ (SRO) are yet to be clarified. Addressing these challenges would be influenced by the political will of the leaders to abide by their signed commitments.

## **53. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force**

### **54. Introduction and Background**

55. The ECCAS Standby Force, known by its French acronym FOMAC, was established in 1999 at the ECCAS Yaoundé Summit, well before the African Standby Force (ASF). It was established under the framework of ECCAS' Peace and Security Council, known as COPAX. The COPAX is the decision making organ of the ECCAS on all issues concerning peace and security. The Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale (FOMAC) is the peace operations arm of the COPAX.

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<sup>2</sup> Cardoso, J. Peace and Security Operations in SADC: Institutional and Operational Frameworks. Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis 2009

<sup>3</sup> Cardoso, J. Peace and Security Operations in SADC: Institutional and Operational Frameworks. Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis 2009




Fig 1: ECCAS members and governance structure

56. According to Article 23 of the Protocol establishing COPAX, FOMAC will be composed of national and multidimensional (military, police / Gendarmerie, and civilian components) contingents from the Members States with a mandate to maintain and undertake peace, security and humanitarian missions. FOMAC can be authorized to deploy by ECCAS, the African Union or the United Nations, consistent with the subsidiary principle that underpins ECCAS' relationship with the AU and UN.

57. The absence of a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between ECCAS and its Members States relating to FOMAC remains a big gap. The only binding legal framework governing the FOMAC is the document known as *Catalo 2010 of the Units*, signed February 28<sup>th</sup> 2008 in Libreville, Gabon by Member States. Under this arrangement, Members States pledged a force of 4800 (police, military and civilians) personnel and 6 airlift carriers.

58. The Planning Element, (PLANELM) of the FOMAC was established in July 2006 in Libreville, and it consists of representatives from the various ECCAS member states. ECCAS has opted for a big multidimensional PLANELM of 36 out of which 24 are already sitting.

59. The ECCAS has opted for a non-permanent Brigade headquarters. In their view the brigade headquarter would be when a peace operation is authorized and would be led by an individual State or a group of States, in coordination with the PLANELM. ECCAS has not developed yet a Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC).

#### **60. Logistic issues**

61. The COPAX will authorize the FOMAC in case of intervention. However, in the case of an intervention involving the AU or the UN, the authorization and support will come from these organizations. The Logistic Base (Log base) of the Force is planned to be established in Douala, Cameroun. It is however, obvious that ECCAS will require a lot of external support to have this base established.

62. In terms of training, seven Centres of excellence have been identified within the ECCAS Members States for the purpose of capacity building of the FOMAC. They are evenly distributed among the ECCAS Member states. In the same framework of capacity building, three exercises have been conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the times of writing this report, ECCAS was running its first peace operation in Central Africa Republic (CAR), known as MICOPAX. ECCAS has also been conducting maritime exercise in the Gulf of Guinea since September 2009. With respect to partnerships, the EU through the APF, is FOMAC's main partner.

#### **68. Conclusion**

69. There is no doubt that efforts to operationalize the ASF has registered good progress although, the degree of progress varies from region to regions. Progress in developing a multidimensional concept for the ASF is perhaps one of the most remarkable to date. The Military and Police components have been put in place in all RECs and RMs. However, there are still some crucial gaps, especially as it relates to the civilian component.

70. The absence of a binding framework between the AU, RECs/RMs is a critical gap that needs to be addressed as matter of urgency. Meanwhile, the AU should adopt an advocacy plan to raise awareness about the ASF.

71 Based on the foregoing, it is likely that the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the ASF will be achieved by the end of 2010. Moreover, it is hoped that lessons from the AMANI exercise would contribute to achieving Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2015.

## Chapter IV

### The Panel of the Wise and Similar Structures in the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

#### 1. Introduction and Background

2. Drawing on Africa's rich tradition of bestowing peacemaking efforts on the elders because of their wisdom, the African Union established the Panel of the Wise as one of the key pillars of its peace and security architecture. The idea of something along the lines of the panel was muted during the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), but it never materialized. However, the idea was revisited in the 1990s in the face of brutal and protracted domestic conflicts in several African states. It subsequently, re-emerged at the Kampala meeting that adopted the Conference on Security, Stability and Development Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). The concept was subsequently embraced when the OAU established the Council of the Wise as part of the Central Organ of its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the precursor to the current Panel.

2. In its current configuration, the Panel's composition and mandate is outlined in Article 11 of the Protocol establishing the PSC. Consisting of five highly respected African personalities from diverse backgrounds, the Panel's role is to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on matters relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent. In addition, Article 11(4) of the Protocol states that "...at its own initiative, the Panel of the Wise shall pronounce itself on issues relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa." The latter point is critical because it provides for the Panel to act independently, though in a complementary manner so as not to contradict the activities of the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission. In a nutshell, the Panel's mandate is twofold: to support the PSC and Chairperson in their peacemaking efforts, and to act independently on issues that it deems significant to the enhancement of human security on the continent. Operationally, the Panel can act either at the request of the PSC or the Chairperson of the Commission or most importantly, on its own volition.

3. Its mandate was elaborated in the *Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise*, which was adopted in November 2007. It specifically outlined eight key points as the pivotal role of the Panel. Under the *Modalities of Action*, it is clearly stated that the Panel does not have a mediation role but can "assist and advise mediation teams engaged in formal negotiations." In general terms, it can play an advisory and backstopping role to mediation efforts. The Panel which is supposed to meet at least three times a year, held its inaugural meeting in Addis Ababa in 2008 and developed its work programme.

#### 4. Similar Structures in the RECs

5. While efforts to operationalize the Panel continue to make progress, similar efforts are underway in the RECs. In fact, in some RECs such as ECOWAS, its Council of the Wise established under the 1999 *Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security* predates the Panel. The ECOWAS Council

of the Wise has been at the forefront in preventive interventions in West Africa. Members of the Council have been deployed by the Mediation and Security Council to either backstop ongoing mediation efforts or to intervene to avert the outbreak of violence in potential crisis situations. Since its establishment, Council members have been deployed to Niger, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Guinea-Bissau to deal with varying degrees of conflicts in these countries. In a bid to strengthen its overall preventive diplomacy, ECOWAS is in the process of establishing a permanent Mediation Facilitation Division, whose mandate will include supporting the Council of the Wise. Moreover, plans are underway to establish a Forum of Former Presidents which will complement the work of the Council of the Wise.

6. One of the major shortfalls of the Council of the Wise is the fact that its members are appointed by their governments. This is potentially problematic as it could impair their impartiality. This was demonstrated in the crisis in Niger over former President Mamadu Tandja's attempt to perpetuate himself in power through unconstitutional means. There was evidence that the Council member from Niger was too close to President Tandja, and as such, did not fully cooperate with ECOWAS' mediation efforts. Institutionally, there is no dedicated support for the Council in the ECOWAS Commission along the lines of the Panel's Secretariat at the AUC. Among other things, this deprives the ECOWAS Commission of the ability to provide adequate support to Council members when they are on assignment, and most importantly, complicates efforts to capture valuable lessons and best practice from their engagements. In operational terms, there is no institutional linkage between the Council and the Panel; a gap that needs to be addressed urgently if the interventions by both entities are to be optimized.

7. For its part, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) established a structural component called CEN-SAD Permanent High Level Mediator for Peace and Security in 2000. The High-Level Mediator has since undertaken mediation efforts in Chad, Mali, Niger and the Central African Republic with varying outcomes. Institutionally, there is no support mechanism for the High-Level Mediator at the CEN-SAD Secretariat, whose overall staffing level is skeletal. To date, there is no evidence of cooperation between the High Mediator and the Panel or its equivalents in the RECs.

8. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is in the process of establishing a Committee of Elders to as part of its preventive diplomacy strategy. The Committee will have nine standing members and will be supported by a unit in the Secretariat. The Committee's functions will include mediation, dispatching of peace envoys, and providing leadership for COMESA election observation missions. The Committee was not operational as of the time of writing this report. The first five Elders were elected by the Council of Foreign Ministers in 2009 and the remaining four will be chosen in 2010. Support structures and staff within the Secretariat also need to be agreed upon and established.

9. Under the draft 2010-14 Peace and Security Strategy, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has prioritized the establishment of a Mediation Support Unit. It is important to note that, IGAD has considerable experience in mediating conflicts. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan and the current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) are two of

the most notable examples of its role in mediation efforts in the region. However, currently it appears to have little institutional capacity beyond its facilitators/envoys monitoring these two peace processes.

10. The East African Community (EAC) is seeking to establish a Council of Eminent Persons to undertake mediation within and among the EAC member states. The concept is still under development and is embedded in its Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) and the two draft protocols; these instruments are still awaiting the approval by EAC partner states. However, once they are approved it would be critical to clarify the mandate of the Council of Eminent Persons, and its formal and informal links with the AU Panel of the Wise. For now though, it appears that the EAC Council will be primarily aimed at dealing with mediation instead of other areas of conflict prevention such as shuttle diplomacy. One of the most unique features of the EAC's Council of Eminent Persons is that fact its membership is not restricted to individuals from the five partner states. Thus, the Council could include high-level personalities from other regions. This is perhaps in recognition of the pivotal role played by key South African personalities including former President Nelson Mandela in the Burundi peace process, the EAC's newest partner state.

11. So far, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has opted not to have a standing organ that is equivalent to the Panel of the Wise or similar structures in other RECs. The troika of the Organ would mandate prominent personalities from the region to either backstop an ongoing mediation effort or to embark on other preventive endeavours. Under this model, SADC has deployed mediators and Special Envoys to Zimbabwe and more recently, Madagascar to deal with the conflicts in both countries. Just as with the other RECs, there was limited evidence of cooperation between SADC and the AU's Panel of the Wise in their respective engagements.

12. In Central Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is in the process of establishing the "Comite Des Ambassadeurs (Ambassadors' Committee), which was formally approved in 2007 and is attached to the COPAX. The Committee of Ambassadors consists of an ECCAS expert's roster on mediation and representation of the Heads of State in the region. At the time of writing this report, efforts were underway to select Committee members. To support the work of the Committee and its wider mediation efforts, in November 2008 ECCAS approved the establishment of a Unité d'Appui à la Médiation (a Mediation Supporting Unit). This Unit and the Committee of Ambassadors, when fully operational, will play the role of the Panel of the Wise in the region. These two organs should be operationalized as a matter of urgency to bolster ECCAS' preventive diplomacy in the region; a crucial issue given the number of conflict situations in the region.

### **13. Progress, Challenges and Constraints**

14. Since 2008, the Panel has held several meetings at various locations, at least five of which was part of its routine meetings, while the remaining ones were focused on some key thematic issues. The Panel has undertaken confidence-building missions to several countries including Central African Republic (CAR) and South Africa prior to its recent elections, to name but a few. Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim one of

the Panel members was deployed to engage with the various stakeholders in South Africa to ensure that the tensions surrounding the elections were lessened. The visit, which contributed to lessening the tensions, was part of the Panel's preventive engagement. Additionally, the Panel has focused on developments in West Africa, Southern Africa and the Horn region, and in this respect has pronounced itself on the situations in Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Somalia and Darfur.

15. On the other hand, its thematic meetings have focused on three themes: *Election Related Conflicts; Non-Impunity, Justice and National Reconciliation* and *Women and Children in Armed Conflicts in Africa*. The Panel's focus on these themes would undoubtedly contribute to providing clarity, and hopefully some form of consensus on these very divisive questions that have emerged in several AU member states. In a way, this is perhaps the most straightforward aspect of the Panel's mandate. The Panel's conflict prevention role is more problematic as its role in this realm is not properly defined, at least in conceptual terms.

16. For instance, while the Panel is envisaged to be involved in conflict prevention, it is not clear at what stage of the prevention process it intervenes. In other words, does prevention mean preventing conflicts from happening or managing conflicts from escalating? If prevention is understood as the former, then the Panel's role would be somewhat of the advocacy type, and if it is the latter, the Panel might be drawn into a direct mediation contrary to the role envisaged for it in the Modalities document.

17. Meanwhile, although the establishment of the Panel is provided for in the Protocol establishing the PSC, it does not appear in the structure of the AU Commission raising budgetary, ownership and sustainable issues. As at the time of writing this report, the Panel did not receive any funding through the AU regular budget. Consequently, all its activities and those of its Secretariat have been funded through partner support; an unsustainable situation. On a separate note, the AU Commission has found it difficult to deploy members of the Panel because quite often they have other commitments. Consequently, the 2010 AU Summit in Kampala approved the establishment of a "friends of the Panel group" as a way of enhancing it. Whether this new group will help to change this situation would be largely determined by its institutional link with the AU and most importantly, the availability of resources to support its operations.

18. At another level, the fact that the appointment of members of the Panel has to go through the political organs of the AU raises questions about its potential politicization. Member states have demonstrated a great deal of interest in the appointment of members of the Panel, potentially undermining their role in certain conflict situations. There is a general perception that political expediency has trumped other criteria in the selection of members of the Panel; potentially undermining its effectiveness.

#### 19. *The Panel Secretariat*

20. Another institutional challenge has to do with the location of the Panel's Secretariat. While the Panel's Secretariat is currently located in the Conflict Management Division (CMD), there is no consensus on whether it should be

permanently located there or should be moved to the office of the Chairperson or the PSC Secretariat. Here there are two options. The first is, to maintain it in its current location on condition that its reporting to the office of the Chairperson and the PSC is streamlined. Currently, the Panel's Secretariat reports to the office of the Chairperson through the Director of the Peace and Security Department and the Commissioner, a cumbersome process. The second option is to move it to the office of the Chairperson. This would significantly increase its visibility within the Commission and strengthen its link with the office of the Chairperson, which has had so far a more direct working relationship with the Panel than even the PSC. Adopting the second option could potentially help to address some of the staffing challenges that the Panel's Secretariat is confronted with as it would benefit from the resources availed to the Chairperson's office.

21. Operationally, the Panel's Secretariat, which has an ambitious mandate, has only two professional staff and an administrative assistant, a staffing level that is far too inadequate for its tasks. To illustrate the mandate-resource gap, the *Modalities* document outlines 11 core functions for the Secretariat which among others, include to "collect and analyze information on developments on the continent and the priority countries and region the Panel may choose to focus on; conduct research and contribute substantive knowledge on conflict prevention, peace-making and mediation; facilitate the Panel's outreach efforts to civil society, research and academic institutions, and other relevant organizations; and contribute expertise and support to the Panel's efforts to raise debate on specific issues relating to the promotion of peace and security in Africa." Needless to say, these tasks require a combination of both substantive and administrative skill set, which cannot be provided by the current two-person staff in the Secretariat. The problem of the skeletal staff is compounded by the fact that, the two professional staff are not AU regular staff; both were hired through partner support, raising questions of sustainability. Moreover, they have other responsibilities, which limits the time that they can dedicate to the Panel's activities.

## **22. Conclusion**

23. Overall, progress in operationalizing this critical component of the APSA has registered varying degrees of progress. While the AU and ECOWAS have progressed very well in creating the institutional architecture for this component, other RECs are either at the initial stages of establishing theirs or have adopted different models such as SADC which has opted not to establish a standing body. Despite the different conceptual and practical approaches by the AU and the RECs, there is a general recognition of the need to develop this aspect of the APSA. However, cooperation and complementarity even between the AU's Panel and ECOWAS with well established Organs remains a big challenge. How the AU and the RECs addresses this gap, would contribute to optimizing their preventive measures, and most importantly, demonstrate the extent to which the envisaged peace and security architecture is working



## Chapter VI

### Findings, Trends and Issues: Understanding the Dynamics of the APSA

1. This chapter discusses the findings, trends and the strategic issues relating to the operationalization of the APSA. The analysis is structured around the only existing roadmaps for the ASF and the CEWS, and the following criteria: Vertical and Horizontal Coordination; Sustainability; Subsidiarity; Coherence and Partnership. The aim here is to reflect on the key findings of the study by employing the aforementioned criteria as the framework of analysis. It is hoped that, this approach would contribute to illuminating the qualitative and quantitative status of the establishment of the various APSA components, and most crucially, their level of interdependence. In this vein, the challenges, gaps and best practices would be highlighted so as to inform continuing efforts to operationalize the APSA.

2. Understanding the level of coordination between and among the various APSA components at the AU and the RECs/RMs is a logical starting point in mapping progress, gaps and challenges in the operationalization of the APSA. The central question is what is the level of coordination between AU and RECs/RMs in their efforts to operationalize the APSA? To address this question, it is critical to look at coordination from two perspectives: horizontal and vertical. For the purposes of this report, vertical coordination refers to the relationship between the AU, RECs and RMs, while horizontal coordination refers to the REC/RM to REC/RM interface and that between the various APSA components.

### 3. Vertical Coordination

4. The level of coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs has registered some progress, especially as it relates to the operationalization of two key components of the APSA: the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The level of coherence in the development of these components is more advanced than the other three components (the PSC, the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund). This is partly explained by the fact that the ASF and the CEWS have clearly articulated roadmaps, thereby providing more structured basis for their operationalization. For instance, the AU and the RECs/RMs have worked closely together in the development of the doctrine and policy instruments for the ASF. While there are still some gaps in the development of the various standby multi-dimensional elements, coordination has proved much easier due to the existence of a roadmap. The planned Exercise AMANI Africa, which would bring together all the RECs/RMs, would undoubtedly contribute to capturing valuable lessons for the AU PLANELM which would invariably benefit the RECs/RMs. More broadly, the rotating workshops between the AU, RECs/RMs and their partners provides an additional avenue to take stock of progress and to address wider partnership issues including funding and other forms of support. In the same breadth, the quarterly meetings between the AU and the RECs on the CEWS is proving to be an important brainstorming and lesson sharing exercise on progress and challenges in establishing the early warning systems at the continental and regional levels.

5. Institutionally, the appointment of the REC/RM Liaison Officers to the AU has improved the communication gap and it is hoped that when the AU deploy its Liaison Officers to the RECs/RMs, it would boost coordination. However, despite the improved communication between the AU and the RECs/RMs, their operations to date have brought to the fore some challenges that need to be addressed if they are to be fully optimized. It is therefore important for the AU and RECs/RMs to clarify the level and mandate of the liaison officers. For instance, the current profile of the Liaison Officers at the AU Commission is a combination of serving military officers and civilians drawn from varied backgrounds. This has raised questions about the right profile for the Liaison Officers. This particular challenge can only be addressed after the AU, RECs and RMs have agreed on the mandate of the Liaison Officers. A related challenge is how to ensure that the Liaison Officers are involved in the substantive work of the AU and its Organs such as the PSC. There are concerns that if not properly calibrated the liaisons could be reduced to couriers, an approach that would undermine the intended objective of improving coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs in procedural and substantive terms. Moreover, it is not clear how the reporting structures for the Liaison Officers are structured. For instance, while the Liaison Officers have specific officials they report to in their respective RECs, it is not clear who they report to at the AU Commission.

6. Beyond the ASF and CEWS, there appears to be limited coordination between the other APSA components. At the time of writing this report, there was no direct linkage between the PSC, Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the RECs/RMs, although this is envisaged for the future. In light of this there is a general consensus among the RECs/RMs that the AU Commission needs to play a more strategic leadership role in improving coordination in the overall operationalisation of APSA. Related to this is the feeling that APSA in its current iteration does not adequately cover all existing and emerging security challenges. For example, while the ASF is envisaged as an instrument for peace operations, the emerging security challenges such as terrorism, piracy and improving the governance of security forces in several member states falls outside the remit of the ASF. In other words, the ASF is confronted by a conceptual challenge, which needs to be dealt with if it is to be an effective tool in managing both existing and emerging conflicts. The critical point here is to ensure the conceptualization of APSA is flexible so that it can be recalibrated as and when needed. The flexibility advanced in this instance is twofold. First, it is important for the conceptualisation of the APSA to be flexible. Second, it is critical for the AU to be flexible to allow for a bottom-up approach as that would ensure that the APSA is aligned with the needs within the regions.

7. At another level, there appears to be a disconnect between the AU PSC and similar organs in the RECs. This is a crucial gap given that enforcing decisions of the PSC rests with its members who are also members of the RECs/RMs. Thus, without proper coordination, implementing PSC decisions will be significantly diminished, potentially undermining the credibility of the PSC. More broadly, cooperation even between the Chairperson of the AU and the Chief Executives of the RECs/RMs has been largely personality dependent, a problematic approach given the strong imperative for a more structured cooperation. Among other things, this makes continuity and predictability of the cooperation between them difficult.

## **8. Horizontal Coordination**

9. Given that the various APSA components are developing at different paces, the level of horizontal coordination has been limited. For instance, the inter-locking system that is envisaged whereby the decisions of the PSC benefit from information and analysis from other components such as the early warning systems at the AUC and the RECs has been limited. Although this is partly a function of the fact that the APSA is still being operationalized, it is important to ensure that the level of interface is improved throughout the operationalization process. This is a gap that needs to be addressed if the envisaged interconnectedness, interdependence and complementarity of the APSA are to be optimized

10. At another level, the REC/RM to REC/RM interface has been equally limited. This portends a big gap given the overlapping membership in some RECs/RMs and the practical and political implications of such a dynamic. From a practical standpoint, member states that belong to more than one REC are faced with resource – human and material – challenges in meeting their commitments to the various entities. Politically, such members tend to put more emphasis on RECs that are more in tandem with their national interests. While this is somewhat unavoidable, it is an issue that needs to be tackled.

11. Despite these challenges, there are some REC/RM to REC/RM coordination initiatives on peace and security, which could provide useful lessons on how to enhance inter-REC coordination. For instance, relation between COMESA, EAC and IGAD in the area of peace and security include: a Joint Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) programme for East Africa with EAC on Small Arms and Light Weapons and with IGAD on pastoralist conflicts and cross border issues. Moreover, COMESA currently hosts the Inter-regional Coordinating Committee (IRCC), which coordinates the various RECs in Eastern Africa on European Union funding. Efforts are also underway to establish a tripartite coordination mechanism involving COMESA, EAC and SADC. The envisaged framework would help to deal with coordination issues in a region that stretches from North through East to Southern Africa that hosts the largest number of RECs/RMs with large overlapping membership. Meanwhile, ECOWAS and ECCAS have bi-lateral cooperation on specific issues such as human trafficking and piracy in the strategic Gulf of Guinea. In addition, ECOWAS has another partnership with IGAD in the area of early warning. However, despite these partnerships, coordination remains a big challenge. In addressing questions relating to vertical coordination, it is important to reflect on the issues of complementarity, existence of formal structures, questions of overlapping membership and broader political dynamics that are often at the heart of such complex arrangements.

## **12. Sustainability**

13. The issue of sustainability featured prominently at the AU Commission and RECs/RMs, primarily on account of the fact that the operationalization of the APSA has been largely dependent on partner support. This is partly explained by the fact that recruitment of staff at the AU is constrained by the Maputo Structure which limits the number of personnel that can be hired through its regular budget. A major

consequence of this has been the heavy reliance on external partner support for the key components of the APSA. For instance, most of the staff of the PSC Secretariat, the Panel of the Wise and the Liaison Officers were recruited on short-term contract through support from various partners. This approach inevitably raises questions of sustainability, predictability and flexibility. It is not clear how long partners will be willing to support these programs and even in those situations where they are providing support, some of it is not predictable. Additionally, there is consensus among the AU, RECs and RMs about uncertainties that result from the unpredictable nature of partner support.

14. Although this was identified as a major gap, some RECs such as ECOWAS have put in place its own resource mobilization strategy from its Members. For example, the ECOWAS has instituted a Community Levy, a percentage of which is dedicated to the ECOWAS Peace Fund. It is a flexible instrument that is funded from the Community Levy and partner support, and is geared to support a range of issues from military exercises to election observer missions. In practical terms, this has meant that ECOWAS accounts for approximately 80 percent of the budget to support its conflict prevention and management endeavours. ECOWAS views partner support as added value and is therefore not dependent on it for the implementation of its programs. Because of the fact that it consists of resources from its members, the ECOWAS Peace Fund can fund national projects by providing support to local non-governmental organizations and community groups. Resources from the Fund have been used to fund a range of activities including anti-corruption initiatives in some of its member states. Unlike partner support, the ECOWAS Peace Fund is flexible and as such can even fund military exercises which, most partners would not support such activities due to domestic constraints. The Peace Fund is an impressive instrument that undoubtedly enhances ECOWAS' ownership of its peace and security agenda, and should be replicated by other RECs/RMs to the extent possible.

15. The issue of sustainability gets even more pronounced when the AU or the RECs/RMs deploys a peace operation. The AU's peacekeeping experiences in Darfur and currently Somalia, has demonstrated the risks of being heavily dependent on external support. Both missions encountered serious financial and logistics shortfalls which seriously limited their ability to implement their mandates. However, even in peace time, maintaining the proposed logistics depots for the ASF would cost a considerable amount of resources. As of the time of writing this report, neither the continental nor regional depots had been developed. While partner support would be crucial in establishing the depots, it is critical to ensure that their maintenance is not exclusively dependent on partner support. As stated above, such dependence is risky because of the lack of predictability, and the stringent constraints that comes with partner support. Moreover, the predictability challenge has been exacerbated by current economic downturn which has seriously impacted some key partner states leading to drastic cutbacks in funding support for a range of issues including peace and security. This has forced even some centers of excellence to explore the idea of setting up endowment funds to guarantee their continued functioning.

## **16. Subsidiarity**

17. While the RECs/RMs appear to recognize and accept the principle of subsidiarity in their relationship with the AU, there is less clarity on its application in practical terms. For instance, some RECs/RMs are of the view that, the AU Commission should not view itself as an implementing agency; it should rather play more of a coordination role. In other words, the AU should be willing to cede responsibility to the RECs/RMs especially on issues where they have a greater comparative strength. The unanswered question is who identifies those specific areas that the AU should be involved in implementing, and those for which it should have a coordination role? Clarifying this is critical given the implications of such a division of labour on the APSA. One of the arguments advanced in favour of this approach is the need to minimize competition between the AU and the RECs/RMs in their interventions in conflict situations. Moreover, the RECs/RMs believe that through this model, the AU would be in a stronger position to provide strategic guidance to them, which is deemed to be lacking currently. For instance, most RECs/RMs are of the view that the AU could do better in coordinating them, a role that could enhance the REC/RM-to-REC/RM cooperation is significantly enhanced if it limits its role in implementation. As discussed above, overlapping memberships in some RECs requires greater coordination if competition is to be minimized. While it is not practically possible for the AU to disengage from implementing its own programs, it is equally important to note that if the envisaged APSA is to function as an inter-locking system, the AU needs to provide more strategic guidance.

18. There is consensus among the RECs/RMs that the AU is currently not playing that role effectively due in part to the human resource constraints at the AU Commission. Thus, strengthening the human resource capacity of the AU Commission is an important first in the application of the principle of subsidiarity. An enhanced Commission would be in a stronger position to provide the strategic guidance that is needed for the full operationalization of the APSA. For instance, the AU is lagging behind some of the RECs/RMs in the operationalization of some of the APSA components. The African Standby Force is a classic example of this trend. While some of the RECs/RMs had already exercised their PLANELMs and undertaken field exercises, the AMANI exercise for the AU PLANELM was undertaken only recently. Under the circumstance, the AU PLANELM which is meant to act as the nerve centre of the ASF is essentially lagging behind the components that it is supposed to lead. This situation applies to other APSA components such as early warning where both ECOWAS and IGAD have more advanced early warning mechanisms than the AU. Needless to say, this undermines an effective application of the subsidiarity principle; an important principle that underpins the APSA.

## **18. Coherence**

19. Coherence in the context of this report is used in two ways. First, is to assess the extent to which the current configuration of APSA is coherent or comprehensive, and second, to assess the level of interdependence of the various APSA components. There is a general feeling among the RECs/RMs and other actors that the APSA is not comprehensive enough in its current configuration. As outlined in the introductory section of the report, there are a number of security and related developments that do not fall within the remit of any of the APSA components. The need for improved

management of security forces on the continent through Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rising tide of terrorism, piracy, disaster management, post-conflict reconstruction and broader governance issues were identified as challenges that are not adequately addressed under the current APSA. While much resources have been devoted to the development of conflict management instruments such as the ASF, there is a need for a balance with conflict prevention instruments such as early warning systems and improved governance, which is perhaps the single most important prevention tool. However, even the conceptualization of the ASF is viewed as not comprehensive it is more of an instrument for peace support operation based on the six scenarios outlined in the roadmap for its operationalization. Consequently, if it is not configured it would not be a useful tool to address the aforementioned emerging security challenges. Additionally, the APSA does not fully capture the conflict triggers and the changing dynamics in all the regions. For example, some of the regions such as West Africa are moving out of an active conflict phase to a peace consolidation phase, which requires additional tools to supplement those currently in the APSA toolkit. Improving the management of security forces, dealing with the abuse of incumbency by civilian leaders and promoting post-conflict development were identified by most RECs/RMs as priority areas and as such the APSA should be recalibrated to ensure that it can address these challenges.

20. As discussed in the section on vertical coordination, there is limited coherence between and among the APSA components at the AU and the RECs/RMs. This is particularly notable with the PSC, the Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the regions. To date, there has been limited interaction between these pillars despite the fact that they are seized with the same conflict situations. Even with the more structured approach to operationalizing the ASF and the CEWS through their roadmaps, there are both conceptual and practical disconnects. There is lack of conceptual consensus on a harmonized approach to information collection for early warning, with AU and some RECs opting for an open source approach with others preferring the closed system which is close to the traditional intelligence gathering. The different approaches would undoubtedly affect the level and most importantly, the kind of information that is shared with the AU and other RECs. Practically; those with a closed system are less likely to share information freely because their activities are often anchored on the intelligence systems of their member states, which, understandably, cannot be shared with everyone. On the other hand, those with an open system will be less inhibited to share information, although the quality and timeliness of their information might not be timely enough for an early response. How the AU and the RECs/RMs deals with this dilemma would determine the success of the early warning systems that are crucial to bolstering the preventive aspects of the ASPA.

## **21. Partnership**

22. Partnership between the AU, RECs/RMs and external multilateral and bilateral actors has emerged as a major feature of efforts to operationalize the APSA. The operationalization process is benefiting from a wide range of partner support for the various components. The partner support which is delivered through various multi-lateral and bi-lateral frameworks such as the Africa Peace Facility (APF) and the UN's 10 Year Capacity-building Program. While the outcome of the support has varied, it has raised questions of sustainability and predictability (discussed in detail

above) and ownership issues. For example, questions have been asked about the extent to which the high reliance on partner support undermines the principle of ownership. This is a critical issue given that some regions are keen to maintain this principle, and as such are less inclined to accept partner support even for the operationalization of the APSA components. In situations like this, the AU has an opportunity to act as a bridge between RECs/RMs that are keen on maintaining ownership of their peace and security agenda and partners as is currently the case with SADC.

23. The AU acting as a bridge would have at least two effects. First, it would ensure that all the RECs/RMs have equal access to partner support, especially 'pool' funds such as the APF. This would to some extent minimize the likelihood of some RECs/RMs lagging too far behind in the operationalization of APSA. It is crucial to ensure some level of parity in the development of the various components if the architecture is to function effectively. Second, such a coordinating role would undoubtedly enhance the principle of subsidiarity, one of the underlying principles of the APSA. However, it should be pointed out that this approach comes with its own challenges especially as it adds another layer of organisational, administrative and financial procedures, thereby increasing the pressure on the AU's human resource base.

24. Overall, there was a general feeling of the need to diversify partner support for the APSA. It is currently too dependent on EU support as even the REC/RM Liaison Officers to the AU are supported through the APF. This is viewed in some quarters as a risky strategy as the operationalization of the APSA could be weakened if EU support is withheld or withdrawn. Moreover, the imposition of 'one-size-fits all' conditionalities such as the need for all RECs/RMs to spend at least 70% of their previous APF allocations before new funds can be disbursed is problematic because not all RECs/RMs have the same absorptive capacity and resource needs. Consequently, the capacity-building efforts in some RECs/RMs have been held back due to weak absorptive capacity or other factors in others.

## **25. Conclusion**

26. On the whole, efforts to operationalize the APSA to date has brought to the fore critical challenges and gaps as discussed above, which, if properly addressed would, enhance human security on the continent. In this vein, addressing the challenges associated with coordination, subsidiarity, sustainability, coherence and partnership are important first steps.

## Chapter VII

### Recommendations and Way Forward on the Operationalization of APSA

1. The report makes the following recommendations, which are divided into two categories: strategic/cross cutting and APSA component specific.

#### I. STRATEGIC/CROSS CUTTING ISSUES

- I. **Provide Clear and Consistent Strategic Guidance:** The AU should provide strategic guidance for the operationalization of APSA. While the AU has provided some guidance on specific components of the APSA such as the ASF, through the development of the roadmap for the operationalization of APSA, it needs to do more for the other components. This would not only reinforce the principle of subsidiarity but it would ensure greater harmonization and coherence of the APSA.
- II. **Improve Staffing Levels at the AU Commission and REC/RMs:** Related to the above, the staffing level at the AU Commission needs to be significantly increased. To ensure sustainability and to enhance residual capacity, the AU needs to revise the Maputo Structure which currently limits the Commission's ability to hire staff through its regular budget. While partner support has helped to fill this gap through the various capacity-building programs, it is nonetheless, not a sustainable foundation to build the APSA. Staffing of the various APSA components at the AU and the RECs/RM should be addressed as a matter of priority.
- III. **A holistic and Flexible Approach to APSA:** The AU should adopt a holistic, flexible and dynamic approach to its conceptualization of APSA. Thus, APSA should not be limited to the five components identified in the Protocol but should be flexible to factor in emerging political and security dynamics. The APSA in its current configuration does not address some of the key emerging challenges that were identified by this study such as the growing need for Security Sector Reform (SSR); the rising tide of terrorism; piracy; election related violence and transitional justice issues. These are crucial issues that should be at the heart of the APSA. In a nutshell, the APSA should be driven by its original *raison d'être* i.e. the need to promote human security on the continent.
- IV. **Establish Stronger Institutional Linkage with the RECs/RMs:** The AU should strengthen its relationship with the RECs and RMs. Despite the existence of the Protocol and the MoU between itself and these entities, the institutional relationship between them remains weak. This is a critical gap given that the RECs/RMs are the pillars of the APSA. To deal with this, it would be important to have a structured partnership framework between the Chairperson of the AU and the Chief Executives of the RECs/RMs. One practical step in this direction would be to ensure that the Chairperson of the AU meets with these officials in advance of AU. Such meetings would allow them to review developments in the respective regions, and potentially shape the agenda and decisions of Summit meetings.



- V. **Improve Inter-Departmental Coordination and Cooperation at the AU Commission and RECs/RMs:** The AU should improve inter-departmental cooperation between its various departments at the Commission. There is limited collaboration between the various departments which hampers the AU's ability to provide the strategic guidance that it is expected to provide in the operationalization of APSA. Improving inter-departmental cooperation should be a cornerstone of strengthening and enhancing the capacity of the AU Commission. The RECs need to take similar steps to reinforce their capacities and the coherence of their programs and activities.
- VI. **Mainstream Gender Issues in all APSA Components:** The AU, RECs and RMs should ensure that issues of gender are mainstreamed into all the APSA components at the continental and regional levels. Although there is a commitment to do so on paper, the current staffing level of some of the APSA component is male dominated. This is a gap that should be tackled as a matter of urgency.
- VII. **Increase Collaboration and Partnership with Civil Society:** The AU, RECs/RMs should increase their collaboration with civil society. This is crucial as it would ensure that the operationalization of APSA is in tune with the developments on the ground. To date, several RECs such as ECOWAS have developed strong partnerships with civil society on a range of issue, most notably in the development of its early warning system. Such collaborative efforts should be replicated by the AU and other RECs/RMs.

## 2. THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

4. **Clarify PSC Relationship with Panel:** The AU should clarify the role of the Panel of the Wise and its relationship with the PSC. The relationship between the two entities has so far been very limited. While this could be explained by the fact that most of the components of the APSA are still being operationalized, it is equally important to ensure that they are properly aligned throughout the operationalization process.

5. **Provide Fixed and Flexible Budget:** The AU should provide a fixed and flexible budget for the PSC to ensure that it can function effectively. The PSC is increasingly interested in undertaking fact-finding and other missions, but is often constrained by the absence of financial and other resources. Visits by the PSC to a given theatre would constitute a strong demonstration of its commitment to that conflict and potentially, act as deterrence to potential spoilers: state and non-state. In addition, the MSC should be provided with resources so that they can undertake field visits to PSC-authorized missions. Such visits would provide them with first hand information on a given situation, thereby strengthening their advice to the PSC.

6. **Strengthen Role of PSC Monthly Chair:** The PSC should strengthen the role of its monthly chair by making sure that it provides the leadership role on both substantive and process issues, including the drafting of Communiqués. So far, the PSC has deferred a lot of these issues to the Commission. If not checked this approach would undermine its ownership, and could backfire if the Commission is drawn into hotly contested political issues.

**7. Enforce Criteria for Appointing PSC Members:** While it might be impractical for the AU to enforce the full range criteria for membership of the PSC, it should nonetheless engage with the RECs to ensure that their nominees meet at least the basic requirements. For example, the capacity of members to participate fully in the activities of the PSC and adherence to good governance norms should be cardinal requirements for memberships. Appointing members that do not meet the basic criteria would in the long-run undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the PSC; two principles that should be preserved.

**8. Improve Collaboration with RECs and UN Security Council:** The AU should ensure closer collaboration with the decision making organs of the RECs and the UN Security Council. This is critical, because it is only through effective collaboration that the leverage of these institutions would be increased. That these organizations are seized with the same issues is not in doubt, what is in question is their level of cooperation. There is evidence that, where cooperation has been lacking as was the case between the PSC and ECOWAS over the ongoing crisis in Niger, and the PSC and the UNSC over the indictment of President Omar Bashir of Sudan, the results have not been optimal. The need to speak with one voice is a compelling reason for closer collaboration. In this vein, joint information sharing, planning and coordination are important first steps.

**9. Improve Synergy between PSC and other APSA Components:** Related to the above, the AU should ensure greater synergy between the PSC and other APSA components. There is a strong imperative for closer collaboration and coordination between the PSC and other components due to its pivotal role in the maintenance of peace and security on the continent. To date, there is limited evidence of cooperation between the various entities, a gap that needs to be plugged urgently.

10. *The PSC Secretariat*

**12. Additional Staff for PSC Secretariat:** Provide additional staff to deal with the Secretariat's growing responsibilities. A first step in this direction would be to approve the 13 posts and proposed committees. It is critical to ensure that newly hired staff possesses diverse backgrounds and in-depth understanding of the dynamics of peace and conflict on the continent.

**13. Dedicated Translators:** Provide the PSC Secretariat with its own dedicated translators who can be called upon without prior notification. Having a standby pool of translators is consistent with the mandate of the PSC, especially as it has to provide adequate and timely response to emerging challenges.

14. *The Military Staff Committee (MSC)*

**15. Clarify Institutional Location of MSC:** The AU should clarify the institutional location of the Military Staff Committee at the Commission headquarters. Ideally, the affairs of the MSC should be handled by the PSC Secretariat and not the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). This not does in any way preclude the MSC to liaise with the PSOD and vice-versa.

**16. Reinforce the Capacity of the MSC and PSC Member States:** The MSC needs to be reinforced and given the required means in order for it to effectively carry out its mandate of providing advice to the PSC. A first step in this direction would be to ensure that members of the PSC have the required staff complement in their embassies including military officers.

**17. Establish Civilian and Police Committees to Complement the MSC:** Given the multi-dimensional character of contemporary peace operations, the AU through the PSC should establish civilian and police committee to complement the work of the MSC. This would ensure that the PSC receives the multi-dimensional advice it requires when it contemplates launching peace support operations. It is therefore critical to have police and civilian experts to provide advice to the PSC on those matters.

**18. Convene Regular Meetings of the MSC:** It is critical to ensure that the MSC meets on a regular basis, at least once a month. To the extent possible, meetings of the MSC should be timed to coincide with those of the PSC as that would ensure greater synergy between them. To facilitate its meetings, the MSC should have a meeting room and translators at their disposal.

#### **19. THE CEWS AND SIMILAR STRUCTURES IN THE RECS**

**20. Strengthen Support Systems:** The AU should strengthen the support systems including human and financial resources in AUC and all regional organizations. This is critical to ensure that the APSA can function effectively.

**21. Expand Connectivity between AUC and RECs:** The AU should work with the RECs to improve and expanding connectivity at all levels including transfer of information from all RECs to the AU Situation Room. While there is some level of information exchange between the AU and some RECs, more needs to be done to broaden this information as a way of increasing synergy between the continental and regional early warning systems. An important first step in this direction would be to improve the existing information technology infrastructure.

**22. Adopt Holistic Early Warning Indicators:** The AU and RECs should adopt holistic early warning indicators and ensure that they are aligned with PSC protocol which calls for the indicators to include political, economic, social, military and humanitarian issues.

**23. Provide Additional Analysts for the CEWS:** The AU should increase the number of analyst in qualitative and quantitative terms. The number of analysts in the AU early warning is not adequate and they are overstretched. In the same breadth, special attention should be given to strengthening analytical capacities especially of those RECs that are still in the process of establishing their early warning systems. Addressing this gap would help to improve the quality of the analysis and the policy options presented to decision-makers

**24. Broaden the Recipient of Early Warning Reports:** The AU and RECs should institutionalize and broaden the recipients of its reports and policy options. In this vein, where that practice is not already in place, early warning reports should be

shared with a range of actors including, the ASF PLANELM, the Peace Support Operations Division, the PSC Secretariat, Members of Panel of the Wise and its Secretariat, AU/REC mediators, special representatives, and ongoing peace support operations.

**25. Increase and Strengthen Collaboration with Other Actors:** The AU and the RECs should increase and where it exist their engagement with other actors such as the United Nations agencies and civil society in Africa and beyond. To date there is no actual collaboration and coordination with the UN and its specialized agencies, other international organizations, this is a gap that needs to be filled. Moreover, collaboration with civil society should be improved. ECOWAS' partnership with civil society in this area provides a useful model for the AU and other RECs that are yet to establish such partnerships.

**26. Improve Documentation of Lessons Learned:** The AU and RECs should improve and strengthen the lessons learned and documentation process. To date, there has been little effort in this direction. However, capturing lessons and best practices would go a long way in enhancing the efficacy of the CEWS and similar structures in the RECs.

## VI. THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

**1. Adopt Binding Legal Instrument with Member States:** The AU, RECs and RMs should adopt binding legal documents with member states for the employment of pledged troops. While there is an MOU between the AU and the RECs/RMs, it deals more with Force Generation than other more substantive issues such as accountability to the Members States, compensation and reimbursement. To date, none of the RECs and RMs have signed a formal MoU with their Members for the deployment of their troops. A legal and binding document is critical to the development of the Rapid Deployment Capability. The AU, RECs/RMs and the Members States have to sort out this very important issue.

**3. Harmonize Membership of Standby Arrangements:** The AU should engage the RECs and RMs to deal with the overlapping membership. Currently, several countries belong to more than Standby Force. This gap should be addressed to minimize the effect of overlapping membership. The AU Commission should tackle this issue as part of its strategic leadership for the ASF.

**4. Improve Staffing of PLANELMs at AU and RECs/RMs:** The staffing level of the PLANELMs at the AU and the RECs/RMs should be enhanced. The current staffing levels are weak in quantitative and qualitative terms. This challenge is particularly pronounced with the police and civilian components of the standby arrangements. For example, there is only one civilian officer in the AU PLANELM. Moreover, the AU should ensure that a **Chief of Staff for the ASF is appointed** as a matter of urgency. The position of has been vacant for the past three years, following the passing away of its first Chief of Staff, General Ishaya Hassan. Adopting the proposed structure for the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is an important first step as it would help to fill some crucial staffing gaps.

6. **Address Logistics Gap as Priority:** The AU, RECs and RMs should address the issue of logistics as a matter of priority. The establishment of continental and regional depots is important first step. To date, no logistic depot has been established, exposing a critical gap in efforts to operationalize the ASF. In order to minimize predictability and sustainability challenges associated with partner support, the AU, RECs and RMs should ensure that they provide the bulk of the resources for their logistics depots. Ensuring that the AU's Peace Fund is resourced African Members is an important priority if this is to be accomplished. The fact that ECOWAS, ECCAS and SADC ran complex field exercises that were mainly funded by their member states demonstrates the potential for the AU and RECs to fund the activities of the ASF with their own resources.

7. **Provide Guidance and Leadership for Centers for Excellence:** The AU should provide more guidance and leadership for the various centers of excellence in the regions. That all RECs and RMs have their own centers of excellence is commendable, however, in the interest of harmonization and coordination, the AU should engage with these centers so as to ensure that training programs and curriculum is closely aligned to the requirements of the ASF.

8. *Specific Recommendations for the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF)*

**I. Improve Communication and Coordination with RECs in the Region:** Members of the EASF should work towards improving communication and coordination between the EASF and the RECs in the region. As of the time of writing this report, there was limited or no coordination between the EASF and IGAD, EAC and COMESA. Increased coordination could help to address some of the challenges associated with the fact that there is no single REC that covers the EASF Members States. Adopting an MoU between these institutions would be an important first step.

**II. Harmonize and Integrate CEWARN with EASF's Planned Early Warning System:** Members of the EASF and IGAD should work together to ensure that CEWARN, which is one of the well established early warning systems in the region is integrated with the EASF's planned early warning system. This would not only minimize duplication and redundancy, it would contribute to enhancing the cohesion of the region.

10. *Specific Recommendations for the North African Regional Capability (NARC)*

i. **Ensure NARC PLANELM and other Structures are fully staffed:** NARC member states should ensure that its PLANELM, Brigade Headquarters and the Executive Secretariat are staffed to the required levels in order to achieve the goals stipulated in roadmap II. For example, the NARC PPLANELM should have 15 qualified personnel from various components – military, civilian and police – and be drawn from all the member states. As at the time of the visit for this study there were only three officers managing the PLANELM. Moreover, all the officers at the time were Libyan, depriving the system of the recommended multinational character.

- II. **Second, NARC Liaison Officer to the AUC Soon:** To improve communication with the AUC, NARC should second its liaison officer to the AU Commission as soon as possible. This would help to deal with the communication gap between NARC and the AU Commission.
- III. **Coordinate with Other RECs in the Region:** NARC member states should improve their coordination with other RECs in the region. There is currently no working relationship between NARC and other regional and sub-regional entities in North Africa, namely the League of Arab States (LAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Community of Sahel - Saharan States (CEN-SAD). Harmonization and coordination between NARC and these institutions is crucial and the AU could potentially play a coordination role.

11. *Specific Recommendations for the ECCAS Standby Force*

- I. **Adopt Formal Legal and Policy Instruments:** ECCAS should establish binding policy and legal instruments for the Standby Force.
- II. **Develop Civilian Component:** The civilian component of the FOMAC must be developed as well as the Logistic Depot.
- III. **Improve Translation Services for ECCAS:** ECCAS should be supported to translate more documents on peace and security from English to French. The activities of ECCAS are often hampered due to the language barrier. This is a big challenge because a disproportionate number of the existing literature on peace and security is in English.

## VII. THE PANEL OF THE WISE AND SIMILAR STRUCTURES AT THE RECS

1. To enhance the role of the Panel, the report makes the following recommendations.
2. **Clarify Role of the Panel:** The role of the Panel in the AU's preventive strategy should be clarified. It is critical to establish whether the Panel will be involved in direct mediation or it would continue to play a supporting role of mediation efforts as has been the case so far. Clarifying this would help to define the kind and level of support that it would require. If it is to be involved in mediation, it would require more substantial staff support and should be properly integrated with the AU's Mediation Support Unit, whose establishment is underway.
3. **Reconsider Appointment of Panel Members Based on Geographic Regions:** The appointment of members of the Panel should be revisited to ensure that it follows the eight recognized RECs instead of the current geographic configuration based on the five regions. Aligning the appointment of Panel members with the RECs would undoubtedly increase the level of coordination between the Panel and its equivalents in the RECs, a relationship that is crucial but has been lacking so far.

4. **Include Panel in AU Commission's Structure:** The Panel should be included in the AU Commission's structure so as to give it greater visibility, and most importantly, to ensure that it is supported from the AU regular budget. The current reliance on partner support does not bode well for the sustainability and ownership of the Panel.

5. **Increase Staff Complement for Panel's Secretariat:** The current staff complement of the Panel's Secretariat should be increased to at least 5 professional staff and an administrative assistant. It should however, be pointed out that, the proposed increase would only be adequate if the Panel's role is limited to backstopping mediation efforts and other short-term preventive engagements, if it is to be engaged in direct negotiations, the required staff complement and skills set will be significantly higher.

6. **Increase Synergy Between Panel and Other APSA Components:** Efforts should be made to ensure that the Panel is properly linked up with other APSA components at the AU Commission and the RECs. Ensuring that the Panel engages with other APSA structures and its equivalents the RECs on the issues on its agenda is an important first step in improving coordination. From a practical standpoint, there should be periodic meetings (at least twice a year or as the need may be) between Panel members and their counterparts in the RECs. These can be modeled on the quarterly meetings between the CEWS and regional early warning centers, although it is not necessary for them to meet on a quarterly basis.

7. **Develop Robust Communication Strategy:** The Panel should develop a robust communication strategy as that would give visibility to its engagements. This is particularly critical for its pronouncement on key thematic issues such as questions of election related violence and the peace and justice dilemma. The position of the Panel on issues of this nature would help to complement and where necessary shed more light on the AU's position on some of these controversial matters.

8. **Establish Dedicated Secretariats for Panel Equivalents in the RECs:** Resources should be provided to RECs to establish dedicated secretariats to support the activities of Council members. This is critical as it would ensure that Council members are properly supported and lessons from their engagements are captured and applied to future engagements.

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