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African Journal on Terrorism aims to create space for robust, rigorous and innovative research and policy-related papers on terrorism and violent extremism, and encourages fruitful intellectual engagement between policy practitioners and academia. In particular, the Editors are looking for empirical, theoretical and policy-oriented articles that recognize the inherently problematic nature of terrorism on the African continent and employ a critical-normative perspective on the subject.

The scope of subject matter of interest for the journal includes conceptual and field research on terrorism, violent extremism, insurgency and radicalization as well as issues related to Human Security and building community resilience in Africa. African Journal on Terrorism provides a forum for the publication of original theoretical and empirical research articles, disciplinary debates and assessments, editorial commentary, special issues and sections, end of mission reports, research notes, announcements and book reviews.



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Editorial Comment

Terrorism remains the greatest threat to international peace and security today. The manifestation and effects of the problem on African development is profound. The papers in this journal and past editions speak to the magnitude of the problem. The first lesson taught those fighting the scourge, either using coercive and non-coercive strategies, is “know the enemy; know their environment”. The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in 2010 to support this process. It undertakes first class research on terrorism in Africa with a view to guiding those working on the problems. The African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (AJPCT) plays a critical role in this process. It publishes papers on different dimensions of terrorism in Africa and suggests methods for preventing and managing the problems.

Almost ten years down the line, it has become essential to reposition the journal to provide an open but rigorous scholarly platform that encourages critical analysis and sustained reflections on issues of terrorism on the continent. Hence, ACSRT reconstituted the editorial board of the journal and organized a 2-day Inaugural editorial board meeting from 07-08 July 2019 at the ACSRT Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria to agree on the way forward. The meeting was attended by 18 members of the new editorial board, who are experts and practitioners in the field of Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Africa. The aim of the inaugural editorial board meeting was to discuss the strategic focus of the journal towards achieving international standard. Participants were drawn from all five AU regions of Africa, and included staff of ACSRT who are members of the board. Members of the new board include Prof Isaac Olawale Albert of the Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria who is the Editor- In-Chief of the Journal. On the board is also Amb. (Prof.) Joram M. Biswaro, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the AU Mission in South Sudan. The other eminent Africans on the board are listed in this edition of the Journal.

The new board took a number of radical decisions, which explains the new look of AJPCT. Future editions of the journal would reflect some of our decisions. The board proposed for the approval by the appropriate AU authority, the change of the name

of the journal from *African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* to *African Journal on Terrorism*. This is aimed at meeting international standard of journal naming as well as broadening the scope of the journal to cover all aspects of terrorism in Africa. The board agreed on a new editorial policy for the journal reflecting issues such as contents of papers for submission, submission methods, peer review mechanisms, ethical considerations, and design of the different aspects of the journal. We agreed on the scientific schema for assessing submitted papers. It was also decided that every edition should have a “technical paper” in which ACSRT informs that continent about the terrorism trends in Africa: are things getting worse or better? The present edition of the journal adheres to this agreement. Readers would agree with us that this is a major contribution to African peace processes by ACSRT.

The decision of the management of ACSRT to reposition the journal must be commended. The commitment of the board members is also salutary. Since the meeting in Algiers, all members of the board have been doing one thing or the other towards ensuring that all our agreements are strictly adhered to. Readers of the journal are also invited to suggest how the journal could be made more development-relevant for ensuring that Africa becomes a more peaceful continent we all ask for.

Editor in Chief

Prof. Isaac Olawale Albert,
Institute for Peace and Strategic
Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria

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Terrorism, Violent Extremism and Insurgency in the Sahel Region: *An Assessment*

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Abstract

The Sahel faces a veritable perfect storm of social, economic and security challenges, all of which both exacerbate, and are exacerbated by, the fragility of states in the region. The region has become home to terrorist groups in recent times such that numerous protracted atrocities have been committed against innocent civilians, security forces and government agencies by the various terrorist groups. The main aim of the study was to provide an assessment of the insurgency and the terrorism situation in the Sahel with a view of identifying the root causes and providing strategies aimed at addressing the conditions resilient for the spread of insurgency and terrorism in the region. This study adopted a robust approach of systematic scoping review using the Preferred Reporting Item for Systematic and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) principles for literature review studies. The assessment of the situation reveals a deterioration of security, safety, and stability in the Sahel region. The diversity in the attacks by Jihadist groups, ethnic self-defence groups, and trans-national criminal networks, could be attributed to their domination of territory. The inability of the security forces to deny the Terrorist/Violent Extremist groups and Tans-national Criminal Networks the terrain/choke points they currently dominate on the routes linking the Sahel and Maghreb regions has contributed to sustaining terrorist and criminal activity within the Sahel region countries. A number of political, socio-cultural and economic factors still make conditions very conducive for the spread of terrorism and violent extremism across the Sahel belt. The security forces have remained responsive to the evolving situation. Counter-Terrorism Operations have gained momentum.

While there is the need to do more to support the CT operations in order to improve security and stability, a human security response approach should inform military concepts of operation.

Keywords: Terrorism, Insurgency, Violent Extremism, Sahel Region, Counter-Terrorism, COIN.

1.1 Introduction

Terrorism remains a significant threat to international peace and security [1]. The International Community, Regional Organizations, Governments, Military, Intelligence and Security Agencies, Civil Society and Local Communities have all come to terms with the fact that no country or community is immune to this threat and that a collaborative whole-of-society approach is required to effectively address the phenomenon. African countries have been particularly susceptible to the threat of terrorism due to weak institutions, porous borders, inadequately trained or ill-equipped security forces, historical grievances and lack of economic opportunities [2]. These factors have acted as catalysts for extremist ideologies to emerge and fester in parts of the continent. Terrorism could thus be viewed as deriving from multifactorial and extremely diverse dimensions which do not lend to prediction by one single variable. Although collaborative efforts are delivering some effective preventative and counter-measure responses, terrorist and violent extremist organizations continue to hold considerable initiatives [3]. This is manifest in their capacity to launch sustained attacks and cause debilitating harm and destruction to security personnel, innocent civilians and property.

The Sahel has long been characterized by political violence, border permeability, territorial disputes, trafficking of all kinds, and ethnic-sectarian violence [4]. Instability in the Sahel dates to the colonial period resulting from demographic disposition and grievances shared by the various ethnic communities in northern Mali. Since independence, these long held grievances were never resolved. Indeed, mistrust between the central government in Bamako, Arabs and the Tuaregs in northern Mali only deepened over time. Since the Tuareg uprising in 2011 and the French military intervention in Mali in 2013, instability and insecurity have been exacerbated by the resurgence of Islamic terrorist groups. Mixed with trafficking networks, separatist movements and other conflicts, the Sahel region has been exposed to violence and is increasingly being transformed into a crisis hub. Invariably, this has attracted

attention from the international community, as threats of terrorism and related mobility issues have implications beyond the region [5]. The West African part of the Sahel region particularly Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria continue to witness persistent terrorist attacks even to the later parts of 2018 and early 2019 [6]. This is a manifestation of the worsening security situation in many parts of the Sahel region. 2018 and 2019 have shown a spike in the number of attacks particularly by Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria, Niger, and Chad, Jama'at Nustratal-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM) or the Group for the Support of Islam and Moslems (GSIM) in Mali and Burkina Faso and Ansarul Islam in Burkina Faso.

The deteriorating security situation in the Sahel has elicited support from the international community resulting in a multiplicity of both international and regional military deployment in the region. Despite the multiplicity of deployments, terrorist activities are far from abating. Some experts have often expressed concerns about the appropriateness of the current counter-terrorism and peacebuilding measures that are deployed to address the situation in many quarters. What this study seeks to do is to spotlight the root causes of the protracted atrocities as well as the current shortfalls of the counter-terrorism and peacebuilding measures adopted by all actors in the region in order to proffer workable recommendations aimed at effectively combating terrorism in these parts of Africa.

1.2 Methodology and Systematic Search Strategy

This study adopted a qualitative research strategy as a means of exploring the insurgency and terrorism situation in the Sahel region. The main aim of the study was to provide an assessment of the insurgency and the terrorism phenomenon in the Sahel. Secondary sources of data were used for the study. These sources include research published articles in peer-reviewed journals, working papers, government reports, newspaper articles as well as students' thesis and dissertations. The study was conducted using systematic scoping review approach. Systematic scoping reviews have great utility for synthesizing research evidence and are often used to categorize or group existing literature in a given field in terms of its nature, features, and volume. Electronic searches were conducted to examine all pertinent literatures irrespective of publications and language status thus published or not published. Prominent databases such as Scopus, Google Scholar, CiteSeerX, Research Gate, PsycINFO, JSTOR, EBSCO, ProQuest and ScienceDirect were searched using detailed search

approaches. Keywords used for the search include Africa, Sahel, terrorism, Insurgency, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, violent extremism, boko haram, jihadist groups, terrorist groups, armed conflicts, Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. The databases of Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) were sourced for data on terrorism incidents and its corresponding deaths in the Sahel.

In order to meet the objectives of this review, the author adopted the highly robust review methodology developed by the Campbell collaboration [7]. The author fine-tuned the details of every step in line with the specific nature and objectives of the study. Campbell's method is also in the core of major systematic review methodologies employed by leading organizations such as Cochrane, and Preferred Reporting Item for Systematic and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA). The data extraction was conducted using the PRISMA principle for systematic scoping review as proposed by Moher *et al* [8]. The PRISMA process involves the definition of the scope of the systematic scoping review, identification of potential studies through literature searches using keywords, screening of abstracts and papers to meet inclusion criteria, characterization of articles for mapping by keywords and Meta-Analysis. These steps are inter-related key steps conducted in a continuous iterative process.

1.3 Understanding Insurgency and Terrorism

Terrorism has become one of the most security challenges for many countries in the world. Due to the threat terrorism poses to international peace and security, it has attracted a lot of attention globally. Although there are international instruments which condemn terrorism and call for its suppression and elimination, there remains the primary challenge of a lack of a universally accepted legal definition for terrorism. The lack of specificity in definition has continued to pose the risk of non-standardized, insufficient or incorrect application and implementation of counter-terrorism measures. There is a long-standing consensus in the academic community over the disagreement surrounding the conceptual and operational definition of terrorism. Both the theoretical conceptualization and the empirical manifestation of terrorism are highly contested base on state, national, political, geopolitical, religious and even ideological constellations, giving rise to not one but many manifestations of terrorism, differing from one region to another, one sub-region to another and one country to another [9].

However, even though there is still lack of agreement on what terrorism is, attempts at arriving at a definition have been made. At the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) defined an act of terrorism as “any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage” [10]. Similarly, the 2015 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation”. In addition, Forest and Giroux [11], define terrorism as a tactic that uses violence or threat of violence as a coercive strategy to cause fear and political intimidation.

Insurgency on the other hand, is a strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power. Insurgency could also be defined as any kind of armed uprising against an incumbent government [12]. It is characterized by protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, and urban areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization which are all designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favor. In his book titled ‘Globalization and Insurgency’, Mackinlay [13] defined insurgency as the ‘actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to achieve their aim. Insurgency could start as a social protest, from a given group of people, who feel continuously marginalized in the affairs of government.

From the foregoing, terrorism and insurgency arise generally from similar causal conditions, terrorism often being employed as a tactics within a broad framework of an insurgent campaign. For example, groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria are known to employ a mix of insurgent and terrorism tactics. It is also clear that terrorism can stand alone as in the case of known terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic States (IS).


1.4 Terrorism and Insurgency in the Sahel: Background and Historical Perspective

The background and the historical antecedents covers; the geographic description of the Sahel, overview of insurgency and terrorism in the Sahel, Mali and the Rise of Tuareq insurgency, Algeria and the origin of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Nigeria and the Emergence of Boko Haram terrorism.

1.4.1 Geographic Description of the Sahel Region

Geographic definitions of the Sahel region vary. Commonly, the Sahel stretches from Senegal on the Atlantic coast, through parts of Mauritania, Mali, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Sudan to Eritrea on the Red Sea coast. Figure 1 illustrates a map showing the boundaries of the Sahel region. Culturally and historically, the Sahel is a shoreline between the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. This means it is the site of interaction between Arabic, Islamic and nomadic cultures from the north, and indigenous and traditional cultures from south.

Figure 1: Map showing the Sahel Region



Source: The Conservation (2017)

1.4.2 Overview of Insurgency and Terrorism in the Sahel

The Sahel region of Africa has become home to some of the world's deadliest terrorist groups in recent times resulting in numerous protracted atrocities committed against innocent civilians, security forces and government agencies [14]. Terrorist organizations have expanded their ambition, capabilities, capacities and geographical reach in the Sahel, with devastating impact on human security and economic development [15]. There appears to be a competition of Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda affiliation among terrorist groups in the Sahel. Al-Qaeda affiliated groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Macina Liberation Front (MLF), Ansarul Dine and Al- Mourabitoun operating under the name JNIM as well as Boko Haram and Ansarul Islam are very active in the region. Similarly, IS-affiliated groups such as ISWAP and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have dominated the terrorism landscape in the Sahel particularly in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. Attacks by these terrorist groups have killed tens of thousands of people and displaced millions more within and across national borders [16]. For instance in 2015, Boko Haram killed more people than IS killed in Syria and Iraq combined. From June 2011 through June 2018, the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) documented 2,021 incidents involving Boko Haram, in which 37,530 people were killed, nearly double the conventionally cited estimate of 20,000. Over the same period, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) identified 3,346 incidents, in which 34,261 people were killed (Campbell & Harwood, 2018). As at March 31, 2019, the group has carried out 50 attacks and killed 204 persons [17].

In Mali, the situation worsened in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising necessitating international intervention against armed groups from progressing to the capital city of Bamako [18]. The rise of extremist groups is exacerbating old inter-communal tensions between ethnic groups particularly those of Peul (Fulani) and Dogons [19]. On 23 March 2019 in Ogossagou, armed men dressed like traditional Dozo hunters attacked a Fulani community killing 160 people, including women and children. Similarly, about 100 members of the Dogon ethnic group were killed on 10 June 2019, in Sobame Da located in Mopti region. Due to its geographical location, Niger is exposed to criminal activities, including terrorism, on multiple fronts. While groups such as JNIM and its affiliates generate insecurity at the border with Mali and Burkina Faso, the most notable threat is posed by Boko Haram. The South Eastern part of Niger particularly, the Diffa region is the most affected [20]. Despite claims that Boko Haram has been technically defeated following the

intensification of counter-terrorism operations carried out by the MNJTF in 2015, the group continue to carry out attacks in northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and the Lake Chad Basin area of Chad [21]. The group had had to change tactics every now and then in order to continue to wreak havoc in its areas of operation. Terrorist activities have taken a terrible toll on local communities that were already fragile and economically marginalised. Burkina Faso is another country greatly affected by the scourge of terrorism in the Sahel in recent times. Between January 2016 and June 2019, an estimated number of 521 terrorist-related attacks were recorded, resulting in the deaths of over 750 people [22]. The fear however, is that, if the terrorists win in Burkina Faso, the country could become a launchpad for terrorists to expand their influence to the coast of West Africa and even beyond.

1.4.3 Mali: The Rise of Tuareg Insurgency

The grievances of Malian Tuareg and other northern Malian communities date to the colonial period. In the transition to independence in the late 1950s, some Tuareg were disappointed not to receive their own state, particularly when France's Common Organization of the Saharan Regions (French: Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes, OCRS), a territorial unit created in 1957 and dissolved in 1963, failed to realize such aspirations [23]. The Tuareg rebellion of 1963-1964 reflected dissatisfaction with the early postcolonial state and a desire for independence, as well as divisions within Tuareg from the Kidal region after independence. Its brutal suppression by the Malian army left anger that endured even after Mali's government opened Kidal to the outside world in the mid-1990s [24]. The fathers of some present-day rebel commanders, such as the MNLA's Mohamed Ag Najem and Ansar al Din's Iyad Ag Ghali, died in that conflict.

In the early 2000s, as Algeria's civil war drew to a close, AQIM's predecessor organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (known by its French acronym GSPC) moved south into the Sahara and Sahel, conducting kidnappings and raids from Mauritania to Chad [25]. The corruption of some Malian officials, including northern military officials, appears to have abetted AQIM's involvement in this business. AQIM also attempted to embed itself in northern Malian communities through commerce, marriage, and outreach to dissidents, including former Tuareg rebels. The entry of AQIM followed years of outreach from local as well as transnational religious actors in Bamako and in the north, notably the Tablighi Jama'at, a Muslim missionary society that originated in Indian subcontinent.

As Mali entered the present decade, domestic and regional turbulence grew. In addition to long-term trends like the increasing frequency of droughts and the intensification of AQIM activity in the Sahara and the Sahel, a host of developments destabilized politics in North and West Africa. To the north, the “Arab Spring” began in Tunisia in January 2011. Protest movements left regimes intact in Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania, but they plunged Libya into civil war. As Colonel Mu’ammarr Qaddhafi fought for survival, refugees, fighters, and weapons travelled out of Libya. Analysts have debated how much weight to accord this circulation of men and arms in explaining why Mali’s 2012 rebellion occurred when it did, but at the very least the turmoil in Libya decreased Mali’s prospects for stability. The MNLA, created officially in October 2011 after meetings in Zakak, in far northern Mali, benefited from returning fighters and weapons, as well as the high-level defections of Malian soldiers, officers, and gendarmes who had previously joined or been integrated into the security forces following past peace accords.

The 2012-2013 Malian crisis can be explained in a series of events. The build-up to the rebellion began with the formation of the National Movement of the Azawad (French: Mouvement National de l’Azawad, MNA) in Timbuktu on November 1 2010. The MNLA, an alliance of the MNA and Ag Bahanga’s National Alliance of Tuareg of Mali (French: Alliance Nationale des Touareg du Mali, ANTM) issued its first communique on October 16, 2011. This culminated into the MNLA’s first attacks in northern Mali. The MNLA, along with fighters belonging to the Tuaregled Islamist group Ansar al Din drove the Malian national army out of northern Malian cities. The MNLA declared a state of independence for northern Mali as the “Azawad” on April 6, 2012. In northern Mali, the Islamist coalition, comprising the Ansar al Din, AQIM, and MUJAO politically and militarily outmaneuvered the MNLA, taking control of northern Malian cities resulting in Islamist fighters’ advancing into the Mopti Region and their seizure of the town of Konna. The rapid battlefield successes resulted in the French Military intervention of “Operation Serval” which recaptured Mopti from Islamist. The Islamist resorted to guerrilla tactics, including the first suicide bombings in Malian history on February 8, 2013, in Gao. In 2015, Amadou Kouffa a Marabout who had acted as commander for the Islamist militants in the 2013 Battle of Konna formed the Macina Liberation Force (MLF). Kouffa was reportedly killed by the French Army in November 2018, but reappeared in February 2019 in a video denying his death.

1.4.4 Algeria: Islamic Insurgency and Origin the of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

The roots of AQIM are found in the Algerian civil war that broke out in 1992, following the army's decision to step in and prevent the Islamic Salvation Front party *Islamique du Salut* (FIS) from winning the first democratic elections in the history of the country. With the suspension of the electoral process and the banning of the FIS, the country became the theatre of an all-out conflict pitting the military against various armed Islamist groups. Amongst the latter, the Armed Islamic Group *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA) soon emerged as the most effective, particularly in the wake of spectacular operations such as the hijacking of an Air France flight from Algiers to Paris in 1994 [26]. Throughout the 1990s, the GIA made no distinctions between Algerian security forces and the civilian population, and even carried out a series of operations in France, in one of the bloodiest conflicts ever witnessed in the region.

However, by the late 1990s, a series of factors had weakened the GIA, leading to the gradual demise of its popular support: the army's successful "eradication" policy against terrorists; the GIA's increasingly erratic and extremist leadership; its violent tactics; and, in particular, its role in the killing of civilians. In this context, in 1998, former GIA member Hassan Hattab broke away from the organization, founding the new *Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat* (GSPC), with the explicit goal of avoiding the unnecessary targeting of civilians. The rise of the GSPC coincided with a dramatic strategic shift: between the late 1990s and early 2000s, the civil war had slowly turned from an all-out conflict into a low-intensity insurgency, as the Algerian authorities carried out a series of high-profile arrests and successful military operations while offering an amnesty to the remaining jihadi fighters.

Against this background, in the 2000s, the GSPC de facto retreated to two strongholds, from where it continued to carry out several attacks against the Algerian state: the Berber-inhabited Kabylia in the East; and the Saharan region in the South [27]. This concealed a growing dualism within the organization, as the Saharan branch of the GSPC, led initially by Amari Saifi "El Para" and subsequently by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, focused almost exclusively on smuggling and kidnapping mostly for fundraising purposes, whereas the GSPC in the Kabylia continued to target the symbols of the Algerian state in a more conventional fashion. In addition, the organization was plagued with internal strife, as various personalities clashed

over leadership and tactics. In 2003, Hassan Hattab was ousted and replaced first by Nabil Sahraoui and then in 2004, after Sahraoui's death, by Abdelmalek Droukdel [28].

Under Droukdel also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, the GSPC underwent a radical reorganization, as the group went back to targeting civilians, a practice earlier denounced by Hattab. However, despite Droukdel's efforts, the dualism within the organization persisted. Moreover, Droukdel decided to establish an increasingly closer relationship with Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, in what marked a significant departure from the traditional "xenophobia" of Algeria's Islamist terrorism, i.e., a rejection of any form of external support. This rapprochement culminated in 2007, when the GSPC officially re-branded itself as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), thus marking its affiliation with the global jihad's strategy and tactics. In the wake of this event, AQIM executed some of its most devastating attacks in April and again in December 2007, striking at the heart of Algiers and causing dozens of casualties. These attacks also underlined AQIM's new tactics, as the group used suicide bombings in a similar fashion to insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq [29].

Despite AQIM's spectacular ability to carry out such attacks, the organization is still plagued with several long-standing problems. First of all, although estimates vary, the group probably continues to rely on just a few hundred members, thus highlighting its inability to develop from a terrorist group into a more structured threat involving a mass movement or a full-blown insurgency. Second, the organization's operations remain confined to two main areas, the mountainous Kabylia and the inhospitable Sahara, as the security forces are in control of the situation everywhere else in Algeria. Third, although one of AQIM's goals is the regionalization of its presence to the whole North African region, so far it has failed almost completely to expand its operations to neighboring Morocco, Tunisia and Libya. Nevertheless, AQIM has been able to exploit the security vacuum in the Algerian Sahara and the Sahel region, from where it has managed to establish a significant presence in Mali, Mauritania and Niger [30]. In March 2017, the various Al Qaeda affiliated groups AQIM, Al Murabitoun, Ansar al Din and MLF came together to form the JNIM in response to the deployment of international forces such as MINUSMA, Operation Barkhane and the G-5 Sahel Joint Taskforce.

1.4.5 Nigeria: The Emergence of Boko Haram Terrorism

Boko Haram is a militant organization based in north-eastern Nigeria and also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon [31]. The group was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf upon the principles of the Khawaarij advocating Sharia law. It turned into a violent extremist group in 2009 and has been responsible for loss of lives in many parts of Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram previously existed as *Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād* [32]. One of the goals of the Boko Haram group is to champion for the establishment of an Islamic State, ruled by strict sharia law especially in the Northern part of Nigeria where the majority of the populations are Muslims. Boko Haram believes that democracy is too lenient and violates Islam. It also opposes the Westernization of Nigerian society and also the concentration of the wealth of the country among members of small political elite, mainly in the Christian south of the country [33].

The roots of Boko Haram lie in the Islamic history of northern Nigeria, in which for some 800 years powerful sultanates centered on the Hausa cities close to Kano and the sultanate of Borno (roughly the region of the states of Borno and Yobe together with parts of Chad) constituted high Muslim civilizations. These sultanates were challenged by the jihad of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio (that lasted from 1802-1812), who created a unified caliphate stretching across northern Nigeria into the neighbouring countries [34]. Dan Fodio's legacy of jihad is one that is seen as normative by most northern Nigerian Muslims. The caliphate still ruled by his descendants (together with numerous smaller sultanates), however, was conquered by the British in 1905, and in 1960 Muslim northern Nigeria was federated with largely Christian southern Nigeria [35].

The Muslim response to the Christian political ascendancy was the move during the period of 2000-2003 to impose Sharia in 12 of the northern states in which they predominated [36]. For the most part, imposition of Sharia brought the previously feuding Muslim groups together, and there was no further use of takfiri (accusations of being non-Muslim) [37]. While the imposition of Sharia did satisfy the official manifestations of Islam in the north (both Sufi and Salafi), it is clear that radicals who were takfiris doctrinally such as members of Boko Haram were left outside [38].

There is no doubt that the suppression operation of 2009, and the killing of Muhammad Yusuf by Nigerian security forces in July of that year, was a turning

point for Boko Haram. The group was frequently said at this time to be defunct. In September 2010 (coinciding with Ramadan), however, Boko Haram carried out a prison break (said to have released some 700 prisoners) [39] and thereafter, the group began operations again. The targeted assassinations are the most revealing, involving political figures, such as Abba Anas bin `Umar (killed in May 2011), the brother of the Shehu of Borno, and secular opposition figures (Modu Fannami Godio, killed in January 2011), but also prominent clerics such as Bashir Kashara, a well-known Wahhabi figure (killed in October 2010), Ibrahim Ahmad Abdullahi, a non-violent preacher (killed in March 2011), and Ibrahim Birkuti, a well-known popular preacher who challenged Boko Haram (killed in June 2011). The shootings of these prominent clerics seem to be in accord with Boko Haram's purificationist agenda with regard to Islam [40].

Boko Haram related violence has largely been confined to Nigeria's northeast, in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. It has been most heavily concentrated in Borno, with the brunt of the violence borne by Maiduguri, Gwoza, and Kukawa. Violence has also become common south and east of Maiduguri, along the border with Cameroon's Far North Region, and around Lake Chad. There have been sporadic incidents in places such as Nigeria's Middle Belt and the capital of Abuja that have been attributed to Boko Haram. Boko Haram has adopted suicide attacks as an important tactic in its struggle against government authority.

Over the past seven years, Boko Haram has demonstrated flexibility and remains a formidable threat to the Nigerian state despite losing much of its territory. Though the group is undoubtedly less powerful than it was in 2015, there is no sign that the government will defeat it in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, the pervasive threat of violence sharply curtails the ability of international aid organizations and donor countries to provide humanitarian relief. The extent of the group's popular support and the extent to which the security services are fuelling Boko Haram recruitment needs to be properly assessed.

1.5 Identifying the Root Causes

While the incidence and spread of terrorism in the Sahel cannot be attributed to any single factor, reference is copiously made by scholars and practitioners on causal factors such as political grievances, relative deprivation and actual or perceived injustice which tend to act as catalysts and exploited by terrorist groups to justify

the need to distrust government and to cause a change through violent means. While many authors have alluded to the vast geographic nature of the Sahel belt as fertile grounds for insurgencies and insurrections, others have cited the meeting of different and occasionally hostile creeds and ideologies. Nomadic pastoralists come into contact with agrarians, while predominantly Muslim northerners meet with Christian and animist southerners. Arabs, Berbers and Tuareg meet sub-Saharan (black) Africans. This meeting of different peoples has resulted in violence, and further created historical tribal rivalries and conflicts with occasional clashes. The inter-communal/ethnics violence has been exacerbated due to the rise in extremist groups.

Some proximate causal factors identified include poor communication and mistrust between government and local communities, lack of government presence in local communities, inability of government to provide the basic needs of local communities, lack of opportunities, unemployment, lack of accountability by political office holders, corruption, injustice, impunity, discrimination, exclusive politics and other context-specific good governance deficits. These create conditions of disillusionment, hopelessness and frustration in local communities and facilitate radicalization as well as resort to acts of violent extremism and terrorism. Also, the lack of economic and financial capacities of Sahel countries to deliver on the expectations of the citizenry are also proximate causal factors to the state of disillusionment, hopelessness and frustration in a number of instances.

The incidence of militant religious extremism, the presence and activities of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), the running of criminal/illicit economy, and the trafficking of weapons and drugs are considered as key external causal factors. The threat of terrorism in the Sahel continues to evolve around local terrorist groups and insurgencies with a Militant Salafi-Jihadism worldview and an affiliation to either Al-Qaeda or Islamic State. The world view dimension of the terrorist groups also facilitates the provision and receipt of support. These groups, tend to profess an extremist religious world view with a strategic terrorism objective. In both of these cases, an examination of the Ways, Means, and Ends employed and pursued by these groups reveals that external factors play a major part in sustaining their activities. There appears to be an externally driven grand strategy to suppress Islamic Sufism and aggressively diffuse and propagate a Salafist-jihadist ideology in the Sahel through militancy. The activities of most terrorist groups in the Sahel indicate consonance

with this grand strategy. The Salafist-jihadist ideology projects a deviation of the dictates of the Islam faith and strict adherence contrary to what the local African communities have practiced over centuries and which is tolerant of other faiths and cultures. This is a recipe for confrontation.

1.6 Challenges of Counter-Insurgency/Counter-Terrorism in the Sahel

Faced with the complex and sophisticated terrorist attacks, stakeholders in the Sahel region have responded by deploying troops aimed at combating terrorism. Given the level of terrorist activities, it comes as no surprise that the region as a whole has undergone a process of securitization in recent years, which has resulted in a multitude of forces on the ground. The current deployment in the Sahel includes G5 Sahel Joint Force, Operation Barkhane, Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and well as the national armies of the respective countries. The trends in terrorist activities and counter-terrorism efforts observed in the Sahel is rather not encouraging. Counter-Terrorism response has been fraught with a lot of difficulties and challenges leading to the worsening and deterioration of the security situation in most countries of the Sahel. This has the potential of spreading to other neighbouring countries. A number of shortcomings could be cited.

Undermining the success of the counter-terrorism efforts, is the discontent among troops, as exemplified by instances of military personnel refusing to take part in operations or abandoning their posts. This is further compounded by the mistrust among troop contributing countries with some troops always in a hurry to announce victory without crediting the entire force. This has often led to disagreements among countries contributing troops to the counter-terrorism efforts thereby derailing the progress of the force.

The lack of capacity to confront the challenge by state security apparatus is another issue [41]. Inappropriate training, ill-equipped and a lack of ammunition, together with militants' prowess, contribute to low morale. Counter-terrorism operations require specific training, equipment, intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialized military preparation. It would seem unrealistic to expect any significant improvement on this front in the short and medium terms, partly because of funding constraints and delays in deployment for some of the missions, such as G5 Sahel Joint Force. Lack of financial capability of troop contributing countries to effectively resource

personnel has resulted in logistical constraints of deployed troops [42]. Corruption within government and state security apparatus has also contributed to the logistical constraints of the troops as there have been cases of politicians and senior military personnel misapplying funds meant of equipment and retooling of troops.

Lack of coordination, cooperation, and collaboration among the various deployed troops in the Sahel is a major setback confronting the fight against terrorism. There have been cases of some deployments refusing to share intelligence with other contingents operating in the same theatre, thereby undermining their military capability to curtail the scourge of terrorism. The delay in the response of some non-national contingents to distress calls from national authorities of the member states in which they are deployed is also another challenge.

In addition, it has become apparent that the ever-growing focus on counter-terrorism, underscored by significant international (Western) efforts, seeks to abandon the implementation of peace accords and agreements such as the 2015 Algiers Peace Accord in Mali, which is crucial not only for a security solution but also for a political resolution of the conflict. In some cases also, the security situation has made it difficult for governments to implement reforms needed to address root causes fuelling the spread of terrorism. Similarly, the influx of foreign support and resources to address security challenges such as terrorism and human trafficking appears to fail to address much-needed reforms in state behaviour, governance and justice, which are significant factors in driving violence and radicalization.

1.7 Conclusion

The Sahel faces a veritable perfect storm of social, economic, and security challenges, all of which both exacerbate, and are exacerbated by, the fragility of states in the region. In all, it could be said that fragility of states within the Sahel belt, porous nature of borders, drug trafficking, transnational organized crimes and the persistent inter-communal violence have contributed to the vulnerability of states to terrorists organization. This is manifest in the terrorist groups' capacity to carry out devastating attacks against security and civilians alike. However, ensuring future stability will require far more than a purely military approach. Investments in education, infrastructure, poverty alleviation, family planning, youth engagement, good governance initiatives, humanitarian relief and climate change adaptation strategies, among others, are critical to alleviating the pressures on states and addressing the broader causes of

insecurity, insurgency, terrorism and violent extremism. By maintaining a more holistic understanding of the pressures facing states and populations today and in the future, governments in the region and their partners may yet contribute to a more peaceful and stable future for the Sahel in order to ensure community resilience and empowerment.

1.8 Policy Recommendations

The policy recommendation of this study is that placing emphasis on kinetic militaristic strategies alone to combat violent extremism and defeat terrorism will not be enough unless they are conducted in tandem with addressing the root causes such as marginalization, poverty and social exclusion, injustice, lack of rule of law, and bad governance in Africa.

Although military strategies may be justifiable in combative situations, more practical and lasting solutions must be targeted in preventive measures. Policies geared towards preventing and combating violent extremism must necessarily consider creating conducive economic atmosphere and a sense of belonging, particularly for young people to be productive and contribute to the socio-economic development of their communities and countries.

Therefore, the Human Security approach to preventing and countering Violent Extremism, with the citizenry and their local communities as the primary referent objects of national security policy formulation and implementation are worthwhile pathway to eschewing impunity and abuse of human rights and help build trust, social cohesion and sense of belonging between Government and the citizenry. Without these, military expenditure and counter-terrorism operations, particularly in violent extremism zones where poverty and marginalization are pervasive, will be a mirage.

Countries in the Sahel need to understand the transnational nature of the terrorist threat and, therefore, the sine qua non-requirement to share actionable intelligence in order to disrupt potential attacks and arrest criminal elements.

In order to ensure and strengthen peaceful co-existence, the shaping of the intercommunity relations of ethnic-based societies which have outstanding disputes borne out of history or mistrust is a priority that should engage the urgent attention of community leaders, Local Government authorities and policy makers, particularly in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

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Political Economy of Insurgency in North East Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper examines the activities of the insurgency in the North Eastern part of Nigeria, particularly those of the Boko Haram sect and its impact on the economic development of the region. This paper further reveals that the situation in the North Eastern part of the country is aggravated by the deteriorating economic situation in the region which continues to make it an ideal place for Islamic extremists to carry out their reign of terror against government institutions and to conduct attacks against the Nigerian state at large. The paper interrogates the approaches adopted by the government in responding to the insurgency in the region and finds that the approaches so far adopted by the government continue to yield very little results. In-depth study of the situation in the North Eastern part of the country reveals that the grievances which have resulted in the use of violent tactics against the government by insurgents, are better addressed through a multifaceted approach, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach which takes into account the specific needs of the region. The paper concludes with alternative policy recommendations based on the research findings that point to the peculiarities of the region and which offer a possible avenue for addressing the insecurity impasse in the region.

Key words: Economic Development, Extremists, Government, Insurgency, North East Nigeria.

1.0 Introduction

Over the years, the West African sub region has witnessed relative peace and stability. The sub-region refers to the states within West Africa. This has also helped

the economies within the region to consolidate economic growth and development. While the popular assumption has been that democracy has come to stay in Africa, the case has not necessarily been the same for all the countries in the sub Saharan African region. Some of these countries have seen their democracies stretched beyond limits from internal political divisions having external consequences to vulnerabilities posed by instability with close neighbors. Nigeria has not been an exception to these challenges as well. Since the return of democracy to Africa's most populous nation the 29th of May 1999, the country has had to confront numerous political and economic challenges after several years of military rule. Appeasing divergent interests in Nigeria, with a multiplicity of ethnic groups has required not only astute skills and political compromises but also at great costs, some of which are reflected in the loss of lives and property unfortunately. Not too long after the commencement of the fourth Republic, which has marked the return to democratic rule after years of military rule. The nation was confronted with an insecurity crisis emanating from the Niger Delta region.

Apart from the development related challenges that confront every other developing country, there has been a growing threat posed by insecurity in Nigeria today. The insecurity dilemma in the northern part of the country in recent times has claimed the lives of so many people. Iyekekpolo [1] echoes the importance of identifying the cause of the Boko Haram insurgency as being necessary to ensuring the recurring violence in northern Nigeria. While there continues to be several explanations for this insurrection [2] little attention seems to be placed on the historical context from the times of colonial rule which has resulted in a distinction between the North and the South in Nigeria [3] as is the case today. Also, the situation tends to impede economic growth and development not only in the north, but in Nigeria as a whole. While the government's response up until this moment has been swift and reactionary, meeting every confrontation with the use of force, these responses have produced very little results. In some cases, it has been said that the security forces have aggravated the situation through extrajudicial killings. This is partly a fallout of the broader erosion of "the very social networks of trust and reciprocity that is key to overcoming a guerilla-style insurgency like Boko Haram" as argued by Agbiboa [4]. Another important point to note is that despite the government's repeated attempts at resolving this challenge, a fundamental question that remains to be answered is why these attempts have failed. Could it be that the approaches adopted by the government do not necessarily seek to tackle the root of the problem? Despite these

many concerns, Nigerians are the ones who are caught in between this carnage and onslaught unleashed on them by the various terrorist groups and militias seeking to thwart the fabric that holds the nation together such as Boko Haram, Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP) and Ansaru, to mention a few.

Whatever the reasons are, this paper offers an in-depth study and understanding of the causes and reasons for the prolonged insecurity impasse in the north east and by extension the northern part of the country and its likely impact on the economic development of the region.

2.0 Statement of the Problem

The insecurity situation in northern Nigeria is therefore worth paying attention to as it poses a very serious and imminent threat to the overall progress and development of the country. The questions that this paper seeks to address therefore, are the following:

- i. Why has North Eastern Nigeria remained a haven for extremists, unlike other parts of Nigeria?
- ii. Why have previous policies aimed at tackling insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria failed and yet succeeded in other parts of the country?
- iii. What is the impact of the insecurity impasse in North-Eastern Nigeria on the economic development in the region?

3.0 Methodology

The paper is an analytical qualitative one which relies on primary sources of data from official documents and publications of government ministries, departments and agencies as well as states specific data on economic indicators and performance since the inception of the insecurity dilemma in the northern parts of Nigeria from the National Bureau of Statistics. Other sources include books, journals, and reports from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and United Nations Development Programme, academic papers as well as online news from both national and international media websites.

4.0 Economic Dimensions to Insurgency in Northern Nigeria

While some arguments seem to highlight the situation in Africa with respect to the sociological underpinnings of insecurity, the economic dimension to these arguments are insufficient. The central contention here which is closely associated with the human needs theory of social conflicts states that ‘all humans have basic needs which they seeks to fulfil and failure caused by other individuals or groups to meet these needs could lead to conflict’ [5], [2]. It is therefore imperative that security should be given a boost in Africa to sustain economic development in a continent that has a high prevalence of poverty and underdevelopment.

There have been a few attempts to link insecurity to underdevelopment in West Africa; one of such attempts asserts that economic underdevelopment is a major cause of insecurity in West Africa. Marshall [6] posits that there are two factors which help to explain the ‘great disparity between expected levels of political violence in the generally poor and poorly integrated and mobilized countries of Africa and the observed high levels of violence and welfare’. He goes on to state that ‘perhaps the most important factor is the economic and political marginalization of the majority of the populations of many African countries. This position offers a pointer to what could possibly be the root cause of most conflicts in Africa; however, it does not consider other factors such as cultural differences and historical antecedents.

According to Hansen, as cited in Alozieuwa [2], the two main sources of conflict in Africa are ‘the modernization paradigm which tends to see conflict as endogenously generated; this looks for factors as the conflict between primordial loyalties and the strains on the modernization processes. He further argues in the same context that a source of conflict in Africa is a structural approach which uses ‘the economic and political linkage between African countries and metropolitan countries as a wider canvas against which to work out issues of conflict’ (*ibid.*). It is pertinent to point out here that scholarly positions remain divided on this matter as with other matters on the relationship between conflict and development.

Cornish [7] argues that while there may be a connection to terrorism and underdevelopment, which could be found in deprivation, disease, inequality, ill-health, debt, corruption crime and so forth this connection while being plausible is difficult to prove and most certainly is not a complete answer to the problem.

5.0 Political Feud Perspectives to Insurgency in Northern Nigeria

Irrespective of the analytical dimensions to understanding the causes or sources of conflict in Nigeria which invariably breeds insecurity on the continent it is clear that the country needs to address its insecurity challenges if they are to make progress in economic development.

Alozieuwa [2] identifies the general misconception about the northern part of Nigeria as a monolithic political entity. He also opines that attention needs to be given to this misconception. However, Kukah observes that the ascription of leadership qualities by British colonialism to the Fulanis, later took root in the latter's mind and made them unresponsive to the quest of other citizens for a place in the power ladder in Nigeria [2].

This theoretical perspective has continued to generate more interest in explaining the insecurity that exists in the northern part of the country as it further exposes the deep division that exists amongst Nigeria's disparate social groups. According to Alozieuwa [2], this perspective is premised primarily on the argument that the emergence of President Jonathan after the 2011 elections pitted some formidable political forces in the north against most of those in the south, particularly the minority ethnic Ijaw nationality of the south-south of Nigeria who saw this as an opportunity to placate their restive region over years of perceived political and economic marginalization. This argument is further premised on the belief that the persistent violence by extremist elements in the north against government institutions is aimed at undermining the legitimacy of a southern president. However, this argument can no longer be justified under the current administration of President Muhammadu Buhari.

6.0 Religious and Ethnic Dimensions to Insurgency in Northern Nigeria

The Northern part of Nigeria remains a predominantly Islamic society. The ethnic composition of the people in this region is also a major factor that helps to understand the peculiar relationship that religion has with tradition. Northern Nigeria is mostly composed of the Hausa- Fulani as well as other smaller ethnic groups which all share Islam as a common religion. Although, it is important to note that other religions such as Christianity may also be found in some parts of Northern Nigeria. This is important in taking into cognizance the fact that the insecurity impasse that has prevailed since 2003 to date in the region reflects the use and interpretation of Islam

continues to emanate from the region. For instance, Boko Haram which remains the dominant Islamic extremist group in the region continues to intensify its reign of terror on the Nigerian state, it is pertinent to note the motivations behind the insurgency's actions. Rufai [8] contends that "a careful look at the style and mode of operations of the movement also provide some insight into its ideology". Its affiliation with al Qaeda by extension places within a shared broader vision of global political Islam, which as Alozieuwa [2] explains, is the overthrow of all worldly government (kufur system) and the enthronement of an Islamic theocratic state. It is instructive to note however, that Abdile and Botha [9] (p.499) are of the opinion that "while religion provides an obvious backdrop to the activities of Boko Haram, former members themselves did not cite it as a dominant reason for joining Boko Haram".

Alozieuwa [2] goes on to argue that Boko Haram, and other similar affiliated Islamic extremist groups in Nigeria, such as Boko Haram, Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP) and Ansaru, have invoked the name of Allah severally to explain why it carried out its terror campaigns against media sources. Boko Haram operatives for instance, shares the same mindset elucidated by Mozayyan, it believes that it can defeat the Nigerian state notwithstanding the sophistication and quality of weapons at the latter's disposal [2]. It is important to note that the level of interaction between ISWAP and ISIS remains largely unknown, since the former pledged allegiance to the later in 2015 [10].

Oshita [11] contends that by politicizing ethnicity and religion, the elite of various nationalities act as conflict entrepreneurs, using ordinarily non-conflictual differences as instruments for mobilizing local support to satisfy their own selfish political and economic motives. They deliberately manipulate public discourse by portraying common inter-group differences as confrontational and irreconcilable, and, in the process, achieve personal benefits from the conflict. By focusing on differences and undermining basic commonalities, the elite promote mutual disrespect within the society, with groups perceiving one another as architect of their problems.

Although Nwanegbo and Odigbo [12] offer a puzzling view, arguing that Boko Haram, which is one of the main Islamic groups wreaking havoc on the Nigerian state, seems to be a destructive political tool with a cosmetic pretension of being religious. The bombing of Nigeria Police Force Headquarters in Abuja on June 16, 2011, the U.N house in Abuja on August 26, 2011 and other high-profile bombings

attest to this assertion. However, D'Amato [13] contends that Boko Haram does not have a history of transnational ethnic or political affiliations.

7.0 Theoretical Framework

While there are various theories that have been adopted in explaining the dynamics and intricacies of the insecurity impasse in northern Nigeria [1], the Political Feud Theory provides a suitable analytical framework for this research. The theory takes into cognizance the assumptions that the insecurity impasse in the northern part of the country is in part an attempt at bringing about a regime change in the country [2]. This position has also received further support as explained by some influential voices within the polity. The primary argument being that the situation in the northern part of the country has deteriorated into a state where politically aggrieved elements have now taken the country hostage through acts of violence in an attempt to ensure that their political interests are given full expression [2].

This theory captures the notion of political repression as an instrument that facilitates conflict or violence. Collier [14] contends that “political repression has ambiguous effects on the risk of conflict. A society that is highly democratic is safer than one that is only partially democratic”. The theory subscribes to the role of historical antecedents in understanding the insecurity dilemma in the northern part of Nigeria and yet makes provisions for an economic dimension to this impasse and the consequences of the situation on economic development of the region. This theory supports the assumption that the current insecurity situation in the northern part of the country can be traced to the regional disparity within the context of relative deprivation [2] that has come to characterize the region as a result of years of neglect and economic isolation. This theory continues to receive wide acclaim as it captures the various elements that explain the situation in the region both from a political and economic perspective. Grievances over historic exclusion from economic, social and political opportunities and power provides incentives for insurgency, and the appeal to group loyalty and identity can be a powerful means to mobilization. The political dimension to the insecurity impasse in the region is significant in understanding the nature and causes of the crisis. It is important to note however, that this position is closely collaborated with the economic perspective of the crisis. Insecurity in northern Nigeria does not only result in the loss of lives and property, but it also affects the economic outlook of the region as the situation makes progress on economic development increasingly difficult.

The activities of the insurgency remain a threat to Nigeria [15]. They can also be said to be the biggest nightmare that confronts the Nigerian state since the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914. This takes into account other challenges such as the relative political instability that has since shaped the nation's journey to statehood.

The theory appears to be one of the most common explanations for violent behavior which emanates from the inability to fulfil needs which in turn affect the security of a nation and also closely supports the Political feud Theory too. This being the case with the insurgent groups in Northern Nigeria such as Boko Haram whose militant activities was born out of frustration and aggression on the part of policy makers and implementers of the northern region who for long have been aggrieved.

8.0 Economic Underdevelopment and Insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria

Northern Nigeria has been the most underdeveloped part of the country since Nigeria gained independence in 1960 compared to other parts of the country. Just as poverty and proliferations of small arms have been attributed to some of the factors that fuel insecurity in the North, there is no doubt that this plays a major role too. The popular position is that this region has been a victim of prolonged years of neglect and marginalization, yet others contest this view. The violence and conflict that is peculiar to northern Nigeria goes as far back as 30 years ago.

Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, new forms of political elites have emerged in the northern part of the country. The emergence of these new political actors has done little to transform the lives of the average northerner, leaving some to assert that poverty and underdevelopment is a northern phenomenon [16]. One of the first group that emerged as a security concern in northern Nigeria since the return to democratic rule was the 'Nigerian Taliban' with its origins from Yobe and Borno States in 2003. According to the International Crisis Group, the group was met with strong resistance by the Nigerian security forces which led it to flee into neighboring Cameroon while most of its members fled to Maiduguri, in North East Nigeria only to re-emerge in 2006-2009 under a new name of 'Boko Haram'.

According to the Red Cross, over 780 bodies were buried in mass graves after the group launched a wide scale offensive against the state of Bauchi in July 2009. These

attacks were repelled by security forces and it also led to the capture of the then leader of the group Yusuf Mohammed. The insurgency has since attracted other “Muslim youth, including university students and some young people who apparently were revolted by corruption in wealthy families” as pointed out by the International Crisis Group in its report.

It is also worth taking into cognizance the emergence of a new insurgent group which operates from the northern part of the country. This group which is known as Ansaru has so far used kidnapping of foreign nationals in Nigeria to vent its opposition to the West. Though it is still unclear to establish any links between Ansaru and Boko Haram. However, there is every tendency to believe that in a bid to consolidate its position it may seek to strengthen ties with other radical Islamist groups in Mali and elsewhere in the Maghreb as Campbell [17] points out.

The situation in the north has thus degenerated further thereby intensifying the already deepened feeling of inequality and deprivation that is commonly associated with the region. According to Johnson [18] of the Washington based Council on Foreign Relations think tank, ‘despite a per capita income of more than USD 2,700 and an annual GDP growth of 7 per cent Nigeria has one of the world’s poorest populations. An estimated 70 per cent of the population lives on less than a USD 1.25 a day. Economic disparities between the north and the rest of the country are stark. In the north, 72 per cent of people live in poverty compared to 27 per cent in the south and 35 per cent in the Niger Delta’. As it currently is, the underdevelopment in the north eastern part of the country seems to offer an attractive platform for the insurgency to consolidate its agenda against the Nigerian state.

9.0 Data Presentation and Analysis

The data used for this paper is obtained largely from the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics. The methodology adopted for the research consists mainly of a qualitative analysis of the data to which empirical findings are drawn after rigorous analysis. This work therefore depicts an in-depth analysis of various economic development indicators and how they are being affected by the current insecurity impasse in Northern Nigeria for the specified period under review.

10.0 Consequences of Insurgency on Economic Development

As Page [19] puts it, failure to understand and incorporate security concerns into development policy may significantly limit the ability of developing countries to achieve acceptable rates of growth and poverty reduction. Nigeria continues to face numerous economic development challenges. These challenges remain prevalent in the northern part of the country due to the on-going security problems in the region.

Another major concern is that the security forces that are responsible for the protection of lives and property appear to be ill equipped and, in most cases, taken off guard in the fight against insecurity in the country.

An analysis of the impact of the situation on economic development can be understood by comparing the situation with the rest of the country in terms of certain basic economic development indicators.

10.1 Unemployment and Insurgency

Taking into account the situation as at 2010, unemployment in northern Nigeria has been on the increase since the inception of the current insecurity impasse in the country. The situation has only grown worse as the insecurity situation in the north has made the limited available jobs even more vulnerable. Nigeria was ranked 157 out of 186 countries in the 2018 United Nations Human Development index. This goes on to establish the difficulty young Nigerians face in their quest for employment. The reason is that in such a conflict thorn region like the north, investors are increasingly becoming reluctant to invest capital and other resources which are needed to create job opportunities.

10.2 Poverty and Insurgency

Recent economic growth, in Nigeria, particularly in the agricultural sector has recorded some positive results as the proportion of underweight children has reduced, from 35.7 per cent in 1990 to 23.1 per cent in 2010. However, this has not necessarily translated into economic growth and development. As at 2010, the total number of people living in relative poverty in Nigeria was 60 per cent. While the popular assumption is that poverty remains endemic in northern Nigeria, it is symbolic to note that the situation is a reflection of high levels of illiteracy and lack of access to basic social amenities and infrastructural facilities. Fasakin [20] argues that

“economic deprivation caused by the collapse of industries, a lack of infrastructure and the absence of economic opportunities has weakened the standard of living and economic development of the people of northern Nigeria”.

According to the World Bank's Nigeria Economic Report 2013, average poverty rates for the North East and the North West areas are 59.7 per cent and 58 per cent, respectively, while the North Central has an average rate of 48.8 per cent. By contrast, average rates in the South West, South East and South-South are 30.6 per cent, 39 per cent and 37.6 per cent respectively. Of the 18 Nigerian States that experienced increases in the estimated poverty headcount between 2004 and 2010, over half of them are Northern states.

According to the World Bank's 2013 Economic Report on Nigeria, the national poverty rate (headcount) declined only slightly between 2004 and 2010. Poverty continues to be a major stumbling block on the road to economic development in the north and most parts of the Nigeria. This trend increasing makes the prospects for economic development in the region difficult.

It is worth noting that the insecurity situation continues to make efforts aimed at ameliorating the present situation difficult and until significant gains are made in the reduction of poverty.

10.3 Literacy and Insurgency

There is no doubt that every nation that hopes to make significant strides in economic development has to be driven by a largely literate population. According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics, in 2008 the per centage of youth literacy in the North East was around 58.7 per cent to 73.5 per cent compared to the South West which recorded 95.8 per cent to 99.2 per cent. The rate of literacy in northern Nigeria has been on the decline as evidenced by the number of candidates with a minimum of five (5) credits including Mathematics and English language. It is worth mentioning that the destruction of schools and other educational infrastructure has been a result of the insecurity situation in the north which has thus worsened access to educational services in the region. Since the inception of the current insecurity impasse in the country, the situation has only grown worse as the insecurity situation in the north has made the limited access to quality education difficult.

This situation further aggravates the unemployment in the region thereby making jobs more difficult to come by. Again, the youth are the most vulnerable in this situation as the high rate of illiteracy in the region make them easy targets for recruits and more vulnerable to being brain washed by the terrorist groups in the region.

On July 6, 2013, militants said to be Boko Haram Islamic radicals stormed a boarding school in Yobe State in Northern Nigeria opening fire, throwing explosives and killing as many as 42 people most of whom were children [21].

These incidences no doubt affect the educational institutions in the northern part of the country as well as having an increased tendency to jeopardize the quest for achieving literacy amongst the high number of illiterates in the Northern part of the country.

There are a higher number of classrooms in the southern part of the country compared to the north. This therefore means that while the north remains vulnerable to a slow pace in economic development due to less skilled labor, the south would benefit more from a more educated population.

On access to education in the area of primary school enrolment, for both males and females, the north is performing below the southern part of the country. A significant reason for this can also be attributed to the insecurity situation in the north.

Hence, the importance of providing quality education for the increasing number of youths in the region cannot be over emphasized. The northern eastern part of Nigeria with its vast potentials such as in commerce ,and arable land for agricultural productivity needs to tap into the pool of its youth population to galvanize the much-needed economic development of the region which has suffered significant setbacks since the inception of the current insecurity impact

11.0 Summary of Findings

The insecurity confronting the Northern part of the country has been a major challenge for Nigeria's nascent democracy. As Nigeria grapples with this menace which has claimed the lives of hundreds of people and led to the destruction of so many properties, the imperativeness of a lasting solution cannot be over emphasized.

While the government has deployed several tactics to resolve the impasse, these strategies have resulted in little progress on the issue. Another very important point that is worth noting also is the fact that the insecurity in the Northern part of Nigeria is no longer a 'Northern problem'; it is serious challenge that threatens the very existence of the entire Nigerian state.

The insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria while having its roots in internal factors such as political grievances and religious fundamentalism which is fueled by high levels of poverty, deprivation, and years of underdevelopment has grown worse over the years and now takes on an international dimension with some of the Islamic insurgency groups having links with international terrorist organizations. The lack of progress has been linked to years of colonial neglect and marginalization by successive regimes. Unfortunately, the insecurity in Northern Nigeria continues to have a negative effect on the economic development of the region and by making it increasingly difficult to consolidate on the little gains in economic development thereby risking the prospects of progress in this area.

12.0 Conclusion

An in-depth study of the situation in Northern Nigeria shows that the problems that confront this region can be attributed to internal factors and historical roots rather than external factors outside Nigeria that may include state sponsored terrorism. It is necessary to look into alternative approaches to resolving the situation in the interest of the entire Nigerian state. Until the government is able to implement people centered policies that touch on the lives of the people directly, the situation in the North may persist. As the research has shown, military force alone will not resolve the situation in Northern Nigeria. A more pragmatic approach would be to pursue a rigorous economic development policy aimed at bettering the lives of the people in the North while at the same time affording the North's economy the opportunity to catch up with the rest of the nation's economy. Despite being a multicultural society with over 200 million people, according to the United Nations Population Fund State of the World Population Report 2019, the prospects of lasting peace can be actualized in Northern Nigeria. Insecurity in Northern Nigeria threatens the unity of the entire nation and has the possibility of plunging the country back into military rule if it is not quickly addressed.

13.0 Policy Recommendations

Following the nature of the research findings from the research work, the following policy recommendations if implemented would go a long way in reversing the situation in Northern Nigeria for the overall benefit of the region and the nation as a whole:

1. The state needs to embark on a rigorous policy to improve human capital development in North Eastern Nigeria by paying more attention to the specific needs of the region and responding in accordance to these needs through investments in education, primary health care, skills acquisition trainings for the youth, in addition to creating an enabling environment for small businesses.
2. The state needs to ensure that its coercive apparatus which is constitutionally responsible for the protection of lives and property improves on its human intelligence capacity by cultivate more assets on the ground in the troubled regions.
3. There is an urgent need for improved transparency, accountability and the rule of law in governance. This has the tendency to build mutuality between the state and society, thereby making both better able to work in harmony towards rooting out the insurgency in the North Eastern region.
4. The state also needs to adopt a combination of approaches that emphasizes improving the economic development in the North Eastern region, while at the same time ensuring that the use of force is strictly controlled to avoid the misgivings associated with extrajudicial killings by security forces. This would go a long way in addressing concerns bothering on human rights which have in recent times impacted negatively on the purchase of weapons by the state.
5. The state urgently needs to introduce stiff penalties such as life sentences for those who are caught. In addition to making more concerted efforts to improve the judicial process with regards to convicting and sentencing sponsors of the insurgency.

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From Counter-Terrorism to Livelihood Destruction: *Factors Causing Systemic and Continuing Destruction of Livelihoods in the Lake Chad Basin*

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Abstract

Since 2009, Boko Haram has led to massive displacements of the local population, destruction of livelihood capitals, the decimation of the local economy, and the plummeting of food productions in the Lake Chad region. Likewise, aggressive military campaigns and security restrictions have also negatively impacted the stability of the region. This paper describes the factors causing systemic and continuing destruction of livelihoods in the Lake Chad Basin. Based on the literature and field research in Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon, the study found that Boko Haram has a direct impact on households causing fatalities, destruction of livelihood assets and forced displacements, and indirectly affecting agricultural production, household income, food prices, markets, and transport services. Systemic destruction of livelihood has continued due to factors such as previous socio-economic tensions, environmental variabilities, insecurity, and the nature of counter-insurgency campaigns. These factors aggravate food insecurity and limit return and recovery in areas affected by militant activities in the Lake Chad region.

Key Words: Boko Haram, Counter-Terrorism, Livelihood, Agriculture, Lake Chad Basin

1.0 Introduction

Boko Haram's insurgency has led to fatalities, massive displacements of the rural population, the destruction of livelihood capitals, the decimation of the local economy, and the plummeting of food productions in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB).

Likewise, aggressive military campaigns and security restrictions have limited access to livelihood assets, stifled food productions, and prolonged violence and instability in the region. According to the World Bank, the risk factors for conflict were prevalent in the Lake Chad region before the onset of militant activities; these factors included underserved region, an undiversified economy, governance challenges, environmental vulnerability, demographic growth and youth bulge, high integration and migration, and insecurity and illegality [1]. Boko Haram exacerbated the challenges already faced by rural communities to create conditions for violence and instability.

Mohammed [2] identified three distinct and yet overlapping phases of Boko Haram—the Kanama, the dawah, and the violent phases. Ogbozor [3], further subdivided the violent period into moderate or low violence, very violent, and decline in violence phases. Kanama represents the period of the first open challenge to the Nigerian authorities by the “Nigerian Taliban” (presently known as Boko Haram), whereas the dawah represents the period of the gradual build-up to the first major attack of the sect in 2009. The violent phase is the most intense period of militant activities—with a severe impact on civilians, livelihoods, and the neighboring countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

Since mid-2015, there has been a decline in violence from militant groups due to the 2015 pre-election mop-up operation and the offensive military counter-insurgency campaign of President Buhari’s administration [4]. However, violence has continued in the region due to food insecurity, massive population displacement, and a decimated local economy [5]. The Food and Agriculture Organization [6] attributes the continuing violence and instability to factors such as previous social and economic tensions, unsustainable agricultural practices, erratic rainfall, and environmental factors. Equally, the war economy, government policies, and the negative impact of counter-insurgency operations have contributed to violence and food insecurity in the region. In mid-2018, splinter factions of Boko Haram, the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the *Jama’u Ablis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad* (JAS) renewed attacks on military bases and soft targets. Whereas ISWAP focuses on taking out military targets, JAS intensified attacks on civilians and their livelihoods.

This paper explains the impact of Boko Haram and factors aggravating livelihood crisis in the Lake Chad region. The study is based on the literature and interview of 125 households in five communities: Dalori, Mubi, Pompomari (Nigeria); Bourrha

(Cameroon) and Gagamari (Niger). According to USAID [7], “In situations where insecurity blocks access to the affected area, it is possible to estimate the impact of shocks with secondary data such as historical evidence from baseline and previous shock periods, interviews with displaced persons or hosts, collection and analysis of local and national-level market and production data.” The paper begins with a review of the livelihood system of the Lake Chad Basin; the direct and indirect impact of Boko Haram; the factors causing continuing and systemic destruction of livelihoods, and the conclusion.

2.0 The Livelihood System of the Lake Chad Basin

Before the onset of the Boko Haram insurgency, subsistence agriculture was the dominant livelihood activities in Dalori, Pompomari, Mubi, Bourrha and Gagamari communities of the Lake Chad Basin. The crops grown were millet, maize, beans, groundnut, sorghum, and guinea corn, whereas the livestock reared included cow, goat, sheep, and poultry. However, the study found that the livelihood strategies of the communities since the beginning of militant activities consisted of mostly non-farm or off-farm activities. The changes in livelihood patterns have been largely attributed to militant activities and counter-insurgency campaigns that restricted access to farm production capitals and resources.

Majority of the households interviewed reported farming as a primary livelihood; Dalori, 60 per cent; Bourrha, 52 per cent; Pompomari, 48 per cent; Gagamari, 40 per cent; and Mubi 36 per cent. Subsistence agriculture accounts for 66 per cent (Farming 47.2 per cent, herding 15.2 per cent, and fishing 4 per cent) of the livelihood activities of the communities, whereas 34 per cent of households were engaged in other activities such as driving, bicycle repair, tailoring, carpentry, bricklaying, teaching, services, and other skilled/non-skilled industrial activities. Secondary data support these viewpoints and according to Oni and Fashogbon [8], agriculture is the primary source of livelihood in most rural communities. Odada et al [9], stated that agriculture is the main economic activity with an estimated 80 per cent of the rural population engaged in farming, livestock rearing, and fishing in the Lake Chad region. The Food and Agriculture Organization concluded that 80-90 per cent of communities in the Lake Chad basin depend on agriculture [6].

However, most of the respondents reported a decline in agriculturally based livelihood activities following the Boko Haram insurgency, while the non-

agro based activities such as trading, and other off-farm activities were on the increase. The majority of the respondents maintained that their primary livelihood activities; farming, fishing, and herding had been impacted by insecurity in their communities. For example, some respondents in Dalori and Pompomari said that they currently live in internally displaced camps and have no source of livelihood except the handout they received from aid agencies. Respondents from Bourrha, Gagamari, and Mubi said that insecurity has limited access to farmland and agricultural activities and almost all the respondents reported changes in livelihood strategies.

A comparison of pre-Boko Haram livelihood activities and the events during the insurgency phase show that the pre-Boko Haram livelihood activities consisted of predominantly farming, herding, fishing, and trading, whereas the current livelihood strategies of most of the respondent included non-farm activities. The findings suggest a variation in livelihood strategies before the resumption of militant activities and the insurgency period. Insecurity prevented many farming households from cultivating the field, grazing animals, fishing or trading in agricultural products. Restriction on movements due to the presence of the armed group has severely constrained agrarian activities [6]. Boko Haram sacked rural farmers and disrupted farming activities while they occupied several local government areas in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. A study by the UNHCR [10] at the Minawao refugee camp, Cameroon, shows that most of the refugees were Nigerians engaged in farming (71 per cent), trading (22 per cent) and cattle herding (8 per cent). These alluded to the drop in agricultural production, a primary livelihood activity in the basin areas.

Aside from the changes in subsistence activities, a comparison of the household income before and during the insurgency shows disparities in household's income before the resumption of militant activities and a drastic decline in household income during the insurgency phase. During the pre-Boko Haram period, Bourrha reported the highest average monthly income of 75 USD, whereas Gagamari has the least 55.9 USD equivalent (Field survey 2016). The average monthly income of Mubi, Pompomari, and Dalori are 70.2, 65.8, and 60.43 USD, respectively (Ibid). As earlier observed, most of the households stated that their source of revenue is from subsistence agriculture and off-farm activities such as trading. On the reasons for the disparity in the income level among the households, Bourrha and Mubi reported engaging in trading and off-farm activities that give higher returns than subsistence agriculture. The proximity of Bourrha (Cameroon) and Mubi (Nigeria) enhanced

trading activities between the border communities. A respondent from Bourrha said that it took just one to two hours to travel from Bourrha to Mubi but several hours to go to Maruoacity in the Far North region of Cameroon.

Most respondents from Gagamari attributed low household income to primary agricultural production activities such as farming and artisanal fishing. According to the FAO “people involved in artisanal fishery activities and their families continued, with few exceptions, live at the margin of subsistence and human dignity” [11] (p.142), “fishermen are the poorest of the poor.” Townsley [12] further notes that “fishery is the activity of last resort.” These explain why Gagamari has the lowest household income among the respondents. Households in Bourrha and Gagamari experienced a decline in revenue but not as much as Dalori, Mubi, and Pompomari. Bourrha and Gagamari were mainly refugees transit communities for people displaced from Northeast Nigeria, whereas the latter are the hot spots of the Boko Haram violence.

3.0 Direct and Indirect Impact of Boko Haram

Boko Haram had a direct impact on households causing fatalities, destruction of livelihood assets, forced displacements, and indirectly affecting household income, agricultural activities, food prices, markets, and transportation. Also, systemic destruction of livelihood results from processes, institutions, and policies of the government and the failures of the national, regional, and international response to the conflict [13]. The direct and indirect impacts of Boko Haram and the factors fueling continuing violence are discussed below.

3.1 Fatalities

Boko Haram targets and strips household of their assets. Farmers from Dalori, Mubi, and Pompomari reported direct attacks from the group, causing deaths and injuries. The attacks, according to some of the respondents, led to changes in household compositions with some of them losing key family members. However, respondents from Bourrha and Gagamari reported not directly targeted by the militants but indirectly impacted through serving as host communities for refugees fleeing northeast Nigeria.

A survivor of Dalori village attack on January 30th, 2016 described how coordinated attacks by the militants led to multiple fatalities.

The survivor said, “Boko Haram killed over 80 people in one major attack in Dalori village. While people were fleeing to a neighboring village of GomariKerkeri, the military intercepted three female suicide bombers who attempted to detonate bombs. The security officials also stopped the militants from penetrating the Dalori IDP camp. The number of deaths would have been higher if the attacks were not foiled” (Female respondent, Dalori survivor). Another female respondent said, “I have a husband before that take care of us, but Boko Haram killed him, we are dependent on relatives and friends” (Female respondent, displaced widow, Dalori).

These stories illustrate a pattern of militant attack in many agrarian communities in the basin areas. Similarly, Mubi witnessed multiple attacks by Boko Haram since 2011, leading to several fatalities. On January 6, 2012, during a funeral of a victim of Boko Haram on December 28, 2011, Boko Haram members resurfaced again and gunned down 17 friends and relatives of the deceased during the funeral service. On June 1, 2014, during a football competition in Mubi, Boko Haram detonated a bomb that killed 40 people on the football field. An unknown number of persons were killed following the capture of Mubi by Boko Haram on October 29, 2014, as one of the Boko Haram’s defunct Caliphates. Boko Haram routinely took out anyone perceived as a threat or disloyal during its occupation of Mubi. Though Pompomari is located close to a military base, the community witnessed several confrontations between Boko Haram militants and the military. On December 22, 2011, about 100 people were killed in Pompomari following multiple bomb explosions and shooting between Boko Haram and the army officers.

Dalori, Mubi, and Pompomari experienced direct attacks by Boko Haram, Gagamari, and Bourrha were not directly targeted by the militant but were indirectly impacted by serving as host communities for refugees from Nigeria.

3.2 Destruction of livelihood assets

Another significant impact of Boko Haram is direct attacks and destruction of livelihood capitals. Insecurity limits access to essential livelihood assets such as farmlands, schools, and social events. Dalori, Pompomari, and Mubi reported different accounts of the effects of Boko Haram on livelihood assets. A survivor of the Dalori massacre narrated how households were stripped of livelihood capitals during an attack on their village:

“A group of Boko Haram militants dressed in military uniforms stormed our village with vans and motorcycles. We thought that they had come to protect us, but they attacked us; several people were shut or machete, and they also looted and carted away our foodstuff and livestock. As if that was not enough, they set fire on the entire village...we watched our houses, food storage and livestock burnt to ashes. Added to the sad situation, we could not identify the bodies of our dead relatives to give them befitting burial because they were burnt beyond recognition” (Respondent, survivor of Dalori attack).

Another survivor confirmed that the only asset left in the community after the attack was bare land and the remnant of burnt properties. The survivor added: “Surviving without assets to live on is worse than death....I used to sell firewood but lost everything – no farming or sale of firewood, our market was also destroyed. I am presently living in Dalori IDP camp, and supported by gift and donations (Male IDP respondent, Dalori).” The survivors of the Dalorimassacre were left with little or no assets as the entire village was razed down; most of the survivors now live in internally displaced camps or with host families. A farmer sums up the patterns of Boko Haram attack, “Boko Haram often aim to kill everyone or strip them of their asset so that survivors would not have anything to live on” (Respondent, male farmer, Dalori).

In Mubi, private and public infrastructures were destroyed or looted after Boko Haram captured the town and renamed it ‘Madinatul Islam,’ or city of Islam on October 28, 2014. Gwoza was earlier captured and renamed ‘DarulHikma’ or House of Wisdom on July 2014. Although the duration of the insurgent occupation of Mubi was short, the level of damage was enormous. As the Nigerian security forces retook the town in mid-November 2014, a Mubi returnee gave an account of the level of destructions, said, “Mubi has eight banks, but they were all destroyed by Boko Haram, since we return to our home, we usually travel for two hours to Yola for our banking services” (Male respondent, Mubi). After briefly taking control of Mubi in late 2014, Boko Haram militants stole more than one hundred million Naira (300,000 USD) from a Diamond Bank branch in Mubi.

Unlike Mubi, Pompomari witnessed restrictions to its access to lands for farming and grazing animals due to insecurity and military restrictions. A respondent said, “the government has stopped access to farmland due to the security situation, people

have been prevented from cultivating what they will eat, sell and feed animals (Male respondent, Pompomari). The state of emergency (SoE) imposed in Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa states prevented households from cultivating land and herding livestock.

Boko Haram destroyed infrastructures such as homes, health facilities, schools, bridges, communication, and community infrastructures. The direct attacks on education by the militants resulted in some schools closing or becoming occupied by internally displaced persons. Majority of respondents from Dalori, Pompomari, and Mubi stated that schools in their communities were shut down due to insecurity. Bourrha and Gagamari reported that Nigeria refugees stayed in schools as shelters due to the unavailability of a refugees camp.

3.4 Displacement of households

Boko Haram sacked communities, causing the displacement of people and livestock. An analysis of the International Office for Migration (IOM) data shows that as at November 2016, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) at the Dalori (FTC) and Dalori (KOFA) were the highest in Maiduguri Metropolitan areas. The two camps account for about 30 per cent of the total IDPs in Maiduguri [14]. Likewise, Pompomari IDPs camp has the second-largest concentration of IDPs in Yobe state, approximately 14.66 per cent of the total IDPs in Yobe State; the Kukareta camp is the highest with about 67 per cent of total IDPs [15]. Dalori, Mubi, and Pompomari reported cases of forced displacement, whereas Bourrha and Gagamari reported hosting Nigerian refugees.

A respondent from Bourrha said: “Refugees started arriving Bourrha after Mubi was attacked and captured by Boko Haram. Since then, our business and religious activities have been curtailed. This has led to an increase in the prices of goods and services and a reduction in the volume of agricultural activities and trade with Nigeria.” (Male respondent, Bourrha). Another respondent from Bourrha said: “Before now, we allow anyone from outside to come and stay in our community, but this has changed. First, we must know where he’s coming from, what he does for a living and who he is looking for in our community” (Female respondent, Bourrha).

Bourrha and Gagamari were transit camps for refugees fleeing northeast Nigeria to Cameroon and Niger. A refugee and a host family complained of harsh living condition in Gagamari. The refugee said, “It is tough to have something doing because

the community we are staying is impoverished. We are dependent on international organizations for support” (Male refugee, Gagamari). Another respondent said: “I am a farmer, I depend on farming activities for survival, though whenever drought occurs, my production is low” (Male respondent, Refugee Host Family, Gagamari). These highlights some difficulties faced by refugees and host families.

3.5 Impact on market, transport and food prices

Boko Haram has impact on markets and transport, affecting trade, food prices, and coping capacities. A respondent said, “Our market has become a place for business and sorrow... I lost my elder brother in a suicide bomb attack” (Male respondent, Dalori). Another respondent said, “Markets in our community were shut down following increased bomb attacks, we often go to a nearby market for buying and selling” (Male respondent, Pompomari). The majority of the interviewees in Dalori, Pompomari and Mubi reported that their markets were burnt or shut down due to insecurity or rampant cases of suicide attacks. Farmers experienced post-harvest losses as they could not find markets to dispose of their products.

In cities, functional markets recorded low sales and patronages due to general insecurity. Estimates from the World Food Program show that activities in Maiduguri market reduced by 40 per cent because many traders avoided the city regarded as the epicenter of the Boko Haram’s violence [15]. In Yobe State, two important markets (Damaturu and Potiskum markets) known for livestock trading recorded lower activities due to security concerns (Ibid). The Borno state government also had to shut down four major cattle markets, including Gamboru in an attempt to choke the cash flow to the Boko Haram militants [16]. Boko Haram was allegedly using intermediaries to sell stolen cattle in Gamboru market (Ibid). The restriction or outright closure of some markets in northeast Nigeria hurt livelihoods and increases food insecurity.

According to the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Niger is mainly living from pastoralism, but insecurity and closure of the border with Nigeria affected livestock production and trade in the country [17]. There was a massive return of livestock from northern Nigeria, putting cattle at risk in Niger as there were no access to Nigeria pasturage and markets in places such as Maiduguri, Baga, Malam Fatori, and Gaidam (Ibid). Apart from livestock marketing, Niger depends on the import of grains from Nigeria. World Food Program [16] shows that Niger relies on the import of grains from Nigeria. The closure of Damsak

market to minimize the risk of Boko Haram's attacks led to the increase in the cost of commodities in Niger's border town of Diffa (Ibid). In Cameroon, the closure of the borders with Nigeria led to the reduction in the number of traders coming from Nigeria to buy food products and livestock from the Far North region of Cameroon. This resulted in surplus commodities in the local market, poor sales, and a decrease in prices of cereals and animals.

Most of the respondents reported disruptions in transport services due to road closures and insecurity. Others preferred using alternative routes to avoid the risk of attacks by militants. In Borno state, major roads such as Maiduguri-Dikwa-Gamboru Road, Maiduguri-Gubio-Damasak and Maiduguri-Mungono-Baga were closed for up to three years due to security concerns. In Niger, the closing of the Niger-Nigeria border due to militant activities was a primary issue to marketers and transporters. The changes in supply routes and closure of border points for all trucks to minimize the risk of Boko Haram's attacks increased the cost of transportation and prices of commodities. In Cameroon, the closure of Kousseri boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria paved the way for an alternative route through Fianga. It led to an increase in prices of products coming from Nigeria, and increases in transportation cost for commuter vehicles going to Nigeria from Cameroon. There were also complaints about harassment and the demands for bribes at a formal and informal checkpoint by security officials.

The impact of the insurgency on staple food prices in Dalori, Pompomari, and Mubi were estimated using the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Food Security Technical Working Group (FSTWG) [18] data for Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. The prices of rice, millet, sorghum, and beans between December 2015 and April 2016 were used to illustrate changes in rates. The study found that there were marginal increases in the food prices for staples in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states within five months from December 2015 to April 2016. Nevertheless, if one compares the price increases since the beginning of the insurgency, it is much higher. According to the Farmers Early Warning System Network [19], the prices of staple foods in most markets have risen in comparison with the previous five-year average. For example, by 50–150 per cent for maize and by about 76–204 per cent for sorghum. FEWSNET predicted a further increase in some areas due to lack of farming in some conflict-hit areas for about three years.

The other factors that have contributed to the soaring food prices include the announcement of the state of emergencies in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in May 2013. The restriction of movements of people and goods led to increases in food items in the area as demand was more than supply. The devaluation of the Nigerian Naira following the drop-in oil price also affected purchasing power. The ban on rice importation and some essential commodities into Nigeria and the restriction of foreign transactions also put pressures on commodities. In some areas affected by the conflict in northeast Nigeria, there has been no farming for up to three years. An assessment by Christian Aid [20] found that only 2.7 per cent of the population in rural Borno cultivated crops, food production was well over 90 per cent below average in 2016. These shows the precarious food insecurity situation in areas impacted militant activities.

4.0 Factors Causing Systemic and Continuing Destruction of Livelihoods

According to FAO [6], violence and instability have continued in Northeast Nigeria due to previous social and economic tensions, unsustainable agricultural practices, erratic rainfall, and environmental factors. FAO maintains that the risk factors for conflict are still prevalent and has continued to pose threats to return and recovery in the region. Ongoing instability and livelihood destruction have been attributed mainly to factors such as insecurity restricting mobility and access to livelihood capital, destruction of rural assets and infrastructures, occupation of territories, farms and grazing lands, erosion of local governance, poor governance and corruption.

4.1 Insecurity Restricting Mobility and Access to Livelihood Capital

Insecurity is a major concern in northeast Nigeria; the threats of being kidnaped or killed have prevented many farming households from cultivating the field, grazing animals, fishing or trading in agricultural products [1]. Security restrictions also limit movements, access to livelihoods assets, and hurt agricultural production. Farming and grazing animals were suspended in areas affected by landmines and improvised explosives devices (IEDs). The use of fertilizer for farming was discontinued because some fertilizers contained ammonia used by Boko Haram to manufacture bombs. Similarly, fishing and trading in towns near Lake Chad were proscribed because Boko Haram levied cross-border fish traders in the Nigeria-Niger border. The prolonged enforcement of these bans prevented people from engaging in their livelihood, thus aggravating violence and food insecurity [5].

World Food Program [16] corroborated that most households restricted agricultural production to a few kilometers of their settlements due to insecurity, resulting in the plummeting of local food production and production deficit. There were also security restrictions on the cultivation of ‘tall’ crops such as sorghum because it decreases visibility and acts as a shield for the insurgents. However, farmers could cultivate mainly groundnut and cowpea that does not affect visibility [16]. These restrictions hurt food security; the rights to grow crops of choice were taken away from the farmers.

4.2 Destruction of Production Assets and Rural Infrastructures

Boko Haram destroyed farming infrastructure, looted harvests and livestock, and disrupted services available to local farmers, all of which has contributed to the decrease in agricultural production [1]. In many rural communities, there has been a loss of production assets and public infrastructure, because of looting and destruction of farms, grains storage facilities, health centers, schools, and water supplies. In Mubi, private and public infrastructures were destroyed or stolen after Boko Haram captured the towns. Livelihood assets such as houses, food storages, livestock, and equipment were targeted, burnt, destroyed, or looted by the militants. The destruction of rural infrastructures and the disruption of essential services contributed to assets stripping and a decrease in agricultural production in the region [6]. As a consequence of the destruction of these facilities, the availability of essential services has been limited in northeast Nigeria. The displacement of farmers, teachers, civil servants, and health workers has led to relocation of people from the affected region, causing losses in human resources. The lack of human resources perhaps represents one of the biggest challenges in establishing processes of recovery and resettlement.

4.3 Occupation of Territories, Farms, and Grazing Lands

Boko Haram sacked rural farmers, disrupted agricultural activities while they occupied several local government areas in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. The occupation of agrarian territories and land by the insurgents’ limited food production. The use of farmlands as shelters by displaced persons caused fragmentation of farmlands [1]. The Food and Agricultural Organization underlined that population displacement, due to the conflict, has increased pressure on limited resources such as water and land, reducing their availability while heightening the risk of social tensions [6]. Displaced households have increased pressure on host families and communities, due to limited resources such as water and land. According to the International Office

of Migration [21] many internally displaced persons in northeast Nigeria live with host families; in Borno state, 93 per cent of IDPs live in host communities, whereas 7 per cent lives in conventional camps. Communities struggling to meet basic needs now face additional challenges of hosting IDPs and refugees fleeing violent areas. These scenarios are common in northeast Nigeria, where insurgents have harnessed territories and forced rural farmers out of their lands or where social tension exists between IDPs/refugees and their host communities due to limited resources.

4.4 Closure or Restriction of Markets, Roads, and Border Crosses

According to FAO [6], insecurity and military restrictions have limited market functionality and trading, affecting food prices and households coping capacities. Access to markets for buyers and traders has been constrained as a result of insecurity and limited mobility. Additional restrictions are associated with border closures, unwarranted checkpoints, high taxation on essential commodities, and protection related payments. All of these have resulted in a reduction in cross-border trading, and more local trading between primary and secondary markets [1]. At the peak of the insurgency, some markets, roads and border points were closed preventing movement and trading in the affected areas such as northeast Nigeria, Far North region of Cameroon and Diffa region of Niger. The measures affected communities that have adapted to trading and migration as a strategy for coping with changing livelihood patterns.

The treaty of the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) statute recognized and facilitated interstate migration of citizens within the sub-region [22]. These treaties made migration and cross-border trading activities among the Lake Chad riparian countries possible. Nevertheless, these trading channels have also been negatively utilized by Boko Haram to carry out cross-border attacks without restriction. In some area's markets, roads, border points, and checkpoints have re-opened, there are still restrictions.

4.5 Erosion of Local Governance Structure

Another factor causing continuing instability is the erosion of local leadership. Some traditional rulers have been killed or forced to flee from their communities resulting in a leadership gap in some rural communities. On May 30, 2014, Boko Haram ambushed and killed the Emir of Gwoza, Alhaji Idrisa Timta. The traditional leader

was targeted along with his colleagues while traveling to Gombe for the burial of Emir of Gombe, Alhaji Shehu Usman Abubakar [23]. The incident shows the deadly attacks on traditional rulers by Boko Haram who target and takes out unfriendly traditional leaders believed to be working with the government security forces. Many villages and community leaders have been systematically killed or forced to flee from their communities by the militants. The erosion of governance and local authorities are tactics of Boko Haram to control and dominate many agrarian communities. The absence or total eradication of traditional leadership authority have exposed some of the conflict affected districts to leadership deficit.

5.0 Conclusion

This paper describes the impact of Boko Haram and factors causing systemic and continuing destruction of livelihoods in the Lake Chad Basin. 125 households from five communities Dalori, Pompomari, Mubi, Bourrha, and Gagamari were interviewed for the study. The research indicated that Boko Haram had an impact on communities causing fatalities, assets stripping, displacements, and the plummeting of food production. Systemic destruction of livelihood has persisted due to factors such as insecurity restricting mobility and access to livelihoods, military blockages, destruction of rural infrastructures, land occupation by IDPs, market restriction and the war economy.

These findings corroborate Justino [13], conflict and violence impacts on the lives and livelihoods of individuals, households, and communities directly and indirectly. Direct effects include changes in household composition, and economic status; whereas indirect channels include changes in local and national markets as well as social relations (Ibid). The results also support Young and Osman [24] assertion on continued and systemic destruction of all types of livelihood strategies due to ongoing processes, institutions, and policies. Arguably, counter-insurgency operations, military restrictions, and insecurity have contributed to prolonged instability and livelihood crises in the areas affected by Boko Haram. These factors aggravate food insecurity and limit return and recovery in the Lake Chad region. Thus, explains the continuing humanitarian and livelihood crisis despite the perceived technical defeat of Boko Haram by the Nigerian government.

6.0 Recommendations

The following recommendations should be considered as away forward:

1. Insecurity should be addressed head-on, especially in communities directly and indirectly impacted by militant activities. The measure is necessary to consolidate the ongoing recovery and stabilization efforts in communities affected by insurgency in the Lake Chad region.
2. There is a need for a relaxation of security restrictions and military blockage that limits access to livelihood assets to ensure unlimited access to farm production capitals.
3. Relief and emergency intervention to IDPs, host communities, and returnees should continue until activities are normalized. The government and donors' agencies should provide food aid to address precarious food security and nutrition situation in the Lake Chad region.
4. There is a need for livelihood intervention through the provision of cash, inputs, and tools to farmers, to ensure the prompt return of farmers to primary livelihood activities.
5. Broad-based rural development plan that prioritizes agricultural development should be established as a strategy for the long-term stability of the Lake Chad Basin.

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Fragile State, Just War, and the Crisis in Counterterrorism: *Reflections on Boko Haram and Nigeria's War on Terrorism*

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Abstract

This article revisits Boko Haram crisis through the prism of state fragility, just war and disputed government's response. Several studies on Boko Haram emphasize the impact of the group on peace and human security. However, limited studies attempt to connect the crisis in Nigeria to state fragility and justification of government responses through just war theory. This paper adopts an intersection of state fragility theory to explain the emergence and dominance of the group and just war theory to explain government's response. It argues that while economic, social and political grievances led to the rise of Boko Haram, government's excessive use of force is characteristic of a fragile state and has fuelled radicalization of more young people in the region. We recommend the adoption of broad long-term counterterrorism measures that are predisposed towards the rejection of unjustified brute force as a deplorable aberration in the fight on terror.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Nigeria, Counterterrorism, Just War Theory, Non-lethal strategies.

1.0 Introduction

Terrorism is a major global threat and continues to be a subject of policy and academic research. Equally, concerted efforts to counter terrorism have increasingly violated existing laws posing serious threats to human security [1]. Scholars have highlighted the absence of a standard definition to terrorism as one of the leading challenges in counterterrorism [2]. Ironically, while governments prefer the use of force against armed group's legitimate calls, other scholars contend that governments need to examine their role in igniting ferocious confrontations. Windsor [3] concludes that factors such as a denial of fundamental freedoms of association and peaceful dissent as well as political persecution and marginalization are some of the demerits of poor governance that catalyse radicalisation and extremism. Therefore, fighting terrorism should not solely depend on military capabilities but rather on other non-lethal avenues.

Lehrke and Schomaker [4] identify three unique measures that most governments relied on in their counter terrorism strategies between 2001 and 2011. These include; targeted killings, capturing of alleged leaders of terrorist groups, and increasing security on key government installations and people involved in critical decision making. Their analysis shows that even though killing, capturing, and defending yield positive results in the short run they are counterproductive in the long run. For example, killing tactics targeting a terrorist group within a specific area can have detrimental effects on the environment and innocent civilians.

Since Nigerian government began its major crackdown on members of Boko Haram, most of its strategies fall within the three main approaches of killing, capturing and defending. Scholars have argued that narrowing counterterrorism measures to these three strategies face the risk of being counterproductive. For example, Lehrke and Schomaker [5] opine that to achieve effective counterterrorism strategies, there is need to adopt holistic approaches that combine both military and peaceful strategies. This opinion forms the crux of this paper as we seek to examine why should a country with substantial economic and military capabilities like Nigeria fail to effectively deal with Boko Haram. While for scholars such as Onuoha [5] and Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk [6] government's strategies are partly responsible for continued resilience of the group this paper seeks to contextualise the areas in which the government has failed by looking at the economic grievances and the counterterrorism philosophy

being employed. We begin with a background of insurgent groups in Nigeria, and Boko Haram in particular.

2.0 Literature Review

2.1. Insurgent Groups in Nigeria

Boko Haram is part of a chain of outlawed groups that continue to engage Nigerian government in protracted conflict. Even though the country has witnessed political and ethnoreligious crisis in 1960s [7], [8], the current wave of violence has resulted in a massive loss of property and lives. Successive governments have failed to offer long lasting solutions and the country has literally lurched from one crisis to another including a series of *coups d'état* that perhaps laid the foundation to current peace deficits [9].


Return to civilian rule in the late 1990s has so far not accomplished the much anticipated results as poor governance practices like nepotism, corruption, marginalization, and ethnicity have dominated the Nigerian political and economic landscape. To no one's surprise, armed groups across the populous nation have continued to use poor governance as a justification of their actions and 'normalized' violence as a means of achieving their ends [10], [11].

Despite having to deal with protracted violence over the years, the absence of sustainable peace lies on government's poor conflict resolution mechanisms [12], specifically, little attention is given to political, economic and social reforms as a means of tackling growing violence. In turn, groups intending to accomplish certain economic, religious, or political goals exploit government's weakness to spread their ideologies and to recruit more members. Initially, groups such as the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People' (MOSOP), Arewa People's Congress (APC) and the Egbesu Boys formed militia wings that were relatively popular among their ethnic and religious groups but did not pose a serious threats to the government [13].

The same can be said of Boko Haram, a group that began by expressing dissatisfaction with government's high-handedness on communities or people with whom they shared a similar identity. Issues such as marginalization, poverty, demand for autonomy, freedom, and rights, environmental overexploitation, political federalism,

and in some cases inclusive political leadership area central part of the demands by the various insurgent groups in Nigeria. Specifically groups from Northern Nigeria have over the years decried economic marginalisation and poverty. Concerns that cannot be considered baseless if the information from the National Bureau of Statistics in Nigeria presented in figure 1. below are to go by. The information shows that although poverty remains a national challenge in Nigeria, Northern states such as Jigawa, Sokoto, Yobe and Bauchi have over 80 per cent poverty rates.

Figure 1. Showing the level of Poverty across the country



Source: Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics (2010)

While in some cases, the government’s use of force can be effective in dealing with emerging cases of insecurity, it is not be the only solution. For example, the momentum and spirit of groups such as MOSOP and others demanding for better resource allocation or increased political freedoms can be diminished through the use of force. But for radicalized groups such as Boko Haram that seek total transformation of their society, ferocious brutality is not the only panacea to thwarting their grievances [13].

Noteworthy, religious dimension of Boko Haram's demands is not new in Nigeria, especially among the communities in the North. Since the early 19th century, revivalists, radicals, extremists, fundamentalists, reformists, and revolutionary groups with religious philosophies have been present [14]. Loimeier [15] and Chaliand and Blin [16] opine that the experience of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 propped uplike-minded revolutionary groups and it is believed to have inspired the Maitatsine crisis, a huge wave of religiously inspired violence that took place in the Northern Nigeria between 1980 and 1985. Although the security forces forestalled the violence, the events provide sufficient inspiration to contemporary ethno religious fighters [17].

Needless to say, both the government and insurgent groups have used violence in the past and as Nyadera and Bincof [1], opine that the use of violence by both sides only result in death and infringement of civilian's rights. Onuoha [6] adds that at the height of these crises and amid local and international pressure, government often works to clear itself of any blames. It is out of this that Boko Haram's ideology seems to resonate well with the deprived masses whose government appear to do very little to uplift from their current deprivation [19]. In other words, groups such as Boko Haram present themselves as saviors to groups that feel marginalised and oppressed.

2.2. What is Boko Haram?

Boko Haram has had a plethora of appellations in a bid to contextualize its activities. Although its official name is *Jama'atu Ablis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad* which stands for People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad, the group has also is also refered to as *Yusufiyya* – meaning a movement of Yusuf, its founder [18]. It has also been referred to as the Nigerian Taliban although there is no clear evidence that links the group to Afghanistan's Taliban in spite of their ideological proximity [6]. The group is said to prefer its official name which according to its adherents, confines its activities and beliefs within the teachings of the Holy Book-Quran. Even so, it is through the tag Boko Haram that it is vastly known.

Boko Haram is a bilingual name derived from the combination of Hausa and Arabic words, respectively. Boko stands for "Western education/book" and Haram is an Arabic word that means "forbidden" [6]. In short, when loosely translated Boko Haram denotes a group that is against western education which by extension would


mean that the group is an enemy of western culture. But western education alone is not the sole factor that drives the group's activities and as it will be distinguished, the group's activities are motivated by an intersection factor other than a revolt against western education [19]. As other scholars like Olukayode-Akinbi [20], have also noted, Boko Haram's revulsion against western education is not just about the West or the Europeans, it also includes Nigeria's political elites who are western educated as well as other people who espouse western-style institutions and processes which contradicts the doctrines of Islam [22]. Put together, the meaning of Boko Haram transcends western culture to include: a western society in its entirety, modernization, and politics that, according to the group, are not within the purview of Islamic doctrines. Contrastingly though, the group has utilized a wide range of western technology including weaponry, telecommunication devices and media [21].

The emergence of Boko Haram is often traced back to 2002 by a number of writers and commentators [21]. However, there are dissenting opinions concerning the origin of Boko Haram and two of them have gained prominence in contemporary literature [22]. The first is pegged on a pre-colonial narrative dating the roots of the group back to the 19th century and the second narrative cites the emergence of Boko Haram to 1995. The pre-colonial argument claims that early roots of Boko Haram developed in the 19th century when a collection of Muslims established the Sokoto Caliphate in northern Nigeria which resisted Christian missionaries' as well as colonialists' activities. Sokoto Caliphate lasted for more than a century prior to its defeat by British in the 20th century, who then merged the south and the north creating the currently visible divisions between Muslims dominated north and the Christians dominated the south. But even in the defeat, caliphate's legacy is still salient in the establishment of Boko Haram since Mohamed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, has often cited and used the relative success of the Sokoto Caliphate in resisting western ideologies to seek the support of the local communities [24].

A more recent debate on the inception of Boko Haram asserts that the group developed its nucleus in 1995 when *Ahlulsunnawal'jama'ah hijra* (Muslim Youth Organisation) was established by Abubakar Lawan in Maduigiri, Borno state. Noteworthy, at the time the group embraced a non-violent approach in its activities until 2002 when Mohammed Yusuf took over the group. From then henceforth, the group became infamous for its disputation that Western-style education was prohibited by Islam thus acquiring the name Boko (western education/book) Haram (forbidden).

Amist the debate over the origin of the group, the impact it has had on Nigeria and other regional countries are undisputed. Despite frequent pronouncements by state officials that the group is being defeated and on the verge of collapse, statistics on its continued activities tell a different story. Between 2014 and 2019, over 2800 attacks have been linked to the terrorist group with more than 31,000 people mostly civilians being killed. Kidnappings, extortion, and arson attacks have also been used by the group. The figure graph indicates some of the attacking trends of Boko Haram in the last five years:

Figure 2: Attacks and Fatalities Linked to Boko Haram (2014 to 2019)



Source: ACLED, 2019

3.0 Theoretical Framework

3.1 State Fragility Theory

According to Hardy [23], an entity is considered to be a state when it fulfills certain qualifications. Existence of a population, government, defined and recognized territorial boundaries, capacity, and freedom to engage with other states are requisite characteristics. Sovereignty of a state is thus derived from the above characteristics. Carment, Prest, and Samy [24] define fragile as a set of quantities or properties

that are disproportion. The term fragile state, on the other hand, remains relatively problematic. At what point does a state become fragile remains a topic of debate [25] given the various terminologies such as failed states, ungoverned territories, or collapsed states that are used interchangeably [26].













Nonetheless, there is a consensus that state as an entity has certain responsibilities and obligations towards upholding and ensuring sufficient safety and security, social well being, and representation of its people. Failure or success in fulfilling some or all of these duties then become a basis upon which a state can be considered fragile or stable. Therefore, the main assumption of this theory is that a state becomes fragile from the moment it loses the ability to guarantee development and safety of its citizens [27]. The same assumption is echoed by Cilliers and Sisk [27] who argue that “...a state is said to be fragile when it is unable to provide for basic human security or create the public goods and conditions needed for gains in human development.”

Noteworthy, the debate over what constitutes a fragile state should not be limited to mean that the state is unable to deliver the said responsibility. In fact, in most cases, states that have been considered fragile have some capacity to deliver upon the necessary responsibilities, despite the immense challenges that hinder its ability to fulfill their obligations. State fragility theorists, therefore, do not focus more on the debate of what accounts for a failed state; rather they seek to explore the complex relationship between causes and impacts of state fragility. In other words, the issues that cause a state to be fragile are also its consequences, thus creating a complex cycle that many countries find it difficult to escape. At the center of this relationship is the extent to which institutions of the state are either stable or unstable. It is from this perspective that other scholars also make a distinction between a resilient state and a fragile state [28].

Nigeria's status as a fragile state has worsened in the last two decades despite being among the top five strongest countries economically and militarily in Africa. The Fragile State Index, a rigorous and in-depth ranking list of countries in the world from the most fragile to the least fragile conducted by the Fund for Peace, gives a better analysis of the Nigerian case. Since the year 2006, the country has been on the decline from position 22 to 14th in 2019, as indicated in the table above that ranks a total of 178 countries.

Table 1: Nigeria's Trend among the most Fragile States between 2006 and 2019

Sort by Indicator: Hover your mouse under the Indicator icon and click the sort button:

														
	Rank	Total	SA	FE	GG	EC	UD	HF	SL	PS	HR	DP	RD	EX
2019	14th	98.5	9.0	9.9	9.4	7.8	8.1	6.9	8.0	8.9	8.3	9.2	7.2	5.9
2018	14th	99.9	8.9	9.6	9.3	8.0	8.3	7.2	8.3	8.9	8.6	9.1	7.5	6.2
2017	13th	101.6	9.2	9.6	9.2	8.0	8.6	7.2	8.6	9.2	8.9	9.1	7.5	6.5
2016	13th	103.5	9.7	9.9	9.4	7.7	8.8	7.4	8.8	9.4	9.1	9.1	7.7	6.5
2015	14th	102.5	9.9	9.8	9.9	7.6	8.8	7.1	9.1	9.1	8.8	8.8	7.5	6.0
2014	17th	99.7	9.5	9.5	9.8	7.3	8.9	7.0	8.8	9.0	8.7	8.3	6.9	6.0
2013	16th	100.7	9.5	9.4	9.8	7.5	9.2	7.3	8.8	9.3	8.6	8.5	6.6	6.3
2012	14th	101.1	9.2	9.8	9.7	7.5	8.9	7.6	9.1	9.1	8.6	8.4	6.5	6.6
2011	14th	99.9	9.1	9.5	9.6	7.3	9.0	7.7	9.0	9.0	8.6	8.3	6.0	6.9
2010	14th	100.2	9.3	9.4	9.5	6.9	9.3	8.1	9.4	9.1	8.8	8.4	5.8	6.2
2009	15th	99.8	9.4	9.6	9.7	6.6	9.5	8.3	9.2	9.0	8.6	8.5	5.3	6.1
2008	18th	95.7	9.2	9.3	9.4	5.9	9.2	8.2	8.9	8.7	7.5	8.2	5.1	6.1
2007	17th	95.6	9.2	9.5	9.5	5.4	9.1	8.5	9.1	8.7	7.1	8.2	5.6	5.7
2006	22nd	94.4	9.2	9.0	9.1	5.4	9.0	8.5	9.0	8.3	7.1	8.0	5.9	5.9

Source: Fund for Peace, 2019

The table provides a robust indication of the economic, military, political, social, and cohesion indicators. Brinkel and Ait-Hida [28] document that Nigeria's biggest problems are poverty and insecurity. The economic indicators cover, among other issues the level of inequality, inflation, access to essential services as well as poverty levels. Social indicators include the level of violence (peace), human resource index, amount of people displaced internally and externally, mortality rate. Political indicators include corruption, governance, access to illegal arms, aid received, among others.

Out of these findings, Nigeria is considered to be among the 20 most fragile states globally. Further indications that Nigeria is a fragile state can be examined through numerous ethno-religious conflicts that the country has experienced since the 1960s. Besides, infant mortality is particularly high in Nigeria, with the country ranked 11th among 188 countries surveyed. Although the UN recommends a ratio of one police officer to approximately 400 citizens, in Nigeria, the ratio is approximately one officer to 600 citizens. Lack of sufficient police officers means that the country is not only under-policed, it also means that ungoverned territories where radicalization of youths take place easily emerge. It also affects intelligence gathering and response by security forces in case of violence, making it difficult for rapid response.

Inequality in Nigeria is equally another source of concern. Particularly, the eastern and western regions in the Northern part of Nigeria are worse compared to the rest of the country. It is therefore not surprising that conflicts have emanated from these regions. According to a report by the AfDB the government is performing dismally in the provision of water, health, education as well as sanitation service. Scholars such as Agbiboa [29]; David and Asuelime [30] assert that the failure by the government of Nigerian to deliver on vital socio-economic and political necessities has played an important role in the emergence of armed groups. Corruption has also eroded both the state's capacity to offer services and people's trust in the government's ability to solve their problems. Such feelings of hopelessness are push factors for joining armed groups.

Moreover, the discussion here is not just the emergence and rise of Boko Haram as Nigeria has had several other militias before. Equally, most of the countries in the world have had to deal with similar problems of armed groups. What we underscore here is that whenever armed groups are operating in a fragile country, then two challenges emerge. One is that governments often lack the capabilities, both hard and soft power, to successfully respond to such problems and secondly the governments lack legitimacy, especially when it resorts to the use of force.

Fragile states, therefore, face major obstacles in resolving violence. Factors like corruption, insufficient policing, marginalization and other forms of injustices that lead to state fragility trigger a new round of fragility by engendering the rise of violent militia groups, street protests, and reduced investment causing further unemployment as well as declined government legitimacy. Terrorist groups take advantage of such an environment to spread their ideologies and gain support of the deprived locals.

It is without doubt that Nigeria has the ability to avoid some of the crisis it has been experiencing if only the right governance practices are allowed to thrive. Ideas on dealing with terrorist groups such as Boko Haram already exist in various policy papers but the implementation of these policies fail due to corruption and inefficiency. This theory thus provides a better insight into understanding the challenges faced by the government in trying to defeat this Boko Haram. But even more crucially, it also explains why more and more citizens have lost confidence in the government and would be willing to give another actor their attention and sacrifices.

3.2 Just War Theory

Just war as a concept has evolved through philosophical and religious doctrines for many centuries. The concept is associated with ancient Catholic church thoughts of ethical warfare. In the recent years, the concept has become prominent with guerrilla warfare, war against terrorism and humanitarian intervention wars. While it provides justification as to when an entity is allowed to resort to war and its conduct during such wars, its proponents be it thinkers such as Saint Augustine, Immanuel Kant, Hugo Grotius, or the U.S. Catholic bishops and Michael Walzer seems not to agree on which particular war is justified. Nonetheless, governments and terrorist groups have often used the principles and ideas of just war theory to legitimise their actions. Although this theory has attracted huge criticism following America's invasion of Afghanistan, its assumptions play a very critical role in developing international law especially those pertaining to conflict. The underlying assumptions of this theory include just decision (*Jus ad Bellum*), proportionality (*Jus in Bello*) and order (*Jus Post Bellum*). Below we expound on the meaning of these three concepts;

3.2.1 *Jus ad Bellum*

Perhaps it is the most highlighted aspect of the theory that governments rely on to justify their counterterrorism strategies. It is centered on the argument that upon the occurrence of an armed conflict between government forces and terrorist groups a number of considerations ought to be taken into account. One is that the response must be made by a legitimate authority and in this case the government through its security forces [31]. Secondly, the action should be towards the right intention meaning that the decisions being taken should inspire peace, order, and stability.

The third factor is that there should be all signs that the response is for a just cause to mean that the response is for purposes such as protecting civilians, brings to justice the perpetrators and correcting past offenses [32]. There should be other considerations such as the chances of the chosen response strategy being successful, which needs to take into consideration good judgment that will avoid disasters such as a possible genocide or a prolonged war that will put the government into a spending spree. In other words, the amount of resources, both human and financial, invested in the operation needs to be consistent and justifiable with the outcome. The chosen decision especially if it involves the use of violence has to be taken after other channels have failed. High-risk strategies should not be the first choice [33].

3.2.2 *Jus in Bello*

This concept guides the operational aspects of armed conflict and can be applied in the war against terrorism. It seeks to guide the behavior of security forces involved in operations such as there must be discrimination between people involved in the conflict and those who are not. It also seeks to regulate the weapons, strategies, and techniques used [34]. The importance of this concept is that war or response to war should be conducted in a manner that upholds the rights and dignity of civilians especially those not involved in the conflict by ensuring their properties and life are protected and people are not attacked indiscriminately [35], [36], and [37].

Jus Post Bellum

Although it's a new addition to the theory, Jus Post Bellum as a concept is critical in comprehensive conflict and peace processes. It addresses how and what the government should do in post armed conflict scenario. Indeed, the intended or unintended lack of emphasis on this concept explains why some societies slip back to violence [38]. Proponents of this concept argue that conflict does not just end with the defeat of the involved groups but the government has a crucial obligation to ensure that some of the root causes and administrative loopholes are addressed. One of the main post-conflict issues is to address justice. This is not only the examination of non-state actors but also of government agencies' conducts and in case of any form of illegality, the people responsible must be punished. This helps to restore confidence in the government and remove any doubts of impunity and selective justice. Reconciliation efforts need to be introduced so as to allow the country to reflect on the mistakes of the past and solutions for the future.

Having examined the main assumptions of just war, its application to war on terrorism seems reasonable on the surface. The theory seems to lean on government's justification of use of force in responding to incidences of terror. Of course, it prescribes the use of force as a last resort, but seemingly with regards to war on terrorism, the last resort comes much faster than it would have been in other instances.

Nigerian government can also claim that its offensive on Boko Haram is a just war. The group has claimed responsibility to some of the most disturbing crimes of this century including the kidnapping of over 200 girls in Chibok, suicide bombings,

attack on security officers and burning of villages. Boko Haram is also on the spot for using child soldiers and women as suicide bombers. The number of deaths amounting to the activities of this group as well as the economic impact is indeed reasonable grounds to understand government response. In addition, the government can also claim that it had organized dialogue platforms with the group which did not materialize and thus necessitating the use of force. We contend that the Nigerian government non-lethal efforts were not only ineffective but also were nipped in the bud. Radicalization was not an overnight event but rather a corollary of a plethora of grievances by different groups and inadequate response by the government on these grievances. Similarly, Boko Haram has relied on several issues to justify its use of force and state fragility is one of the basis that promotes radical ideas especially if such fragility is caused by poor governance.

4.0 Challenges Facing Nigerian Government Response

4.1 Ongoing Insecurity and Displacement

In north-eastern Nigeria, specifically in Borno, the continuous problem of insecurity has hindered the return and resettlement of displaced persons back to their local settlements. This has consequently affected stabilization programs initiated as government's response to activities and impacts of Boko Haram. According to a report by the International Organization for Migration [39], approximately more than 2 million people are displaced and the number continues to burgeon. The military operations conducted in the Northern States have forced civilians from time to time to move into displacement camps. This is mostly attributed to the infamous practice of clearing villages, a widely used technique by the Nigerian government.

Noteworthy, previous governments, most specifically under President Goodluck Jonathan, opted to pursue a highly militarized response in countering the threat of Boko Haram as consolidating additional support from international organizations proved futile. This is because donors struggled to find viable partners to support civilian stabilization efforts. However, under President Buhari, there have been a paradigm shift by adopting diverse efforts to attract donors. For example, the government sought the assistance of the World Bank and the European Union in facilitating a Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) in north-eastern Nigeria.

4.2 Insufficient Regional Cooperation

In as much as Nigeria is the most affected by the activities of Boko Haram, the upheaval covers the larger Lake Chad Basin region. Yet little success can be seen in terms of collaboration among the regional countries. The G5 Sahel operation which stands as the possible regional response to Boko Haram has been facing several challenges. For example the lack of an elaborate Boko Haram strategy within the G5 Sahel framework combined with insufficient resources and personnel are major obstacles. In addition intelligence gathering a key component of counter terrorism has not been forthcoming due to weak intelligence capacity created by lack of modern intelligence gathering equipment like drones. Dependence on other operations particularly the French-backed *Operation Barkhane* which the G5S forces have continuously relied on raises serious questions on sustainability and capacity of the countries [40].

5.0 Discussion

The war against terrorism is coined under a fight against a broader global threat [41], [16] providing governments with an opportunity to legitimize the use of excessive force on whoever is deemed as a 'terrorist' in the international arena. Indeed, governments have benefited from regional and international support to fight groups whose activities border on terrorism. It would be facile for one to quickly dismiss government's response and the growing solidarity by heads of states in combating terror across the world. Needless to say, terrorism has caused devastating human and economic losses in different countries and with terrorist groups keen on targeting civilians in places and time that governments cannot expect and in such instances the frustration of policymakers and security agencies tasked with protecting people comes to bear. Similarly, terrorism continues to expose governments as incompetent and unable to protect its citizens during such attacks and the anticipated political consequences explain why governments are quick to respond with brute force against any group deemed to be terrorists.

On the other hand, it is clear that government's violent response continues to provide terrorist groups with narratives and the ideological keystones to further their interests. Not only are most of the existing counterterrorism approaches mismanaged, but they also seem to be inefficient and very costly to the taxpayers. In the meantime, terrorist groups continue to persist and transform if the recent nature of attacks which include lone fighters and unconventional means are anything to go by.

Politicization of the war against terrorism is another major concern going forward since governments are today taking advantage of the global image of the war against terrorism to further their own political objectives at home. It is no longer surprising to find political rivals branding their opponents as terrorists or members of such groups. This Inauspicious trend gives a section of political actors unfair advantage by portraying their competitors as threats to national security. Equally, it has also led to therelegated genuine grievances to criminal demands and in most cases, these concerns remain unsolved.

Non-violent and soft strategies to counterterrorism are therefore intended to achieve a more critical goal than simply dismantling the network or terrorists' facilities. They predisposed toward therejection of unjustified brute force as a deplorable aberration in the fight against terror. According to Stern [42], soft strategies to counterterrorism require that proper inquiry of deep-rooted causes of extremismbe undertaken. In other words, before placing the concerns of a group on a global terrorist scale, it is appropriate to understand the origins of their concerns and objectively examine the nature and origin of the group's ideology. This way, some of the groups that transmogrify to terrorist organizations may have been rendered irrelevant had honest and effective commitment been made to address their grievances.

Politicization of counterterrorism programs has had serious ramifications on the citizens. The rivalry between the president Buhari and opposition governors who head the states of Yobe and Borno states affects the activities of donor countries and institutions which are being forced to exercise a balancing act between the political rivals. The problem of corruption has also been a major hindranceto the country'swar on terrorism as some of the terrorist group's ideology include anti-corruption campaigns.

6.0 Conclusion

This paper has examined the relationship between fragile states, emergence of terrorism groups and governments' justification of their responses. Nigeria's experienceis an indication that while governments associate domestic groups with larger networks of terrorist cells, theyfail to acknowledge local factors that lead to the rise of such groups. This places a high premium on preemptive doctrine that readily welcomes the use of hard power. Yet while hard power can be effective in sequestering terrosistgroups, it can not guarantee decisive victory and in turn, opens up the flood gates of unending

ferocious violence especially when government's response does not ameliorated the effects of the terror attacks.

It is, therefore, not difficult to conclude that over-reliance on hard approaches does not guarantee decisive victory and are partly to be blamed for the escalation of the crisis in Nigeria. Boko Haram benefited immensely from governments' miscalculations to further their ideologies which could have been significantly contained if proper strategies were adopted. Therefore, we underscore the necessity of soft approaches that narrow down to communities' involvement in government's counterterrorism measures, addressing the deep-rooted cultural, political and economic grievances, responding effectively to early warnings and improving justice system.

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Environmental and Natural Resources Consequences of Armed Conflicts and Violent Extremism in Sahelian Countries in Africa

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Abstract

Environmental and natural resources aspect of armed conflicts and violent extremism is inadequately handled in conflict reportage and response strategies. Much is placed on the direct impact on human life and properties. This notwithstanding, environmental degradation during conflicts has a serious impact on the present and future generations. This study focuses on the environmental and natural resources consequence of armed conflict in the Sahel region of Africa. The study relied on globally accepted scores on the performance of countries in the Sahel on various environmental performance indicators such as ecosystem vitality, biodiversity and habitat preservation, agriculture, water and sanitation produced by the Yale University and data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Project database to draw empirical link between conflict and the environment. The findings reveal that the Sahel region over the last five years has been unstable due to continuous armed attacks. Along the same period, environmental performance based on key indicators such as water and sanitation and ecosystem vitality were below average. Overall lower environmental performance index (EPI) was associated with high incidence of arms conflict in the region. The study concludes that the ongoing and increasing trend of conflicts and armed attacks in the Sahel pose a threat to the environment. There is, therefore, the need for response measures and global action to secure the environment from further destruction due to conflicts and armed attacks.

Keywords: Armed Attack, Conflict, Environment, Natural Resources, Sahel Region

1.0 Introduction

Armed conflicts are detrimental to society because they cause the loss of lives, health problems and property destruction worth millions of dollars. In Africa for instance, armed conflicts and terrorist attacks are responsible for the loss of over a million lives and destruction of property worth millions of dollars annually [1]. There have been concerted efforts to respond to the threat of armed conflicts and terrorist attacks through the deployment of peace support operations, agreements and laws aimed at ceasefire or a reduction in the consequences of these conflicts. In all these, the discourse on the issue of the environment and natural resources are relegated to the background. While there exist several legislations including the universality accepted International Humanitarian law (IHL) that seek to reduce the effect of arms conflict on civilians' life, health and property, there is little recognition and attention given to the environmental impact of violent extremism and armed conflicts especially in the Sahel region of Africa. Even in conflicts that result from competition over natural or environmental resources, the narrative and response action often pay little or no attention to environmental or natural resource conservation.


Historically, conflicts arise from a combination of environmental, political, and economic factors. Environmental degradation and competition for environmental resources remain a major cause of conflicts, especially in Africa [2]. The situation is more pronounced in the Sahelian countries where environmental resources are scarce and competition for them is fierce. Many studies have linked conflicts and even terrorist attacks in some of the Sahelian countries especially Mali, Niger, Chad among others to the environmental degradation and competition over access to already shrinking resources [1]. In many of these countries, conflict is seen as a potent tool for either protecting or gaining control over environmental resources with significant livelihood, cultural or other sociological importance.

Conventionally, the major aspect and dimensions that are given much coverage in conflict reporting especially in Africa include political, religious, ethnic, tribal and clan divisions, economic factors, and historical feuds [3]. The environment and natural resource management issues although well recognized are not given equal attention. This generally comes from the lack of understanding of how conflict affects the environment and disinterest in environmental stewardship. Four major environmental issues that are clearly linked to many conflicts and terrorist attacks in

Africa include access and control of oil and gas reserves, the Nile water, hardwood timber as well as rangeland and rain-fed agricultural land. While oil, Nile waters and hardwood timber-related conflict are at a national-scale, conflict over rangeland and rain-fed agricultural land are mostly local.

The Sahelian region of Africa characterized by a fragile environment and depreciating natural resources base is one of the regions in the world that has witnessed high incidences of violent extremism and terrorist attacks, especially in the last two decades. The region which covers the biogeographic transitional zone between the Sahara to the north and the Sudanian Savanna to the south is occupied by a sizeable number of African countries including northern Senegal, southern Mauritania, central Mali, northern Burkina Faso, the extreme south of Algeria, South-eastern Niger, the North-eastern Nigeria, South-western Chad, central and southern Sudan, the extreme north of South Sudan, Eritrea, Far North Cameroon, Central African Republic and the extreme north of Ethiopia (Figure 1). The Sahel stretch of Africa faces several environmental issues and burgeoning global warming and climate change impact. For hundreds of years, the Sahel region has suffered from drought and megadrought that have worsened vulnerability of agrarian base livelihood and natural resources conservation [4]. The region suffered from a drought that lasted for 250 years (1450 AD to 1700 AD), drought in 1914 and recently frequent drought from 1951 to 2004 [5]. These droughts among other forms of environmental degradation have caused famine and excessive dependency on natural and environmental resources.

Apart from the challenges that the Sahel face with regards to depleting environmental resources, the region has also been faced with violent extremism, armed conflicts and terrorism. In the past five to ten years, the Sahel region has witnessed sustained activities of terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) leading to violence, extremism and instability of the region [6]. There are also pockets of violent herder-farmer conflicts recorded in Nigeria, Mali, Sudan and other countries in the Sahel region that have been linked to climate change, environmental and land degradation, and population growth [7]. An *Al-Jazeera* documentary aired on April 27, 2015 also linked the Northern Mali conflict to droughts and food shortages. There are also several incidences of religious terrorism, anti-state rebellions, and arms, drugs and human trafficking in the Sahel region that have ostensibly been linked to vulnerability created by environmental degradation and shrinking natural resources base.

Figure 1: Map of the Sahel Belt in Africa

The volatility and instability of the Sahel region are still under ascendancy despite several national and international efforts. For instance, al Qaeda-affiliated Jama'at Nustratal-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM) or the Group for the Support of Islam and Moslems (GSIM) comprising of AQIM, Macina Liberation Front (MLF), Ansarul Dine and al-Mourabitoun group, operating from Mali has spread its attacks into Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast with the possibility of moving into other coastal countries within the region. Drugs and human trafficking in Mauritania between South America and Europe are still being reported and Boko Haram still continues to terrorized many parts of Nigeria and neighboring countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger. These events among others bemoan the volatility of the Sahel region and indicative of the high attention it deserves if peace must be sought in this region. Ostensibly, the areas of the terrorist attack and violent extremism are also part of the region with worse environmental degradation and fierce competition for natural resources. This interconnectedness resulting in recognition of the fact that the nature of the environment and natural resources dynamics could explain the increasing incidence of terrorist attack and extreme violence in the Sahel region.

There is an apparent relationship between violent conflict and environmental degradation as well as resources depletion [8]. At the most basic level, it is clear that

armed conflicts and terrorist attacks result in the destruction of the environment either in the form of pollution, destruction of forest and significant areas of ecological importance, contribute to climate change and reduction of ecosystem vitality. At the same time, many conflicts have also arisen from competition over limited natural resources and desire to protect some biophysical component of the environment. Considering the environmental vulnerability of the Sahel and the increasing instability in the region, the dynamic relationship between violent extremism, terrorism and environmental stewardship could provide insight for understanding the nexus of the conflict and determination of mechanisms for addressing the problem. The purpose of this study was therefore to explore the dynamic relationship between violent extremism, conflict and environmental protection and resource management.

2.0 Literature Review

Literature on the dynamic interrelationship between conflicts or violent extremism and environment or natural resources governance abound. The key areas highlighted include large displacement of people in refugee camps that put pressure on the surrounding ecosystem [9]. Forests are cleared to provide wood for building shelters and creating cooking fires. Other consequences from the conflict include the degradation of National Parks and Reserves. A good example is the case of Rwanda where conflict shifted personnel and capital to other parts of the country, making it hard to protect wildlife [10]. Through chemical contamination, marine ecosystems were reportedly damaged with wreckage from naval ships, which leaked oil into the water. Oil contamination in the Atlantic Ocean due to World War II shipwrecks is estimated at over 15 million tonnes [11].

One dimension of the environmental threat of armed conflict is that the environment is not only a receptacle for conflict or war activities but also a source of conflict as well. Resources are a key source of conflict between nations, communities and ethnic groups. The situation is even pronounced in regions with scarce natural resources such as those in the Sahel and arid regions. It was predicted that after the end of the Cold War, environmental degradation would exacerbate scarcities and become an additional source of armed conflict [12]. The survival of many nations, communities and ethnic groups depends on the availability of resources from the environment [13]. Studies have shown that resources that are a source of armed conflict usually include territory, strategic raw materials, energy sources, water, and food/pasture. In

order to maintain resource stability, chemical and nuclear warfare have been used by nations in order to protect or extract resources, and during conflict [14]. This further deteriorates these resources and makes them vulnerable to depletion.

The progression of warfare and its effects on the environment continued with the invention of weapons of mass destruction. Although the use of nuclear weapons has largely been banned by various conventions and agreements, effect of their usage during the World War II can still be observed. On top of the great loss in human life, natural resources are usually the first to suffer: forests and wildlife animals are wiped out at the least onset of conflict. There are several direct and indirect effects on the environment originating from warfare. Physical destruction of biophysical components of the environment due to the nuclear blast or by the biospheric damage due to ionizing radiation or radiotoxicity directly affects ecosystems within the blast radius [14]. The atmospheric or geospheric disturbances caused by weapons used during war can lead to weather and climate changes.

Militarism and its impact on the environment has been alarming. Traditionally, human security is linked to military activities and defense [15]. Scholars and institutions like the International Peace Bureau are now increasingly calling for a more holistic approach to security, particularly including an emphasis on the interconnections and interdependencies that exist between humans and the environment [16]. Military and armed activities have significant impacts on the environment [17]. Not only can war be destructive to the socio-environmental factors, but military activities produce extensive amounts of greenhouse gases that add to anthropogenic climate change pollution, and cause resource depletion, among other environmental impacts.

Habitat destruction and biodiversity loss remain one of the major consequences of war and arms conflict. Due to forced displacement caused by war, many refugee camps have been established in biodiversity hotspots. Examples of such situations abound in Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan where both refugees and rebel groups find cover in a protected forest and places of ecological importance [18]. Perhaps the most famous example of habitat destruction occurred during the Vietnam War when U.S. forces sprayed herbicides like Agent Orange on the forests and mangrove swamps that provided cover to guerrilla soldiers. An estimated 20 million gallons of herbicide were used, decimating about 4.5 million acres in the countryside [19].

Throughout Africa, war has been a major factor in the decline of wildlife populations inside national parks and other protected areas [20]. European forests equally experienced traumatic impacts from fighting during war. The shattered forests in the battle zones faced exploitation [21]. Notwithstanding the several studies that have established the effect of war and conflict on the environment, there are still critics who stated that no compelling empirical link has been made between the environment and conflict issues.

1.3 Environmental Diplomacy Theoretical Framework

Environmental (ecological) diplomacy has emerged as a theoretical framework for understanding and finding a solution to environmental and ecological problems within sovereign states. Environmental diplomacy is broken down into two general categories viz. conventions regulating the use of natural resources, and conventions regulating pollution. This theory is underpinned by the fact that political boundaries rarely reflect biological boundaries so that as national economies consume resources and produce pollution, they spread environmental problems far beyond their national boundaries. Thus, environmental and natural resources conservation is a collective activity that goes beyond national boundaries. As a result of this, diplomacy is required when dealing with transboundary environmental issues. Environmental problems from armed conflict result from transboundary conflicts and hence should be explained in line with environmental diplomacy principles.


The environmental diplomacy underpins the fact that attention to the environment especial at the national level are borne out of compelling obligations to the use of natural resources, and prevention regulating. Absence of this obligation as it is in the current state during conflict cause destruction of the environment. It is contended from the environmental diplomacy framework that destruction of the environment during wartimes or conflicts cannot be controlled without obligatory regulation that binds nations and belligerent groups. Thus, increasing incidence of environmental destruction during conflict is a testament of limited or absence of binding rules that defined and regulate how human interaction with the environment should be during conflicts or wartime.

4.0 Study Area and Methods

4.1 The Study Area

The Sahel region in Africa covers eco-climatic and biogeographic transitional zone between the Sahara to the north and the Sudanian Savanna to the south. The Sahel region has a tropical semi-arid climate and spread from across the south-central latitudes of Northern Africa between the Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea. The Sahel portion of Africa covers part of northern Senegal, southern Mauritania, central Mali, northern Burkina Faso, the extreme south of Algeria, Niger, the extreme north of Nigeria, central Chad, central and southern Sudan, the extreme north of South Sudan, Eritrea, Cameroon, Central African Republic and of Ethiopia. The Western part of the Sahel has been referred to the Sudan region historically. This belt was roughly located between the Sahara and the coastal areas of West Africa.

Figure 2: Map of Study Area in the Sahel



Topographically, the Sahel is mainly flat with most part of the region lying between 200 and 400 meters in elevation. There are some isolated plateaus and mountains within the Sahel, but those areas are designated as separate eco-regions because their flora and fauna are distinct from the surrounding lowlands. The Sahel is mostly covered by grassland and savanna, with areas of woodland and shrubland. The annual rainfall varies from around 100–200 mm in the north of the Sahel to around 600 mm (24 in) in the south. Traditionally, most of the people in the Sahel have been semi-nomads, farming and raising livestock in a system of transhumance, which is probably the most sustainable way of utilizing the Sahel. A map of the Sahelian countries in Africa covered in this study are presented in the map in Figure 2.

4.2 Research Design and Data Collection Method

The study employed a case study research design that involved focusing on the Sahel Region of Africa. Case research design is most suitable when a study is intended to examine a particular phenomenon within a geographic region or scope [22]. In this study, we examined the implication of increasing and sustained conflict in the Sahel on the environmental performance of countries in the Sahel. A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods was employed to collect and analyze data that provides a comprehensive view of the impact that conflicts in the Sahel has on the environment. A combination of both quantitative and qualitative research methods provides an opportunity for understanding both the dimensions and magnitude of events or phenomenon under a study [23].

The data for the study were obtained from secondary sources. Data on armed conflict in the selected countries in the Sahel were obtained from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Project database. The ACLED database contains the most comprehensive public collection of violence and conflict data for developing states. The data collected include the number, types and forms of conflicts that occur in the Sahel from 2014 to 2018. Data on environmental performance were obtained from environmental performance index (EPI) records produced jointly by Yale University and Columbia University in collaboration with the World Economic Forum as reported by Wendling [24]. The EPI provides a quantitative basis for comparing, analyzing, and understanding environmental performance for 180 countries across various components including environmental health, ecosystem vitality, climate change among others. For the purpose of this study, data

were collected on environmental health, ecosystem vitality, biodiversity and habitat, forest, water resources and agriculture from 2014 to 2018.

4.3 Data Analysis

The data collected were analyzed with the aid of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21.0. The data collected from the various sources were obtained in Microsoft Excel data format. The data were then inspected, sorted and exported into the SPSS programme for analysis. The first part of the analysis involves the use of exploratory statistical analysis methods to provide a broad-based understanding of the data and the variables studied. This was followed by various descriptive and inferential statistical analyses to reveal the trend in arms conflicts across the selected countries. The descriptive analysis use included measures of central tendencies and dispersions and the inferential statistical analysis involves the use of regression analysis.

5.0 Findings

5.1 Overview of Conflict, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region of Africa

The trend in armed conflicts and attacks is as obtained from the ACLED Project database. The ACLED on each of the five countries of the Sahel studied is presented in Figure 3. From the results, there is an increasing trend of conflict and violent attacks across many countries in the Sahel. Apart from Sudan where a reduction in the number of violent attacks has been recorded, the remaining countries show a sustained increase from 2014 to 2015. Nigeria shows the highest record of attacks but with decrease trend from 2015 to 2016. The period of reduction in violent attacks in Nigeria coincided with the early years of President Muhamadu Buhari regime where the activities of Boko Haram and Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) went down. This observation support claim that violent activities somewhat reduce at the early stage of new regimes as these groups slow down to understand the agenda of the new regime [25]. Although the reduction in attacks was attributed to pre-emptive attacks by the Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the desire of the groups to understand the tactics and measures of the new regime is a factor.

The results as presented in Figure 3 show that conflicts and armed attacks have increased steadily from 2014 to 2018 in Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal and Mali while a fluctuating trend is seen in Nigeria and Sudan. The results show that 2014 remains


the year with the lowest conflicts and armed attacks in all four countries. A report by Reliefweb described the period between 2011 and 2017 as the period of Sahel crisis [27]. The report noted that a combination of factors including, the 2011 drought, high food prices, low agricultural production, as well as the inability of affected households to recover from the 2010 food and nutrition crisis, exacerbated the sub-regions vulnerability in 2012. Moreover, the 2010-2011 crises in Cote d'Ivoire and Libya also contributed to increasing the vulnerability of hundreds of thousands of households that were deprived of the remittances of migrant workers who had fled these conflicts.. In 2012, approximately 18.7 million people were estimated to be food insecure and over one million children were at risk of dying from severe acute malnutrition.

A culmination of the above conditions resulted in conflicts from community and ethnic militia and other groupings in response to the hardship within the region around that time. Many reports have suggested that between 2012 and 2017, the Sahel region faced several challenges some of which resulted in the high number of conflicts and armed attacks in the region. Political instability was one of the challenges that the Sahel region faced for years. In Mali, the military coup of March 2012 brought an abrupt halt to 20 years of stable democracy. In its aftermath, terrorists who had occupied most of the northern region started heading south, intent on taking control of the whole country. In January 2013 a French-led and Chad-supported intervention stopped their advance. The conflict compounded the security and humanitarian crisis, in part by disrupting supply routes and causing food shortages.

The Darfur crisis of Sudan which also escalated in 2013 persists until today contributing to the increasing trend of conflicts and armed attacks across the Sahel region. There are persistent rebellion and militia activities in East Africa that did damage to Chad's security through this period. During Niger's 50 years of independence, the country has seen two armed rebellions, four coups, seven governments and periods of promising democratic change as well as reversals. These circumstances further exposed the vulnerability of the region and accounted for the high cases of conflict in the region. Nigeria constituting part of the Sahel has also witnessed a burgeoning state of conflicts and armed activities in recent years especially with the emergence of Boko Haram and the continuous herder-farmer conflicts in the North [26].

The trend in Burkina Faso is not markedly different from other countries in the region. Insecurity in the country is equally high with an increasing report of conflict-related violence reported in western regions of the country. Seven security-related incidents have been recorded in Boucle du Mouhoun, a region bordering conflict-affected Mali, since October 2018 [24]. In total, an estimated 1.4 million people live in conflict-affected regions of Burkina Faso. The number of internally displaced people continues to rise, with an additional 6 148 recently identified, bringing the total number to 47 029 this year [27]. The population of the Sahel town of Djibo has increased by 50 per cent this year due to forced displacement from surrounding areas [27]. The negative effects of the insecurity and increasing violence are aggravating the vulnerability of refugees, host and displaced populations, who are in need of multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance.

Figure 3: Armed Attacks in Selected Sahel Regions from 2014 to 2018



5.2 Forms of Armed Conflicts and Possible Environmental Component Threatened

The study also examined the kind of forms of violent attacks that are witnessed in the countries studied. From the results obtained, it was noted that violent conflicts in the Sahel take several forms and include battles, explosions/remote violence, protests, riots, strategic developments and violence against civilians. As the result in Table 1 shows nearly one-third (30 per cent) of all the armed attacks were violence against civilians. The results further show that about 22 per cent of the remaining attacks were in the form of battles and 23 per cent were protests. The least form of arms

attack was using explosions/remote violence (8.8 per cent), riot (9.3 per cent) and strategic development (5.8 per cent).

Violent attacks that involved more people, their displacement and use of massive weapons have a greater threat to the environment [28]. Battles which are often the form of conflict between militia groups and the military are some form of violent attacks that have the tendency to exert a significant and negative effect on the environment and natural resources. Violence against civilians also has the tendency to result in the displacement of people from their residence [29]. Incidence of such nature was reported copiously in many communities in the Sahel. Conflict on civilians has been one of the main causes of forced migration which has enormous environmental threats. Communities forced to migrate usually end up in camps in the forest leading to the destruction of habitats and ecosystem services. Strategic development activities are usually undertaken by rebels and terrorists to take control of certain parts of a state. Although they represented the least number of attacks, they have an enormous impact on the environment as massive deployment of arms is involved.

Table 1. Forms of Armed Attacks in the Sahel and Environmental Threats

Attack Types	Frequency	Per cent	Environmental Unit Threatened
Battles	3618	22.1	Forest and Ecosystem
Explosions/Remote Violence	1447	8.8	Forest and Ecosystem
Protests	3832	23.4	Water Resources Sanitation
Riots	1521	9.3	Water Resources Sanitation
Strategic Developments	954	5.8	Forest, Biodiversity and Habitat
Violence against Civilians	5011	30.6	Water Resources Sanitation


5.3 Environmental Performance within Conflict Areas in the Sahel Regions

The study examines the environmental performance of the studied countries in relation to ecosystem viability, water and sanitation, agriculture, biodiversity and habitat protection. The scores as produced by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy in collaboration with the World Economic Forum was used. The

approach involves taking the ratio of the difference between a country target on the different performance indices to the difference between the best and worst targets for environmental performance. Based on the approaches above, the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy has provided annual scores of countries around the world. The results in Figure 4 present the average performance of the countries studied in each of the environmental components from 2014 to 2018.

From the results, it is observed that Senegal, Burkina Faso and Niger recorded their highest score in environmental performance on biodiversity and habitat preservation. The result shows that Mali, Nigeria and Sudan rather performed better in the domain of agriculture. Apart from Sudan, the rest of the countries performed above average (>50) in biodiversity and habitat preservation. Apart from Senegal, the other countries performed above average (>50) in agriculture. Clearly, the results show that the environmental components that the studied countries in the Sahel have their highest score were either agricultural performance, biodiversity and habitat preservation. Besides, many countries scored low in water, sanitation and ecosystem vitality. In fact, all six countries performed below average in water and sanitation while all but Niger and Nigeria also performed below average on ecosystem vitality.

Figure 4: Environmental Performance Indicators Scores of Sahelian Countries of Africa




Source: Yale University (2018)

5.4 Environmental Performances and Conflict Trends in the Sahel

Using the overall Environmental Performance Index (EPI) of each country, the researchers sought to find out if there is any ostensible pattern between the number of conflicts or violent attacks in a year and the level of environmental performance. The results are presented in Figure 5. From the results, there was a rise in conflict over the years while the EPI was in decline. For instance, the cumulative EPI of the countries studied in the Sahel was 199.9 while the number of conflicts was 710. In 2015, however, the number of conflicts increased to 3492 which represented 392 per centage increase while the EPI increased by 21 per cent. This result shows that although EPI increased from 2014 to 2015 with an increase in a number of conflicts, the rate of increase was very negligible compared to the rate of increase in conflict. As the number of conflicts increased from 3258 in 2017 to 4181 in 2018, the EPI for the countries declined from 281.3 to 275.8. This result shows a negative relationship between conflict and environmental performance.

Figure 5: Conflict Trend vs Environmental Performance Index



6.0 Conclusions

The destruction of vegetation and other biophysical components through armed conflict and warfare across the globe has also been empirically established. However, the magnitude of the problems created on the environment and empirically linked quantitative analysis was missing especially for the marginalized and vulnerable regions such as the Sahel. This study relied on globally accepted scores on the environmental performance of countries with respect to ecosystem vitality, biodiversity and habitat preservation, agriculture, water and sanitation produced by the Yale University and

the conflicts data from ACLED Project database to establish an empirical link between conflict and the environment.

As the findings revealed, the Sahel region over the last five years has been unstable due to an increase in conflicts and armed attacks. Around the same period, environmental performance based on water and sanitation and ecosystem vitality were below average. The overall EPI was lower in the years where armed conflict in the region was at its peak. The increase in armed attacks and conflicts from 2017 to 2018 was associated with declining environmental performance in the region. The nature of armed conflicts and primary actors ostensibly revealed a high potential threat to various units of the environment. Forest cover is threatened by forced migration and refugee camping, rebels and militia activities among others.

The study concludes that increasing trend of conflicts and armed attacks in the Sahel pose a serious threat to the environment. Various aspects of the environment such as forest and wildlife, water resources, climate, land and other natural resources are negatively affected by the armed conflicts and wars. Ecosystem vitality, biodiversity and habitat protection, water and sanitation and agricultural productivity of the region might further deteriorate if actions are not taken to reverse the trend of regular armed attacks. From the findings, it would be a grievous mistake to ignore the environmental consequences of conflict, and hence the international community needs to act with greater urgency. There is the need for response measures and global action to secure the environment from further destruction from conflicts and armed attacks.

7.0 Recommendations

The study recommends the need for awareness creation at the international, national and local levels on the impact of armed activities on the environment. Conscious efforts at awareness creation can arouse interest and action from state institutions and relevant stakeholders to act to secure the environment from destruction by conflicts and armed activities. At the local level, it is expected that once awareness is created, conflicting parties may realize that a deteriorating environment is detrimental for the survival of all sides. They need to be made to know that they should cooperate to restore and protect the environment.

We also recommend that the practice of establishing peace parks in conflict resolution should be given greater attention. Peace parks are transboundary protected areas that are formally dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity and of natural and associated cultural resources, and the promotion of peace and cooperation. Establishing such parks will serve an important purpose beyond the symbolism of peace to restoration of the environment.

Unlike the IHL given worldwide recognition, laws and regulations that are to protect the environment from harm during conflict has not been promoted and given attention. The UN can lead this process by revising the IHL and empowering the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to add environmental destruction to crime against humanity for culprits to be prosecuted. This will act as a deterrent for all groups involved in conflicts.

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Explaining the Resurgence of Biafra Radicalisation and Nationalism in South-East Nigeria

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Abstract

Since the inception of Nigeria's fourth republic, there have been well over five secessionist movements from south east Nigeria with momentum potent enough to attract the attention of the Nigerian state. Such movements are always assessed from the realist context of power politics which accrues no justification for challenge against state sovereignty with underlying interest covered in hardened positions and allowed free progress to the crisis stage. In this work, attempt is made to analyse the potency of secessionists' group radicalisation and a possible adoption of terror strategy against the Nigerian state in the near future. Content was qualitatively generated from secondary and primary sources. The theories of Relative Deprivation and Horizontal Inequality were adopted as frameworks in analysing the marginalisation 'question' of south east Nigerians while the Staircase Radicalisation theory was used in evaluating the progressive scale of secessionist activities with a view to establishing the present threshold and/or the possibility of crossing the redline. It is discovered that the "Igbo marginalisation" cliché, which is the livewire of secessionist impulse, is gaining more validation among the south easterners and that secessionists' activities are getting more brazen, daring, audacious and extreme with time. There is, therefore a need, for the Nigerian government to wade in and advance a superior argument, through action, to foreclose the chances of another unconventional warfare against a radical group – this time, from the east.

Keywords: Marginalisation, Nigerian Civil War, Radical Ideology, Relative Deprivation, Secessionist Movement

1.0 Introduction

Since the year 1999, the Igbo of south east Nigeria have perpetually agitated and craved for equity and fairness in recognition and resource allocation and distribution. Some have overtly called for a restoration of the defunct Biafra and have hoped to realise that self-determination motive through peaceful means. Such groups as identified by Thompson *et al* [1] include but not limited to the Igbo Concerned Citizens, Igbo Elders' Forum, Igbo Renaissance Movement, Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), etc. Depending on the nature and character of their activities, some of the aforementioned groups have been largely ignored by the Nigerian government while others such as MASSOB, BZM and IPOB have attracted even much attention than due.

The month of September, 2017 marked a watershed in the dynamics of security contours in Nigeria. This period witnessed the birth of a new contentious 'terrorist group' which increased the number of officially recognised terror groups in Nigeria from two to three – *viz* the *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad* (Boko Haram), *Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan* (Ansaru) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Here, the IPOB secessionist group was declared a terrorist group by the Nigerian military on September 15, 2017, for according to it, the group "from all intent, plan and purpose...is a militant terrorist organisation" [2]. An official court order was acquired and gazetted on September 20, by the President Muhammadu Buhari's led administration, to legitimise the group's terror identity with excerpt reading thus:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that by the order of the Federal High Court, Abuja, in suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/871/2017, dated September 20, 2017...the activities of the Indigenous People of Biafra are declared to be terrorism and illegal in any part of Nigeria [2].

Though the terror identity of the group has remained highly controversial and has been contested by various scholars (*see* Ekpo [3]; Ekpo and Agorye [4]; Ekpo and Agorye^[4]), the group, by the virtue of the court order, remains a terrorist group within the geo-political space of the Nigerian state.

We do not seek to debate the legality or necessity of IPOB proscription and its declaration as a terrorist group since from all indications the group's activities did

not qualify such status as prescribed by the 2013 Terrorism Act (as amended) (*see* Ekpo [3]). IPOB is just one, out of the various secessionist groups that have rendered the defunct eastern region of Nigeria volatile with consistent propagation of Igbo deprivation ideology and call for secession from the Nigerian state so as to form the utopian state of Biafra which would offer freedom, justice, equity and liberty – commodities which they feel deprived of in the current Nigerian state arrangement.

By state ordinance, there is a terrorist group in south east Nigeria. By strategy and tactics, there is no such group. By potency, there are possibilities and indicators to bet on a possible emergence of an extreme group that could mobilise a dangerous few into radicalisation with certain objective and subjective conditions wrapped in cloak of deprivation, sentiment of nationalism and hope or utopia of a perfect Biafra which could only be likened to the Biblical Canaan soaked with milk and honey.

What then are the push and pull factors of secessionism in south east Nigeria? What drives, gives credence to, and proliferate the ideology of deprivation among the Igbos? Why is it that whoever founds a secessionist group in south east Nigeria always tend to have followers? What is the trend in patterns and *modus operandi* of secessionist movements in south east Nigeria? At what Staircase of radicalisation is the ideology of deprivation and call for secession in the south east? Are there chances and possibilities of progression to violent extremism? What would facilitate or constitute the Achilles' tendon and Achilles' heel for a violent secessionist group in the south east? Based on the aforementioned, how can the government wade in to foreclose the chances of fighting 'real' terrorist groups from the south east and north east Nigeria? These are the pertinent questions that this work seeks to answer.

2.0 Operational Definition of Concepts

Several concepts are repeatedly used here to depict specific and/or peculiar meanings as regard our work. Since most of them might be amorphous and used interchangeably to convey different meanings and serve unique purposes, we risk operationalising our keywords. By *south east Nigeria*, we refer to the geopolitical zone in Nigeria that is comprised of the five exclusive Igbo states of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo. By the *Nigerian Civil War*, we refer to the hostilities and armed conflict that followed the declaration of the Republic of Biafra out of the defunct eastern region between the Nigerian government and the Biafra forces and lasted between May 30, 1967 and January 15, 1970. *Ideology* here depicts a set of ingrained and articulated

pattern of belief that is held firmly by a group of people as a fact even when it might be a factoid. **Mobilisation** as used in this work defines the process of deploying antics, techniques, rhetoric and/or every other means available by a vanguard to fantasize and recruit passive, active and prospective membership and commitment of a group of people to a certain cause at a particular point in time. **Secessionist Movement** as used in this work implies a conscious effort, attempt and agitation by a group of persons of common primordial or constructed identity, interest and destiny to pull out of an already existing sovereign state for an independent state of their own. **Radicalisation** here is defined to depict an extreme and hardened position over an ideology or a cause by adherents in such a manner that adherents are ready to go violent and would even trade their lives for the cause if need be. **Marginalisation** here refers to a fortuitous or calculated exclusion of a distinct group of people with peculiar identity, but within a larger heterogeneous polity, from direct or indirect access to the resources and privileges that is being enjoyed by other members of the larger group with disparate identities.

3.0 Theoretical Framework

The themes under study have attracted a plenitude of attention from sociologists, political scientists, historians, psychologists and conflict analysts – leading to a plethora of positions, assumptions and standpoints which only a theoretical framework can streamline and synthesize. This informed our adoption of the various theories used in the work, to better explain and frame what would have otherwise been, at best, wordy and at worst, inscrutable.

3.1 Horizontal Inequality

The theory of horizontal inequality attempts an explanation into the underlying causes and nature of intergroup conflict in a diverse or heterogeneous polity or communities. The theory was propounded by Professor Frances Stewarts in her series of publications but became pervasive with her edited text titled *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multi-ethnic Societies*. The theory assumes that conflict is not an organic characteristic of a multi-ethnic society but holds its manifestation to certain forms of injustices. That is to say, “cultural differences do not lead to violent conflict unless there are also major economic and/or political causes”. Succinctly, an ethnically polarised people can live in maximum peace and harmony if tangible and intangible resources and privileges are equitably shared/distributed at a mutually agreed and sanctioned formula. However, where

injustice prevails, there is a horizontal inequality and that is, according to Stewarts [5] the underlying source of inter-group conflict. Here, horizontal inequalities (HIs) are defined as injustices or “inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups”. They are called horizontal to distinguish them from inequalities among individuals, which is referred to as vertical inequalities (VIs) [5]. Economic inequality occurs if a certain group is denied access to ownership of assets, opportunities and income; social inequality occurs when a group is denied access to social services as health, education, water, housing, etc; political inequality occurs if a group is prevented from participating maximally in political leadership; and cultural inequality occurs if holidays and cultural practices of a certain group is not recognised within a larger polity.

When the collective interest of a group is trampled upon by another group within a polity, there is mass mobilisation by a vanguard within the marginalised or suppressed group with a view to righting the wrongs with a strategy that is determined by the intensity or severity level of the HIs. Where severe HIs affect both the elites and masses of a marginalised group, there is high tendency of outbreak of violent resistance. Where there is a sharp HIs (which might be spatially distributed) with the government failing to respond or further repressing the victimised group, the later always resorts to violence and could also pursue secessionist cause for abrupt autonomy. HIs are total with conspicuous indicators and are based on the following conjectures that:

- a. conflict is more likely where there are significant political or economic horizontal inequalities, or both;
- b. political mobilisation is especially likely where there are consistent horizontal inequalities, that is both political and economic horizontal inequalities run in the same direction;
- c. lack of cultural recognition and equity, or cultural status horizontal inequalities, will be provocative, while cultural inclusion will help sustain peace. A change in either direction may be particularly relevant to group mobilisation;
- d. political mobilisation and possibly conflict will become more likely where HIs are widening (Stewarts, 2008:19).

Extant literatures (*see* Achebe [6]; Ekpo and Agorye [2]; Ezeani [7]; Forsyth [8]; Odumegwu-Ojukwu [9]) are available on the state of the Igbo within the Nigerian polity. Analyses are made of the sharp HIs that the Igbo and the people of the defunct Eastern Nigeria were subjected to between July 1966 and May, 1967. The reaction and mobilisation by the group culminated in the declaration of the Biafra Republic on May 30, 1967 and the 30-month conundrum that succeeded it. The transitional justice system that followed the Nigeria-Biafra war is often adjudged as faulty since it failed to address the root causes of the conflict. Hence, the debate has remained that the Igbo are still marginalised and are unequal in status with the other major ethnic groups in Nigeria politically, economically, socially and culturally and that these injustices perpetrated against the Igbo have become institutionalised with subtle legislations and unwritten constitution. It is on the aforementioned context that secessionist movements are analysed on the basis of oppressed group/identity, mobilising and agitating to right a wrong, secure justice or even secede to form an independent State of Biafra.

However, other analysts have failed to interpret or analyse the agitations in south east Nigeria on that context. To some, the Igbos (Ndigbo) are the ones marginalising or short-changing one another, not other groups in Nigeria. To others, there is no such thing as marginalisation. To the rest, the issue of marginalisation is perceived and conceived by the Igbos based on some subjective variables which if subjected to rigorous analysis are easily faulted. These necessitated our adoption of the relative deprivation theory as another framework to blend these points of view and establish the meeting and divergent points as regards potency in group mobilisation, radicalisation and violent resistance.

3.2 Relative Deprivation

The concept of relative deprivation was first used systematically in the 1940s by the authors of *The American Soldiers* to capture the feelings of individuals who felt lacking in status or privileges in relation to what is obtainable or enjoyed by others [10], [11]. Thus, by its etymological meaning, relative deprivation conveys the feeling of deprivation by persons “of some desirable thing relative to their own past, another person, persons, group, ideal, or some other social category” [12]. The concept was further developed with presuppositions, assumptions and hypotheses which qualify its present framing as a framework for understanding the relationship between social

comparison, injustice and inter-personal/group conflict. Consequently, the theory of relative deprivation has been used in explaining phenomenon such as poor physical health, participation in collective protest, susceptibility to terrorist recruitment [13] and outbreak of political violence [10].

In his attempt to offer an explanation to the underlying reason *Why Men Rebel*, Tedd Robert Gurr [10] identified relative deprivation (RD) as the sinew and interstice linking frustration and aggression in men which is most times expressed through political violence. He defined relative deprivation as:

actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping (p.24)

By the above, he sees of relative deprivation to be the gap between what an individual or a group possesses and what s/he or they feel they deserve or ought to have possessed at a particular point in time. It is an existing tension “that develops from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction” (p.23). Gurr sees relative deprivation as the source of individual or group frustration which eventually culminates in conflict expressed as collective violence or political violence against the source of frustration.

Just as in HIs, the severity of the violence is dependent on the duration/degree or sharpness of the deprivation which is tantamount to the level of frustration accumulated and expressed. According to Gurr [10], mild deprivation would galvanise a few persons into political violence; moderate deprivation would attract more number across the brink; while very high deprivation is likely to motivate a large number of people into action (p.9).

The theory of relative deprivation as such “concerns *individuals* – their comparisons, appraisals, and effect” [13]. It is the “judgment that one is worse off compared to some standard accompanied by feelings of anger and resentment”. The theory assumes “that such comparison, if regarded as unfair, can result in either interpersonal or intergroup outcomes” (p.205) and is best captured in three steps *viz*:

- a. there must be comparison made by an individual – if one does not compare, there can be no relative deprivation;
- b. there must be a cognitive appraisal that leads the individual to perceive that the individual or his/her in-group is at a disadvantage;
- c. the perceived disadvantage must be viewed as unfair – the perceiver thinks the perceiver or his/her in-group deserves better and this results in angry resentment [13].

A careful review of the two theories above reveals some meeting and departing points. While the HIs explains a positional, objective and ‘actual’ phenomenon of identity-based injustices, the RD explains a subjective and perceived or assumed injustice against an individual or a group. Both theories are however, interested in explaining the outcome or relationship between actual or perceived injustice in allocation of resources and privileges. Just as in HIs, RD could lead to the mass mobilisation of resources by an aggrieved group against its perceived source(s) of deprivation, irrespective of the objectivity or subjectivity in its definition of deprivation. In our case, the Nigerian government and a myriad of Nigerians appear to be satisfied with the post-war transitional justice system which offered the acclaimed R [3] (Reconciliation, Rehabilitation & Reconstruction) but there is a virile disposition of discontentment on the part of Ndigbo regarding what was promised, what was realised and what is presently obtainable. Whether from the objective and factual interpretation or subjective and perceived claims, the potency of friction between some secessionist groups in the south east and the Nigerian state is not controvertible – of greater concern are the burgeoning radical secessionist ideology and the possibility of groups’ adoption of an asymmetrical violent tactics against the Nigerian government. This informed our utilisation of the Staircase Radicalisation theory in framing that analysis.

3.3 Staircase Radicalisation

The staircase radicalisation model explains the conditions and steps that culminate in the movement of relatively deprived people from mere frustration stage to violent extremism. It was advanced by Fathali M. Moghaddam [14] to explain the social and psychological processes that lead to terrorist act. Here, five staircases are identified and are likened to that of a building but gets narrow and less *ad populum* as movement progresses to the apex.

The *ground floor* houses millions of people with a common sense and feelings of relative deprivation and perceived injustice. The *first floor* contains a certain percentage that graduates from the *ground floor*. These set of persons are interested in finding pragmatic ways to righting the wrongs and earning justice for their group. Movement is made to the *second floor* when it appears that “they do not see possibilities for individual mobility and do not feel that they can adequately influence the procedures through which decisions are made”. The anger and frustration gets fiercer with a leader encouraging members to vent their aggression on the source(s) of the group’s deprivation. This automatically leads to a leap to the *third floor* whereby terror strategy is gradually justified by group members. On the *fourth floor*, a red line is drawn whereby one is either “for us or against us” with potential terrorists recruited for a terror group which is considered to be legitimate by group members. At the *fifth floor*, training is done for a selected few to sedate the moral tendencies that could prevent group members from harming targets or themselves. At this stage, members are equipped and are ready to engage [14].

From extant works and observation, millions of south east Nigerians feel relatively deprived and would, in every available opportunity, express such feelings either implicitly or explicitly. A few have taken steps to seek alternatives and avenues to righting the wrongs and such alternatives have metamorphosed from the early fourth republic parleys to formation of peaceful and civil pro-Biafra groups. Little or no change has been realised and frustration has, over the years, become fiercer with formation of groups of which overt operations, covert dealings and vituperations suggest a dangling between the third and fourth staircases of radicalisation. This model is used in subsequent headings to analyse such reality. Further analysis is made to adduce the facilitating and militating factors against movement to the fifth staircase.

4.0 The Nigerian Civil War, Post-War Transitional Justice and Biafra Nostalgia

The contemporary history of Nigeria is largely the history of colonial manipulations and intrigues and interplay between the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria – Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. As rightly explicated by Olusanya [15] the various constitutions modelled and remodelled for Nigeria between 1914 and 1960, by the British colonial government, fortuitously accentuated rivalry and accommodated the interest of the aforementioned ‘super’ ethnic groups through a rather disproportionate

and insidious arrangements. Rather than arrest tension, it heightened the clashes of interests, atmosphere of diffidence and environment of grievances which transcended the colonial era [16], [17]. It is based on the forgoing that the civil war between the defunct Eastern Nigeria and the Nigerian government (1967-1970) can be contextualised.

The Nigerian civil war was a thirty month violent conflict between the defunct Eastern Nigeria (which seceded as the Republic of Biafra) and the then Federal Military Government (FMG). Confrontation and hostilities started exactly on the 6th day of July, 1967 and ended on the 15th day of January, 1970, with the Nigerian government emerging victorious. The author have, in separate works and publications [18], [2], and [17], recounted the structural, proximate and triggering causes of the Nigerian civil war and have also highlighted the politics that played out in the post-civil war peace building. There seem to be a consensus among scholars and analysts that the Nigerian government failed to forgive and reabsorb the defeated peoples of Eastern Nigeria, even as it had declared a “no victor no vanquished” policy [19], [20], [7], and [21]. Even the celebrated Policy of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation (3Rs) is adjudged to have been a ruse for according to Taiwo [22], “the programs did not ameliorate the conditions of Nigerians due to some political hindrances”.

Unlike what transpired in the post 1994 Rwanda, there was very little attempt at erasing the victor-vanquish mentality - creating a room for the nurturing of victim psychology and a fantasy of a perfect country that was never had, by the defeated. For instance, Achebe [6], forty-two years after the war still holds firmly to the Biafra ideology thus:

For most of us within Biafra our new nation was a dream that had become reality – a republic, in the strict definition of word: “a state in which the supreme power rests in the body of citizens entitled to vote and is exercised by representatives chosen directly or indirectly by them”. We could forge a new nation that respected the freedoms that all of mankind cherished and were willing to fight hard to hold on to. Within Biafra, the Biafran people would be free of persecution of all kinds (p.143).

Similarly, the then President and head of the defunct Biafra Republic, Col. Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu [9] believes Biafra was:

a line drawn for a persecuted people to have a beacon of hope, a line drawn so that a fleeing people can at least hope that once they cross it, they have arrived at a goal, a line drawn so that a hated and persecuted people can at least know that once they reach there, they would have love and succour. This is why there was no declaration of that line as a republic until certain acts of war were initiated against the persecuted people (p.178).

Some analysts even think the three years old Republic of Biafra had dwarfed the over fifty years old Nigeria in terms of nation-building and technological development. This position is held and expressed by Ezeani [7] who wondered why:

After more than 50 years of political independence, the country [Nigeria] cannot boast of the basic facilities such as reliable electricity and good network of roads taken for granted in countries that cannot compare with it in terms of wealth generation. What is wrong with Nigeria? Why is the country, which takes the glory of being the *Giant of Africa* unable to run even an airline with a single aeroplane or helicopter? Why can Nigeria not perform after it had killed Biafra it wanted the world to believe was the major obstacle hampering its progress? Why was the war-time Biafra better than the peace-time Nigeria in terms of national achievements, technological advancement and social cohesion? (p.185-6).

On the basis of the above positions, hinge the Biafra ideology of an ideal state in which worth cannot depreciate with time and space; which offers perpetual safety and security to the Igbo; which guarantees justice, human rights and rule of law; which despises marginalisation, inequality and deprivation; which provides a fertile environment and equal opportunities for individual/group aspirations. The Igbo having felt short-changed in the present Nigerian arrangement find succour in the psalms and nostalgia of Biafra which is conceived of as a lost glory that can be restored and the only channel to ensuring equity and security for Ndigbo. It is based on the above premise that Nwofe [23] concluded that:

The Igbo who is the major inhabitant of the defunct area called Biafra actually harbour a sense of insecurity and fear of extermination, on one hand, and a sense of opportunity in the new Republic of Biafra on the other. They appear to be conscious of the fact that they are an endangered set of people in Nigeria and the desire to have a separate sovereign state of Biafra overwhelm them (p.77).

It is this collective fear that has culminated in a “Biafran consciousness” among Ndigbo of southeast geo-political zone. Such identity has no clear distinction between the old Biafra and that being agitated for – and is motivated by same factors but is fought for in a rather different strategy. As corroborated by Julius-Adeoye [24]

The old Biafra was a political identity, whereas, the retention of the war in our collective memory assisted in the transition to the evolvement of Biafra as both cultural signifier and identity that describe both the diasporic Igbo and the Igbo of Nigeria. While the old declaration adopted a violent confrontational approach with the Nigeria nation, the new wave is premised on peace demonstration through global protestation and media propaganda (p.17).

Thus, the idea of Biafra has become so ingrained, cultivated, nurtured and transferred from generations to succeeding generations. It has occupied a befitting portion in the minds of Igbos and has assumed a position of a movement. In the words of Amanambu [25], “Biafra is a movement that exists more in the mind and can only be defeated with a superior ideology”. In fact, as it is in the present Nigerian political environment, “virtually every Igbo man/woman is a member, fan or a sympathiser of the Biafra agitation” [26]. This Biafra ideology, fantasy, euphoria and nostalgia gets stronger and more appeasing as indices of relative deprivation are made and pointed at by Igbos against other groups in Nigeria. Underneath this sentiment lies the weakness in the immeasurable guarantee of peaceful agitations for the restoration of the Biafra republic.

5.0 Relative Deprivation and the Resurgence of the Neo-Biafra Sentiment

To the Igbos, virtually every post-civil war policy were strategically designed to emasculate them economically, socially and politically. Cases are made of the federal government’s outlawing the importation of some vital commodities as grade-two clothing and stock fish which the Igbo depended on for economic resurgence; the flat exchange rate of any amount of Biafran currency for twenty pounds; the voiding of every bank transaction made in the Eastern region (excluding Calabar) during the period of the war; the politics of assets reclaiming which witnessed the transference of a chunk of Igbo properties to the victorious sides; and the refusal to invest, or even blocking international donors, from investing in the reconstruction

of war-torn Eastern infrastructures [26], [27]. Accusing fingers are also pointed at the politics in the reabsorbing of former federal civil and public workers; a few that were reconsidered were either demoted or stagnated – especially in the military and intelligence services [19], [21]. State controlled scholarship opportunities were denied the sons of the defeated on bizarre excuses and no justification [21]. Aptly, there were no indicators of genuine intent of reconciliation as the Igbo were still being treated with contempt [2].

The daunting *status quo* appear to have transcended the military dictatorships to the politics of the Nigerian fourth republic with the Igbos still feeling highly short-changed, neglected and marginalised by a centric circle that has neither accepted nor let them go. Arguments are made of Igbo-dominated south east geopolitical zone possessing the least number of states and the rationale for not rotating the most exalted political position (president) based on geopolitical zones [23]; Igbos failing to produce Nigeria's president since 1966 whereas, its contemporaries are doing so [2]; “failed leadership, official corruption, nepotism and the internal conflicts occasioned by the inability of the Nigerian government to guarantee the safety of its citizens” [24] structured suppression, injustice, hatred and desire for survival by Ndigbo [25]; ethnic bigotry, exclusion and competition [28]; relative deprivation [29]; and infrastructural deficit, human/economic resource allocation imbalance and political injustice against the Igbos [25]. The aforementioned factors have awakened the secessionist impulses which are perceived by the average Igbo as “a divine intervention in response to age-long marginalisation of Igbos in the political economy of Nigeria [26].

Inversely, others have conceived of the agitations in the south east as mere cacophony anchored on subjective presumptions and clouded presuppositions. To Thompson et al [1], marginalisation of Ndigbo is a “recent claim”; to others like Adetunberu and Bello [30], deprivation claims by the Igbos and peoples of former Eastern Nigeria is a mere allegation and is propagated based on “hatred to other sections of the country”; and as Ojibara [31] would portray it, it is just an ordinary claim. To President Muhammadu Buhari, marginalisation is just a figment of clouded reality – “they say they [Igbo] are marginalised but they have not defined the context of marginalisation. Who is marginalising them? Who? Do you know?” [1]. In the words of Ezukanma [32], it is a “defeatist despondent attitude towards Nigeria – not marginalisation – that is our [Igbo] problem in Nigerian politics”. When President Buhari was again, confronted with the Igbo marginalisation question during an interview aired by Arise TV on Monday, 7 January, 2019, he responded thus:

Somebody made an observation that I was not patronising the Igbo from the South East. I told him that when I won the election, I studied the amount of votes I got from all the geopolitical zones...I got 198,000 from the whole of the South East which virtually any local government can give me. But I appointed ministers of foreign affairs, labour, industries, and investment, mines and tech [nology]; these four I never knew them from Adam...How fair do you want me to be? [33].

The above position is supported by the Igbo appointees in President Buhari's cabinet such as Dr. Chris Ngige, who believes that the Igbo, by refusing to vote *en masse* for the former had short-changed themselves for "it is too late to cry" [34], "since politics is business in a way, you invest in business and you reap profit. Yes, that is what it is. But all I want to tell you is that we [Igbo] played bad politics; we made a bad investment because they invested in the Jonathan presidency" [35]. In essence, by "putting their eggs in one basket", the Igbos are the source of their present marginalisation. This position is well corroborated and explained by the former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Mr. Babachir Lawal, who berated thus:

They (South East) go their own way which they are entitled to doing and then they come round and say marginalisation in an election which they marginalised themselves...Nobody forced them to vote PDP [Peoples Democratic Party] but they lost. So, that is politics. Politics is a game of risk. You lose, you sit down and watch through the window when people are chopping [sic] on the dining table. So they shouldn't blame anybody on marginalisation [36].

However, though the present administration and indeed the political elites from other divides of the country see the Igbo marginalisation claims as either imaginations or self-inflicted, most Igbos think otherwise and deprivation remains the primary fuel fanning the embers of Biafra ideology and secessionist impulse. It is the sordid engine for mobilisation of aggrieved people by Biafra secessionist vanguards. Incidentally, secessionist movements are becoming more innovative in strategy, hardened in position and violent in tactics – posing graver threats with time.

6.0 On Which Staircase? The Changing Patterns and Strategy of Secessionist Activities in South East Nigeria

There is no gainsaying the fact that when the Nigerian government overran the Republic of Biafra and reincorporated it into Nigeria, the Igbos had felt deprived of their near perfect state devoid of any threat whatsoever and had developed the victim mentality and status of prodigal sonship. The 'vindictive' post war policies of the federal government had nurtured in them a feeling of being a relatively deprived and persecuted people. However, there were attempts by the Igbo second republic politicians to leave the *ground floor* to the *first floor* by wrestling for power and influence to force through change in that regard. For instance, Col. Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu (the Biafra strongman) had declared interest to contest for a senatorial seat while on exile at Ivory Coast [9] and Dr. Alex Ekwueme, an Igbo, successfully emerged as the Vice President of Nigeria during the second republic (1979-1983). The second republic parleys yielded even more dividend as the Shehu Shagari administration had granted Col. Odumegwu-Ojukwu an unconditional state pardon in May, 1982, leading to his celebrated return to Nigeria after decades on exile in Cote d'Ivoire [9].

However, the hope of influencing the polity or righting the wrongs by defunct Biafra leaders was thwarted by the December 31, 1983 putsch, which dislodged the civilian government of President Shagari and brought Gen. Muhammadu Buhari to power as head of state and government. Gen. Buhari's highhandedness in handling Igbo politicians destroyed the goodwill and minute hope which the Igbo had nurtured. For instance, while respected Igbo politicians such as the deposed Vice President, Dr. Alex Ekwueme and the defunct Biafra head of state, Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu were arrested and imprisoned in the dreaded Kirikiri prison for some flimsy justifications, the deposed President (Alhaji Shehu Shagari) who was the head of the executive was kept under a house arrest. The comparison in treatment of the ethnically desperate 'suspects' spilled emotions and insinuations were made that the Buhari coup was a systematic intervention of the Hausa-Fulani north against a possible emergence of Dr. Alex Ekwueme (an Igbo) as a successor to Alhaji Shehu Shagari.

The autocratic tendencies of the military regimes ensured that the wounds and feelings of deprivation could not be vented and the accumulation of such frustration is blamed for deprivation related coups such as that attempted by Major Gideon

Orkar and his group in April 22, 1990 with the aim of severing five states of Bauchi, Borno, Katsina, Kano and Sokoto in northern Nigeria (source of deprivation) from Nigeria (deprived) (*see* Siollun [37]; Ekpo and Agorye [2]).

Transition to civilian rule in 1999 brought about resurgence and attempts by Ndigbo to, yet again, redeem themselves from at least, political inequality and deprivation. The attention was shifted towards grabbing the presidency which has been revolving between the northern and western regions of Nigeria, with the Igbo “last seen” in July 15, 1966. There were concerted efforts by Igbo political elites to win trust and confidence of their ‘erstwhile’ brothers through covert parleys with major stakeholders to reassure their commitment and loyalty to the Nigerian project. However, change would not come as it appeared the dream of an Igbo presidency in 1999 was nipped in the bud before it even matured – the power that he had side-lined the Peoples Democratic Party’s (PDP) presidential hopeful, Dr. Ekwueme (an Igbo) for Chief Olusegun Obasanjo a Yoruba and former military Head of State (1976-1979) who within weeks of regaining freedom from prison, “outspent” Ekwueme in the February 1999 PDP primaries and “won comfortably with 1,658 votes to 521” [38]. Hope was still kept alive and the parley and subtle diplomacy continued. For instance, Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, the former Biafra leader, ran for the Nigerian presidency himself in 2003 under the platform of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) but secured an infinitesimal per centage of the total votes cast. Before then, he had reached out, again, to major stakeholders on reconciliation missions.

In the heat of IPOB agitation in 2017, President Buhari had confirmed such attempt by the former at building bridges when he berated thus:

In 2003 after I joined partisan politics, the late Chief EmekaOjukwu came and stayed as my guest in my hometown Daura. Over two days, we discussed in great depth till late into the night and analysed the problems of Nigeria. We both came to the conclusion that the country must remain one and united. Nigeria’s unity is settled and not negotiable [39].

Retrospectively, the failure of an Igbo emerging as the president in 1999 had pushed some people into the *second floor* – those who felt they stood no chance of influencing policy decisions to their favour. This culminated in the formation of the first pro-Biafra group (Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)) in 1999 with the objective of acquiring freedom from official

deprivation through tactics as no census, sit at home, and no election until there is referendum. According to the MASSOB leader Chief Ralph Uwazurike, in a Youtube video, it was the overwhelming level of adherence to the boycotts sanctioned in 2004 that led to his incarceration in 2005 by the Nigerian government. Upon his release on 2007, he claims he was scolded and dissuaded by Igbo leaders, including Odumegwu-Ojukwu, from deploying such extreme but relevant and insidious tactics which they believed was compounding the marginalisation problem and was too narrow to force through the needed change and political inclusion [40].

MASSOB's change in strategy was perceived as perfidious by some members who felt betrayed by the reactionary tendencies of its leader, Mr. Ralph Uwazurike. It was upon such lacuna that Nnamdi Kanu leveraged upon to launch the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) as the 'real' and "undisputable champion, fronting the Igbo secessionist cause" [24]. IPOB, aside maintaining the initial strategies designed by MASSOB, innovated approaches at mobilising supporters and through the use of insidious propagandas aimed at keeping the dream. Unlike MASSOB that was adjudged to have supported the principles of "pacifism and non-violence" [28], IPOB was more radical, daring and brazen. In terms of mobilisation, IPOB "employed a lot of hate campaign", "door-to-door mobilisation", "Short Messaging Service" and "rumour mill" [41] of which "gas chamber" is the *Radio Biafra* and its social media handles (see Julius-Adeoye [24]). In 2015, Nnamdi Kanu, according to Uzodinma [42] reportedly aired on *Radio Biafra* that:

there is no going back, by December 2015, Nigeria would have seized to exist; we shall fight until we get Biafra, if they don't give us Biafra, no human being will remain alive in Nigeria by that time. We shall turn everybody into corpse, you better go and buy your coffin (p.17).

Kanu and IPOB's propagation of provocative propaganda is documented in the work of Ekpo and Agorye [2]. He would not hesitate labelling Nigeria a "zoo" which only understands the "language of violence and force", daring that "if they fail to give us Biafra, Somalia will look like a paradise compared to what would happen to that zoo" (p.42). Kanu would threaten to "break the zoo into pieces" and would admonish IPOB members to "burn Nigeria down to the ground" any day they wake up to hear that he has been arrested" (p.43). IPOB, through its media channels has even attempted to securitise President Muhammadu Buhari and present him as security threat and

impostor harvested from Sudan by people of vested interest [4]. The activities of IPOB's *Radio Biafra* has been placed on the same pedestal with the *Thousand Hills Free Radio and Television* in Rwanda of which hate speeches, *inter alia*, culminated in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. IPOB's demeaning radio propaganda and brazenness is summarised by Thompson et al [1] when he noted that:

The IPOB, with the radio media being its main tool is alleged to have addressed the Federal Republic of Nigeria as a zoo and president Buhari as terrorist, evil and pedophile in some of its radio messages...In a video message while addressing some Igbo in Diaspora at the World Igbo Congress in the US, Kanu was seen soliciting for weapons from the audience and boasted that the Biafran passports and sovereign status has been recognised by some powerful countries...that he was going to Nigeria to regroup and on a particular date, "something will happen" which he urged the audience to look out for... that the only language the Nigerian state understood was war and he was ready for them (p.8).

The effect was that the frustration level of aggrieved people became higher and aggression was implicitly and explicitly justified and promoted by the IPOB leadership. Statistics available reveals that no fewer than 146 people died during clashes between IPOB/MASSOB and security forces in 2016; with 76 deaths in Anambra, 61 deaths in Abia and 9 deaths in Delta. The clash between secessionist groups and security personnel at Onitsha/Nkpor axis of Anambra state on May 30, 2016, is known to have resulted in 127 casualties with security personnel constituting 32 of that number [2]. Protests between May 30 and 31, 2016 had led to the setting ablaze and vandalism of police and army vehicles by IPOB [43]. Having been "configured", through propaganda, to see Hausa-Fulani Muslims as the source of their deprivation, IPOB members on December 2, 2015, "burnt down the central mosque in the commercial city of Onitsha, South East Nigeria and destroyed trucks believed to be owned by a notable Nigerian businessman of the Muslim faith" [29]. Between 9 and 15 September, 2017, there were clashes between IPOB members and Hausa communities as well as punctured clashes with security forces which led to the death of 27 IPOB members [44]. Suspected IPOB members were even fingered in September 14, 2017 burning down of the police station at Ariariamarket in Aba, Abia state [45].

By subtly justifying the use or/threat of use of violence, some Igbo had actually graduated from the *second floor* to the *third floor* of the radicalisation staircase where by striking fear into the minds of perceived sources of deprivation was becoming an option to be considered. In March, 2014, there was even a case of an audacious charge by another MASSOB splinter group, the Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM), invading and taking control of the Enugu State Government House for about four hours, hoisting the Biafran flag, declaring Nigerians staying in “Biafraland” as *persona non grata*, and attempting to seize the state’s broadcasting service [28]. Such extremism is terror personified and qualifies as a failed civilian coup which if supported with adequate logistics, could actually “make something happen”.

It would be safe to argue that secessionist groups in south east Nigeria are dangling between the *third* and *fourth* staircases and have exhibited some tendencies which could have or is even driving a shift in paradigm to the *fifth* staircase. For instance, IPOB had in 2017, formed a secret/intelligence service which it christened as the Biafran Security Service (BSS) to gather intelligence and prevent Igbos from being attacked in any non-south eastern state that they occupied in Nigeria [2]; how it intended to protect remains a puzzle. There is every reason to believe that such group, if not checkmated, could have evolved into “something” as the IPOB leader had boasted. There were also reports of IPOB members displaying certain degrees of hate, resentment and aggression against members of the public, including Igbos, who failed to identify with, or brand themselves with Biafra paraphernalia and emblems [46], [47], [48]. That was a strong indicator of group definition – the “we against them” threshold which is a vital variable that defines the *fourth floor* in the staircase.

As mentioned earlier, secessionist groups in south east Nigeria are dancing between the *third* and *fourth* staircases and have displayed enough characteristics to suggest a possible progression to the *fifth* staircase. The likelihood of such upward movement or not, is aided or facilitated by some factors or conditions. It is necessary to therefore articulate the possible push/pull factors for and/or against potential use of violent strategies as terrorism, among secessionist groups in south east Nigeria.

7.0 Pull/Push Conditions Favourable for/against Adoption of Terror Tactics

Secessionism as a movement and Biafra as an ideology seems to be gaining greater level of acceptance among the Igbos when juxtaposed with what was obtainable in

the innocent years of the fourth republic. As it stands today, “virtually every Igbo man/woman is a member, fan or a sympathiser of the Biafra agitation”. Empirical study conducted in the south eastern state of Anambra by the Cleen Foundation has shown that as at October 16, 2017, about 80 per cent of the entire population of Anambra state are IPOB members with 50 per cent of such number concentrated in Onitsha; 95 per cent of residents in the town of Nkpor pledge their loyalty to IPOB; and that for every 10 Igbos randomly picked in Anambra, 7 are IPOB fans and about 5 out of every 10 are IPOB members [26]. Such reality could be said of other south east Nigerian states but in varying degrees. For instance, an observer noted with awe, that at a particular protest in November 2015 at Aba (Abia state), IPOB numbered “nearly twenty five thousand persons” with composition spanning across “youths, males, females and even the aged” populations [29]. These populations seem to be loyal to the calling and admonitions of their secessionist group leaders. An indicator of such loyalty is the successes recorded in series of “sit at home order” sanctioned by IPOB [41]. More worrisome is the presence of overzealous populations in the strata of unemployed youths, tricycle/okada riders, bus/taxi drivers, artisans and traders who, according to Cleen Foundation [26] constitute “foot soldiers”. Control over a population as vast as this is dangerous for extreme individuals with megalomaniac tendencies, as group members could be easily swerved to the terror lane with histrionics gauged in objective and subjective conditions.

Another supporting factor for a possible adoption of terror strategy is the covert and overt support accorded secessionist groups by some Igbo elites and other actors. The fluidity in meeting the stringent bail conditions of the IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu, is a clear indication that certain shadow parties have stake in the secessionist impulse in the south east. According to Amanambu [25], Nnamdi Kanu “has received the supports [of] many reputable figures such as Charles Soludo, Pat Utomi, Uzor Kalu, Peter Obi, among others”. Support has also been received from prominent Igbo sons and daughters in the Diaspora – the reader could recall that it was during a meeting with Igbos in Diaspora that the leader of IPOB solicited for arms to make “something happen” in Nigeria. Possession of, and constant supplies of arms is a perfect motivation for a paradigm shift in strategy from “handicapped” peaceful protests to violent terror tactics. If we are to go by the claim of the IPOB’s leadership that it gets support from well over 30 countries [49] then the prospects of security racketeering cannot be entirely ruled out. There are cases where shadow parties fuel crisis from outside, make the best use of such opportunities and then surface as a

messiah. This is thus a dangerous factor that could aid disposition to violent and terror strategy and could actually “make something happen”.

The highhandedness of the Nigerian government in handling secessionist agitations in the south east is another viable factor that could justify groups’ adoption of terror tactics as last resort. With several military operations and security presence, a good number of protesters have met their untimely death and this further complicates the frustration and resentment nurtured in the south east against the Nigerian state. Campbell [50] agrees that “abuses by the security services and mismanagement by the federal authorities could fan the flames”. According to Nwofe [23], naked force is responsible for “outrage that seem to awaken more political outcry for [sic] marginalisation, injustice and ethno-religious hegemony among the people of the south east” (p.74). Repression, according to study, for instance, is blamed for the radicalisation of the Boko Haram group to the *fifth floor* of radicalisation staircase [51], [52]. Same could be said of the militancy in the creeks of the Niger Delta and if indicators are ignored, same might culminate in secessionists’ adoption of terror tactics for according to Ekpo *et al* [53] force is retrogressive in an ideological warfare because it creates many widows, widowers, orphans, etc, and heightens the frustration/collective grievance ratio, making perceived victims more susceptible to terrorist recruitment (p.92).

Also to worry about, is the overt support of some secessionist groups operating in the south east Nigeria by some militant groups in the Niger Delta region. For instance, the 2016 resurgence of militants’ attack on the critical oil infrastructures in the Niger Delta was not specifically about perceived deprivation of the region but had as one of its ultimatum, the release of the IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu, who was by this time in custody [30]. Alhaji Asari Dokubo, a former militant, has in several interviews, videos and publications reiterated that he is a “Biafran” and would offer support to any group with genuine commitment to the restoration of the Republic of Biafra which he agrees was declared based on a consensus reached between stakeholders, including his – Ijaw ethnic group. The former militant leader had once declared his rejection of Nigeria, stating that “the future of my children lies with Biafra, and if you do not speak about it, your generation will tell you and spit on your face and urinate on your grave for betraying them” [53]. Such romance is a motivating factor for a number of reasons. Foremost, the militants have flawed Nigeria’s security architecture and have possessed the knowhow in weapon smuggling and illegal bunkering and crude

refining over the years. Also, they have in the creeks, a criminal safe haven which could constitute a major base for coordination of operations and supplies. Above all, the connection to the Atlantic would offer a link to the outside world which at the moment is one of the luxuries the south east region fails to possess.

Very importantly, the continued presence of indices of relative deprivation would provide factoids for instigation, incitement and validation of violence being the last resort. On the normal basis, disagreement between groups in a polity might not necessarily lead to aggression but, the hopelessness of perpetual political, economic, cultural and social deprivation with no foreseeable remedy makes for a coordinated violence. This position is reinforced by Abner Cohen when he averred that:

Men may and do certainly joke about or ridicule the strange and bizarre customs of men from other ethnic groups, because these customs are different from their own. But they do not fight over such differences alone. When men do...fight across ethnic lines it is nearly always the case that they fight over some fundamental issues concerning the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political, or both [5].

This, in essence, explains the vagaries that complicate the deprivation narrative for as subjective as it might seem, it can stimulate emotions and frustrations with an unpredictable elasticity limit.

Worthy of note, also, is the fact that secessionist groups in the south east such as IPOB have already developed and perfected a guerrilla strategy in mobilising and assembling members and supporters from different corners of Nigeria to demonstration/protest hotspots, after which, they disseminate [26]. IPOB also coordinates payment of monthly dues by members “into the coffers of the association” [50]. In the case of resort to terrorist tactics, it would be so easy to form cells, exchange information and coordinate supplies with such structures already on ground.

On the other hand, there are certain factors too that discourage the utilisation/display of asymmetric violent dispositions by secessionist groups in the south east. One and the most prominent of such remains the trauma of the earlier war (1967-1970). The casualty rate (which is estimated at between 500,000 and 2 million [18], and the *déjà vu* of war condition, kwashiorkor stricken children (*see* Ch.13 of Forsyth [8]), and years of retrogression and stagnation still flashes back with hallucinations

strong enough to sedate the thought of protracted violent confrontations. Even so, the strong presence of security forces in the south east is also interpreted as a sign that insurrection from the south east might be crudely and cruelly crushed. Such views became more germane when juxtaposed with the comment of stakeholders as President Buhari, who during a *BBC Hausa* interview, reportedly avouched that:

The Igbos hate me for what happened during the Biafran War... I don't have any regret, and as such do not owe any apology to them, in fact, if there is a repeat of the civil war again, I will kill more Igbos to save the country [2].

With a seeming assurance as brunt as the above, secessionist groups, the author believes, are dissuaded from adopting violent strategy that might likely culminate in the repetition of an ugly history with a more gory narrative. The footsteps of the "Operation Python Dance" launched across the south east Nigeria in September 2017 by the Nigerian Army, have demonstrated this presupposition aptly.

Also, south east Nigeria is landlocked and surrounded by "hostile" neighbours with history of commitment to the Nigerian project. For instance, the region is surrounded to the west, east and south by the south-south geopolitical zone and has the north central as a northern neighbour. Unlike the militants that possess creeks and the Boko Haram group that enjoys a large span of 'impermeable' forest area and control over porous international borderlands, the south east is surrounded by neighbours loyal to the Nigerian state and of which a vast majority of its population dread the Biafra dream. The fact that the Biafra agitation is increasingly perceived as an Igbo affair has alienated support from minor ethnic groups of the defunct Eastern region of Nigeria who themselves are suspicious of a potential Igbo colonialism if such a state as Biafra materialises. Even the Igbos of present Delta and Rivers States (who possess maritime boundary) have adopted disparate identities, thereby, alienating and withholding their support for the Biafra project. Hence, sustaining supplies and bases for coordinating protracted asymmetrical warfare would be foully herculean and frankly impossible.

Another point to note is that secessionist movements receive little or no support from the present crop of Igbo political elites (*see* Ademola-Adelehin & Amas-Edobor [54]). None of the Igbo politicians in the present dispensation (except

Senator Ike Ekweremmadu, the deputy Senate President), whether in the state or federal levels, have overtly declared support for or identify with the grievances of secessionist movements in the south east. Rather, they would, as earlier stated, blame the political immaturity of their brethren for the political and economic calamity that befalls them.

Most importantly, there is no popular support for violence or terror tactics and there is a clear absence of balance between secessionists' and the Nigerian government's coercive control and institutional support. These are some indispensable variables in defining the trajectory to the wisdom or irrationality of such engagement. According to Gurr [10]:

Societal variables that affect the focusing of discontent on political objects include the extent of cultural and subcultural sanctions for overt aggression, the extent and degree of success of past political violence, the articulation and dissemination of symbolic appeals justifying violence, the legitimacy of the political system, and the kinds of responses it makes and has made to relative deprivation (p.13).

Even as a vast population in the south east feel relatively deprived, a chunk do not support violent strategy for as conspicuous as it is, the influence of secessionists movements over the present state institutions is quite infinitesimal and the ratio of the balance of coercive control of them both is too irrelevant to even think of quantifying.

8.0 Conclusion and Recommendation

Secessionist impulse in south east region of Nigeria is a hydra-headed inferno and a time bomb that has become intractable and indeed, generational. It is a spit on the face of Nigeria as a state, and Nigerians as a people, that decades after a disastrous conflict, the country is yet to mend fences and chart a pathway to genuine reconciliation as experimented in Rwanda. It is dangerous, also, that the country, already plagued by an avalanche of security challenges is baiting another frontline in the south east to compliment the insurgency in the Niger Delta and the north east and the brigandage in the north central. How else would it be contextualised that a people claiming to be marginalised with objective and subjective variables are suppressed with brute force

and are offered more reasons to perpetually renounce their commitment to a country they should be very proud of?

Whether objective or not, the question of marginalisation, which forms the backbone of secessionists' impulse is a legitimate concern that demands utmost and urgent attention by the Nigerian government. The greatest of the risk in antagonising those concerns and dismissing them as mere cacophony is that it does not just point at old scars of the civil war years but opens wounds of which agony quadruples with time. Such could be said of the reawakening of the nostalgia and ideology of Biafra, not as a 1967 mistake, but as an ideal state still within reach. The danger and imminent threat is that for factors outlined in the work, secessionist groups have become more brazen, radical and audacious with favourable situations and conditions to cash in and perch on the strained Nigerian armed forces, through terror tactics.

While we have attempted a conjecture of the conditions that might discourage adoption of asymmetrical violent strategy, we have also chronicled some violent dispositions and have gauged such tendencies in staircases without foreclosing a possible movement to the "permanent side".

The Nigerian government might justify its proscription and declaration of some secessionist groups as terrorist groups as a short term emergency measure. Otherwise, such demagogues are not appropriate as medium or long term strategies at stabilising the south east region. Palpable government presence should be felt in the south east in the areas of infrastructures, equitable distribution of political and economic resources and political inclusion and consociation which would, at a long run, dwarf secessionist's livewire for agitation - marginalisation. This equitable redistribution of resources and recognition would provide a counter argument for apostles of Biafra and by so doing, the seed of antithesis would germinate from within and Nigeria will need not to spend fortunes in suppressing protests as the drums of secession would have ceased playing. It is high time Nigeria started embracing early warning signals and taking appropriate measures to neutralise problems at manageable stages. If preventive measure were placed above curative measures, most of the commonwealth spent on arms acquisition would have been rechanneled into productive ventures – but would Nigeria learn from its contemporary history?

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Addressing the Problem of Terrorism and Extremism in Nigeria: *Secularism to the Rescue?*

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Abstract

Nigeria is a multi-religious state where most conflicting interests have been channelled along ethnic and religious lines. Major religious groups clamour for relevance and dominance and are at times extreme in their activities. Some, like those of the Boko Haram group, have resorted to terrorism in the pursuit of their claim for a religious state. Beginning in 2003, when it first attacked, Boko Haram has continued the campaign of kidnappings, killings, bombings, suicide bombing, and attacks on civilian and military targets throughout northeast Nigeria, resulting in a significant number of deaths, injuries, and destruction of property. While Nigerians seem to be united in condemning the acts of terrorism, the same cannot be said of the sentiments that fuel some of the demands of the group. As always, a sure way to politicize pertinent issues in Nigeria is to drive it along ethnic and religious lines and the Boko Haram situation is no different. Using the Boko Haram situation as a case study, this paper examines the legal framework for combating terrorism and extremism in Nigeria and suggests the need for a purely secular state as a pivotal step towards eradicating religious extremism in Nigeria.

Keywords: Religion, Extremism, Terrorism, Boko Haram, Secularism.

1.0 Introduction

Nigeria is a multi-religious state with predominantly two major religions: Christianity and Islam [1]. Although there are other religious groups such as the African Traditional Religion, Hinduism and even Atheism, they are however in the minority as the majority are either Christians or Muslims [2]. Adherents of these religious

groups are sometimes hostile to one another as a result of religious extremism. The religious divide between Christians and Moslems is further heightened by the geographical identity: those of the southern stock, who are predominantly Christians, have one more reason – the geographical divide and primordial suspicion between the North and the South – for the perpetual struggle for dominance and control. This often resonates in the now very popular phrase of “the mistake of 1914”, being the year the British amalgamated the south and northern regions into a nationality entity. These combination of factors have for a long time created a climate of conflict and tension in which religion becomes the cause of explosive violence, and a platform for ventilating much deeper grievances, founded principally on political power and control of resources.

Nigeria operates a federal system of government patterned after that of United States of America but in the north the constitutional position is complicated with the introduction of Islamic Sharia law in the year 2000 [3]. Worse yet, politicians appeal to religious and ethnic sentiments in soliciting for votes. The consequence of such appeals to religious sentiments in furtherance of political ends is the increase in religious extremism and terrorism; as major religious groups struggle for dominance, some even holding the belief, albeit misguided, that having leaders from their religious group is an indication that their religious group is more significant.

This work considers religious extremism as one of the causes of terrorism in Nigeria. It examines the legal frame work for fighting terrorism in Nigeria and discusses the advantages of having a purely secular state. The paper proceeds in four sections. Section two considers the meaning of religious extremism, terrorism and the relationship between religious extremism and terrorism. Section three deals with the legal framework for combating terrorism in Nigeria. Section four considers the possibility of a secular state in Nigeria and the fifth and final section contains the recommendation and conclusion.

2.0 Meaning of Religious Extremism

The term extremism means going to the extreme, extending far beyond the norm of the greatest severity, and immoderate expedient. An extremist advocates or resorts to extreme measures in religion or politics. It can manifest in different dimensions such as psychological, social, political, economic and religious. It is found almost in all religions although for some the problem is more apparent. Religious extremism

manifests itself through criminal acts such as killing, kidnapping and other forms of attack. Religious extremists are willing to murder because they embrace theologies that sanction violence in the service of God [4]. Down through the ages, religion has been abused in many ways to suit the interests of some who consider themselves as custodians and defenders of religious values and faith. Religious intolerance is a fundamental obstacle to social, political and economic progress.

2.1 Meaning of Terrorism

Terrorism has been described as an illegal and violent activity, mostly directed against governments [5]. According to Mbah, Nwangwu and Edeh [6] terrorism refers to violence principally, but not exclusively, carried out by organized and unorganized non-state actors, as well as the state, designed to instill fear on victims in order to achieve political, economic, social and even religious ends.

Aloa and Atere [7] states that terrorism means violence perpetrated by individuals within or outside the government circle that is specifically directed against civilian or government institutions as a way of calling attention to perceived, real or imaginary injustices in a clandestine manner. This definition is in tandem with that given by Imobighe [8] wherein terrorism is defined as “the use of violence for political ends including any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.”

Terrorism was first defined by the international community, in the League of Nations’ Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism in 1937, as all criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or group of persons, or the general public.

The OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 1999 defines terrorist acts as:

- (a) Any act which is a violation of criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of or cause serious injury or death to, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
 - (i) intimidate, put fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any

act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or

- (ii) Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or create a public emergency; or
- (iii) create general insurrection in a State.

(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a)(i) to (iii)

(Article 1(3) of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 1999)

The definition of terrorism in the Nigerian legal framework on the subject can be found in section 46 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act 2004 and section 1(3) of the Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act 2013. A close examination of these and the various definitions given above will reveal a common thread running through them all, namely; terrorism as a tool for compelling action or inaction through fear and intimidation.

Nigeria has had its unfair share of violent and terrorist acts perpetrated by clandestine groups, individuals and organizations. Different groups with different names have masterminded violence and terrorist attacks in Nigeria at different times and places. They include the Niger Delta ethnic militants in the South-South, Odu'a People's Congress (OPC) in the South-West, Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in the South-East and the *Jama'atul Alilus Sunnah Lidda' await Jihad*, popularly referred to as Boko Haram in the North-East [9].

2.2 Relationship Between Religious Extremism and Terrorism

Terrorism is a multifaceted phenomenon. Hoffman [10] has observed that religion has become the key motivator for several terrorist organizations in Africa. Among the organizations and individuals who have been religiously inspired to adopt terrorist violence, those who espouse a radical interpretation of Islam are predominantly singled out [14]. Almost always, religion is listed among the causes of terrorism [8].

Religiously inspired terrorism is on the increase and Islamic terrorists and organizations have been the most active and greatest threat in recent years. All the major world religions have extremist that have taken up violence to further their perceived religious goals at some point in time [1]. Essentially, terrorism has been used throughout history by various religious sects to achieve objectives through the use of violence. The terrorist activities of the Boko Haram group in furtherance of their quest for an Islamic state in Nigeria, aptly exemplifies the relationship between religious extremism and terrorism.

3.0 Religious Extremism in Nigeria.

Historically, religious extremism has accounted for a number of violent conflicts the world over and Nigeria has suffered its unfair share of this predicament [12]. Some examples of religious conflicts in Nigeria include those of the Kasuwan Magani in 1980, Zango Kataf, Gure-Kafanchan and Lere in 1987, Ilorin and Jerein 1989, Tafawa Balewa in 1991 as well as that of Zang Kataf in 1992 [13]. These conflicts are usually in the north between the Hausa/Fulani Muslims and Christian ethnic minorities. According to Sulaiman [16] the 'pagan question' has played a major role in creating a climate of suspicion and intolerance between the Christian and Muslim groups.

Nigeria is a nation made up of many ethnic groups with various religious affiliations. Religious violence has caused untold sufferings in Nigeria. It has resulted in loss of lives and the destruction of property. It has cost the government valuable income; as there is some times need to provide relief materials and supply for victims of religious violence. More than that, religious violence has compromised peace and order in the country and dented the image of the country in the international community [16]. A good example of religious extremism in Nigeria is the Boko Haram terrorist activities. This is not to say that there are no Christian extremists in Nigeria or other countries for that matter [14].

Boko Haram, in general terms, simply means "western education is forbidden." It was formed in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno, north eastern Nigeria, by a radical Islamic cleric, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf [15]. The sect's philosophy is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam, and the group's official name in Arabic is *Jamā'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lādda'awatiḥ wal-Jihad* which when translated means people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad [8].

The goals of Boko Haram are to overthrow the Nigerian government, incite religious tensions by acts of terror and eventually declare an Islamic state in Nigeria. The practical and procedural instruction of the movement is outlined by its view that the accomplishment of Sharia can only be achieved through armed conflict to remove a tyrannical government. According to Burton [16] there have been a series of massacres in Nigeria beginning in 2000 when there were riots between Christians and Muslims over the imposition of Sharia law in Kaduna which led to the death of over 5,000 people. Indeed, the religious colouration of the group is bound to attract the sympathy of those who practice the Islamic religion, irrespective of whether they approve of their method or not. It is virtually impossible for a group that professes to promote the tenets of any other religion to have had that level of impact in the Northern part of Nigeria, where Boko Haram operates. This invariably explains the seamless connection with the Islamic state.

The reasons often given for the emergence of Boko Haram in political discourses are poor governance, economic deprivation, and elite corruption [17]. It has been said that the Nigerian political system relies on the wisdom of the elite, their political entrepreneurship, ideological commitments and manipulative skills in the realm of party politics and liberal democracy; that the Boko Haram group, emerged as an instrument in the hands of the northern elite in order to ascend to national position of the presidency in order to acquire state power; that Boko Haram is a political Islamic movement created by Nigeria's northern elites to acquire political power in Nigeria's multi-religious political setting in which religion is a major factor in determining the distribution of political power [9].

According to Kolawole [18] the motivations for Boko Haram terrorist activities include religious extremism, resentment over the killings of their members and poverty. Although the common factor that binds all members of the Boko Haram group is their desire to overthrow the secular government and to propagate Islamic law, abject poverty, social injustice and the high level of unemployment in Northern Nigeria have been said to act as enabling condition for Boko Haram terrorism. These factors, along with the ostensibly stolen election mandates, has been said to account for a high and growing disillusionment with the western system of governance, particularly among jobless young men who ascribe their hopeless conditions to the imposition of western education by a government that has continued to mismanage national resources [19].

Irrespective of whether one agrees with the above views on the emergence of Boko Haram, it has become obvious that religion acts as the ideological force that legitimizes and unifies the group. But the core recruiting line for the sect, it must be stressed, is its religious colouration and indoctrination of the ignorant. It must also be stressed that strong religious sentiments defies rational thinking even among the most educated.

The ongoing ethnic conflicts between Nigeria's Christian farmers and the Muslim herders is yet another example of religious extremism and conflicting interests being channelled along ethnic and religious lines and like the Boko Haram situation, it is having devastating effects on the Nigerian people [20], [16]. The growing religious and ethnic intolerance being displayed in Nigeria is both scary and heart-rending. Some clerics now openly call for jungle justice against Fulani cattle herders and Islamic jihadists. Commenting on the ongoing ethno-religious conflict between the Christian farmers and Muslim herders, Ojo stated:

We need to know that Muslims are not the enemies of Christians in Nigeria. Cattle herders are not the enemies of farmers in this country. The Fulani are not the enemies of other ethnic groups neither are the Northerners up in arms against the Southerners. Our common enemies are the few extremists among all the groups. The bigots who are in the minority are our problem. They and their sponsors are the ones we must join hands to expose and deal with according to the laws of the land, not through resort to self-help and jungle justice. We must learn from the aftermath of the political cum religious war ravaging the Central African Republic as well as that of the genocidal war in Rwanda. With the country's economy already in recession, the country can least afford a full-blown ethno-religious war. It therefore behooves the government at all levels to play their critical role of welfare and security [24].

It is therefore evident that religious extremism has become a serious threat that should be addressed in the contemporary Nigerian society. Some are of the view that addressing societal inequalities and the reduction in, if not complete elimination, of unemployment and poverty is a starting point towards addressing the issues of religious extremism. True, addressing these issues will no doubt help, but it must be stated that poverty may not necessarily be a major cause of terrorism or violence

arising from religious extremism. In late 2009, Farouk Abdulmutallab, a suicide bomber gave the following answer to the question on why he chose the terrorist path:

In fulfilment of a religious obligation, I decided to participate in jihad against the United States. The Koran obliges every able Muslim to participate in jihad and fight in the way of Allah, those who fight you and kill them wherever you find them, some parts of the Koran say, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was a 23-year old Nigerian son of a wealthy businessman and former Nigerian government minister. By all accounts, he lived a highly privileged life. For him, his jihadist path was not motivated by hunger or poverty, or the need to redress social inequalities. Rather, it seems that he was motivated primarily by the belief that he had a responsibility to wage war against non-believers. As he told the court during his trial: “[t]he Quran allows every Muslim to undertake jihad and his attempted murder of hundreds of people was justified”. States that some people try to justify terrorist acts by claiming that it is their right to religion, (which is one of the fundamental human rights) that they are asserting. Clearly, religion is one factor that motivates religious extremists to carry out terrorist acts. The examples of Abdulmutallab and others, such as Osama bin Laden, show that personal wealth is not necessarily a deterrent to extremist religious views [2], [3]. From the above therefore, addressing social economic factors without more may not be enough in addressing issues of religious extremism and terrorism in Nigeria.

4.0 Legal Frame Work for Combating Terrorism in Nigeria

The legal framework for combating terrorism in Nigeria is essentially embodied in two enactments: the Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011, and the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013. The Terrorism Act was enacted by the National Assembly to prevent and deal with acts of terrorism in Nigeria in accordance with the powers conferred on it under section 4(2) and 11 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).

Prior to the enactment of the Terrorism Act, the Criminal Code (in the South), and the Penal Code (in the North) and other statutes dominated the criminal justice system in creating, defining and prescribing punishment for criminal acts. Significantly, both the Criminal Code and Penal Code do not contain specific

provisions for counterterrorism. They merely criminalize specific acts of violence such as murder, homicide, rape, riot amongst others [21].

The road leading to the enactment of the Terrorism Act was not an easy one. It took Nigeria a decade after the devastating September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, to come up with a comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation in the form of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011. In spite of this development, the September 2011 attack was however significant as it marked a turning point in the war against terrorism. A direct consequence of the attacks was that it spurred the United Nations Security Council to pass Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) which required all members of the United Nations Organization to make terrorism a serious crime in their domestic legislation along with terrorist funding and other ancillary offences. The United Nations Security Council also set up the Counter-Terrorism Committee to follow up progress in the implementation of the resolution by member-state. Member-states, including some African countries complied with the resolution, without delay, by amending their existing counter terrorism laws or enacting new ones [26].

The first attempt by the Nigerian government to give effect to Resolution 1373 was the insertion of two sections into the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2002, which was then being overhauled to meet international standards on financial crime legislation.

It was only in 2011 that efforts to enact anti-terrorism Act in Nigeria became a reality. However, one of the factors that eventually compelled Nigeria to enact an anti-terrorism legislation was the incident that took place on December 25th 2009, in which the young Nigerian, Umar Abdulmutallab, who was associated with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, attempted to set off an explosive aboard Delta/ North West Airlines Flight 253, with 274 passengers.

As a result of this incident, the US Transportation Security Administration issued new security measures which included blacklisting Nigeria by classifying it “Country of Interest” on the US Terror Watch list [26]. The US gave four conditions to be fulfilled by Nigeria before it could be delisted. One of which was the enactment of legislation combating terrorism in the country. It was in fulfilment of these conditions and further pressures from the U.S. that culminated in the enactment of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 [26].

The Terrorism Prevention Act was enacted in conformity with the United Nations guidelines. It addressed issues of prevention and prohibition of terrorism, as well as the financing of terrorism. It also provided for the effective implementation of the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 1999 as well as the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 and prescribed punishment for the violation of its provisions. The Act also provided for mutual assistance, information sharing and extradition with foreign states with regards to terrorism related offences [22]. The Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 was amended in 2013.

However, in spite of the Terrorism Act and the subsequent amendment, the Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act, the terrorist activities of the Boko Haram group have continued unabated. This is an indication that much more is needed to eradicate this plague. Perhaps, it is necessary at this stage to give attention to the factors that fuel the underlining sentiments that act as motivation for terrorism in Nigeria as this may well be the first step towards surmounting this challenge. The next section explores the possibility of addressing religious extremism through secularism.

5.0 Secularism to the Rescue?

Secularism has been defined as state neutrality toward religion or the separation of religion from state. It is the belief that religion should not be involved with the ordinary social and political activities of a country. (Cambridge English Dictionary). Secularism is the giving up of religious thought and feeling in the normal day to day interaction in the society. In other words, religion should remain subjective and not objective. A secular state has been described as one which guarantees individuals and corporate freedom of religion, deals with the individual as a citizen irrespective of his religion and does not seek either to promote or interfere with it [23].

A secular state has also been said to be a state where citizens are not discriminated against in any form or manner on the basis of their religion. The secular state views the individuals as a citizen and not as a member of a particular religious group. Religion becomes entirely irrelevant in defining the terms of citizenship; its rights and duties are not affected by the individual religious beliefs [31]. Secularism in this context, is not same as atheism. It is not the absence of religions in the state. It is the absence of a state sponsored religion.

Interestingly, Section 15(2) of chapter two of the Nigerian Constitution states that national integration shall be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited. (1999 Constitution as Amended) Section 10 of chapter one of the same Constitution states that Nigeria shall not adopt a state religion. Unfortunately, since Nigeria attained independence in 1960, Nigeria has been grappling with religious issues. Although Section 38(1) of the Nigerian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, separating state affairs from religion has not always been the case. Some states in Nigeria have intricately woven religion and state into a single fabric such that religion can barely be distinguished from the state. In some northern states of Nigeria for instance, Islam has been enthroned as a state religion through the implementation of Sharia thereby giving the impression of an Islamic state. Even in parts of the country that appears to be secular, we see system of laws and administration of justice which is traditional and religious [16]. The present state of affairs has resulted in the struggle for supremacy and significance among the various religious groups and this has led to violent religious extremism and the attendant terrorism by the radical Islamic jihadists.

Significantly, Berman and Iannaccone [24] have noted that policy makers cannot mitigate religious extremism by targeting beliefs and teachings. So secular attacks on doctrine and theology can only serve to antagonize many but convince no one. Therefore, in order to successfully address religious extremism and the resultant terrorism that is sometimes a consequence of it, secularism should be considered.

6.0 Recommendations

It has been stated that militant theology of religious radicals is most effectively neutralized by competing theologies, which are in turn most effectively produced by competing religious groups [25]. An open religious market encourages religious moderation by facilitating the entry of numerous competing religious groups, virtually none of whom can hope to benefit from government control of religion. A constitutional commitment to the separation of church and state, including fiscal and legal non-discrimination, discourages religious militancy by reducing the payoffs associated with religiously-oriented political action [33] (p.2). Berman and Iannaccone [32] stated that sects are efficient producers of club goods and will naturally branch out from their core business as suppliers of the supernatural when secular markets and civil society under-produce collective goods. In the process of

providing benign goods and services, a sect acquires the credibility, organization network, and membership base that also facilitate violent collective action. They thus recommend constitutional democracy coupled with a vibrant market economy; where various religious groups are allowed healthy competition without states assistance or interference.

According to Berman and Iannaccone [32], Nasser applied this policy in Egypt in the 1950s, when the Muslim Brethren threatened his power. He took not only the conventional approach of locking up the leadership but also nationalized their entire social welfare provision network and this policy shut down Islamic terrorism in Egypt for more than two decades. It has also been stated that violent sects tend to arise in countries where the civil government has suppressed religious freedom, favouring one form of religious expression over all others. Within these environments, a disfavoured sect is strongly motivated to oppose the government, despise the established religion, and covet the privileges that come with state support [32].

On the other hand, state sponsored religion often leave members feeling more superior and significant in relation to members of non-state sponsored religion. In the same vein members of various religious groups in multi religious states, as is currently the practice in Nigeria, struggle endlessly to get the attention of the state or attain state sponsorship and the state is often hard press to prove that it does not discriminate between the various religious groups in its practices. None of the above condition is ideal for a peaceful and stable government and society.

Therefore, in a pluralistic society like Nigeria, where people profess different religion and are split up into number of sects, practical separation of religion and state remains the best workable arrangement. This should be the starting point towards addressing violent religious extremism and to some extent terrorism in Nigeria. In the light of the above, this paper recommends the following:

1. Care should be taken to ensure that the Nigerian government at all levels – federal, state and local – adopt an open and uncompromising neutral attitude towards religious groups in the country.
2. It should be an offence against the state for anyone in a position of power or anyone in government to allow his religious inclination to override common interest. Nigerians should be treated equally and fairly irrespective of their religious affiliation.

3. State institutions, such as educational institutions and government departments, should be purely secular and religion and matters of faith should be confined to the realm of private or family life.
4. The Nigerian government should refrain from sponsoring pilgrimages for any religious group.
5. It should be considered a felony to appeal to religious sentiments to solicit for votes to public offices.

Doing the above will ensure practical separation of state from religion and help to eradicate the struggle for supremacy by the various religious groups.

7.0 Conclusion.

The enactment of the Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011, and the Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act 2013, can be regarded as a step in the right direction. However, it is significant to note that law can only be a means to an end, as legislation alone cannot end terrorism in Nigeria. This is because in dealing with groups that incite or perpetrate acts of violence, legal sanctions have their limits. Boko Haram might end up being defeated but that may not put an end to terrorism. Until the root causes that make Nigeria a fertile ground for terrorism, such as religious extremism amongst other, are addressed, Nigeria may have to contend with the problem of terrorism for a very long time.

The topic of religion's relationship to violent extremism is a sensitive one. It must be stressed however, that in a pluralistic society like the one in Nigeria, where people profess different religion and are split up into number of sects, secularism; that is, practical separation of religion and state is the best workable arrangement and this may well be a starting point towards addressing religious extremism and to some extent terrorism in Nigeria.

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Community Policing Approach: Joint Task Force and Community relations in the context of Countering Violent Extremism in Nigeria

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Abstract

While there has been increasing focus on the importance of community policing approach in countering violent extremism, few works have focused on how security agents-community relations affect the community policing strategy in countering violent extremism in Nigeria. Therefore, this study examines security agents-community relations in the context of countering violent extremism programme in Nigeria. The findings of this study show that in the enforcement of countering violent extremism, communities believed the state security agents had been compromised or infiltrated by terrorist's groups such as Boko Haram. Hence, communities believe that it has become risky to assist the government in the countering violent extremism programmes. In the same vein, the state security agents believe that some communities are in support of Boko Haram by providing intelligence to them. Therefore, the study concludes that the mutual suspicion between both parties is affecting the effective implementation of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme in relevance to government CVE programme in Nigeria, as it shows the need to build confidence in Trust and effective means of communication, in order to address the lack of Trust.

Keywords: Counter Violent Extremism, Community Policing, State-Community Relations, Terrorism and Counterterrorism

1.0 Introduction

Much emphasis on community policing has been placed on the importance of the strategy in addressing or curbing violent extremism with the diverse models of

Community policing and their effectiveness and challenges [1]. Besides, scholars have started examining state-community relations in the context of counter-violent extremism program in West, specifically in Australia and United Kingdom where issues of violent extremism among Muslim population is increasingly becoming a significant security challenge for the states [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], and [16].

However, there is a dearth of literature on how Police-Community relation is influencing the effective implementation of the countering violent extremism programme of the Nigerian government. The main argument of this article is that in the context of Community policing strategy of countering violent extremism, Community leaders and members are sceptical of providing vital information to the Joint Task Force needed in identifying individuals engaging and teaching radical Islamic ideology, recruiting would-be violent extremist or terrorists and secretly supporting the activities of Boko Haram by acting as spies. The Fears of the members or leaders of the Communities relates to their belief that the weakness of the Joint Task Force influenced their vulnerability to Boko Haram. Hence, the JTF is either infiltrated by supporters and sympathisers of Boko Haram. Alternatively, Boko Haram has some of the members of the Joint Taskforce on their payroll. Thus, assisting the security agents in the ways mentioned above is tantamount to putting their lives at risk.

On the other hand, the security agents are equally suspicious of members and leaders of the Community due to their belief that many of these leaders and member supported and Community to support Boko Haram. Specifically, they believe the socio-economic conditions of the people also influenced their vulnerabilities to the activities of Boko Haram recruiters that come with hard currencies and promise for business start-ups as benefits for joining the organisation. Therefore, the mutual suspicion between state security agents such as the Police and Community leaders or members has hampered the effective enforcements of Community policing approach in addressing countering violent extremism in North-eastern Nigeria.

Studying Nigeria has become imperative due to the rise of terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram and the Nigerian government's hard and soft measures aimed at countering and weakening the capacity of Boko Haram to successfully launch attacks and addressing conditions or causes of terrorism respectively. The focus of this study is

on the soft approach such as the counter-violent extremism programs aims, amongst other things; to prevent diverse conditions that aids terrorist recruitment such as Community and civil society engagement in deconstructing terrorist narratives in schools and mosques, addressing socio-economic inequality, Community engagement in intelligence provision on factors that spur terrorism and information on activities of terrorist groups in local Community.

The article employs the qualitative approach; Semi-structured interviews together with secondary data such as relevant grey literature. Leaders and members of Community-based Civil Society Organisations and state security agencies are selected as respondents of the study. The purposive sampling technique was used to select the respondents. One principal finding of the study indicates that the overriding issue of mistrust by Community residents towards security agencies, and vice-versa, and lack of participation by Communities, are significant challenges that affect the effectiveness of the approach in the effort to curb violent extremism

This study contributes to the emerging literature on Community policing approach in addressing violent extremism. It is equally relevant to government agencies, including the security agencies as it highlights the inherent challenges in the enforcement of Community Policing approach in addressing the rise of violent extremism and terrorism in Nigeria. The first section examines the literature on Community Policing and countering violent extremism. The next section briefly explains the method of the article. The section that follows presents the findings of Police-Community relations and countering violent extremism in Nigeria. The last section concludes the article.

2.0 State-Community Relations and Countering Violent Extremism: A Review of Literature

While extant literature has focused on strategies of Community Policing, recently scholars are beginning to ask crucial questions on state-Community relations and how that could make or mar community policing approach in addressing violent extremism

The vast literature on policing identifies a shift from the traditional model of policing to the more open Community policing model. Similarly, the literature has identified that the program of Community policing has emerged to be a policy-choice for all in America, Europe, Asia, New Zealand and Africa. Often described as the contemporary,

modern and progressive form of policing, by researchers [17], [18]. According to Cordner [19], four different dimensions of Community Policing exist these include; philosophical, strategic, tactical, and organisational. Skolnick and Bayley [20] contend that a wide range of activities relates to Community Policing. They further argue that due to its various programmatic elements, Community policing implies different things in different contexts. Thus, four programmatic elements featured prominently under the banner of Community Policing: Community-based crime prevention; reorientation of patrol activities; increased accountability to the public; Decentralisation of command^[21]. These four elements constitute the bedrock of all other strategies of Community-Policing approach. Goldstein [21], and Skolnick & Bayley [21], highlights that Community-based crime prevention is entrenched on the principle of the neighbourhood watch, while reorientation of patrol activities revolves around foot patrols and horse patrols, and it is considered a highly efficient method of enhancing communication between the Police and the public.

Regarding increased accountability to the public, Skolnick and Bayley [21] argue that community policing encourages the broadening of public input in policing and the reciprocity of communication. Furthermore, the Decentralisation of command entails developing distinct methods and peculiarities that suit communities different policing priorities and problems to enable greater police involvement in the Community and feedback from it. These four elements of Community policing are linked and interdependent for the effective functioning of the approach.

Despite its attractions and importance, there have been challenges to the successful implementation of Community policing. Specifically, scholars have raised concern over how the relationship between state-communities can either advance and negatively affect the Community Policing approach to Countering Violent extremism. The existing literature on Community Policing-CVE engagement takes into cognisance the issue and role of trust-building in different political contexts [22], [32], [23], [24], [25], [12], [11], [26], and [27]. These studies are mostly uniformly consistent in affirming that there is a low context of Trust between Communities and state Policing agencies within the context of countering violent extremism. According to Cherney [23], in his study, Police- Muslim Community engagement in the counter-terrorism context of Australia is fraught with tension and challenges, especially as it concerns the police engagement with Muslim communities. His study highlights how the Australian Federal Police Community Liaison Team draws the thin line between intelligence gathering and community engagement.

More importantly, the crucial issue of handling and building trust with these Muslim Communities in the Australian contexts is examined, and as noted by the author, reconciling this tension is only through demonstrating integrity. The author further argued in the findings of the study that Community-Police engagement within CVE context has the potential to build and increase the Trust level, which would invariably enhance police intelligence-gathering skills and capabilities. Cherney and Hartley^[4] examine how the Police engage with Muslim communities in tackling radicalisation and violent extremism in Australia. Their study points to the fact that Australia Muslim communities and those abroad feel securitised and 'othered' owing to the Counterterrorism policy and practice. This thus births an atmosphere of distrust and unwillingness to partner and cooperate with the Police. They further went ahead to assess the effectiveness of community engagement and policing Muslim communities and recommended that the engagement should be more community-led than police-dominated. Bullock and Johnson [2] examine the nature of engagement between UK Police and Muslim communities within the general context of public policing. Their study highlights that police-Muslim communities' relationship is fraught with mutual distrust. In the USA, Bjelepore [28] highlights just like the situation is in the other political climes where community engagement is equal to suspicion, the American approach is also not an exception. Bjelepore highlights how Muslim communities' members express scepticism concerning engagement efforts with law enforcement agents, due in part to the law enforcement agents infiltrating mosques and conducting blanket and covert surveillance on the leaders of the Muslim Communities.

Similarly, security and law enforcement agencies express corresponding fear towards the communities and in turn, have little or no Trust in them. Arcchik et al [28], posit that in France, state security authorities' engagement with Muslim communities as regards terrorism and violent extremism is mostly not cordial and frosty. However, the situation is entirely different in Spain; according to Colas [29], Spain's response to terrorism and the Muslim communities is unlike what played out in other European countries.

The review of the literature point to the existence of specific issues: the securitisation of the Muslim Community; and the issue of Trust as it relates to Community policing CVE engagement. Evidence in the literature point to the profiling of Muslim communities as problem groups. The blow-back effect of this is reflected in community police-CVE engagement that is marred by distrust. The context-specific

nature of the Community policing approach, mainly as it affects State-Community relations, provides a need for further studies in areas where state-community relations in other contexts of Counter Violent Extremism is studied. Therefore, this article contributes to the emerging literature of Community policing approach in addressing violent extremism. In other words, it seeks to build on the earlier works by advancing empirically, the debate on the relationship between state-community within the context of countering violent extremism through community policing is frosty and marred by mutual suspicion on the sides of both the communities and the Police. I proceed in this article by examining how these issues manifest practically and its challenges encountered via placing this under scrutiny the role of communities. This study contributes to the emerging literature on Community policing approach in addressing violent extremism. It is equally relevant to government agencies, including the security agencies as it highlights the inherent challenges in the enforcement of community policing approach in addressing the rise of violent extremism and terrorism in Nigeria.

3.0 Method

The qualitative data for this study emanates from semi-structured interviews with purposively-selected community leaders, members, community-based Civil Society Organizations, scholars and security agents between 2017 - 2018. The Community-based Civil Society Organisations and scholar's personnel who comprised the sample equals 'key informants' or 'organisational proxies' who are assumed to have a good knowledge and understanding of the issues discussed. As at the time of completing the interviews, access to these affected communities was significantly limited; thus, the sample size of 10. Hence, the article makes use of both telephone and face-to-face interviews.

The interview guide covered a host of issues as reflected in the extant literature. Such issues included participation in any CVE policy/program government, the government ascribing any role to communities within the context of CVE, understanding and support of government CVE programs, police-community partnerships the nature of such partnerships, and the challenges experienced in such collaborations and partnerships in Countering Violent Extremism.

All interviewees gave informed verbal consent, and permission to use data in academic research on the condition of anonymity. The condition of anonymity is

particularly critical, given the possibility of questioning by the state authorities due to the sensitivity and delicate nature of the issue. Each interview was transcribed, thematically analysed vis-à-vis the aim of the study and extant literature.

4.0 Community Policing and Countering Violent Extremism Programmes in Nigeria

First, I want to clarify that by policing, I am referring to security agents involved in countering violent extremism in North-Eastern Nigeria, also known as the Joint Task Force on Boko Haram. Countering violent extremism (CVE) programme has become a policy choice for almost all countries, going by the rate of proliferation of violent extremism. Ideally, it is within the counter-terrorism policy of any country. Technically, it means that all CVE programmes are context-specific. Stemming from the above, it would mean that just as CVE programmes are context-specific and environmentally limited; the responding issue of violent extremism also requires a local understanding. Critically knowing the socio-economic dynamics underlying violent extremism is not out of place. Thus, without a proper understanding of what constitutes violent extremism in Nigeria, the corresponding analysis that follows tend to oversimplify the issue together with western-oriented ideas.

Extremism and analysis that stem from it tends to view the Nigerian situation as a result of internal religious dichotomy and regional political divides. Not ruling the possibility of these two as dominant push and pull factors, it is essential to know that these do not constitute the only factors for extremism. Socio-economic hardship which is a product of multiple issues such as unemployment, unequal wealth distribution, deep-rooted corruption, unparalleled poverty and education deficiency; all these indicator triggers that propel violent extremism. These multiple catalysts generally lead to frustration-aggression, which in turn, births violent extremism [30], [31], and [32].

Violent extremism in Nigeria is a complex multi-layered issue that exists in various shades. They manifest as jihadist organisations, nationalist-separatist movements, and Islamization movements. The heterogeneous nature of the Nigerian society with multi-ethnic and religious communities further fuels the multi-complex phenomenon of violent extremism in the country, even though the nature of radicalisation varies and different motivators drive it. The CVE programme, which contains the community-based counter-radicalisation is a strategy to address the issue of violent extremism. In its

2014 National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), the Nigerian government stressed the importance of collaborative efforts with community leaders and that ‘... Tackling an internal security challenge is impossible without public goodwill’ [33]. According to Njoku [34], ‘these policies entail collective efforts by all agencies of government in employing hard and soft measures to prevent terrorism’. The theme of collaboration resonates all through the document. The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy known as NACTEST was initiated and organised around five work strands: Forestall, to prevent people becoming terrorists; Secure, to strengthen protection; Identify, to pre-empt attacks; Prepare, to build resilience; and implementation, to mobilise efforts. Security agencies play a crucial role in each of the five streams of NACTEST, but it is IDENTIFY – which has the most significant community focus. Security agencies responsible for IDENTIFY functions have the task of maintaining a sustainable and working relationship with community representatives [34]. The Community policing approach/initiatives came up as an alternative to the ‘hard-policing’ approaches to countering terrorism. Thus, Nigeria used the ‘softer’ bottom-up approaches to countering violent extremism, has it been in the USA, Britain and Canada [13], [11], and [14]. The approach seeks to bring about a redefinition of the goals of policing that would enable two-way communication between the public and the Police [35].

5.0 Joint Task Force-Community Relation and Countering Violent Extremism through Community Policing approach in North-Eastern Nigeria

In this section, I examine JTF-community relations in the context of CVE-community policing approach in North-east. I argue that the lack of effectiveness in the Community policing programmes is as a result of inherent mutual suspicion between the communities and state agencies, particularly the Nigerian Police. This situation has impacted negatively on Community policing program and the extremism the overall objective of countering the proliferation of terrorism in Nigeria. Hence, I argue that there is a need to build confidence on both sides.

6.0 Community Perceptions of the Joint Task Force in the Context of Countering Violent Extremism

Scholars highlight the significance of Trust between communities and the Police within the context of Counter violent extremism [36], [37], [38], and [39]. Though,

Spalek^[11] explains that despite this, justice has not been sufficiently melted out of the issue of Trust within the Community policing literature. Trust is an essential pillar of community policing, and the existence of it is fundamental to CVE. It is a crucial issue within the context of policing counter-terrorism [11], [12], and [15]. Relatedly, Gianakis and Davis [40] affirm the importance of Trust between the Police and communities, due to the relative power that the Police possess over individuals. Goldstein [22], therefore asserts that a situation marked by the absence of Trust would alter the policing that occurs within a community. Also, Luhmann [11] highlights the consequence of the absence of Trust between communities and the Police. According to the scholar, 'the quality and type of micro-level interaction that takes place, often at street level, between police officers and members of the public is crucial to the trust or distrust generated toward policing at an institutional level' [11].

Participants responses on the issue of Trust validate the arguments mentioned above of scholars specifically that the Nigeria community-policing CVE engagement has raised and generated lack of Trust, suspicion, and un-engagement between the Police and communities. Participants tended to concur that this is because members of communities are not confident in divulging vital information about violent extremism with the security agencies (Police) because of fear of reprisal by the violent extremists. The communities do not trust that the security officers will guarantee their safety after sharing critical information to them. One of the interviewed community members illustrates this and states that they were not comfortable with the idea of sharing information or intelligence on violent extremist's groups in the Community. Specifically, sharing information such as the whereabouts of terrorist groups as well as religious leaders radicalising and recruiting youths within the Community. This also includes information on violent extremist groups living within the Community and those supporting their activities. The interviewed community member puts it this way "Let me tell you there are some villages that even they know them, but they are afraid to tell the security personnel because they say if that they say it and they know that is you that told so people, not only you will be affected, all your family. That is why they are afraid, so those village people they will keep silent even if the security agents involved in Community Policing in the North-east approach them, they will keep silent that they do not know them". There have been reports that some security agents are under the payroll of Boko Haram. Consequently, this aggravated the distrust. One of the interviewed Community-Based Civil society organisation

leaders puts it this way, “One of the issues that communities have raised is that they are scared because sometimes, they find out that the people they have gone to report, come back to them. That Trust is not there”. This further reinforces the argument of the findings of the study that community members including their leaders are suspicious of security agencies in the light of reprisal attacks and the connection to the information that they shared with them.

Furthermore, advancing the challenge of Trust, a community-leader stated that the seemingly cooperative relationship with state security agents is not willingly done, instead coerced. Consequently, he argues that government efforts have been counter-productive. Thus, the government began to deploy other means of gathering intelligence. It needs to address violent extremism such as vigilante groups. Explicitly, the community leader stated that: “I believe community leaders show some good level of Trust for government security agencies, not really because the agencies are doing very well in maintaining security, but mostly because it is assumed generally in Africa that when you disagree with government policies, you risk leaving your office or any privileges you hitherto enjoy from the government of the day. If the Trust in government security agencies have been absolute, then we would not see local security arrangements like vigilante groups or civilian JTF in the Northeast like we have today”. However, even the vigilante that the government turn to as alternatives have themselves become circumspect to state security agencies, thus taking laws into their hands in enforcing counter-terrorism. Explicitly, another community member stated that: “Government collaboration with communities is not effective, the Civilian JTF comprising of framers, hunters to fight and protect themselves. So, these people if they catch a bandit, instead of handing the bandit over to the JTF, they would deal with him just because they do not trust them (Government security agents)”.

Another issue that further strains State-Community relations in the context of Countering Violent Extremism-Community Policing, is the near absence of a clear-cut role for the Community in the CVE-CP programs of the government. The roles or manner through which the government engage the Community is not formal, and moreover, it remains ambiguous. For instance, an executive of a community-based civil society organisation puts it this way: “We come together to discuss other security issues. However, in the countering extremism, no, we have not had any role and responsibility”.

This quote also highlights an additional issue relating to how the absence of ascribed roles and responsibility may hinder participation or bring about a culture of un-engagement between the Police and communities. This negates the underlying principle of Community policing and its dangerous to countering violent extremism. Ensuring participation and fostering a culture of engagement is premised on the need for members of communities to recognise the fact that they are part of the CVE program/framework. Thus, attempts by the security agencies (Police) to obfuscate the needed relationship with communities to CVE is risky for the whole process. Further explaining scepticism around the issue of participation and collaboration between communities and state security agents, some of the interviewed respondents mostly expressed concern over the frosty partnership and collaboration exists. According to one community member, “government-community collaboration have been hypocritical... we have always had governments who use propaganda (more like deception) in every sphere of governance, so even if the government appears to show some commitment, there is always a grey area beneath the surface”.

Respondents also highlighted various socio-political issues related to hindering trust-building between communities and security agencies. Corruption was highlighted by one of the interviewees as a factor that tends to diminish the Trust in security agents. An interviewed community member stated that: “The level of bribery and corruption which have unfortunately penetrated even the military is worrying. Also, it is one of the reasons why Trust in security agencies has gradually waned. When your security is in the hand of someone who can accept a 50-naira bribe at a checkpoint and allow a vehicle to go through without the standard check-up, then I think you would be insane to trust that person to keep you safe”. Closely related to this is the issue of politicisation of the war against violent extremism. An interviewed community member sees the whole incident as attempts to score cheap Political points by the government. According to the respondent, “people think that all these things that are happening to them are politics... it is one of the challenges, they don’t trust the government at all. Also, they think they are using it as politics maybe they are using it in order to frame someone, to frame the state government”.

The above data highlights some points. First and foremost, according to the reflections and experiences of communities, it agrees with conclusions in the literature that Trust from both sides (Mutual Trust) is a related feature of community policing–CVE engagement [41], [2], and [42]. Of particular importance, the data describes how in

reality and practice this Trust aligns with most of the concerns of communities vis-à-vis Mayer et al [43] features of Trust- Integrity, ability and Benevolence.

In this context, the feature of integrity is as an essential characteristic of building Trust. This may be probably due to the mutual suspicion in existence between both actors. Furthermore, the data illustrate the pertinence of participation which also stems from building Trust. No doubt the violent extremists in Nigeria have embraced global Jihad movements and are now regarded as prominent players, with growing ties, but the war strategy is local to confront it requires street knowledge. Hence, the importance of participation, engagement, and prioritising the principle of community policing.

7.0 Joint Task Force Perceptions of Communities in the Context of Countering Violent Extremism in North-Eastern Nigeria

Another part of the argument is the views of the state security agents on the issue of Trust in its relations with Community leaders and members in the context of Countering Violent Extremism via community policing. A security agent interviewed highlighted that they do not trust communities' members when it comes to efforts of curbing violent extremism.

According to them, the delicate nature of the fight against violent extremism necessitated the need not to divulge critical information and intelligence. In another vein, an interviewed academic/scholar affirmed the issue of mutual suspicion between both communities and the security agents and highlights how this poses a danger to the Community policing approach and Counter Violent extremism efforts of the government. In their words, "The state does not trust communities enough to be able to give them the necessary information that they need to curb terrorism, and the communities themselves do not trust security agents. They don't trust them due to many things that happened, they are happening and is still happening within the context of CVE and CT particularly and within other contexts in our Nigerian society; we don't have this Trust for communities, and by extension it affects the CVE program and community approach of the government that they introduced have major challenge, and the government needs to build Trust and once there is no trust, once you don't trust the security agents, then it is bound to fail, it wouldn't work. So yes, there is no synergy. There is mutual suspicion".

Additionally, this issue of distrust is not entirely limited to the communities and their members. Also trust within the inner structure of the security paraphernalia is also highlighted as one of the surrounding issues affecting state-community relations in the context of Counter Violent Extremism via community Policing. As reported by one of the security agents interviewed, Trust within the structure of the security agencies is also not fully guaranteed and assured. According to the respondent, ‘... Even within the Police, we still have people that are sympathetic in the Boko Haram. So, you do not expect that such a person will succeed or rather, such operation will succeed’. This further buttress earlier claims by the interviewed leaders of community-based civil society organisations as regards the issue of Trust. The interviewed security agents expressed pessimism and low level of Trust not only with community-based civil society regarding partnership and information sharing but also within the internal structure of the security agencies.

Furthermore, speaking of inherent challenges with security agencies. Another security agent alluded to the absence of proper ethical and operational capacity within the security agency and its effects on building Trust with communities. According to the interviewee, “Our attitude is not even portraying us as those that are even public volunteer information to.... you know, we are too harsh. Our way of investigation, our way of, you know, dealing with the public...Even our investigative department, they are no more doing their job as it is expected. You see someone that will give you information about a criminal; he cannot make an independent investigation. You arrested this person, you torture him for him to give you information that is not true and at the end of the day, you discover that such person you tortured was an innocent person. You get me right now? So, people are afraid even to associate themselves with the Police not to talk of even volunteer the information. So, it becomes very complicated when you want to achieve community policing because people from a far distance see policeman as their enemy instead of the person that volunteer information for them to detect crime which is the primary responsibility of the Police that they could have worked towards championing. The synergy between the Police supposed to do with the public. However, unfortunately, the disconnection is high, and nobody will want to say Police, come. I see somebody there. He carries rifle o. Come and see.’ Police will now go back and say “... Mr so person was the one that gave me information that you are the one that carried a rifle. Even that person is a criminal. When he is now being released, they go to that Community to kill that person”.

Another subtheme related to Trust-building is the issue of ethical Orientation and Operational Capacity. Some of the interviewed respondents highlighted scepticism as regards the ethical orientation and the operational capacity of the Police/security agents, and how this affects the level of Trust in community-engagement and countering violent extremism. One of the interviewed Community based Civil-Society Organisations puts the issue of operational capacity this way: “They lack the in-depth knowledge of what they are fighting. They cannot detect other forms of IEDs apart from bombs”. Similarly, a community member described the issue of the ethical orientation of the security agents in the following way: “Irregularities and poor adherence to operational ethics are also some reasons why I do not just give absolute Trust to our security agencies. For example, when you see a policeman who is so drunk that he flings his weapon to one side and sleeps off on the other, then you have a big security problem”.

The above view of the respondents validates Njoku [35] arguments that there is a lack of Trust between the security agents and civil society organisations in the Nigerian state’s counter-terrorism operation. Hence, this article argues that there is mutual suspicion or distrust in state-civil society relations in contemporary Nigeria. Specifically, this inherent distrust between the state and communities influenced the process of formulating and implementing security policies in the country.

Interestingly, the highlighted complexities as regards Trust, as shown in this article, are consistent with the situation in a different context. In the British context, Spalek [11] examine the role of Trust between Police and communities within the context of engagement and partnership concerning terrorism. She further asserted that in a context of what is known as ‘new terrorism’, there appears to be low Trust between Police and particularly the Muslim communities. As such, there is a need to amend the fragile Trust that exists between both parties, through trust-building activities. The challenge of mutual suspicions between the state and communities’ further ties into the debate on the US countering approach, where Muslim communities and charities are primarily securitised and regulated as a result of the narrative that these organisations have contributed to the proliferation of terrorism in the US [44]. The challenge of Trust in the relations between the state and communities in the context of violent conflict have reverberated in parts of Africa. In Kenya, the government attitude to the Muslim Community in the context of countering the rise of terrorism in the country reflects in the way it treats this Community. First, Muslim charities and

communities in Kenya have been treated as suspects in the proliferation of terrorism and have faced various levels of government repression [45]. Therefore, the findings of the Nigerian case contribute to the debate on the challenge of engagement and partnership between Police and communities within the context of curbing the rise of violent extremism.

8.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

This article examined the examined state-community relations in the context of CVE via community-Policing strategy. It argues that there is inherent mutual distrust of both the state security institutions and Community negatively impinging on the practical implementation of community policing in addressing Countering Violent extremism.

Thus, in order to strengthen Trust, there is a need to make the community approach a comprehensive approach that encourages participation from all sections of the Community. Thus, as argued by Spalek [46], the use of ‘connectors’ who can help improve Trust between the Police and the Community is crucial in the Nigerian context. These connectors operate in environments of low-trust by helping to build bridges and relationships. These connectors could be religious or community leaders, as well as heads of Madrassas. Moreover, the government need to assign roles or formally assigned specific roles to community leaders on the CVE via Community Policing program. This will go a long way in carrying the communities along in the CVE programs from the point of policymaking to the implementation of the policy. This will contribute to ensuring a sense of ownership of the problem and by default the intense need to address it.

Above all, the government should aim at eradicating the ‘push and pull’ factors that trigger the emergence of violent extremists, as it is crucial to nip it in the bud. Thus, more attention should be focused on grassroots factors such as poverty, lack of education and social exclusion- all these render individuals more liable and susceptible to radicalisation. The government, in collaboration with CSOs, should renew efforts at improving these stated factors, particularly in the affected areas. These must exemplify building resilience to extremist ideologies and radicalisation, and expansion of educational programs. Likewise, marginalisation at the community and individual levels needs to be addressed.

Considering that religion can be a combustible source of violent extremism, conscious efforts should be made to promote and ensure religious moderation and tolerance. Radical exhortations and sermons, which may lead to violence, should be guarded avoided.

Counter-messaging should also be promoted and held in high esteem. Its ability to reduce the attractiveness of the messages and narratives of violent extremists makes it a viable tool. To this end, the government should implement counter-messaging programs that will make use of repentant terrorists and victims/survivors of attacks, to tell their stories. This can only be done with effective partnership with religious leaders and CSOs

Furthermore, no doubt the violent extremists in Nigeria have embraced global jihad movements and are now prominent players, with growing ties, but the war strategy is local, to confront it requires street knowledge; thus, the pertinence of community participation cannot be overemphasised between state security authorities and the Community.

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ACSRT Africa Terrorism Dossier (January – June 2019)

1.0 Executive Summary

General Situation: The reporting period, 1st January to 30th June 2019 recorded a total of **868** terrorist attacks resulting in a total deaths of **3,221** across the continent. Five countries most affected by terrorism during the period are Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia, and Cameroon (**In decreasing order of deaths recorded**).

Target of Terrorist Attacks: While 417 out of the 868 terrorist attacks were launched against civilians, 336 were targeted at Security Forces. 59 attacks targeted Government Institutions/Officials and 56 targeted Personnel of International Peace Operations (AMISOM and MINUSMA). The attacks by al-Shabaab, ISWAP, ISCAP and JNIM were mainly against Security Forces whilst, Boko Haram (SF), ADF/ISCAP, ISGS, Other IS affiliates mostly targeted civilians. The terrorist groups used Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in 570 out of the 868 attacks. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were used in 214 of the attacks and both IEDs and SALW were used in 12 attacks. Other 72 attacks were cases of kidnapping.

Terrorism Deaths/Casualties: A total number of 3,221 deaths resulting from the 868 terrorist attacks were recorded during the period. The actual casualty figures for the period were 1,729 civilians, 874 Military/Security personnel and 618 terrorist. Boko Haram (SF) killed 579 persons (457 civilians, 122 military); ISWAP killed 210 persons (172 Security personnel, 38 civilians); Al-Shabaab killed 395 persons (192 civilians, 203 security personnel); ADF/ISCAP killed 49 persons (39 civilians, 10 Security personnel); Other IS affiliates killed 79 persons (60 military, 19 civilians); ISGS killed 119 persons (56 Security personnel, 63 civilians); and Unknown/Other groups killed 988 persons (812 civilians, 176 Security).

Focus on Epicentres: Out of the total of 868 terrorist attacks, the Sahel region accounted for 423, Horn of Africa recorded 155, and the Lake Chad Basin recorded 130. The Lake Chad Basin recorded 1,053 deaths from terrorist attacks, the Sahel region recorded 1,031 deaths and the Horn of Africa recorded 443 deaths within the period under review.

Conclusions/Recommendations: Violent atrocities committed by terrorist groups continued. The Lake Chad Basin, the Sahel Region and the Horn of Africa region became the centre of complex and sophisticated attacks resulting in the deaths of civilian populations and the security forces. In mobilizing partnership, political will and resources to address the situation of terrorism in Africa, consideration would need first to be given to the *crystallization of consensus* on what exactly the challenge derives from, a clear concept of operation on how to address the challenge and what it takes to do so. Consideration may have to be given to the postulation that the centre of gravity of the terrorism offensive in Africa derives from a Salafi-Jihadist ideology. In such a consideration, attention needs to be paid to the strands of Salafi-Jihadism which manifest in a rejection of man-made laws and a self-serving manipulation of the interpretation of the concepts of *Jihad, Takfir, Al Wala wal Bara, Tawhid*, and *Hakimiyyah* which exist within normative mainstream Islam. The mobilization of Islamic scholarship and political support by the African Union in this endeavor is key.

2.0 Introduction

Terrorism and Violent Extremism have remained the primary threats to peace, security, national stability and development on the continent during 2019. The AU Commission, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and Member States with the support of partners continue to exercise various strategic and operational initiatives at the national, regional, continental and international levels to mitigate the situation. The phenomenon has however, developed into a complex mix of ideology-driven acts of violence, transnational organized crime and insurgency. This is manifested in the multiplicity of armed groups with varying motives and trajectories that are spreading and unleashing violence across the continent.

In spite of these combined efforts, the threat continues to mutate with new variants of inter-community massacres, violent conflicts between herders and sedentary farmers and a gradual but persistent expansion into new territories by Salafi-Jihadi ideology-oriented Terrorist and Violent Extremist groups who now have presence in all regions of the continent. The threats have remained resolute both in intent and capability, with growing confidence and cohesion in the launching of devastating attacks on civilians, security forces, and critical infrastructure across the continent.

Most worrying is the recent tendency of these groups to launch attacks on military operational bases to kill and capture soldiers as well as seize military equipment. In the affected areas, the situation undermines the confidence of local populations in the ability of their governments and military to protect them against attacks by the terrorist groups. Local populations in a number of the affected areas therefore live in an environment of absolute insecurity and are at the mercy of the Terrorist and Violent Extremist groups.

The relatively weak national economies of many AU Member States and the continued prevalence of a number of structural and governance gaps tend to make it rather very challenging to speed up the creation of the necessary socio-economic conditions that could prevent the spread of the influence of the terrorist groups. The effort by governments to counter the message of the terrorist groups, that they have an alternative to provide solutions to the grievances of local communities and improve their well-being has thus been considerably challenged by the inconsistency and inability of governments to address the expectations and provide the basic requirements of the local communities. The effort has not been able to yield the expected results.

Under the circumstances, the expectations of the local communities that government would ensure their peaceful existence tends to be considerably undermined in those areas where the terrorist/violent extremist groups operate. In some local communities, the mere need for survival and self-preservation tends to foster a relationship of mutual support between the community and the terrorist groups. As a result, terrorist groups now occupy and control some portions of national territory in a number of the affected Member States. The terrorist and violent extremist groups in control of such territory, tend to run their own criminal economies in the areas under their control in conjunction with transnational organized criminal networks and the local population is made to benefit from it. The trajectory of this situation, if allowed to continue, could overtime, develop into entrenched insurgencies and would be extremely difficult to dislodge.

This 2019 mid-year Africa Terrorism Situation report takes into account the activities of terrorists and violent extremist groups for the first half of 2019, with the view of taking stock of the general terrorism situation and provide policy recommendations aimed ameliorating the threats.

3.0 Methodology

In line with its mandate to assist African Union (AU) Member States, build their Counter-Terrorism capacities and to prevent Violent Extremism, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) has developed tools that enable it to collect, analyze, process and disseminate information on terrorism-related incidents occurring in Africa.

The ACSRT maintains a robust database that stores information on terrorism, more specifically, on terrorist groups, their leaders and members, and activities and avails this information to the African Union Commission and the African Union Member States. Information for the Database is collected by the ACSRT Situation Room Team using the Africa Media Monitor (AMM) developed in collaboration with the European Union Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) for advanced web mining and information extraction. With the AMM, the Situation Room Team scans and accesses over 1400 websites 24/7 and retrieves real time information on terrorist incidents. The Centre also stores terrorism-related information received from Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) based on existing cooperation. The AU Continental Early Warning Situation-Room and reports from AU Field Missions and other field missions are also sources of information for the dossier.

The data for the analysis of this report, is limited to information stored in the ACSRT Africa Terrorism Database, collected in conformity with the definition of terrorist acts as defined by the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Notwithstanding the lack of a universally accepted common definition of **Terrorism**, the AU, in its **1999 OAU CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM**, *Article 1 paragraph 3, (a) and (b)*, and *Article 3*, defines what constitutes a *Terrorist Act*. The ACSRT and therefore the dossier defer to this definition.

To ensure credibility and reliability, the Centre validates all accessed terrorism incidents from the ACSRT Focal Points of the Member States. The Focal Points are the institutions in AU Members designated to collaborate and share terrorism and Counter-Terrorism related information with the ACSRT. In accordance with its mandate, the information validated by the ACSRT on the number of attacks, deaths

and injuries recorded are considered as the official data for the ACSRT Database irrespective of other conflicting figures.

4.0 Threat Assessment

The perpetration of terrorist acts across all regions of the continent continues to be predominantly dominated by local Salafi-Jihadi groups affiliated to Daesh (IS) and/or al Qaeda. Incidents of inter-community violence also account for a considerable number of the atrocities that have occurred during the year. Armed groups which have not openly declared affiliation to Daesh (IS) or al Qaeda have also been responsible for a number of the recorded incidents, some of which have undertones of an intent to occupy and control territory in order to facilitate the running of criminal economies. While the West, East, Central and North Africa regions recorded the most incidents, the Southern African region which, had in the past not recorded any incidents of terrorism, has begun to consistently record terrorist attacks since the beginning of the year.

At the regional level, **West Africa** recorded the highest number of terrorist attacks. The region recorded 544 attacks that resulted in 1,834 deaths. Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger were the countries in which the attacks occurred in the region with Burkina Faso experiencing a rather sharp increase in the number of attacks during the period. Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) are the main terrorist groups that operate in the West Africa along the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin corridors. Both the al Qaeda affiliate group Boko Haram and its breakaway IS affiliate group, ISWAP continue to dominate the terrorism landscape in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel countries of Nigeria and Niger. Their major areas of operation have been in the North-Eastern Nigerian States of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. ISWAP also continued to launch attacks in the Diffa region located in the South-East of Niger during the period. While Boko Haram mostly targets civilians, they also do carry out attacks against military deployments. ISWAP's main target has however been the security forces. The modus operandi of ISWAP indicates that it seeks to demoralize the deployed troops and win the hearts and minds of local populations by demonstrating that it is the group that could be relied upon for protection and provision of services to them. JNIM and ISGS are both Salafi-Jihadi terrorist groups affiliated to al Qaeda and IS respectively and operating in the Sahel

region. While virtually pursuing the ideology of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the two groups continue to operate in Mali and across the border in both Burkina Faso and Niger. They have accomplices in two other violent extremist groups, the Macina Liberation Front and Ansarul Islam which also operate from Mali and Burkina Faso respectively.

Next to West Africa, the **East Africa** region recorded 175 attacks that resulted in 502 deaths. Countries that accounted for the attacks and deaths were Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Burundi. The al Qaeda affiliate terrorist group, al Shabaab continues to dominate the terrorism landscape in East Africa and operates mainly in **Somalia** and **Kenya**. In **Somalia**, the capital Mogadishu, Lower and Middle Shebelle, Hiraan, Bay, Gedo, Bekool and Lower and Middle Juba were areas in which most terrorist activities of the group were recorded. In recent times, the group has resorted to suicide bombings using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and targeting civilians in high population density areas as well as government offices and installations. While this tactic reduces the casualty rate of its fighters, it increases, very highly, the casualties inflicted on its target/targets per attack. The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), also known as Abna Ul-Calipha is an IS-affiliate group that also operates in the Puntland region of Somalia. In **Kenya**, the eastern Kenya counties of Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa experienced attacks attributed to al-Shabaab, primarily in the form of IED attacks targeting Kenyan security forces. In the Northern Kenya Coast, al-Shabaab is believed to have a base in the Boni forest, from which it launches attacks to other parts of Kenya.


Central Africa recorded 105 terrorist attacks resulting in 707 deaths. These attacks and deaths occurred in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad and Cameroon. Boko Haram and ISWAP continued to launch limited terrorist attacks in the Far-North region of Cameroon and South-Western Chad whereas the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) focused its attacks in DRC. Although the *ADF* has been known as a rebel group operating in the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**, it has carried out several violent attacks which could be considered as terrorist acts as per the AU definition of a Terrorist act. The group has not been officially declared a terrorist group except by Uganda. Reports of a linkage of the group with ISCAP however raise numerous concerns about its exact status as a violent extremist or rebel group. On 16 April, there was an attack on a DRC

military base in **Bovata**, North Kivu that killed two soldiers and one civilian. The attack was presumed to have been carried out by the ADF. Two days later, however, the Islamic State (IS), in an official statement claimed responsibility for the attack and declared the DRC as the “**Central Africa Province of the Caliphate**” thus marking the birth of **Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)** in the region. IS has since continued to claim responsibility for the abduction of 15 civilians near **Oicha** on 23 May and an attack on the DRC army near **Goma** on 3 June in which it alleged that 25 soldiers were killed. Although the ADF has not publicly pledged allegiance to IS, the fact that operations conducted in an area which hitherto was controlled by them are now claimed by IS raises a number of legitimate questions. The Islamist ideology of ADF also gives some credence to the suspicion that ISCAP might be deriving support from ADF or that ADF has been integrated into ISCAP.

North Africa recorded 30 terrorist attacks and 109 deaths which occurred in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria. Terrorist groups in **North Africa** remained active in Southern Libya and the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt. The region hosts several terror groups and sleeper cells affiliated to IS and al Qaeda. In **Libya**, the IS affiliated group has carried out several attacks resulting in the deaths of many civilians and security forces. Similarly, the al-Qaeda local affiliate group has engaged in numerous acts of kidnapping for ransom in Libya. In **Egypt**, local terrorist groups affiliated to IS continued to dominate the terrorism landscape, particularly in the Sinai Peninsula. A counter-terrorism offensive launched by the Egyptian Army has however reduced the capability and cohesion of the terrorist groups in the Sinai considerably. In **Tunisia**, IS and al-Qaeda affiliated groups carried out attacks in Gafsa and the capital, Tunis. On 26 April, in Mount Chaambi, an AQIM local branch, **Uqba Bin Nafi Battalion** (KUBN) launched an IED attack on a vehicle carrying security forces, killing one (1) soldier and injuring three (3) others.

Southern Africa recorded 14 attacks that resulted in 59 deaths. All the terrorist acts recorded in the Southern Africa region occurred in the Cabo Delgado province in the North of Mozambique. Daesh (IS) has claimed responsibility for a number of these attacks in Mozambique, indicating that its affiliate group Islamic State Central African Province (**ISCAP**) carried out the attacks in conjunction with their local affiliate in Mozambique, al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah (ASWJ). The figure 1 gives detail of terrorist groups' mobility corridors within the first half of 2019.

Figure: Terrorist Groups Mobility Corridors, 2019 Source: ACSRT Records, 2019




5.0 Results

5.1 Terrorist Attack

5.1.1 Total Terrorists Attack: 868

Figure 2 shows the detail number of attacks indicating those with fatalities.




The first quarter of 2019, January to June recorded a total of 868 terrorist attacks across Africa.

In 516, out of the 868 attacks fatalities were recorded. 268 of the attacks recorded no casualties whereas in 84 attacks people were injured with no deaths recorded.

Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

5.1.2 Attacks Per Region

Figure 3 shows the proportion of attacks recorded in each region.




West Africa recorded the highest number of terrorist attacks. 544 out of the 868 attacks representing 63 per cent were recorded in the region.

The region with lowest number of attacks was southern Africa with a total of 14 (2 per cent), all of which occurred in Mozambique.

The rest are East Africa, Central Africa and North Africa with recorded attacks of 175 (20 per cent), 105 (12 per cent) and 30 (3 per cent) respectively.

5.1.3 Type of Target

Figure 4 shows the details of the number of attacks by targets.




For the period, civilians were predominantly targeted in terrorist attacks. 48 per cent of the total attacks were civilian targets.

Whilst 39 per cent of attacks targeted military, 7 per cent and 6 per cent of the attacks targeted government institutions and international organizations respectively.

Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

5.1.4 Per centage of Attacks by Target Type

Figure 5 shows the detail regional per centage of attacks by targets.



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

Civilians were the highest target of all terrorists' attacks in all regions except North Africa. 57 per cent (60), 52 per cent (284) and 93 per cent (13) of all attacks in Central Africa, West Africa and Southern Africa respectively were of civilian targets.


Also, Security forces were the highest target of terrorist attacks in the East and North Africa regions. 48 per cent (84) and 63 per cent (19) of all attacks in East Africa and North Africa respectively targeted security forces

Majority of the attacks against international organization in East Africa were on AMISOM, whereas majority of the attacks against international organization in West Africa were on MINUSMA.

5.1.5 Means of Attack

Figure 6 shows detail per centage of the means by which terrorists attack.

For the entire continent, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) accounted for 66 per cent (570) of attacks in the first quarter of 2019.



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)


Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) was the next most common form of attacks accounting for 25 per cent (214).

Cases of Kidnapping/ Hostage taking accounted for 8 per cent (72) of means by which terrorist attacked, followed by 1 per cent (12) of attacks involving the use of both IEDs and SALW.

5.1.6 Per centage of Regional Attack by Means of Attack

Figure 7 shows detail per centage of the means by which terrorists attack in various regions.

Majority of attacks in West Africa (384) and Central Africa (74) involved the use of SALW. All attacks in Southern Africa (14) used SALW.



Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) was used in most attacks in East Africa (87) and North Africa (18).


Cases of Kidnapping/ Hostage was highest in West Africa (36), followed by Central Africa with 11 cases.

Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

5.2 Deaths; 3,221

5.2.1 Deaths Per Region

Figure 8 shows per centage distribution of deaths per region.



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

A total number of 3,221 terrorism deaths were recorded for the period.

The highest number of deaths for the period occurred in West Africa. The region recorded 1,834 deaths out of the 3,221 representing 57 per cent of the deaths.


Central Africa followed with a total deaths of 707, then East Africa with a total deaths of 512.

North Africa recorded the 109 number of deaths. All deaths in the Southern Africa (59) occurred in Mozambique.

5.2.2 Victims

Figure 9 shows the number of deaths per victim.

Civilians constituted the highest number of casualties. Out of the 3,221 deaths for the period, civilians accounted for 1,729 deaths representing 54 per cent.



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

Within the period also, a substantial number of military/security forces were killed. A total number of 874 security personnel, representing 27 per cent of all deaths were killed by terrorist groups across Africa.

618 (19 per cent) militants of terrorist groups, were killed by security forces in reprisal attacks.

5.2.3 *Per centage of Victims Deaths per Region*

Figure 10 shows the per centage distribution of deaths per regions.


In all the regions, civilians were the highest victims of terrorist attacks.

In West Africa, 60 per cent (1,096) were civilians, 27 per cent (488) were military/security and 13 per cent (250) were militants of terrorist groups.

In East Africa, 44 per cent (233), 41 per cent (208) and 15 per cent (81) were civilians, military/security and terrorists respectively.

In Central Africa, 45 per cent (320) deaths were civilians. 17 per cent (119) and 38 per cent (268) were military/security and terrorists respectively.


In North Africa, 51 per cent, 31 per cent and 18 per cent of deaths were military, civilian and terrorists respectively. 95 per cent and 5 per cent deaths in Southern Africa were civilians and military respectively.



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

5.2.4 Deaths by Means of Attack

Figure 11 shows the details of deaths by means of attack.



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)


SALW accounted for 79 per cent (2,549) total deaths for the period.

IED attacks resulted in 576 deaths representing 18 per cent of the total terrorism deaths for the period.

For the period, 24 people died from cases of kidnapping. This represents 1 per cent of the total deaths.

5.2.5 Per centage of Deaths by Means

Figure 12 shows regional per centage of deaths by means of attack.



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

In all regions, except East Africa, SALW accounted for the highest number of deaths.

SALW accounted for all deaths in Central Africa and Southern Africa. In West Africa, SALW accounted for 81 per cent (1,486) of the total deaths for the period. In North Africa also, 91 per cent of the deaths were from SALW.

IED accounted for majority of the deaths in East Africa. 55 per cent (282) of the deaths in the region were as results of IED attacks. Similarly, 318 people were killed in West Africa through IED attacks, more than those died in East Africa.

6.0 Countries with Terrorism Incidents

For the period under review, 20 out of the 55 countries in Africa recorded incidents related to terrorist attacks. Three countries (Algeria, Burundi and Uganda) out of the 20, recorded attacks with no deaths.

On January 29, an IED explosion in Sidi Bel Abbes, Algeria wounded 2 security forces. No group claimed responsibility for the explosion.

On January 27, an IED explosion in a drinking located in Bujumbura, Burundi wounded 8 civilians. No group claimed responsibility.

On April 03, armed men kidnapped two persons in Queen Elizabeth Park, Uganda and demanded ransom payment before their release. 8 of the suspected kidnappers were arrested by police forces.

Countries in Central Africa that recorded attacks were Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).


Countries in East Africa that recorded attacks were Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and Burundi.

Countries in North Africa that recorded attacks were Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.

Countries in West Africa that recorded attacks were Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, Nigeria, and Mali. All attacks in Southern Africa took place in Mozambique.

6.1 Country Profile

6.1.1 Countries with Terrorism Incidents



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

Table 1: Detail Records of Countries

No	Country	Attacks	Deaths	Injured	Military/ Security	Civilians	Terrorist
1	Algeria	1	0	2	0	0	6
2	Benin	1	1	0	0	1	0
3	Burkina Faso	175	436	93	60	320	237
4	Burundi	1	0	8	0	0	0
5	Cameroon	44	274	67	29	134	118
6	CAR	7	26	23	2	22	2
7	Chad	11	177	22	53	11	113
8	DRC	42	230	49	35	153	123
9	Egypt	10	66	30	50	7	232
10	Ethiopia	2	5	0	0	5	0
11	Kenya	16	54	3	20	26	8
12	Libya	13	39	82	11	27	2
13	Mali	234	571	368	159	341	389
14	Mozambique	14	59	38	3	66	0
15	Niger	53	224	45	93	78	401
16	Nigeria	81	602	261	194	379	428
17	Somalia	155	443	374	189	189	562
18	Sudan	1	10	0	0	10	0
19	Tunisia	6	4	18	2	0	15
20	Uganda	1	0	0	0	0	0

Table 2: The Ten Most Fatal Terrorist Attack

No	Country	City	Date	Group	Deaths	Description
1	Cameroon	Far-North	6/10/19	Boko Haram	88	Assailants attacked a military base, killing 16 soldiers and 8 civilians. 64 insurgents were also neutralized
2	Chad	Bouhama	4/15/19	Boko Haram	70	Assailants attacked a military post killing 7 soldiers. 63 assailants were also killed.
3	Cameroon	Buea and Bamenda	2/9/19	Armed Separatists	69	Armed Separatists attacked seven towns in Buea and Bamenda killing 69 civilians

No	Country	City	Date	Group	Deaths	Description
4	Burkina Faso	Soum	4/1/19	Unknown	62	32 people were in terrorists attack. Intercommunal clashes resulted in 30 deaths
5	Niger	Diffa	3/8/19	ISWAP	45	Armed men attacked military post killing seven soldiers. 38 terrorists killed in reprisal
6	Somalia	Juba	1/19/19	Al Shabaab	41	Armed men attacked a military base killing 41 soldiers
7	Mali	Mopti	6/18/19	Unknown	41	Armed jihadists attacked dogon villages, killing 41 civilians
8	Chad	Lake Chad	23/06/19	Boko Haram	37	Assailants attacked a military post killing 11 soldiers. Security forces killed 26 militants.
9	Nigeria	Borno	16/06/19	Boko Haram	33	Three suicide bombers detonated IEDs killing 38 persons
10	Mali	Menaka	15/01/19	ISGS	34	Armed men attacked MSA , an auto defense self-group post killing 34 persons

6.1.2 Five Most Affected Countries

In all, five countries namely; Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia and Cameroon accounted for 79 per cent (689) of the total terrorist attacks in Africa.


Three out of the five countries are located in West Africa (Nigeria, Mali and Burkina Faso), and accounted for 56 per cent (490) of all attacks for the period.

In terms of the deaths, the five most affected countries accounted for 72 per cent (2,316) of the total deaths for the period.

The Three countries from West Africa, that featured in the most affected countries accounted for 50 per cent (1,609) of the deaths for the period.

The countries most affected for the period under review are Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia and Cameroon (**in decreasing order**).

Mali recorded the highest number of attacks (234) whereas Nigeria recorded the highest number of deaths from attacks (602). Although Burkina Faso recorded the second highest number of attacks (175), the second highest number of deaths (571) was from Mali.



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

6.2 Terrorist Groups Activities

6.2.1 Attacks and Corresponding Deaths

For the period under review, Al-Shabaab carried out the highest number of attacks. 131 attacks were perpetrated by the group resulting a total of 395 deaths.

Boko Haram conducted the second highest number of attacks. 104 attacks perpetrated by the group resulted in 579 deaths.


Although Al-Shabaab carried out the highest attacks, the group caused the second highest number of deaths for the period.

The three most deadly group for the period are, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and ISWAP

In total, Al-Qaeda affiliated groups (Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, JNIM and Ansarul Islam) accounted for 36 per cent of attacks for the period and 36 per cent of deaths for the period.

The IS affiliated groups (ISWAP, ISGS, ADF and other IS Affiliates in North Africa) accounted for 11 per cent of attacks and 13 per cent of the deaths for the period.

Figure 15 shows detail attacks by various terrorist groups and the corresponding deaths for the period.



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

6.2.2 *Targets of Terrorist Groups*


Most attacks by ISGS, Boko Haram, Ansarul Islam, JNIM targeted civilians. Most attacks by Al-Shabaab, ISWAP and ISCAP/ADF however target military/security forces

All Al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Africa except al-Shabaab targeted civilians more in their attacks, whereas all IS affiliated groups except ISGS targeted military/security forces more in their attacks

Most attacks by Al-Shabaab attacks on international organization targeted AMISOM troops, whereas most attacks by JNIM targeting international organization targeted MINUSMA

In most attacks by other smaller groups or attacks where no group claimed responsibility, civilians were the target.

Figure 23 shows detail target type by various terrorist groups for the period.



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

6.2.3 Victims of Terrorist Groups


Most victims of Boko Haram, ISGS, Ansarul Islam, and ADF/ISCAP attacks were civilians.

Al-Shabaab killed 192 civilians and 203 military; Boko Haram killed 457 civilians and 122 military.

Most victims of Al-Shabaab, ISWAP, JNIM and other IS Affiliates were military. ISWAP killed a total of 172 security forces, whereas JNIM killed a total of 95 security forces. This represents 82 per cent and 66 per cent of the deaths caused by ISWAP and JNIM respectively.

In most attacks by other smaller groups or attacks where no group claimed responsibility, civilians accounted for the highest number of deaths.

Figure 16 shows detail victims of the various terrorist groups for the period.



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)

6.2.4 *Per centage of Terrorist Means of Attack*


SALW constituted the highest means by which the various terrorist groups operating in Africa attack except Al-Shabaab. The use of IED featured prominently in most attacks perpetrated by al-Shabaab.

All attacks by the ADF/ISCAP, the group use SALW. Cases of kidnapping was high in attacks by Boko Haram, other IS affiliated groups in North Africa as well as Separatist in the Anglophone region of Cameroon.

In most attacks by other smaller groups or attacks where no group claimed responsibility, SALW was mostly used.

That notwithstanding, almost all terrorist groups except ADF/ISCAP and Separatist made use of IEDs.

Figure 17 shows the various terrorist groups and their means of attack.



Source: ACSRT Database (2019)


7.0 Focus Analysis on Epicentres

7.1 Attacks in Epicentres

Total Attacks in Africa: 868


- Sahel region: **423**
- Horn of Africa: **155**
- Lake Chad Basin: **130**
- Other Parts of Africa: **160**
- Within the period under review, the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso and

Niger-Tillaberi Region) recorded **49 per cent**, Horn of Africa (Somalia) recorded **18 per cent**, and Lake Chad Basin (North Eastern Nigeria, South-West Chad, Far North Region of Cameroon, Niger-Diffa region) recorded **15 per cent** of all the attacks in Africa.



Source: ACSRT Database, 2019

7.2 Total Deaths Recorded in Epicentres



Source: ACSRT Database, 2019

Total Deaths in Africa: 3221

- Lake Chad Basin: 1053
- Sahel Region: 1031
- Other Parts of Africa: 694
- Horn of Africa: 443
- **33 per cent** of the deaths recorded within the period under review occurred in the Lake Chad Basin.
- **32 per cent** of the deaths occurred in the Sahel Region.
- **14 per cent** of deaths for the period occurred in the Horn of Africa.
- **21 per cent** of the deaths occurred in other parts of Africa.

7.3 Deaths by Category in Epicentres

Table 3: Category of Deaths in Epicentres

Epicentre	Civilian	Military/ Security	Terrorists	Comments
Lake Chad Basin	469	283	301	The Lake Chad Basin recorded the highest numbers of Security/military forces and terrorists deaths among the epicentres.
Horn of Africa	182	188	73	The lowest number of deaths against civilians, Security/military forces and terrorists among the various epicentres were recorded in the Horn of Africa.
Sahel Region	667	235	129	The highest numbers of deaths against civilians among the various epicentres were recorded in the Sahel region.
Other Parts	411	168	115	All other parts of Africa except epicentres recorded civilian deaths of 411. 168 security forces were also killed.

Source: ACSRT Database, 2019

8.0 Epicenters of Terrorist Activities

There is a growing manifestation by Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs) of a complex mix of the crave for territorial control for ideological and socio-economic purposes through the use and threat of violence against state security forces and civilians. There is also the observation that these NAGs tend to link up with transnational organized crime networks to sustain livelihood in the areas that they control for mutual benefit. The issue of a Salafi-Jihadi ideology is also at the bottom of many terrorist acts that continue to be committed in many parts of the continent. The following areas deserve special mention:

Central Africa Republic (CAR). In the Central African Republic, various militia groups, which are not listed as terrorist organizations, continue to seek control of territory and to launch attacks against civilian populations in contravention of the provisions of the Khartoum Peace accord. Efforts to see to the implementation of the Khartoum accord would have to be given priority attention if the situation is to be contained and prevented from deteriorating.

Southern Libya. The situation in Southern Libya remained unsafe and it continues to serve as a safe haven to which terrorist groups operating in the Sahel region are able to withdraw to, refit, regroup and launch their attacks in the Sahel Region. The ongoing belligerence between the Government of National Unity (GNA) and the Libya National Army (LNA) has subsumed and derailed efforts to address the terrorism phenomenon in Libya and its repercussion on the situation in the Sahel region. There is therefore a resurgence of several previously dormant Jihadist groups who have exploited the situation and began launching attacks. Intensifying the border monitoring of the movement of armed groups between the South and West of Libya, Algeria, Niger and Chad for the purposes of interception could further degrade the capability of these groups to launch attacks in the Sahel region.

Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique. The incessant terrorist acts in the Cabo Delgado province in northern Mozambique are of grave concern. On 25 July, in Makoul, a village of Cabo Delgado, the local terrorist group al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah (ASWJ) issued a statement, through IS Central media, claiming to have killed four field Intelligence Officers working for the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM). Several other ACSRT reports indicate that there could be an operational alliance between ASWJ and IS, following IS claim of responsibility for the attack

believed to have been perpetrated by ASWJ. A possible linkage of the terrorist acts occurring in Cabo Delgado with the establishment of ISCAP has become a major source of concern to analysts. The Mozambican government has launched extensive operations against the insurgents. IS comments on these operations is likely to confirm the extent of their involvement in the insurgency.

North-Eastern Nigeria. This year marks 10 years since the Islamist insurgency in the northeast Nigeria began and gradually spread into other parts of the Lake Chad Basin. At the operational level, Boko Haram and its offshoot, ISWAP continue to demonstrate considerable momentum, cohesion, capability and a will to face the MNJTF in the efforts of the latter to stabilize the region. Effective response to the prevailing situation would require that the tempo of the ongoing Intelligence led military operations be intensified to completely deny ISWAP and Boko Haram the territory that they currently control. This should however be complemented with a creeping ground implementation of a well thought through stakeholders-based Human Security Response Approach plan that assures justice, protection, inclusion, education and the provision of social amenities in order to win the hearts and minds of the local communities.

Central Mali. The Central Mali regions of Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu are the areas most affected by terrorist activities. Trapped in the marginalization, inter-communal conflicts, the quasi-absence of state institutions and the violence of Jihadist groups against so-called non-cooperative individuals, civilian population remain vulnerable to JNIM's and ISGS's militancy. In order to prevent jihadist groups from exploiting the conflict, assistance to marginalized citizens by authorities and partner organizations, design of strong PCVE and Reconciliation programs; and commencement of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of armed groups operating in those areas could significantly improve the crisis situation. This will be a major step towards reconciliation and the area, which when harnessed could serve as a blue print for other parts of the two regions bedeviled by Jihadist insurgency and communal violence.

Northern Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso has also become targets of many terrorists' attacks. The country, since the beginning of the year has witnessed consistent regular attacks on police, military personnel and civilians. Militants of the Jihadist group Ansarul Islam are reported to have been part of these attacks. The groups have also

resorted to attacking isolated security forces outposts and ambushing reinforcements to support these outposts. There is no gain saying that this is having a telling effect on the morale of the security forces and that appropriate concepts of operation will need to be evolved to reduce casualties to the security forces. The fear however, is that, if the terrorists win in Burkina Faso, the country could become a launchpad for terrorists to expand their influence to West Africa's coast and beyond.

Somalia. In spite of the neutralization of substantial numbers of al-Shabaab militants by AMISOM, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Somalia National Army (SNA), the group continues to exhibit a will, cohesion and capability to carry out attacks. A reinforcement of the technical capability of the intelligence effort and providing adequate equipment for the Security forces are issues that should engage the urgent attention of the policy makers and their partners. The central role of intelligence in the fight against insurgencies, violent-extremism and terrorism cannot be overemphasized. Al-Shabaab continues to exhibit its dexterity in the use of IEDs in many of the daring and complex attacks carried out within the period. Further control measures in the distribution of explosive material and detonators could help reduce the access terrorist groups have to these materials. The proliferation of artisanal gold mining in almost all countries of the Horn/East Africa region is considered to be a possible source of these materials to terrorist groups. Supply of explosive material and accessories to mining sites should therefore be controlled to minimize terrorist groups' access.

9.0 Counter-Terrorism Response

Across the continent, Member States and regional bodies have continued to review and adopt series of counter-terrorism measures including field deployments to deal with the threats of violent extremism and terrorism. The operational successes of the field deployments of AMISOM, US-AFRICOM, and the SNA continue to significantly degrade the capacity of al Shabaab in Somalia. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has inflicted huge losses and setbacks on Boko Haram and ISWAP during the period and has significantly degraded the operational capability of the two groups in the Lake Chad Basin region. The frequency of Boko Haram attacks in Cameroon has also gone down considerably as a result. In addition to the number of terrorists killed during attacks launched by terrorist groups, 2,018 fighters of the various terrorist groups were neutralized during deliberate counter-terrorism

operations launched by the military, bringing the total number of terrorist fighters eliminated during the period to 2,636.

Counter-terrorism operations in **North Africa** particularly in **Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia** have resulted in the dismantling of several terrorist cells affiliated with IS and AQIM as well as the discovery and destruction of numerous caches of arms and ammunition. In the Sahel, the French Operation Barkhane, G5 Sahel Joint Taskforce and MINUSMA are the deployments in operation. While Operation Barkhane and the G5 Sahel Joint Taskforce have mandates to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime, MINUSMA is mandated to help the Malian government stabilize the situation and extend control of the central government of Mali to other parts of the country. Although MINUSMA does not have a counter terrorism mandate, it has nonetheless been inundated by terrorist attacks on its troops, facilities and equipment. A significant challenge with the Sahel deployment is therefore the need for better coordination to ensure effectiveness in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel. Ensuring that the G5 Sahel Joint Taskforce is adequately equipped is a crucial part of this effort.

10.0 Conclusion and Recommendation

The threat of terrorism in Africa continues to be fomented predominantly by Salafi-Jihadi groups with affiliation to al Qaeda or IS. These groups profess a rejection of established societal norms and their replacement through violence. In addition to mere allegiance and affiliation, these groups have demonstrated sufficiently over time that they are guided by a Salafi-Jihadist world view as motive and ideology for their campaign. The sustaining and enduring nature of this affiliation with the global Salafi-Jihadi movement brings to the fore, the puzzle of why the Salafi-Jihadi idea/world view continues to attract followers on the African continent and how to address it. What should be of concern to policy makers is that this affiliation culminates into support that comes in the acquisition of technical expertise not only for the projection of combat power, but for a strategy that deploys a combination of proselytization, community support and other coercive schemes as tools for recruitment. The use of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) supports this overall effort. At the policy level, the structural fault lines that facilitate such affiliation and association need to be clearly identified and systematically addressed with the involvement of vulnerable communities in schemes that are justice led, protect local communities and build mutual trust. A holistic approach that engages all stakeholders and mobilizes support

for the purposes of ensuring peaceful mutual coexistence of all cultures and beliefs, appears to be a worthy pathway for arriving at enduring solution to the current threat of terrorism on the continent.

At the operational level, Boko Haram(SF) and ISWAP continue to maintain such momentum in the Lake Chad Basin area as to make one question the intelligence capabilities, both human and technical of the security forces deployed against them and whether partners are providing the required assistance to combat the situation. Whilst Boko Haram has maintained a modus operandi of indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets, ISWAP has continued to focus its attacks on government and military targets in the far north of Cameroon, the Diffa region of Niger, north-eastern Nigeria and south-western Chad. Like al-Shabaab, ISWAP is also known to be providing protection and other social services to local communities in their areas of operation and using that as a tool to galvanize support against government for injustice, insensitivity and exclusion. This strategy is translating into a dividend of sympathy, loyalty, support and cooperation of the related local communities and in great measure is responsible for the resilience and growth in the combat power of the group. The longer the evolving relationship is allowed to thrive and entrench itself, the more difficult it will be for security forces or government effort to undermine it and re-gain the hearts, minds, confidence and trust of the local population. In addition to counter-terrorism measures being waged, a concerted Human Security response approach aimed at protecting and empowering local communities in the lake Chad Basin area through decentralization would be a necessary tool for building trust between the governments and the local communities.

In spite of all the efforts being put into the fight against terrorism on the continent, the terrorist groups continue to increase their momentum particularly in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, DRC, and more recently in Mozambique. Lives and property continue to be at tremendous risk to terrorist attack. The terrorist groups have in a number of instances demonstrated a capability for planning and mobilizing adequate combat power to take on military deployments successfully, seize their equipment and take soldiers captive. One cannot overlook the adverse impact of such terrorist initiative and success on the morale of the security forces and the confidence of local communities on the ability of government to protect them. A reinforcement of the technical capability of the intelligence effort and providing adequate equipment for the Security forces are issues that should engage the urgent attention of the

policy makers and their partners. The central role of intelligence in the fight against insurgencies, violent-extremism and terrorism cannot be overemphasized.

The **Cabo Delgado** province of Mozambique has become one of the arenas of fast-emerging terrorist activity and deserves mention. There appears to be operational alliances between the local terrorist group **al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah**, and some IS affiliated groups particularly the ISCAP and ISISSKTU. On 04 June 2019, Islamic State (IS) first claimed presence in Mozambique. During the period under the review, ISCAP claimed responsibility for an attack that killed 11 persons, in the province. A number of victims were beheaded, a typical technique associated with **al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah**. The linkage of the group with ISCAP could be worrying for the reason that an operational alliance that is mutually supporting could lead to further escalation and entrenchment. Although the Mozambican authorities continue to respond to the situation in **Cabo Delgado** in order to bring it under control, generating adequate response to the situation appears to require urgent international prioritization and cooperation. It is considered that immediate international assistance would be vital if we are to prevent the **Cabo Delgado** situation from deteriorating to one similar to that brought about by Boko Haram or al Shabaab.

Increasingly also, there is an escalating pattern of sub-national terrorism on the continent. The recurrent retaliatory attacks between the Fulani and Dogon communities in central Mali is a typical example. Although these attacks fit into the African Union definition of what constitutes a Terrorist Act, they tend to be categorized merely as inter-ethnic clashes and thereby attract rather insufficient punitive/deterrent action. It is considered that this approach as to categorization requires a review. Violent ethnic/tribal clashes contributed immensely to the number of violence related deaths occurring on the continent. Although these deaths from ethnic/tribal clashes have not been recorded in this bulletin as resulting from terrorist acts, the phenomenon is one that should equally engage the attention of security policy decision makers. Also worrying is the upsurge of kidnapping for ransom by armed groups which are not terrorist groups. The phenomenon is fast eroding the confidence of citizens in governments to ensure their safety as it has resulted in deaths in many instances where ransom is not paid. Addressing the root causes of these two phenomena with a human security response approach could both help address the root causes and the accusations of human rights abuses that are levelled against security forces. The mischief to disrupt is a possible linkage between these groups and known terrorist organizations.

BOOK REVIEW:

Countering Extremism: *Building Social Resilience Through Community Engagement*

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Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Jerard, Salim Mohamed Nasir

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Reviewer:

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The book elucidates the subject of building social resilience to counter extremism through community engagement. The author acknowledged the role the community plays in preventing and countering extremism and terrorism and advocated other varying approaches to countering same. This paper therefore conducts a review of the book and gives summary of the various chapters, with highlights of the strengths and weaknesses identified in the book.

Generally, the book is of immense value to understanding the challenge of violent extremism and the relevance of community engagement in combating the scourge of extremism in various societies. Of significance to the discourse is the emphasis on integrating community aspirations with the grassroots development programmes of governments, aimed at fostering confidence between citizens and the state. This book further recommends that communities should evolve robust mainstream orientations which are aligned to national values. The orientation should be used to socialize individual members of the community in order to serve as deterrent to the spread of strange and alien extremist narratives.

In Chapter One, the author asserts that in order to defeat extremism and terrorism, community engagement is a global necessity in the 21st century. It is important that the government has an interface with the community to ensure that the community is extensively involved in the process of countering extremism. The author draws the attention of the reader to how various terrorist and other extremist groups have used the Internet, since its advent in the 1990s, to mobilize members of the community.

The author also emphasized the need for the government to be sensitive in its reaction to extremist threat so as not to generate resentment from the community or aid more support for extremist and terrorist groups. The community clearly has a role to play in the fight against extremism. The author has simply shown that involving the community is a powerful tool which should be harnessed.

Chapter Two titled “Community Engagement: Singapore Experience”, the author uses Singapore as a model to show how the Community Engagement Programme (CEP) was set up by the government, the various institutions that were used as channels to involve members of the community, and the challenges of sustainability. The idea of a CEP is to create resistance against extremist and terrorist attacks. However, in the case of Singapore the CEP was setup not only to create resistance but to repair the damage done to the community by the Jemaah Islamiyah, by way of building social resilience against extremism. The government recognized that the schools, workplaces and Inter Racial and Religious Confidence circles are all integral parts of the community, and incorporated them into the CEP. This model can also be employed by governments in African societies, as there are schools and religious institutions which can easily be a target for extremist groups to recruit their members. Therefore, governments should, like the Singaporean model, structure their CEPs to involve religious and educational institutions.

Chapter Third takes a look at the title of the book using South Asian models. The author considers reasons for radicalization and the making of a terrorist. He further takes a look at reasons for radicalization in Pakistan’s context and recognizes that to end the menace of extremism and terrorism, the first step is for policy makers to understand the complexity of the problem and thereafter evolve a strategy to counter the problem. An exclusive government provides breeding ground for the recruitment of dissatisfied youth, while an inclusive government instills the feeling of security among the citizenry and gains the citizens’ confidence in the State’s capability to protect them.

Chapter Fourth focuses on Community Engagement Models in the Middle East, the history of cyber terrorism and the two approaches the As-Sakinah campaign adopted. The two approaches are: open dialogue which is aimed at countering the extremist ideologies, while the second approach involves promoting positive alternatives. In order to achieve its objectives, the campaign follows local and global news coverage on extremist groups, infiltrates extremist websites chat rooms and

fora to oppose the intellectual support for extremism. This approach was instrumental to spreading moderate Islamic orientations that foster social harmony and peaceful co-existence in the society.

In Chapter Five, the author advises that the relationship between the police and the community should be a partnership. This is because there are aspects of the community life that only members of the community can understand. Engaging members of the community in the effort to counter extremism also provides an opportunity for building community cohesion.

Re-education programme for German prisoners of war that were held by Britain during and after the World War II was the focus of Chapter Six. The Chapter reveals that as early as World War II, Britain understood the importance of CEP and also made use of it in the denazification project as a strategy to ensure and sustain long term victory against Nazism.

Chapter Seven looks at Fear Management Approach to Counter Terrorism. The author points out that the sole intention of terrorist attacks is not to kill and wound but to instill fear. Terrorism may lose its appeal if terrorists realize that their activities are unable to influence and disrupt society. Sensitization of members of the community on terrorist attacks could help reduce the impact of such attacks on their lives and activities.

Chapter Eighth looks at Countering Violent Extremism in the UK. The author posits that certain actions taken by governments turn out to unintentionally boost support for terrorists. One of such actions is the amount of information the government allows the media to access, which the media in turn uses to pay too much attention to extremists and terrorist attacks. The less attention the media pays to terrorist attacks the lesser success the attacks are likely to achieve. The author also explains that it is wrong for the entirety of Muslims to be judged on the actions of extremists. He advocates for a partnership between the police and Islamists and also Salafis in order to undermine the activities of extremist and terrorist groups.

Chapter Nine focuses on government officials, the American public and the stigmatization of the Muslim community based on the actions of a handful of individuals. The author advocates for a more accommodating environment for Muslims as against Islamophobia. There should be a campaign to sensitize non-

Muslim members of the community on how the ideologies of the extremists varies from the teachings of Islam.

Chapter Ten looks at The Internet and New Media: Tools for Countering Extremism and Building Community Resilience. Platforms like Facebook and Twitter present avenues for people to unite not only for social interaction but to effect changes in their community. The internet can be harnessed to counter the radicalization of recruits as much as it has been used for radicalization.

To further emphasize the importance of community engagement in countering extremism, chapter Eleven cites Victoria-Australia as an example. Victoria-Australia is multicultural and multi-faith society that adopted measures that would encourage social inclusion and curb alienation. Community engagement should be all inclusive in the sense that people from various cultural, linguistic, racial and religious background could be accepted wholly without any form of discrimination.

Chapter Twelve takes a look at the UK model of community engagement. The idea of community engagement runs throughout the book. However, the author opines that the Salafis who have been left out of discussions because of their extreme ideas, should also be made part of the partnership between the government and the community. Also, counter-terrorism cannot be the main reason for engagement with Muslims as this may send inadequate message. The Muslims should be brought into the society with the aim of accepting them as members without discrimination.

In conclusion, the book succeeded in using practical models to show that in the fight against extremism the community can play an integral role. The idea of engaging members of the community is brilliant, and should begin much earlier for members of society in order to avoid the adoption of any form of extremism. Although the author failed to factor in the African experiences in terms of extremism and combating the scourge of extremism and terrorism, the experiences drawn from wide array of geographic scope could easily be applicable on the continent. This book is a great source of knowledge on building social resilience to counter extremism through community engagement. Given the nature of topics in the book and the importance that countering extremism holds in national development, the book could serve as a great source of knowledge to leaders of strategic decision-making bodies, especially in the field of education and security.

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