

CURRENT DYNAMICS AND CHALLENGES OF
**VIOLENT EXTREMISM
IN WEST AFRICA**



West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

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WEST AFRICA NETWORK FOR PEACEBUILDING (WANEP)

P.O. BOX CT 4434

Cantonments – Accra

Ghana

E-mail: wanep@wanep.org

Website: www.wanep.org

ABOUT WANEP

The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) is a leading Regional Peacebuilding organisation founded in 1998 in response to civil wars that plagued West Africa in the 1990s. Over the years, WANEP has succeeded in establishing strong national networks in every Member State of ECOWAS with over 550 member organisations across West Africa. WANEP places special focus on collaborative approaches to conflict prevention, and peacebuilding, working with diverse actors from civil society, governments, intergovernmental bodies, women's groups and other partners in a bid to establish a platform for dialogue, experience sharing and learning, thereby complementing efforts at ensuring sustainable peace and development in West Africa and beyond.

In 2002, WANEP entered into a historic partnership with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the implementation of a regional early warning and response system referred to as ECOWARN. A Memorandum of Understanding between WANEP and ECOWAS was signed in 2004 and has consistently been renewed. The MOU is currently running for another five years – 2014 to 2019. This partnership constitutes a major strategic achievement for WANEP and West Africa civil society as it offers the much-desired opportunity to contribute to Track I response to conflicts and policy debates.

In August 2015, WANEP signed an MOU with the African Union Commission to provide support to the Commission's Peace and Security Department in the implementation of the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) including the gender mainstreaming of the architecture. WANEP is also a member of the Peace and Security cluster of the African Union's (AU) Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the ECOSOCC Adviser on Civil Society relations with African Governments and the Focal Point for Africa CSOs on the AU-EU Joint Strategy (JAES). At international level, WANEP has a Special Consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and is the West Africa Regional Representative of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). WANEP provides professional courses in conflict prevention and peacebuilding informed by several years of practical experience to governments, businesses, and practitioners throughout the region and beyond. Underlying its work is a commitment to professionalism and a dedication to a world of mutual respect, tolerance and peace.

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Structure of the Report

Table of Content

Introduction/Background	P. 4
Aim/Objectives.....	P. 6
Methodology.....	P. 7
Overview of Violent Extremism in West Africa.....	P. 8
Nigeria.....	P. 9
Burkina Faso.....	P. 12
Mali.....	P. 14
Niger.....	P. 17
Radicalization and Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Discourse.....	P. 19
Mahdism as the Bedrock for Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Northern Nigeria	P. 24
Boko Haram: Reasons for Emergence.....	P. 26
Root Causes of Violent Extremism in West Africa.....	p. 27
Macro Level Factors.....	P. 28
Poor Governance and Socioeconomic Challenges.....	P. 28
Weakness of the State.....	P. 29
Localized Conflicts.....	P. 30
Meso Level Factors.....	P. 31
Religious Enigma.....	P. 31
Micro Level Factors.....	P. 31
Youth Unemployment.....	P. 31
Repressive Security Responses.....	P. 32
Other Root Causes of Radicalization and Violent Extremism.....	P. 33
The Socio-Economic Root Causes of Radicalization and Violent Extremism.....	P. 35

Ethnic/Identity Marginalization.....	P. 36
The Politics of Oil in the Lake Chad Basin.....	P. 38
Corruption among the Political and Military Elite.....	P. 39
The Push and Pull Factors of Violent Extremism.....	P. 39
Strategies and Tactics of the Violent Extremists.....	P. 41
Mode of Recruitment.....	P. 41
Mode of Attacks/Operations.....	P. 42
Changing Strategies of the Violent Extremists	P. 43
Effectiveness of Strategies adopted by Violent Extremists.....	P. 45
Gender Dynamics in Violent Extremism.....	P. 46
Women in/and Violent Extremism.....	P. 48
Experiences of Some Women under Boko Haram.....	P. 49
Financing of Violent Extremist Activities in West Africa.....	P. 52
Civil Society and Violent Extremism in West Africa.....	P. 55
Civil Society Organizations in Nigeria and Burkina Faso.....	P. 55
Civil Society in Niger and Mali.....	P. 57
Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism.....	P. 59
Empowering Local Communities.....	P. 61
Counter-Messaging Approach.....	P. 63
Addressing the Socio-Economic Root Causes.....	P. 63
Countering Violent Extremism in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria.....	P. 68
Women and the Prevention/Countering of Violent Extremism (P/CVE).....	P. 69
Role of CSOs in CVE.....	P. 71
Strategies Employed by Governments to Counter Radicalization and VE.....	P. 75
The Hard Approach.....	P. 75

The Soft Approach.....	P. 77
Effectiveness of the Strategies adopted by Governments.....	P. 79
Regional Approaches to Counter Violent Extremism in West Africa.....	P. 80
The Role of ECOWAS in the Prevention of Radicalization and the Countering of Violent Extremism.....	P. 81
Conclusion.....	P. 82
Recommendation.....	P. 83
For States.....	P. 83
For WANEP and CSO Actors.....	P. 85
For ECOWAS.....	P. 85
For Donors and International Partners.....	P. 86
References.....	P. 87

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background

Undermining our common humanity, violent extremism is inherently global. It is driven by a mixture of personal, societal and ideational factors whose manifestations vary from one individual to the next. Violent extremism has affected different societies during different eras and in different regions of the world. The present plan of action does not provide a single solution to this challenge- there is no one tool or approach that will put it to rest forever. Instead, we need to broaden the way we think about this threat and take measures to prevent it from proliferating.¹

--Ban Ki Moon

Currently, terrorism has become a global phenomenon which concern is raised daily by the academia, the print, electronic and social media. There is no section of the world that is immune from neither terrorism nor its devastating effect. Terrorism is, therefore, a negative universal occurrence, the world over. As highlighted by Mark Juergensmeyer:

The French...have dealt with subway bombs planted by Algerian Islamic activists, the British with exploding trucks and buses ignited by Irish Catholic nationalists, and the Japanese with nerve gas placed in Tokyo subways by members of the Hindu-Buddhist sect. In India residents of Delhi have experienced car bombings by both Sikh and Kashmiri separatists, in Sri Lanka whole sections of the city of Colombo have been destroyed both by Tamils and by Sinhalese militants, Egyptians have been forced to live with militant Islamic attacks in coffeehouses and riverboats, Algerians have lost entire villages to savage attacks perpetrated allegedly by supporters of the Islamic Salvation Front, and Israelis and Palestinians have confronted the deadly deeds of both Jewish and Muslim extremists. For many Middle Easterners, terrorist attacks have become a way of life.²

From the year 2000 when Juergensmeyer made this observation, the list goes on to include countries as Iran, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Spain, France, Niger, and Nigeria.

Undoubtedly today, the African continent is inundated with several challenges ranging from poverty, under-development, mass illiteracy, short life span, conflict and the general feeling of insecurity. One of major security challenge confronting the continent is the rising wave of radicalization and violent extremism leading to terrorism. Today, the wave of terrorism has hit Africa with an alarming frequency and heightened magnitude, beginning from Algeria after the 1991 election that denied the victorious *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS) the opportunity to rule the country. This denial, supported by the West brought about a wave of terrorist activities

1 Ban Ki Moon, UN Secretary General, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, January 2016.

2 Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2000, p. 4.

that led to the death of more than 70,000 people between early and the late 1990s³. As if in a cony shape, the wave descended from North Africa to sub-Saharan Africa with countries like Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire receiving their fair shares of the violent extremist activities.

Member countries of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) have to a large extent both individually and collectively felt the impact of terrorism and violent extremism on the economic development and political stability of the respective countries.

On 17 February 2005, The Africa-American Institute held a summit which was titled "Africa's Response to Terrorism", His Excellency, Mr. Simeon Adekanye who was Nigeria's Deputy Permanent Representative at the United Nations as at the time of the 2005 summit made a critical observation on the impact of terrorism in Africa when he stated:

Terrorism remains a cardinal threat to national, regional and international peace and security. It constitutes a deliberate violation of the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights and freedoms. It is an affront to the Charter of the United Nations and the principles and values enunciated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and its Protocol to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). It seeks to destroy both physical and economic infrastructure. Terrorism poses a grave threat to territorial integrity and stability of States.⁴

In the same vein, Kofi Annan while serving as the United Nations Secretary General noted that:

Terrorism is a global threat with global effects; its methods are murder and mayhem, but its consequences affect every aspect of the United Nations-from development to peace to human rights and the rule of law. No part of our mission is safe from the effects of terrorism; and no part of the world is immune from this scourge.⁵

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 of 1999 and 1373 of 2001 required of member states to:

1. Criminalize the willful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist attacks;
2. Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts; or entities owned by such persons;
3. Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents.

3 Noah Feldman, *After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003.

4 Adekanye, Simeon (2006), "African Challenges and Capacity in Countering Terrorism, Regional Differences in Coordination of Counter Terrorism Efforts Regarding the UN Anti-Terrorism Technical Assistance to Africa" at the African-American Institute (AAI), New York, 17 February 2006, p.1.

5 Kofi Annan, "In Large Freedoms: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All", United Nations A/59/2005

Undoubtedly, today the part of the African country affected most by the scourge of radicalization and violent extremism is the Sahel and West Africa, ranging from the activities of Boko Haram, a violent extremist group classified by the Global Terrorism Index and the United States Homeland Security as the most deadliest terrorist group in the world ahead of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Nigeria, Chad, Cameroun and

Niger to the violent activities of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for the Unification of the Jihadist Organization (MUJAO) and *Ansar Dine* in Mali, to the attacks in Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and the danger of eminent attacks in Senegal, the Gambia and other parts of the region.

This study, therefore, undertook a cursory look at the dynamics of preventing radicalization and the countering of violent extremism in four selected countries in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region. Specifically Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria were selected as case studies. The causes (push and pull factors) of radicalization, recruitment pattern of the extremist groups, strategies employed by the extremist groups, strategies employed by the states as counter measure, the effectiveness of the strategies, the financing of extremist activities, the role of the civil society in the countering of extremism, the role of women in/and the countering of violent extremism were issues investigated in the study.

Aims/ Objectives/Purpose of Research

The general aim of the study is to investigate, discuss and analyze radicalization and violent extremism in four selected West African states- Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria. The specific objectives are to:

1. Present a brief overview of terrorism in West Africa
2. Examine the root causes of radicalization and violent extremism in West Africa including the pull and push factors
3. Discuss the gender dynamics involved in the effect and prevention/countering violent extremism
4. Examine the strategies employed by the selected states in the prevention of radicalization and countering of violent extremism
5. Examine the various strategies employed by radical and violent extremists groups in the selected countries
6. Discuss the role of ECOWAS and civil society in the prevention of radicalization and the countering of violent extremism in West Africa

Methodology

The study involved the collection of qualitative data to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the nature and scope of violent extremism in West Africa focusing on four countries namely, Mali, Nigeria, Niger and Nigeria. These are the countries that are most affected by the threat of violent extremism in the sub region. The research started with a desk review of secondary sources of data on violent extremism from policy documents,

commissioned reports, books, journal articles, policy briefs, occasional papers and web-based publications. The review helped to gain a broader understanding of dynamics of violent extremism in West Africa and more critically, to identify the areas that are yet to be covered by the existing literatures. The secondary sources of data were complimented with primary data from in-depth and key informants' interviews with the relevant stakeholders in Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Burkina Faso.

In Niger, broad consultations were held with representatives of different civil society organisations (CSOs), government officials, researchers, youth leaders and religious leaders in April 2017. One focus group discussion was held with some civil society representatives. Similarly, in Mali, the research team conducted series of interviews and extensive discussions with various experts, AU Officials, UN Officials, representatives of various CSOs, and other international organisations. In Burkina Faso, interviews were carried out with government representatives, civil society organizations, youth organizations, UNESCO representative, religious leaders, women organizations and street informants. In Nigeria, consultations were carried out with women in the zone of conflict, women and men in two IDP camps, the coordinator of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the Permanent Secretary of the Adamawa State Ministry of Special Duties, the Director, Child Development in the Adamawa State Ministry of Women Affairs, Secretary of the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), two IDP camps managers, Adamawa State Commissioner for Information, the Police Public Relations Officer, members of communities affected by Boko Haram, the academia, the Department of State Services, military personnel, traditional and religious leaders, the guild of hunters and a parliamentarian. The primary sources were content analysed using narrative styles.

To validate the finding of the research, an expert review workshop was held by WANEP Regional Office in Accra on 28 September 2017. The workshop brought together participants from the four countries where the research was conducted, thus Niger, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali, representatives from CSOs, academia and international organisations like ECOWAS, UN and the AU. Inputs from the workshop helped to revise and improve on the quality of the report.



CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN WEST AFRICA

West African states have made significant strides in the area of electoral democracies, to the extent that even monarchical and sit-tight leaders especially in Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and The Gambia have had to pay the price for wanting to obstruct the storm of what we consider as the 'Fourth Wave Democracy' in the region. Despite this significant improvement in the political development of West African states, the region is bedeviled with the upsurge of radical and violent extremist groups. Today, North and West Africa have been identified as key geographical harbors of radical and violent extremist movements. In the past, these movements mainly from Algeria and Mauritania were largely localized, but today, "extremists have developed into complex organisations that combine religious ideology with criminal networks, operating both locally and globally."⁶

Some of the reasons that can be adduced to the flourishing of radicalization and violent extremism especially in West Africa include decades of conflict that brought about the liberalization of small arms and light weapons, political instability, transnational organized crimes, border porosity, economic marginalization of groups, the region's substantial mineral wealth and the interest of foreign countries and businesses to control this wealth, and other social issues such as poverty, illiteracy, youth unemployment and marginalization, and the erosion of local values. This gave the Wahabist and the Jihadist movements the impetus to fill in the gap through ideological renaissance. Notable radical and extremist groups that operate in West Africa are Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad (MUJAO), the Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC), the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MLA), the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Ansarul and Ansar Dine, the Ja'amatul Alhus Sunna Lid Da'awatis wal Jihad (Boko Haram). The question then is why is West Africa so susceptible and attractive to radical and violent extremist groups? There are several reasons which are summarized in the following remarks:

West Africa is vulnerable to terrorism and terrorist financing for a number of reasons. The sub-region suffers from political instability, ethnic and communal violence, pervasive corruption, widespread poverty and high rate of unemployment and underdevelopment, especially among young people.... As an indication of the severity of the challenges to human development in the region, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 2011 Human Development Report ranked 13 of the 15 ECOWAS countries as 'experiencing low human development'.... Poor governance and weak public institutions underpin most of the human development challenges in the region. Most of the borders in West Africa are porous and there are many ungoverned spaces along the vast boundary lines. All the countries lack capacity to effectively police the borders and boundary lines which is a vulnerability that can be exploited by terrorist groups to establish training bases for their members, and to transport and distribute weapons across the sub-region.⁷

6 Roisin Hinds, "Islamic Radicalisation in North and West Africa: Drivers and Approaches to Tackle Radicalisation", Rapid Literature Review, October 2013, Pp. 1- 19.

7 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Report, "Terrorist Financing in West Africa", 2013, P. 6.

For as stated:

Compounding the situation is the rising radicalization and the southward migration of terrorists and extremists, particularly members of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), through the Sahel towards Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Indeed, there are indications that AQIM has operational bases in some West African countries and has forged tactical alliances with terrorist groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), and Ansar Eddine in Mali and Niger. These alliances have taken the form of AQIM's provision of training and logistical support to Boko Haram and other terrorist operatives. In addition, there is suspicion that Boko Haram has developed ties with the Somali militant group Al Shabaab.⁸

Nigeria

Nigeria has got a long history of violent extremism dating back to the early 1980s beginning with what was popularly known as the *Maitasine*⁹ group which began in the suburbs of Kano city. The leader of this group was Muhammadu Marwa, a migrant Camerounian Islamic cleric who settled in the city of Kano in the 1940s and was later expelled in 1964 by the late Emir, Sanusi Lamido for his radical preaching against the established Sunni Muslims in Northern Nigeria. Marwa later denied the prophethood of the prophet of Islam and declared himself as the real prophet, which again saw him at loggerheads with the established Islamic clerics in Kano who requested the halting of the radical ideology of Muhammed Marwa by the Kano State government. Violence between members of the sect and the police ensued when the latter wanted to disperse the groups preaching crusade, which lead to the death of more than 4000 persons. Marwa himself was eventually killed by the Nigeria Army troops while the remnant of his followers dispersed to Bauchi, Maiduguri and Yola.¹⁰

In 2003, a large segment of radicalized group of young people led by a certain Mohammed Ali who worshipped at the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri city left the city on *hijra* (pilgrimage) to a small village called Kanama in the present Yobe State sharing boundary with the Republic of Niger so as not to be infested with the irredeemable corruption taking place in the modern state. While in Kanama village, they established a caliphate with the name *Taliban* which in Arabic means the young, but which name coincided with the American invasion of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. "Its leader, Mohammed Ali, espoused ant state ideology and called on other Muslims to join the group and return to a 'true' Islamic Law, with the aim of making a more perfect society away from the corrupt establishment."¹¹ According to Kyari Mohammed:

8 Financial Action Task Force (FAFT) Report, "Terrorist Financing in West Africa" 2013, p. 5.

9 The word 'Maitatsine' in Hausa translates as the one who reins curses. Muhammadu Marwa was said to have always reined curses on the political authorities and traditional/religious leaders in Northern Nigeria for not adhering strictly to the principles and tenets of Islam while preaching before a large multitude of his followers. See, Nathaniel D. Danjibo, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The Maitatsine and Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria", Conference paper delivered at the Institute for Development Studies, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, November 2009.

10 Isieche, 1987; Falola, 1999.

11 Andrew Walker, "What is Boko Haram?" Special Report 308 of the United States Institute of Peace, 2012, p. 4.

The Kanama camp was forested and ensconced between two bodies of water near the Nigeria-Niger border. Trenches were dug and camouflaged across the only two access roads from Kanama and the exit road to Niger Republic, and sandbags were used to reinforce the defences. The militants then launched attacks on police

stations and government buildings and generally wreaked havoc on the Yunusari, Tarmuwa, Borsari, Geidam, and Damaturu local government areas of Yobe State between 21 December 2003 and 1 January 2004.¹²

In December 2003, the group's violent confrontation with another community over the control of a fishing pond attracted the police but the group was able to subdue the police, burnt down the police station and carted away some arms and ammunition. The Nigeria was drafted and it succeeded in launching a brutal attack against the group killing several of its members including its leader, Mohammed Ali, as the remnant escapees fled to the Mandara hills towards Cameroun, where the military used heavy artillery on them killed scores.¹³

Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of the Boko Haram was said to have belonged to this group of the 'Nigerian Taliban' whose dispersed remnant settled in Maiduguri. In an interview he conducted in 2010, Mohammed Kyari noted that Mohammed Yusuf did not actually play an active role in the conflict between the group and the state other than the role he played in the recruitment and talent spotting and indoctrination of young people for the group.¹⁴ He and his group could not gain acceptance by the predominantly Sunni clerics and was denied refuge by several Imams and Mosques, and was even denounced by one of his famous mentors, Sheikh Jafaru Adams, an itinerant preacher from Kano for his radical views against the state and its establishments. It was said that Sheikh Jafaru in fact, helped to negotiate the return of Mohammed Yusuf from exile in Pakistan with the promise that he would abandon radical/militant Islamism.

In 2002, Mohammed Yusuf assembled a group of young radicals and started the *Da'awaa*¹⁵ phase of his charismatic preaching in Maiduguri where he engaged in fierce contestation for space and open arguments on the doctrinal teaching of Islam with his major opponents, the *Izala tul Bidi'a Wa Iqama tul Sunna*.¹⁶ At some point, these two radical movements shared the same mosque but Yusuf and his movement was later expelled by the *Izala* group. After going on *hijra*¹⁷ to a parcel of land provided by his father-in-law, Alhaji Boi Fugu, he built a mosque named after Ibn Taimiyya¹⁸ and a school where he engaged radical minds. Mohammed and

12 Kyari Mohammed, "The Message and Methods of Boko Haram" in Marc-Antoine Perouse De Montclos, ed. Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria. Los Angeles, CA: African Academic Press, a Tsehai Publishers, 2015, p. 7.

13 D. Cook, "Boko Haram: A Prognosis". James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, December 16, 2011.

14 Kyari Mohammed, "The Message and Methods of Boko Haram" in Marc-Antoine Perouse De Montclos, ed. Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria. Los Angeles, CA: African Academic Press, a Tsehai Publishers, 2015, note 3, p. 27.

15 *Da'awaa*: An Arabic word which can be translated to mean evangelism combined with proselytism.

16 Call for the rejection of innovation and the embracing of the original practice of traditional Islam as done by Mohammed the prophet of Islam. The *Izala* movement was found in Jos city by a certain sheikh Suleiman but became radically popularized by the late Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gunmi.

17 The word *Hijra* means pilgrimage. Mohammed Yusuf equated his relocation to the new site as a pilgrimage likened according to the pilgrimage embarked upon by Prophet Mohammed from Medina to Mecca for spiritual fortification when the people in Medina literally drove him out of the city.

18 The works of Taimiyya had wherein he rejected western science and cosmology impacted greatly on the life and teachings of Mohammed Yusuf.

his group later adopted the name *Ja'amatul Ahlis Sunna Lid Da'awati Wal Jihad*¹⁹. This group later engaged in a violent confrontation with the Nigerian security forces in June 2009. Mohammed Yusuf was arrested by the troops of the Nigerian Army and was handed to the police who carried out extra-judicial killings on him and some of his followers. This marked the beginning of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.

²⁰ The extremist group has thus far caused the death of over twenty thousand Nigerians and the displacement of over two million persons with devastating humanitarian consequences. Other splinter group known as the Ansarul Din, an offshoot of Boko Haram has emerged but its activities have been overshadowed by those of Boko Haram. The group believed to be headed by the son of late Mohammed Yusuf is vexed by the indiscriminate killing of Muslims by Boko Haram and dissociates itself from Boko Haram.



Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing Boko Haram occupied territories

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013

¹⁹ Translated to mean Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad by Salisu Salisu Shuaibu, Mohd Afandi Saleh and Abdullahi Yusuf Shehu, "The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigerian National Security", International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Vol. 5, No.;

²⁰ Danjibo, op.cit. 2009.

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso is an interesting piece to examine. There is no notable resident violence extremist group in the country except for one Mallam Dikko who runs a radical but not yet confirmed violent extremist group in the northern part of Burkina Faso. Virtually all those interviewed submitted that pockets of attacks in small communities bothering Mali were carried out by extremists groups from Mali who had no base in Burkina Faso. This position has been corroborated by field work on violent extremism in Burkina Faso in 2013. The research team came to the conclusion that:

Burkina Faso is vulnerable to VE but that the threat is not imminent. That is, structural conditions in Burkina Faso are such that there is a prevalence of ‘push factors,’ which increase the risk of VE. However, we found a relative absence of ‘pull factors,’ with the result that a broadly stated vulnerability has not translated into specific threats. At the same time, we identified numerous sources of resilience in Burkina Faso, deriving from both the state and from the civil society.²¹ However, literature on violent extremism in Burkina Faso outlined a few of the attacks that were suspected to have been carried out by al-Mourabitoun of Mokta Belmoktar and the Macina Liberation Front of Amadou Kouffa. These two extremist groups are affiliated with the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). A short account of the attacks in Burkina Faso was captured thus:

In April 2015, A Romanian mining company worker was abducted in the northern part of the country, and a security officer was killed when trying to intervene. In August and October 2015, security outposts were hit in Oursi in northern Burkina Faso and Samarogouan in the west. In January 2016, a restaurant and a hotel in Ouagadougou were stormed by terrorists. More recently, in September and October 2016, other security outposts were attacked in Koutougou, Intangom and Markoye in the north.²²

The question then is if Burkina Faso does not have a resident violent extremist group, why then the methodological choice of Burkina Faso? Though the country does not have resident violent extremist groups, it still became a victim of attacks by violent extremist groups in communities north of the country, apart from the dastard attack on Splendid Hotel that claimed the life of 33 people including three violent extremists. The extremist also struck at Aziz Istanbul restaurant in Ouagadougou killing 17 persons. During the validation workshop held on 28 September 2017 in Accra, there were speculations that the sympathizers of the ousted president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Campore both in Cote d’Ivoire and in Mali could be responsible for instigating the attacks in Burkina Faso. It was said that Blaise Campaure was the mediator between violent extremist groups in Mali and some parts of the Sahel with their respective governments. While in office as the president of Burkina Faso, he lavishly hosted the conflicting parties and treated them specially. These people are not happy that his ousting has also terminated the privileges they secured during his reign. There was also a purported intercepted telephone conversation of an Ivorian army general who was said to have promised that he and the other friends of Blaise Campaure would continue to make Burkina Faso ungovernable until they regained power.

21 Peter Romanuik, “Assessing Violent Extremism: The Case of Burkina Faso”,

22 Maj. Djomagne Didler Yves Bamouni, “Fighting Terrorism in Burkina Faso”, *Per Concordiam, Journal of European Security and Defense Issues*, Volume 7, Issue 4, 2016, p. 32.



Figure 2: Map of Burkina Faso

Source: Premiumtimesng.com

Mali

The Northern part of Mali has become a major hub of violent extremist activities since 2012. The most prominent extremist groups operating in the country include Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Dine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and al-Mourabitoun. These groups especially AQIM and MUJAO are also active in countries such as Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger. They are a jihadist group whose common interest is to dismantle regional governments and implement sharia. Al-Mourabitoun, for example, believes that it has a sharia-based duty to unite Africa's Muslims and Islamic movements against secularism and French influences in the region.²³ More ominously, most of these groups are also involved in all sort of criminality such as drug trafficking, human trafficking and kidnapping for ransom, which defeats their main goals as the Defenders of the Islamic Faith.²⁴

Members of these groups live among the population in the communities, and usually operate in the ungoverned spaces along Mali's border with Niger, Algeria, Mauritania, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso. This makes it difficult to sometimes identify them and further complicates efforts to combat extremist threats. The vulnerability of Mali to these extremist threats has been attributed to issues including, governance and security weaknesses, identity fault-lines, local conflicts, poverty and porous borders.²⁵ Nevertheless, it is also imperative to note that violent extremism in Mali is linked to the broader security crisis involving jihadist movements and Tuareg

23 For more information see "Mali: Extremism & Counter-Extremism". <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/mali>, accessed on 20 June 2017.

24 Aning, K. & Pokoo, J. (2014). Understanding the nature and threats of drug trafficking to national and regional security in West Africa. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 3(1).; United Nations Security Council. (2011). Emerging Security Threats in West Africa. Research Report No. 1; Goita, M. (2011). West Africa Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM's Sahelian Strategy. *Africa Security Brief*.

25 Buchanan-Clarke, S. and Lekalake, R. (2016). Violent extremism in Africa: Public opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn. *Afrobarometer Policy Paper No.32* June.

separatist groups in the north of the country. Thus, although prior to the 2012 political crisis, AQIM and its affiliates operated in the isolated parts of northern Mali, there was little or no confrontation between them and the Malian security forces. The groups began to launch full-scale attacks²⁶ against the Malian government and international targets following the 2012 political stalemate which culminated in the overthrow of President, Amadou Toumani Touré, in a military coup.




Figure 3: Area of Occupation of the various Armed Groups during the 2012 Crisis

Source: France24, 2016

Thus, during the political crisis, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)²⁷ took advantage of the security vacuum created by the military absence and occupied the territories in northern Mali with the support of AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine.

²⁶ With weapons stolen from Muammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya.

²⁷ Which had been fighting the military with the intent of creating an independent state in Mali's north since the post independence period.

The MNLA subsequently declared an independent state of Azawad in the areas that they occupied including the major cities of Tombouctou, Gao and Kidal.²⁸ However, MNLA lost control of the north to AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine due to ideological differences. Therefore, as represented on figure 1, while MUJAO controlled the towns of Douentza, Gao and Ménaka, AQIM occupied the towns of Tombouctou and Tessalit, and Ansar Dine remained in control of Kidal.²⁹ This led to a full-blown security, political and institutional crises in Mali because while the Transitional Government was controlling the southern part of the country, the north was dominated by the extremists groups. And throughout the period that they controlled the north, they imposed a strict version of sharia law, and committed series of atrocities, including attacks on UNESCO world heritage sites including Sufi shrines, in Tombouctou, stoning punishments for adulterers, and the cutting off of hands of thieves.³⁰ The north was recaptured after the military intervention by France *Operation Serval* and the African Led International support Mission for Mali (AFISMA) in early 2013 following an attempt by the extremist groups to capture the country's capital, Bamako.³¹

To support the re-establishment of state authority and to restore constitutional order, the United Nations through Security Council resolution 2100 deployed the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2013. The Mission supervised an election in August 2013 which resulted in the election of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita as President. However, despite considerable progress toward peace, including an agreement between the Mali government and the Tuareg separatists in 2015, attacks by the extremist groups continue unabated. Some of their high profile attacks are provided in **annex 2**. At present, MINUSMA base, Malian military post, banks, hotels and restaurants continue to be targets of suicide bombers, IEDs and mortar shell attacks by AQIM and its affiliates.

Niger

Violent extremism in Niger is a recent phenomenon that has evolved rapidly with increasing complexity. The presence and activities of extremist groups along its border regions with neighboring countries such as Mali, Libya and Nigeria has posed significant threat to the peace and stability of the country. Niger's vulnerability to extremist's threat has been attributed to several factors including the instability in neighboring countries such as Mali, Libya and Nigeria, its participation in the Multi-National Joint taskforce to combat Boko Haram (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin, porous borders, weak security apparatus, local conflict dynamics and socio-economic discontent of the population.³² As indicated by Guéret, Niger sits at the crossroads of a huge area in the Sahel region where state actors have limited control, and also home to a toxic blend of insurgencies, ethnic militias, drug traffickers, smugglers and violent extremist groups.³³ This has facilitated the activities of extremist groups such as Boko Haram around the Diffa region along the country's border with Nigeria and AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO around Tillabéri, Agadez, Maradi, and Zinder along the border with Mali and Burkina Faso (see figure 2 for the location of these regions).

28 For more information see United Nations. (2014). *Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Mali*. New York: United Nations.

29 *ibid*

30 *ibid*

31 Cilliers, J. (2015). Violent Islamist extremism and terror in Africa. Institute for Security Studies Paper 286. Available at https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper%20286%20_v3.pdf. Accessed on 28 May 2017.

32 Interview with representatives of CSOs and Government agencies in Niamey, April 2017; UN Security Council, United Nations. (2012). Report of the Assessment Mission on the Impact of the Libyan Crisis on the Sahel Region, 7 to 23 December 2011, UN Doc. S/2012/42, January 18, 2012, available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%202012%2042.pdf. Accessed 30 June 2017.

33 Guéret, T. (20107). Niger and the Fight Against Violent Extremism in the Sahel. <https://rusi.org/commentary/niger-and-fight-against-violent-extremism-sahel>, *Commentary*, 13 April 2017. accessed on 14 June 2017.

The Diffa region, Maradi and Zinder were mentioned during the field interviews as very notorious for Boko Haram activities due to the porous borders and weakness of the security infrastructures.³⁴ Indeed, the first attack of Boko Haram in the country which occurred on February 2015 took place in this region.³⁵ Since April 2016, Boko Haram has repeatedly crossed the border from Nigeria to launch multiple attacks in the Diffa region, leading to numerous deaths (both civilians and security forces), injuries, displacements and destruction of properties. On June 4, 2016, the region recorded the most deadly attack by Boko Haram in the city of Bosso, killing about 32 soldiers from Niger and two from Nigeria.³⁶ An additional 67 people were injured and properties worth thousands of CFA franc were destroyed during the attack. According to OCHA, since the beginning of the crisis in 2015, over 160 Boko Haram attacks have taken place in the Diffa region with over 455 people killed, wounded or kidnapped.³⁷ The already precarious security and humanitarian situation caused by these sporadic cross-border raids have further been aggravated due to the influx of Nigerian refugees, returnees and the internally displaced persons fleeing from Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. Despite the intervention of security forces and government, the region continues to be unstable due to the frequent attacks by members of Boko Haram in villages around the area.

34 Interview with civil society actors in Niamey, April 10-15, 2017.

35 United Nations. (2017). Niger: Attacks by Boko Haram continue in Niger's Diffa region, forcing more people to flee – UN. <http://www.un.org/victimsofterrorism/es/node/2851>, accessed 10 May 2017.

36 OCHA (2017). Niger - Diffa: Access, Insecurity and Population Movements. <http://reliefweb.int/map/niger/niger-diffa-access-insecurity-and-population-movements-may-2017>, accessed 23 June 2017.

37 This includes 86 attacks in 2015; 76 attacks in 2016 and 21 attacks as at May 2017. OCHA (2017). Niger - Diffa: Access, Insecurity and Population Movements. <http://reliefweb.int/map/niger/niger-diffa-access-insecurity-and-population-movements-may-2017>, accessed 23 June 2017.




Figure 4: Political Map of Niger

Source: One World-Nations Online

The regions of Tillabéri, Tahoua, Agadez, and Arlit in Western and Northern Niger have also recorded repeated attacks by extremist groups including AQIM and MUJAO. These groups frequently transit through the vast northern part of Niger in the areas bordering Algeria, Chad, Libya, and Mali to carry out multiple lethal attacks targeted at army positions, refugee camps, Western interest and Nationals. AQIM and its affiliates are also engaged in criminal activities such as kidnapping of mostly Western Nationals, drug trafficking and trade in contraband goods.

CHAPTER THREE

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES

Radicalization and Violent Extremism: A Conceptual and Theoretical Clarification

The concept ‘radicalization’ is difficult to define and this accounts for why Schmid came to the conclusion that the many people who use the term have not reached an agreement on its definition.³⁸ Radicalization is the gradual indoctrination of person to be disposed to extremist views or belief in an ideology. The Government of Australia views radicalization as taking place “when a person’s thinking and behaviour become significantly different from how most of the members of the society and community view social issues and participate politically.”³⁹ This definition offered by the Government of Australia does not explain what radicalization is but only presents the process of radicalization or the decision to be radicalized. Most terrorists do not willfully embrace terrorism; they go through a gradual initiation process and later find themselves accepting terrorism without an initial intention to do so.

As Horgan and Taylor noted, “What we know of actual terrorists suggests that there is rarely a conscious decision made to become a terrorist. Most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialisation towards extreme behavior.”⁴⁰ Today radicalization and Islamism are almost synonymous as most thinkers and analysts believe that radicalization is a function of Islamic extremism. This position can be misleading as holding a radical view does not necessarily transmute into terrorism. Borum strongly believes that “Most people who hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, and many terrorists... are not deeply ideological and may not ‘radicalize’ in any traditional sense.”⁴¹ But we must acknowledge the fact that radicalization does not just take place in a vacuum; it has multiple and complex causes. For example, it is noted that “Radical Islam is a by-product of a number of historical developments, including the social, the economic and political dys-functionalities of Muslim societies that have blocked these nations from satisfactory development.”⁴²

Persons drawn to radicalization have different experiences and reasons to attribute their attractions to radicalization. The radicalization experience is a conjecture of experiences. To this effect, there is no one clear cut reasons as to why people embrace radicalization. Some are endeared to it as a result of social discrimination; some as a result of political marginalization; some as a result of economic exploitation and others as a result of ideology and still others as a result of actual and perceived injustice. In the words of Kyari Mohammed, “The drivers of radicalization of Islamic groups include both internal and external developments.... The basic message of radical Islam, whether in the Middle East, North Africa or northern Nigeria, is the same: it is the duty of Muslims to revolt against and change apostate rulers and governments in order to help re-establish a

38 Alex P. Schmid, “Radicalization, De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization”, Research Paper presented to the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, 2013.

39 The Government of Australia, “Living Safe Together: Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalization in Australia”, 2015, p. 5; See also, Chris Angus, “Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses”, NSW parliamentary Research Service, February, e-brief 1, 2016, p. 2.

40 J. Horgan and M. Taylor. “The making of Terrorists”, *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, 2001, 13(12): 16-18.

41 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories”, *Journal of Strategic Security*, Volume 4, Issue 4, 2011, pp. 7-36. See p. 8.

42 Daniel Benjamin, “Strategic Counterterrorism”, *Brookings Foreign Policy Number* 7, October 2008, p. 3.]

proper Islamic state.”⁴³

As far back as 1994, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence, commenting on the extremist group in Chechnya, noted that “the problem of the spread of Islamic extremism is not at all locally confined.”⁴⁴ A study conducted by Ruud Koopmans among Muslim communities in Europe revealed an interesting pattern of common interest despite the fact that Muslim communities in Europe did not migrate at the same time and the fact that settlement pattern among Muslim migrants depicts ethnicity and nationalities. It is therefore, interesting to note that 60% of Muslim respondents agreed that Muslims should return to the root of Islam, 75% were of the view that there is only one interpretation of the Koran which every Muslim should stick to, and 65% insisted that Koranic and Islamic rules and laws were more important to them than the rules of the countries they migrate into⁴⁵. Given this revelation, the researcher concluded that:

These findings clearly contradict the often-heard claim that Islamic religious fundamentalism is a marginal phenomenon in Western Europe or that it does not differ from the extent of fundamentalism among the Christian majority. Both these claims are blatantly false, as almost half of European Muslims agree that Muslims should return to the root of Islam, that there is only one interpretation of the Koran, and that rules laid down in it are more important than secular laws.... But given its strong relationship to out-group hostility, religious fundamentalism is very likely to provide a nourishing environment for radicalisation.⁴⁶

As far as some scholars are concerned, radicalization among Muslims is inherently and intrinsically inherited from the doctrinal teachings of the Koran, and therefore there cannot be moderate Islam. This position holds that no matter how educated and exposed Muslims are, there is the tendency and inclination to seek to defend the faith even if it is by force of arms. This is why Bale’s observation, though contested, conveys some meaning. For Jeffrey Bale,

Many observers have naively assumed that all Muslims who are not directly participating in jihadist terrorism, either as perpetrators or as active facilitators, must ipso facto be moderates in terms of their core belief and ultimate goals. This is false. First, no Muslim who is also an Islamists, even if he or she eschews or abjures the use of violence and terrorism for essentially pragmatic or practical reason, is really a moderate given his or her Islamic separatist aim. Second, neither other types of Islamic fundamentalists (e.g. of the ‘quietist’ rather than the ‘activist’ variety) nor hardline Islamic traditionalists can be justly characterized as moderates with respect to their doctrinal tenets. Third, even the large number of semi-observant or non-observant Muslims (i.e. those who do not strictly follow Muslim rituals or regularly attend mosques, or who engage periodically in certain in certain religiously-proscribed activities like gambling and drinking) are not necessarily moderate with respect to their basic theological beliefs, their social and political attitudes towards ‘infidels’ or their views about armed jihad. After all, con

43 Kyari Mohammed, 2015, p. 21.

44 Cited in Mark Kramer, “Prospects for Islamic Radicalism and Violent Extremism in the North Caucasus and Central Asia”, PONARS Eurasia Memo No. 28, 2008, p. 2.

45 Ruud Koopmans, *Fundamentalism and Out-group Hostility: Muslim Immigrants and Christian Natives in Western Europe*. Berlin: WZB Mitteilungen, December 2013.

46 Alex P. Schmid, “Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) The Hague, Research Paper, May 2014, p. 9.


veniently ignoring Islamic injunctions is not the same thing as explicitly repudiating them.⁴⁷

Robert Spencer⁴⁸ aver that core texts in the Koran and the Hadith which advocate for the global application of Shari'a law oblige the subjugation of and the waging of war against non-believers and the history of Islam is replete with referential facts on this belief.

Spencer made reference to Ibn Warraq's assertion that there were "moderate Muslims but no moderate Islam... there is no orthodox sect of Islam and no Islamic school of jurisprudence that does not teach the necessity to work toward the political dominance of Islamic Law and the subjugation of unbelievers under the law."⁴⁹

Since radicalization is a process towards an agenda setting,⁵⁰ the New York Police Department categorized four stages of radicalization- pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadisation.⁵¹ In other words, before radicalization will take place, a person would have to be vulnerably disposed either through persuasion or through coercion; he or she would have to identify with the radical group; they would have to accept to be indoctrinated before embarking on jihad, which disposes them to carry out attacks. These four steps are simply summarized in the diagram below as adopted from Scott Hefstein.⁵²

Figure 5: Arrow depicting the process of radicalization to violent extremism



Violent extremism, though another nebulous concept, is perhaps, the resultant product of radicalization. Though not exhaustive, extremism can be defined or viewed as the:

political ideologies that oppose a society's core values and principles. In the context of liberal democracies, this could be applied to any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and universal human rights. The term can also be used to describe the methods

47 Jeffrey M. Bale, "Denying the Link between Islamist Ideology and Jihadist Terrorism: 'Political Correctness' and the Undermining of Counterterrorism", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Volume 7, Issue 5, pp. 45ff; Cited in Alex P. Schmid, "Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?" *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) The Hague, Research Paper*, May 2014, p. 12.

48 Robert Spencer, "Stealth Jihad: An Interview with Robert Spencer", by Right Wing News, December 13, 2008

49 Robert Spencer, *Ibid.*

50 See, Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories", *Journal of Strategic Security*, Volume 4, Number 4, Winter 2011, pp. 6- 36.

51 New York Police Department (NYPD), *Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat*. USA: New York, 2007.

52 Scott Helfstein, *Edged of Radicalization: Individuals, Networks and Ideas in Violent Extremism*. Report Submitted to the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2012, figure 1, p. 18.

through which political actors attempt to realize their aims...by using means that ‘show disregard for the life, liberty and human rights of others.’⁵³

We should not however, restrict or narrow the understanding of the concept to religion or religious indoctrination as is often obscurely defined interchangeably with terrorism or Islamic terrorism. In other words, violent extremism may not be borne out of religious ideologies since far right wing violent actions can be⁵⁴ accommodated in defining extremism. For example, in its report of April 2014, the New American Foundation observed that “Since 9/11 extremists affiliated with a variety of far-right-wing ideologies...have killed more people in the United States than have extremists motivated by al-Qaeda’s ideology.” In fact, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report of 2016 tagged “Preventing Violent Extremism in Schools” has expanded the concept of violent extremism to include ‘active shooters, terrorists, gangs, criminal enterprises, human traffickers, and online predators.’⁵⁵ The US Justice Department defined homegrown extremism encouraging, endorsing, commissioning, justifying and supporting “a violent criminal act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals by a citizen...who has rejected Western cultural values, beliefs and norms.”⁵⁶ This depicts elasticity in understanding the concept of violent extremism.

A summary of key findings of a study conducted by ‘Women Without Borders’ with regards to the FEAR of mothers concerning radicalization revealed the following results as the strongest sources of radicalization. Seventy-eight percent of the women opined that both the internet and the influence of radical leaders are sources of radicalization; seventy-six responded that messages through the television and activities of political actors and organization also constituted sources of radicalization and finally, only sixty-five percent attributed radicalization to religious groups. Other sources included a desire for revenge (73%), community instability (68%) peer pressure (66%), trauma (63%) and self-isolation (48%).⁵⁷ This goes to show how potent all these five sources of radicalization and violent extremism as illustrated in Table 2.

Table 1: What Mothers Fear most as the Sources of Radicalization

Serial No.	Item	Percentage
1	The Internet	78
2	Influence of Radical Leaders	78
3	Messages disseminated through television	76
4	The role of Political organization	76
5	The Role of Religious groups	65
6	A Desire for Revenge	73
7	Community Instability	68
8	Vulnerability to Peer Pressure	66
9	Trauma	63
10	Isolation	48

Source: Schlaffer and Kropiunigg, 2015.

53 P. Neuman, “Prisons and Terrorism Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation in 15 Countries. Policy Report of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, 2010, p. 12.

54 <http://edition.com/2014/04/14/opinion/Bergen-stemen-kansas-shooting>.

55 Office of Partner Engagement, Unclassified report of the FBI, “Preventing Violent Extremism in Schools”, January 2016, p.5.

56 International Association of Chief of Police (IACP), Committee on Terrorism, Countering Violent Extremism Working Group. Cf. www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/ACP-COTCommonLexicon_Eng_FINAL, 12 Aug, 2012.

57 Edit Schlaffer and Ulrich Kropiunigg, “Can Mothers Challenge Extremism? Mothers’ Perception and Attitude of Radicalization and Violent Extremism” Women Without Borders Change the World, Vienna, 2015, p. iv.

Mahdism as the Bedrock for Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Northern Nigeria

Though Islam had existed in northern Nigeria for about 12 Centuries now, it was not until 1804 that Islam manifested radical tendency with the jihad of Shehu Usman Danfodiyo, a well-respected learned Fulani Charismatic teacher and preacher. The position of John Paden summarily reinforced by Muhammed Kabir Isa, came to the conclusion that “Militant Islamist movements and their organisations are spread across a wide range of demographics and vistas in northern Nigeria. Central to understanding these movements is the Sokoto jihad and caliphate, founded by Uthman Ibn Danfodio, which serves as framework, an inspiration, and a model for present day movements, both Sunni and Shia”

Shehu Usman Danfodiyo was revered as a Mahdi by his followers a title which he later denied. Among Muslims especially of the Shiite denomination, there a strong belief in the coming of a Mahdi, a precursor who would come and prepare the way for the last judgment by reforming and purifying the practice of Islam. This great reformist must descend from the lineage of the prophet of Islam and must emerge from Mecca, the holy land of Muslims, which is more or less an eschatological pronouncement and expectation among Muslims. The coming of the Mahdi shall be preceded by eschatological signs that will contradict universal principles such as the crashing of the moon, the sun rising from the west instead of the east, the great oceans drying up within a twinkling of an eye and other great signs and wonders beyond wonders.

In the 19/20 centuries, several revolts and resistance movements have taken place linked to the Mahdist tradition, which have formed the basis of radicalization and violent extremism in today's northern Nigeria. Sabina Brakoniecka has documented these movements in some of her scholarly works on Boko Haram.

In the 20th century, Mahdist ideas continued to develop as a result of several anti-colonial activities. In 1902, a preacher known as Malam Maizanna proclaimed himself the Mahdi and called Muslims to reject British authority. In 1903, the Sultan of Sokoto, Attahiru I fled with his followers from forces. They moved eastwards to Bima hill where they expected to meet the Mahdi. In 1906, in Satiru near Sokoto, a Mahdist revolt broke out under the leadership of a village head named Isa and his aid Danmakafo (Hausa: the Blind One (sic)). In the same year, many preachers in Kontagora, Gombe and Bauchi called on Muslims to avoid paying taxes to the British and foretold of the immanent approach of the Mahdi. At the same time, Mahdist ideas flourished on the eastern edge of the Sokoto caliphate territory. In the Mandara mountains on the present day Cameroun-Nigerian border, where Boko Haram have their last bastion today, a strong Mahdist movement developed⁶².

The doctrine of life and death in Islam is associated with the belief in the Mahdi, the great purifier who would strive hard to overrun the enemies of the Islam, obliterate oppression and establish a new global order based on justice and equity. To this end, Mohammed Kabir Isah was right to observe that “Militant Islamism- as well as radical Islamism- is rooted in the recurring cycles of revivals of Muslim history.”

Boko Haram: Reasons for Emergence

There are several reasons for the emergence of the Boko Haram in Nigeria. One basic reason has to do with injustice and the impunity of the Nigerian state, which is often been ignored in the analysis of the violent activities of the sect. In July 2009, the mosque and school belonging to the sect were completely destroyed by the security forces of the Nigerian state. The group, in line with due process of seeking justice went to the court and the court in its judgment ordered the Nigerian state to rebuild the mosque and the school for the sect but the state, known for its culture of impunity, disregarded the court verdict. Secondly, the sect also petitioned the Federal Government of Nigeria requesting that the police personnel involved in the extra-judicial killings of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf and more than 70 other members must be brought to book. Again, the Nigerian state ignored the call for justice. Every other violent activity of the sect can be 'justifiably' linked to these two episodes. Emphasizing on socio-economic factors as responsible for radicalization and violent extremism, Olojo noted that:

Individuals and groups (sic) grievances such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalization, can be used as mobilizing instruments by sinister group to get support and recruit for terrorist violence. The predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria provide the group a steady stream for recruitment, the deprived youths and Almajeris are willing to join any movement for them to find an alternative to the current economic and political inequalities that exist in the country; believing that the sect (sic) version of radical Salafism to be the answer to their problems.

In the case of Boko Haram, Bintube (citing Wicker) noted that Boko Haram as an insurgent radical group emerged as a result of the injustice and extra-judicial killings meted to the leader of the group, Mohammed Yusuf and several other hundreds members of the sect. Holding a radical view does not necessarily translates to becoming violent. A person can hold a radical opinion without necessarily becoming violent. As a matter of fact, several persons have upheld radical views but have at the same time denounced violence. Violent extremism occurs when "a person or group decides that fear, terror, and violence are justified to achieve ideological, political or social change, and acts accordingly."

CHAPTER FOUR


CAUSES AND DRIVERS OF RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Root Causes of Violent Extremism in West Africa

The drivers of violent extremism in West Africa are varied, complex and multi-factorial with religious, ideological, political, economic and historical dimensions. Multiple factors or variables influence the emergence of extremist groups and the decision of individuals to join or support those groups. Allan et al conceptualize these variables or factors into three different but interrelated levels namely, macro level, meso-level and micro level factors respectively.

As represented on the three-layered pyramid in figure 3, while the macro level factors look at situational issues involving country or community-wide factors, the meso-level focuses on the socio-cultural issues affecting identity groups. The micro level includes the individual factors that motivate people to join the extremists groups. Put differently, the three-layered pyramid shows a large and potentially vulnerable population at the base, individuals at-risk of radicalization in the middle and an actively violent minority at the apex. In this section, the model is used to analyze the factors underpinning the growing threat of violent extremism in West Africa focusing on the four country case studies.

Figure 6: Theoretical Model of Drivers of Violent Extremism



Source: Allan et al, 2015

Macro Level Factors

Poor Governance and Socioeconomic Challenges

The first macro level factors identified as underpinning the growing threat of violent extremism in West Africa is the issue of poor governance and democratic deficits. Most respondents noted that violent extremism is just a symptom of limited/or the lack of strong state presence in the isolated desert areas in the Sahel region and the failure of governments to provide basic services (health care, education, infrastructure, water, welfare and security) to the population in those areas. Thus, most of the border regions and communities like Kidal in Mali and Diffa in Niger have for a long time been deprived of basic social amenities, economic development and social intervention programmes.⁵⁸ A respondent in Mali, for instance, noted that.

In most of the G5 Sahel countries, the governments hardly control 2/3 of the total land space. You can travel several kilometers or miles without seeing any security agencies. This has created a no man's land which is being exploited by the extremist groups⁵⁹.

The absence or weakness of the state presence has created a general feeling of neglect and sense of political exclusion, economic marginalization, and injustice by the central government as well as underdevelopment and poverty in those areas.⁶⁰ In Mali, for example, the Tuaregs have for several decades fought over perceived marginalization by the government and demanded an autonomous state in the north of country.⁶¹ The Tuaregs feel distant, disenfranchised, and alienated from the government, and that is what is causing the recurrent rebellion in northern Mali.⁶² Expectedly, the vacuum created by the state absence has been exploited by AQIM and its affiliates to build substantial support and legitimacy in the Sahelian communities. In some of the communities, it was indicated that the extremist groups have utilized social service provision to exploit the population to gain support. This practice is common especially in the Diffa region in Niger where Boko Haram was alleged to be using motorbikes and money to influence the youth to join the group. Also in northern Mali, AQIM's strategy to consolidate support from locals has been the use of money and providing for the suffering masses what the state has failed to deliver by building schools and feeding the hungry.⁶³ In sum, violent extremism is embraced by the people who feel marginalized as a vehicle for advancing their goals.

Weakness of Security and Defense Forces

The inability of the security and defense forces to ensure the safety and security of the population has led some youth to join the extremist groups for protection. That is, most of the security and defense forces in Mali

58 The worst part is that most of the deprived regions like Diffa and Agadez in Niger have abundance of natural resources like petrochemicals and Uranium which are being explored by foreign companies.

59 Interview with CSO representative in Bamako, Mali, April 2017.

60 See Tech, T. (2014). Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment of Mali Public Version. Report of USAID.

61 Keita, K. (2013). Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali. Global Research, February 01. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-crisis-in-mali-a-historical-perspective-on-the-tuareg-people/5321407>; Hershkowitz, A. (2005). *The Tuareg in Mali and Niger: The Role of Desertification in Violent Conflict*, American University, <http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/tuareg.htm>, accessed 10 June 2017.

62 Voelker, J and McQuaid, V. (2009). Terrorism and Violent Extremism in North Africa. CNA Conference Report, September 15.

63 Dolan, K. A. (2013). The Secret of Al Qaeda In Islamic Maghreb Inc.: A Resilient (And Highly Illegal) Business Model. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2013/12/16/the-secret-of-al-qaeda-in-islamic-maghreb-inc-a-resilient-and-highly-illegal-business-model/2/#7cbf56d213ae>, accessed on 14 June 2017.

and Niger are facing different forms of challenges that are hindering their effort to protect the population and secure the borders. The long borders and harsh terrain in the northern regions especially has made the border areas very difficult to secure and patrol. Currently, a large tract of territories in northern Mali also remains ungoverned, making the operational coverage of the security and defense forces especially along the borders very limited. This situation has further been aggravated by the inadequate funding, manpower and equipment (mobility assets) to carry out the security operations.

The combination of these challenges has affected the operational efficiency of the security forces and their ability to protect the population from constant attacks. Most youth according to the field interviews joined groups such as AQIM and Ansar Dine just to protect themselves, their families and communities as well as their properties due to the inability of the security forces to ensure their safety and security. For instance, it was noted that some herdsmen joined Ansar dine to protect their cattle from cattle rustling.

Localized conflicts

Prolonged and unresolved local conflicts including the Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger, Fulani herds-men-farmer conflicts, ethnic, religious and political violence in Nigeria have provided a fertile ground for violent extremism. In both Mali and Niger, AQIM and Ansar dine have exploited the deep-rooted grievances of some of the ethnic groups like the Fulani's, Kanuri's and the Tuaregs in order to garner support and resources to control the populations. In Northern Mali, for instance, the difficulties in implementing the peace agreements signed by the government and the armed groups have been exploited by AQIM and its affiliates to launch their multiple attacks against peacekeepers and Western national/interests. The impact of the Libyan crisis also contributed to the problem of violent extremism in the Sahel region. For Niger especially, it was noted that its strategic location within the Sahel-Sahara zone in a neighborhood of jihadist and Tuareg separatist rebellion in Mali, religious and political violence in Nigeria, and state collapse in Libya has contributed to the country's vulnerability to violent extremism.⁶⁴

In the case of Nigeria, although there seemed not to be a direct relationship between politics and the emergence of Boko Haram, it can be inferentially deduced. Political conflict between Malla Kachalla who was the governor of Borno State between 1999 and 2003 and Ali Modu Sheriff who was a Senator at the time but later became governor of the same State between 2003 and 2011 would have partly been responsible for exposing some members of Boko Haram to acts of violence. Ali Modu Sheriff was the political godfather of Malla Kachalla but their relationship later became estranged when the former insisted on determining who occupied the most sensitive positions in the state cabinet. While the conflict lasted, they became politically fractionalized to the extent of Ali Modu Sheriff hiring political thugs known as the 'ECOMOG' to provide security for him. Senator Ali Modu Sheriff won the heart of the late leader of the Boko Haram sect, Muhammed Yusuf, whose followers became members of the 'ECOMOG' that provided security for Ali Modu Sheriff. This was possible because Ali Modu Sheriff had promised to adopt and institutionalize sharia law in the state.

64 See UN Security Council, United Nations. (2012). Report of the Assessment Mission on the Impact of the Libyan Crisis on the Sahel Region, 7 to 23 December 2011, UN Doc. S/2012/42, January 18, 2012, available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%202012%2042.pdf. Accessed 30 June 2017.

On several occasions, there were violent clashes between the supporters of Governor Malla Kachalla and Ali Modu Sheriff's 'ECOMOG'. Therefore, political violence became the catalyst that provided the impetus of Boko Haram violence.⁶⁵

Meso Level Factors

Religious Enigma

The instrumentalization of religion by the extremists groups to exploit the socioeconomic conditions of the population to recruit people was identified as one of the pull factors driving violent extremism. The field study showed that violent extremism in Niger and Mali is not rooted in any particular religion but rather hinges on how religion, ethnicity and identity have been exploited and perverted by extremists to radicalize people into engaging in violence. Thus, it was noted that people join the extremist groups not because of any religious indoctrination or adherence to any so called jihadist objectives. It is rather about how people's socioeconomic conditions and dissatisfaction with the heavy-handed security responses has been exploited by the extremists using religious rhetoric. Extremists use religion and cultural identities to exploit existing grievances of the population to pursue their objectives and also capitalize on religious identities to recruit their members by accusing the secular state as the cause of their predicaments.⁶⁶

Micro Level Factors

Youth Unemployment

Unemployment and underemployment were cited as some of the broad range of economic factors facilitating radicalization and violent extremism at the individual level. A report published by the Institute of Security Studies in August 2016 also confirmed this link between unemployment and violent extremism in Northern Mali. Most of the extremist groups according to the responses from the field study recruit from the ranks of the unemployed and underemployed people, including the relatively well-educated. The groups exploit the frustration of the youth, caused by their inability to meet basic needs and the lack of socioeconomic opportunities to earn a living. In most of the areas affected by the menace, the youth have lost hope for the future due to persistent state neglect and lack of employment opportunities. The absence of job opportunities has made violent extremist groups an attractive source of income for some of the youth to sustain their livelihood.

A 2007 research conducted by Nigeria's Central Bank showed that 78 per cent of the inhabitants of the North-Eastern Nigeria were leaving below the poverty line as a result of youth unemployment. In the same vein, Danjibo also established a strong relationship between Boko Haram violence and youth unemployment by narrating how young graduates, unable to get jobs, tore their certificates and joined Boko Haram.⁶⁷

65 Isaac Olawale Albert and Nathaniel Dominic Danjibo (2004), "Borno: Fitting the Designs of the Political Elite", in Adefemi V. Isumonah, ed. *Participatory Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies, University of Ibadan.

66 Thérout-Bénoni, L. et al (2016). Mali's young 'jihadists' Fuelled by faith or circumstance? ISS POLICY BRIEF 89| AUGUST.

67 N. D. Danjibo (2009) "Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The Maitatsine and Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria", Paper presented at a conference organized by the Institute of French Research in Africa and the Institute for Development Studies, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, November. This paper has recently been published by the *Journal of Islamic Sects Research*, Volume 10, No. 1, Spring 2017, pp. 207- 235.

Repressive Security responses

In Niger, certain stringent measures by the central government to deal with the extremist threat were perceived as generating community support and sympathy for violent extremists because they violate people's human right and rule of law. These measures include, among others, the closure of local markets, imposition of prolonged curfews or states of emergency, preventing people from going to the farm, ban on riding motorbikes, repressive and heavy-handed security responses, and the arbitrary arrest of suspected Boko Haram members without evidence.⁶⁸ Although, the idea behind some of these measures is to prevent further attacks by Boko Haram, it has rather had a radicalizing impact on the population.

Some of the measures according to the experts and CSO actors interviewed have brought untold hardship and frustration on the population despite the limited positive outcomes. For instance, the ban of motorbikes has had multiple implications on the owners, passengers, sellers and repairers. Specifically, for the private and commercial owners of the motorbikes, they are deprived of their means of transportation and livelihood for the period that the ban is active. Similarly, the passengers who used the motorbikes also get frustrated as they cannot afford the expensive taxi fares. The sellers and repairers of the motorbikes are invariably also denied of their source of livelihood.

Moreover, because majority of the population in the areas affected by extremist activities are farmers, preventing people from going to their farms create some dissatisfaction as it is their only source of income and livelihood. Likewise, the closure of local markets has also had serious negative effects on market women, traders, businesses and farmers. The repressive and heavy-handed security responses as well as the arbitrary arrests and imprisonment of suspected Boko Haram members without any concrete evidence has also aroused public provocation against the security and defense forces of Niger and Nigeria. In Nigeria, for example, the Amnesty International has produced a damning report concerning the violation of the rights of suspected Boko Haram members where it stated that over 1000 suspected were arrested and detained in Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri and 'Guantanamo' base in Danmaturu in Yobe State.⁶⁹ Put together, all these stringent measures have had a debilitating impact on the population, causing many people to be easily radicalized and exploited by the Boko Haram and its affiliates. In fact, it was alleged that in some of the communities the residents sometimes even want the extremist groups to attack the military so they can have their freedom of movement. They refuse to cooperate or share information with the military and often join the extremist groups to fight against the hardship imposed on them by the state. Ominously, these concerns raise issues about the extent to which local communities and authorities are involved in the development and implementation of government strategies and initiatives to combat violent extremism.

Other Root Causes of Radicalization and Violent Extremism

As already posited, there are multiple root causes of violent extremism and radicalization, depending on the situation and the context.⁷⁰ Studies on the causes of radicalization and violent extremism and even terrorism "were unable to identify a typical profile or decisive individual factors. It was found impossible to extrapolate generalizations from the case studies and individual life stories as the motives and ideas that turn individuals into violent extremists are multifaceted and extremely complex."⁷¹ However, most of what is presented in

68 Interview with civil society organisations, Niamey, Niger, April 10-15, 2017.

69 Amnesty International Report, 2014.

70 Edward Newman, Exploring the 'Root Causes' of Terrorism: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29: 8, 749-772, 2006; Tore Bjorgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward. London: Routledge, 2005.

71 Christian NONlist, "The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism", CSS Analysis in Security Policy, No. 183, December

scholarship as the root causes of radicalization includes ideology and belief system, socio-economic condition, bad governance, marginalization and oppression and lack of justice.⁷²

Chris Angus outlined radical ideology, personal relationships, identity and social exclusion, and perceived injustice against a community as drivers of radicalization and violent extremism.⁷³ In the same vein, the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) documented nine causes of radicalization and violent extremism, which includes individual socio-psychological factors, social factors, political factors, ideological/religious factors, culture and identity crisis, trauma, group dynamics, radicalizers/groomers factor, and the social media factor.⁷⁴ Since most of the radical and violent extremist groups in West Africa have direct links with Islamism or political Islam, ideology here is regrettably narrowed to Islamism which “is a desire to impose any given interpretation of Islam over society and it is viewed by its adherents as a comprehensive ideology.”⁷⁵ Proponents of Islamic ideology “believe that Islam must be placed at the centre of an individual’s identity, as either the overriding or the only source of that identity. The Islamist outlook is one that essentially divides the world into two distinct spheres: ‘Muslims’ and the ‘rest’.”⁷⁶

Radicals, violent extremists and terrorists who use ideology as an instrument often convince would-be recruits and members of greater reward if they became martyrs for the cause of Islam. However, respondents from the field revealed that the transmission of radical ideology is borne out of half-baked knowledge of the Koran and illiteracy on the part of the adherents. For example, the Secretary of the Ministry of Justice in Burkina Faso was of the opinion that whereas it takes Catholic priests /Christian pastors a long time to be trained in both philosophy and theology, most Muslim clerics do not undergo such a long training, and therefore, are not adequately prepared to transmit the right knowledge needed for peaceful co-existence in the society.⁷⁷ This was corroborated by the Chairman, Muslim Council of Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa State, who when asked about the causes of radicalization and violent extremism, with regards to Boko Haram, said:

...So they preach jihad and you know those Muslims with half education thinking jihad is just to go and fight, when you fight you have an opportunity to go to Aljanna (paradise), but they don’t know what are (sic) the things that qualifies (sic) jihad to happen and the real meaning of jihad is like they don’t know because jihad means to struggle for the cause of Allah, so struggle to acquire knowledge for your religion, to struggle to be well acquainted to the practice of the religion you are doing (sic). But for those who are half way in education, who cannot go to the extent of defining what jihad means, most of them have conceived the ideas of Boko Haram.⁷⁸

This goes to show that ideology capitalizes on the religious illiteracy of adherents and this can happen both in Christianity and Islam. In today’s Christianity, there are lots of people who believe in only what the pastors say and are so ignorant of the Bible. Likewise in Islam, where adherents chant ‘*Allah Hu Akbar*’ (Allah is

2015, p. 2.

72 Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, “Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism” A Report Prepared for the United States Agency for International Development, 2009.

73 Chris Angus, “Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses”, NSW Parliamentary Research Service, February 2016.

74 Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), Issue Paper 04/01/2016, pp. 3& 4.

75 Chris Angus, Ibid. p. 3.

76 R. Manning and C. La Bau, “In and Out of Extremism”, How Quilliam Helped 10 Former Far-Right and Islamists Change, Quilliam, August 2015, p. 17.

77 Interview with the Secretary General of the Justice Ministry in Burkina Faso.

78 Interview with the Chairman, Muslim Council of Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa State.

Great) emotionally without applying reason to what is being said. Madam Martine's observation is also valid. According to her:

In the context of religion, the problem emerges when people misrepresent religion. Instead of leading people on the path of truth, they mislead them. Religious leaders keep people in the dark. The leaders keep the followers perpetually poor. For example, in Islam, where the Imams are given children to teach, they keep these children poor and make them vulnerable. These children do not have any alternative way of thinking except the one taught by the Imam. If the Imam has some inclination to radical ideology, these children will imbibe such ideology. The Koranic children in the streets are a ready tool for radicalization. Burkina Faso is not protected from the environment, because these children are already out there.⁷⁹

The Socio-Economic Root Causes of Radicalization and Violent Extremism

Though it is hard to conclude an argument linking poverty and unemployment directly to radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism, the socio-economic factor cannot be out rightly denied as one⁸⁰ of the triggers. Scholars who are of this opinion suggest that people drawn to violent extremism and terrorism often blame it on poverty, unemployment and other forms of economic hardships.⁸¹ In both Burkina Faso and Nigeria, field respondents have, in fact, directly linked poverty and unemployment to radicalization, violent extremism and even terrorism. Sodipo is of the opinion that "Boko Haram and other violent Islamist groups have been able to tap grievances over widespread poverty, government corruption, ethno-religious divides, and abuses by security forces to fuel a rise in Islamic radicalization in northern Nigeria."⁸² In the case of Burkina Faso, the submission of one of the interviewees aptly captures the motivating factors for youths to be radicalized or join violent extremist groups:

Factors that can motivate the young into joining radical and extremists groups are unemployment first. Jobless people are the most recruitable. There is also the case of poverty. The percentage of those who live below one dollar in Burkina Faso is very high. And since violent extremists have a lot of money, they can buy people. The military in the north told me that terrorists use golden bullets to fight. I brought some of the bullets so they can make rings for me. Violent extremist groups have a lot of money and are better equipped than Burkina Faso army. There is also fanaticism in religion. Fanatics are easily recruited by the extremists. There is also the weakness of the state. Moreover, the state cannot be present in all parts of Burkina Faso and since the state cannot be present in all its territories, violent extremists groups take advantage.⁸³

79 Interview with Madam Martine, Coordinator General of the UN Women in Burkina Faso, May 2017.

80 This was the position of all the respondents- that poverty and unemployment especially among the youth were responsible for the youth being attracted to radicalization and violent extremism.

81 See Alan B. Krueger and Jitika Meleckova, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection?" *Journal of Economic Perspective*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Fall, 2003, pp. 119-144.

82 Michael Olufemi Sodipo, "Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria", *Highlights of Africa Security Brief*, No. 26, August 2013, p. 1.

83 Interview with a journalist working with UNESCO Youth Club in Ougadougou, May 2017.

James Piazza carried out a study on 172 countries between 1970 and 2006 and found out that “Countries that feature economic discrimination against minority groups experience around six more incidence of domestic terrorism per year.”⁸⁴ In the case of Nigeria, it is observed that:

Understanding Boko Haram’s appeal among some citizens in Nigeria’s far north requires an examination of underlying development challenges facing northern Nigeria, where high rates of poverty and unemployment are exacerbated by extreme population growth and low level of literacy. These factors, combined with weak governance, rampant corruption and inadequate public service delivery, has contributed to widespread disaffection that some suggest may facilitate Boko Haram recruitment.⁸⁵

A study conducted by Nigeria’s CLEEN Foundation in 2013 reiterate the fact of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, weak family structure, and corruption in governance as the underpinning causes of Boko Haram.⁸⁶ Information derived from the field also revealed the fact of ethnic marginalization, the politics of oil in the Lake Chad Basin and corruption amongst traditional ruling elites in the local communities as root causes of violent extremism.

Ethnic/Identity Marginalization

The field study discovered that there were certain ethnic communities that were for a long time treated like outcasts in the local communities. These downgraded groups mostly found in Michika, Madagali, Gulak, Gwaza and parts of Zambisa forest provided the slave labour that enriched ‘superior’ groups in these communities. Since independence, policies and politics were deliberately designed to perpetually keep these marginalized groups in bondage. For example, successive governments both at the federal, state and local levels have refused to bring any form of development to these outcast communities. There are no roads, no schools, no hospitals, no police station, no markets, no banks, and in short, no government presence in whatever remote form. These unfortunate groups have also not been represented politically even at their wards much less in their local councils. This situation could be likened to the decline of Great Britain which Fareed Zakaria described as a society that “retained a feudal cast, given to it by its landowning aristocracy. This elite disdained manufacturing and technology...”⁸⁷ And this initiated the process of its decline and became the bane of its modern scientific and technological development. When emphasizing the fact of identity marginalization and oppression as strong drivers of violent extremism, a traditional ruler said:

Let me say that extremism is not part and will not be part of us, but because of social problems. That is what led to violent extremism not as a primary factor but as a secondary factor. Most of the people that joined extremism in my community in general, they are not Islamic scholars, they are not products of Islam alone, even some Christians joined. So the issue of extremism is not even there. But the question here is that of self-survival. In my community, after the insurgency I did some little statistics, 71% of those that joined were the group of poor people. There is this group called Matakan. We have people from slave families, some were born out of wedlock and then there is one outcast group in our community that is called the blacksmiths. In

84 James A. Piazza “Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination and Domestic Terrorism”, *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (3), 2011.

85 L. P. Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently asked Questions”, *Congressional Service Report (CSR)*, Vol. 10, p. 10.

86 Cited in Freedom C. Onuoha, “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?” *United States Institute of Peace, Special Report Number* 348, June 2014.

87 Fareed Zakaria, *The Post American World*. New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 2008, p. 176.

Michika they are called Rege, and in Madagali they are called Ingyagu...they are being segregated in the society. They cannot go to school to sit on the same bench with the free-born and superior groups, they cannot marry from the family of the superior group and no free-born can marry from them, they cannot eat from the same dish with the superior groups, they cannot have access to government jobs. They are the poorest in the society. They are being called for labour 'go to my farm', 'go and bury the dead'... and the pay is very small. So when the insurgents came, these people did not have the means to run and even if they ran, they will not be accepted. So they decided to stay back and join. So imagine the person that will not eat in the same dish with others, he or she will not go to school with others, he or she will not get government work, the person that will not have money even to eat. So when Boko Haram came to these communities, they banked on this segregation and made these people leaders of the communities, gave them money in hard currencies and told them if they could loot, the spoils of violence belonged to them. These people willingly submitted themselves to Boko Haram and I cannot find any single one of them that was driven by ideology. They are being driven by financial gain and self-recognition. So the matter of radicalization is not even there. When they were caught by the military if you asked them 'are you members of Boko Haram'? They will say 'yes I am a member of Boko Haram and I have no regrets.'⁸⁸

The theories of relative deprivation and horizontal inequality as propounded by Berkowitz⁸⁹ in the 1960s and Ted Robert Gurr⁹⁰ in the 1970 are very apt in explaining why these groups would become vulnerable to Boko Haram. Berkowitz stated that "the strength of the aggressive reaction to some thwarting is a joint function of the intensity of the resulting anger and the degree of association between the instigator and the releasing cue."⁹¹ In a clear case of frustration-aggression thesis, these marginalized ethnic groups willingly joined Boko Haram and carried out acts of arson against their perceived oppressors in order to change the status quo of their social category, and in turn, Boko Haram strategically appointed members of these groups as the Amir and local governors of their respective communities in order to also strategically swell the number of Boko Haram and to expand its territorial control.⁹²

The Politics of Oil in the Lake Chad Basin

Another remote reason attributed to the emergence of Boko Haram was linked to the politics of oil in the Lake Chad Basin and Both Ali Modu Sheriff who was the governor of Borno State when Boko Haram emerged and Idris Derby the President of Chad were fingered in this narrative. The story line is that whereas Chad has been

88 Interview with Alhaji Muhammad Sanusi, the District Head of Duhu and under his jurisdiction are six villages and 95 wards. His position that identity oppression and marginalization were the push factors of joining Boko Haram was corroborated by Mr. Babale Marchulum, the Secretary of the Adamawa State Emergency Management Agency (ADSEMA) who mentioned the slave labourers and outcasts in the mercenaries of Boko Haram.

89 In the early 1950s, the psychologist Berkowitz was perhaps the first to relate aggression to frustration and the simple analysis is that people often become very aggressive if they are frustrated from achieving a desired goal. See Leonard Berkowitz, *Aggression: A Social Psychology Analysis*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962.

90 See Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 1970.

91 Berkowitz, op.cit., p. 33.

92 Interviews with a District Head of Duhu in Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa State, the Coordinators of both the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA).

able to, through the assistance of France, discover oil in its own side of the Lake Chad Basin, Nigeria has spent billions of dollars trying to discover oil in its own side of the Basin. But information gathered from the field revealed that there is an abundance of oil on the Nigerian side of the Basin. However, the oil on the Nigerian side was being drilled by a criminal gang led by Ali Modu Sheriff. But whenever, oil was being drilled on the Nigerian side, it disrupts the flow of oil on the Chad side, which is being controlled by Derby and France. Therefore, a secret pact was entered into between Idris Derby and Ali Modu Sheriff mediated by France.

The involvement of France in the political economy of most African states has been a matter of concern and speculation. In 2015, for instance, Aljazeera carried out series of documentaries of how France, from its colonial days in Africa was instrumental to sponsoring murders, regime changes and political instability in most of the countries it directly assimilated in order to protect its economic interest. It is also obvious to state that up to the present, most of the francophone countries in Africa are and have remained mere appendages of France. In the present circumstances, France was also accused of double standards in Mali, where it is alleged that it supports not only the rebels but the terrorists also. Its major aim is to cause the breaking of Mali so it can have access to the control of oil and gold in the northern part of Mali.⁹³ This position was echoed and reiterated during the validation workshop held in WANEP's Regional Headquarters on 28 September 2017. With regards to the Boko Haram issue and the involvement of France, for instance, France was part and parcel, and in fact, initiated some of the meetings that resurrected the moribund Multinational Joint Task Force at a Paris 2014 summit alongside Republic of Benin, Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Nigeria with representatives from the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union (EPRS, 2015). Another meeting of same countries also took place soon after Muhammadu Buhari assumed duties as the President of Nigeria in 2015.

Despite this seeming positive role played by France, a lot of respondents from the field believed that France became more committed only after Muhammadu Buhari emerged as the President of Nigeria in 2015.⁹⁴

Sheriff was asked to use the opportunity of Boko Haram and raise a criminal gang in the Northeast to prevent the Nigerian government from drilling oil on the Nigerian side of the lake and in return they agreed on the distribution of the proceeds. Presently, Sheriff has more of his oil business in Chad and in Central African Republic than he has in Nigeria.⁹⁵ Recently, several officials of the Nigerian National Petroleum Cooperation (NNPC) and workers of an oil exploration company escorted by the Nigerian military were attacked and killed by the members of 'Boko Haram' on their way to the Nigeria's side of the Lake Chad Basin to resume oil exploration activities. Nigeria's Junior Minister for petroleum, Ibe Ukachukwu was forced to suspend oil exploration activities in Lake Chad.⁹⁶

93 Information derived from the Malian military participants during a group discussion at a training workshop on Border Security and Counter-terrorism in West Africa held in Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre from 21- 27 September 2017.

94 Most of the respondents in Nigeria were of the opinion that the change of guards from President Goodluck Jonathan to President Muhammadu Buhari was the reason France showed some commitment towards the fight against Boko Haram and it was also the reason why Cameroun and Chad also changed their attitude on the same cause. Buhari's visit to both Chad and Cameroun right after his inauguration as President of Nigeria changed things for the better.

95 Interview with some community leaders

96 Reported on newspaper review of Thursday, 28/07/2017.

Corruption among the Political and Military Elite

After the invasion of the camp of Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri in 2009, Governor Ali Modu Sheriff gave orders to the security agents to arrest and if need be exterminate members of the Boko Haram sect. Some of the traditional ruling elite saw an opportunity in the order and submitted lists containing the names of innocent citizens to the security forces to arrest and execute, thereby making it possible for the traditional rulers to dispose innocent people of their farmlands, wives and daughters. This action of the corrupt traditional rulers drove several young men who became victims of their treachery to willingly join Boko Haram. These young men came for the heads of these traditional rulers and slaughtered several of them.⁹⁷

The military was also fingered in this corruption mess. Reports from the field has it that criminal elements joined Boko Haram to enable them raid banks, people's businesses and to engage in cattle rustling. It was said that soldiers would arrest Boko Haram cattle rustlers with large heads of cows and buy off those cows at ridiculous prices and load them in trucks and move them to the southern parts of the country where they would sell them at exorbitant prices. There was a particular incidence where a Boko Haram cattle rustler came with over 300 heads of cows and soldiers bought them at the rate of N500 (\$2) each and moved the cows to the south and sold them for more than N250,000 (\$1000) each.⁹⁸ A son of a member of the Civilian JTF⁹⁹ was arrested with over N500,000,000 (an equivalent of \$2.5 million at the time of his arrest) confessed to acquiring the money through cattle rustling for Boko Haram.¹⁰⁰

Furthermore, it was an open secret that both the top hierarchy of the military and the political class of the People's Democratic Party under the President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan regime have conspired to corruptly enrich themselves using Boko Haram as a conduit. This is obvious with the several corruption cases presently in court linked to the former National Security Advisor, Rtd. Colonel Sambo Dasuki who took \$2 billion dollars meant for the procurement of arms for the military and distributed the money to himself and other members of the political and military class.

More striking was the case of Chief Air Marshall Alex Badeh who was made the Chief of Defence Staff by President Goodluck Jonathan. Alex Badeh is from Mubi town, one of those captured by Boko Haram. Information from the field revealed that two weeks before his town fell to Boko Haram, he evacuated all the valuables from his country home and ordered the Nigerian Air Force to bomb his country home and in return, the government of Goodluck Jonathan gave him N500,000,000 (equivalent of \$2.5 million) as 'compensation.' Badeh was also accused of siphoning the same amount from the account of the Nigerian Air Force for 16 months when he served as the Chief of Air Staff, apart from the money he received from the office of the National Security Advisor for arms procurement, which he never did until Muhammadu Buhari took over as President in May 2015.

The Push and Pull Factors of Violent Extremism

Both push and pull factors will refer to the reasons, the values, the models and inspiration that would endear people into accepting or rejecting violent extremism. Sara Zeiger and Anne Ally refer to 'pull factors' as "the

97 Interview with two local traditional rulers in Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa State.

98 Interview with Comrade Yelwa who was a principal witness to the transaction, July 2017.

99 Civilian JTF means Civilian Joint Task Force, a group of vigilante and hunters guild working hand in hand with the Nigerian Security Forces to combat and arrest members of Boko Haram.

100 Interview with Comrade Yelwa, July 2017.

psychological benefit or attraction of violent extremism that fills an individual's need such as monetary incentives, sense of protection or safety, protection or safety for their family, sense of belonging, revenge for injustice or death, personal empowerment or religious rewards."¹⁰¹ As elaborate and encompassing as this definition is, it has missed some very important factors which are key major pull/push factor of violent extremism, and these are intimidation, threats and coercion. In the case of Nigeria, evidence from the field revealed that members of Boko Haram, upon overrunning a community would carry out extra-judicial killings of some young men and compel forcefully conscripted persons to also execute a close family relation or friend.¹⁰² Likewise in Burkina Faso, field investigation revealed that some communities in the northern part of the country were constantly harassed by intruding violent extremist groups from Mali.¹⁰³ Using Somalia¹⁰⁴ as case study, Table 1 however, summarises the push and pull factors of violent extremism.

Table 2: Push and Pull Factors of Violent Extremism

Push Factors	Pull Factors
Unemployment and Poverty	Access to material resources
Clan marginalization	Access to weaponry and protection
Social and Political marginalization	A sense of belonging
Poor (or no) governance	Order and strong governance
Human rights violation and violence	Revenge-seeking
Endemic corruption and impunity of certain groups	Self-esteem and personal empowerment (being a hero for defending country or religion)
Youth frustration	Religious justification (victory or paradise)

Source: African Union Mission in Somaliland adopted from Martine Zeuthen, 2015.¹⁰⁵

Strategies and Tactics of the Violent Extremist Groups

Mode of Recruitment

At the level of membership, almost all the violent extremist groups use similar strategies to recruit members. This includes radical preaching in the mosques and the media (radio especially), exploitation of the socio-economic discontent of the population, forced conscription, monetary inducement and the use of mystical powers. First, responses from the field study indicated that Boko Haram, AQIM and its affiliates uses

101 Sara Zeiger and Anne Ally Eds., *Countering Violent Extremism: Developing and Evidence-Base for Policy and Practice*. Perth, Western Australia: Hedayah and Curtin University, 2015, p. 4.

102 Interviews conducted with six women who were in Boko Haram's captivity in both Zambisa and Gwoza forests for at least two years. Three of the women were interviewed at Shua community of, one of the communities worst hit by Boko Haram and the other three were interviewed at the Merkoyi IDP camp in Yola, Adamawa State.

103 Interview with Jonas Hien, Director, Organisation Pour le Renforcement des Capacite de Developement, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

104 Somalia in the Horn of Africa is one of the weak or failed states in Africa dealing with the Al-Shabab violent extremist group for almost three decades now.

105 Martine Zeuthen, "From Policy to Practice: Findings and Lessons Learned from a Research-Based Pilot Countering Violent Extremism Programme in the Horn of Africa", in Sara Zeiger and Anne Ally Eds., *Countering Violent Extremism: Developing and Evidence-Base for Policy and Practice*. Perth, Western Australia: Hedayah and Curtin University, 2015, chp. 4.

radical Islamic preachers at the Mosque and the Islamic schools to recruit members. They radicalized members through preaching by targeting the unemployed and frustrated youth because most of them especially those from the Islamic schools lack the ability to critically analyze and question the ideological narratives and doctrines espoused by the extremists. Second, the groups exploit the population using the historical injustice, underdevelopment, marginalization by the central government and the human right abuses of the military to win their hearts and minds to follow their cause. Third, the extremist groups work with the chiefs, village leaders and other influential persons in the communities to indoctrinate the unemployed youth by giving them money. Many chiefs and village leaders in the Diffa region according to respondents are in Niamey prison for providing support to Boko Haram.

Fourth, another strategy that is employed by the extremist groups is the use of money to induce the population to follow their cause. Explaining how this was done, one of the CSO representative interviewed in Niger posited that,

before the attacks in the Diffa region escalated, Boko Haram created a form of a bank where they lend money to the people especially the youth. They knew the people cannot pay back the money and so they continued adding more money to what people have already borrowed. Sometimes too they call the youth and buy them “Kaboubou” (motorbikes) to use for commercial activities and pay back as they work. However, the people are usually unable to pay the money and instead of forcing them to pay, they rather add more money and eventually the people become indebted to them. After owning so much, they will then ask them to join them and start indoctrinating them. Those who refuse are forcefully taken away by the group.¹⁰⁶

In some cases, it was noted that Boko Haram organized traders to form associations where money is given to members to operate their businesses. Some unemployed people also join those associations to benefit from it, while members also convince their friends to join. To this end, “Boko Haram is exploiting the financial gap in the entrepreneurial ecosystem to lure young Nigerians into the group and trap them. The insurgents are buying their way into the lives of young people in the north by providing aspiring entrepreneurs with loans to start up the business of their dreams”.¹⁰⁷

Overtime, members of those associations become radicalized and adherent of the group. Very often, the radicalization is not based on any religious indoctrination but rather the extremist groups make the people feel that the central government is the cause of their predicament and marginalization. They rely on the issues of unemployment, poverty, corruption of the political elite and the inability of the government to ensure the security to radicalize people.

Fifth, some respondents maintained that Boko Haram uses mystical powers to attract followers and also cause members to commit very heinous crimes like killing their own parents and family relations under the pretext that they are infidels or unbelievers. While this cannot be proven scientifically, there was a strong belief that it existed in the regions affected by extremist activities. Nevertheless, some respondents disagreed with this assertion and rather argued that it was the influence of drugs and brainwashing that causes the extremist groups

106 Interview with Civil Society Organisations, Niamey, Niger, April 2017

107 Reuters 2016. “Boko Harma ‘lures, traps’ young Nigerian Entrepreneurs”. Cf. <http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/fe4536004c5f3b388218f79ffda8f5e4/Boko-Haram-lures-traps-young-Nigerian-entrepreneurs-2016204>, accessed 3 July 2017.

to commit such inhumane attacks against their own people. Lastly, some members of the extremist groups were forcefully conscripted from the villages and communities that were attacked.

Mode of Attacks/Operations

The targets and mode of attacks of the violent extremist groups differs slightly from one group to the other but they all end up in violence. AQIM's tactics according to Zachary and Masters include guerilla-style raids, assassinations, and suicide bombings of military, government, and civilian targets.¹⁰⁸ AQIM's attacks reached its apex in 2007 following the simultaneous bombing of the UN headquarters and the Algerian Constitutional Court in Algiers on December 11, 2007.¹⁰⁹ Before then, the group used to conduct small scale ambushes and guerilla-style attacks using small arms, mortar, rocket, and IEDs against Algerian security forces and Government officials. But emboldened by very advanced weapons and combatants from Libya after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011, AQIM has carried out more sophisticated attacks in recent times, sometimes in collaboration with MUJAO and Al-Mourabitoun.

Since 2012, AQIM and its affiliates have conducted high profile kidnapping of Western citizens and execution of Western hostages, mostly aid workers, tourists, diplomats, and employees of multinational corporations in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Algeria. Kidnappings do not only raise funds, but also facilitate prisoner exchanges. Unlike Boko Haram, AQIM and its affiliates have mostly targeted Western interests. On November 2013, AQIM, for example, kidnapped and murdered French journalists, Ghislaine Dupont and Claude Verlon in northern Mali in response to the military intervention of France *Operation Serval* and African-led international support mission in Mali (AFISMA).¹¹⁰ The group has also carried out IED and grenade attacks against UN peacekeepers, facilities and vehicles as well as large scale car and suicide bombings at hotels, beaches, crowded areas, government buildings and security post in the Sahel region especially in Northern Mali. Three of its recent prominent attacks that killed and injured several people were the: joint attack with Al-Mourabitoun on the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali on 20 November 2015; attack on Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso on 15 January 2016; and the Grand-Bassam attack on 13 March 2016 in Cote d'Ivoire. These attacks received a lot of global attention due to the different nationalities of the victims involved and the fact that in countries like Cote d'Ivoire that was the first time such an attack was launched.

108 Zachary, L. and Masters, J. (2015). Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). *Council on Foreign Relations*, 27 March 2015. <https://www.cfr.org/background/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb>. accessed 23 May 2017.

109 Ibid; Stanford University. (2017). Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/65>, accessed 15 June 2017.

110 Ibid.

CHAPTER FIVE

STRATEGIES ENGAGEMENTS

Changing Strategies of Violent Extremist Groups

The Boko Haram violent extremist group started like a bunch of illiterate with uncoordinated members. Their violent activities began by attacking government institutions and installations. The police became their primary targets and most of their attacks were carried out on motorbikes and tricycles. The group later became more sophisticated in the use of fire arms and explosives. It was widely believed that some of their members went for training in Yemen, Pakistan, Mali and Somalia. They have also used several smart tactics in capturing communities. For example, when they overran Michika town, they had sent some of their members to settle in the town pretending to be date sellers in wheel barrows. On a particular market day, the members who buried their rifles under the date positioned themselves strategically in the four corners of the town and in every street. At the precise time they all dug out their rifles from under the dates and started shooting sporadically killing scores of people and in less than 30 minutes they have captured Michika town.¹¹¹

In terms of recruitment, the group was said to have employed different strategies ranging from ideology emphasizing jihad and the Sharia law, to providing soft loans to innocent victims and to coercion. If they got to a community that was religiously inclined, they preached jihad and Sharia but if they got to a community that was not inclined to religion, they recruited from criminal gangs, and if they got to a place where group identities were disadvantaged, they preached justice and equality. In the case of the caste groups in Michika, Madagali and Gulak, Boko Haram even appointed the suppressed and marginalized groups as Emirs. According to the Chairman of the Muslim Council,

...you know Boko haram is full of experts that gives (sic) them the strategy. Sometimes when they have found a Muslim community they will come in a religious way showing the people that they are after jihad while in the real context, it wasn't jihad.... It is actually terrorism because at the end of the day, they are killing even Muslim brothers. They kill those that would not join them because those that are enlightened who knew that it was not truly (sic) Islam that they are practicing, they choose (sic) to kill the people.¹¹²

Another effective strategy Boko Haram employed was the use of suicide bombing, which is the strategy they have used in causing a lot of damage to life and property'. In this case the sect had migrated from using adults and teenagers to using mostly teenage girls and women. And the major reason why Boko Haram would prefer to use women and girls for suicide missions is simply because of the cultural and religious values that dignify a woman with innocence and respect. A woman is both easily manipulated and accommodated. Because most women are laden with emotions, they easily fall prey to psychological manipulation and exploitation.

The dislodgement of Boko Haram and the recapturing of most communities under the control of the extremist group have also provided the members with some adaptation skills. A good number of the sect members have been able to find their ways into the IDP camps and have used the opportunity to detonate explosives in some

111 Interaction with Mallam Ali, June 2017.

112 This was the position of the Chairman, Muslim Council during an interview session in Jimeta, Yola, June 2017.

of the camps.

Others have filtered into the fringes of other communities and are now attacking and killing returnees and collecting their foodstuff and rustling cattle. Boko Haram also lays siege, attacking and killing people along the highways and diverting trucks carrying foodstuff and petrol into the forests. The extremists have also devised means of putting improvised explosive devices in black nylon bags and giving them to children to drop them in public places.

There is also the strategy of kidnapping for ransom adopted by Boko Haram. The over 200 Chibok girls abducted from their school in Chibok community on 11 April 2014 were used not just as human shield but later as means of negotiating a ransom. Recently, too, some of the lecturers who were among the oil exploration team that was attacked on their way to Lake Chad are still under Boko Haram captivity and are expected to be used to negotiate a ransom.¹¹³

Effectiveness of Strategies Adopted by Violent Extremist Groups

There is no doubting the fact that strategies adopted by Boko Haram both in recruitment into radicalization and the execution of violence were very effective. Two hundred and two (202) out of the 207 respondents affirmed that Boko Haram strategies were very effective. To illustrate how effectively strategic Boko Haram was, the analysis of a traditional ruler would suffice elucidation.

To have an operation, you need a base, you need arms, you need fuel, you need men and you need food. These are the five things you need in every operation. For Boko Haram, they sat and knew that there are criminals in that forest. This Zambisa is not just a forest, there are over 200 communities inside Zambisa. They are there to farm so they engage in all the criminalities. No police, no anything, they live on their own. The source of water is the River Yazaram, it passes through Zambisa, that is the water Maiduguri is using. It is a very important resource. They can grow their own food. Zambisa is also a game reserve by all standards. The choice of Zambisa is very strategic. Boko Haram moved there because of the already existing hardened criminals. Zambisa is a safe corridor to ship arms from Chad, Cameroun and Libya. The last thing they needed was petrol and that was why they took Madagali. When they captured Madagali they took 4 million litres of petrol. They drained it, they even used mattress to soak and squeeze the last drop out. In Madagali they found 75 trailers of rice, you know it is a smuggling route. I advised the military then, one man from Taraba, he was the Major in charge of Madagali and Michika, to prevent petrol from coming to Michika and Madagali because in Madagali alone there were 25 filling stations all filled with petrol. They used to smuggle it to Cameroun. When they invaded the place they took the petrol, you know that was what kept them alive.¹¹⁴

The effectiveness of the strategies of Boko Haram can be measured by the success by which the extremist group was able to coordinate, penetrate and carry out its violent attacks. The fact that Boko Haram was able to metamorphose from a rustic to a more sophisticated and formidable group also further attests to this fact.

113 In 2015, the report of the Amnesty International indicated that Boko Haram had abducted over 2000 young girls between 2014 and 2015 alone. See, Search for Common Ground Early Warning Bulletin, April 2017, p. 3.

114 Interview with Muhammad Sanusi, the traditional ruler of Duhu, Jimeta, Yola, June 2017.

Perhaps, too because of its link with Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabab, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other terrorist networks availed the group the opportunity to learn new skills from strategic partnership. Because of the effectiveness of its strategies, Boko Haram was able to:

1. Recruit and radicalize members in large numbers from Nigeria, Chad and Niger
2. Successfully bomb the Nigerian Police Headquarters in Abuja
3. Successfully bomb the United Nations Building in Abuja
4. Infiltrate the government of President Goodluck Jonathan as admitted by Jonathan himself
5. Successfully manufacture improvised explosive devices and carry out suicide attacks
6. Attack several military barracks in the North-East and in Abuja
7. Attack an Air Force Base in Maiduguri and burnt down some air crafts
8. Successfully abducted over 270 Secondary School girls in Chibok and several other thousands of women and children and held them captive
9. Successfully raid banks and carted away large sums of money to finance their operation
10. Skillful in the use of modern weapons and artillery
11. Effectively use the media and social media

Gender Dynamics & Violent Extremism (Women focused)

Since gender is a social construct and the fact that radicalization, violent extremism and even terrorism is mostly defined in the territorial boundaries of male dominance, it is also important to outline and discuss both the involvement of women in and the role they can play in the prevention of radicalization and countering of violent extremism. In other words, this study takes it for granted that 'gender' here will be heavily tilted towards discussing the triggers, pull and push factors that attract women into radicalization and violent extremism, but also their experiences in the hands of violent extremists and how women can help prevent and counter extremism. The involvement of women and girls in violent extremist movements in West Africa is one of the grey areas in academic literature. This is basically due to the misconception that men are the perpetrators of violent extremism, while women or girls are seen as victims. Some of the practitioners interviewed alluded to this claim and argued that traditional or cultural norms in the Sahelian areas restrict women from taking full participation in the public and private spheres in their communities. However, contrary to this conventional notion, the snippet of information gathered during the field study indicated that Women and girls are not only victims but have also been perpetrators, recruiters and sympathizers of violent extremist groups. But among the extremist groups, Boko Haram was cited as the group that included women in its operations. Not much is known with respect to AQIM and its affiliates when it comes to the instrumental use of women in violence.

Generally, with regard to the reasons behind women involvement in extremist groups like Boko Haram, it

was indicated that most women and girls are conscripted by force by the extremist groups when they attack villages and communities, and very few also join voluntarily to improve their socio-economic status. On April 14, 2014, for instance, Boko Haram kidnapped more than 270 schoolgirls from Chibok in North Eastern Nigeria's Borno State. Regarding the voluntary participation of women, the proponents of that view argued that in the traditional setting, women are often marginalized in the political and socio-economic spheres due to the patriarchal structures of the society. This structural imbalance has resulted in limited access to resources by women and lack of socioeconomic opportunities. Women, it was argued, join the extremist groups in order to improve their socio-economic wellbeing. However, the voluntary participation is facilitated by brainwashing of women by the extremist groups who take advantage of their vulnerabilities by promising social justice and better condition of life. Boko Haram, for instance, use to have a female wing that targets widows and young girls, who are in dire need of assistance by promising them socio-economic empowerment.

Some interviewees also noted that the extremist groups like Boko Haram use charms or mystical powers to woo or recruit the women and girls, while others join to either get husbands or because their husbands have joined the group. To further reinforce this point, one of the respondents in Niamey, noted that,

some Islamic preachers in the Diffa region of Niger ideologically brainwash the women that if you are a woman and you don't have a husband, when you pray Allah does not listen and therefore, your prayers will not be answered. This reason coupled with other societal pressures push some women to join the groups to get husbands.

This became clear in July 2014 when three women were arrested in Nigeria by the military for recruiting widows and young girls and promising them marriage to Boko Haram members. But in general terms, there is no doubt as argued by Gichoya that the use of women by groups such as Boko Haram is a tactical response to the corresponding tactics by the Nigerian security forces, which increased the pressure on male extremists and frustrated its efforts.

With respect to the specific roles that women play in these extremist groups, it was indicated that they are often used as cooks, spies, informants, laundresses, sex slaves, suicide bombers just to mention a few. They gather information for the groups because they can easily pass through security checkpoints without their identity being noticed. Boko Haram has reportedly used more than 200 female suicide bombers in Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger for tactical advantages to support their mission.

In addressing violent extremism in the region, women issues need to be prioritized like those of men to limit their vulnerabilities. Thus, gender perspectives should be factored into legislative and policy frameworks as well as strategies to address the menace of violent extremism. While gender issues have been integrated in most of the existing policy frameworks according to the information gathered from the field study, not much has been done practically on ground in ensuring that the needs and interests of women are factored into addressing violent extremism. It is well acknowledged that women play key roles in preventing or countering extremism. As mothers and wives, women can have influences on their children and their husbands to prevent them from being recruited into these extremist groups. Their opinions are very relevant as they are mostly the first to see indications or symptoms of radicalization of their children. In this sense and as indicated by most of

the women interviewed some of the cultural and religious practices that restrict women from engaging in the public space, such as preaching and interpretation of the Quran and active participation in the decision-making processes needs to change to enable them contribute to the prevention of violent extremism.

Women in/and Violent Extremism

There are several studies dealing with either women being directly and indirectly involved in violent extremism and terrorism or women who are aiding to fight against violent extremism. The ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that drive women into violent extremism are as same as those that drive men into violent extremism. However, studies have identified “grievance about sociopolitical conditions; grief about the death of a loved one; real or perceived humiliation on a physical, psychological, or political level; a fanatical commitment to religious or ideological beliefs; an intention to derive economic benefits; or a desire to effect radical societal change.” A study of women’s involvement in violent extremism and terrorism in Somaliland and Puntland revealed that women are subtly engaged by the extremists and terrorists using their social networks and interactions in the community as a means to express their views to ‘influence and recruit.’ “Often, the women are approached by individuals appearing stereotypically religious in their appearance and with religious authority from a nearby mosque. The women are financially compensated for engaging with nearby households to get their children to attend a certain madrasa or collect money for a certain mosque.”

Other factors that engender the involvement of girls and women in radicalization and violent extremism include:

- ☐ Feeling of social and cultural alienation
- ☐ Feeling that the international Muslim community is being persecuted
- ☐ Demonstration of anger, frustration and sadness over a perceived lack of international action against the persecution of Muslims
- ☐ Utopian idea of building a Caliphate/Islamic state
- ☐ Individual duty and identity building
- ☐ Romanticization of the experience, both in travels and in forming a union with a jihadist husband
- ☐ Economic and financial pressures
- ☐ Social and family problems such as domestic violence
- ☐ Limited access to rights and marginalization of women’s roles
- ☐ Relationship with radicalized men and desire for romance
- ☐ Being single, divorced or widowed and lacking social standing
- ☐ Gender-based discrimination in the society

Women who get involved in violent extremism either by voluntary association or by coercion and cajolement play the roles of planners and informants, recruiters, handlers of logistics, soldiers and suicide bombers.

Experiences of some Women under Boko Haram



Recently in Nigeria, military intelligence gathered that parents are willingly donating their daughters to Boko Haram to be used as suicide bombers. According to Brigadier-General Sani Usman who is the spokesman for the Nigerian Army, “It was discovered that most of these hapless minors were ‘donated’ to the terrorist sect by their heartless and misguided parents and guardians, as part of their contribution to the perpetuation of the Boko Haram terrorists’ dastardly acts against the Nigerian society and humanity.” A study conducted by the Search for Common Ground shows that “over 70% of the twenty-one identified suicide bomb carriers responsible for ten attacks were females.” There are other several ways by which women get involved in terrorism. In Burkina Faso, a woman was arrested by security forces for harboring and hiding terrorists in her ban in one of the communities, north of Burkina Faso. Several other young ladies in Burkina Faso were also lured into being sympathetic to the cause of radicalization and violent extremism by associating with the violent extremists as ‘friends’ or by marriage.

In Nigeria, there are several reasons why women joined Boko Haram violent extremism. One of the many reasons was the need for revenge by women whose husbands, brothers and parents were killed by the Nigerian security forces in the name of flushing or subduing Boko Haram. Others were ideologically brainwashed to fight for the cause of Islam. These categories of women who are mostly teenagers and young adults were often prepared for suicide mission by Boko Haram. As a matter of fact, Nigeria recorded more cases of female suicide bombers than male suicide bombers. Other young women were forcefully married to provide sexual gratification for members of Boko Haram. Still, other women provide domestic services for the members while the trusted ones were given social responsibilities. For example, an old woman we met in Merkoyi Internally Displace Peoples (IDP) camp told her story, thus:

My story is a sweet is a sweet one. I am a Margi by ‘tribe’ and I am from Askira town in Borno State. When Boko Haram was advancing to my community, my son came to me and said I should prepare for us to escape. I told him to rather pick his wife and two children on his motor bike and quickly escape from the town. He did and I never saw him and his family again to this date. I trekked for two days and nights wondering aimlessly in the bush until I got to a big river I could not pass. That was where I was captured by the Boko Haram. They took me into a thick forest (Zambisa). While on the way to the forest, one of them said to me ‘Mama we know you. Are you not the one who used to cook and sell food in Askira community? You will do the same here.’ So, for more than two years, I and other older women used to cook for them. Although we cooked for them, they only fed us once and two of us were only given one litre of water to drink daily. While we cooked soup with meat for them, they only gave us Bawbaw leaves powder to cook our soup without salt or pepper or any form of ingredients. One particular night, a young man came to me and asked if I wanted to escape from the camp and I said I would if I had the opportunity. He said he would come for me in the dead of the night and will touch my feet and he did as promised. He took me on his motor bike and took me far into the forest. He showed me a tree and said I should sit under it- that by morning time, some people will come and pick me up. In the morning, a group a people came dressed in military uniform and met me under the tree. They were only speaking French. They first took me in a Hilux van to a place I later identified as Cameroun and later transferred us to another place in Niger Republic. Later I found myself in Kano before I was brought here to this IDP camp where I became the women leader of the camp. Here in the camp, I used to teach children but my sight became weak and I don’t have money to purchase binoculars so I stopped.

My research partner, Dr. Jude Momodu spoke in English to me to ask whether the young women under Boko Haram were sexually molested. I was hesitant because that would be an ethical question and I did not want to pry into the privacy. The old woman retorted in Hausa ‘Ai naji abin da ya fada, meaning ‘I have heard what he said’. We all were shocked as we looked at the old woman with awe. The old woman said Boko Haram

members would not have any carnal knowledge of any woman they have not married, willingly or forcefully as that would contravene their doctrinal teachings- the very pillar upon which their ideological struggle was hinged on. However, this is contrary to the views of others who believe that some women were sexually molested by Boko Haram. Some young women narrated how they used to rub their children's feces on their body to ward off Boko Haram members who wanted to have sexual intercourse with them, and when the extremists later found out, they ceased most of the children and threw them into rivers to drown. Moreover, some of the women who were released from Boko Haram captivity in Zambisa willingly went back to the forest to rejoin their Boko Haram 'husbands' and lovers and their excuse was that while at the camp, they had enough to eat and enjoyed sex with Boko Haram.

This brings to bare the experience of two young women and the mother of one of the women who told us the story of how Boko Haram members forcefully married them. One of the women said when Boko Haram came to her father's house they gave the option of either giving his daughter's hand in marriage to one of them or being killed. The father took the option of letting her get married to a Boko Haram member. She had an eight month old baby boy for him. The second young woman who was just barely sixteen said she was abducted by Boko Haram and was forcefully married to one of them when she was 14 years old. They took her to Zambisa forest where she became pregnant and had a boy who was just six months old as at the time of the fieldwork. Her mother who was about 45 years old said it was her younger brother who led Boko Haram members to her house and arranged for the forceful marriage of her daughter. For days, Boko Haram members tried to persuade her to willingly give her daughter's hand in marriage to one of them but she courageously told them she would not and even if they killed her, they should realize that even in the hereafter she would not consent to the illegal marriage. When her daughter was forcefully married and taken to Zambisa forest, she followed the daughter to the forest to stay with her. The three women were later rescued by the Nigerian military. A traditional ruler had told us that from his personal research, Boko Haram had fathered over 25,000 children and this he said was a more dangerous threat to the peace and stability of communities.

More horrific was the story of a middle aged woman we interacted with in the IDP camp. As at the time of interview, she and her six children were living in the camp. This was her story:

Boko Haram came to our community in Gwaza in Borno State and met my bother in the farm. They shot him dead. They came into the community and met my husband and 37 other persons in the mosque and short all of them. My husband was still breathing when I got there. I insisted on taking him away but Boko Haram pointed a gun at me and said I must let him die in the land of the infidels. I backed my husband but they shot him dead on my back and left him with me in his pool of blood. I cried and called for help but nobody could assist me. Even very old women were afraid to assist me bury him. For two days I dug a grave to lay his body and since I could not carry him again, I dragged his body into the grave and buried him. As if that was not enough, Boko Haram dragged me to a village square and in my presence shot 157 young men and dumped their bodies into a well.

The President of an Industrial Court in one of the states in Nigeria who hailed from Girei in Adamawa told me of how a man brought two children into Yola and placed them under the custody of a man who willingly adopted them as foster children. The man who brought the children said when his community was attacked by Boko Haram, as he was running he met one of the children sitting and crying by the side of his dead mother and picked him up. Bare a distance, he met a woman leaned to a tree suckling a baby. The woman was dead while the baby was still sucking her breast. He again took the baby from the mother's arms and ran with the two babies until he got to Yola where he found the Good Samaritan who accepted to adopt the children as the man could not cater for the two children since he was also internally displaced without a home or means of

livelihood.

Financing of Violent Extremist Activities in West Africa

The financing of radicalization and violent extremism, including terrorism can be done in three ways:

1. Providing individuals money for travels, accommodation and personal upkeep;
2. Providing money to carry out operations;
3. Providing social services such as schools, hospitals, and other needs to deprived communities.

One of the most secure and surest ways of financing radicalization and violent extremism is through the channel of Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs), also known as Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs). This is largely because:

NPOs possess characteristics that make them particularly attractive...for terrorist financing. They enjoy the public trust, have access to considerable sources of funds.... NPOs may also have exposure to large number of beneficiaries, some of whom may be vulnerable to radicalization. Furthermore, they may have a global presence that provides a framework for transnational operations. Including in insecure and conflict-affected areas, where terrorist groups may be present or seek to operate.

The information gathered from the field study indicated that the extremist groups finance their operations through multiple covert and overt sources, which are either legitimate or illegitimate. It was mentioned that all the extremist groups including AQIM, MUJAO and Boko Haram covertly receive funding, donations and material support from countries in the Arab and the Gulf regions, charity organisations and from their affiliate organisations outside the region. Others include clandestine funding from regional political and religious sympathizers and businessmen from the Sahel region, Nigeria and North Africa. While these claims were not backed by any concrete evidence, there were strong suspicions that the violent extremist groups have both internal and external financial backing. Nonetheless, majority of the respondents noted that the main source of funding of the groups especially AQIM and its affiliates are extortions, ransom from kidnappings, and other criminal activities such as narcotics/drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking of arms, humans, vehicles, cigarettes, and armed robbery in the ungoverned spaces in the Sahel region. Indeed, kidnapping for ransom and drug trafficking was mentioned as the most significant terrorist financing threat in West Africa. The sad reality is that most of the communities where these illegal activities are taking place do not see the need to fight against crimes like drug trafficking because they benefit from the proceeds of such activities. AQIM in particular is reportedly providing support for the suffering masses what the failing state structures have not.

Boko Haram had multiple sources of financing and in fact, became one of the wealthy terrorist organizations in the world. The group generated money both from within and outside Nigeria. At its early state under the leadership of Muhammed Yusuf, information had it that the group was receiving funding from countries in the Middle East in the guise of charity with the knowledge of Borno State Government during the administration of Senator Ali Modu Sheriff. When relationship soared between Yusuf and Sheriff and the later used the authority of the state to block funding, Boko Haram was sponsored by politicians and notable business people across Nigeria. It was public knowledge when security reports linked some of the Governors in Northern Nigeria to the financing of Boko Haram. Some of the Governors admitted but insisted it was rather a pact they entered into with the group to buy peace in their states.

After the death of Mohammed Yusuf and with the emergence of Abubakar Shekau as the leader of the VE group, Boko Haram strategically captured several towns and local governments, took over the motor parks, markets, international border posts and other income generating sources including levies imposed on local inhabitants and for over two years generated large sums of money to finance their violent activities. Among the markets under their control were the cattle markets in Potiskum and Mubi which were the two largest cattle markets in West Africa. They also controlled the fishing and other associated businesses in the entire Lake Chad. When the government of the Republic of Niger issued out policies to stop fishing activities when it discovered that it was used as a conduit for financing terrorism, Boko Haram became a major employer of the people by controlling the grain, pepper and onion markets in Niger.

□ There is also the allegation that Boko Haram received international funding from other terrorist networks, criminal gangs and foreign governments. France was particularly fingered out as a major financier of Boko Haram. The two French helicopters that crashed at Girei were loaded with foreign currencies, while the helicopter that was intercepted with money and some French military personnel in a border community with Cameroun lends credence to the strategic interest of France in Cameroun and Chad. This also brings to mind the role that France played supporting Biafra during the Nigerian civil war of 1967- 1970. This also reinforces that France would usually support governments, sponsor oppositions and supply arms to rebels.

The Financial Action Task Force Report outlined some other sources of funding for especially the Boko Haram extremist group and other terrorist organization to include:

- The use of physically challenged and the almajurai
- Taxing members of the sect
- Through real estate business
- Sale of used cars
- Investing in the telecoms business
- Sale of small arms and light weapons
- Human and illicit drug trafficking
- Extortion of civilians by intimidation
- Sale of goods and other lucrative businesses
- Electronic transfer of money through banks and financial institutions
- Bonding through the provision of soft loans for small scale businesses
- Financial contribution political leaders and business men and women.

Civil Society and Violent Extremism in West Africa

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) play a central role in preventing and countering violent extremism. As ac

tors that have a unique local knowledge and understanding of the conditions conducive to violent extremism, CSOs provide an important bridge between government policy and local realities. They can help address the causes of violent extremism, strengthen community resilience, support the reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants and advocate against potentially counterproductive government policies. As governments in West Africa are increasingly looking beyond military solutions to extremism, the role CSOs have become very crucial in ensuring a holistic approach to countering violent extremism (CVE). Across the sub region, CSOs are playing different roles in CVE efforts.

Civil Society Organizations in Nigeria and Burkina Faso

Most of these services outlined can and should be provided by the civil society in the sense that apart from being actively engaged in societies and communities, they buy the trust of the people. Whether as victims or perpetrators, people prefer to deal with civil society organization as the latter are seen to be reliably transparent and empathetic to the plight of people. This is the reason why recent resolutions of the United Nations encourage national governments to engage local communities and non-governmental organization in their quest to prevent radicalization and counter violent extremism. Local people in Adamawa State who were victims of Boko Haram said since 2013 when they their communities were attacked, and since these communities were re-captured by the Nigerian security forces, Nigeria's National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the Adamawa State Emergency Management Agency (ADSEMA) only brought relief materials for them twice. The support they received from institutions was mainly from civil society, faith-based and international organizations. To this end, civil society organizations in Nigeria need to be strongly supported by the government to be able to carry out their counter measures against radicalization and violent extremism.

The greatest challenge confronting civil society organizations in their efforts at preventing radicalization and counter violent extremism is when governments fail to appreciate the noble role of CSOs or when governments see them as competitors rather than collaborators. For example, "In the name of fighting terrorism, governments have curtailed political freedoms and imposed restrictive measures against human rights defenders and civil society activities in many countries."

However, CSOs also need to synergize and work transparently with governments; they also need to rationally draw boundary lines between activism and national security. In Nigeria, for instance, the government has accused the press and CSOs of leaking vital information to Boko Haram ahead of executing counter measures. Recently, too, communities in Borno State have protested against the International Red Cross accusing the body of interfacing with Boko Haram in the distribution of humanitarian aid when the victims of Boko Haram have not been assisted.

CSOs also need to be wary of the interest of the donor countries in carrying out their activities in the sense that such interests are usually not revealed. Usually, donor countries are not likely to pump in funding where they have not stake either political or economic. Oxfam, for instance, has argued that aid has internationally been politicized to the extent that it does not reach people with the greatest needs. For example, the aid that America offers to Iraq and Pakistan is much more than the aid offered to African countries like D.R. Congo and the Central African Republic, Somalia and South Sudan all in the name of the securitization of American interest. Furthermore, the global Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has called for caution in the sense that CSOs could be subject to 'manipulation' and 'exploitation' by terrorist and extremist groups.

Another cautious note for the civil society is the priority given to development activities and the balancing of self-comfort. While in Adamawa for the fieldwork, civil society organizations were criticized for prioritizing their comfort and luxury over and above the activities they carry out. For example, the Commissioner for Information noted with embarrassment how 13 members of a civil society organization chartered a flight from Abuja to an IDP camp to inspect FOUR toilets the society donated. He called attention to the fact the cost of hiring a flight, hotel accommodation and per diem for the CSO members could have built more than 50 toilets for the IDPs. Despite this criticism, however, the Early Warning Systems and Peace Education programmes of the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) in Burkina Faso and Nigeria; the intervention activities of Search for Common Ground, Save the Children, the International Red Cross in Peace negotiation and post conflict reintegration. Currently, the Office of the National Security Advisor in Nigeria works with over 70 NGOs and CSOs on countering violent extremism in Nigeria.

On February 15 to 17, 2017, UN Women and the G5 Sahel Secretariat, in partnership with WANEP organized a three day early warning training workshop in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The workshop provided the opportunity for Sahelian women from the G5 Sahel countries including Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania to reflect, inform, and share experiences on their efforts to prevent the spread of violent extremism through effective early warning mechanisms at national and regional levels.

Civil Society Organizations in Niger and Mali

In Niger, most CSO representatives interviewed indicated that violent extremism was new in the country and therefore, CSO involvement on the issue is now evolving and taking shape. Very few CSOs are working in the field of countering violent extremism. These CSOs are mostly located at the big cities like Niamey, far from the local communities and regions where issues of radicalization and extremism are widespread. Although, some notable CSOs like WANEP, CESA, and Caritas Développement (CADEV Niger) in Niamey are working with some local communities to prevent radicalization and violent extremism, it was indicated that more community based CSOs are needed on the ground to deal with the threat. This notwithstanding, the few CSOs that are working on the issue of violent extremism are supporting the Nigerien government in de-radicalization efforts through capacity-building and training of local actors, sensitization and awareness creation programmes for the population in the affected places such as Diffa, Agadez, Tillabéri, Agadez, Maradi, and Zinder.

WANEP-Niger, for instance, is currently working with eight (8) communities along the border with Mali to sensitize and educate the population about the issues and dangers of violent extremism. Committees for peace and security have been created in these eight (8) communities. Members of these committees have benefited from a Training of Trainer(s) (ToT) programmes on the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism, promoting peaceful coexistence and dialogue, as well as conflict resolution methods. Members of the committees of peace and security in turn share what they have been thought with the community. However, some members of the committees were being attacked by the extremist groups due to their activities in the communities. But apart from this intervention in the communities, WANEP-Niger also provides early warning information on radicalization and violent extremism issues to government and other stakeholders.

Organisations like Caritas Développement (CADEV Niger) has also developed a programme on Justice, Peace and Security specifically targeted at dealing with radicalization and violent extremism. The project focuses on working with the youth, women, religious bodies and leaders, chiefs and the media on how best to ensure security and prevent radicalization in the communities. The Justice, Peace and Security programme of CADEV is aimed at promoting inter-faith dialogue and social cohesion in Niger by providing the space for Islamo-Christian dialogue through exchange and coexistence that enable sharing and solidarity. While the

programme has yielded some notable results, few challenges exist. Thus, most of the youth in the area of the programme focus are unemployed and as a result, they want to be paid before they attend the sensitization programmes. The inability of CADEV to pay them has made it difficult to sometimes organize them together for programmes.

Other CSOs like CESAO, CONGAFEN, Timidria, JAAD, AEC, and RASADO-SALAM which are part of the network members of WANEP-Niger have also organized series of sensitization and training programmes to educate the population especially the traditional authorities, the educated and uneducated youth, to prevent them from being radicalized by countering the narratives of radical Islamic preachers and Boko Haram adherents. The use of media platforms is another aspect of CSO interventions. Just like WANEP-Niger, some CSOs have also established councils for peace in some of the border communities to provide information to the appropriate authorities on any happenings in those places. Thankfully, the government is somewhat using these councils to gather information and intelligence about the activities of the extremist groups.

While CSOs are undertaking several interventions in Niger, there are limitations that hinder their efforts. It was mentioned that CSOs activities on violent extremism are not coordinated in Niger. The collaboration with government is also weak and needs to be improved. The sensitization and educational activities of CSOs in the communities are also limited in terms of the geographical coverage due to the issue of sustainable long term funding. To this end, it is essential for CSOs to be supported by donor agencies and development partners to be able to widen their geographical coverage to cover all the affected areas of violent extremism. Moreover, the collaboration of efforts with the government has to be strengthened.

Most CSO interviewed in Mali indicated that violent extremism was not their typical area of focus although part of their activities on governance focuses on certain aspects of the phenomenon. However, following the 2013 political and security crisis in Mali, most of them have now developed specific programmes to deal with issues of extremism. For instance, radicalization and violent extremism was not the initial focus of WANEP-Mali. But within the last three years they have held several meetings in Bamako, Gao, Mopti and other places on the subject. In February 2017, WANEP-Mali organized a workshop with G5 Sahel Women Group and adopted an action plan in accordance with the UN Secretary-General Plan of Action of Preventing Violent Extremism as well as National Action Plan. Apart from the conferences, WANEP-Mali is currently building the capacity of CSOs on conflict prevention, peace education, early warning signs of radicalization and violent extremism, as well as raising awareness of youth problems in the country. The Network has also established platforms at the community level to build the capacity of community actors to deal with the threat of extremism in cooperation with the national police. Together WANEP-Mali network organisations, they are also providing advocacy, expert advice and technical support to the Malian government in the development of the National Policy draft on violent extremism and terrorism. WANEP-Mali is also engaged in advocacy at the regional and national level to ensure that strategic level decisions taken are in consonance with what is prevailing on ground or local realities.

Other CSOs like the Institut malien de recherche-action pour la paix (IMRAP), Ligue pour la Justice et les Droits de l'Homme, and Association des Femmes pour les Initiatives de Paix are also engaged in programmes to sensitize the vulnerable youth about the dangers of joining extremist group and educating them on other alternative sources of livelihood. Apart from organizing workshops, some CSOs like IMRAP are carrying out research on violent extremism to promote a deeper understanding of the phenomenon and how best countries in the Sahel can deal with the issue with the support of CSOs and international partners. Peace committees have also been established in some communities to promote peace and prevent violent extremism.

In spite of all the interventions, it was established that one of the major obstacles that frustrate CSOs efforts is the insecurity in the northern part of Mali. This has affected the activities of CSOs as they are constantly at risk of attacks by the extremist groups. As a result of this, the number of CSOs working in the areas affected by the menace of violent extremism are few. The other challenges have to do with the lack of collaboration with state agencies as well as competition between the various CSOs. The latter especially has stymied CSOs efforts to work together with one common purpose and approach to tackle the problem. Hence, it was suggested that institutional competition should be addressed to allow CSOs to effectively collaborate to prevent the radicalization of vulnerable people in the north. The trust between CSOs and Government also needs to be enhanced - If the police, judiciary, military and other state agencies effectively work with CSOs, the impact will be significant. As indicated by Chairperson of the WANEP-Mali Steering committee, Madam Fatoumata Demlele Djounte, the government should see CSOs as partners and support their work.

CHAPTER SIX

PREVENTION AND COUNTER MEASURES

Preventing Radicalization and the Countering of Violent Extremism

Since radicalization is a process, process approaches would also have to be taken as measures. Therefore, the processes of de-radicalization and counter radicalization have been found to be more effective than pure military approach. And this is because, since radicalization has a multiple channels, a straitjacketed approach cannot solve the problem. For this reason, the United States, for instance, came up with nine approaches (which are not even exhaustive) to de-radicalization and counter-radicalization. These include:

- Programmes for the prisons
- Education
- Promoting inter-cultural dialogue
- Tackling economic and social inequalities
- Use of the Internet to counter messaging and recruitment
- Reforming and strengthening legislation
- Developing and disseminating information
- Training of agencies involved in de- and counter-radicalization policies
- Reinforcing global actions against radicalization

“....collectively, we must take concrete steps to address the danger posed by religiously motivated fanatics, and the trends that fuel their recruitment. Moreover, this campaign against extremism goes beyond a narrow security challenge.”

According to the US Department of States and USAID, “CVE refers to proactive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that facilitate violent extremists to attract new recruits to violence and building specific alternatives, narratives, capabilities, and resilience in targeted communities and populations to reduce the risk of radicalization and recruitment to violence.” This definition suggests that countering violent extremism is not the same as countering terrorism. Whereas countering violent extremism is a process where proactive measures are taken to ‘prevent radicalization to violence’, the countering of terrorism is aimed at “collecting evidences and making arrests before an event has occurred.” or made the United States government to adopt a three-pronged approach to the countering of violent extremism, and these are (1) to empower communities and civil societies (2) messaging and counter-messaging (3) addressing root causes and driving factors. These approaches may not be exhaustive depending on the cultures and values of the environment where radicalization and violent extremism takes place but they will help to serve as a general blue-print for preventing radicalization and the countering of violent extremism.

Empowering Local Communities

Countries that have one way or the other been affected by violent extremism and terrorism have come to appreciate the important roles communities can play in countering violent extremism efforts. “Local partnership between community groups, local authorities, voluntary sector organisations, faith groups and social enterprises are the key to building resilient communities.” To this end, working with men, women, the youth, faith-based organizations, community based organization, local traditional and religious leaders and other community stakeholders is imperative for the prevention of radicalization and the countering of violent extremism. However, communities cannot play their roles of resilience if they are not strong and cohesive or if any of the critical stakeholders are neglected. Communities, therefore, need to come together to solve their problems independent of but assisted by governments. If this is achieved, “it will have a powerful benefit of making communities more cohesive and resilient to violent ideologies through increased meaningful interaction.” Community resilience can be viewed from different perspectives, ranging from actual community security to community development. Communities need security from the state and this is an elastic demand which involves community policy, neighbourhood watch, and community development in terms of good schools, health services, markets, worship centres, communication services, and community statistical data. This requires that the government is closer to the community as the community is closer to the government.

What we find in most parts of the Sub-Saharan Africa is the total neglect of communities by governments of African states, and this has created a vacuum that has made it possible for criminal gangs and elements to fill. In Mali, for instance, the total neglect of the northern part of Mali by the central government both in terms of governance and service delivery made it possible for the Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and other radical elements to infiltrate local communities.

In Nigeria, the famous and notorious Zambisa forest had been a den for criminals from different countries - Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Niger Republic, and Nigeria since the 1950s. In the 1970s, several communities bordering the forest were plagued by small pox disease and the government decided to relocate these communities to the Zambisa forest without the presence of any law enforcement agencies. No soldiers, no police, no courts, no schools, no hospitals, no forest guards, no immigration service, no prisons and no local governance. The people lived on their own like a sheep without a shepherd. In short, the people lived in a state of nature where life was nasty, brutish and short. They evolved their own police, laws and courts not guided by due process and the rule of law. The forest was also rich in terms of fertile soil for agriculture and trees for logging. This was the kind of environment Boko Haram needed. Zambisa was also strategic for military covert operations. As a matter of fact, what the Nigerian Army referred to as ‘Camp Zero’ in Zambisa was actually a military training camp set up by the General Ibrahim Babangida regime to train his National Guards. This camp was disbanded by the General Sani Abacha regime and since then, no military activities took place in the camp until it was occupied by Boko Haram.

Both northern Nigeria and northern Burkina Faso share similar characteristics in terms of governance and quality of life of the local inhabitants. That Boko Haram succeeded in capturing three major states (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe) in North-eastern Nigeria can be attributed to the isolation of the local community from the overall governance project of the Nigerian state. As a matter of fact, even the measures taken by the Nigerian state in addressing the Boko Haram problem did not factor in the important role of the local communities. One of the traditional leaders affirmed:

The government thought it could do it alone. We know who the Boko Haram members were; every community knows them. But when the government thought that we were not important stakeholders, we folded our arms

and let them do whatever they thought best. Now it is a big problem. I can tell you that if the Nigerian government had rallied all the local community and traditional rulers in this region, this thing called Boko Haram would have not escalated to this point.

Governments must realize they cannot fight radicalization and violent extremism alone; it would require the collaboration of all stakeholders including the local communities. This is why we passionately agree with the submission of Mardam Martine who was of the view that:

In order to fight against violent extremism in Burkina Faso, the state cannot do it alone. We need synergy. It is a social problem that requires the collaboration of people at the grassroots. Who is able to detect a terrorist or someone with radical behavior? It is only the neighbors in the community who can be fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers or friends. It is the grassroots people that can help to detect a terrorist. It is not a matter of defence force or the government alone; it is collaboration, the communication and dialogue of people- what they have seen and experienced. It is only collaboration that can help us mitigate this phenomenon.

Counter-Messaging

Counter-messaging or counter-narratives is very central to the demystification of religiously motivated ideological narratives often used by radicalizers and violent extremists to justify acts of arson and terrorism. Ideological narratives are the main tool for appealing to people's emotions and sentiments, what a scholar would refer to as people's 'soft corner'. Islamists use the potency of ideological narratives often reclining to some verses of the Qur'an to drive and achieve their hidden agenda, be it political or economic. Usually,

The propaganda is faith-driven and spread through the exploitation of the religious sentiment of the masses. Radicals' and extremists' narratives preach that all other interpretations of Islam are false, and try to feed in the idea that their way of Islam is the 'purest form' and the 'only way' of Islam. The Islamist extremists aim to bring back the caliphate, with the primary objective of attaining state power. Thus, ideological conviction is one of the main features of radicalization and extremism. Their agenda involves establishing an Islamic state to be run on the basis of the Shariah.

This kind of approach to radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism would require a systematic counter-narrative derived from the same textual source. For example, Nigeria's Ministry of Information constantly and periodically sponsors recitation of verses from the Koran that recognizes diversity and promotes peaceful co-existence. How far this will go a long way in touching the hearts and minds of radicalized persons and violent extremists cannot be measured but it is doubtful if the other underlying root causes are not adequately addressed.

Addressing the Socio-Economic Root Causes

It is not surprising that Nigeria's North-East has come under fire; the grounds have for a long time been prepared and fertilized. A 2007 commissioned study by the Central Bank of Nigeria on poverty index revealed that the Northeast recorded 78%, and in terms of illiteracy, the region recorded 74%. These statics shows that there is a strong co-relation between deplorable socio-economic conditions and conflict. The neglect of the social and economic conditions of people in the Northeast nurtured and catalyzed the Boko Haram radicalization and extremism.

Practically speaking, even after the devastation and destruction of communities and infrastructure in the North-east by both the activities of Boko Haram and the military, there does not seem to be any serious commitment

on the part of the Nigerian government to rebuild the affected communities and the damaged infrastructure. Virtually all the roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, markets, churches, mosques, houses and farms were destroyed and razed down. This has further impoverished the people and their communities. A study conducted revealed that over 2000 schools were destroyed by Boko Haram in the Northeast leaving millions of children out of schools.

In Madagali and Gulak Local Government Areas of Adamawa State, what the local communities wanted most was the security of their communities, which they earnestly yearned for the Nigerian government to provide so they could go back to their day-to-day businesses. During a group interaction, one of the participants expressed the frustration of the local people thus:

Here we are seated doing nothing. They said we should go back to our communities and we did, yet we are unable to go back to our farms. None of us here wants to be a burden to anybody. We are great farmers and we do not want to depend on government for our livelihood, but we cannot go back to our farmlands. Before the Boko Haram crisis some of us here produced as much as one thousand bags of grains, which is enough to keep us and pay for our children's school fees and even support others. Today we have been reduced to beggars. From this community to our fertile farmlands is just about seven kilometers but some of us who attempted to go back to the farm were killed by these boys (Boko Haram). The soldiers are staying near them but when we told them that we are being attacked by these boys while on our farmland, they said they cannot do anything to help us until they are given the authority to do so. So all we need in this community to pick up our lives is security. Let them just provide that for us and we will be okay.

The fear of the local people was corroborated by the observations of the head of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) who was coordinating the IDP humanitarian interventions and the reintegration of IDPs back to the local communities when he stated:

Our recovery programme starts with return and after you return, we always want reintegration and peace to be paramount. Then we come in to look at what government will do in terms of bringing basic services because whatever we want to do for recovery to make people get back home, give the basic services of education, health, police outposts, if people don't see these things, they will not have the confidence to go back and this is our emphasis- these three basic things- peacebuilding, basic services and then livelihood are absent.

The problem for the local people was that of chains of security commands in the sense that orders would have to be given from Abuja before security forces could take action to protect the lives of civilians, women and children. It was obvious that people in the local communities, which were reclaimed from Boko Haram were not secured both in terms of actual and human security. When asked how prepared they were to defend themselves, one of the participants said in Hausa "Yadda ka ganemu anan, in banda iccen girki bamu da abin tsaro anan."

Niger has put in place different measures to address the conditions that motivate violent extremism to thrive. The 2011 Sahel-Sahara Development and Security Strategy (SDSS) which is supported by USAID is one of such measures. This strategy mainly targets the youth and is aimed at improving security through economic development and increased employment, access to social services, and community governance. Activities carried out under the SDSS project include the use of respected Nigerien voices and religious leaders to promote peaceful resolution of conflict, religious tolerance, and respect for Nigerien identity through radio, social media, and civic education. Others activities include the reintegration of forced returnees from Algeria, Cote D'Ivoire, Libya, and Nigeria. Although, the success of implementation of the SDSS has been limited due to

funding issues, it has however helped reduced the risk of insecurity and increased resilience to violent extremism. Indeed, through the project, individuals and communities have had their voices and concerns heard and partially addressed.

Furthermore, the High Authority for Peace Consolidation (HAPC) of Niger which is under the presidency has also rolled out a number of interventions to prevent violent extremism. The Authority is executing projects in the affected areas such as Agadez, Diffa, Maradi, Tillaberi, Zinder to address the issues relating to violent extremism, farmer-herder conflict, and rebellions. In Diffa, the HAPC deployed several religious leaders there in 2016 to sensitize the population about the true values of Islam and to counter the narratives of the extremists groups as part of a broader de-radicalization program. Additionally, the Authority has created an inter-ministerial committee involving the key ministries such as finance, education, justice, agriculture to ensure a holistic approach to the issue. The committee has adopted a policy framework to develop the regions affected by violent extremism and conflicts, free arrested Boko Haram suspects who are on remand but are not guilty, and to accelerate the prosecution of perpetrators of violent attacks.

The Nigerien government through its ministry of education is also organizing sensitization and training workshops for teachers and students in some selected schools on the causes and effects of radicalization and extremism and how to prevent recruitment in the schools. In particular, this intervention has focused mostly on the informal Islamic schools where the preaching of extremist ideas and views by radical Islamic scholars has become common. One of the respondents interviewed for instance noted that

In Maradi and Zinder, it was the extremist preaching of Nigerian Islamic scholars that started the problem in the area. Most Islamic schools in these areas are mainly used to brainwash the students. Whatever, the children are thought by these Islamic scholars, they accept it without questioning the basis of the ideas being told them. For example, they tell the students that the French and Arabic schools are not good but it only the Islamic schools which are the best. The problem is that because most of the schools are not regulated by the government, anyone just gets up and establishes a school.

As a matter of fact, the informal Islamic schools were seen as contributing to radicalization and violent extremism in Niger. As a result, although the ministry of education's sensitization programmes is timely and relevant, specific policies need to be enacted to regulate the informal Islamic schools.

To ensure that former combatants of Boko Haram who have surrendered do not turn back to engage in violent activities, the government with the support of the French Development Agency is working to reintegrate them into society. The government is also using the ex-combatants to persuade other members of Boko Haram to abandon the group by superficially improving on their economic status. In the Diffa region, it was reported that about 130 ex-combatants of Boko Haram who abandoned the group in 2016 have been accommodated in temporary apartments, given smart phones and provided with good food and clothes. The idea as mentioned earlier is to induce those still with Boko Haram to abandon the group in order to enjoy the freebie given to these ex-combatants. Yet, it was pointed out that people in the area have questioned the whole idea of accepting these ex-combatants without convicting them. They question why arrested suspects who have never killed or joined Boko Haram are imprisoned, while the ex-combatants who have committed so many atrocities are accepted without trial. Due to these issues, some of the communities in the Diffa region have refused to accept the ex-combatants. This line of thinking is, however, gradually changing due to the sensitization programmes of the HACP and other government ministries and agencies. Lastly, because the prisons have become a recruitment ground for the extremist groups, the Reinsertion and Rehabilitation section of the Ministry of Justice is working with the prison administration to rehabilitate and reintegrate violent extremist prisoners into main

stream society through the implementation of programmes including basic vocational trainings.

The responses from the field interviews showed that no official strategy or specific policy exist to prevent violent extremism in Mali. The National Assembly is now working with various stakeholders to have a policy framework adopted. Nonetheless, some of the government's policies and interventions are indirectly contributing to the prevention of violent extremism. The National Reconciliation Policy which is being implemented by the Ministry of National Reconciliation is one of such policies. Thus, following the 2013 conflict and the subsequent signing of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2015, national reconciliation has become one of the cornerstones for the consolidation of peace, national unity and the reestablishment of the State in the northern regions. In 2014, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) was established by a Presidential Decree of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and endorsement by the National Assembly to facilitate the reconciliation processes. The TJRC which replaced the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission has a mandate of contributing to lasting peace and national unity through truth-seeking and reconciliation. The focus of its activities has been addressing human rights violations committed during the conflict. As part of its activities, community dialogue sessions have been held in the north and peace negotiations with the armed groups is also ongoing as part of the national reconciliation process. This has helped to promote social cohesion and peaceful co-existence between the communities and more crucially, denied the extremist groups the opportunity to exploit their grievances to further their objectives.

Another important interventions of the government are the "Programme for Accelerated Development in the Northern Regions" and the draft decentralization policy of the country. These programmes are aimed at improving the socio-economic conditions in the northern part of Mali to address some of the root cause of the recurrent conflict in the country such as poverty, unemployment, and underdevelopment. The implementation of the programme, however, remains challenging due to the insecurity and the limited state presence in the northern regions. Nevertheless, the project when successfully implemented will help in consolidating the peace and security of Mali through socioeconomic development in the regions affected by violent extremism.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs is also working on the issue of radicalization in Mali to prevent increased radicalism and recruitment by violent extremist groups. The Ministry has partnered with the High Islamic Council and other religious associations to promote moderate Islam and the secularity of the state. However, the success of this intervention has been limited due to the limited presence of the Malian government in the north.

Countering Violent Extremism in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria

Efforts to counter extremists threat in Niger is evolving. However, most of the initiatives have focused more on terrorism. In the legal domain, Niger has updated its legislation to criminalize acts of terrorism. Specifically, the code of criminal procedure has been amended to allow for a specialized counterterrorism jurisdiction and stronger investigative techniques. At the institutional level, the three main law enforcement agencies (the National Police, the National Guard, and the Gendarmerie) and the military have established crisis response units to detect, deter, and counter acts of violent extremism and terrorism in Nigerien territory and more critically, enhance their border patrol capacity. The Ministry of Interior has also created a National Police Intervention Group (GIPN) to respond to violent extremism and terrorists threats. Operationally, the law enforcement and security services have been deployed to the affected areas like Diffa and communities along the borders with Algeria, Libya, and Mali to maintain security and to assure the people of government commitment to protect them, ensure their safety and security. At the regional level, Niger also contributes troops as part of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area along with

Benin, Chad, Cameroon, and Nigeria.

While anecdotal evidence suggests that the presence of the security forces has reduced the incidents of attacks, improved joint border patrols and operations in the fight against Boko Haram, AQIM and its affiliates, a number of challenges hinder the effectiveness of their interventions. The long borders and harsh terrain in the north of the country is one of the challenges that make the borders very difficult to secure and patrol. This has further been aggravated by insufficient funding, manpower and equipment to carry out the security operations. The lack of strong cooperation from the local population in terms of sharing information is another major obstacle. Three main reasons account for this security conundrum. The first is the radicalizing impact of the security measures imposed by government. According to some interviewees, government policies such as curfews, ban of motorbikes, closure of markets has rather provoked support for the extremists due to the frustrations and hardships that has accompanied such stringent measures. Others also blame the situation on the excesses of the security forces and the arbitrary arrest of Boko Haram or AQIM suspects without evidence. The second reason is the fear of the population of possible attacks by the extremist groups when they share information with the security forces. And the third issue has to do with the fact that the people themselves benefit from the criminal activities of the extremist groups.

Aside the security deployments, the Nigerien government has established the Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism (SCLCT) in Niamey, made up of personnel from all the three law enforcement agencies. The SCLCT has a separate operational cell in the regional capital of Diffa. The main aim of the SCLCT is to facilitate greater information sharing and interagency counterterrorism investigations. In 2015, the SCLCT was able to arrest about 1,200 terrorist suspects' including at least 70 minors, on charges such as planning acts of terrorism, association with a terrorist organization, recruitment, and terrorism financing. While some of these suspects have been sentenced, others are still on remand with their cases under review, but those found innocent have been released. Nevertheless, the slowness of the investigation and prosecution processes has received criticisms from the population.

As part of efforts to counter violent extremism, the Malian military and law enforcement agencies have been deployed to the north of the country to detect, deter, and respond to acts of violent extremism and terrorism. However, they depend heavily on French Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA forces to maintain security in areas under their control. The government has also tightened security at the airport and border areas in the north. Despite the security deployments, a large tract of territory in Mali's north remains ungoverned, making the operational coverage of the security forces especially along the porous borders very limited. The lack of resources (i.e. manpower, funding, mobility assets and equipments), effective coordination and control capacity have affected the operational efficiency of the Malian security and defense forces. These deficiencies have been exploited by AQIM and its affiliates to launch their violent attacks against peacekeepers and foreign nationals.

Legally, there have been some reforms to enable the effective investigation and prosecution of acts of violent extremism and terrorism. In 2013, the National Assembly passed a law amending the Penal Code and the Penal Procedures Code and also created a judicial unit to fight terrorism and trans-border crime. A prosecutor in charge of this 'anti-terrorist' judicial unit was appointed in July 2014 to deal with terrorism cases. However, the lack of training in investigative techniques, and inexperience with trying terrorism cases continue to affect the work of the already weak judicial system.

Women and the Prevention/Countering of Violent Extremism (P/CVE)



Since women are often the primary victims of violent extremism, they can also offer great services in the prevention of radicalization and the countering of violent extremism. It is also acknowledged that “Equality between men and women is central to progress in human development. It is also a way to promote stability, prosperity and well-being for all.” In 1979, the United Nations held a Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which convention came to be known as the ‘Women’s Bill of Rights’. In 2000, the United Nations adopted a Resolution, popularly known as Resolution 1325 aimed at mainstreaming gender in the prevention and resolution of conflict, peacebuilding programmes and post conflict reconstruction. Women know how to tell their stories better, but can also help men to understand the stories better. If the role of women in the countering of violent extremism is narrowly understood in the society, it limits and derails policy options in the entire fight against violent extremism. If women are given the opportunity and are better empowered, they are (1) able to recognize early signs of radicalization, (2) build supportive and resilient communities and (3) adopt appropriate actions that can prevent radicalization from taking place or ending it. Therefore, mainstreaming gender would include the:

Participation of women in discussions and development of CVE policies and programmes; integration of WPS (Women, Peace and Security) and CVE agendas; producing context-specific indicators on women and CVE; promotion of CVE programmes focused on women’s empowerment; gender mainstreaming in P/CVE programming; monitoring of CVE programmes from a gender perspective; promotion of partnership with local organizations to increase outreach and build ownership; capacity building of women and women’s organizations; increased representation of women in security services; promotion of gender equality including economic empowerment of women; and facilitation of women’s participation in P/CVE programming, including through provision of security for women’s groups.

The opinion of some of the field respondents as to how women can help prevent and counter violent extremism are outlined below:

Women are- when they are aware, when they know it then they are the ones who will first open the eyes of their kids.... Women are at home with the kids; they are the ones who will help the kids open their eyes on what is coming and how they can be used. If you take an area where this is happening, if the women are educated and are aware, then they will pass that on quickly to their offspring and that will help secure a nation.

Women can contribute because they are the pillars of the society. They have children at home. When they are not able to educate the children early enough, these children can become violent extremists. The role of women in the family and society is very important. There is the issue of education. Ill-informed people can be drawn to violent extremism. Women can contribute by playing the role of mothers, educators and pillars of families. The seed of violent extremism starts at childhood. In the family, the fruit of our education is the woman who is closest to the children.... If women unite they will win. They can contribute in fighting violent extremism by forming united associations because unity is force.

The survey conducted by ‘Women Without Borders Change the World’ also came up with the following findings as what mothers need in order to prevent radicalization and counter violent extremism. Amongst the mothers who responded, 86% said they needed increased knowledge of early-warning signs and how to respond to them; 84% believed self-training could assist in preventing radicalization and violent extremism; 80% of mothers were of the opinion that parenting skills and meeting with other women to share experiences are very crucial in the fight against radicalization and violent extremism; while 79% and 76% mothers said deeper knowledge of religion and support from social organizations such as NGOs and CSOs were necessary to fight radicalization and violent extremism.

Table 3: What Mothers Need in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism

S/N	Need	Percentage of Response
1	Increased knowledge of early-warning signs	86
2	Training in responding to early-warning signs	86
3	Self-confidence training	84
4	Parenting skills	80
5	Meeting with other women	80
6	Knowledge of religion	79
7	Support from social organization	76

Role of CSOs in the Countering of Violent Extremism

Roles played by the civil society organizations in shaping and reshaping societies cannot be ignored. In a recent study, the World Bank acknowledged that the growth and development of civil society is “one of the greatest accomplishments of our age.” Civil society organizations have very broad activities

which engage in development, humanitarian relief, policy advocacy, poverty reduction, and other forms of non-profit activity....They work in partnership with marginalized communities to shift power relations so that the previously excluded have a voice to political decision making and can gain access to resources and assets needed for autonomous development.

CSOs are critical and important stakeholders in the prevention of radicalization and the countering of violent extremism. Most civil society organizations have been interacting with local communities and societies before, during and after experiences of radicalization and violent extremism, unlike the governments that have created a wide gap between governance and the local people and communities.

It is known that the root causes of terrorism include poverty, human deprivation, hopelessness, and anger at government politics. Although it is the responsibility of states to eliminate these causes; however, it is the responsibility of the civil society to cure these causes within the grassroots. Civil society should become a cure for deprived society by soothing its pain and embedding positively to all layers of the population. That function is exactly why government may be helpless because it does not have such a tight interaction with grassroots whereas civil society has a natural capacity to interact directly with the common people.

This gives the opportunity of closeness to both victims and perpetrators of violent extremism. The term ‘countering violent extremism’ encapsulates such issues as:

- Peacebuilding
- Conflict resolution
- Promoting positive values with greater consideration for pluralism, interfaith/interethnic harmony and social
- Development assistance in conflict areas
- Counseling and reconciliation
- Reintegration
- Human security needs

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Most of these services outlined can and should be provided by the civil society in the sense that apart from being actively engaged in societies and communities, they have the trust of the people. Whether as victims or perpetrators, people prefer to deal with civil society organization as the latter are seen to be reliably transparent and empathetic to the plight of people. This is the reason why recent resolutions of the United Nations encourage national governments to engage local communities and non-governmental organization in their quest to prevent radicalization and counter violent extremism. Local people in Adamawa State who were victims of Boko Haram said since 2013 when they their communities were attacked, and since these communities were re-captured by the Nigerian security forces, Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the Adamawa State Emergency Management Agency (ADSEMA) only brought relief materials for them twice. The support they received from institutions was mainly from civil society, faith-based and international organizations. To this end, civil society organizations in Nigeria need to be strongly supported by the government to be able to carry out their counter measures against radicalization and violent extremism. This is in line with submission Cortright et al (2011: 3) that:

Civil society organisations can play significant roles in helping to resolve armed conflict and address conditions conducive to violent extremism. They provide early warning of potential conflict....Civil society groups have wealth of knowledge concerning the human rights and development and development situations in specific countries and may be better informed than governments and intelligence agencies about the causes of armed conflicts.¹¹⁵

115 David Cortright, Alistair Millar, Linda Geber-Stellingwerf and George A. Lopez, E. Fackler and J. Weaver “Friend, Not Foe: Opening Spaces for Civil Society Engagement to Prevent Violent Extremism.” Fourth Freedom Forum and the Kroc Institute for

The greatest challenge confronting civil society organizations in their efforts at preventing radicalization and counter violent extremism is when governments fail to appreciate the noble role of CSOs or when governments see them as competitors rather than collaborators. For example, “In the name of fighting terrorism, governments have curtailed political freedoms and imposed restrictive measures against human rights defenders and civil society activities in many countries.”¹¹⁶

However, CSOs also need to synergize and work transparently with governments; they also need to rationally draw boundary lines between activism and national security. In Nigeria, for instance, the government has accused the press and CSOs of leaking vital information to Boko Haram ahead of executing counter measures. Recently, too, communities in Borno State have protested against the International Red Cross accusing the body of interfacing with Boko Haram in the distribution of humanitarian aid when the victims of Boko Haram have not been assisted.

CSOs also need to be wary of the interest of the donor countries in carrying out their activities in the sense that such interests are usually not revealed. Usually, donor countries are not likely to pump in funding where they have not stake either political or economic. Oxfam,¹¹⁷ for instance, has argued that aid has internationally been politicized to the extent that it does not reach people with the greatest needs. For example, the aid that America offers to Iraq and Pakistan is much more than the aid offered to African countries like D.R. Congo and the Central African Republic, Somalia and South Sudan all in the name of the securitization of American interest.

Furthermore, the global Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has called for caution in the sense that CSOs could be subject to ‘manipulation’ and ‘exploitation’ by terrorist and extremist groups.¹¹⁸

Another cautious note for the civil society is the priority given to development activities and the balancing of self-comfort. While in Adamawa for the fieldwork, civil society organizations were criticized for prioritizing their comfort and luxury over and above the activities they carry out. For example, the Commissioner for Information noted with embarrassment how 13 members of a civil society organization chartered a flight from Abuja to an IDP camp to inspect FOUR toilets the society donated. He called attention to the fact the cost of hiring a flight, hotel accommodation and *per diem* for the CSO members could have built more than 50 toilets for the IDPs.¹¹⁹ Despite this criticism, however, the Early Warning Systems and Peace Education programmes of the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) in Burkina Faso and Nigeria; the intervention activities of Search for Common Ground, Save the Children, the International Red Cross in Peace negotiation and post conflict reintegration. Currently, the Office of the National Security Advisor in Nigeria works with over 70 NGOs and CSOs on countering violent extremism in Nigeria.

Strategies Employed by the Burkina Faso and Nigerian Governments to Counter Radicalization and

International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2011.

116 David Cortright, Alistair Millar, Linda Geber-Stallingwerf and George A. Lopez, “Friend, Not Foe: The Role of Civil Society in Preventing Violent Extremism”, Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, Volume 2, Issue 2, 5-1-2012, p. 238 (238-256).

117 Cf. OXFAM, “Whose Aid is it Anyway? Politicizing Aid in Conflict and Crises”, Briefing Paper Number 145, 2011. Available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp145-whose-aid-anyway-100211-en_0.pdf.

118 The Financial Action Task Force, “Interpretive Note to Special Recommendation VIII”, <http://www.fatf.org/dataoecd/43/5/38816530> pdf. Accessed 17/07/2017.

119 This was the observation of the Commissioner for Information in Adamawa State during an interview session in June 2017.

Violent Extremism

The Nigerian government uses two strategic approaches to addressing the Boko Haram crisis and these are the hard and soft approaches. While the hard approach entailed military operations, the soft approach rests basically at policy formulation and implementation.

The Hard Approach

Though there were obvious Early Warning Signs that Boko Haram would pose a serious threat to the security of the Nigerian state, the Goodluck Jonathan administration first treated it as one of those internal crisis in northern Nigeria. The Nigerian government lived in denial of the problem and showed no commitment in dealing with Boko Haram. According to Mr. Emmanuel Thsumdu, he had to sell his personal and official car in order to raise money for the vigilante and hunters guild to initiate the recapturing of communities under his constituency.¹²⁰ The initial response was to ask the Nigerian Police Force to move into Maiduguri to maintain law and order because the government considered it to be one of those ‘normal’ religious disturbances.¹²¹ When the police was unable to contain the situation, the Nigerian military was asked to assist the police.

As the Boko Haram sect became formidably cruel and lethal in its attacks while expanding its frontiers beyond Maiduguri, the Nigerian government established the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) codenamed ‘Operation Restore Order’ comprising the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy, the Nigerian Air Force, the Police, the Department of State Security, the Immigration service, the Customs, and the Defence Intelligence Agency.

Though the JTF recorded high success in its operation against the sect, it was latter disbanded as a result of ill-advice. The then Nigerian Army hierarchy which wanted to take absolute control of the entire theatre of operation advised President Goodluck Jonathan to disband the JTF and in its place establish a 7 Mechanised Division with its headquarters in Maiduguri. Perhaps, this was the worst strategic mistake as Boko Haram became more emboldened and fierce in its attacks.

On 31 December 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan gave a national broadcast on the continued Boko Haram during which he declared a state of emergency in 14 local Government Areas in three states of Borno, Yobe and Plateau. The President also gave directive to the Chief of Defence Staff to collaborate with other security chiefs to set up a counter-terrorism unit within the Armed Forces. With the state of emergency declared, the military set up check-points in virtually all parts of the north, creating hardship and encumbrances for travellers. Military personnel have also used the check-points to commit all manner of human rights violations. In 2015, the Amnesty International brought out a report indicting the military of the violation of the fundamental rights of people, including Boko Haram suspects. The militarization of security in the Northeast did not only violate human rights but also increased Nigeria’s defence spending by 20%.¹²²

The military operations in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria transmitted into several codenames ranging from Operation Restore Order, to Operation Boyana to Operation Zaman Lafiya¹²³.

120 Mr. Emmanuel Thsumdu is presently representing Madagali/Gulak in Nigeria’s House of Representatives. During an interview with him, he opined that the Nigerian government under Goodluck Jonathan was not ready to do anything initially to halt attacks on communities in his constituency. As a Member of the House of Representatives, he had tried on several occasions to call the attention of even the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshal Alex Badeh, to salvage the situation but he was ignored. So he had to sell his personal and official cars to be able to raise some money to support the hunter’s guild and the vigilante to recapture the local governments under his jurisdiction.

121 A. M. Umar, “Nigeria and the Boko Haram Sect: Adopting a Better Strategy for Resolving the Crisis”, Master of Arts Dissertation submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, United States of America, 2013, Pp. 1-98.

122 F. Copeland, *The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria*. The Hague: Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 2013.

123 Hausa phrase meaning peaceful living.

It must be acknowledged that with the coming on board of Muhammadu Buhari as the President since May 2015, military operations against Boko Haram has recorded and continue to record successes. President Buhari who was once a military Head of State (1983-1985), and who was at one time recalcitrant by invading Chad while he was the General Officer Commanding 3 Mechanised Division with headquarters in Jos overseeing the entire Northeast, moved the military command from Abuja to Maiduguri and gave directive to the military hierarchy to subdue and degrade Boko Haram by December 2015. The military launched Operation *Lafya Dole*,¹²⁴ Operation Crackdown and Operation *Gama Aiki*.¹²⁵ President Buhari also initiated the establishment of a Multi-national Joint Task Force comprising soldiers from Benin Republic, Cameroun, Chad, Niger Republic and Nigeria with a take-off grant of 200 million dollars.

The question is why would the Nigerian military be unable to subdue Boko Haram under President Goodluck Jonathan's five years in office but succeed in its operation against Boko Haram in less than six months under the Buhari administration?¹²⁶ President Buhari assumed office on 29 May 2015 with some cogent promises- to fight corruption, to provide security, to institute discipline in governance and to provide jobs for the unemployed. Buhari set up a committee to probe into the mismanagement of the 2 billion dollars meant to procure arms to fight Boko Haram and the committee discovered that the money was diverted and rather disbursed towards the People's Democratic Party Presidential campaigns, through the office of the National Security Advisor, retired Colonel Sambo Dasuki.¹²⁷ The vigorous fight against corruption brought about the positive dynamics in the fight against Boko Haram.

The military operations recaptured virtually all the places under the control of Boko Haram in the three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe and are trying to comb out the remnant of the sect members in Zambisa forest. In August 2017, the Nigerian Army also established a Special Strike Force Unit to flush out the remnants of Boko Haram.

In Burkina Faso, since the country does not have resident extremist groups, the government has directed the Gendarmerie and the army to embark on constant patrols of the communities that come under the attack of the extremists in the northern parts of the country. It has also dispatched plane clothes security personnel to spy and dig out information on the daily activities being carried out in the local communities. Small communication technologies have been launched in local areas to enable quick reportage of any suspected persons and their activities for timely intervention. Burkina Faso also collaborates with Cote d'Ivoire and Mali to exchange security information on the activities of extremist groups in the Sahel, and in fact, this led to the arrest of some of the terrorists who carried out attacks on Splendid Hotel and a restaurant in Ouagadougou.¹²⁸ Burkina Faso is also part of the Sahel G-5 political group comprising Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger whose cooperation is aimed at preventing radicalization and countering violent extremism.¹²⁹

124 Hausa phrase meaning peace by force.

125 Hausa phrase meaning finish or complete the work started.

126 A one-time military commander who led some Nigerian troops to fight Boko Haram wondered why the Nigerian military that excelled in peacekeeping missions since the 1960 and did excellently well to bring to an end the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone was unable to subdue Boko Haram under President Goodluck Jonathan and could do that under Buhari without importing some mercenaries.

127 Colonel Sambo Dasuki is presently in custody and he is standing trial in the court of law for the diversion of the 2 billion dollars meant for arms procurement during President Goodluck Jonathan's administration.

128 This information was derived from different persons during the fieldwork in Ouagadougou in May 2017. However, a lot more of the respondents were of the opinion that military and security operations alone could not solve the problem of extremism until the government tackled the issues of poverty and unemployment.

129 Maj. Djomagne Didier Yves Bamouni, "Fighting Terrorism in Burkina Faso", op. cit. p. 32.

The Soft Approach

Under the soft approach, the government of Nigeria reviewed the 2004 Act of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission to also include terrorism financing; enacted the 2011 Terrorism Prevention Act which was amended in 2013; embarked on de-radicalization programme through counter messaging; established the Victim Support Fund (VSF); inaugurated the Presidential Initiative on the North-East (PINE); established the North-East Regional Initiative (NERI) and proposed the establishment of the North-East Development Commission which is given speedy consideration by the National Assembly. Whereas the VSF has been actively engaged in the field, especially giving support to mostly those profiled in the IDP camps, with particular attention paid to children, the Presidential Initiative on the North-East and the North-East Regional Initiative are still operating at the level of blue-prints. Presently, there seemed not to be concrete commitment on how to rebuild the North-East by these two bodies.

The Nigerian government had also adopted advocacy and public enlightenment to sensitize the public on security tips especially on how the public can identify a Boko Haram suicide bomber. Sixteen points were outlined by the Security Council.¹³⁰ Accordingly, a suicide bomber:

- Wears loose clothing giving the impression that the body is disproportional larger than the head or feet.
 - Wears heavy clothing, no matter what the season (out of season dress), for instance, wearing a sweater or raincoat during hot weather as well as slack or baggy clothes.
 - Has unusual gait, robotic walk. Stiff movements, lack of mobility of the lower torso or decreased flexibility (from wearing bomb devices however, backpacks are increasingly common).
1. Display of tunnel vision. The bomber often will be fixated on the target and appears nervous, preoccupied or have a blank stare.
 2. He or she appears to be focused and vigilant and may be fervently praying to him/herself – giving the appearance of whispering to someone.
 3. Display no response to authoritative voice or direct salutation.
 4. Display behavior which may be consistent with no future – unconcerned about receiving purchases or change.
 5. Walk with deliberation – but not running towards a visible object.
 6. Demonstrate forceful action (to reach a desired target by pushing their way through a crowd or restricted area).
 7. Display signs of drug use – including, for example, enlarged pupils, fixed stare and erratic behavior.
 8. Carries bags or backpacks (used to carry explosives, nails and other shrapnel). The bomber generally holds his or her backpack tightly. Wires sticking out of the bag.

130 A poster containing the 16 Points was handed to us by the Nigerian Police Force in Jimeta, Yola, Adamawa State in June 2017.

9. Has a fresh shave – a male with fresh shave and lighter skin on his lower face. May also have shaved his or her head to have a short haircut (this may be done to disguise appearance or to be better groomed when going to paradise).
10. May smell of unusual herbal/flower water (in order to smell better when going to paradise). Note: The unusual herbal body odour is as a result of the incense used in the final rituals performed on them as they take off for suicide mission.
11. Has a hand in the pocket tightly gripping something like a triggering device.
12. Always be on the look-out, especially in trains, buses, planes, markets, shopping malls, mosques, churches and large events.
13. Do not attend to fights display, or distribution of free gifts.

In Burkina Faso, the youth seemed to be given some space in governance and the government is partnering some international bodies and the international community, especially France and the United States on how to positively engage the youth. Government in Burkina Faso is also actively engaging the civil society organization on advocacy and de-radicalization and counter terrorism programmes.

Effectiveness of the Strategies adopted by the Governments

Between 2009 and 2015, one could assess the fact that strategies employed by the Nigerian government to counter Boko Haram were weak and ineffective, and this was because the extremist group was triumphantly ahead of the Nigerian security strategies. Outstretched by Boko Haram continued attacks, the government became hopeless and the only slogan that could strategically keep the government going was “government was on top of the situation”. It was obvious that the President Goodluck Jonathan led government lacked both the ability and capacity to effectively subdue Boko Haram much less end its violent activities.

Since 2015, after Goodluck lost election to Muhammadu Buhari who promised bringing to an end the Boko Haram violence one of his cardinal objectives, strategies adopted by the Nigerian government became progressively positive and effective. Offensive by the Nigerian military against Boko Haram has yielded positive results in the sense that virtually all the local government and territories that were hitherto under the control of Boko Haram were recaptured. Furthermore, the establishment of the Multi-national Joint Task Force combining military forces from Benin Republic, Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, seem to be the best strategic move in the dislodgement of Boko Haram in the sense that the violent extremist group no longer has the capacity to launch attacks from controlled bases within the Lake Chad basin as it used to. Furthermore, although the global philosophy is not to negotiate with terrorists, 184 Nigerian responded applauded the exchange of prisoners and the possible ransom Nigerian government paid to secure the release of some of the Chibok girls from the hands of Boko Haram.¹³¹ However successful this strategy is, it comes with some risk and this is because the onslaught against Boko Haram helps to dislocate security to the extent that it affords the group the opportunity to mix and mingle with innocent people and operate in cells.

An overall assessment of the strategies (especially military operations) employed by the Nigerian government in combatting the violent activities of Boko Haram can be given a pass mark in the sense that military

¹³¹ A short opinion poll conducted with the students of the Institute for Peace and strategic Studies of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. The question “Do you think Nigerian government was strategically and morally justified in securing the release of the Chibok girls by paying ransom to Boko Haram and releasing some of their members?” was posed to 207 students and 184 responded in the affirmative. The 21 students who opined that government was morally wrong and not justifies insisted paying ransom and releasing some Boko Haram members would only embolden and further fuel terrorism.

operations, for instance, has been able to dislodge Boko Haram from its stronghold especially the Zambisa and Gwoza forests. The operation has also been able to recapture virtually all the territories hitherto under the control of Boko Haram. Furthermore, the fact that attacks by Boko Haram which climaxed in 2015 have drastically reduced in intensity and frequency to the extent that President Muhammadu Buhari stated in December 2015 that “Boko Haram is technically degraded and defeated”.

On the part of Burkina Faso, the government, civil society and local community relations and the joining of the G-5 Sahelian states alongside Mali, Chad, Mauritania and Niger, coupled with the joint security report sharing that Burkina Faso has with Mali and Cote d’Ivoire seemed to be very effective. Government security forces seem to be closer to the local community often times dressed like civilians, gathering and sharing intelligence with the local communities on how to counter radicalization and violent extremism.

Regional Approaches to deal with Violent Extremism in West Africa

Apart from the national level interventions, there are many programmes at the regional level to prevent and counter violent extremism in West Africa. According to the African Union Office in Mali and the Sahel region (MISAHEL), there are about seventeen different strategies developed by the various multilateral organisations, states, groups of states and networks to combat terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel region.¹³² The UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), ECOWAS, African Union (AU), European Union (EU Sahel strategy), France, United States, Countries in the Sahel (G5 initiative) and Lake Chad Basin Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), The African Development Bank (AfDB), The Islamic Development Bank (IDB), The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)¹³³ among others have all developed their own strategies and initiatives for the region. Among the strategies and initiatives, the G5 Sahel initiative by countries in the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) has gained much attention, partly due to the fact that it is a home-grown initiative by the affected states in the region. It was created in February 2014 to enable a region-wide collaboration to deal with the Sahel-Sahara region’s political and security challenges.¹³⁴

Interestingly, most of the different strategies and initiatives deal with common issues including promoting social well-being, stability, security, good governance, education, resilience (including infrastructure) and development.¹³⁵ They also emphasize on regional integration, local development, border management, the root causes of irregular migration, transnational organized crimes and the creation of better opportunities for women and the youth.¹³⁶ Given the multi-dimensional challenges in the Sahel, these interventions are not only essential but timely. Nevertheless, what it also means is that there is the likelihood of duplication of efforts. The weak coordination and competitions between the relevant actors on ground even compounds the problem. The challenge according to some respondents is how to overcome the institutional competitions and have a common policy that addresses the issues in a more coherent, effective and integrated manner. Although the

132 Interview with an Officer of MISAHEL, April 2017, Bamako, Mali.

133 Helly, D., Théroux-Bénoni, L., Galeazzi, G., Maïga, I., and Ouédraogo, F. (2015). Sahel strategies: why coordination is imperative. ISS Policy Brief 76 | March.

134 France24. (2017). African leaders agree to new joint counter-terrorism force. <http://www.france24.com/en/20170206-african-leaders-agree-new-joint-counter-terrorism-force>, accessed 1 July 2017; Reuters. (2014). African nations form G5 to work on Sahel security, development. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-sahel-g-idUSBREA1F0P520140216>, accessed 1 July 2017; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2015). UNODC facilitates security cooperation between G5 Sahel states. Available at <https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/g5-security-cooperation--mali-workshop-oct-2015.html>. Accessed 10 June 2017.

135 Helly et al (2015). op. cit

136 ibid

various stakeholders have their own organizational needs and objectives, it is critical for them to work together to have a consolidated approach to the problem. This according to some respondents will help ensure the maximum use of the limited resources and the sustainability of the interventions. Other respondents also cautioned that despite the common issues identified in the various strategies and initiatives for the Sahel, it is important to have country specific approaches due to the varied local specificities or contexts.

The Role of ECOWAS in the Prevention of Radicalization and the Countering of Violent Extremism

ECOWAS as a regional body was set up in 1976 with the mandate to only help facilitate economic cooperation. However, its mandate was implicitly now extended to attend to political and social issues. There cannot be a better time than now when ECOWAS would have to get involved, especially on how to address the new wave of global conflict. With regards to the prevention of radicalization,

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for example, has a rich body of experience upon which to build, given its focus on conflict prevention, dialogue and trust building, and strengthening community resilience—all integral components of countering violent extremism. Furthermore, the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan contains principles that are closely related to CVE principles, in that it emphasizes the primacy of prevention (such as addressing conditions conducive to terrorism), promotes respect for human rights and good governance, and encourages the utilization of nonmilitary tools and inter-state cooperation to counter the threat. Among the innovative initiatives undertaken by ECOWAS is the Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), a mechanism created in 1999 to monitor and report signs of potential conflict in the region. ECOWARN has since evolved into a partnership between governments and civil society actors, with the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) facilitating the civil society component.¹³⁷

In Nigeria, there is a disappointing reaction concerning the role of ECOWAS in the countering of extremism. Many Nigerians believe that ECOWAS is a parasitic body on the Nigerian state in the sense that though Nigeria contributes more than any other country in terms of logistics and fiancé to ECOWAS, the regional body did not make any firm commitment in assisting Nigeria in its fight against Boko Haram.

With the exception of Benin and Niger Republics, no other ECOWAS country had declared firm support for Nigeria in the fight against Boko Haram extremism either by contributing troops or resources.¹³⁸ This is not commensurate to the role Nigeria played in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire and the Gambia to help resolve the conflicts inherent in these countries at the expense of her citizens and resources.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Global Centre on Cooperative Security, "Countering Violent Extremism in West Africa and the Sahel: Strengthening Regional Prevention Capacity" December 14 Project Description.

¹³⁸ The Multi-national Joint Task Force was established at the instance of President Muhammadu Buhari who sought the support of Cameroun, Chad and Niger Republic by paying visits to these countries respectively and soliciting their support in the fight against Boko Haram.

¹³⁹ It would be recalled that Nigeria, more than any other country in Africa lost hundreds of her troops both in Liberia and Sierra Leone; it also shouldered the financial burden to not only finance peacekeeping operations in these countries but also facilitated post conflict peacebuilding, democracy and development in both countries. In fact, a retired Nigerian Army General said most of the 12 billion dollars General Ibrahim Babangida was accused of mismanaging actually went into financing ECOMOG in Liberia.

In Burkina Faso, most of the interviewees were of the opinion that ECOWAS can contribute significantly in preventing radicalization and the countering of violent extremism by helping member countries to eradicate poverty and provide jobs for the teeming unemployed youths.¹⁴⁰ Another interesting recommendation was that ECOWAS should create a data base for all its citizens connected to the database of each member country so as to enable the tracking of movements and records across the member states.¹⁴¹ During an interview session in Burkina Faso, it was stated that:

The strength of ECOWAS lies in her member states. The member states should collaborate and work together. ECOWAS should concentrate more on integration because it was the main reason why it was established. Integration is important because violent extremists groups are integrated. Today in ECOWAS, you cannot enter any country to pursue a terrorist. ECOWAS should also develop an action plan for employing young people and women; it should also provide capacity for civil society groups to help in the fight against radicalization and violent extremism.¹⁴²

Conclusion

There is no gainsaying that radicalization and violent extremism, though recent phenomena on the African continent and most especially in West Africa and the Sahel are undeniable factual experiences. Violent extremist groups have adopted several strategies through which they have penetrated West Africa, ranging from ideological spread, inducement, and coercion capitalizing on illiteracy and shallow knowledge of religion, poverty and the weakness of the states. West African states affected by the menace of violent extremism have also adopted strategies ranging from military operation to de-radicalization processes without greater attention paid to the structural problems that led to the emergence and spread of violent extremism. It must be acknowledged, however, that violent extremism may not be totally eradicated but it can be mitigated, and in order to reduce the strength and effects of violent extremism, governments in West African must pay serious attention and demonstrate greater commitment in the fight against poverty, illiteracy, underdevelopment of rural communities and youth unemployment. To this end, governments of West African states through ECOWAS must learn to collaborate with local communities, the civil society organizations, women and youth organization and other relevant stakeholders.

Recommendations

For States

- Deal with corruption in government and impunity - public officials who embezzle state funds meant for development programmes have to be prosecuted to serve as a deterrent to others. Impunity creates public frustration and draws people to join extremist groups to fight against the state.
- Strengthen the capacity, accountability, transparency and effectiveness of state institutions - the institutions of state responsible for dealing with acts of violent extremism such as the law enforcement agencies, military, judiciary and the prisons have to be strengthened to effectively implement their respective mandates. The security and defense forces especially need to be provided with the requisite resources to protect the population from attacks and to increase visibility in the border areas, through

140 This was the position of the priest in charge of the Justice Development and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church in Ouagadougou; the Secretary of the Association of Pentecostal Churches in Burkina Faso; the UNESCO youth leader and the lady coordinating the UN Women for Peace in Burkina Faso.

141 In both Burkina Faso and in Nigeria, from the local communities to the national governments, there are no records of citizens concerning births, deaths, the aged, children, women, men and migration flows except at airports and designated borders.

142 Interview with a journalist working with the UNESCO Youth Club in Ouagadougou, May 2017.

more frequent joint patrols to secure the borders. Furthermore, there is the need for broad reforms and training of the security and defense forces to conform to international human rights and rule of law standards. The criminal justice system has to be reformed and strengthened to respond effectively to the threat of violent extremism.

- Promote inclusive, participatory & representative governance and sustainable development in line with the Sustainable Development Goals especially in the areas affected by violent extremism. The problem of violent extremism has its roots in the governance and development deficits mostly in the northern parts of the four countries under study. Therefore, ongoing efforts to promote good governance and accelerated development should be consolidated and sustained.
- Deal with the youth bulge problem – there is the need for a comprehensive programme to deal with the issue of youth in the area of especially education and unemployment. Most youth in the affected regions are unemployed, uneducated and ignorant, making them susceptible to manipulations by the extremist groups. This has to be dealt with to reduce their vulnerabilities.
- Tackle the issue of transnational organized crimes in the Sahel region by strengthening the legal frameworks on terrorist financing and enhance the capacity of the institutions established to deal such crimes.
- Strengthen the collaboration with CSOs in the development and implementation of strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism.
- Monitor and evaluate Government initiatives on violent extremism – monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms should be built into government programmes to assess the impacts and challenges of interventions to adapt it to the changing situation on ground.
- Reform the educational system with emphasis on entrepreneurship and technology to deal with the growing unemployment problem - the current educational system in most of the countries is more theoretical and not skill-based. Therefore, student complete school and they wait for government to employ them instead of creating their own businesses. The inability of the public sector to employ many graduates compounds the unemployment situation in the various countries. It is important, therefore, to train students on the skill sets they require for the job market and to create their own jobs to employ others.
- Enact laws and legislative instruments to regulate the informal Islamic Schools to deal with issues of radicalization and unemployment – some Islamic schools in Niger and Mali has become a hub for radicalization and recruitment by the extremist groups. It is important for governments to put in place policies to regulate the activities of the numerous informal Islamic schools and revise their syllabus where necessary.

- Strengthen communication, coordination and information-sharing systems between the border security providers and local authorities in the border communities to track the activities of these extremists groups.
- Conduct comprehensive research on the evolving nature and possible future trends of violent extremism in your countries in order to review and adapt national action plans and strategies to current realities on ground.
- Involve the Media in the prevention and countering of violent extremism. There should be policies to train the media on how to report on violent extremism cases.
- Develop specific programmes that targets the youth with emphasis on providing them with educational and socioeconomic opportunities.
- Programmes developed for the reintegration of ex-combatant of extremist groups should consider the needs of the wider civilian population to avert perceptions of injustice
- Develop specific programmes to facilitate intra-and interfaith dialogue and discussions to promote tolerance and understanding between divided communities.
- Mainstream gender perspectives in efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. In particular, build the capacities and support the activities of the G5 Sahel Women national platforms to engage in prevention and response to violent extremism;

For WANEP and CSO Actors

- Develop specific programmes on violent extremism based on the country context in line with national, regional and global action plans to prevent and counter violent extremism.
- Strengthen and expand the geographical coverage of sensitization and educational programmes to promote peaceful co-existence and national unity in areas affected by violent extremism.
- Strengthen the collaboration with government and other stakeholders to prevent and counter violent extremism.
- Develop national context-specific early warning indicators for monitoring violent extremism and ensure that it is integrated into national early warning systems as well as the ECOWAS Early Warning

and Response Mechanism (ECOWARN). This will ensure the adequate provision of timely and reliable early warning information to national government and security providers for the appropriate action to be taken.

- Encourage and advocate for the provision of adequate resources to be committed to the implementation of national and regional strategies to address violent extremism. Also monitor the usage of those resources to ensure accountability and transparency to prevent corruption.
- Engage experts to conduct further research into the evolving nature and possible future trends of violent extremism in West Africa to ensure that programming is tailored to current realities on ground.
- Ensure that national, regional and International instruments on human rights and rule of law including the African Union Principles and Guidelines of Human and People's Rights while countering terrorism are respected and complied with by security and defense forces when countering violent extremism.
- Establish mechanisms to strengthen the relationship between security providers and local communities and authorities in the border areas to facilitate the sharing of information. This will help build trust and confidence between the communities and security agencies to address cross border issues that facilitate violent extremism.
- Strengthen the capacity of local authorities through training, education and sensitization programmes in areas including peaceful co-existence, religious tolerance, mediation, arbitration and restorative justice, conflict management, dangers and risks associated with the use and trafficking of arms and drugs. This will help resolve local conflict for sustainable peace.

For ECOWAS

- Provide technical support to countries in West Africa to develop national strategies and action plans in line with regional and international policy frameworks on violent extremism.
- Strengthen engagement with CSOs in West Africa and explore possible areas of cooperation to prevent and counter violent extremism.
- Support cross-border security cooperation initiatives focused on violent extremism and terrorism. Also ensure streamlined and coordinated programming by national actors, to avoid the duplication of activities.

Donors and International Partners

- Provide sustainable funding to the national government to deal with the socio-economic problems and the root causes of violent extremism in West Africa.
- Ensure the effective coordination of the different strategies of the various multilateral organisations working especially in the Sahel region to ensure coherence and avoid the duplication of efforts.
- Provide material and technical support to countries affected by violent extremism to counter the threat in a sustainable manner.
- Ensure that part of the funding dedicated to addressing violent extremism are committed to address the specific needs and capacity building of women

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Appendix One

List of some Attacks by Boko Haram

Date and Location	Attack	Casualties/Deaths
Sept 7 2010 Bauchi	A prison is attacked and 721 inmates freed	5 dead
31 st December 2010 Abuja	Bomb Attack in a military barracks	4 civilians dead
29 th May 2011 Bauchi and Abuja	IEDs Detonated in several towns during Goodluck Jonathan's inauguration	15 dead
16 th June Abuja	A suicide bombing at the Abuja police headquarters	At least 2 dead
25 th August 2011 Gombi in Adamawa State	Attack on a police station and 2 banks	12 killed
26 th August 2011 Abuja	A car bomb detonated on the United Nations compound	23 dead more than 75 injured
4 th November, 2011 Yobo, Damaturu and Borno States	Multiple IED attacks targeting Security forces and their offices, markets and 11 churches.	More than 100 dead
22 nd -23 rd December 2011 Maiduguri and Damaturu	Clashes between Boko Haram and Nigerian soldiers in the towns	50 militants, 7 soldiers and 11 civilians
25 th December 2011 Madalla, Jos, Gadaka, and Damaturu	Bombings and shootings at St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, Mountain of Fire and Miracles Church in Jos, another church in Gadaka and the headquarters of the State Security Service in Damaturu.	41
January 20, 2012	Coordinated attacks targeting police and military buildings, a prison and other targets in the city of Kano	More the 200 dead
26 th February 2012 Jos, Plateau State	Suicide car bomber drove his car into the Church of Christ church during morning prayers	6

8 th April 2012 Kaduna	A Christian church was bombed after Easter Service	38
17 th June 2012 Kaduna	Bombings in 3 churches	19
7 th August 2012 Kogi State	Shootings at a Deeper life church	19
25 th December 2012 Maiduguri and Potiskum	Shootings at some churches	27
28 th December 2012 Musari	The village was attacked in the night as the people slept	15
18 th March 2013 Kano	Bus bombing at a bus station	Between 22 to 65 killed
16 th -19 th April 2013 Baga in Borno state	A massacre/ shootout with security forces at a military post	187
17 th and 18 th June 2013 Maiduguri and Damaturu	Shootings at a private school in Maiduguri and a secondary school in Damaturu	At least 9 children, 13 students and their teachers
6 th July 2013 Yobe	Shootings at a government run secondary school	More than 42 killed
11 th August 2013 Maiduguri	A mosque was attacked after the morning prayers	56
12 th September 2013	An ambush in the forest	40 soldiers
17 th September 2013 Benisheik in Borno State	Staged a fake checkpoint and through that executed travelers and burned vehicles in the town	161
20 th September 2013 Abuja	Shootout during a search for hidden weapons in the capital city of Abuja	7-9
29 th September 2013 Yobe State	Shooting at the male dormitory of the College of Agriculture Gujba	44
24 th October 2013 Damaturu, Yobe State	An attack on a military barracks and 4 police facilities	35
29 th October 2013 Damaturu	A raid on the town of Damaturu	128

26 th January 2014 Kawuri, Borno State	Shootings in a market in Kawuri	At least 45 dead	
11 th February 2014 Konduga, Borno	A raid which included Shootings, slitting of throats and torching of houses on the village	At least 23	
15 th February 2014 Izghe, Borno State	A raid on the Christian village of Izghe	At least 106	
25 th February 2014 Yobe	Use of IEDs with Shootings at the Federal Government College of Buni Yadi	59	
14 th April 2014 Abuja	Twin Bombings at a bus station	More than 88 killed	
14 th -15 th April Chibok , Borno State	Kidnapping of girls from a secondary school	276 school girls	
1 st May 2014 Abuja	Car bomb at a police check-point	19 killed with at least 60 injured	
5 th May 2014 Gamboru and Ngala in Borno State	RPGs, AK47s and Armored personnel carriers stolen from the Nigerian Army were used to attack the town	At least 300 killed	
20 th May 2014 Jos	Twin bombings at a market known as Terminus	118 killed with at least 56 injured	
27 th May 2014 Buni Yadi ,Yobe State	Shootings at a checkpoint and a local police station	49 security personnel and 9 civilians	
30 th May 2014 Gwoza	Assassination during an ambush	The 3 rd Emir of Gwoza, Idrissa Timta	
1 st June 2014 Mubi, Adamawa State	Bombing at a football field as spectators were leaving	At least 40 killed	

2 nd - 3 rd June 2014 Gwoza, Borno State	A raid conducted on the villages of villages of Goshe, Attagara, Agapalwa and Aganjara	At least 200 killed	
7 th -8 th June 2014 Garkin Fulani, Northeast Nigeria	Kidnappings over a weekend in the northeast-ern village of Garkin Fulani	At least 20 young women.	
20 th –23 rd June 2014 Kummabza and 3 other villages , Borno State	The town was held hostage with series of raids and attacks carried out	70 killed with 91 women and children abducted	
17 th -20 th July 2014 Damboa	A raid was carried out on the town of Damboa	66 killed with 15,000 displaced	
19 th September 2014 Mainok, Borno State	An attack on a busy market	30	
3 rd November 2014 Yobe State	A suicide bombing on Shia Muslims who were marching to mark the Day of Ashura	15 Shittes killed	
10 th November 2014 Yobe State	A suicide bombing on the Government Science Secondary School	46 students killed	
28 th November 2014 Kano	Suicide bombing and gun attack at the Central Mosque of Kano	At least 120 killed	
1 st December 2014 Maiduguri, Borno State	2 female suicide bombers detonated explosions at a crowded market place	At least 5 dead	
10 th December 2014 Kano	Female suicide bomber near a market	At least 4 killed with 7 injured	

13 th December 2014 Gumsuri, Borno State	Shootings with the village burned down by petrol bombs	Between 32-35 killed with at least 172 kidnapped	
22 nd December 2014 Gombe State	Bus station bombing	At least 27 killed	
3 rd -7 th January 2015 Baga	A multiday massacre with bodies strewn on the streets of the town.	2000	
10 th January 2015 Maiduguri,	A 10 year old girl blows herself up in a market	At least 20 killed with 18 injured	
11 January 2015 Potiskum,	2 female suicide bombers aged about 10yrs detonate in a phone market	At least 3 dead with 43 injured	
18 th January Northern Cameroon	People are kidnapped from their villages	80 people	
6 th February 2015 Bosso and Diffa, in Niger	A raid on the towns of Bosso and Diffa	Unknown number of casualties	
15 th February 2015 Dama-turu.	Suicide bombing at a bus station	16 killed, 30 wounded	
24 th February 2015 Potiskum and Kano	Two suicide bombings at bus stations	At least 27 killed	
26 th February 2015 Biu and Jos.	A raid on the towns of Biu and Jos	At least 35 killed	
27 th February 2015 Mainok, Borno	An attack on the village market	15	
7 th March 2015 Maiduguri	Multiple suicide bombings at a fish market, a Department of State Security office and another market	54 dead with 143 wounded	

22 nd June 2015 Maiduguri	Bombing by 2 female suicide bombers at a mosque	30 killed with 60 injured	
1 st July 2015 Borno	A raid on 3 villages in North-eastern Nigeria	At least 145 killed	
5 th July 2015 Yobe State	Suicide bombing at a church	At least 5 dead	
6 th July 2015 Jos	Multiple bombings at a mosque and a restaurant	At least 44 killed with 67 injured	
3 rd September 2015 Kerawa, Cameroon	A raid on a market and an infirmary	30 dead with 145 injured	
17 th November 2015 – Yola	A blast in a marketplace	32 killed, 80 wounded	
21 st December 2015 Adamawa state	Bombing outside a mosque	20 killed	
9 th February 2016 Dikwa	Suicide bombings at an IDP camp	60 killed, 78 wounded	
16 th March 2016- Maiduguri, Borno State	3 female suicide bombers detonated in a village known as Umarari on the outskirts of Maiduguri	22 dead, 18 injured	
26 th March 2016 Askira/Uba Local Government area	A raid on the village of Tumpun	At least 4 dead	
5 th April 2016 Diffa, Niger.	Suicide bombing in a public transport	At least 3 killed with several injured	
12 th May 2016 Maiduguri	Suicide bombing detonated near a government compound	At least 6 dead	

4 th June 2016 Bosso	A raid on the town of Bosso	At least 32 killed with 67 injured	
30 th June 2016 Djakana, Cameroon	Suicide bombing at a mosque and video club	At least 15 killed with several injured	
8 th July 2016 Borno	Suicide bombing at a mosque	9 killed with dozens injured	
27 th August 2016 – Chad's border with Niger	Land mine planted near the border of Chad and Niger	4 Chadian soldiers who were on patrol were killed	
12 th October 2016 Maiduguri, Borno State	A car explosion at Muna motor park	At least 8	
1 st November 2016 Gubio, Northern Nigeria	Car bomb exploded near a military check-point	9	
9 th December 2016 Madagali	Twin suicide bombings at a market	At least 45 killed with 77 injured	
25 th December 2016 Mora, Cameroon	Suicide bombing at a market	At least 2 dead and 5 injured	
7 th January 2017 – Buni Yadi, Yobe state	An army base was attacked	At least 5 soldiers dead	
13 th January 2017 Kangarwa, Borno State	An attack on the position of the Nigerian army in Kangarwa village	3 Nigerian soldiers killed with 27 others injured	
14 th January 2017 Borno state	Roadside bombing	Two soldiers killed	
16 th January 2017 Maiduguri	Two suicide bombs detonated at the University of Maiduguri	3 including a professor	
5 th May 2017	An attack on an army post in the Lake Chad region	9 Chadian soldiers	

20 th May 2017 Borno	A rampage on recently liberated Borno communities	At least 7 dead and 40 injured	
2 nd June 2017 Northeastern Nigeria	Two suicide bombings at a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs)	11 killed	

Appendix Two**List of some Attacks by AQIM**

Date and Location	Attack	Casualties/Deaths
11 th April 2007 Algiers	One suicide attack against the Prime Minister's office in Algiers and a second attack on a police station in the east of the capital	At least 30 dead with several wounded
July 2007	A suicide bomber self-detonates in a car near a military encampment	10 soldiers
6 th September 2007: Eastern Algeria	An explosion in a crowd waiting to greet Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika	22
8 th September 2007 Dellys	Explosives planted in a car detonated in a barracks	28 Coast Guards
11 th December, 2007 Algiers	Car bombs detonate at the United Nations offices and the Constitutional Court building	41 dead including 17 UN employees
24 th December 2007 Mauritania	AQIM operatives shoot and kill four members of a French Family on vacation	4 dead 1 injured
19 th August, 2008 Issers, Algeria	A car bomber self-detonates near a police academy	43 killed with more than 45 wounded.
31 st May 2009 Mali	Kidnapping and Execution	British citizen Edwin Dyer
23 rd June 2009 Nouakchott, Mauritania	AQIM militants kill an American aid worker in a kidnapping attempt	Christopher Legget killed
30 th July 2009 Damous, near Tipaza.	There was an ambush which occurred during the escort of a military convoy on the outskirts of the town Damous	At least 11 Algerian soldiers killed
25 th November 25 2009 Menaka, Mali	Kidnapped from his hotel by gunmen	French citizen Pierre Camatte was released later on Feb. 23, 2010

29 th November 2009 Mauritania	AQIM kidnaps three Spanish aid workers. They are released, in exchange for a ransom payment between \$6.3 million and \$12.7 million from the Spanish government.	3 Spanish aid workers who were released on March 10, 2010
19 th April 2010 Northern Niger	AQIM kidnaps French national Michel Germaneau in Niger but later moves him to Mali	He was killed after a French and Mauritanian army raid on AQIM members in Mali that killed six militants
16 th September 2010 Arlit, Niger	5 French nationals working for the nuclear company Areva in Niger kidnapped	They are held hostage for more than 3 years, and are released in October 2013
7 th January 2011 Niamey, Niger	Two French nationals Antoine De Leocour and Vincent Delory are abducted from a bar	The men are killed in the rescue attempt
15 th April 2011 Algeria	An attack on a checkpoint in the Tizi Ouzou Province	17 Algerian soldiers
26 th August 2011 Cherchell, Algeria	AQIM launches two suicide attacks against a military academy	18
25 th November 2011 Timbuktu, Mali	Sjaak Rijke from the Netherlands, Johan Gustafsson from Sweden and Stephen Malcolm McGown from South Africa were abducted from a restaurant	Sjaak Rijke from the Netherlands was released on April 6, 2015 but the rest are still captive: A German was killed when he resisted the kidnappers
16 th January 2012 Algeria	Governor of the Illizi region in Algeria is kidnapped after his convoy is attacked close to the Libyan-Algerian border	He is rescued the next day
11 th September 2012 Libya	An attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi	4 dead including U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens with about 10 wounded
19 th March 2013 Mali	Beheading of a hostage who was kidnapped in Hombori, Northern Mali in November 2011	Philippe Verdon

November 2013 Northern Mali.	The French journalists were reportedly abducted in front of the home of a member of the Tuareg rebels' National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad after interviewing a rebel leader in Kidal, Mali.	Ghislaine Dupont and Claude Verlon were murdered
19 th April 2014 Algeria	An ambush of Algerian soldiers who were returning from their voting stations near Tizi Ouzou 75 miles east of Algiers	At least 14 Algerian soldiers and 3 AQMI militants
27 th May 2014 Kasserine, Tunisia	An attack on the home of Tunisia's interior minister	4 policemen killed
July 2014 Tunisia	The Uqba Ibn Nafi Battalion, a joint venture between Ansar al Sharia and AQIM attacks the Tunisian military in the Chaambi Mountain region	15 killed with about 20 wounded
16 th August 2014 Northern Mali	A suicide bomber self-detonates on a patrol base 60 km east of Timbuktu	2 peacekeepers killed with 9 injured
5 th January 2015 Nampala, Mali	An attack (shootings) on the military and the town	At least 7 soldiers killed with 9 wounded
20 th November 2015 Bamako, Mali	An attack on the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako by AQIM and Al-Mourabitoun	21
15 th January 2016 Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso	Heavily armed gunmen attack the Capuccino restaurant and Splendid Hotel	30 killed, 56 wounded with 126 taken hostage and later released
13 th March 2016 Ivory Coast	3 Gunmen open fire at a beach resort in Grand-Bassam	At least 19 killed with 33 injured
19 th August 2016	AQIM's branch in Tunisia, the Uqba bin Nafi Battalion, claims responsibility for an ambush on Tunisian forces in the Mount Sammama area of Kasserine Governorate	3 soldiers killed with 7 wounded

Appendix Three

List of Respondents in Niger

	Name	Organisation
1	Clement Kacou Gbedey	WANEP-Niger
2	Algabit Illiassou	WANEP - Niger
3	Kaka Touda	AEC
4	Anne Marie	CESAO
5	Abbas Abdoul	Centre de Recherche et d'analyse des politiques publiques
6	Ali Bouzou	Timidria
7	Raymond Yora Younoussi	CADEV
8	Yonli Labdam Assane	CADEV
9	Haoua Abdou Idi	JAAD
10	Rahamatou Diarra	RASADO-SALAM
11	Abdous Souley	Ministere de l'education
12	Sita Adamou	CA
13	Hassane Ambouka	CLUB-UNESCO
14	Mme Yagana Boukar	HACP
Members of the Focus Group Discussions (CONGAFEN)		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mme Kako Fatouma • Jehaou Jisa • Alhassane Bouli Issa • Mohamed Zeinabou • Zahou Hamatou • Haby Ibrahim • Yme Fodi Halima Boubacar • Rakiatou Zada 	

List of Respondents in Mali

	Name	Organisations
	Amadou Tiéoulé Diarra	Ligue pour la Justice et les Droits de l'Homme
	Mme Fatoumata Maiga	Association des Femmes pour les Initiatives de Paix
	Traore Mohamed	Réseau Plaidoyer et lobbying
	Ibrahima Koureissi Diakaria TRAORE	Clinique Demeso
	Mohamed Mahamar	Coalition Malienne des Défenseurs des Droits de l'homme
	Madani KOUMARE	Plate-forme DESC
	Mme Bouaré Bintou Founé SAMAKE	WILDAF
	Maitre Saran Diakite Keita	Réseau Femmes & Paix de l'Espace CDEAO
	Moussa Djiré Vice-Recteur	Université des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques de Bamako (USJPB)
	Néné Konaté Traore	I IMRAP
	Ambroise Dakouo	Alliance pour refonder la gouvernance en nAfrique ARGAs
	Abdoulkassim Fomba	Think peace
	Sidi Ali Ould Bagna	Réseau des jeunes des pays du G5 Sahel
	Dr Mariam Djibrilla Maiga	CCONSCIPAL-Mali
	Mouhamed s Koné	Union des jeunes musulmans du Mali (UJMA)
	Zoumana FANE	I IMRAP
	Mamadou Diarra	MISAHEL
	Thera Boubacar	WANEP-MALI
	Mme Fatimata Demlele Djounte	

List of Respondents in Burkina Faso

S/N	Name	Designation
1	Mr Boris Some	National Network Coordinator of WANEP
2	Mr Poule Bambara	Secretary General, Ministry of Justice
3	Mrs Martine Yabre	Coordinatrice-Pay, Union Africaine des ONG de Development
4	Jonas Hien	Organisation pour le Renforcement des Capacites de Development
6	David Hien	Director, Youth Empowerment programme
7	Boula Antandre	National Secretary, Justice and Peace
8	Vasale Dousant	President, UNESCO Youth Club
9	Pastor Henry Hien	General Secretary of the Evangelical Churches
10	Mr Assent Clavier Batenou	Communication specialist and journalist

List of Respondents in Nigeria

1	Dr Jude Mohmoh	Senior Lecturer, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University Yola
2	Dr Saheed Owonikoko	Lecturer, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University Yola
3	Ahmad I. Sajoh	Honourable Commissioner of Information, Adamawa State Ministry of Information and Strategy
4	Sa'ad Bello	Coordinator, Adamawa State National Emergency Management Agency
5	Haruna Hamman Furo	Permanent Secretary, Ministry for Special Duties/Adamawa State Emergency Management Agency
6	Babale Marchulum	Secretary, Adamawa State Emergency Management Agency
7	Chief Superintendent Uthman Abubakar Doma	Police Public Relations Officer, Adamawa State Command
8	Muhammed Sanusi Mustapha	Traditional Chief and District Head of Duhu in Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa State
9	Hon. Emmanuel Tsumduh	Member Representing Madagali Constituency in the State House of Assembly
10	Mr Tarfa Garba	National Secretary of the Hunters and Vigilante Guild
11	Mr Genesis	St. Theresa IDP Camp Manager, Yola
12	Mrs Hannatu Yaki	Consultant for UNICEF on Child Protection and Gender Based Violence

13	Mrs Yakubu Gwaakoama Tiki	Director, Child Development, Ministry for Women Affairs and Social Development, Adamawa State
14	Baba Idi	82 year old man beaten and captured by Boko Haram for three years for smoking cigarette
15	Baba Bitrus	80 year old Christian who was forced to convert to Islam and taken captive by Boko Haram for three years
16	Hadiza Umar	Mother of a captured 16 year old who was forcefully married to a Boko Haram member
17	Amina Umar	16 year teenager who was forcefully married to a Boko Haram member and eventually had a six month old boy at the time of interview
18	Hafsatu Usman	17 year teenager who was forcefully married to a Boko Haram member and an eight month baby boy at the time of interview
19	Adamu	A young man who was captured by Boko Haram and was taken to Zambisa forest and who said he came in contact with the Chibok girls.
20	Mama Fatima Hassan	A 76 year old woman and food seller who was captured by Boko Haram to supervise catering services for the group
21	Maryam Musa	Mother of six children whose husband was brutally killed by Boko Haram and who had to dig the grave and bury her husband alone.
22	Aisha Ali	A woman who was under Boko Haram's captivity in Gwoza forest for more than four years
23	Two operation officers of the Department of State Services	
24	Group interview with more than 30 young men	
25	Ali Shua	A banker and a youth leader in Shuwa community
26	Barr. Abana Geire	President of an Industrial Court
27	Comrade Yelwa	Vice President (North) Society for Peace Studies and Practice
28	Ada Ichoja Ohaba	Network Coordinator, Christian Rural and Urban Development of Nigeria
29	Two Senior Military Officers	

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AUSTRIAN
DEVELOPMENT
AGENCY



WEST AFRICA NETWORK FOR PEACEBUILDING (WANEP)

P.O. BOX CT 4434

Cantonments – Accra

Ghana

**Tel: +233 (0)302 411638, +233 (0)302 406340, +233 (0)302 426004,
+233 (0)302 408224; +233 (0)55-3147910**