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ACSRT: PROMOTING A BALANCE BETWEEN COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA

Ensuring respect for human rights in the shaping and delivery of response to terrorism has often generated thorny discussion. Like Maximilien Robespierre during the French Revolution, some members of terrorist groups and their sympathizers continue to advocate that ‘Terror is nothing else than justice’. This contention seeks to cite injustice as a justification for terrorism. On 9th December, 1994, the UN General Assembly at its 84th Plenary Session adopted without dissent, Resolution A/Res/49/60 with a declaration on measures to eliminate International Terrorism. The Declaration condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations committed anywhere, by whosoever and for whatever purpose and urged Member States:

“to take effective and resolute measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of international law and international standards of human rights for the speedy and final elimination of international terrorism.”

The 2001 UN Security Council Resolution 1373 also reaffirmed that any act of international terrorism constitutes a threat to international peace and security and called on UN Member States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts. The Resolution called on UN Member States to “become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism…” In the absence of a clear definition of terrorism, the Security Council impliedly expected that the types of conduct set forth in the International conventions and protocols would be incorporated into the national legislation of UN Member States in order to define what constitutes a ‘terrorist act’ and provide the appropriate punishment. In spite of UN General Assembly Resolution A/Res/49/60 and UN Security Council Resolution 1373, and other International instruments which condemn terrorism and call for its suppression and elimination, there remains the primary challenge of a lack of a universally
accepted legal definition for terrorism. The lack of specificity in definition has continued to pose the risk of non-standardized, insufficient or incorrect application and implementation.


The very essence of the right to life and respect for human dignity tend to drive the balance between Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights. An assessment of the role of the African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) in promoting this balance between Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights in Africa would be well served by first seeking a common understanding of the prevailing terrorism situation and the existing international legal framework. A review of the challenges and prospects of enhancing compliance thereof as to the observance of human rights, could then bring to the fore, the efforts, challenges and future plans of the ACSRT to promote such balance.

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights while recognizing that human dignity is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace, defines Human Rights as “Universal legal guarantees protecting individuals and groups against actions which interfere with fundamental freedoms and human dignity.” Although not a treaty, the Declaration is an expression of the fundamental values which are shared by the international community having influenced the development of international human rights law and given rise to numerous related international agreements. The Declaration could be said to be binding to the extent that it has become part of customary international law. Individual AU Member States have indeed accordingly,

Over the last two decades, acts of terrorism, violent extremism and lack of opportunity, particularly for the youth, have emerged as the greatest threats to peace, security, stability and development on the continent of Africa. The attacks on the Embassies of the United States in Nairobi and Dar es Salam in 1998, have been severally cited as the major turning point for terrorism in Africa and a trigger for the 1999 OAU Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Since then, the situation has continued to deteriorate in a number of regions on the continent resulting in the death, maiming and displacement of huge numbers of both security forces and innocent civilians. Between 2015 and 2017 the number of terrorist acts on the continent was estimated at 1,500 attacks per year. The Horn of Africa region, the Lake Chad Basin, the Maghreb, the Sahelo-Sahara regions and the Central Africa region are currently the most affected. The situation in these regions has evolved into one of asymmetric warfare in which in some cases, terrorist groups occupy portions of national territories, recruit members from local communities and run criminal economies therefrom for their benefit and also that of local communities that are sympathetic to their cause.

In addition to shooting to kill and maim, terrorist groups have in the context of asymmetric warfare, evolved tactics and techniques that include the use of vehicles as weapons, suicide bombing and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to undermine the sense of security of the local populations and their confidence in their governments to protect them. This has in turn necessitated the deployment of troops by the affected governments. Both doctrinally and tactically in terms of military field operations, this puts a great deal of stress on field commanders and their national authorities in the shaping of an appropriate Counter-Terrorism response that effectively pursues a hardly identifiable and illusive enemy and still ensures a balance.
between their asymmetric warfare effort to ensure public protection and safety on the one hand, and the requirement to uphold human rights on the other. In spite of this marked advantage to the terrorists, response by government security forces is expected to be in consonance with the requirements of the international Counter-Terrorism legal framework which is actually developing a growing emphasis on prevention. It is within this context that the ACSRT is currently called upon to promote a balance between Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights in Africa.

The ACSRT was established as a structure of the AU in 2004. The decision to establish the Centre was taken in 2002 as part of the AU Plan of Action to Prevent and Combat of Terrorism. The primary role of the ACSRT is to assist AU member States build their Counter-Terrorism capacities. Its mandate includes the conduct of research, analysis and studies on the terrorism situation and terrorist groups in Africa, maintaining a terrorism database, centralizing information on terrorism and sharing this with AU Member States. The Centre conducts assessment missions to various AU Member States in order to ascertain their Counter-Terrorism capability and compliance with International Legal Instruments and then provide advice. In its capacity building effort, the Centre conducts seminars, workshops and training sessions in various aspects of Counter-Terrorism and the Prevention of Violent Extremism for the benefit of Member States. It also facilitates the drafting of Member State Counter-Terrorism legislation, Strategies and Plans of Action in accordance with human rights requirements. For the purposes of effective coordination, the Centre maintains a system of Focal Points with all the 55 AU Member States, as well as the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms. Representatives of these Focal Points meet annually under the auspices of the ACSRT to review and share compliance experiences on the Counter-Terrorism and Prevention of Violent Extremism situations. Validating compliance by Member States with Human Rights requirements in their Counter-Terrorism efforts is a major aspect of this endeavor.
The 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in its Article 1 (3) specifically defines a “Terrorist Act” as:

“(a) Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

(i) Intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or

(ii) Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or

(iii) Create general insurrection in a State.

(b) Any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).”

The AU has been rightfully lauded for defining what constitutes a “Terrorist act” in the Convention. In addition, Article 22. 1. of the Convention states that:

“Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as derogating from the general principles of international law, in particular the principles of international humanitarian law, as well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”.

From the above, it could be discerned that the 1999 Convention took due cognizance of the need to balance Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights in the shaping and delivery of response. It could be argued however that the definition of “Terrorist Act” in the Convention is rather broad as it sets no distinctive evidentiary standard for the prosecution of the
offences anticipated under the Convention as distinguishable from crimes with similar tenor that are already captured in domestic legislations of its Member States and for which lesser punishments may have been provided. This could be open to abuse in pursuit of political persecution. The definition could be said to be open to human rights abuse by governments and security forces. The Convention is the primary Regional instrument that the ACSRT relies on in its awareness creation and advocacy for a balance between Counter-Terrorism and Human rights.

Like all other UN Member States, individual AU Member States bear the primary responsibility for preventing and combating terrorism within their territories in accordance with their domestic legislation which is to be in conformity with the relevant UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, the 19 International Legal Instruments made up of conventions and protocols and Regional Instruments such as the OAU Convention, to which they are parties. These indeed form the International Legal framework for the prevention and combatting Terrorism. It is this legal framework that has over the years provided the legal space within which the ACSRT has sought to assist AU Member States balance their Counter-Terrorism response with respect for human rights and prevention of abuse and impunity.
Since 1963 when the first International Legal Instrument on Offences and Certain Acts committed on Board Aircraft was adopted, the situation has continued to evolve with new Resolutions, Conventions, Protocols and Regional Instruments that provide more clarity.

Considering the broad legal framework over the years and the general uncomplimentary public perception of what terrorism entails, one could argue that the challenge has been more with implementation in view of the available scope for abuse rather than the mere lack of appropriate legislation. As previously indicated, the very definition of a “Terrorist Act” by the OAU, provides some room for abuse by Member States to the detriment of their own citizenry. The Westphalia concepts of Sovereignty and National Security which continue to take precedence over the concepts of Human Security and “Sovereignty as a Responsibility” in many AU Member States holds a potential to facilitate such abuse. Again, the fact that the AU tends to take its decisions by consensus and that its Peace and Security Council lacks an enforcement capability similar to the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter is also a factor. It is pertinent to mention however, that over time, AU Member States have unanimously reiterated that “effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing”.

The 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy which derives from UN General Assembly Resolution, 60/288 of 2006 and which continues to be reviewed every 2 years, captures the essence of the current global counterterrorism effort. It is based on 4 Pillars.
This strategy categorically reinforces the issue of Human Rights in any Counter-Terrorism effort by UN Member States. Pillar four of the Strategy clearly requires that all efforts to prevent and counter terrorism should be based on ensuring Human Rights and the Rule of law. The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is currently a major tool that the ACSRT relies on in its awareness creation effort for a balance between Counter-Terrorism efforts and respect for Human rights and in assisting AU Member States develop their own Counter-Terrorism Strategies and Plans of Action depending on their particular circumstances.

The African Union Model Anti-Terrorism Law is another major instrument that the ACSRT relies on in its capacity building effort to ensure a balance between Counter-Terrorism and Human rights. The ACSRT was actually instrumental in the shaping and coming into being of the Law. The Model Law, which was adopted by the AU in 2011, serves as a guide to AU Member States in the drafting of their Counter-Terrorism legislation. The Model Law reaffirms in its preamble that:

“the fight against terrorism must be carried out in accordance with international law, including international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.”

The Model Law also provides in its section 1, a more comprehensive definition of a “Terrorist Act” and states specific exceptions of acts, which “shall not be considered as Terrorist Acts.” The ACSRT facilitates the drafting of AU Member States’ Counter-Terrorism laws in accordance with the Model Law and that has been very helpful in the effort to ensure the required balance.

The 2015 UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism is another formidable tool that the ACSRT relies on in its approach of focusing on the Prevention of Violent Extremism that could lead to Terrorism. The Plan recognizes that although the definitions of “Terrorism” and “Violent Extremism” are the prerogative of UN Member States, such definition must be consistent with Member States’ obligations under international law, in particular international human
rights law. It emphasizes the need to take a more comprehensive approach which encompasses not only militaristic security-based counter-terrorism measures, but also systematic preventive measures which directly address the root causes and drivers of violent extremism that could lead to terrorism; a considerable proportion of which have been attributed to be shortcomings of governance. This approach therefore entails the involvement of the whole-of-society including the Military, Law enforcement, Intelligence and Government Officials as well as Civil Society, the Media, Community and Religious leaders, the Youth and Women to share ideas on the Terrorism/Violent Extremism threat and required response in accordance with the law. The ACSRT approach is grounded in the “nothing about us without us” notion in building mutual trust between the Government and the Governed at the community level. It involves collectively evolving appropriate responses that would enhance community resilience and make community members less susceptible to terrorist recruitment and attacks. The Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism Courses that the ACSRT runs in collaboration with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) since 2016, with participants from AU Member States is based on this approach. The last Course was organized in Algiers in July 2018 with 40 participants and the next course will run at the KAIPTC in Accra from the 10th to 21st September 2018.

In January 2016, the African Union launched its Principles and Guidelines on Human and Peoples’ Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa. The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights had adopted the Principles and Guidelines at its 56th ordinary session in Banjul in May 2015. The Principles and Guidelines were developed on the basis of Article 45(1)(b) of the AU Charter and contain 14 principles and guidelines for AU Member States to follow in order to adhere to human rights in their fight against terrorism. The ACSRT relies on these Principles and Guidelines to create awareness for a Human Security Response approach to the prevention and countering of Violent Extremism placing Communities first and seeking to foster the development of the tenets of Citizen-oriented states in place of Elite captured states.
The African Charter on the values and principles of Decentralization, Local Governance and Local Development adopted by the African Union on 27th June 2014 in Malabo is another formidable instrument that the ACSRT seeks to rely on in its quest to promote a balance between Counter-Terrorism and Human rights. In essence, the Charter seeks to empower local authorities and communities to participate in the governance process through decentralization, local governance and local development. The adoption of the Charter is indeed a laudable turning point by AU member states. It seeks to address the issue of inclusion of the citizenry in governance decision making and implementation that directly affect them at the local level. Article 1 of Charter defines Decentralization as:

“the transfer of power, responsibilities, capacities and resources from national to all sub-national levels of government with the aim of strengthening the ability of the latter to both foster people’s participation and delivery of quality services.”

The Charter also defines Local development as:

“the mobilization of local, national and global human, economic, socio-cultural, and political and natural resources for the improvement and transformation of livelihood, communities and territories at the local level.”

The Charter provides the required platform for the ACSRT to pursue its Human Security response approach for the prevention of Violent Extremism and to ensure a balance between counter-terrorism efforts and human rights. The challenge however is that the Charter has still not been ratified by the required number of 15 AU Member States that would bring it into force. Current ASCRT effort is therefore on advocacy aimed at creating the necessary awareness that would ensure early ratification by the 15 Member States so required. Although 13 AU Member States have signed the Charter, only three have so far ratified it. The early ratification of the Charter could provide further impetus to the efforts of the ACSRT to facilitate a balance between Counter-Terrorism response and Human Rights in AU Member States.
The ACSRT maintains a list of researchers as resource persons across the continent who conducts research on Terrorism and Violent-Extremism in their various local communities on behalf of the Centre. In similar fashion the Centre maintains a community of bloggers and journalists from Africa who write for the Centre on issues of Terrorism, Violent Extremism and Human Rights. These resource persons have over the years contributed a great deal to the effort of the Centre to ascertain where human rights gaps exist in counter-terrorism response delivery and what could be done to address them.

Conclusion

In spite of an existence of an elaborate International Counter-Terrorism Legal framework that condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and calls for its suppression and elimination, there remains the primary challenge of a lack of a universally accepted legal definition for terrorism. This situation does not help standardization and creates room for abuse in the effort to ensure a balance between counter-terrorism efforts and Human rights.

The terrorism situation in the most affected regions in Africa has deteriorated into one of asymmetric warfare with security forces seeking to confront a faceless, ruthless and elusive enemy who seeks to undermine the confidence of the population in the ability of the security forces to protect them from terrorist attacks. AU Member States have nonetheless unanimously reiterated that “effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing”. Both doctrinally and tactically, these places field commanders in quite a quandary as to ensuring operational effectiveness on the one hand and ensuring compliance with human rights on the other.

In line with the UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, the African Union Principles and Guidelines on Human and Peoples’ Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa, the
African Union Model Anti-Terrorism Law and the African Charter on the values and principles of Decentralization, Local Governance and Local Development, there is a growing consensus among AU Member States to focus on a preventative human rights sensitive approach to the menace of terrorism, that involves local communities in the shaping and delivery of plans to prevent Violent Extremism that could lead to terrorism in local communities.

The African Charter on values and principles of Decentralization, Local Governance and Local Development although adopted in 2014, is yet to come into force when 15 AU Member States ratify it. The ratification of the Charter and its implementation promises to address the right of inclusion in governance at the local community level thereby enhancing mutual trust between governments of AU Member States and their local communities. It is expected that this will greatly enhance the balance between Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights on the Continent.
THE DYNAMICS OF ILLEGAL MINING ACTIVITIES AND THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE STATE: THE CASE OF GHANA

By Betty Acquah(1)

Abstract

Artisanal small scale mining is said to include both the exploration of mineral deposits by using fairly basic equipment, produced at low levels with minimal capital investment, on concessions measuring up to 25 acres and operating with an official license (Aryee, Ntibery & Atorkui, 2003). Illegal mining can therefore be explained as the act of carrying out mining activities by individuals and small-scale mining companies operating without an official license. Illegal mining activities now cuts across many rural areas and is indeed a threat to the security of the country. Despite the industry specific laws and regulations, institutions and various guidelines to regulate mining activities, the effects of illegal mining continue to overwhelm the country. This article tends to profile the activity of illegal mining, the security threats associated with it and the way forward to prevent the possible exploitation of these illegal activities by terrorists and other criminal networks. In order to analyze the dynamics of the activities of illegal mining, it is necessary to assess the mining industry holistically. This would include small scale mining, legal and regulatory framework governing the operations of the industry, the Africa Mining Vision and Action Plan; and the threats illegal mining activities pose to the security of the country.

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   Organisation: Economic and Organised Crime Office, Ghana
Introduction

The history of Ghana’s gold dates back to it colonial name Gold Coast. As the name implies, the country is blessed with mineral deposits. Apart from gold and the other traditional minerals such as bauxite, diamond and manganese, the country has discovered other minerals which includes phosphate, nickel, chromium, and uranium (Ghana Minerals Commission, n.d.) which are yet to be explored. There are also other unexploited minerals such as iron ore, limestone, kaolin, feldspar and silica sands (Ghana Minerals Commission, n.d.). The historic importance of mining to the economy cannot be understated “as it attracts more than half of all Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), generates more than one-third of all export revenues, is the largest tax-paying sector in the country and makes a significant contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment creation” (International Council on Mining and Metals, 2015, p. 5). Gold forms the largest total mineral revenue in the country. According to SVP Exploration of Pelangio team in Ghana (n.d.), there are over 100 million ounces of gold reserves and resources in Ghana (para 2).

Ghana has both surface and underground mining operations. The country recognizes the activities of both large scale and small scale mining; while the large scale has been opened to foreign investors, small scale mining is reserved for Ghanaians.

Ghana’s mining industry has attracted over 250 local and foreign companies. Currently, there are 14 large scale companies producing gold, diamond, bauxite and Manganese, with over 1,000 registered small scale mining groups and 90 Mine Support service companies (Minerals & Mining Policy of Ghana, n.d. p. 12). The mining industry in Ghana is largely operated by foreign investors but the Government of Ghana still owns about 10 percent interest in most of the main large scale mines (International Council on Mining and Metals, 2015).

In 1983, the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) was instituted to boost investor interest in the sector to help revive the economy at the
time (Minerals and Mining Policy of Ghana, n.d.). The ERP stimulated the implementation of series of laws and policy measures to create an effective regulatory framework for the mining industry (International Council on Mining & Metals, 2015; Amponsah-Tawiah&Dartey-Baah, 2011). For instance, the Minerals Commission was established in 1984; “the declaration of the minerals and mining code in 1986; the small-scale mining law in 1989, and the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1994” (Amponsah-Tawiah&Dartey-Baah, 2011, p. 64). Apart from these, there were other incentives introduced to attract foreign investors into the mining industry in Ghana. For example; “corporate income tax on mineral production of private companies in Ghana were decreased, breaks on import duties on equipment, mining companies were allowed to retain 25% of foreign exchange in an external account and the cedi exchange rate was adjusted to a more realistic level” (Amponsah-Tawiah&Dartey-Baah, 2011, p. 64; Minerals and Mining Policy of Ghana, n.d. p. 11).

Despite all the successes chalked by the industry it was still facing major challenges as a result of the emphasis on privatizing the industry to boost production in the 1980s. Some of the challenges still remain unresolved as the sector is still fully privatized (Minerals & Mining Policy of Ghana, n.d.).

Some of the major gold mines operating in Ghana are Tarkwa gold mine, Obuasi underground gold mine, Iduapriem open pit mine, Chirano gold mine and Wassan open pit mine (raregoldnuggets.com, 2016). There are also some mines that are both operational and under construction; Bogoso, Prestea underground gold mine, Ahafo and Akyem gold properties and the Damang mine (raregoldnuggets.com, 2016).

Mining contributes significantly to the nation’s GDP by providing employment and fiscal benefits to the state. However, the recent rampant proliferation of illegal mining activities leaves much damage in its wake. Examples are the destruction of roads, bridges, large and small water
bodies, and farmlands; threatening food security and creating potential future water crises in a region with unquantified climate change impacts. The influx of foreign nationals in particular, the Chinese have created a lot of challenges; fueling disputes between Traditional Authorities and their communities, with as many scandals on human right abuses also reported. Other foreigner induced challenges include proliferation of fire arms and possible financing of terrorism in Ghana.

Illegal mining affects the quality of life for Ghanaians by impacting negatively on the environment (Brauch, et al., 2011). With the soil and water polluted post-mining, the health of the people are also compromised. Because of the illegal nature of the activity, the economic benefits to the country is limited, if not entirely absent. The economic returns are accrued by a limited few while the environmental impact affects the majority.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the impacts of illegal mining on internal security of the State. Illegal mining “involve a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone’s life and livelihood is put at risk by discrete and identifiable events in society” (Brauch et al., 2011, p. 73). The extent of environmental or land degradation, deforestation, water pollution and air pollution threatens the security of the State. We should not lose sight of the fact that security threats have transcended from the military to include the environmental realm as well as population growth and resource scarcity (Brauch et al., 2011). The paper would identify the vulnerabilities illegal activity poses to the State, considering the ways in which citizens are harmed and the protection that they lack. The vulnerability of the system has to do with the “characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of illegal mining” (Brauch et al., 2011, p. 73).

**Significance of Ghana’s Mining Industry**

The mining industry experienced exponential growth in the mid-1990s. Between the first documentation of gold mining in 1493 and 1997, gold
mining was estimated at 2,488 metric tons (Amponsah-Tawiah & Dartey-Baah, 2011, p. 62). According to the Minerals Commission (n.d.), “gold production increased from 1,583,830 ounces in 1996 to 2,796,955 ounces in 2008, showing an increase of 77%. There were also similar increases in the production of the other major minerals at the end of 2008 compared to the levels in 1996 except for diamonds which saw some reduction in production due to suspension of mining operations at the only large scale diamond mine in Ghana. Bauxite increased by 50% while Manganese recorded a 373.6%” (para 5).

The Economic Recovery Program (ERP) and Ghana’s well known mineral deposits attracted quite a number of local and foreign investors in the country for mineral exploration. Between 1983 – 2013 investment inflows had recorded a total amount of US$13.7 billion increase in output of all mineral (Ghana’s Mining Portal, n.d.).The production of gold increased by 93% from 2.24 million ounces in 2002 to over 4.33 million ounces in 2012. Even with the rather significant decline in gold price, this led to only a slight dip of 0.7% (4.29 million) in 2013 (Ghana’s Mining Vision, n.d. para 2).

Ghana’s gold production is now the 9th ranked in the World (Gold and Fields Minerals Survey, 2011) and the second largest in Africa after South Africa despite the “2% decrease in production from 92 tonnes in 2010 to 91 tonnes in 2011” (Ghana Mining & Energy Summit, 2017, para 7). “According to the Ghana Statistical Service, the mining sub-sector grew remarkably by 14.3% in 2011 compared to the 8.3% it recorded in 2010. By this growth, the mining industry was the third behind the Oil & Gas and Construction sub-sectors which were up by 192.2% and 20% respectively” (Ghana Mining & Energy Summit, 2017, para 8).

Currently, the mining industry contributes about 40 percent of Ghana’s gross export earnings (Pelangio, n.d. para 4). During the first quarter of the year 2017, Ghana’s mining sector reportedly contributed 14.4% GDP growth to the economy (Ghana Mining & Energy Summit, 2017, para 7).
Artisanal Small Scale Mining in Ghana Explained

Small-scale mining is reserved for Ghanaians. The Minerals and Mining Act 2006 (Act 703) defines small scale mining as a miner or company “licensed to win, mine and produce minerals by an effective and efficient method and observe good mining practices, health and safety rules and pay due regard to the protection of the environment during mining operations” (Minerals & Mining Act 2006 (Act 703); Section 93). For a small-scale mining company to be recognized, “a license is granted to a person, a group of persons, a cooperative society or a company for a period not more than five years from date of issue in the first instance and may be renewed on expiry for a further period that the Minister may determine” (Investor’s Guide: Minerals Rights, Licenses, Permits and Procedures –Small-Scale Mining, n.d.). The license is granted to cover a land area of 10 hectares (Investor’s Guide: Minerals Rights, Licenses, Permits and Producers – Small Scale Mining, n.d.)

Small-scale mining is documented as a formal sector of the mining industry in Ghana which requires adherence to regulatory framework. From 1989, for small scale miners to be recognized they were required to comply with guidelines specified in a series of laws and regulations governing the industry. It is required by the existing laws to obtain a license to operate on a given concession (designated parcel of land) to facilitate increased regularization and registration in the industry (Hilson & Potter, 2003).

The Government of Ghana, in 1989 regularized the activities of small scale mining when it established the Precious Minerals Marketing Company (PMMC) which was charged with the responsibility to register, oversee and promote the activities of small-scale mining in addition to purchasing gold produced in the country. So far records show that about 750 local Gold Buyers have been registered and licensed by PMMC. The PMMC has succeeded in sending the market to the doorstep of the producer in an attempt to minimize smuggling (Ghana Minerals Commission, n.d. para 3).
In Ghana, small-scale mining is said to include the exploration of mineral deposits by using fairly basic equipment, produced at low levels with minimal capital investment, having a concession of up to 25 acres and operating with a license (Aryee, Ntibery&Atorkui, 2003). Gold and diamond are the most exploited mineral by small scale miners in Ghana. The operations of small-scale mining continue to be an important economic activity and is predominantly within the remote and poorer areas of the country (Aryee, Ntibery&Atorkui, 2003).

Further efforts by the Government of Ghana to regulate the sector in 1989 resulted to the enactment of three legislations; the Small-Scale Gold Mining Law, PNDC L218, and the Mercury Law PNDC L217 and the Precious Minerals Marketing Corporation Law” (PNDC Law 219) (Barning, n.d p. 8). The Small-scale Gold Mining Law, PNDC L218 outlined the following:

(a) prohibition of small scale gold mining unless a license has been granted by the Minister, (b) the size of the concession, (c) criteria applicable to license holders (d) the establishment of District Small-Scale Centres (manned by trained mining engineers) who provide advice and training facilities to ensure effective and efficient mining operations, including health, and safety and environmental aspects, (e) prohibition of the use of explosives, (f) exemption from payment of income tax and royalties for a three-year period, the encouragement of the use of mercury retort, and the limiting of sale of gold only to authorised buyers (Barning, n.d. p.8).

In order to acquire a license as a small-scale mining company:

(a) only Ghanaians of at least 18 years can be granted small-scale mining license

(b) a prospective applicant for a small-scale mining license notifies the small-scale District Center of the Minerals Commission of his or her intentions

(c) the District Officer inspects the site to determine its suitability and prepares a report,
(d) if found suitable the area is demarcated and site plans are prepared by the prospective licensee

(e) a notice of intention to allocate the area for small scale mining is published at the District Assembly for twenty-one (21) days

(f) if no objections are made, the applications are subsequently submitted together with the field report by the District Officer to the Head Office

(g) The Minerals Commission checks to ensure that the area is not already under license

(h) the applicant is then advised to obtain an Environmental permit from EPA

(i) The Minister then issues the License (Statement by the Hon. Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, n.d.).

The small-scale mining district centres were located in Tarkwa, Dunkwa-on-Offin, Bibiani, Asankragwa, AssinFosu, AkimOda and Bolgatanga to provide technical extension services to the mines and improve supervision” (Bansah, Yalley&Dumakor-Dupey, 2016, p. 9). The district centres were required by law to perform the following functions:

(i) compile a register of all small scale gold miners and prospective small scale gold miners specifying such particulars as may be determined by the secretary;

(ii) supervise and monitor the operation and activities of the small scale gold miners and prospective small scale gold miners;

(iii) advise and provide such training facilities and assistance as may be necessary for effective and efficient small scale gold mining operations and

(iv) submit to the Minerals Commission in such form and as such interval as may be directed by the commission, reports or other documents and information on small scale gold mining activities
within the district (Small Scale Gold Mining Law PNDC Law 219 of 1989).

As earlier indicated, the Government of Ghana established the Precious Mineral Marketing Corporation (PMMC) to help in the sale of gold and diamonds produced by the small-scale miners. The PMMC has its operations across the country through their offices and some authorized agents and subagents who buy gold from the miners and resell to PMMC (Barning, n.d.).

According to the Minerals & Mining Policy of Ghana (n.d), small scale mining continues to make substantial impact to the country’s foreign exchange earnings (Minerals & Mining Policy of Ghana, n.d). According to the Policy (n.d.), from 1989 to 2012, the total gold production by artisanal small scale mining increased from 2.2% to 43% of national production (Minerals & Mining Policy of Ghana, n.d.). According to Ntibery (2016), the industry produced “1.49 million ounces of gold representing 34.3% of Ghana’s total gold output in 2014” (Bansah, Yalley&Dumakor-Dupey, 2016, p. 8).

Currently, it is projected by Abdul-Gafaru (2017) that small scale mining employs over one million people directly and indirectly which is approximately 60 percent of Ghana’s total mining labour force. In 2013, gold exported by small scale mining operations was estimated at 34 percent of Ghana’s total gold export, which equaled the total contribution of the three largest multinational companies in the country (para 1)

Over the years, the focus of the Government of Ghana has been to “regulate and promote small-scale mining and strengthening the collection, transparency and management of mineral revenues”. In 2012, half a dozen of mining laws and regulations were passed (International Council on Mining and Metals, 2015, p. 5).
Legal Framework Regulating Mining in Ghana

Aryee (2001) stipulated that Ghana experienced a decline in gold production because for about 40 years no new mine had been opened. This he said was as a result of the countless difficulties faced by mining sector investors which could be attributed the financial, economic, institutional and legal framework within which the mining industry was operating (Amponsah-Tawiah&Dartey-Baah, 2011). Therefore, to increase mineral output and investment avenues in the industry, the Economic Recovery Program was initiated in 1984.

As earlier indicated, the Economic Recovery Program stimulated the implementation of a series of laws and policy measures that created an effective regulatory framework for the mining industry (International Council on Mining & Metals, 2015; Amponsah-Tawiah&Dartey-Baah, 2011). This included the Minerals Commission which was established in 1986 to serve as a “one-stop investment center for the minerals and mining industry” (Ghana’s Mining Portal, n.d. para 6) and “the minerals and mining code in 1986; the small-scale mining law in 1989, and the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1994” (Amponsah-Tawiah&Dartey-Baah, 2011, p. 64).

The Minerals Commission law of 1986 as amended by the Minerals Commission Act 1993 (Act 450) established the Minerals Commission. The Commission is the main promotional and regulatory body for the minerals sector in Ghana and is responsible for “regulating and managing the utilization of the mineral resources of Ghana and the coordination and implementation of policies relating to mining. It also ensures compliance with Ghana’s Mining and Mineral Laws and Regulation through effective monitoring” (Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, 2016, para 1).

The Minerals Commission is required by law to carry out the following functions:

a. Formulate recommendations of national policy for exploration and exploitation of mineral resources with special reference to
establishing national priorities having due regard to the national economy;

b. Advise the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources on matters relating to minerals;

c. Monitor the implementation of laid down Government Policies on minerals and report on this to the Minister;

d. Monitor the operations of all bodies or establishments with responsibility for minerals and report to the Minister;

e. Receive and access public agreements relating to minerals and report to Parliament;

f. Secure a firm basis of comprehensive data collection on national mineral resources and the technologies of exploration and exploitation for national decision making; and

g. Perform such other functions as the Minister may assign to it (Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, 2016, para 5)

In fulfilling its functions, the Commission engages in the following activities:

a. Investigate the background, process applications for mineral rights and recommend their grant or otherwise to the Minister;

b. Review agreements relating to minerals; Collect, collate and analyse data on the operations of mining companies for the decision making and for dissemination;

c. Organize and attend workshops/ seminars/ conferences, as well as issue publications to promote mineral sector activities;

d. Liaise with other governmental agencies, notably the Bank of Ghana, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), to ensure that the spirit of the sector’s fiscal regime is maintained;
e. Liaise with other governmental agencies, notably the Geological Survey Department (GSD) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to monitor and ensure the adherence of mining companies to the terms and requirements of the mineral rights granted to them (Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, 2016, para 5-6).

The 1992 Constitution and the Minerals and Mining Act 2006 (Act 703) gives the authority to the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources to grant mineral rights. The mineral rights cover a three stage licensing system: namely, reconnaissance license, which is for a period of one year renewable for a further one year; prospecting license, which may be granted for an initial period not exceeding three years or over an area of land not more than 750 contiguous block, with the possibility of further renewals of up to two years each. A prospecting license holder is entitled to a mining lease upon the presentation of an acceptable feasibility study which incorporates environmental impact studies. A mining lease may be granted for a period of 30 years and may be renewed for a further 30-year period, for an area normally not exceeding 50 sq. kilometres (Minerals and Mining Act 2006, Act 703; Barning, n.d.).

“These rights are granted by the Minister of Mines and Energy to applicants who demonstrate adequate technical, financial and managerial capability to engage in mining activities” (Barning, n.d p. 18).

We should not lose sight of the fact that over the years, the focus of the Government of Ghana has been to regulate and promote the mining sector especially the small-scale mining by “strengthening the collection, transparency and management of mineral revenues” (International Council on Mining and Metals, 2015, p. 5).

Several laws governing the operations of the industry were passed to regulate the activities of mining companies. Some of such laws are the Environmental Protection Agency Act, 1994 (Act 490), the Water Resources Commission Act, 1996 (Act 522), the Forestry Commission Act, 1999 (Act 571), the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462), the Internal Revenue
Act, 2000 (Act 592), the Ghana Revenue Authority Act, 2009 (Act 791),
the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands Act, 1994 (Act 481) and the
Precious Minerals Marketing Company Act, 1989 (PNDCL 219). Also the
Environmental Assessment Regulations, 1999 (LI 1652) (‘Environmental
Regulations’); Ghana’s Mining and Environmental Guidelines, 1994;
Operational Guidelines for Mineral Exploration in Forest Reserves for
selected Companies, 1997; Environmental Guidelines for Mining in
Production Forest Reserves in Ghana, 2001; Guidelines for the Preparation
of Feasibility study reports, 2009; Mine Closure and Post-closure Policies;
and Guidelines for Corporate Social Responsibility in Mining Communities
are some documents to assist in the regulation of the industry.

According to International Council on Mining & Metals (2015), in
2012 alone, half a dozen of mining laws and regulations were passed (p. 5).
Some of them were; the Minerals and Mining (General) Regulations, 2012
(LI 2173), the Minerals and Mining (Support Services) Regulations, 2012
(LI 2174), the Minerals and Mining (Compensation and Resettlement)
Regulations, 2012 (LI 2175), the Minerals and Mining (Licensing)
Regulations, 2012 (LI 2176), the Minerals and Mining (Explosives)
Regulations, 2012 (LI 2177), the Minerals and Mining (Health, Safety,

Despite these laws and regulations, there are some roles played by
stakeholder institutions to ensure that the key objectives are met. The role
of the Minerals Commission has already been stated. The Environmental
Protection Agency, the Water Resources Commission and the Forestry
Commission have the responsibility to ensure that there is strict adherence
to environmental regulation (Mineral & Mining Policy of Ghana, n.d.).

The Ministry of Finance, the Ghana Revenue Authority and the Bank of
Ghana oversee the fiscal aspect of the industry (Minerals & Mining Policy
of Ghana, n.d.). Similarly, the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources and
the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology are responsible for
the policy formulation on natural resources and environmental protection.
In addition, the Lands Commission and the Geological Survey Department are responsible for land management and proper geological mapping, research and analysis to provide reliable geological information.

The role of the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands, District Assemblies and Traditional Rulers cannot be understated. They represent the interest of the people and the communities with mining operation. They are responsible for proper management of part of royalties received on behalf of the communities with mining operations by providing economic and social infrastructure (Mineral & Mining Policy of Ghana, n.d.).

The Ghana Chamber of Mines as an association of the mining companies in the country is dedicated to pursue the common interest of its members bearing in mind the interest of the nation and the achievement of the sector’s objectives (Mineral & Mining Policy of Ghana, n.d.).

**Utility of Galamsey - Illegal Mining**

“Galamsey “as is popularly known is the operation of a mining concession without an official license and permit. The term “galamsey” was coined from the phrase ‘gather and sell’ (Rambaud et al., 2000). Mining activity can be termed “illegal even where a license is secured and the mining is done in an unapproved area or done in a prohibited area such as forest and game reserves, close to rivers and in water bodies and close to residential areas and other structures” (Statement of the Hon. Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, n.d. p. 3). Even though Ghana has legally formalized the engagement with small scale mining companies, about 85 percent are reportedly operating on illegal basis (Abdul-Gafaru, 2017). “According to the Ministry of Lands and Forestry and Mines of Ghana, the number of small scale miners increased rapidly by 941.73% from 1984 to 2004” (Ntibery, 2016, p. 9).

Illegal mining activity is destructive to the land, causes pollution and contaminates water bodies. The activities are said to be facilitated by some
chiefs, land owners, communities, farmers and opinion leaders who take power to themselves to give permission to people to mine (Statement of the Hon. Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, n.d.) with the excuse that the land belongs to them.

Carson et al., (2005) reported that “the State officially purchases galamsey gold, via agents licensed through the Precious Mineral Marketing Corporation, adding that a total of US$460 million had been roughly contributed to the national economy by the artisanal small scale mining sector in Ghana since 1989” (Tschakert, 2008, p. 25).

The impacts can either be positive or negative. However, the negatives that emanate from the mining industry sometimes outweigh the benefits generated for the mining companies and the country as a whole. The positive impact can be seen in the value added to the economy. A life cycle analysis conducted by the International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM) in 2015 based on a sample of seven (7) mines indicated that directly they contributed about US$796 million to the economy (ICMM, 2015, p. 6). According to ICMM report on the life cycle analysis, the “indirect impact of mining on goods and services in the supply chain could amount to US$1,556 million equivalent to 3.2 percent of Ghana’s GDP” (ICMM, 2015, p. 6)

In addition, the impact of mining on employment cannot also be overlooked. According to ICMM (2015),

“On average the sample of mining companies employ annually about 7,000 people directly while in total about 111,000 jobs are supported. This means that for each job at the mine site an additional 15 jobs are supported in the wider economy. Comparing that to local procurement, it means that for each US$1 million of local procurement about 105 jobs are supported” (ICMM, 2015, p7).

A statement made by the Hon. Minister of Lands and Natural Resource (n.d.), estimated that about 500,000 people are directly employed by small-scale mining while 500,000 benefit indirectly from their activities.
The impact of mining operations in Ghana varies and are overwhelming since it borders on the very existence of people and their livelihood. Mining affects environmental elements such as the land, air, and water (Amponsah-Tawiah & Dartey-Baah, 2011). According to Amponsah-Tawiah & Dartey-Baah, (2011)

“The environmental impacts of such small operations have, however, varied, depending on methods and the scale of operation. The factors that have contributed to aggravating these environmental impacts are economic, technical, legal, and operational in nature. Although mitigation efforts have had a limited impact, it is expected that the measures now being considered for adoption will improve the efficacy of the Government of Ghana’s drive towards improving environmental management in resident small-scale precious metal mining operations” (Aryee, Ntribery & Atorkui, 2003, p. 131).

In as much as the environmental impact of mining is devastating, the socio-economic determinants of the mining industry are not easily predictable thus difficult to deal with (Ahmad et al. 2003). According to Ahmad et al. (2003), the mining industry largely focuses on maximizing benefits rather than the socio-economic factors and related environmental factors. Generally, socio-economic factors such as environmental, health and safety are tough to handle even in the western countries (Amponsah-Tawiah & Dartey-Baah, 2011), but due to a wide array of foreign investors, the risks and hazards in the industry; Ghana cannot afford to slack in dealing with these factors.

In addition, mining companies employ heavy machinery, cyanide and explosives in their operations to acquire minerals. Most of the chemicals they use and their modus operandi are detrimental to human life and health and the safety of the environment. According to ILO (2005), the heavy machines used by these large mining companies have a destructive effect on the environment (Amponsah-Tawiah & Dartey-Baah, 2011). The activities of mining might not affect the entire country directly but they
affect the mining communities in devastating ways which invariably affect the economy and security of the country. Their activities generate dust and cause noise pollution. The negative health effects cannot be understated and these make the country spend more on providing health care for its citizens. “An attempt to quantify annual losses to the economy through environmental degradation by the Environmental Protection Council in 1988 put conservative estimates at 41.7 billion cedis, the equivalent of 4% of total GDP” (Amponsah-Tawiah&Dartey-Baah, 2011, p. 66).

Also, farming lands have been acquired for mining activities which has deprived mining communities of their source of livelihood (Amponsah-Tawiah&Dartey-Baah, 2011). The heavy metal contamination causes the soil to lose its nutrient for planting food. Not to mention the contamination of water bodies with cyanide by large surface mining operations and mercury contaminations by small-scale and illegal mining activities which are becoming common features of mining communities around the country (Amponsah-Tawiah&Dartey-Baah, 2011, p. 66).

The devastating effects of galamsey operation in Ghana cannot be understated and these include revenue losses to the state; since they do not pay taxes and the pollution of the environment and water bodies. In March 2017, the Ghana Water Company warned that the rate of pollution in our water bodies is approaching alarming levels, and that if the activities of these illegal miners are not curtailed, the country risks importing water for consumption by 2020 (Abdul-Gafaru, 2017).

According to Hilson& Potter (2003), illegal mining and illicit mineral marketing activity often go hand-in-hand (p.241). Annually, it was estimated that small-scale miners smuggle about 60,000 to 80,000 ounces of gold out of the country (Ghana Mineral Commission, n.d.). In 2016, it was estimated that USD2.3 billion worth of gold left the shores of Ghana through galamsey (myjoyonline.com, 2017, para 20). The smuggling of gold causes the country to lose revenue through taxes which could otherwise have been used for essential developmental projects.
Artisanal Mining and Internal Security in Ghana

The greatest threats to national security is more internal than external. The spate of illegal mining activities have exposed the vulnerability of the internal security system of Ghana. Environmental quality and benefits to the society/state is threatened by the mining activities in sensitive ecosystems of the country; putting lives and livelihoods at risk.

For instance, the Police along with maintenance of the law are tasked with handling internal security and other domestic disturbances. However, inadequate capacity to prevent, predict, prepare for, face and cope with disasters have created the impression that the Police Department are not up to the task of handling activities such as illegal mining (Brauch, et al., 2011). Most often than not, Police Departments are found to be ill-equipped and inadequately trained to handle issues or situations for which they were established (Tyagi, 2015). Thus the call for support from the Armed Forces in certain situations. Due to the indiscriminate nature and violence associated with illegal mining in Ghana, the Armed forces have been deployed in several communities to help enforce the laws of the land and to maintain the sovereignty and integrity of the state in the face of serious threats of national disintegration (Tyagi, 2015). Consequently, President of Ghana, Nana Addo Dunkwa Akuffo Addo embarked on a serious campaign to combat this menace of illegal mining by constituting a task force of about 400 law enforcement officers in an operation dubbed “Operation Vanguard”. A similar operation was initiated known as “Operation Halt” was commissioned by the former president to help manage the problem posed by illegal mining activities.

Confirming this, the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) Director of Public Relations, Colonel E. Aggrey-Quarshie (2017) explained the role of GAF in internal security operations. This was a counter response to allegations of the military involvement in galamsey operations. He stated that GAF in support of civil authorities deploy personnel across the country to perform numerous operational roles in order to safeguard the integrity and
security of the state and to preserve the environment. According to him, the “officers were deployed under “Operation Halt” to support the efforts of curbing illegal mining activities and to provide security at state sanctioned mining sites and concessions, to ward off illegal mines, robbery attacks and encroachment” (Graphiconline.com, 2017, para 5).

Involvement of illegal miners are caused by factors including but not limited to resource scarcity, lack of alternative livelihoods, cumbersome licensing acquisition processes, inadequate enforcement of existing legislations, political manipulations and socio-spatial segregation. The booming illegal mining activities makes evident the gaping loopholes in our internal security system. To mention a few, it has exposed,

a. the inability to prevent, resist and recover from the impact of illegal mining

b. the weak or lack of enforceable legislative framework and judiciary regulations to prevent, and/or mitigate the impacts of illegal mining

c. the inability of state institutions to monitor, prevent and /or regulate the illegal mining activities

d. the reactive nature of our security systems as opposed to pro-activeness

e. weaknesses in Traditional Authorities to contribute to solving the problem within their communities

f. the inadequate knowledge and or use of technical knowhow to address the menace holistically

g. the level of political involvement in the activity and how these politicians manipulate even the law enforcement institutions for their personal interest

h. poverty and individual greed and lack of appreciation of the issues of security (Brauch, et al., 2011).
Internal security is a collective responsibility because defence and security matters are assessed and managed multidimensionally. This statement was made by Air Commodore Victor K. K. Mamphey, former Director-General of the Ghana Civil Aviation Authority (Graphiconline.com, 2015, para 8). Air Commodore Victor Mamphey in his statement identified illegal mining as one of the flashpoints that should be taken seriously. He further indicated that to address the issue, it required the “collective efforts of the security agencies as well as inputs of the judiciary, environmental protection agencies, traditional institutions and civil society groups to assist in providing and sustaining peace and stability in the country” (graphiconline.com, 2015, para 13).

The current state of illegal mining is prone to criminal network exploitation and terrorism or financing of terrorism. Here are few of the possible threats affecting the image of the country. There are reports of Ghanaians fronting for foreign nationals to get small scale licences to operate which is reserved for Ghanaians. Foreign nationals could take advantage of the situation to make money to fund their illegal activities. These foreign nationals inadvertently recruit locals and arm them to protect the mines and themselves from external aggression thereby increasing crime rate in illegal mining areas. This could also be an avenue for the increase in proliferation of arms into the country. In DR Congo it is reported that mineral revenue is being used to fund local conflicts. This situation would not be farfetched if Ghanaians allow foreign nations to exploit our mineral deposits.

In addition, the number of gold scams is reportedly on the increase especially when gold price rise on the international market. Foreigners tend to like to purchase gold on the black market thereby causing an increase. The existence of a black market is due to the unequal difference in gold prices between the price Government pays to purchase gold from small-scale miners and the price of gold on the international market.

There also exists the threats to water and food security. Most of these mining areas were predominately farming communities however due to
the activities of small-scale and illegal mining most of the farm lands have been given away as mining concessions. In addition, several local farmers have also sold their farmlands to mostly illegal miners especially in rural mining areas.

The loopholes in our internal security that illegal mining exposes can be mitigated through a series of well-targeted interventions. Also, the development of an Artisanal Small-Scale (ASM) mining policy embedded into a broad rural development strategy, taking into account the poverty cycle that limits the development of the ASM can go a long way to address the menace of illegal mining (The African Mining Vision Action Plan, 2011, p. 19).

**DISCUSSION**

There is wide held opinion that illegal mining is a poverty driven activity. It is rather a “highly lucrative business that is propagated by a small group of gold buyers, mercury dealers and businessmen often supported by affluent and influential politicians and other players outside the actual mining areas” (Tschakert, 2008, p. 25) which can easily be exploited by criminal networks and terrorists. There have been reports of foreign nationals being involved in small-scale mining which is reserved for Ghanaians. Apparently, Ghanaians front for these foreign nationals to get concession to exploit gold. A news article on myjoyonline.com (2017) stated that an estimated 50,000 Chinese nationals have settled in the various rural mining regions creating predominately Chinese mining communities. According to the report, crime rate has increased in those regions, armed robbery is on the increase in illegal mining areas. These crimes are apparently committed with guns brought into the country by the foreign nationals and given to the locals to protect them during their illegal activities. These guns often end up in the wrong hands and are used for these crimes. (myjoyonline.com, 2017 para 15). In addition, it was reported that apart from the increase in weaponry, trafficking and the use of narcotics are also on the increase in those communities (myjoyonline.
Furtherance to this, a Senior Police Officer is reported to have stated that:

“proportion of the cocaine and methamphetamine trafficked through Ghana is directed towards miners. He explained that workers use these drugs in order to give them courage and help them survive long hours in dire conditions. Such drug use proliferates in informal and illegal gold mining camps in South America. As Ghana becomes a key narcotics trafficking transit state, patterns repeat themselves. As profits and goods from galamsey enter the supply chain informally, there is also a high risk that proceeds will be diverted towards other crimes” (myjoyonline.com, 2017 para 16-17)

Moreover their activities “involve rudimentary techniques of mineral extraction, highly manual processes, hazardous working conditions and frequent negative human and environmental health impacts” (Tschakert, 2008 p. 24). Generally, small-scale mining has the “potential to reduce poverty but it comes at a high risk of accidents, physical hazards and unguarded mining practices. These factors tend to keep miners in a vicious cycle of poverty and vulnerabilities which undercuts the sector’s image as a viable livelihood” (Tschakert, 2008, p. 24).

It is also unfortunate that due to the “devaluation, misrecognition, and criminalization” of their activities, illegal miners are left out from participating not only in “environmental and political decision-making but also in negotiating potential alternative livelihoods. In other words, miners often have no say in what is recommended for the sector and for substitute income-generating activities” (Tschakert, 2008, p. 25).

Migration is one of the determining factors for the increase in illegal miners. Due to unemployment and poverty, people are said to migrate to mining community in search for gold for the opportunity to better their lives. According to Hilson& Potter, 2003, in an effort to escape poverty, many migrate to mining communities because the industry “promises” immediate economic relief. The sector seem to be the safe haven for unemployed and illiterate youth who end up being exploited by owners of
small-scale mining companies (at the detriment of their health) with the prospect of extracting gold which yields immediate and substantial return on the market (Hilson & Potter, 2003).

News report on Revitalization News, tagged “Ghana Launches Effort to Restore Landscapes and Rivers Damaged by Illegal Mining in 2017”, the Abakoma Hene of the Heman traditional council, Nana Kwan Nsowah II Divisional Chief in the area stated that there was nothing they could do to stop the water from being polluted by the activities of the illegal miners due to high unemployment in the area. Adding that the galamsey operators earn a lot of revenue for their families. A daily minimum is about GHC400 (equivalent to USD100). This he said makes it difficult to stop their activities (Ghana Launches effort to restore Landscapes…2017). This stems from the fact that Chiefs and their sub chiefs are left out in the fight against illegal mining. There are wide held arguments that chiefs give out lands without recourse to the state institutions as earlier indicated. This is due to their control over land (because they are custodians of the land) and the rural population. There should therefore be punitive measures given to chiefs found to be associated in illegal mining activities (Abdul-Gafaru, 2017).

In addition, excuses for indulging in this activity such as poverty and unemployment should be discouraged. As we have found out, this assertion is far reaching because galamsey operators find themselves in a vicious cycle of poverty and vulnerabilities which undercuts the sector’s image as a viable livelihood (Tschakert, 2008, p. 24). Otherwise similar arguments and excuses could be made for prostitute, arm robbers and the likes.

Many countries that enjoy safe and secure water take it for granted (Tarallo, 2016). Ghana’s water and wastewater system is in urgent need of rescue as the Ghana Water Company had warned that by 2020 the country risk importing water (Abdul-Gafaru, 2017).

The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) reports of rapid diminishing of water sources and quality of water in mining areas and other areas downstream. It is evident downstream when one travels
along the River Ankobra, Birim, Densu, Ayensu and other major water sources in the country. Climate change also poses uncertain impacts which could be either droughts or flooding to magnify the impact of water quality deterioration. (Graphic.com.gh., 2017) Mining communities close to these polluted water bodies still depend on the polluted water due to lack of alternative water sources. Ghana Water Company shut down its treatment plant in some of these areas such as Kyebi due to the quantities of expensive chemicals they had to use in treating polluted water. (Ghana launches effort to restore landscapes…2017, para 9-10). Increasingly the cost of treating water for cities and peri-urban areas has risen as reported by GWCL’s Head of Communication Stanly Martey in his speech for the 2017 World Water Day. According to Mr. Martey, the Ghana Water Company uses about 75 bags of alum to treat 3.5mgd of water as compared to the previous years where 30 bags of alum were used for 6mgd of water (graphic.com.gh, March 3, 2017). He noted that the Sekondi-Takoradi metropolis was facing water shortage due to the current less production of potable water. Mr. Martey further indicated that the Daboase Water Treatment Plant which supplies potable water to the people of Sekondi-Takoradi and its environs had the capacity to supply six million gallons of water per day but it is now producing only 3.5mgd which is insufficient for the twin-city (graphic.com.gh, March 3. 2017, para 15).

According to Tarallo (2016), water security could also increase the risk of conflict and instability. Droughts can spin a spike in food prices, which can in turn cause civil unrest and increase migration (para 8). There is the possibility of low production of on-farm produce, farmers depend on these polluted water bodies to irrigate their farms which is currently muddied and full of metal and chemic residues with high permanence. There is also the mitigating health effect when polluted water is used to irrigate the farms.

The Government of Ghana in earlier part of 2017 embarked on reclaiming land which have been affected by the activities of illegal mining. The land is estimated at 1.5 percent of the country’s land surface. The total land surface of the country is approximately estimated at 238,000 square kilometers,
out of this; between 50,000 and 60,000 square kilometers representing 1.5 percent is reportedly degraded by the activities of illegal mining (Ghana Launches effort to restore landscapes…2017, para 4). This venture is greatly lauded since the extent of degradation is alarming. This initiative was geared towards closing illegal mine pits and drenches to treat the soil for reforestation and vegetation which would come at a cost to the state.

It is also well known that gold prices run counter-cyclical to the monetary policies of major economic and geopolitical events. Ghana needs to grow its Gold Reserve for currency stability and to act as a pillar to sustained macroeconomic growth. Therefore for Ghana’s longer term developmental needs, a substantial gold reserve is necessary to achieve currency stability (Arkaah, 2017, para 17). The industry is largely holding the economy but currently the Ghana Cedi is running low against the US Dollar. This decline can partly be attributed to the depletion of Ghana’s gold reserve according to some experts. It is estimated that about 50 million tons of gold from illegal mining are exported primarily to China and India (Arkaah, 2017, para 23). As earlier started illegal mining and illicit mineral marketing activity often go hand-in-hand (Hilson& Potter, 2003 p. 241).Annually, it was estimated that small-scale miners smuggle about 60,000 to 80,000 ounces of gold out of the country (Ghana Mineral Commission, n.d.). What is Ghana doing about it? The Government of Ghana has enacted laws and regulations to guard their activities but apparently most have decided to remain unregistered because the government has created a procedurally complex regulatory environment and has failed to provide adequate on-site support and extension services (Hilson & Potter, 2003).

The sector is also being exploited by political parties. During political campaigns flag bearers (from different parties) for the sake of votes create the impression that the illegal activity would be protected (Abdul-Gafaru, 2017). Conversely, galamsey operators who are aware of the politician’s desire for their votes also continue their illegal operations without any regard to the environment and the state during election periods (Abdul-Gafaru, 2017). It was reported that;
“around the 2016 elections galamsey miners set off to vandalise the offices of various political parties amidst chants of “no galamsey, no votes”. Illegal miners have recently repeated such threats asking President AkuffoAddo to halt his fight against their operations or risk being voted out of power in 2020 (Abdul-Gafaru, 2017, p.2).

This is a contributing factor to the menace. A research on ‘Small-scale mining in Ghana: The government and the galamsey’, the author concluded that “political leniency and law enforcement corruption has resulted in a booming small-scale gold system under poor government control” (Teschner, 2012, p. 308).

However, the President has not heeded to their chants but has rather intensified the call to fight against galamsey operators. As part of the fight against galamsey operators the President of Ghana gave them three-week ultimatum to halt all mining operations. During the period over 500 excavators and 1000 dredging machines were prevented from carrying out any mining activity (myjoyonline.com, 2017). Subsequently, “Operation Vanguard” which is a task force consisting of Military and Police personnel was commissioned by the President to ensure that those small scale miners without proper documentation do not return to their illegal operations.

In as much as these measures are underway to fight against illegal mining, the President has been prompted to look into allegations of affluent and influential “big boys” who are reportedly financing the business. Even the Okyehene Osagyefo AmoatiaOforiPanin in an interview with Graphiconline.com (2017) also alluded to the fact that there are “big boys” with political party affiliations who put their interests over the environment and the country as a whole. Thus to tackle the issue of illegal mining there should be a top-down approach as well.

Also the existing Small-Scale Mining law has become obsolete and no longer captures the reality of the sector’s activities (Teschner, 2012). Therefore it should undergo Reforms to capture the current trends in the sector. The state institution that was established to purchase gold from
small-scale miners also failed to do due-diligence on the companies that they purchase gold from. According to the Okyenhene, Osagyefo Amoatia Ofori Panin, the lack of due-diligence by PMMC in its operations has also contributed to the escalation of the menace.

However, it can be argued that since trading in gold is so lucrative, illegal mining operators could attract markets easily with their products and don’t necessarily need PMMC to sell their gold. Some believe this practice would continue even if PMMC was up to task. Hilson & Potter (2003) posited that this illegal mineral sales is due to excessive governmental control of the sector — principally through direct ownership of production and marketing facilities (p 241). They noted that:

In most cases, as part of national efforts to collect mineral output from artisanal and small-scale miners, authorities have implemented policies mandating that product is sold to commissioned state agencies at arbitrarily set prices typically well below the actual market rates. A black market begins to develop if the difference between the government and the world prices (Hilson & Potter, 2003, p. 241) which obviously leaves room for illegal exploitation by terrorists and other criminal networks.

In practice, the activities of small-scale mining and illegal mining actually intertwine. They are both a group of semi-formal sectors operating with varying degrees of legal registrations (Teschner, 2012, p. 308). In an interview with the Okyenhene, Osagyefo Amoatia Ofori Panin by Graphiconline.com, he confirmed the intertwined nature of small-scale mining and galamsey operators. He posited that “there is no way we can deal with galamsey if we allow small-scale mining to subsist. Small-scale mining must be banned alongside galamsey” (graphiconline.com, 2017, para 2). He continues by saying that Ghana cannot go ahead to “issue licences to small-scale miners when, as a country, we lack the regulatory mechanism to evaluate risks thoroughly and ensure that the methods and chemicals used are safe” (graphiconline.com, 2017, para 5).
The politicians and the ‘big boys’ who can assist the Police departments to enforce law and order in dire situations like fighting against illegal mining to protect the internal security of the state have been accused of being involved in galamsey at Banda Nkwanta in the general area of Bui Dam. Although GAF had cleared the air, the perception of corrupt military and police officers involved in these illegal mining operations cannot be easily forgotten. If the Armed Forces are involved, then the security of the state is in jeopardy. In as much as internal security is for the law enforcement agencies, it is a collective responsibility. In this current strategic environment, security has become a collective responsibility and must therefore, be considered in a national, regional and continental perspective (Graphiconline.com, 2015, para5). Let us not forget the Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Xenophobic attacks in South Africa which brought about migrations and unnecessary deaths.

There is also the issue of privatization of the sector and whether or not this could be a determining factor for the increase in galamsey operations. People, especially those who live in mining communities, generally do not feel they benefit directly from the minerals being exploited by foreign companies. The mining communities are largely impoverished, lack good source of drinking water, have high unemployment and illiteracy rates. Communities therefore feel left out of the benefit of exploiting for gold. The Government of Ghana has encouraged local content and local procurement procedures for mining companies to ensure that Ghanaians have a share of the benefits of mining. The local procurement list is to make sure that goods and services available in the country are procured here to promote the growth of the economy particularly in the manufacturing sector by reducing imports and creating employment for Ghanaians (Local Procurement List 2015).

Ghana has also set very high mandatory employment targets: “all unskilled labour must be Ghanaians and at least 90% of senior management (increased to 94% after three years)” (Trade and Agriculture Directorate –Trade Committee, 2016). According to the Trade and Agriculture
Directorate –Trade Committee (2016), “Ghana has instituted strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms with severe penalties for non-compliance with employment targets and even for non-compliance with reporting requirements” (pp. 7-8).

Mining equipment used in these illegal mining activities enter the country to the rural areas without proper due diligence. It was published by Pulse.com.gh on 28th June, 2017 that over 2000 Chang Fan mining equipment had been seized and destroyed by the taskforce set by the President, Nana Akuffo Addo to fight against (Pulse.com.gh, June, 2017). How such huge number of equipment enters the country is left to the institutions that are supposed to monitor such to answer. This leaves us with the question of whether Ghana can eradicate the activities of illegal mining or if it is farfetched as Ahmad et al., (2003) put it; the socio-economic factors such as environmental, health and safety are difficult to handle. But is ensuring that due diligence is done also too difficult to handle?

CONCLUSION

There are quite a lot of articles on illegal mining in Ghana and the topic has been greatly discussed. Security is every country’s top priority and Ghanaians should not play with it. Until the security of a state is threatened, citizens do not value the peace they enjoy. Let ask the war prone countries and refugees whether conflict is a sight to behold.

The way forward is to call for the spirit of patriotism and sense of responsibility towards our country. The country is not for a selected few. I believe tackling the issue requires us to look at the intrinsic factors more than the extrinsic ones. Intrinsic factors being the behavioral and attitudinal change of citizens. The Government is doing its best, the media is propagating the issues far enough, not to talk of the judiciary who have set aside judges to handle issues of illegal mining.
Now is the turn of the individual/citizen; right from the President, the alleged influential people and the supposed “big boys” to be communal seeking and not self-seeking. We need to change our attitude and general outlook to issues that affect the nation and work together to sustain the peace and stability of this our beloved country. We have failed one another, the rich continues to rob the state and the poor continues to be willing and vulnerable stooges to their exploitation of the economy. We should remember someone or people stood for the independence of this country which we enjoy today, why destroy the sacrifices of our forefathers. The institutions must work again, be freed from political exploitation and control, allow the laws to take it full rigor without fear or favor. No nepotism and favoritism. To maintain the security of this nation is our collective responsibility.

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ILLEGAL ARTISANAL MINING, CONFLICT AND INSECURITY IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

By Henry Kam Kah

Abstract

This paper examines illegal activities in the artisanal mining of diamond and gold in the Central African Republic (CAR) including the exportation. Artisanal mining predates the independence of the CAR in August 1960. It continued after independence and illegal activities associated with it have created conflict and insecurity in many areas in the CAR. The paper therefore discusses the consequences of these activities which include the exacerbation of communal and political conflicts, insecurity of persons, property and resources of the country. Suggestions have been made for improvement and for effective policy implementation. If the measures suggested are taken seriously, this may curb the perennial illegal exploitation of precious natural resources by terrorist and criminal networks within and without the CAR for egotistical interests. The methodology used in this study has been to interrogate reports of international NGOs, UN Panel of Experts, pronouncements of governmental officials and rival armed groups like the anti-Balaka and Séléka and also research findings of researchers on mining and development in the CAR.

Keywords: Artisanal, illegal mining, insecurity, conflict, instability, CAR

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Introduction

Artisanal and small scale mining is a worldwide phenomenon that has lasted for over 2000 years. The activity is intense and engaging in rural economies of many developing countries including those of sub-Saharan Africa. Artisanal mining has always been a labour-intensive activity without or with very little mechanisation in many developing economies especially in Africa. The activity which is often in the informal or illegal market sector involves individuals, groups, families or cooperatives with minimal or no mechanisation (Wenget al 2014: 1; Chupeziet al 2009: 10; A Comprehensive Approach to Reducing Fraud 2010: 1). In sub-Saharan Africa alone, not less than two million people have direct employment in the artisanal and small scale mining. There is an additional ten million more people who depend on the sector for their survival. (Ibid) Many of these people extract gold but there are also significant numbers of people extracting deposits of alluvial gemstones and diamonds in several African countries south of the Sahara.

There are huge numbers of people directly and or indirectly involved in this sector which has contributed to boost the rural economies. It has also provided millions of jobs and supplemented the incomes of poor subsistence farmers. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for instance, artisanal mining supplements other economic activities of many families. It alleviates or reduces rural poverty thereby contributing to improved standards of living. Through it, many rural families pursue higher-quality education for their children. It has also improved access to post-secondary studies for adults. Meanwhile, in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the income from artisanal mining enables rural inhabitants to purchase fertiliser (Wenget al 2014: 2) to boost agricultural production. In Cameroon, the Mining Code is silent on the mandatory participation of the local population in the processes leading to the acquisition of artisanal mining spaces. Besides, the separation between the local population and their mineral resources has wrongfully made customary acquisition of mining spaces illegal in the country (Chekoua, et alN.d.: 9-10).
The CAR is endowed with enormous natural resources such as diamond, gold and timber. In 2010, the country was the world’s fourth largest artisanal diamond mining producer with rich alluvial diamond deposits predominantly in the South West which is west of the capital, Bangui. Other deposits with active artisanal mining are located in the east and centre of the CAR (A Comprehensive Approach to Reducing Fraud 2010: 1; Chirico and Malpeli 2014). Considering the importance of mining to the economy of the country, the government estimates that at least 20% of the population in the West, that is, about 60,000 people earn an income from diamond mining alone. As a result of the importance of diamond mining which sustains many lives, it is not unusual to see children skip school to accompany their parents and help them sift gravel to search the gems.\(^{(1)}\)

The challenges of the mining sector in this and other mining countries is that armed groups, criminal gangs, corrupt elites and unscrupulous companies have fed fat from the mineral trade. As a consequence, they have removed or confiscated vast wealth from developing economies for many years. This has been through a range of illegal and/or unethical practices. Through these fraudulent and unethical activities local communities have not been able to reap any significant benefits from mineral extraction. Rather, they bear the brunt of human rights abuse, pollution, conflict and exploitation (Chains of Abuse 2015: 5) on a regular basis. Artisanal mining in the country began before its independence in 1960.

**Artisanal Mining**

The vast majority of diamond mining in the CAR like in Cameroon is done by artisanal miners. Many of them sell the diamond stones to West African middlemen (Chains of Abuse 2015: 31; Cameroon Country Mining Guide 2014: 2; Central African Republic Fast Facts, 2012; Central African

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Republic Crisis 2014: 8; Johansen 2013). Historically speaking, artisanal diamond mining as a dominant activity began in 1961 when a new mining law was enacted legalising it. This has since expanded significantly. The alluvial deposits are found in the vicinity of the Mamber and Lobaye Rivers in the South West of the CAR and this extends into the northern part of the Republic of the Congo and Eastern Cameroon and also along the Kotto River in Eastern CAR which extends into the DRC (A Comprehensive Approach to Reducing Fraud 2010: 17; Bermúdez-Lugo 2015: 8.2). This has enabled the governing authorities of the country to try to formalise this artisanal mining sector through the registration of those involved in mining. This has not been without challenges for the government. The sector remains mostly informal and uncontrolled and also vulnerable to abuse by self-seeking individuals.

The importance of artisanal mining cannot be overemphasised and explains the commitment of the government to formalise and regulate it. The International Crisis Group, a Belgian based Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) estimated in 2010 that there was between 80,000 and 100,000 artisanal miners in the CAR. There was another 320,000 workers employed by the artisanal miners as “diggers” indicating a diamond mining employment of about 400,000 workers. This number supported at least 600,000 family members in the country. Eight years after, this number must have increased considering the involvement of several armed groups in its exploitation to serve parochial interests while destabilising the country. It was also observed that only about 5% of artisanal miners were formally registered (Chains of Abuse 2015: 31; A Comprehensive Approach to Reducing Fraud 2010: 1) which was a great disservice to the economy of the CAR. The government could not raise enough income from the mining sector to provide basic facilities for the citizens especially outside Bangui, the capital of the CAR.

The artisanal miners of the CAR hire mine workers, provide them with tools, equipment and other supplies to facilitate digging as well as washing of the gravel. The miners who register with the relevant
government services are issued production books to record their production for effective control. In spite of this, recording in the production books is not well enforced by those charged with the responsibility. In fact, these books are designed in such a way that pages are removed or changed without easy detection by governing officials who should oversee that recording is done in the books. Most artisanal miners operating in this Central African country work very hard but cannot satisfy their basic needs. Many have thus been tempted to accept offers to purchase diamonds being recorded in their production book so that they can acquire some finance to satisfy their most pressing needs. Others suffer from health and safety risks in their communities. This has been associated with poor water quality, unsanitary living conditions and the absence of law and order (A Comprehensive Approach to Reducing Fraud 2010: 9, 36 and 45).

There are other challenges to surmount in the artisanal mining sector in the CAR. The International Crisis Group report of 2010 painted a pathetic picture of the work and life of artisanal miners in these words:

*The hard physical labour causes hernias and exhaustion, and injuries are common. Miners die under collapsed pit walls, and divers sometimes do not surface. Many miners and their families leave their villages to live in makeshift camps near the mines, where they are even more vulnerable to malaria and often contract parasites by drinking from streams dirtied by their own excrement … Education suffers, because parents encourage their children as young as 11 to dig or sieve instead of going to school* (Chains of Abuse 2015: 31-32).

From the picture painted above of the precarious situation of miners and their families, it is clear that miners go through traumatising experiences including diseases, poor hygiene and death. It is a risky venture. Even children sacrifice their education as they accompany their parents to dig
or sieve for diamond. This is dangerous for a young country struggling to build viable institutions which may eventually not have the man-power to work in them.

The extremely difficult conditions associated with artisanal mining have resulted in the exploitation of miners by different parties that sponsor artisanal mining. The findings of a research carried out by International Peace Information Service (IPIS) in 2013 concluded in part that:

Miners often experience high levels of control by ‘their collectors,’ who only offers uncompetitive prices for their production. If a miner is discovered to have sold to another collector, harassments are quite common (Chains of Abuse 2015: 32).

These miners lived in constant fear and uncertainty because of the harassment from different collectors. They were not also paid their worth in the diamond they collected under very difficult conditions.

Many artisanal miners receive relatively little for the diamonds they mine in the CAR. This is due to their lack of knowledge of their worth. There are also few options for selling the diamond. The very low reward for the effort of artisanal miners and the flow of capital out of the towns through traders has hindered development in the mining communities of the CAR (Chains of Abuse 2015: 32). Another problem with artisanal mining not only in the CAR but also in other mineral rich countries like Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Zambia is child labour. It is estimated that nearly 700,000 children are involved in the mining operations (Illicit Trade in Natural Resources 2016: 11). Many people have also taken to artisanal mining because of the impact of structural adjustment which is making live unbearable for them. Structural adjustment has also led to significant unemployment in several sectors. The advent of industrial mining investments has not reversed the trend. With few available jobs, unskilled people have taken to illegal artisanal mining to supplement their incomes (Wenget al 2014: 2).
Other problems associated with artisanal mining include the influx of migrants into the mining towns. Their arrival increase further the existing pressure on food supply and poor water and sanitation facilities, worsening existing health problems of these mining towns (Matthysen and Clarkson 2013: 30). These problems have long term consequences on the environment and population of the mining and other neighbouring towns in the CAR. Besides, artisanal mining generates tension between artisanal miners and government officials. Non-registered miners do not want to be captured by mining brigade units set up by government. They are also distrustful of government agents and suspect them of rent-seeking incentives and continuous harassment. All these have made it difficult for artisanal miners to carry out mining of diamond and gold successfully (Matthysen and Clarkson 2013: 21). Matters are further compounded for the government because agencies lack the means and capacity to effectively control the artisanal mining sector (Matthysen and Clarkson 2013: 27) and reap benefits from it to sustain the economy and provide basic social amenities to the population. Illegal mining of gold and diamond in the CAR has resulted in conflict and insecurity in many parts of the country.

**Illegal Mining, Conflict and Insecurity**

Diamond is illegally mined in the CAR like in Sierra Leone (Dietrich N.d.: 7; Bromberg et al N.d: 5-7). A lot of the conflict diamonds and gold from the country also illegally enter the global market through Cameroon after it has received valid Kimberley Process certificates issued by relevant Cameroonian authorities. This has therefore made it possible for conflict diamonds to be “legally” exported as if the goods were from Cameroon. The fraudulent transfer of conflict diamond from the CAR into Cameroon has been made possible by refugees that fled from the country to Cameroon. In some cases, Cameroonian smugglers have crossed the border into the CAR on smaller routes in the bush to buy minerals directly from the mines and get them certified in Cameroon.
It is important to note that illegal mining and smuggling of diamond and gold was always part of life in the CAR but it took on another turn when the Séléka was created to topple the government of General François Bozizé (Matthysen and Clarkson 2013: 19; Tomolya 2014: 463; Bromberg et al N.d.: 13). Different Séléka factions obtained funds from the diamond industry through a variety of methods. In the eastern part of the country they took systematic control over diamond areas, imposed “taxes” and mining “fees” and also protected payments. In the western part of the country, the Séléka fighters were mainly involved in extortion, demanded “protection” payments from miners and collectors and also from companies involved in the transportation of diamond (Chains of Abuse 2015: 22).(1) The illegal diamond trading and smuggling networks in the North East of the CAR presented rebel groups and enemies of the state with an opportunity to make a profit to finance their activities and perpetuate hostilities (Bermúdez-Lugo 2015: 8.2).

The exacerbation of conflict and insecurity in the CAR is promoted among others by two main dealers who buy illegal diamond. These are Abdoulkarim Dan-Azoumi representing the buying house of BADICA and Raffi Arslanian representing SODIAM. The UN experts investigating illegal mining in the CAR arrived at this conclusion. The investigation also implicated Mahamat Oumarou, Abdoulkarim’s brother in the illicit trade of diamonds from the CAR through his own diamond company SudAzur. It was established that these three persons headed illegal networks working in collaboration with armed groups and which purchased, traded and exported conflict diamonds.

Several other buying houses notably the ADR, IAS International, and Sino Sango were also involved in the diamond trade of the CAR. They

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did so with little transparency in their supply chains. The inefficient and corrupt custom services at the Bangui M’Poko International Airport have promoted illicit trade in these precious minerals. Abdoulkarim uses his aerial transport company Minair to export thousands-worth carats illegally annually (Bromberg et alN.d.: 15). This carefully organised illicit network of diamond exportation by these financial barons and influential personalities has served but their own vested interests and not that of millions of citizens of the CAR. Many of them are dying from the scourge of war waged by rival armed groups who have used proceeds from diamond and gold to buy weapons and to enrich themselves.

In addition, the problem with illegal mining and cross border flow of conflict diamonds is that it has fuelled violence especially in areas of the CAR outside the control of government (Obale 2016: 3-4). This was for a long time limited to Bangui and its outlying area or immediate vicinity. The Séléka rebels for several years controlled some diamond-producing areas in the north of the CAR and this gave them enough financial resources to purchase better weaponry and continue to incite conflict and insecurity in the country. Both the Séléka and anti-Balakainsurgent groups have made profit from internal diamond trade in the CAR after a ban on its exportation in 2013 by the Kimberley Process. In some cases they took over mine sites and controlled them through a demand for “taxes” or demanded “protection” money from the miners and traders in these diamonds. Towns that were notorious for this practice included Carnot, Berberati, Bria, and Boda.

The Sélékaarmed group was involved in the sale of parallel mining authorisations, traded and smuggled diamonds as well as pre-financed mining activities especially in the East of the CAR. For the anti-Balakaarmed group, members earned money by racketeering artisanal miners or collectors and also positioned themselves as “protectors” of economic operators in the mining towns under their control. Some of
their local commanders operated as collectors. This helped to secure the weapons they needed to fight against the Séléka and seize the mines they were controlling. Some of the Séléka rebels had also asserted control over customs revenues and mining concessions which gave them money with which to procure more arms to destabilise local communities under their control (Weyns et al 2014: 56; Bermúdez-Lugo 2015: 8.1; Central African Republic 2013: 3; Arieff 2014: 6).

The Séléka and anti-Balakarival armed groups were involved in smuggling diamonds out of the CAR. This was facilitated by the fact that they obtained money from the illegal sale of diamond. They dug for and traded in minerals. They also perpetuated vicious attacks against artisanal miners and traders and collected whatever they could to continue to cause mayhem in parts of the CAR that were under their control (Chains of Abuse 2015: 6 and 21). There is a glaring example of how conflict and insecurity were generated due to illegal mining perpetuated by rebel groups in the CAR in September 2011. It was the year that the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP) became embroiled in serious conflict with the Union des Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR) in Bria over control of the diamond mines of the area.

Again, in June 2012, between 70 and 100 armed men alleged to be rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony of Uganda or Baba Ladé fighters attacked the AREWA Bakouma mining project (Tomolya 2014: 463-464). This was probably to collect precious gems or seize the mines and carry out illegal exploitation. From this they would raise money and invest it in the destabilisation of the CAR in particular and the neighbouring countries of Chad, DRC, Sudan and Cameroon. Many of these armed groups thrived on what one might describe as the entrepreneurship of war.

Besides, the rise of the Séléka and the overthrow of General François Bozizé as well as the control of key areas of the economy like diamond trade in the CAR by these Séléka rebels made Christians to spend sleepless nights. They feared that Muslim leadership at the helm of state would bring
about untold suffering for non-Muslim communities. In a counter offensive and sweep to power, anti-Balaka groups exacted revenge on Séléka fighters, the Muslim population broadly speaking and more importantly, reclaimed diamond which the Séléka had taken control of. The ferocity of the anti-Balaka counter offensive created panic in the mining areas. The scenario at the mines during the anti-Balaka offensive was aptly captured by an eye witness Mahamat Adamou. He was a middleman between miners and a Bangui buying house. In his own words he captured the scenario thus:

When the attack began, they picked up all my mine workings: all the tools, pumps, diamonds. Christians have taken it all up and they have taken over diamond mining on my sites (Koura and Eckel 2017).

The tools picked up by the anti-Balaka fighters in the mine of Mahamat Adamou would have been used to exact punishment on enemies of the anti-Balaka, the Séléka groups and Muslims in general. The diamonds seized from Mahamat Adamou and other Muslim operators in the area were certainly sold through illegal networks within and outside the country to raise finances to support the fight against the Séléka from keeping power in the CAR. The anti-Balaka in Bodatown, which constituted of young boys and older men kept watch over artisanal diamond mines, gold digging and other resource extraction in the region. They controlled these gold and diamond mines to make the best of them, maximise profit and continuously foment conflict with the Séléka who were intent on instituting a Muslim leadership in the CAR. It was also a show of force and reaction to the Séléka militias who had in 2008 accused President Bozizé of creating a monopoly over the domestic market for his relatives and members of his ethnic group (Koura and Eckel 2017).

Furthermore, the exacerbation of conflict leading to the Séléka takeover of government in May 2013 after the overthrow of François Bozizé led to a ban of diamonds from the CAR worldwide by the Kimberley Process regulators. It was intended to keep the gems from fuelling further violence in the country but this was not to be. Apart from the fact that some
people involved in cutting, polishing and appraising diamond like Camille Guimale saw their work shrink, conflict continued with even greater intensity. Although the official trade in the country shrunk considerably in the early years, local and international experts concluded that smuggling and illegal exports were flourishing and helped armed groups which included the Séléka and anti-Bakala to stockpile arsenals and assets and continue to cause havoc in many parts of the CAR. Prove of the intensity of the illegal exports was so glaring that by November of that year the UN estimated that over 140,000 carats of diamonds worth $24 million were exported in spite of the ban by the Kimberley Process regulators. Of this 6634 carats from the CAR were seized in Antwerp in the Belgian offices of BADICA, the CAR diamond marketing company.

The seriousness of the illegal export of diamond was re-iterated by CAR’s former Minister of Mines Olivier Mailbangar. According to him over 80% of the country’s diamonds were exported fraudulently (Koura and Eckel 2017). Such a statement from a former Minister of Mines shows the gravity of the problem. The banning of the certification of diamond from the CAR was also counterproductive because it did not only increase its unofficial export but also made the government to find difficulties in paying its workers. The multiplier effect was dissension among civil servants. The helplessness of government in the face of illegal diamond exportation was recognised by Joseph Agbo, head of the Ministry of Mines and Geology who said that although the diamond industry accounted for 51% of CAR’s export earnings, the government was no longer in control of this industry (Koura and Eckel 2017). This statement meant that there was now open competition for the industry among rival groups keen on using its proceeds to unleash mayhem in the country. This is not healthy for the peace that the CAR badly needs today.

More and more militia leaders built up their revenue streams through diamond smuggling and gold exports. This enabled them to resist the central government and this made the CAR virtually ungovernable. It is now harder to find a lasting solution to the political crisis in the country. The government representative to the Kimberley Process negotiations
Maxime Kazagui told the Voice of America (VOA) that “in truth, diamonds have made us more unhappy than happy” (Koura and Eckel 2017). This statement coming from a government official speaks volumes about diamond mining and commercialisation as a bane than a boon for the government and the people of the CAR. It has resulted in many illegal mining and trading. It has also caused armed groups to fight one another over control and use of revenue obtained from it to further inflict pain on an already impoverished and miserable population.

A majority of the non-registered miners have compounded conflict in some mining areas in the CAR. Since these non-registered miners became wary of avoiding being captured by mining brigade units there was often tension between these artisanal miners and government officials. The artisanal miners distrust government agents and suspect them of rent-seeking incentives. They consider government agents as those who harass or perpetuate their harassment (Tomolya 2014: 464; A Comparative Approach to Reducing Fraud 2010: 9; Chupeziet al 2009: 17). Many of them were and still are at daggers-drawn with these government officials. Some government officials harass them not to swell the coffers of the state but their own pockets at the expense of sweating artisanal miners and government.

Besides, the conflict in the CAR was also exacerbated by the purchases of diamonds by trading companies like SADIAM and BADICA. They continuously purchased diamonds from areas controlled by the Séléka and anti-Balaka including those where these groups were known or were indirectly involved in diamond mining. Several groups like the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) and International Crisis Group argued that these companies likely used their stockpiles of diamonds to fund armed groups and benefit in the process. These were considered more or less ‘conflict diamonds’ according to the terms of the Kimberley Process (Chains of Abuse 2015: 35).

The greater consequence of armed groups take-over and control of mining sites was that the government of the CAR could not certify to the
“conflict-free” nature of its exported diamonds. In the North East of the country two main factions of the Séléka rebels vied for the diamond mines. There was the Union des Démocratique pour le Rassemblement (UFDR), a constellation of fighters from the Gula ethnic group. They took firm control of Bria. On the other hand, there was the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP) which grouped Runga fighters. They seized and controlled the mines in Ndele. The diamond mines in Bria and Sam Ouandja particularly provided revenue for rebels who extracted protection money and sold diamonds to dealers in Sudan and Chad. The situation was very pathetic in Boda because Muslim middlemen controlled the diamond trade and reaped its profits while most of the poorly paid mine labourers were Christians. This fuelled sectarian resentment and instability in this part of the country (Flynn 2017).

It is no secret that armed groups financed one of the bloodiest conflicts through illegal sale of local gems and engagement in illicit trafficking of diamonds in the country. This was able to finance a more than two years of inter-religious and political conflict with a lot of casualties recorded (Jamasmie 2017). Due to the inability of government to guarantee security for the diamond that was sold into the world market, the country was suspended from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) in 2013. This suspension affected the livelihoods of a significant number of people in the country. It led to intensified illicit trading which further sustained the blossoming armed groups in the country (Central African Republic 2017-21: 8). It created a very difficult situation for the CAR which had thought that the suspension of diamond exports would frustrate the activities of armed groups and bring a semblance of peace for the CAR. The suspension rather created an opportunity for shady deals that went a long way to polarise and render the CAR conflict prone and insecure.

Conflict between rival groups resulted in ineffectual government control of fraud at local mining sites. This was identified as a key contribution to the robustness of the informal market. In fact, diamond smuggling succeeded in expanding the current conflict in the CAR. It led to insecurity that further
reduced the barriers to smuggling. Armed groups then turned to these resources to finance their operations in the country. The Séléka succeeded in smuggling diamond into neighbouring Chad, Sudan, Cameroon and the DRC before exporting these around the world. The revenues from diamond sale were used to purchase weapons, pay and equip soldiers and mercenaries (Central African Republic Crisis 2014: 6) to destabilise the country and continue to reap benefits from a chaotic scenario.

A new trajectory of insecurity fuelled by illegal mining and commercialisation of diamond and gold in the CAR is the use of the social media by smugglers. They do this to continuously engage in nefarious activities and sell precious minerals in international markets through neighbouring countries. The tools of the digital economy including facebook and whatsapp, twitter among others have been used by the CAR’s traders to find international partners and evade the already limited scrutiny of international diamond markets. Through this they have secured deals amidst continued violence and displacement in this diamond-rich country. As prove that this activity has fuelled conflict in the CAR, Aliaume Leroy, a conflict resources campaigner of an international watchdog organisation Global Witness, argues that “in a poor and fragile country where diamond wealth should be flowing to the civilian population, too much profit is instead finding its way into the hands of those who are helping drive the conflict.” Sellers and middlemen work by tagging prospective buyers in facebook posts before using private messaging services to build relationships and negotiate deals only to further fuel conflict in a country in need of peace and not continuous conflict (Solomons 2017). The use of internet communication technologies has further created difficulties in attempts to monitor the illicit sale of diamonds and gold from the CAR.

Diamond buying institutions like the Bureau d’Achat de Diamante enCentrafricque (BADICA) hasplayed a crucial role in illegal diamond exports and the negative consequences of this on the CAR. The BADICA
funded the Séléka armed group through its purchase of diamonds from the group. The Séléka fighters secured mines which facilitated the smuggling of diamond out of the country to the sister company of BADICA namely KARDIAM. Both the BADICA and KARDIAM provided support for armed groups namely former Séléka and anti-Balaka through the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources, including diamonds and gold (Tijerina 2016).

The backstage role of these companies was detrimental to peace and concord in the CAR. It was for this reason that BADICA was placed on the United Nations Security Councilsanctions list in August 2015. The company was accused of playing a destabilising role in the diamond trade in the CAR. This was contrary to the rules of the Kimberley Process. According to the rules of the Kimberley Process, it is stated that diamond should not be used to fuel conflicts, government control must take place, armed groups should not be found in mining areas and there must be freedom of movement. Based on the negative role of BADICA, a Panel of Experts of the UN investigating into the mining sector opined that freedom of movement was still limited and militia had a stake in diamond production in the country (Tijerina 2016). This was possible because of the assistance BADICA gave to rebel groups rather than proscribing illegality.

There are other associated conflict and security challenges which are an outcome of a poorly organised artisanal mining sector. The artisanal miners themselves talk about the deterioration in the security situation of the country because of this. Such has affected people and businesses in different parts of the country. This chaos in the security situation has resulted in illegal taxation, invasion of mines, violence, bold diamonds, pit collapses and dead miners as well as the proliferation of weapons and circulation of illegal gold. The revenue which is circulating due to illegal exports of gold, diamonds and other natural resources is at the centre of conflict which has engulfed the CAR in the past four years. Over 3000 people are said to have been sent to their early graves according to the
recent estimates of the UN. Over 2.5 million people are desperately in need of humanitarian assistance. Still, another 1 million fled the country to neighbouring countries or camps. The illegal mining, smuggling and export of diamond and gold in the CAR can be brought under control through practical and realistic legislative measures.

Measures to Curb Illegal Exploitation and Sale

Since illegal artisanal mining and trading of conflict diamonds and gold has led to conflict, insecurity and instability in the CAR, there is need for effective legislative measures to end this cycle of poverty and violence in the country. This could be done through a legislative bill that is artisanal mining friendly. A mere imposition of onerous administrative and financial requirements as is the case now will not yield any positive results because artisanal miners will continue to operate these mines and sell their gems underground. The production books and brigade units have not brought order in the artisanal mining sector. A comprehensive bill on the organisation of the artisanal mining sector passed in parliament will inspire hope among helpless artisanal miners and make them to collaborate with government agencies for their own good and in the process, government will raise more money needed to rebuild the battered economy of the CAR after several decades of continuous conflict.

The authorities can also seek international cooperation and assistance to attain this goal if it sees the need (Chains of Abuse 2015: 9). Continuous collaboration with the Kimberley Process regulators will go a long way to starve offarmed groups from continuous smuggling of diamond and gold into the market. In this way, these armed militias would be unable to buy more weapons and fight for power or control of more mining areas. Besides, the government of the CAR must also seek the cooperation of neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad, DRC and Sudan to track down smugglers

of gold and diamond which is taken out of the country and certified in these countries for sale in the world market. This can be done through a bill in parliament where legislators will care about the welfare of their constituents rather than their parochial ethnic and other interests which do not serve the security of the country. At present, the country is losing a lot of money because of the smuggling of its mineral resources through the borders into these neighbouring countries. Smugglers also come into the country from Cameroon for example and cart away gems. An effective policy towards collaboration with these countries will prevent this from happening and the artisanal miners are likely to realise their dreams of making a fortune out of mining gold or diamond.

Other legislative measures can be put in place to ensure an equitable distribution of revenue obtained from artisanal mining in the CAR and to develop the mining areas. This can be done through laws that will prohibit the elite capture of resources which has resulted in grievances and frustration (Central African Republic 2017-21: 37). The elite control the state apparatus and have used public resources to enrich themselves. Among these are illegal operations in the mining industry. They have bought illegal diamonds and gold from illegal artisanal miners to sell and make a profit for themselves to the exclusion of others. Other elite clandestinely sponsored armed groups like the Séléka and anti-Balaka to seize and control the mines. This made it possible for them to continue to pull the strings from behind the scenes. If the legislature of the CAR enact laws which promote the equitable redistribution of revenue that accrue from diamond and gold mining and spread out development initiatives to all parts of the country including the underdeveloped North East, there is a likelihood that illegal artisanal mining will be curbed to its barest minimum and conflict averted in this war-torn country in the Central African sub-region.

There is also need to improve formalisation, productivity and working conditions in artisanal mining activities in the CAR. The overall governance in the mining sector should also be improved upon to inspire trust and hope in those who participate in artisanal mining in the CAR (Central African
Republic 2017-21: 73). This is very possible through well thought laws debated and adopted in parliament and passed into law by the President of the country. Poor governance has not only affected the mining and other socio-economic and political sectors in the CAR but many other African countries leading to intractable conflicts with consequences on the population and the environment. Good governance practices involving transparency must therefore be taken seriously if the mining sector in the CAR will become a boon than a bane for the country and the population. Many people including men, women and children work in the mines day and night to extract precious gems but have continued to wallow in poverty while the ‘big guys’ who will political power swim in opulence. It is high time that there is formalisation and improvements in the working conditions of these mine workers to enable them put food on the table, educate their children to higher levels and realise many of their dreams which have remained dreams in a precarious and difficult mining environment like the CAR.

In addition, there was also need to prevent the illegal smuggling of high value natural resources. Illegal smuggling has broadened the sources of financing for illegally armed groups in the CAR. These arms have been used on the civilian population, killing and maiming some while also destroying fields and other landed property of the people. If the government, with assistance from friendly countries strengthens the security sector to stamp out or reduce smuggling, the armed groups will not make a lot of money through this nefarious activity and their fire-power will be weakened. This can be done through proper training and recruitment based not on ethnic group like André Kolingba did with his ethnic group while in power. Training should be accompanied with the logistics needed to succeed.

The government also need to manage, review or issue concessions in the aftermath of the current crisis in the country which began with the Séléka insurrection of December 2012 against the government of General François Bozizé. The failure to scrupulously manage and review mining concessions or the absence of these has contributed to the cacophony in the mining sector in the CAR. A review of existing concessions and
additional requirements for new concessions will exclude unscrupulous mining groups for the good of the mining sector. The concessions must carry elements of improvement in working conditions, in wages for miners and in environmental protection. Several concessions which were granted earlier need to be reviewed and assigned to the right and not wrong people. The concessions should also take into consideration a community development component so that the communities which are blessed with these resources can also reap some benefits from their exploitation.

Moreso, since the CAR is largely artisanal, support will be needed to give the miners incentives to sell their products in the formal markets, to establish property rights and resolve disputes over ownership and reduce the environmental, health, labour and social risks associated with mining (Central African Crisis 2014: 8, 14 and 17; Obale 2016: 27). The government of the CAR can also prevent illegal smuggling of diamond and gold through stringent legislative measures which empower the forces of law and order to prosecute smugglers of these precious products to fuel conflict as is the case today between the Séléka and anti-Balaka. Both armed militia groups are engaged in illegal diamond and gold export to fuel conflict and benefit from it. As long as artisanal miners feel that there is no incentive to enable them sell their diamond and gold through formal markets, it will be difficult for them to do so. They will continue to sell their gems through illegal networks and get the money they need to provide for their basic needs.

Considering that commanders of the anti-Balaka and Séléka militant groups have continuously profiteered from the conflict in the CAR and directed illegal exploitation of the mines and sale of gold and diamond, there is need for the government to seek for an economic alternative which may redirect the energy of these commanders and their followers (Flynn 2017). Many of their fighters are enlisted to fight because of unemployment and poverty and not necessarily because they believe in the cause. Sustained legislative measures through infrastructural and agro-industrial production may well play a big role in preventing armed groups from being involved in illegal mining, sale, and purchase of arms and fighting.
Furthermore, the legislature of the CAR can with full knowledge of what obtains on the ground end the exploitation of the riches of the country including diamond and gold by proscribing the activities of particularly armed groups so that they will not continue to export them and use the money to purchase weapons, pay and equip soldiers and mercenaries to continue to wreak havoc in the country at the expense of lives (Chains of Abuse 2015: 6). This can only be done if there is a proper study of the problem and then security measures taken to protect these mining sites from falling into the hands of reckless armed groups eager to partition the country into separate spheres of influence.

Powerful individuals like Abdoulkarim and Raffi Arslanian who have used their businesses and money to illegally trade in diamonds which have further impoverished lives should be called to order through acts of parliament which should scrutinise more than before their businesses and supply chains. This will discourage others from getting involved and will also frustrate the efforts of those who collect diamond because illegal market outlets will be scarce to fine for these precious minerals. Laws can also be enacted to reform the custom services to bring in greater control of the goods passing through the Bangui M’Poko International airport and the borders of the country to neighbouring countries.

There is need for the present National Assembly in the CAR to engage in a conscious attempt to build strong democratic institutions. The unreliability of the institutions today has provided an opportunity for foreign businesses to deal directly with local ‘strong men’ whose protection or approval can be bought (PastoorN.d.). Once the people have faith in local institutions and see them as serving the collective interest, they will respect these institutions. This will in turn prevent foreign businesses in dealing with people who represent but their vested interests at the expense of the entire community. These institutions will help to organise the mining sector that will benefit both the government and those involved in mining precious and highly demanded metals.
Conclusion

In this paper we have shown that the CAR is a very rich country in a variety of natural resources. In spite of this, it is rather unfortunate that these resources are a curse and have torn the country apart. Different armed groups compete with one another in a show of force as they exploit these resources and use the money obtained from their sale to continue to fuel war in the country making it ungovernable. Among the scarce and important resources of the country needed in different parts of the world include diamond where the CAR is the 12th highest producer, gold, fish and timber resources. The enormous resources of the country need to be tapped for the benefit of the greatest majority of citizens of the CAR than is presently the case.

Artisanal mining is an important economic activity of the country even before independence and has helped in livelihood sustenance but also influenced political alliances in the country. Several thousands of people are involved in this economic activity under very debilitating conditions and many more thousands are indirectly involved in the mining business in the CAR. Many of the miners enlist the services of children and deprive them of their education in an effort to get precious metals and sell them to capitalists and influential elite and businessmen waiting to exploit them. Others have in the wanton exploitation of gold and diamond destroyed the environment. The influx of workers and people from other places to the mining towns and villages has strained the few available resources like water and health facilities which are neither well equipped nor well-staffed. It has also led to security challenges in these mining towns and villages. There has also been the exploitation of workers and flogging in those mining areas where rebel groups like the Séléka and anti-Balaka have taken over control of mines or have demanded protection fee from miners. The rivalry between these armed militia groups have often led to conflict and insecurity. Those who have been blacklisted by rebel and other armed groups have often paid the supreme price of death.
There has been non-formalisation of mining operations. The unscrupulous activities of government officials sent to encourage and organise the sector has led to illegal operations on a very large scale. Another teething problem for the mining sector in the CAR is the unabatingly illegal transportation of minerals from the country to neighbouring countries which include the DRC, Cameroon and Sudan. From here, these are ‘legally’ added to those mined in these countries to be certified according to the Kimberley Process of certification. This has led to serious competition between rival groups and to a crackdown on illegal miners with greater consequences of war, conflict and insecurity in many communities. This is therefore the sad situation in the CAR where illegal artisanal mining is at the heart of conflict and insecurity. Legislative measures and the political will can save the CAR from this scourge of war spanning several decades now.

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THE UNWINDING OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY

By Emmanuel Wekem KOTIA and Mustapha ABDALLAH

Abstract

The drawdowns of United Nations peace operations from the African continent require thorough arrangements that are fit to face the challenges ahead. This paper seeks to contribute to the discussion on UN peace operations in the light of recent development and apparent difficulties in ensuring stability in the aftermath of mission withdrawals. Through extensive desk research, relying on the authors comprehensive knowledge on peacekeeping in Africa, the paper discusses the impact of the unwinding of peace operations on peace and security in Africa. It also analyses how drawdowns can create space for existing terrorist organisations to undermine relative peace and security in mission theatres. Future prospects for peace and areas for possible improvement are outlined. The research highlights the potential challenges associated with mission closures, including but not limited to the emerging issues of democratic transitions, particularly election-related issues, Security Sector Reforms (SSR), Disarmament Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) and reintegration of former combatants into national armies. The paper concludes that while financing remains a challenge to UN peace operations, putting in place resilient structures is critical to ensuring peace and stability and prevent conflict relapse.

Keywords – Peace operations, Africa, Withdrawal, Stability, Sustainable peace

Research Area: Social Science

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Introduction

Discussions on the withdrawal of peace operations from post-conflict nations are not a recent phenomenon. Increasing demands for a systemic approach led to the emergence of a focus on the drawdown of missions and the subsequent development of the United Nations (UN) Policy (2013) on UN Transitions. In light of the development of peace operations in Africa, including complex missions such as; the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS); and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the issue of UN withdrawal has gained new momentum (Lartey & Adu-Brempong, 2016). For instance, although the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BNUB) effectively expired in 2014, the Security Council, requested the Secretary-General to establish an electoral observer mission, upon a request from the Government of Burundi. The request by the Security Council indicated that, withdrawal of BNUB could not guarantee security in the face of tensions that arose relative to Nkurunziza’s bid for third term in power. Similar apprehension is characterizing democratic transitions in Liberia, which is preceding the end of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in March 2018 (UNSC, 2016). At the same time, although, the United Nations peace operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) reached its completion and made way for the restoration of a stable country, the May 2017 mutinies by a section of the Ivorian army raises concern about stability of the country (Elert, 2017).

As a consequence of these, the unwinding of missions in Africa seems to get many people uneasy about sustainable peace and security. Questions have been raised on whether national security forces are adequately prepared and equipped to assume full control over the security responsibilities of the state after the peacekeepers leave. Much public debate has been generated, expressing concerns regarding emerging gaps when peacekeepers withdraw without proper arrangements (ECOWAS, 2017). Against this background, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres (2017) pro-
nounced that, exit strategies for peace operations are to be part of a comprehensive approach aimed at long-term development and stability.

Regarding the future of peace and stability of African states, a key concern also arises from the complex nexus between Transnational Organized Crimes (TOC) and the growing menace of radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism across the continent. Indeed, while Africa has been grappling with TOCs for some time now, the emergence of extremist groups (e.g., Al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Sharia, Ansaru, Boko Haram, Ansar Dine and Al-mourabitoun) and their mutation into terrorist groups poses a particular challenge to peacekeeping missions. For example, peacekeepers operating with MINUSMA) have suffered considerable terrorist attack over the last four years since the mission was established. Consequently, the hybrid and evolving nature of the current security threats on the continent and particularly in West Africa raises fear as to whether UN exit strategies will ensure sustained peace and stability in mission areas, and by extension the African continent (Aning & Abdallah, 2016).

This paper therefore seeks to examine mission drawdown in Africa and implications on peace and stability in five sections. The first section introduces the general concept of UN peace operations and more specifically discusses the core functions of multi-dimensional peace operations and their merits. Section two discusses the peace operation in Africa, focusing on the nature of armed conflicts and the trends of peace missions on the continent. In section three, we analyze the impact of the withdrawal of peace operations on peace and security in Africa, highlighting how that creates space for extremist and terrorist groups to operate and undermine relative peace and stability. The fourth section examines the prospects for lasting peace, paying particular attention to West Africa - a region that is currently experiencing mission draw downs. The final section provides concluding thoughts.
Understanding United Nations Peace Operations

The United Nations constitutes an embodiment of the international community’s ambition to deal with complex crisis situations around the globe. With the overachieving aim of international peace and security, the UN has put in place peace and security structures as well as peace operation mechanisms, which serve the purpose of saving ‘succeeding generations from [another]... scourge of war’. Peace operations (POs) have thus become the frequently used tools to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. With a legal basis in Chapter VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter and thus binding UN Security Council (SC) mandates, missions have increasingly been deployed on a world-wide scale. The operations are based on the understanding ‘that an impartial presence on the ground can ease tensions between hostile parties and create space for political negotiations.’ (UNDPKO, 2003, p.1).

The practice first began emerging during the era of the Cold War with the dispatch of military observers to the Middle East (UNDPKO, 2008). Peace operations have henceforth been expanded to other regions in the world, including Africa. Regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are also engaging in peace missions under authority of, and in cooperation with the UN. Over the years, the Security Council has demonstrated, through repeated UNSC resolutions, the United Nations’ willingness to further increase its partnership with regional organizations (UNSC, 2012). A particular emphasis is given to the interaction and consultation with the African Union (AU). The latter’s potential in supporting and undertaking conflict prevention and crisis management within its own borders, appears as vital focus point of the partnership. Multiple cooperative operations are already in place and being constantly adjusted. The AU/ UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the ECOWAS mission in Guinea-Bissau and the NATO supported AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are among them.
Not simply the composition, but also the functions of peace operations have grown in size and become increasingly complex and wide-ranging. Peacekeepers have taken on tasks going beyond the simple monitoring of ceasefires. In order to facilitate the political process of establishing peace and security, the spectrum has been widened. National dialogue and reconciliation are being fostered and promoted. Humanitarian assistance is being undertaken and the rule of law, including an emphasis on human rights, is being protected and restored (UNSC, 2015 (b)). Likewise has the Protection of Civilians (PoC) become central to many missions, as for instance in UNMIL (UNSC, 2014 (b)). As MINUSMA’s title indicates, a growing number of peace operations have developed from the ‘traditional’ model into a multidimensional set-up. A range of different components, from military and police to civil affairs, is being integrated into the missions (UNDPKO, 2003). Collectively, these different components work to deliver security, as well as political and early peacebuilding support to conflict and post-conflict countries around the globe. The multidimensional peace operations are said to be ‘extremely significant and positively associated with’ peace-building success (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, p.791).

**Core Functions of Multidimensional Peace Operations**

Traditionally, peace operations were ‘deployed as an interim measure to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which the negotiation for a lasting settlement can proceed.’ (UNDPKO, 2008, p.21). With a further development in theory and practice, the functions have evolved over time alongside the dimension of the missions. From then, the UN Capstone Doctrine (2008) summarizes the core functions of multidimensional peace operations within three categories. Firstly, the creation of an environment which is both secure and stable. This includes enabling the host state to provide and maintain its own security. Secondly, the facilitation of the political process, emphasizing dialogue, reconciliation and the establishment of functioning institutions. Thirdly, the provision of a
framework that allows international actors to conduct their activities in a structured manner.

Additionally, peace operations can be distinguished in their activities. The activities correspond to the previously named functions. Generally speaking, the activities of peace operations are defined along the lines of the political process of the specific conflict at hand (UNDPKO, 2008). The missions’ mandates hereby range from conflict prevention prior to a conflict, to peacemaking and peace enforcement during a conflict, and peacekeeping at the outset of a ceasefire, involving peacebuilding along the way. In light of the withdrawal of peace missions from Africa, it appears vital to focus on the activities of peacebuilding and peace consolidation approaches. The discussion mainly surrounds the question of how the measures undertaken by peacekeepers contribute to the cessation of conflicts and the strengthening of national capabilities. Subsequently, addressing whether the post-conflict governments can ensure a stable and secure future for their nations.

**Merits of Peace Operations**

Peace operations have made vital contributions to international peace and security. Overall, international activism in the form of missions is being named as an important tool ‘designed to stop ongoing wars and prevent old ones restarting’ (Mack, 2007, p.3). There are different ways in which peace operations are being effective. First of all, they have a preventive influence on the breakout and reoccurrence of conflicts. Peace operations have ended or even prevented genocides and mass killings when countering and restraining perpetrators (Krain, 2005). Fortna (2008, p.125) observes that operations in the form of peacekeeping can reduce the risk of repeated war ‘by 75%–85% or more when peacekeepers are present’. Strategically designed intervention missions are said to improve peace prospects and influence the period of peace after a conflict has ended.
(Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Second, peace operations can contribute to the cessation of fighting and reduce the lethality of war. A study on the effectiveness of UN operations shows that ‘the commitment of 10,000 peacekeeping troops has the effect of reducing battlefield violence by over 70 %’ (Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2014, p.750). In addition to the drop in hostilities, enforcement operations are capable of ending ongoing violence (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Third, well-designed missions can limit the spatial aspect of conflicts. Especially in already volatile regions, where countries have experienced the resurgence of violence such as Congo DRC, the spread of conflicts across borders can take a toll on regional stability. Findings show that especially peace operations are effective in securing borders and able to reduce the likelihood of sparking a conflict in neighboring countries (Beardsley, 2011). Lastly, peace operations can have a positive effect on building stable democratic peace and increasing economic development after a conflict has come to an end. The cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia are good example in this regard. Fast economic growth after the cessation of fighting and the regaining of an average income level is being associated with international assistance (Gates et al., 2012). In summary, well-executed peace operations can save lives and contribute to durable peace and stability. Accordingly, the subsequent sections will focus on the possible effect of the unwinding of peacekeeping missions in Africa. Are they leaving behind a structure fit for the continuity of peace within nations?

**Dynamics of Peace Operations in Africa**

The Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Index (2017) ranked 178 countries based on 12 indicators which include the security apparatus, economic inequality and Human Rights among others. Fourteen out of the top twenty nations on the index are located on the African continent. Fragile
states are generally more prone to the emergence of armed conflicts. In order to prevent the sparks of violence and adapt peace operations to local conditions, one has to take into account the impact of armed conflicts and their effects on the local societies in Africa.

**Armed Conflicts**

There is a distinction being made between international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts. With an increasing number of intra-state conflicts, international humanitarian law has been further developed. Evidence are contained in Article 3 and the Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2017) has indicated that ‘about 80% of the victims of armed conflicts since 1945 have been victims of non-international conflicts’. Correspondingly, peace operations have traditionally been used as a tool to deal with inter-state conflicts, but they have increasingly become a tool for intra-state conflicts and civil wars. The range of actors participating in armed conflicts has hence diversified. Primary actors are not only government armed forces, but furthermore, non-state actors like dissident armed forces and armed groups, such as separatists, paramilitaries, rebels, terrorists, extremist groups and warlords. The UN, non-governmental organizations and regional bodies can be considered as secondary actors. Their focus often relies on maintaining and restoring peace and security, and caring for the victims of armed conflicts. The so-called shadow parties, support primary actors in a covertly manner, thereby influencing the balance of power during an ongoing conflict. Among them are foreign governments and organized armed groups who are aligned with different warring parties (The New York Times, 2017).

The effects of armed conflicts are diverse and have a toll on the whole of the society as exemplified in Congo DRC, Sudan and Mali, where scores of people face threat of attacks and death on a daily basis. The reduced level of human capital does not only spring from battlefield deaths,
but also from population displacement and refugee streams due to ongoing violence and persecution characterized by human rights violations (UNDP, 2006). Vital physical infrastructure is being affected, such as the energy, telecommunication, transportation and health sector. Overall, ‘social, political, and economic institutions are indelibly harmed.’ (Gates et al., 2012, p.1713). The ICRC (1998) labels such conflicts, which are marked by the decay of fundamental state structures, as ‘anarchic’. In this context, the breakdown of government structures comes along with weakened state institutions. With regard to the economy, the loss of human capital and the destruction of infrastructure leads to a change in structure and prolongs the recovery to the status quo ante bellum (Serneels & Verpoorten, 2012). Thus, armed conflicts are additionally associated with food insecurity and the deprivation of social services. Civil conflicts on the African continent alone since the mid-1960s have cost more than ‘$120 billion worth of agricultural production.’ (Messer & Cohen, 2004, p.3). The conflicts take a special toll on the younger generation, thus influencing the future of nations. Davis and Kuritsky (2002) argue that sub-Saharan African countries with a violent past experience a ten percent higher infant mortality rate than those without. In terms of education, a decrease in enrolment rates can be traced to armed conflict (Diwakar, 2015). The dramatic effects of armed conflicts highlight the need for well-implemented peace operations.

**Trends of Peace Mission in Africa**

The proliferation of peace operations in Africa has been ongoing since the 1990s, due to the increased response to African armed conflicts. Boulden (2013) identifies two trends of post-Cold War UN politics; increased cooperation with regional organizations and advancement of discussions on, and activity of peace operations in Africa. Firstly, the emphasis on cooperation with regional African bodies has become evident through reports emphasizing partnerships and the interaction with the African Union. The Report on the High-Level Independent Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations (2015, p.62), for instance, emphasizes the role of regional organizations and the strengthening of the UN-AU partnership, overall highlighting ‘the centrality of Africa for UN peace operations’. The annual joint consultative meeting between UNSC and African Union Peace and Security Council are examples for this trend and indicate the significance attributed to the development of peace operations in Africa. Secondly, regarding the United Nations’ action profile on the continent, out of the seventy authorized peace operations 31 (44%) have taken place in Africa. There are currently eight operations running on the continent and with 23 completed missions in the past, Africa has become the continent with most deployed missions overall (UN, 2017). According to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute as of 2017, Africa hosts 75 percent of personnel employed for peace operations (Avezov, Van der Lijn & Smit, 2017). The deployment to African states is additionally being reflected upon throughout the increase in UNSC meetings on African issues (Boulden, 2013).

As the make-up of missions has developed worldwide, so have peace operations in the whole of Africa. Tardy and Wyss (2014) distinguish between sequential, parallel and integrated operations. Their schema assist in understanding the composition of UN missions in cooperation with regional actors. Sequential operations are relatively frequent and require a regional organization to act as a first responder. An example from West Africa is Liberia, where the establishment of UNMIL followed efforts of EUCOWAS to achieve a peaceful settlement (UNSC, 2003). Parallel operations are characterized by their division of labour. The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office and the EUCOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau are among efforts combining multiple actors with parallel functions. In comparison, integrated missions are based on a stronger coordination and shared responsibility. The AU/UN hybrid peace operation in Darfur is a rare example for a peacekeeping mission made-up of force components from Africa and the rest of the world (UNSC, 2007). One can firmly state that operations have assumed various shapes and sizes and will most likely...
continue to do so in the future. Shifting the focus point to West Africa, there are currently two UN peace operations in place, namely UNMIL in Liberia and MINUSMA in Mali. While the operation in Liberia has moved on to handing over security responsibilities to the government, the peacekeepers in Mali are yet concerned with the monitoring and implementation of a ceasefire (UNSC, 2015 (a) & (b)). In light of the drawdown of UNAMIL and the recent completion of UNOCI, it has become imperative to outline the positive and negative aspects of the drawdown of missions.

**Impacts of the Withdrawal of Peace Operations in Africa**

The unwinding of peace operations from post-conflict states can be discussed in light of the structures and conditions peacekeepers leave behind. Is the local government prepared and able enough to take over the responsibility previously cared for by the peacekeepers? Based on the nature of African economies and their weak capacities to rebuild institutions after the outbreak of war, one can always anticipate the implications of mission drawdown on peace and security.

**Implications for Peace and Security**

The readiness of Africa to confront the development and stability of post-conflict states and emerging security issues in the region, is being put to the test once more in 2017. There are anticipated transitional issues in several aspects of mission drawdowns, since sustainability has proven tough to attain in the aftermath of interventions. Hudson (2013) names four pillars vital to post-conflict reconstruction: legitimate security, justice, functioning institutions, and social and economic well-being. Concerns that security sectors of post-conflict nations are not adequately capable of taking over the tasks, are predominantly being voiced. Security forces are expected to fill the roles of peacekeepers. Yet, the fear persists that they are
not trained for the tasks at hand (Hudson, 2013). Inadequate numbers of well trained and experienced personnel in the security sector can have an impact on the functioning of institutions and the maintenance of a peaceful environment. Issues of law and order arise when the Security Sector Reforms (SSRs) have not been diligently implemented.

For example, the SSR program in Liberia is currently rebuilding the 2,000 men Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) (Ministry of National Defense Liberia, 2017). Additionally, officers of the Liberian National Police (LNP) are being trained by UNMIL (UNSG, 2017). Nevertheless, there are voices being uttered that the number of security forces is too low to ensure adequate security for the people. The concern includes subsequent low level of security forces outside the capital (Podder, 2016). This is evident in that smaller countries that possess little manpower and lack adequate funding for armed authorities face tougher tasks. Liberia, just as any other nation facing the unwinding of a peace operation, is threatened by internal, as well as external dangers. With understaffed security forces the price of violence can fall again and give way to increased lawlessness and the increase in the number of unsatisfied citizens in form of rebel groups and armed militias (Gompert, Oliker, Stearns, Crane & Riley, 2007). Concerning threats from the outside, civilians of the region are being terrorized by terror organizations like Boko Haram (Pham, 2012). The add-up of security issues requires the full attention of governments when strategically initiating a durable peace. Institutions and armed forces need to be established in a suitable manner, before the peace operations leave.

The pillar of post-conflict justice goes hand-in-hand with law enforcement and well-functioning institutions. Peace operations have contributed to the initiation of processes which assist the population in coming to terms with their past in order to move on to a brighter future. Tribunals and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have become such tools of the international community. In Liberia for instance, the Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation has been initiated...
(UNSG, 2017). The mechanism appears vital, although political and financial commitment, as well as functioning state institutions are necessary to make most of its potential. Corruption constitutes one issue that has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of governments and weaken state institutions. The topic is reoccurring in SC resolutions dealing with the unwinding of missions.

Economic and social well-being is central to a stable future development. The UN acknowledges the negative impact that the unwinding of peace operations can have on socio-economic aspects of the host country (International Peace Institute, 2012). Governments of post-conflict African nations would be well-advised to set in motion mechanisms that counteract these impacts. The danger that post-conflict states fall off the screen of the different UN organs should be kept in mind. The countries should be continuously monitored, coordinated action by stakeholders should be ensured and the ‘funding gap’ after the end of missions should be largely avoided (UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004). Although the drawdown of missions appears challenging and has made different stakeholders worried, the picture is not at all that bleak.

There are positive developments marking the transition period. Policies aimed at the mentoring of security and government institutions, appear to improve structures. The internal security environment of Liberia for instance has been said to benefit from the UN Mission and is set to handle future challenges (Gompert et al., 2007). If the root causes of the previous conflict have been addressed and command structures have been improved, the hand-over of responsibility can mark a proud moment in self-sufficiency. The focus should lie upon state security, rather than on the security of the government at hand. On the way to full independence from peace operations, citizens of the state become ready to partner with the government and individual organizations, in contributing to the development of their nation.
Implications for the Emergence of Extremist and Terrorist groups

There is no doubt that peacekeepers have suffered considerable attacks from notable terrorist groups such as AQIM, Al-Shabab, Ansar Dine and MUJAO. At the same time, however, withdrawal of peacekeepers without assessing the effectiveness of security and justice institutions can create conditions in which more criminalities, including transnational organized crimes, extremism and terrorism can emerge, thrive, and undermine state authority and challenge the efficacy of regional and global organizations such as the AU and the UN. Currently, the UN Security Council has passed resolution 2363 for the drawdown of UN-AU Hybrid mission in Sudan, arising from United States’ pressure to cut down cost and ensure efficiency. In the first phase of the drawdown, which starts from January, 2018, the troop is expected to be reduced from 15,485 to 11,395 and police from 3,403 to 2,888. Based on further assessment to be submitted by the Office of the Secretary-General together with the African Union Commission (AUC) in January 2018, the number of troops will further be reduced to 8,735 and the police 2,500 by the first half of 2018 (UNGA, 2016). While this is significant to reduce the cost of UN peace operations and to prepare the Sudanese government to take lead in the security governance of the country, the apprehension is that there may be security lacuna, which can be exploited by terrorist groups. This apprehension is heightened by the threat of terrorism across the continent. In 2013, the killing and beheading of twenty-one civilians in Beni Territory, North Kivu in Congo DRC was described as terrorist act and had great impact on peacekeepers and future drawdown plans (Aning & Abdallah, 2016).

But central to the discussion of mission drawdown and its impact on the spread of terrorism should be understood within the context of West Africa, where UNOCI, for example has completely exited from Cote d’Ivoire and UNMIL in Liberia is at the final phase of its drawdown. Although Cote
d’Ivoire is relatively peaceful after the drawdown of UNOCI, the issue of ex-combatants and the quest for re-integration into the formal national army is already creating tension in the country and can potentially be a basis for extremists and terrorists to hijack state institutions and undermine the security of the country. Liberia, although has successfully conducted election in October, 2017, the limited number of security forces can constitute a challenge when UNMIL finally departs from the country. Consequently, as missions plan to draw down, the expected outcome for the UN should not be about reduced financial burden, but more important for the UN is to ensure that legacy of peace and stability left behind can be sustained through the development of robust state institutions capable of preventing and responding to the evolving threat of extremism and terrorism.

**SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND SECURITY**

When the transition period has been well managed by the peacekeepers, but also the host government and the citizens, the foundation for sustainable peace and security is said to take off. A comprehensive approach which creates, identifies and fosters structures necessary for the maintenance of peace is vital for the success of peace operations. Addressing the root problems identified within the economy and socio-cultural behaviour in a cooperative manner is key to a durable foundation (UNSG, 1992). The UN Transition Policy (2013) highlights five key aspects which make the unwinding of peace operations a success. Emphasis should be given to early planning of the transition, a well-integrated and structured presence of the UN, engagement with national stakeholders, development for national capacity, and a clear line of communication.

The development of national capacity should have an additional focus on an effective Security Sector Reform process. Together with the
improvement of the economy and political competencies, reforms and training of the military and police contribute to a stable environment. The effective oversight of security institutions is hereby essential. In light of the withdrawal of UNOCI from Côte d’Ivoire, the UN Security Council (2016, p.1) emphasized the need ‘to sustain well-functioning and accountable government institutions, especially in the security and justice sector’. Not simply a country’s own security, but furthermore the regional security architecture of the continent plays a role in post-conflict stability. Cooperation in the region is therefore to be considered vital to durable peace and security.

Concerning the engagement of national stakeholders, the entire society has a part to play in the future. The maintenance of good governance in the form of liberal democracy, has a duty to respect human rights and to act in a transparent and open manner. The sustainable development of a nation includes the engagement of both men and women on the economic, social and political sphere (Heinecken, 2013). Overall, the peace operations ought to encourage a government to foster a vibrant, active and progressive civil society.

When considering the most recent withdrawals from West Africa, the cases of Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire come to mind. The post-conflict recovery of Sierra Leone has been heralded as being among the most successful cases after the end of a peace operation (UNSG, 2014). However, there exists a fear that the government in Côte d’Ivoire will not able to maintain a stable and peaceful security situation in the aftermath of the recent peace operation (UNSC, 2017). This apprehension is corroborated by the May 2017 mutinies by a section of the Ivorian army over allegedly lack of government’s commitment to the payment of agreed bonuses. The seeming division between supporters of the former President Laurent Gbagbo, and those who are affiliated to the rebel group Forces Nouvelles des Forces Armées (FAFN), with which current President Alasane Ouattara
is associated remains a challenge (Elert, 2017). Liberia, as the country is facing the subsequent drawdown of peacekeepers, is additionally being under observance of the international community. Elections, which are often chosen as a tool for a smooth transition, due to the legitimacy and mandate transferred to the new leaders, are of importance here. Open, transparent and free elections are key and Liberia appears committed to it, except the current electoral impasse that has to be cleared before the re-run of the presidential election between the two leading contenders: George Oppong Weah and Joseph Baokai. Economy wise, future increase in economic activity in Liberia, supported through the growth of the mining industry, is expected (US Central Intelligence Agency, 2017).

In regard to regional cooperation, the consensus remains that the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union remains crucial. There is, and will be in the future, room for increasing the capacity of regional cooperation. Organizations, such as ECOWAS, are key to ensure stable peace in the regions. The African Peace and Security Architecture continues to be a vital framework for the protection of civilians and their human rights. As Zondi (2017) writes ‘a lasting peace must accompany the building of national unity, regional cohesion and continental integration’. Nevertheless, the UN recognizes the constraint which regional organizations are facing due to scarce resources (UNSC, 2014 (a)). In order for regional organizations to serve the intended purpose, the under-resourced operations should be avoided if possible. Accordingly findings show that the increase in spending and the enforcement mechanisms in mandates go hand-in-hand with the reduction of conflicts (Hegre, Hultman & Nygård, 2015). Hence, the cooperation with regional organizations should be undertaken in a manner to make use of their full capacity, if need be by increasing the financial support of the international community.
Conclusion

The unwinding of UN peace operations in Africa and other parts of the world has become increasingly necessary. Indeed, over the past years, especially after the demise of the Cold War and the prevalence of intra-state conflicts, the United Nations has invested huge sums of financial resources into peace operations across the globe. For instance, in the 2016/2017 fiscal year, the General Assembly approved the appropriation of $7.86 billion for 15 peacekeeping operations (UNGA, 2016). The yearly contribution and appropriation of such amount has become a burden for the UN, but more disturbingly to key contributors such as the US. Consequently, while the drawdown is imperative to reduce the burden on the UN in terms of financial, material and human resources, it is important that host countries are adequately prepared to establish structures and institutions to maintain and sustain existing peace.

The apprehension however is that post-conflict states in Africa do not have the resilient structures capable of sustaining the level of peace and security left behind by the UN peacekeepers. In other words, the capacity to return countries to the status quo ante bellum is often limited. The recent mission draw downs in Africa, including; UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire, UNMIL in Liberia and BNUB in Burundi are significant to mention. Whereas, Liberia is at the final stages of the drawdown process, there is fear that if the democratic processes are not managed well, including transfer of power, there could be pocket of violence that can undermine the relative peace and stability in the country. Although Cote d’Ivoire has made significant strides in its socio-economic transformation after the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011 and the subsequent withdrawal of UNOCI, the existing polarization along Ouattara-Gbagbo lines and the challenges of DDR and SSR pose a potential danger to the country’s progress. In Burundi, although the BNUB was replaced with the United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB), to follow and report on the electoral process before, during and after the 2015 elections in the country, challenges emerged
that warranted the need for the AU to intervene. However, a deep schism between AUC African Union Commission (AUC) and the member states prevented the deployment of a 5,000 strong African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), worsening security situation (International Crisis Group, 2016). As Sudan prepares to begin the drawdown process in January 2018, questions remain about the resilience of state institutions to maintain peace and security in the country. All in all, UN mission withdrawals should always ensure that resilient structures are left behind to sustain relative peace and stability. Failure to do that will most likely lead to relapse of conflict, negating the objectives and huge financial investment in peace mission.

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DYNAMICS OF TERRORISM IN MULTI-ETHNIC STATES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Steve Wakhu (1)

This paper argues that in multi ethnic societies, grievances arising out of competition for state power by a few ethnic groups are giving rise to a new form of ethnic radicalisation likely to result to a new form of ethnic terrorism as a sustained tactic for waging conflict. In highly fragile and fractionalised multi ethnic societies, ethnic terrorism is likely becoming the preferred future modus operandi for power struggle. This trend is facilitated by ethnic radicalisation of urban and rural populations, increased urbanisation and urban population, increases in the capital costs of conventional warfare, increased state terrorism and developments in information and communication. As a result, contemporary terrorist methods are likely to conspire to produce the new ethnic terrorism.

Key words: ethnic nationalism, terrorism, ethnic group

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Introduction

Arguing that the theory and history of contemporary terrorism as epitomised in the four waves of terrorism by scholars such as Shughart (2006:8-14); Halliday (2004:4); Rapoport (2001:419); Laqueur (1977:6) and Morgan (2004:3) fail to account for what the emergence of a new form of tribalism, Kaplan (2011:6) asserts that his own contribution to theory on terrorism is his preposition of a fifth wave of terrorism characterised by vicious or outright genocidal conflicts taking place in multi-ethnic societies.

According to Kaplan, the goal of tribal movements in these societies is the creation of a new and perfected people, making all who do not belong to the respective group subject to the intent of extermination. Cederman et al (2010:115) seem to confirm Kaplan’s position by observing that roughly half of the conflicts fought since the Second World War can be linked to ethno-political struggles for state power. However, besides noting that in much of the ethnic conflicts that have taken place, rape has been used as a weapon of terror, Kaplan did not expound further. In this article, it is argued that Kaplan’s hypothesised fifth wave of terrorism transforms from the old fashioned insurgency style of conducting violent ethnic conflict. This transformation is likely to be characterised by a fusion of ethnic radicalisation and contemporary terrorist methods to carry on old ethnic conflicts to produce the new ethnic terrorism.

In the first section, we examine the concepts of ethnic groups, ethnic nationalism and ethnic conflict. In the second section, we consider what is insurgency and terrorism and under what conditions they thrive. In the last section, we revisit changes in the conditions that favour insurgency that predict an increased preference for terrorist methods in situations where ethnic conflict turn violent.
Ethnic groups, ethnic nationalism and ethnic conflict

In ordinary linguistic use, the word ethnic, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, denotes “nationality or place of origin” and an ethnic group denotes “a group or subgroup regarded as ultimately of common descent, or having a common national or cultural tradition”. The word ethnicity derives from the Greek word ethnos, meaning a nation and in the social sciences, the concept of ethnic group is used to refer to any social group to which people belong, and/or are perceived to belong to and whose members claim common geographical and ancestral origins, history, cultural traditions, languages and possess feelings of mutual solidarity, which mark them off from other groups (Betancourt and López 1993:632; Bhopal 2004:441; Harris and Findley 2014:9; Smith 1979:102; Barth 1998:2-3; Phinney 1996:919; Cederman et al, 2010:99). Among these characteristics, the sharing of a common culture i.e. norms, values, attitudes and behaviors (Phinney 1996:920), and language are generally given central importance (Barth 1998:3; Bhopal 2004:441;). Ethnic groups ascribe identity to social actors and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction between individuals (Barth 1998:2) founded on the belief, on the part of their members, that their ethnic communities are the centre of the world and the sole standard of truth and justice (Smith 1979:102). Hence, ethnocentrism or what some may variously call tribalism or ethnicity may be defined as the belief by members of an ethnic group in the centrality, rightness and superiority of their ethnic community, and a corresponding denial of value to other ethnic communities (Smith 1979:102; Cederman et al 2010:99). By this definition, ethnocentrism or ethnicity or tribalism, implies that individual claims to belong to an ethnic group correspondingly imply a claim to be judged, and to judge oneself, by those standards that are relevant to that identity (Barth 1998:6).

Related to the concepts of ethnic group, ethnicity and tribalism are the concepts of a nation and nationalism. Theorists of nationalism define a nation as any aggregate of people or social group linked by co-residence, common sociocultural characteristics, a distinctive history, a special vision
of the world, equal citizenship rights and glued together by a certain kind of solidarity and political programme (Smith 1979:99; Calhoun 1993:214; Smith 2013:3). In other words, the nation is imagined as a community of common origin and shared historical destiny (Cederman et al 2010:92). Nationalism therefore, is a programme of action, political doctrine or principle to achieve and sustain the vision, distinctiveness of a nation vis-a-vis other nations, solidarity or loyalty to the nation that ought to override other loyalties and answering to ideological, economic, cultural, social and political aspirations and needs of a nation (Smith 1979:16; Calhoun 1993:217; Smith 2013:8; Cederman et al 2010:92). In its most ideal form, nationalism demands that the unit of governance and the nation should be congruent with prescribed programme of action, political doctrine or principle as the only legitimate basis of autonomy, self-sufficiency and sovereignty of a state (Smith 1979:16; Smith 2013:8).

There are at least three levels according to Smith (1979:106), at which nationalism has manifested itself i.e. the ethnic or ‘tribal’, the state or territorial, and the ‘pan’ cultural or continental. Here we are concerned with ethnic or tribal nationalism. Smith (p.102) adds that the central elements of ethnicity, from which ethnic nationalism sets out, concern the origins and history of a social group, its possession of a common culture, and the presence of sentiments of social solidarity. Ethnic Nationalism has in the modern era as Cederman et al (2010:87-92) observes, led to the principle that ethnic likes should rule over ethnic likes, triggering fierce political mobilisation resulting at worse to competition between leaders of ethnic constituencies over access to state power and at worst to secession campaigns to establish a new state ruled in the name the ethnic group or campaigns to join another state controlled by ethnic kin. Since politics is the only means through which a state allocates its resources in society, control over politics is congruent to control over the means of production. Where one or a few ethnic groups have control of politics it therefore follows that, only that one or a few ethnic groups control the means of production utilized by other groups, in which case a relationship of inequality and
stratification obtains (Barth 1998:19). In such scenarios, if the health of the political system is poor and the state is weak, the likelihood of ethnic conflict increase if representatives of some ethnic groups are excluded from state power; some ethnic groups have experienced a loss of power in the recent past; the mobilization capacity of some ethnic groups is high; natural resources invite warlords to enrich themselves by looting and there exists a recent history of ethnic conflict (Cederman et al 2010:88; Fearon and Laitin 2003:77).

Out of the conditions that predetermine the likelihood of ethnic conflict highlighted above, it is important to pay more attention the health of political systems and weakness of the state because these two factors determine the magnitude of the rest and therefore have the most far reaching influence on the incidence of ethnic conflict. Botha (2008:35) broadly defines a politically stable state as one that engenders a high degree of political continuity in a system, which allows free political participation and dissent (within legal boundaries). On the contrary, unhealthy political systems are characterised by corruption, nepotism, cronyism, political marginalisation, oppression, a general disregard for the rules of the formal political and economic sectors; a universal resort to personal(ised) and vertical solutions to societal problems, lack of social justice, non-participatory political processes, civic lethargy, the struggle for resource control and unbalanced federalism especially in natural-resource rich areas (Forest 2011:11; Botha 2008:35-6; Cilliers 2003:98; Danjibo 2013:18; Omotola 2008:44; Shinn, 2006).\(^5\)

In weak political systems, often if the state authority is perceived as corrupt, or as having seized power through illegitimate means, it becomes difficult for it to convince citizens to adhere to basic laws and institutional rules; consequently, such governments resort to oppression and the use of repressive and corrupt tactics to maintain authority and legitimacy triggering political violence as the only alternative for repressed citizens (Levi (1988) and Rotberg (2003) in Howard 2010:967; Polich et al 1980:5).
State weakness means that the state is hardly capable of effectively maintaining a monopoly on violence; large swathes of ungoverned spaces exist as de facto zones outside the state’s control in such locations as border areas and slums of the big cities;⁶ the level of governmental and administrative inefficiency is high; the security forces training and equipment are entirely insufficient; corruption and criminalization of the police is far advanced; there is a general lack of institutionalisation; provision of essential public goods is wanting or absent in some instances;⁷ the shadow economy is able to execute capital transactions enabling trafficking in weapons, raw materials and consumer goods; irrepressible internal conflicts persist alongside a network of markets and entrepreneurs of violence and dependency on foreign aid is rampant among other conditions⁸ (Mair 2003:3; Cilliers 2003:98; Howard 2010:960-82; Kimunguyi 2011:3-4; Glickman 2003:167; Danjibo 2013:20; Forest and Giroux 2011:7-9; Omotola 2008:44; Polich et al 1980:6; Shinn, 2006).

In circumstance of state weakness, non-state actors such as rebel groups, terrorist cells, paramilitary units, and insurgents organize and engage in illegal and dangerous activities without having to contend with the presence of the central government (Howard 2010:967; Kimunguyi 2011:6; Forest and Giroux 2011:7-8). In Kenya for instance the consequences of eroding state power have meant that for years the northeast of the country, which borders Somalia, has been essentially cut off from the rest of the country making safe travel in this part of the country only possible in militarily protected convoys since security forces have withdrawn to isolated forts, leaving control of the area to gangs and Somali warlords allowing not only the movement of refugees fleeing the conflict in Somalia but also free movement of terrorist and easy flow of illegal weapons, counterfeits and commodities such as sugar into Kenya from Somalia (Mair 2003:3; Kimunguyi 2011:6). Conditions of state weakness have the potential to drive individuals to resort to violent activities in order to achieve some measure of security, and obtain tangible political and economic ends (Howard 2010:966).
State weakness and the poor health of political systems coexist in a symbiotic and synergetic agent relationship. For instance, Cilliers (2003:98) observes that state weakness characterised by widespread poverty paves way to poor economic conditions which in turn fuel unhealthy political contestation and araison d’état for cut throat competition for state power or replacement of the state in the case of uncontrolled spaces. In a nutshell, put together or in isolation conditions of state weakness and or poor health of the political systems, coupled with competing ethnic interests produce a potent mix that triggers ethnic conflict.

**Insurgency and terrorism**

Over the years’ violent ethnic conflicts have played out in the form of aggrieved ethnic groups waging an insurgent campaign against a sitting government perceived to be controlled by other ethnic groups. Insurgency has been defined by Fearon and Laitin (2003:77); Friedlander (1981:282) as a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. Like terrorists, insurgents are weak relative to the governments they are fighting, at least at the start of operations (Fearon and Laitin 2003:82; Wickham-Crowley 1990:215). Certain conditions have been identified to favour insurgency. These include financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments; extreme poverty that makes the life of a guerrilla relatively more attractive and so aiding in recruitment; a rural base area, preferably with rough, inaccessible terrain; local knowledge of the population superior to the government’s, which aids rebels in hiding from superior government forces; foreign financial or logistic support and training; a large country and rural population which increases the number of potential recruits and makes it more difficult for the centre to keep close tabs on who is doing what at the local level (FearonandLaitin 2003:85; Wickham-Crowley 1990:202; Collier 2004:566). We argue that over the years, in most societies these conditions are significantly changing in favour of more use terrorist methods and less use of traditional insurgent modes of
combat that has dominated the doomed scene in ethnic conflicts. In other words, these changes predict an increased preference of terrorist methods as the default strategy of waging ethnic conflict as opposed to the use of terrorism as a small proportion within broad insurgent guerrilla method of waging ethnic conflict.

First, we must deal with the definitional problem that confronts any discourse on terrorism. There is a longstanding consensus in the academic community over the disagreement surrounding the conceptual and operational definition of terrorism. Both the theoretical conceptualisation and the empirical manifestation of terrorism are highly contested based on state, national, political, geopolitical, religious and even ideological constellations, giving rise to not one but many manifestations of terrorism, differing from one region to another, one sub-region to another and one country to another (Warbrick 2004:1000; Kielsgard 2005:250; Jawad 2015:105; Hoffman 2004:936; Threats et al 2004:64; Schmid 2004:377; Saul 2008:196, 206-207; Botha 2008:29; Cilliers 2003:92; Howard 2010:964; Hübschle 2011:3; Atran 2003:1535). It is not in the purview of this article to outline the problems and difficulties that have persistently stood in the way of an agreed definition of terrorism. These problems have been adequately enumerated by among others Kielsgard (2005:281); Warbrick (2004:1001-3); Saul (2008:196); Hoffman (2004:936-7); Khan (2016:7); Ignatieff (2002:1150); Threats et al (2004:64); Jawad (2015:104-5) and Warbrick 2004:1003).

However, even though there is still lack of agreement on what terrorism is, attempts at arriving at a definition have been made. Originating in Europe, terrorism as a concept first featured in the French revolution as a synonym for “reign of terror” and the word terrorist added to the English lexicon by Edmund Burke in 1795 and later the words terrorism and terrorist given meaning in the 1798 Dictionnaire of the academiefrancaise as systeme, regime de la terreur (Rapoport 2001:419; Laqueur 1977:6; Halliday 2004:3; Shughart 2006:13). According to Warbrick (2004:989) terrorism covers some non-state violence directly or indirectly against state
authorities. Forest and Giroux (2011:1) define terrorism as a tactic that uses violence or the threat of violence as a coercive strategy to cause fear and political intimidation. Saul (2008:196) and Botha (2008:30) insist on a definition that protects human rights and consider the ordinary linguistic meaning of ‘terrorism’ to instantly evocatively and emotively, refer to extreme fear, or intense fright or dread resulting at different times from State and non-State conduct against civilians encapsulating a phenomenon of political violence widely condemned in many societies as anti-social, amoral and inhumane. According to Saul, terrorist violence implies any serious, violent criminal act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, or to endanger life, including acts against property committed outside an armed conflict for a political, ideological, religious or ethnic purpose and intended to:

a. create extreme fear in a person, group, or the general public; and
b. seriously intimidate a population or part of a population; or (c)  
c. unduly compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.10

Ignatieff (2002:1146) and Cilliers (2003:91) distinguish terrorism from ordinary criminal acts pointing out that it is not motivated by financial gain and seeks to attract civilian support by making political claims that are grounded in moral, social, economic and religious principles distinguished from common law crimes and other offences.11 Hoffman (2004:938) points out that implicitly, there is some agreement in the international community prohibiting targeting civilians for death and destruction as terrorist acts.

In the views of Laqueur (1999:8), terrorism, is distinguished from civil war, banditry or guerrilla warfare because while guerrilla warfare often has positive connotations, terrorism elicits negative ones and is nothing but a tactic for waging civil and guerrilla warfare. Different international and regional organisations provide different definitions of their own. Here we shall consider terrorism as a tactic for waging conflict (Laqueur 1999:8; Forest and Giroux 2011:1) over political claims.
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, outlines a non-exhaustive list of conditions that facilitate the staying of terrorism and including: prolonged unresolved conflicts, de-humanization of victims of conflict in all its forms and manifestations, lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socioeconomic marginalization and lack of good governance. Assembly (2008:51) Among these conditions, terrorism has been observed to thrive most in conditions of political oppression and humiliation and therefore governments’ human rights behaviour is the single most important variable determining the occurrence of terrorism, often inviting violent responses to abuses (Walsh and Piazza 2010:23; Foot 2007:491; Omotola 2008:43).

From the foregoing, terrorism and insurgency arise generally from similar causal conditions, terrorism often being employed as a tactic within a broad framework of an insurgent campaign. For example, groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria are known to employ a mix of insurgent and terrorist tactics. It is also clear that terrorism can stand alone as in the case of known terrorist groups such as al-Qaida and other international terrorist organisations.12

**From insurgency to the new ethnic terrorism**

Certain changes in some of the conditions that favour insurgency provide cues for increased presence of terrorism in ethnic conflicts. First, is the increased growth of urban spaces and corresponding growth in urban populations. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003:85); Wickham-Crowley (1990:202) and Collier (2004:566), insurgency thrives where there is a rural base area, preferably with rough, inaccessible terrain and a correspondingly large rural population which increases the number of potential recruits and makes it more difficult for the centre to keep close tabs on who is doing what at the periphery. The rapid global increase in urbanisation means that this resource required for successful insurgency
is greatly diminishing. According to the word development index data of the world bank, the proportion of urban population in the world increased to 54.3% in 2016 up from 33.6% in 1960.

Increased urbanisation means that, in cities and towns unlike rural areas, anonymous denunciation of insurgent movements is generally easier for members of the community who do not subscribe to the insurgent campaign to get away with, giving the government an advantage in its counterinsurgent efforts (Fearon and Laitin 2003:83). Given that most terrorist organisations are known to operate in small highly secretive cells of individuals, isolated as clandestine groups and relying only on their own members, (Davis and Cragin2009:271) terrorism does not require extensive support of the communities in order to thrive because, neither the prospect of anonymous denunciation nor diminished communal support have the potential to significantly cripple the operations of terror groups as urbanisation increases.

In their study, Savitch and Ardashev (2001) examine the occurrence of terror in 40 cities across the globe for the period 1993 - 2000 and find more than a third higher incidence of terror in cities than in rural areas. They suggest five reasons as to why cities and urban areas attract a higher incidence of terrorism. Noting that terrorists choose their targets for strategic value, they argue that first cities have assets such as industrial and commercial infrastructures that make them reservoirs of prosperity and economic growth offering rich targets for terrorists. Secondly, they argue that cities have become ‘nodes’ for vast and powerful international command centres, directing billions of dollars in investment, managing millions of people and controlling thousands of worksites around the globe (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Meyer, 1986 in Savitch and Ardashev 2001:2516). Thirdly, urban heterogeneity puts different social groups in close proximity to one another sharpening the sense of relative deprivation. Fourth, cities are guardians of national prestige and assets holding tangible symbols of military, political and financial power for states. Fifth, cities are the media centres for the world containing international newspapers,
news organisations, television and radio broadcasting studios that instantly publicise around the world any terrorist attack.\textsuperscript{13}

In summary, the higher the value of the target, the greater the resultant publicity and cities and town offer both the value accruable from an attack and the publicity to diffuse its effect to the widest audience possible. These arguments by Savitch and Ardashev find reinforcement in most of the literature on terrorism. The arguments that cities are attractive rich targets for terrorism because they hold tangible symbols of military, political and financial power for states and are ‘nodes’ for vast and powerful international command centres for commerce and are reservoirs of prosperity and economic growth align with the argument by some scholars Cilliers (2003:93, 100); Howard (2010:960); Botha (2008:29); Shinn (2006); Friedlander (1981:282) and Wickham-Crowley (1990:201) that terrorist tactics as a strategy within the broader framework of intra-state conflicts perpetrated by indigenous organizations are intended to embarrass, harm, or even overturn an established government. Therefore, a terror attack on a city offers credible opportunity to embarrass and harm a government that is ethnically perceived as oppressive. Similarly, the argument that cities are the media centres for the world hence offer instantaneous publicity around the world for any terrorist attack. This aligns with the argument by Schmid (2004:381); Jenkins 1985:5,8); Abadie (2004:4) that fear, dread and publicity play a significant role in the calculus of terrorism. To a terrorist, the more the fear generated out of an attack, the faster and wider such fear is diffused, the more successful it is.

Another factor that supports the suggestion that ethnic conflicts are likely to adopt more terrorist methods relates to the rising cost of waging a military style offensive against a government. Wickham-Crowley (1990:223) observes that modern conventional war, has grown increasingly “capital intensive“ requiring huge investments in arms, transportation networks, and supply lines which connect the sources of supplies with the combatants. Obviously as the costs of mounting a military style warfare increases, government accrues more gains on the balance of
power owing to its access to public financial resources and its ability to loop in significant bilateral and diplomatic military support from friendly states in the form of military aid. On the contrary insurgent movements, do not have access to such strategic and substantial financial resources. They are more likely to rely on foreign remittances by diaspora members of the ethnic group, a resource that may not likely increase proportional to the increase in the capital costs of warfare on such equipment as guns, vehicles, oil e.t.c. As prices on these commodities of warfare increase, ceteris peribus, the strength of government increases relative to that of an insurgent group. On the contrary, the structural organisation of terrorist groups which relies on small cells for operational effectiveness requires less financial resources as compared to guerrilla style insurgent campaigns (Davis and Cragin 2009:111).

From an operational perspective Warbrick (2004:1001) for instance, observes that a terrorist attack could range from the single-issue, single bomb throwing/planting activist, to the small elaborate multi-featured organised group. Such a single bomb throwing activist would only require low-cost probably easily available materials to make an improvised explosive device capable of producing an attack with an impact several folds its investment cost. Some of the most viscous attacks carried out in East Africa by Al-Shabaab in 2013 on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya that left at least 65 people dead and in April 2015, that killed 147 students of Garissa University required just a few men (less than 5) and automatic rifles to execute (Emmanuel Kotia and Mustapha Abdallah 2016:5). Yet these attacks elicited much global outrage and local backlash on the Kenyan government.

In the United States, 64-year-old Stephen Paddock of Mesquite, Nevada, opened fire on a crowd of about 22,000 concertgoers in Las Vegas on 1 October 2017 from the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino, killing 58 people and injuring almost 500 using only small assortment of automatic rifles. The point is that terrorism unlike insurgency require less capital and human investment and all that is required is a careful selection
of a target with significant ethnic symbolism such as businesses owned by members of the targeted ethnic group or venues frequented by members of the target ethnic group. The September 2013 attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya appears to have been selected due to its popularity with western citizens residing in Nairobi therefore offering a suitable target for embarrassing the Kenyan government.

Besides, as current innovations in artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous systems, internet of things, 3D printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, material science and quantum computing find their way into military uses so does the cost of military hardware go up and expected to stretch beyond the financial capacities of local ethnic insurgent groups.\textsuperscript{15} We can therefore postulate that going forward, terrorism is more likely to be preferred as the default strategy for waging ethnic conflict owing to its low capital and operational cost relative to the cost of waging conventional guerrilla insurgent warfare.

Furthermore, there already exists a base from which ethnic terrorism can gain momentum. Ethnographic patterns in other forms of terrorism highlight the possibility of increased terrorism playing out in the context of politically motivated ethnic conflicts. It has been shown in the literature that other forms of terrorism such as religious terrorism manifesting in multi-ethnic societies such as in sub-Saharan Africa have predominantly taken the shape of ethno-geographic divisions between major or pre-dominant religious faiths embedded in local conflicts over political, economic and common natural resources. For instance, air (2003:2) and Ousman (2004:76) observe that conflicts in Chad, Nigeria, Ghana and the Ivory Coast have at one time or another developed along the ethno-geographic division between Christians and Muslims. This already existing ethnographic configuration of other forms of conflicts that employ terrorist methods attests to the possibility of pure forms of politically motivated ethnic terrorism gaining currency in the future.

Although preconditions for the development of genuine local variants of religious and international terrorism in highly multi-ethnic societies
such as those found in sub-Sahara Africa and Asia exist, such as a lack of economic perspectives, social deprivation, a loss of cultural identity, political repression, dysfunctional states, corruption, massive unemployment, high levels of crime, porous borders, a steady flow of illicit arms, obscure financial systems, it has been argued by Ousman (2004:76-99); Forest (2011:12); McCormack (2005:3-5, 13); Kagwanja (2006:75); Polich et al (1980:3) and Mair (2003:2) that such a development is not likely because of the high degree of heterogeneity (sects, tribes, cultural values and beliefs), generating competition and sometimes rivalry among the different groups rendering the objective of political mobilization under the banner of one group neither desirable nor feasible.

However, this paper argues that unlike religious and international terrorism, ethnic terrorism does not suffer significantly from the difficulties of mobilising different agitators drawn from different ethnic persuasions. In a context where only a few large ethnic groups competing for state power are involved and locked in potential or actual violent conflict, no further mobilising ideology is required other than the claim of common geographical and ancestral origins, history, cultural traditions, languages and feelings of mutual solidarity (Betancourt and López 1993:632; Bhopal 2004:441; Harris and Findley 2014:9; Smith 1979:102; Barth 1998:2-3; Phinney 1996:919; Cederman et al 2010:99). The only additional requirement is a purposely sustained political program or policy in the form of ethnic nationalism (Calhoun 1993:217; Smith 2013:8; Smith 1979:16, 102; Cederman et al 2010:92-99; Barth 1998:6) and in this case ethnic radicalisation and a pool of readily available agitators (Cilliers 2003:99-100). In any case terrorist tactics as a strategy within the broader framework of intra-state conflicts already exist and the distinction is increasingly getting blurred (Cilliers 2003:93, 100; Howard 2010:960; Botha 2008:29; Shinn, 2006; Friedlander 1981:282; Wickham-Crowley 1990:201, 224; Kagwanja 2006:84).

Another dimension through which ethnic terrorism as we argue may confront us in the future is seen through the lenses of state terrorism. It is
the sole business of the state to use or threaten the use of violence to protect
the society from internal and or external disruption (Claridge 1996:48-52).
Any time the state elects to employ the systematic use or threat to use
violence by its agents or proxies operating with resources of the state, for
unlawful political objectives intended to generate fear and communicate a
message to a wider group than the intended victims who at the time of the
act are unarmed nor organised for aggression then it commits acts of state
terrorism (Claridge 1996:48-52; Kimunguyi (2011:3). State terrorism has
one goal in mind:’ Strengthening of government control by the complete
intimidation of a population’ through such tactics as brutal crackdowns
against opposition leaders (Forest and Giroux 2011:1; Omotola 2008:47;

In circumstances of intense highly flammable ethnic competition for
state power and an obvious imbalance of power by virtue of the control of
the instruments of the state by one or a few ethnic antagonists we can only
postulate that the counter strategy/tactics will involve terrorist methods
as considered by Laqueur (1999:8); Ignatieff (2002:1150) and Forest and
Giroux (2011:1). According to Ignatieff andLaqueur, we can expect that
as governments perceived to be ethnically controlled invest more in the
security sector so does the use of terrorist methods become attractive if a
combination of grievances, ethnic nationalism and irreconcilable ethno-
political differences exists.16 When the state unleashes terror on members
of specific ethnic groups orchestrating gross violations of rights human
have argued that such behaviour from the government is the single most
important determinant of terrorism.17 Where state terror evidently takes on
an ethnic dimension, we can only postulate that the counter reaction by the
victimised ethnic group will involve a higher incidence of terrorism if for
no other reason than fighting dirty on the principle of ‘an eye for an eye’
will balance the power between the ethnic antagonists.

Lastly, revolutions in information and communication technologies
such as the mobile phone and the internet have now become ubiquitous
features in most multi ethnic societies enabling the possibility of sophisticated propaganda, mobilisation and recruitment campaigns through mediums such as conference calls with reporters, video clips of attacks, YouTube, Facebook, twitter, WhatsApp etc. (Forest and Giroux 2011:7; Forest 2011:14; Busher 2014:8; Savitch and Ardashev 2001:2517). Busher (2014:12) for instance found that in sub-Saharan Africa alone, the most ethnolinguistically fractionalised region in the world, 112 websites were linked to violent non-state organisations. Ethnic based social media groups already offer forums thorough which ethnic nationalist and radical sentiments and grievances can be diffused in the ethnic language.

Incidents of ethnically perceived state terrorism such as extrajudicial killings of protesters easily get diffused and exaggerated to radicalise members of the victimised ethnic groups. For instance, in the wake of a flawed Presidential poll in the General Election in Kenya on August 8, 2017, protests broke out mainly in the Lake region of Kisumu that is the native region of the leading opposition Presidential contender, Raila Odinga. During these protests, the police were accused of employing excessive force and committing a host of extrajudicial killing of protesters in Kisumu and other Luo dominantly inhabited areas such as Mathare, Kibera and Baba Dogo slums in Nairobi. Images of the victims of police brutality quickly found diffusion under the hashtag #luolivesmatter#. With increased sharing of knowledge on the internet easy to comprehend ‘how to’ step by step manuals of such things as bomb making, gun handling can easily be accessed.
Conclusion

It is widely held that terrorism has never achieved its objectives Abrahams (2006). This article serves to stimulate further discourse among conflict scholars on politically motivated ethnic conflict in highly fractionalised societies. We have argued that in the case of highly fragile and fractionalised multi ethnic societies, some changes that favour insurgency as a method of waging violent ethnic conflict pave way to ethnic terrorism as the more preferred modus operandi. These include increased urbanisation and urban population, increases in the capital costs of conventional warfare, increased state terrorism and developments in information and communication. Changes in other conditions may also be indicative. In effect, respect for human rights, adherence to the rule of law and more inclusivity in the governance of multi ethnic states have widely been indicated as mitigating against the propensity to choose terrorist tactics in settling political grievances.

References


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Some scholars have sought to include certain physical attributes, such as skin colour and hair texture (Harris and Findley 2014:9) to the characteristics for distinguishing ethnic groups. However, physical attributes are more relevant for distinguishing biological categories better known as racial groups as opposed to the social ethnic groups and do not delineate useful classifications for empirical research in the social sciences as argued also by Helms and Talleyrand (1997). For instance, despite sharing similar racial features such as black skin colour and hair texture, sub-Saharan Africa alone displays the highest number of distinct ethnolinguistic and cultural groups with highest fractionalization index in the world with an average of 7.61 ethnic groups per country (Alesina et al 2003:163-164). In addition, Bhopal (2004:442) warns that inclusion of biological attributes in definitions of ethnic groups in the social sciences should be approached with caution because categorisations based on race bear a history of misuse and injustice.

Fearon and Laitin (2003:80) distinguish between perennialist and modernist (or constructivist) positions on the nature and sources of ethnic nationalism. They note that perennialist arguments stress long-standing cultural practices said to determine and distinguish ethnic groups. On the contrary, modernist theories see the ethnic nationalism as arising out of economic modernization and the development of the modern state making upward social mobility possible, but contingent on sharing the culture of the group that dominates state or society leading to separatist nationalist movements by groups facing such barriers.

In some countries such as Kenya, political competition is highly synonymous to ethnic competition. Electoral outcomes during each election year are determined solely on the tyranny of ethnic numbers rather than policy and ideological prowess of parties and their candidates. Ethnic nationalism is highly identical with political party membership.

Corruption and oppression have delegitimized many governments in the eyes of their citizens, leading them to preserve their loyalties for alternative power centers like clans, tribes and other ethnic groups instead of supporting a legitimate central government.

Polich et al 1980:6 defines an ungoverned space is a “physical or non-physical area where there is an absence of state capacity or political will to exercise control in which governments have ceded control, often allowing other organizations...
to take over the provision of services and functions that the government, in traditional
terms, should be providing.

7- Cilliers (2003:99) avers that in much of Africa, donors—not Africans—call
the shots and where a country receives the vast majority of its funds from donors, not
through taxation, accountability moves off shore since there is no incentive to build a
functioning accountable state based on mutual accountability between rulers and the ruled.

8- Rotberg 2003 in Howard (2010:966) observes that strong states provide one
basic, fundamental public good, which weak states lack: the public good of security
without which it is difficult for states to provide other basic goods that indicate a
state is stable. Howard adds that without the presence of the government and security
personnel, non-state actors such as rebel groups, terrorist cells, paramilitary units, and
insurgents can organize themselves in these spaces and engage in illegal and dangerous
activities without having to contend with the presence of the central government.

9- Even the events of 11 September 2001 could not get the UN Security Council
to agree to a common definition of terrorism.

10- Saul observes that advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action which is
not intended to cause death, serious bodily harm, or serious risk to public health or
safety does not constitute a terrorist act. He further adds that terrorist violence is
distinguishable from private violence not only because it may be political, but also
because it stems from a range of additional public oriented motives.

11- Cilliers (2003:92) adds that terrorism is by its nature an organized and
planned event or policy designed to terrorize and its unlucky victim or destructive
effect are simply a means to an end. That what makes terrorism so fearsome is that
attacks are often directed at a group, people or symbol that may not be directly linked
to their real target, often a government, system, practice or ideology; calculated to
fuel the flames upon which the original political, religious, ethnic, socioeconomic or
other motivations feed such as extremely harsher governments and security agencies
responses fuelling the flames of disaffection and hatred and inducing a spiral of action
and reaction much more powerful than the original terrorist act.


13- Media attention concentrated in cities and urban areas strengthens the
bargaining hand of those who resort to violence, by allowing quasi terrorist
organisations and their allies to identify alternative paths to reconciliation such as
cessation of terror becoming a bargaining chip, based on the idea that people would
prefer to deal with more moderate and predictable elements than face ‘uncontrollable
consequences (Savitch and Ardashev 2001:2517).

index.html


16-  According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, world total government Military expenditure in constant US dollars rose from 1441 in 1988 to 1680 in 2016. See https://sipri.org/databases/milex

17-  In addition, Collier (2004:565) has observed that rebellion occurs when grievances are sufficiently acute that people want to engage in violent protest.

18-  RailaOdinga is a member of the Luo ethnic group. See, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luo_peoples
L’AFRIQUE FACE À LA MENACE DES COMBATTANTS TERRORISTES ETRANGERS (CTE)

Par Dr Abdoulaye MAIGA(1)

Résumé

La lutte contre le terrorisme international vient de connaître une avancée avec l’adoption d’une résolution 2178 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies (CSNU) dédiée à la prévention et à la répression des Combattants Terroristes Etrangers.

Au regard de l’adoption de la résolution 2178 qui ne s’est pas faite ex-nihilo, d’autant plus que la menace des CTE remonte à un passé lointain, il est utile d’identifier les conséquences de la menace des CTE ainsi que les implications de la résolution 2178 en Afrique, en particulier dans un contexte sécuritaire très rude marqué par la montée en puissance de l’État Islamique.

Mots/Notions clefs : Djihadisme ; Combattants Terroristes Etrangers ; Etat Islamique ; migrations.

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Introduction Générale


Toutefois, force est de constater que malgré ces efforts, le terrorisme ne cesse de faire plus de victimes, soit 6789 civils tués en 2014 suite à 789 incidents terroristes, selon le Centre Africain d’Etudes et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme(1).


Dans les lignes qui suivent, il ne sera question que de terrorisme international djihadiste, qui sans être la seule forme de terrorisme, n’en demeure pas moins, la forme la plus virulente.

La résolution 2178 a pour but de lutter contre les CTE, qui sont définis comme étant : « des individus qui se rendent dans un État autre que leur État de résidence ou de nationalité, dans le dessein de commettre, d’organiser ou de préparer des actes de terrorisme, ou afin d’y participer ou de dispenser ou recevoir un entraînement au terrorisme, notamment à l’occasion d’un conflit armé ».

Etant donné que l’émergence de menace terroriste précède de plusieurs années l’adoption de la résolution 2178, nous constatons qu’elle consacre

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une ancienne réalité djihadiste, qui est aussi vielle que le djihadisme lui-même, eu égard aux particularités de cette idéologie (A) et à des applications antérieures de la migration terroriste (B).

**Les particularités du djihadisme**

L’un des points communs entre Al-Qaïda et l’État Islamique (EI), est sans doute leur adhésion à l’idéologie djihadiste, appelée encore le salafisme djihadiste.

Pour bien comprendre cette idéologie, il est impératif de souligner qu’étymologiquement, le Salafisme est dérivé du mot arabe « salaf » qui signifie les ancêtres. Il prône un retour à la pratique de l’Islam, telle que l’exerçait les ancêtres, c’est-à-dire un respect rigoriste de la sunna (le Coran, les hadiths et la sira) et exclu d’office, toute exégèse.

Egalement, le salafisme constitue l’une des sous branches du sunnisme, qui lui-même représente avec le chiisme, les 2 principales déclinaisons de l’Islam.

Sans avoir la prétention de jeter l’opprobre sur tous les salafistes, il important d’insister sur le fait que l’adhésion au salafisme ne fait pas de ses partisans des acteurs violents, car le Salafisme se subdivise en 2 grandes variantes : le Salafisme Cheikhiste et le salafisme djihadiste ou le djihadisme. Si la 1ère variante demeure non violente, on ne saurait en dire de même concernant la seconde variante, qui use de la violence pour imposer une certaine pratique de l’islam.


1- Antoine Sfeir, Dictionnaire Géopolitique de l’Islamisme, Bayard 2009, p 432.
2- Gilles Keppel, Al-Qaida dans le texte, quadrige PUF, 1ère édition, revue et augmentée, Mars 2008
Son chef d’œuvre, est un document datant du 20 Avril 1986, dans lequel il énumère les obligations ci-dessous, à l’endroit de tous les musulmans :

**La défense des terres musulmanes ;**

La participation de tous les musulmans au djihad, à l’exception des personnes suivantes : « l’aveugle, le malade en phase terminale, l’invalide, l’homme, la femme ou l’enfant opprimés qui ne peuvent pas partir et rejoindre le champ de bataille »(1)

Pour d’avantage obtenir la participation des musulmans au djihad, Azzam, affirme d’une part, que tout refus de participer au djihad constitue un péché et considère tout éventuel récalcitrant à un non croyant, et d’autre part, il retient la culpabilité collective des musulmans pour avoir refusé le djihad en Palestine et en Afghanistan.

Dans ce document, considéré comme son testament, Azzam sublime le djihad en le considérant comme l’une voie salvatrice de survie et de rayonnement de l’Islam.

La position marginale d’Azzam n’est nullement issue des sources de l’Islam, que sont le Coran puis les Hadiths. En effet, il est utile de préciser que le djihad, qui est un mot arabe, signifiant littéralement « fournir un effort ». Il revêt deux formes, que sont le djihad majeur et le djihad mineur. Le premier est un exercice auquel tous les musulmans devraient se soumettre en permanence, pour lutter contre la tentation de faire du mal, il est surtout « un combat contre soi-même, contre ses passions »(2). Quant au second, historiquement, il a été pratiqué par les musulmans, suite à une attaque des Mecquois en 624, contre le prophète Mohammed et sa communauté, afin d’annihiler la volonté de ces derniers de retourner à la Mecque. En guise de réaction, le Prophète a invité ses fidèles à se défendre physiquement contre l’agresseur.

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1- Testament d’Abou Azzam en annexe de l’ouvrage de Serge Daniel, Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique, l’industrie de l’enlèvement, p 290
2- Quentin Ludwig, Comprendre l’Islam, Eyrolles 2014, p 120
A la suite de cette précision sur les types de djihad, nous pouvons définir le salafisme djihadiste comme étant une idéologie révolutionnaire utilisant le djihad mineur, qui était historiquement pratiqué en cas de légitime défense, pour perpétrer des actes terroristes dans le but d’atteindre des objectifs politiques, à savoir : l’application de la charia ; la pratique de l’islam salafiste ; le rétablissement du califat islamique.

En application des obligations du djihadisme, le cadre de référence du musulman demeure le califat et sa foi et non sa nationalité ou son État d’origine. Par conséquent, la migration du musulman constitue un déterminant fondamental du djihadisme, ce dernier doit impérativement « secourir » ses coreligionnaires.

L’Afghanistan : application initiale de la migration djihadiste

L’histoire nous offre quelques applications antérieures de la mobilisation de combattants djihadistes pour lutter contre des non musulmans. L’une des plus illustratives, est sans nul doute, le conflit en Afghanistan.

Le 24 Décembre 1979, l’URSS soucieuse d’installer un régime communiste en Afghanistan, envahit cet État avec 40.000 soldats dans le cadre de l’opération « Prague ».

S’il est vrai que l’implantation de l’URSS s’est faite sans grande difficulté dans les premiers jours, cette dernière fera face ultérieurement à une redoutable résistance armée de la part de certaines tribus locales, appuyées par des combattants étrangers provenant majoritairement d’États arabes. Ils se faisaient appeler l’armée des moudjahidines, c’est à dire « les combattants de Dieu ».

Bien que n’ayant pas été considérés comme des terroristes à l’époque, les moudjahidines se sont mobilisés sur la base des préceptes d’Azzam et ont assimilé l’invasion soviétique à une guerre contre l’islam.

Le regroupement des moudjahidines, premier de son genre, était d’autant plus symbolique, qu’il permettra l’émergence d’acteurs, de leaders, qui joueront un rôle fondamental dans le développement du
terrorisme international. Parmi ceux-ci, figurait l’Oussama Ben Laden, que Mokeddem(1) considère comme: « l’une des figures les plus radicales à même d’attirer vers elle les activistes de la mouvance islamiste à partir des pays arabes ». Ben Laden s’impliquera profondément pour rassembler des combattants contre l’envahisseur soviétique au nom du Djihadisme.

La première application de la migration djihadiste a vu la participation de 35000 combattants provenant de 43 pays, qui ont vaillamment appuyé la résistance locale afghane entre 1982 et 1992(2) et ont réussi, grâce à d’autres facteurs(3), à obtenir le départ des militaires soviétiques de l’Afghanistan, le 15 Février 1989. L’URSS aurait perdu plus de 15.000 militaires dans le conflit.


Il ressort de ce développement que la résolution 2178 a pour objet une menace relativement ancienne. Il est vrai que son adoption a été très fortement marquée par la situation sécuritaire au Moyen-Orient. Toutefois, son utilité va au-delà du Moyen-Orient, car d’autres théâtres d’opérations djihadistes situés notamment en Afrique (Première partie) font face à la menace des Combattants Terroristes Étrangers, comme en témoigne l’implantation l’EI sur le continent africain (Deuxième partie).

1- Mohamed Mokeddem, les Afrhans Algériens, de la Djama à la Qa’ida, Editions ANEP, p5
3- Nous faisons allusion à l’appui logistique, financier et militaire fourni par les États-Unis d’Amérique et l’Arabie Saoudite.
Première partie :
aperçu de la menace des CTE au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique.

Pour bien appréhender cette menace, il est utile de mettre en exergue la situation du terrorisme au Moyen Orient, théâtre djihadiste ayant favorisé l’adoption de la résolution 2178 par le CSNU (A) toutefois, et afin de mieux analyser la menace des CTE en Afrique, nous verrons dans quelle mesure la résolution 2178 s’appliquerait en Afrique (B).

La menace des CTE au Moyen Orient : fondement de la résolution 2178

La montée en puissance de certains groupes terroristes en Syrie et en Irak, notamment l’EI, a motivé l’adoption de la résolution 2178(1). En outre, l’impact provoqué par le déplacement de milliers de djihadistes en Syrie et en Irak a poussé les auteurs de la résolution 2178 à faire de la menace des CTE « un phénomène »(2).

Ce qualificatif nous paraît problématique, à plus d’un titre. Après avoir présenté les origines lointaines de la menace des CTE dans les propos introductifs, par conséquent, celle-ci ne mériterait plus d’être considérée un phénomène, c’est-à-dire une : «…chose qui se fait remarquer par son caractère extraordinaire, singulier, exceptionnels»(3). Toutefois, si la menace des CTE n’est pas un phénomène, il n’en demeure pas pour autant que sa manifestation contemporaine revêt des éléments phénoménaux. Parmi ceux-ci on peut citer trois facteurs : la nature sui generis de l’Etat Islamique ; l’ampleur de la menace des CTE ; le rôle d’Internet.

La nature sui generis de l’Etat Islamique :

Afin de démontrer la nature phénoménale de l’EI, il est très utile de déterminer au préalable, ce qu’est un groupe terroriste djihadiste ?

1- 12ème paragraphe du préambule de la résolution 2178.
2- 13ème paragraphe du préambule de la résolution 2178.
3- http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/ph%C3%A9nom%C3%A8ne#60204
Pour répondre à cette question, le Professeur Samir Saul(1), identifie 4 générations de terrorisme, suivant une évolution historique :

- Le terrorisme primaire, soit la commission d’actes terroristes par des individus isolés ;
- Le terrorisme étatique visant à purger les ennemis d’une révolution en utilisant l’appareil d’État à l’image de la révolution française ;
- Le terrorisme groupusculeaire qui est mis en œuvre par des organisations clandestines. L’auteur cite, à titre exemplatif : l’Organisation Armée Secrète, le groupe Stern et l’Irgoun.
- Le terrorisme sponsorisé, qu’il définit comme celui: « commandité par des États (...) Des États parrains prennent en charge des djihadistes et s’en servent comme supplétifs, sous-traitants ou troupes de choc pour des guerres par procuration contre d’autres pays. Ils ont pour mission de déstabiliser, dévaster et détruire de l’intérieur ».
- L’auteur cite parmi les groupes terroristes sponsorisés, les moudjahidines Afrois et l’appui qu’ils ont reçu notamment de la part des USA et de l’Arabie Saoudite. Il poursuit en alléguant que ces moudjahidines ont donné naissance à Al-Qaïda qui est : « la matrice du djihadisme mondialisé » et il estime enfin que l’OEI n’en est qu’ « un rejeton ». Il a clairement établi que l’EI ait appris d’Al-Qaïda en termes de stratégie, de mode opératoire et surtout des échecs de ce dernier.
- Un groupe terroriste djihadiste serait un regroupement structuré d’individus partageant l’idéologie djihadiste et agissant par la violence pour réaliser des objectifs déterminés.
- L’EI à son apogée contrôlait un territoire d’environ 250.000 Km² ; il avait des structures politico-administratives administrant une

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1- Professeur Samir Saul ; « Le terrorisme, ses moutures et métamorphoses » [http://plus.lapresse.ca/screens/218d7577-31fc-4f63-a21c-a074ab8e0811[0].html](http://plus.lapresse.ca/screens/218d7577-31fc-4f63-a21c-a074ab8e0811[0].html)(Consulté, le 10 Mai 2016)

L’EI se situe en réalité entre deux entités distinctes : un État et un groupe terroriste. Ainsi, il constitue une organisation infra-étatique et supra groupusculaire.

L’ampleur :

L’ampleur est le deuxième élément exceptionnel lié à la menace actuelle des CTE. Nous examinerons ce facteur au double plan quantitatif et qualitatif.

L’angle quantitatif :

Des estimations croisées par le CAERT, le nombre de CTE au Moyen-Orient oscille entre 21976-28963. Une telle proportion phénoménale n’a jamais été atteinte auparavant. Selon les mêmes données, environ 100 États ont au moins un citoyen dans les rangs de l’EI.

L’angle qualitatif :

Il nous permet d’interroger l’origine géographique des CTE qui rejoignent l’EI. Cet exercice nous révèle la présence massive de CTE occidentaux au Moyen-Orient, en particulier les États suivants : États-Unis d’Amérique ; France, Grande Bretagne ; Suède etc…

Ce dernier constat a le mérite de mitiger l’opinion répandue qui consiste à lier la cause du terrorisme à la situation politique ou socio-économique. Sans nous engager dans la recherche des déterminants de cette migration terroriste occidentale, nous constatons le déséquilibre patent, en termes
d’Indice de Développement Humain entre ces Etats occidentaux et d’autres Etats ayant leur ressortissant parmi les CTE au Moyen-Orient.

**Le rôle d’Internet :**

Vecteur de la mondialisation, Internet a contribué à faire du monde un village planétaire, grâce aux services qu’il offre(1), à savoir : le courrier électronique (e-mail) ; le Web (les pages avec liens et contenus multimédia de ses sites Web) ; l’échange de fichiers par FTP (File Transfer Protocol) ; les communications téléphoniques et la transmission de vidéos et d’audio en direct (ou streaming).

Au fil de son développement, cet outil qui apparaissait initialement comme exclusivement porteur de vertus, est de plus en plus objet de controverses entre le partisans d’un contrôle d’Internet et ceux qui militent pour une liberté totale sur la toile, à cause des menaces et risques du fait de son par les groupes terroristes.

Aujourd’hui, les experts remarquent l’excellente maitrise d’Internet par l’EI, qui a de très loin dépassé Al-Qaïda, initiateur de l’usage d’Internet à des fins djihadistes.

Qu’est ce qui peut bien pousser un groupe terroriste à utiliser Internet ?

Différents auteurs et organisations se sont penchés sur la question, enavançant des arguments. Ainsi, pour l’ONUDC(2), les groupes terroristes utilisent internet pour 6 raisons : la propagande (recrutement, la radicalisation et l’incitation au terrorisme); le financement la formation; la planification ; l’exécution et le cyber attaque. Ces raisons sont partagées presque totalement par le Professeur Weismann(3) qui insiste, à la différence de l’ONUDC, sur l’usage d’Internet comme arme psychologique afin de :


« de miner la détermination des adversaires, de susciter dans leurs rangs des complices ou des alliés, d’obtenir d’opinions publiques apeurées et trompées les abandons souhaités, de remporter enfin de véritables victoires sans recourir à la violence, ou en la localisant et en la limitant »\(^{(1)}\)

La nécessité de circonscrire les éléments phénoménaux liés à la menace des CTE ont justifié l’urgence et la nécessité d’adopter la résolution 2178. Cette dernière a été très fortement influencée par la situation sécuritaire au Moyen Orient, comme en atteste le constat des auteurs de la résolution 2178, qui ont affirmé que les CTE « contribuent à intensifier les conflits, à les prolonger et à en compliquer singulièrement le règlement »\(^{(2)}\). Les termes des propos décrivent exactement la situation syrienne, où la communauté internationale rencontre du mal à séparer les groupes armés des groupes terroristes. En outre, la résolution fait « particulièrement »\(^{(3)}\) référence expressément à l’État islamique en Iraq et du Levant et son rôle dans la sélection et le recrutement des CTE.

La menace des CTE sur les théâtres d’opérations djihadistes en Afrique, avant l’implantation de l’EI :

L’identification des théâtres d’opérations des CTE en Afrique.

De l’analyse de la définition des CTE, il ressort que le CSNU a ciblé 2 objectifs finaux recherchés par les migrants djihadistes : les actes de terrorisme et l’entraînement au terrorisme. En fonction de ces objectifs, il y a des objectifs intermédiaires, comme l’atteste l’emploi de la conjonction de coordination « ou » marquant le choix entre les différents objectifs intermédiaires. Lorsqu’il s’agit des actes de terrorisme, comme objectif final, les CTE migrent pour deux raisons, à savoir : « commettre, organiser » ou « préparer » ; quant au second objectif final, l’entraînement au terrorisme, les CTE ont le choix entre 3 possibilités : « participer » ; « dispenser » ; « recevoir ».

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2- 11\(^{ème}\) paragraphe du préambule de la résolution 2178
3- 13\(^{ème}\) paragraphe du préambule de la résolution 2178
Aussi, la résolution 2178 donne des précisions sur le processus de migration(1) des CTE, en répartissant les États en 3 catégories : « les États d’où ils viennent »; « ceux par lesquels ils transitent »; « et ceux où ils se rendent ». Parmi ces 3 catégories d’États, nous nous intéresserons particulièrement à la destination des CTE, car c’est à partir de ce lieu que la majorité des objectifs intermédiaires peuvent se réaliser cumulativement. Les multiples avantages offerts par ces lieux en font des sanctuaires.

En appliquant la résolution 2178 à l’Afrique, et en opérant le choix délibéré de ne pas différencier les objectifs intermédiaires recherchés par les CTE, on retrouve des zones géographiques africaines qui correspondent aux déterminants précités. Ces zones géographiques dont question, sont soit à cheval sur au moins 2 États ou sont situés non loin des frontières entre plusieurs États, en général ces zones sont faiblement sécurisées, faisant d’elles des zones grises.


Les groupes et entités terroristes opérant en Afrique et inscrits sur la liste précitée, sont mentionnés dans le tableau ci-dessous, comme suit :

1- 11ème paragraphe du préambule de la résolution 2178
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zones grises</th>
<th>Nom des groupes et entités</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L’espace sahéli-saharien</td>
<td>- Al-Mourabitoune ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Al Mouakaoune Biddam (les signataires du pacte par le sang) ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Mouvement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ansar Dine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Bassin du Lac Tchad</td>
<td>- Boko Haram ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ansaru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La corne de l’Afrique</td>
<td>- Al-Shebbab ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Al-Haramain: Ethiopia branch ;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Al-Haramain Foundation (Union of the Comoros);</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (Somalia);</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Al-Haramayn Foundation (Kenya);</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Al-Haramayn Foundation (Tanzania);</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya /Aaiiai;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Global Relief Foundation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Les profils des CTE en Afrique**

La question des CTE opérant en Afrique ne semble pas faire l’objet du même intérêt que celui accordé à la même menace au Moyen Orient, comme l’atteste l’abondance de données statistiques et d’articles scientifiques. Or l’Afrique n’est pas en reste, loin s’en faut.

Nous avons identifié deux types de CTE qui alimentent le terrorisme dans les zones grises du terrorisme djihadisme en Afrique, il s’agit des CTE africains et des CTE non africains.

- **Les CTE africains** : il s’agit de tout individu dont l’État de résidence ou de nationalité situé en Afrique, migre pour rejoindre un théâtre d’opérations terroriste situé en Afrique, c’est-à-dire dans l’une des zones grises. Les CTE emblématiques africains sont :
Mokhtar Belmokhtar de nationalité algérienne (l’espace sahéli-saharien) ; Aboubacar Shekau de nationalité nigériane (Bassin du lac Tchad) ; Oumar Abou Oubaïda de nationalité somalienne (la corne de l’Afrique).

- **Les CTE non africains** : ce sont des individus, originaires et/ou venant d’Etats situés en dehors de l’Afrique et qui ont rejoint les théâtres d’opérations terroristes situés en Afrique.

A l’absence de statistiques concernant la menace des CTE africains, s’ajoute la faible prise en compte de la participation de non-africains au djihad en Afrique, malgré les alertes données, à l’instar de celle du Vice-président Kenyan William Ruto qui a annoncé que : «des combattants étrangers, dont certains Européens, sont sur le terrain dans la Corne de l’Afrique»(1).

Les CTE jouent un grand rôle dans l’intensification du djihadisme en Afrique, aussi bien dans l’incitation au terrorisme que dans la perpétration d’actes terroristes. On peut évoquer à l’appui de cette affirmation, le cas de la secte prosélytique pakistanaise Dawa-Al Tabligh qui promeut la pratique d’un Islam radical. D’ailleurs, elle a joué un rôle non négligeable dans la radicalisation de Iyad Ag Ghali, chef du groupe terroriste Ansa Dine(2).

Concernant la perpétration d’actes terroristes par les CTE non africains, le cas de la Britannique Samantha Lewthwaite(3) reste significatif. Surnommée la veuve blanche et opérant auprès des Al-Shabaab, elle est suspectée d’avoir activement participé à l’attentat contre un centre commercial de Nairobi, le 21 Septembre 2013, ayant entraîné la mort de 63 personnes, ainsi que celui de l’Université de Garissa, ayant eu lieu, le 02 Avril 2015 et qui a entraîné la mort de 148 personnes.

Dans l’espace sahéli-saharien, on peut évoquer le cas de Gilles le Guen, un djihadiste français qui combattait auprès d’AQMI et qui a été interpellé par l’Armée Française, le 29 Avril 2013, lors de l’opération Serval.

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3- [http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/International/La-veuve-blanche-reine-de-la-terreur-766518] (Consulté, le 22 Juin 2016)
S’il est vrai que la menace des CTE n’est pas nouvelle en Afrique, il ressort, tout de même que l’implantation de l’EI en Libye amplifiera la menace(1).

**Deuxième partie :**


Avant de présenter les différentes menaces que pose la présence de l’EI (B) il est tout indiqué d’évaluer au préalable sa présence en Libye (A).

**La présence de l’Etat Islamique en Libye :**


Pour bien évaluer la situation sécuritaire en Libye, il est très important de présenter la Libye avant la chute de Kadhafi, ce qui permettra également de comprendre l’intérêt que portent les groupes terroristes, dont l’EI, pour cet État.

La Libye couvre une superficie de 1 759 540 km² peuplée, il est peuplé d’environ 6 millions et demi d’habitants, avec un PNB de 62 milliards de dollars. En outre, selon la Corporation nationale pétrolière d’État de la Libye, la production nationale s’élevait à 1,5 million de barils le jour(3), faisant de la Libye le 4ème producteur de pétrole en Afrique après le Nigéria.

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1- Lorsqu’on débute des recherches sur les CTE, on constate une abondance de sources relatives à la menace au Moyen-Orient, ce qui n’est malheureusement pas le cas pour le rôle des CTE sur les théâtres d’opérations situés en Afrique, à l’exception des CTE qui opèrent en Libye aux côtés de l’EI.


3- [https://fr.sputniknews.com/international/201512081020147005-libye-insecurite-chaos-economique/] (Consulté, le 10 Janvier 2015)
Sur le plan militaire, la situation n’était pas moins bonne. Le budget de la défense était estimé à 1.3 Milliards de Dollars\(^{(1)}\) et l’armée libyenne était l’une des mieux équipées d’Afrique. L’on comprend alors, la facilité relative avec laquelle les milices ont pu s’armer lourdement et puissamment en pillant les dépôts d’armes, faisant ainsi de la Libye « un arsenal à ciel ouvert »\(^{(2)}\)

L’implantation de l’EI en Libye, a donc été aisée grâce d’une part à la disponibilité des armes et d’autre part à la paralysie politique de la Libye, caractérisée par l’existence de 2 gouvernements et de 2 parlements, respectivement à Tobrouk et à Tripoli, le tout sur fonds d’affrontements entre milices.

L’EI occupait 20% du territoire Libyen\(^{(3)}\) tel que l’illustre la carte ci-dessous\(^{(4)}\), avec une force combattante d’environ 5000 combattants.

Selon un rapport du Conseil de Sécurité, il se financerait de deux façons, d’un côté, localement, grâce aux trafics multiformes, notamment celui des drogues, des migrants, les revenus issus des rançons contre kidnapping, de l’autre côté grâce au soutien financier envoyé par l’EI en Irak au Levant, qui dispose de plus de ressources financières, issues essentiellement de la contrebande de pétrole.

Pour l’instant la contrebande de pétrole par l’EI en Libye n’est pas une source de financement, à la différence de la Syrie, la preuve est qu’il détruit ces infrastructures pétrolières, certainement pour mieux fragiliser les autorités en place et entraver le règlement du conflit.

\(^{(1)}\) [http://militarybudget.org/libya/][Consulté, le 15 Juin 2015]
\(^{(2)}\) [http://www.marianne.net/Trafic-d-armes-la-Libye-un-arsenal-a-ciel-ouvert_a211456.html][Consulté, le 20 Juin 2016]
\(^{(3)}\) [www.slateafrique.com/630889/libye-etat-islamique-daech][Consulté, le 20 Juin 2016]
Les menaces proprement dites :

Au regard, de cette implantation de l’EI en Afrique, il ressort les menaces suivantes : une amplification de la migration djihadiste (A) ; la diffusion de la menace en direction des Etats voisins (B) ; la « coopétition » entre l’EI et AQMI (C)

L’amplification de la migration djihadiste :

L’implantation de l’EI en Libye a suscité 3 types de migrations, symbolisés par les « 3R » à savoir : le retour ; le repli ; le ralliement.
Le retour :

Il consiste pour des combattants terroristes qui ont évolué auprès de l’EI au Moyen Orient ou en Lybie à regagner leur Etat d’origine ou de départ situé en Afrique. Ces retournés suscitent l’inquiétude sur le plan sécuritaire, car leurs intentions sont souvent ignorées de même que leur identification. L’attentat contre un hôtel de Sousse commis le 26 Juin 2015 par Seifeddine Rezgui un tunisien, vraisemblablement formé par l’EI en Lybie, constitue un exemple de la menace posée par ces combattants terroristes appelés « les retournés ».

Le repli :

C’est un mouvement rétrograde planifié des combattants terroristes fuyant le Moyen Orient, à cause des opérations militaires en cours, vers une autre zone plus sûre, que constitue la Lybie.

En effet, la situation politique et sécuritaire en Libye, contribue à faire de cet Etat une zone de repli pour l’Organisation de l’Etat Islamique. La menace du repli peut être illustrée par la présence de combattants terroristes non africains en Lybie, parmi lesquels figurait Abou Nidal de nationalité iraquienne, chef de l’Etat Islamique à Derna.

Le ralliement :

Il s’agit du regroupement opéré par les sympathisants et autres sympathisants africains ou autres, de l’EI, convaincus par les idéaux djihadistes ou tentés par l’aventure, et qui par faute de moyens financiers, logistiques ou par respect des consignes de l’EI au Moyen-Orient, se dirigent vers la Lybie qui est plus accessible.

Les sources ouvertes relatent, quasi-quotidiennement des arrestations sporadiques par la police de jeunes africains ou européens se rendant en Lybie pour rejoindre l’EI.

La diffusion et/ou l’aggravation de la menace djihadiste en Afrique :

Il est utile de préciser que l’implantation de l’EI en Libye s’est effectuée dans un contexte de reconfiguration marquée par l’allégeance

Fort de cette présence, l’EI a multiplié les attentats spectaculaires en Libye et dans les États voisins, on peut citer :

- le kidnapping, suivi de la décapitation du touriste français Hervé Gourdel, le 24 Décembre 2014 en Algérie ;
- l’attaque du musée du Bardo en Tunisie, le 18 Mars 2015 ;
- Les attaques terroristes coordonnées et audacieuses contre l’armée égyptienne dans le nord-Sinaï en Egypte, le 1er Juillet 2015 ;
- Les attentats réguliers dans les États riverains du Lac Tchad, dont ceux de N'djamena contre la Police, le 15 Juin 2015 ;
- L’attentat dans le Sinaï contre un avion d’une compagnie russe, le 31 Octobre 2015 ;
- l’attaque audacieuse contre la ville de Ben Guerdène, survenue le 07 Mars 2016.

**La « coopétition » entre l’EI et Al-Qaïda**

Le terme coopétition est un néologisme combinant deux termes : la compétition et la coopération. Bien avant l’EI, c’est d’abord Al-Qaïda qui a réussi à créer des filiales en Afrique, parmi lesquelles Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique et les Al-Shebbab. Après s’être opposé en Syrie,
l’Afrique constitue dorénavant le nouveau théâtre de confrontations entre ces groupes djihadistes, essentiellement sous deux formes :

- Une opposition armée entre les 2 mouvances, comme celle qui a eu lieu à Derna en Libye, le 9 juin 2015, suite à l’assassinat par l’EI de Nasser al-Aker, leader de la brigade des martyrs d’Abu Salim. Cette unité est un groupe armé du Conseil de la Choura des Moudjahidines proches d’Al-Qaïda ;

- une escalade macabre contre les populations civiles, les symboles étatiques. Pour occuper l’espace médiatique, les groupes djihadistes se lancerait à une démonstration de force, dont le vainqueur sera celui qui aurait réussi à être plus létale.

- Une compétition sporadique entre les deux groupes terroristes. Pour mieux accentuer la menace terroriste et faire face aux opérations de contre-terrorisme, les terroristes seront tentés de mutualiser leurs forces.

**Conclusion Générale**

Si l’Afrique pendant plus d’une décennie n’arrive pas à « éliminer »(1) le terrorisme, djihadiste notamment, il est à craindre que l’arrivée de l’EI ne complexifie davantage cette lutte.

Face à la migration djihadiste, il est très urgent d’adopter des mesures idoines, parmi lesquelles, le contrôle des frontières, pour justement maitriser dans un premier temps les 3R, avant de pouvoir l’interdire. Toutefois pour que ce contrôle soit un réel succès, il est impératif de renforcer les capacités des Etats à surveiller leurs frontières nationales, aussi la coopération internationale pourrait jouer un rôle important dans cette lutte. A ce sujet, il ressort des médias que la Tunisie a réussi à identifier 3000 de ses ressortissants qui ont rejoint l’EI en Libye et au Moyen Orient.

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1- Modalités de fonctionnement du Centre Africain d’Etudes et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme, EX.CL/195 (VII) Rev.1
Ce résultat très appréciable mériterait d’être partagé avec tous les Etats, en particulier les Etats voisins. Il est quasiment certain que ces individus, se sachant rechercher, ne risqueront pas de se présenter à un poste frontalier tunisien, bien au contraire, ils tenteront une manœuvre de contournement pour rejoindre la Tunisie ou tout autre Etat, en exploitant la porosité des frontières.

Nous avons démontré dans cette étude que la menace des CTE existe en réalité en Afrique, depuis plusieurs années. L’Afrique a également connu, il y a de cela plusieurs années, un mouvement de retour de combattants djihadistes, bien que n’ayant pas été considéré comme des terroristes en ce moment : les Afghans algériens (citoyens algériens ayant participé au djihad contre l’Afghanistan). Selon Mokeddem(1), ces combattants ont joué un rôle négatif dans l’insurrection islamiste en Algérie, car ils : « importeront des idées nouvelles qu’ils s’empresseront de mettre en pratique, transformant l’Algérie en un champ de bataille où seront exposées les pires formes de cruauté ».

En consacrant les CTE comme une menace, la résolution 2178 s’est distinguée par sa grande importance. Elle tranche définitivement la question de l’action des Etats face à la migration terroriste. Ces derniers se divisaient en 2 groupes, d’une part, il y avait des Etats qui même sachant la destination djihadiste de leurs citoyens, restaient inactifs au nom du respect de leur liberté d’aller et de venir et d’autre part, des Etats avant-gardistes qui sanctionnaient la migration djihadiste. Grâce à la résolution 2178 qui a une valeur juridique coercitive, tous les Etats ont désormais l’obligation positive de réprimer la migration djihadiste.

Cependant, nous suggérons que la transposition de la résolution 2178 dans l’ordonnancement juridique national s’accompagne d’une sensibilisation des agents d’application de la loi sur son contenu et l’importance de son application rigoureuse, en mettant l’accent sur le fait qu’un combattant terroriste est tout individu qui migre pour rejoindre l’un des groupes ou

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entités terroristes inscrits sur la liste. En conséquence la menace des CTE n’est pas liée exclusivement à l’EI, encore moins au Moyen Orient.

Cette recommandation nécessiterait de s’intéresser à la migration djihadiste en Afrique intra muros, puis d’établir des bases de données des CTE, qui devraient être partagées entre les Etats.

En définitive, la résolution 2178, sans être la solution absolue contre le terrorisme, a le mérite de s’attaquer directement à la stratégie de dénégation des frontières nationales par les groupes djihadistes, qui recrutent ses combattants sur la base de la foi. Egalement, la lutte contre la migration djihadiste devrait s’effectuer concomitamment avec les autres formes de lutte contre le terrorisme, notamment les actions préventives. Ces dernières permettraient de cibler les candidats au départ pour rejoindre un théâtre djihadiste, puis d’empêcher leur voyage. Il est aussi très important d’offrir des garanties de protection pour ceux qui ont rejoint l’EI et qui sont aptes pour des programmes de déradicalisation, car en l’absence d’une telle mesure, certains n’auront alors d’autres choix que de lutter.
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BETTER LATE THAN NEVER: THE IMPERATIVE OF A SUB-REGIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN AREA

C. Nna-Emeka Okereke

Abstract

The Lake Chad Basic Commission (LCBC) area is fertile for terrorist activities. This is not unconnected to its history of wars, existence of armed groups, experienced fighters and teeming youth population that are vulnerable to extremist narrative espoused by anti-state groups. Member states in the region are at various stages of fragility and are handicapped by crisis of leadership, weak institutions, porous borders and under-governed spaces. These realities are exploited by terrorist organisations to threaten the security of states in the sub-region. The region which falls within Africa’s turbulent Sahel belt therefore requires robust counterterrorism strategy to curtail and eliminate the scourge of terrorism.

Keywords: counterterrorism, insurgency, strategy, sub-region, terrorism

Introduction

Since the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York, the scourge of terrorism has emerged a major challenge to the international community. This has informed the intensification of measures at various national and regional levels as well as the wider global community to counter the scourge of terrorism. The United Nations adopted the Global Counterterrorism Strategy in 2006. This strategy is based on four pillars notably measures to address the conditions conducive for the spread of terrorism.

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terrorism and measures to combat terrorism. Others are measures to build the capabilities of states to combat the spread of terrorism and measures to ensure the respect of human rights in and rule of law in the fight against terrorism. Earlier in 2002, the African Union adopted the Plan of Action of the High Level Ministerial Meeting to Implement the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Protocol on the Combating and Prevention of Terrorism of 1999. Similarly, the European Union

It is however thought provoking that despite the growing threats of terrorism on the larger global scene and the efforts made by other regions to coordinate effective regional counterterrorism response strategy, member states of the Lake Chad Basin area did not put in place adequate mechanisms to counter the scourge of terrorism. This apparent lack of preparedness is presently being exploited by terrorist organisations against member states of the region.

In the past decade, there has been growing concerns on the challenge of terrorism and violent extremism in the LCBC area. This is as a result of the activities of non-state actors like the AQIM, Boko Haram and several other extremist groups and armed militants that constitute threats to the state. As a response, the political leadership within the sub-region have commenced measures to evolved robust sub-regional strategy to steer the joint fight against terrorism. It is against this background that this paper examines the imperative of a sub-regional counterterrorism strategy for the LCBC in the joint fight against terrorism.

**Terrorist Threat and Vulnerabilities in the Lake Chad Basin Area**

The Lake Chad Basin encompasses the area covered by member states of the Lake Chad Basic Commission (LCBC) which include Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Libya. The LCBC was established on 22 May 1964 by Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria which signed the Fort Lamy (now N’Djamena) Convention. These countries share access to the Lake Chad. The CAR and Libya joined in 1996 and 1998 respectively. In 2000, while Democratic Republic of Congo,
Egypt and Sudan were placed on observer status till it ratifies the founding convention. The Commission’s primary mandate is to ensure equitable and sustainable management of the Lake Chad while preserving the ecosystem and promoting sub-regional integration, peace and security in the basin.²

In the last decade, member states of the LCBC have experienced varying degrees of insecurities ranging from armed conflicts, environmental stress, dwindling water resources to terrorism and illicit transnational trafficking. This is not unconnected to the nature of politics, structure of the state system, social composition and the geo-demographic dynamics within the sub-region which stimulates and sustains recurring insecurities. Political exclusion and weak institutions of governance have led to violent conflicts and political uncertainties in countries like Central African Republic, Chad, Nigeria and Sudan. The Seleka rebellion in CAR and its aftermath is consequence of leadership failures, political exclusion and corruption, culture of impunities and weaknesses that characterised state power in the country. For decades, political ascension in CAR was characterised by coups, counter coups and rebellion stressing the utility of force for political ascension. Large portion of CAR’s territory especially in the northern frontiers remain alienated with government presence and control making them vulnerable to rebel activities and alternative state structures.

The crisis in CAR outlived the Bozize and Djotodia regimes degenerating to clear inter-religious hostilities between the majority Christians and minority Muslim populations that were previously co-existing in relative peace. In February 2014, the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda North Africa expressed shock over the hostilities against Muslims in CAR by the largely Christian anti Balaka militia.³ It is speculated that if not tactfully resolved, inter religious hostility in CAR could attract extremist organisations that exploit conflicts situations affecting Muslims to export and sustain violent extremism in the sub-region.

Chad which also is a visible military player in the Lake Chad Basic Area has evolved through a turbulent history of political instability and violent political change in the past four decades. President Idris Berby
who came to power in 1990 through rebellion was also confronted by rebellion from armed groups such as Union des forces pour la Democratie et le Developpemnet (UFDD), Union des forces pour la democratique et le developpemnet-Fondamentale (UFDD-F) and Rassemblement des forces pour le changement (RFC). While containing its internal conflicts, Chad also shares international boundaries with Sudan’s embattled western region of Darfur to the east and volatile Central African Republic to the south. Chad also shares borders with the CAR. Yet her 87 kilometre boundaries with Nigeria is situated in the latter’s north east where the Boko Haram operates with the activities of the sect resulting in the desertion of 9 islands of the Lake which the insurgents occupied. These conflict prone neighbourhoods heighten Chad’s vulnerability to terrorism and other insecurities.

In Nigeria, violent extremism by the Boko Haram has made the country a theatre of terrorism. Northern Nigeria especially the northeast states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe have emerged frontline states for terrorist aggression. Towns like Abuja, Azare, Jos, Kaduna, Kano and several other towns and villages in the northeast have been ravaged by Boko Haram elements in desperate bid to establish a caliphate in the country. The Boko Haram has internationalised it terrorism through cross border attacks in neighbouring Cameroon while it occupied eight Islands on the Lake Chad. In June 2014, the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee approved the inclusion of Boko Haram and its leader, Abubakar Shekau to its list of entities and individuals targeted for financial sanctions in June 2014. This listing prohibits the provision of financial support to the sect and subjects any individual or entities providing such to sanctions.⁴

The Boko Haram insurgency is not without its transnational humanitarian consequences. In November 2014, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) declared that over 100,000 Nigerians fled to Niger since 2013 to escape the Boko Haram attacks while about 2,700 Nigerian refugees are in Chad.⁵ About, 13,000 Nigerians fled to the towns of Guider and Gashiga in North region of Cameroon as well as Bourha,
Mogode and Boukouda in the Far North following Boko Haram attacks on Mubi in late October 2014. Prior to the Mubi attacks, an estimated 43,000 Nigerian refugees were already in Cameroon of which 17,000 were at Minawao refugee camp. Within Nigeria, the UNHCR also estimates that deadly and audacious attacks executed by the Boko Haram have led to the displacement of 650,000 people. So far, over 12,000 deaths have been attributed to the Boko Haram crisis 2009. It is this trend that transformed Nigeria to become a country of concern for terrorism analysis as she is currently ranked fourth by in the Global Terrorism Index of Institute for Economics and Peace.

Like other member states of the LCBC, Libya also has security challenges associated with violent extremism and armed insurgency. Following since the collapse of the Ghadaffi’s regime in October 2011, Libya has been awash with weapons seized from the country’s armoury during the anti-Ghadaffi revolution. This has intensified sectarian fighting between Zintan group and Operational Cell of Libyan Revolution while General Khalifa Hafta launches offensive in eastern Libya. Such internal conflicts within Libya threaten governance, security and stability in the country with implications to contiguous neighbours like Niger which is a member of the LCBC. Niger’s vast under-controlled landmass has been a channel through which illicit arms from Libya spread to anti-state groups within and beyond the Lake Chad Basin area countries.

In 2012, the United Nations Security Council’s Panel of Experts on Libya observed that illicit arms smugglers have been identified to move southwards from Zintan in Libya to Chad and Niger, selling munitions to militants across the Sahel. Smuggled weapons include rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, automatic rifles, ammunition, grenades, explosives (Semtex), Man Portable Air Defence System (MANPAD), and light anti-aircraft artillery (light-caliber bi-tubes) mounted on vehicles. Arms seizures by the Niger authorities demonstrate this. The dangers posed by these weapons were captured by the Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou in the following words:
The Libyan crisis amplifies the threats confronting countries in the region. We are already exposed to fundamentalist threat, to the menace of criminal organisations, drug traffickers, arms traffickers… All the more so because weapons depots have been looted in Libya and such weapons have been disseminated throughout the region. Yes I am very worried: we fear that there may be a breakdown of the Libyan state, as in the case of Somalia, eventually bringing to power religious extremists.¹⁰

The Republic of Niger shares borders with Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali and Nigeria. There exist active extremist groups operating in these countries which pose threats to security of Niger. The Movement for Oneness and Justice in Africa (MUJAO) executed two coordinated suicide attacks on at Arlit and Agadez in Niger Republic on Thursday 23 May 2013. The group linked the assaults to Niger’s cooperation with France in the war against Islamists in Mali. One of the attacks was inside a military camp in the city of Agadez while the second assault was inside Somair uranium mine in the remote town of Arlit which is operated by French nuclear group, Areva. Both attacks led to the death of about 20 persons and were allegedly supervised by Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Al Qaeda linked group such as the Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb also violate Niger’s territory at intervals. Yet, further deterioration of security situation at her southern borders with Nigeria has led to inflow of refugees to the Diffa region of Niger while cross border trafficking in illicit arms persists.

So far, Cameroon has existed as a stable and peaceful country in the Lake Chad Basin area which has not recorded deep internal conflicts. While this is commendable, she has however been exposed to emerging pressures from troubled neighbourhood as refugees fleeing armed conflicts in Nigeria and Central African Republic (CAR) cross over to Cameroon for refuge. Cameroon began receiving refugees from CAR in 2006. In February 2014, some 20,000 refugees fled CAR for Garoua Boulai in Cameroon. This brought the number of CAR refugees that fled to Cameroon since March 2013 to 35,142.¹¹ Besides the flight of refugees
from CAR, Cameroon concurrently play host to refugees fleeing from Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates over 57,000 persons have become refugees in neighbouring countries especially Cameroon due to Boko Haram assault. Such cross-border movement of distressed persons add pressures to the immediate host communities and could become a source of security vulnerability if not well managed.

Furthermore, cross border activities of Boko Haram especially in Northern Cameroon also demonstrates the latter’s vulnerabilities. The sect has proven its capability to export terrorism to bordering countries through the intermittent kidnapping of French nationals in Northern Cameroon in Dabanga and Nguetchewe in February and November 2013. The sect also kidnapped two Italian priests and a Canadian nun in May 2014 while the wife of Ahmadou Ali, Cameroon’s Deputy Prime Minister was also kidnapped in July 2014. Other cross border assaults executed by the Boko Haram in Northern Cameroon include attacks on Gorsi Tourou and Mayo Tsanaga Division.

Evidently, although Cameroon is a relatively peaceful and stable country within the Lake Chad Basin area, armed conflicts in neighbouring states stimulate cross border stress and insecurities within her territory. These have led to the deterioration of security situation in recent times arising from infiltration operation and repeated heavy attacks by the Boko Haram on the position of her armed forces at borders.

The political dynamics in Egypt since the collapse of the regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Mohammed Morsi have also contributed to heighten violent extremism that breeds terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin area. Egypt is confronted by the existential threat posed by Islamic militants such as the Ajnad Misr and the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis group. These Islamist groups have recruited experienced foreign fighters with which they stage coordinated attacks against Egypt. The Ansar Bayt al Maqdis pledged loyalty to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in October
2014. This marks the first significant international affiliate of the ISIS. It is expected that by the merger, the ISIS will provide finances, weapons and recruits to the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in the latter’s struggle against the Egyptian government. Yet, between Egypt and Libya, border areas around Egyptian village of Salloum have become increasingly dangerous and attractive for cross border movement of deserters loyal to Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar and various extremist militias.

The Lake Chad Basin area further falls within Africa’s arc of instability characterized by various illicit transnational trafficking involving arms, narcotics and human trafficking. This stretches from Mauritania in the west through Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Sudan to the eastern frontiers of Africa. Some countries in the area exhibit features of state fragility and have been characterised by history of wars, low intensity conflicts and illicit transnational trafficking by organised criminal syndicates and terrorists. Other features include the persistence of porous borders and several under-governed spaces that serve as sanctuary for terrorists. Furthermore, climatic and environmental stress resulting to desert encroachment and dwindling water resources has further contributed to impoverish large chunk of the local populace making some sympathetic to anti-government narratives from extremist groups in the sub-region. These realities have therefore sustained the proclivity to crisis and chaos making the sub-region vulnerable for terrorist acts. The necessity for adoption and implementation of a robust counterterrorism strategy for the Lake Chad Basin has therefore become imperative.

**Sub-regional Counterterrorism Initiatives in the Lake Chad Basin Area**

“Our basin is exposed to insecurity because of Boko Haram’s permanent threat. If we don’t eradicate them, we won’t be capable of saving our Lake Chad. ...The time has come to act and we must decide today,”

*President Idriss Derby*
The scourge of terrorism that engulfed the Sahel region especially the LCBC area since the advent of 21st Century has stimulated official response transcending national barriers within and beyond the LCBC countries. This became imperative to counter the terrorist threats posed by the Boko Haram, AQIM and other extremist cells using the regions as sanctuary for terrorism. Consequently, member states of the LCBC at national and sub-regional levels have taken measures to combat the terrorist threats. Cameroon established a fourth military region within the army and intensified intelligence operations. The Republic of Niger strengthened her forces along its border with Nigeria while Nigeria enacted anti-terrorism legislations while establishing the 7 Division of the Nigerian Army to boost its counterterrorism response against the Boko Haram.

At the sub-regional level, the first involvement of the LCBC towards a semi-peacekeeping or peace enhancement organisation emerged at the 14th Ordinary Summit of the LCBC Heads of State and Government and the 57th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held separately at N’djamena, Chad in April 2012. This was a direct consequence of concerns over scourge of terrorism and incessant cross border crimes within traversing the sub-region. Following resolutions at the Summit, security meetings involving the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Defence Staff of member states were held in Niamey in May 2012. It was at the Niamey meeting that the resolution to transform the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) on Security involving Chad, Niger and Nigeria was adopted. Cameroon which was not part of the MJTF was absent at the meeting.15 The structure and mandate of the MJTF was expanded to include Cameroon and Central African Republic. Due to the security challenges confronting Libya, she was excused from participating in the MJTF.

At the summit level, the Heads of States and Governments of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, France, Niger and Nigeria met with representatives of the European Union, United Kingdom and United States in Paris, France on 17 May 2014 to deliberate on security in Nigeria. This summit
strengthened efforts at international mobilisation to combat Boko Haram activities in Nigeria.

The Paris summit adopted bilateral and multilateral measures to strengthen international responses against the Boko Haram. At the bilateral levels, the following measures were also to be initiated and sustained by Nigeria and her neighbours:

a- Implement coordinated patrols with the aim of combating Boko Haram and locating the school girls abducted at Chibok in northeast Nigeria.

b- Establish a system to pool intelligence in order to support this operation

c- Establish mechanisms for information exchange on trafficking of weapons and bolster measures to secure weapons stockpiles.

d- Establish mechanism for border surveillance.16

In addition to the bilateral measures, the summit emphasised the importance of regional cooperation by Nigeria and her neighbours to build analysis and response capabilities that will contribute to enhancing the security of all population and the rule of law in the areas threatened by the Boko Haram. This informed the decision of the summit to establish an intelligence pooling unit and also draw up and implement a sub-regional counterterrorism strategy in the framework of the LCBC. The United States, United Kingdom, France and the European Union agreed to coordinate their support for these regional measures through technical expertise, training programmes and support for border area management programmes.17 In addition, participants also pledged commitment to accelerating the implementation of international sanctions against the Boo Haram, Ansaru and their leadership at the United Nations framework which was achieved in June 2014 with the inclusion of Abubakar Shekau and the Boko Haram on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Al Qaeda Sanction List.
In response to the Paris summit, a ministerial follow-up meeting to discuss Boko Haram threat in Nigeria and the region was held in London on 12 June 2014 under UK chairmanship. The Foreign Ministers of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria including the representatives of Benin, Canada, the European Union, France, the United States, United Nations and the African Union were in attendance. The Ministerial follow-up meeting reaffirmed their strong and united commitment to fighting terrorism and insecurity in Nigeria and the region and also condemned the series of atrocities perpetrated by Boko Haram and other groups. They also reaffirmed the commitments at the Paris Summit and progress made since then especially the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU) signed on 9 June in Yaoundé, Cameroon. Other resolutions reached at the London Ministerial follow-up meeting include:

a- Each member state of the LCBC to contribute a battalion to the Multinational Joint Task Force and support its headquarters through a military adviser.

b- Work with the UNSC to include the Ansaru and leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau to the Al Qaeda Sanctions list.

c- Commitment to continue the close cooperation between countries of the region and the international partners represented at the meeting in the search for the abducted girls and the fight against Boko Haram and other groups.

d- Ensure quick operationalisation of the new RIFU arising from the MoU of 9 June 2014.

e- Offer direct tactical training and advice o Nigerian and regional forces engaged in the fight against the Boko Haram and other terrorist groups.

f- Continue regular dialogue at political level to ensure that operational agreements are followed up and remain united in efforts to end terrorism and bring security to the inhabitants of the region.
g- Welcomed the work of United Nations Office for West Africa including the development of a UN integrated support package to assist Nigeria’s efforts against Boko Haram, the African Union Strategy for the Sahel, including the Nouakchott process on regional security, the Global Counter Terrorism Forum and other regional initiatives on border security and border management.18

The United States, United Kingdom, France and other international partners acknowledged that the Boko Haram represents a threat to the whole region and requires regional response.

Besides the Paris summit and London Ministerial follow-up meetings held in May and June 2014, the 3rd Meeting of Ministers of Defence, Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) and Chiefs of Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS) from member states of the LCBC and the Republic of Benin was held from 22-23 July 2014 at Niamey in the Republic of Niger. The Niamey meeting among other things, tasked the Executive Secretariat of the LCBC with liaising with member countries to constitute a dedicated team, who will identify the means to be implemented and design a regional strategy to combat terrorism under the umbrella of the LCBC as decided at the Paris summit of 17 May 2014. Another meeting of the Ministers of Defence, CCDS and CSIS was held at Niamey on 6th October 2014 under the chairmanship of Major Mr Karidio Mahamadou, Chief of Defence Staff of Niger Republic which appraised the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin and appraised the implementation of measures adopted during the 3rd meeting held in July 2014. The Executive Secretariat of the LCBC was tasked to call on member states to strengthen cooperation and judicial collaboration in the fight against terrorism and organised crimes in the sub-region.

In the aftermath of these series of meetings, an extraordinary summit of Heads of States and Government of the LCBC member countries and the Republic of Benin was held in Niamey on 7 October 2014 under the chairmanship of President Issoufou Mahamadou of Niger was attended by Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The deliberations focused on
“An Assessment of the security situation and immediate common strategy in the fight against terrorism caused by Boko Haram group in the region”. This extraordinary summit noted with deep regret, the persistence of horrible atrocities committed by the terrorist group, Boko Haram, against the population and security forces in Nigeria and other neighbouring countries and resolved to fight the Boko Haram in synergy throughout the region. Other decisions reached at Niamey summit include:

a- Expression of determination to reinforce their operational and intelligence capabilities as well as the coordination of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin.

b- Directed experts to develop as soon as possible a common strategy to fight Boko Haram;

c- Decided to finalise the establishment of the Headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force in a secured place by 20 November 2014.

d- Reaffirmed firm commitment towards bringing a common and coordinated response to the current security challenges linked mainly to Boko Haram in the sub-region, in conformity with Resolution 1556 (2004) of the UNSC which considered terrorism as the greatest threat to international security.

e- Finally, the extraordinary summit directed Minsters of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the LCBC countries and Benin to meet immediately to draft a common resolution to the United Nations and the African Union in order to put in place an appropriate legal framework for cross-border military operations against Boko Haram.19

Subsequently, the Executive Secretariat of the LCBC organised the sub-regional workshop on the Elaboration of a Strategy for the Joint Fight against the Terrorist Threat in the LCBC Area at Yaoundé from 15-18 October 2014. This was in response to the decisions reached at the July meeting of Ministers of Defence, CCDS and Chief of Intelligence Services with the LCBC and the October extraordinary summit of Heads
of State and Government of LCBC countries and the Republic of Benin both held at Niamey. It is however important to note that the efforts of the LCBC at evolving a sub-regional strategy in the fight against terrorism has been fraught with numerous challenges. These challenges are discussed subsequently.

**Challenges in the Joint Fight against Terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin Area**

The engagement of the various militaries of member states in counterterrorism operations against the Boko Haram at both national and sub-regional levels is also fraught with challenges. For instance, notable gap in terms of coordination of military offensives against the sect by Nigerian and Cameroonian troops contributed to initial difficulties of combating their activities. Quite often, such offensives were conducted independently in response to real-time attacks, thereby making it easy for the terrorists to cross over the borders creating room for cross border movement of sect’s fighters when confronted separately by the armed forces and other security agencies from both countries. This reality brings to the fore, the imperative of carefully coordinated military offensive by neighbouring countries to combat cross border movement of terrorists.

The initiatives to muster adequate regional cooperation to counter the scourge of terrorism in the LCBC area has been constrained by challenges associated with violent conflict in some members such as Libya, CAR and Nigeria. The outbreak of armed conflict involving the Seleka rebels, anti-Balaka militia and government of CAR significantly weakened the ability of CAR to meet its obligations to the LCBC in terms of deployment of troops to the MJTF within the sub-regions security architecture. Similarly, Libya which has been trapped in violent conflicts since the anti-Ghadafi revolution has been battling to contain its domestic security challenges. She has therefore not been able to play significant role within the LCBC in the sphere of security. So far, Nigeria has continued to sustain active and constructive engagement with member states of the Commission
and the wider international community in her effort to combat the Boko Haram challenge. It is therefore important that internal stability within the member states is a prerequisite for effective counterterrorism cooperation in the LCBC area.

There is also the problem of interoperability of the participating national armies at the MJTF which arises from differences in military capabilities, nature and preparedness of troops for combat operations also arises. Who should contribute an infantry, armour or artillery battalion also arises. In addition, the question of command and control structure of participating troops are all matters of concern as troops are more favourably disposed to obeying commanders from their specific countries. Related to this are concerns on areas to be patrolled by troops from contributing states in combating the Boko Haram insurgents. These challenges require clearly defined Rules of Engagement, mutually supportive military doctrine and motivation for the desired effectiveness to be achieved.

There are also ecological challenges encountered in the efforts at combating Boko Haram terrorism. The Nigeria-Cameroon border area where the sect operates is located in difficult geographical terrain. Troop movements are sometimes hampered as severe difficulties are sometimes encountered in moving military vehicles deep into the hill and mountainous frontiers where the terrorist have established sanctuaries. The seriousness of this challenge comes to the fore especially as the various national militaries lack requisite military technology to address this problem. As the dry season approaches, insurgents tend to maximise the advantages it affords to perpetrate their assaults.

The sub-regional engagement at counterterrorism in the LCBC area should take to task the question of payment of ransom to terrorists for the release of hostages and issues of extradition. This comes to the fore to avert a situation where terrorists are swapped for hostages, money and arms. Such situations are reminiscent of “one step forward, two steps backwards,” in combating terrorism and armed insurgency in the sub-
region. Similarly, the importance of extradition pacts between member states of the LCBC cannot be overemphasised in view of the cross-border movement of terrorists and insurgents.

**Conclusion**

State fragility, porous borders, and continued vulnerability of states within the LCBC area to terrorist organisations have stimulated the quest for a sub-regional strategy for counterterrorism cooperation within the sub-region. This realisation became glaring following audacious attacks executed by the Boko Haram band of extremists against the Nigerian states and her immediate neighbours. The dynamics that characterised Boko Haram aggression has therefore stimulated the linkages that exist between domestic and international security cleavages. As a response, the member states of the LCBC commenced and intensified measures to build adequate counter terrorism and violent extremism internally and at the sub-regional level.

While terrorism continue to persist in the sub-region, the preparedness of some member states to contribute maximally to sub-regional response initiatives is handicapped by internal political turmoil like CAR and Libya. Terrorist organisations exploit such internal crisis to their advantages especially in the bid to overthrow existing political order. This brings to the fore the importance of political stability within states as a prerequisite strand in the war against terrorism.

In all, it could be said that the LCBC members have realised the imperative of a strategy in the joint fight against terrorism and are pulling assets together to counter the scourge. Bearing in mind that counterterrorism engagements are not entirely military, it is necessary that the LCBC equally integrate measures to eliminate conditions that are conducive for the emergence and spread of terrorism while simultaneously dismantling terrorist infrastructures.
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COMBATING TERRORISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS

Emmanuel Kotia

ABSTRACT

With the growing threat of terrorism in Africa, states and regional organization are crafting legal frameworks and designing anti-terrorism measures to prevent and respond to the threat. This paper examines key anti-terrorism measures, focusing on intelligence gathering, training, and border security management. The paper argues that, given the context of Africa, these measures, although may not be exhaustive, could constitute important steps towards countering terrorist threats and vulnerabilities in the continent.

examines the experiences and lessons so far with regards to the implementation of anti-terrorism measures. It also discusses what it perceives as key anti-terrorism measures that can effectively contribute to preventing and responding to terrorism in Africa. The paper concludes that, the nature, dynamics and manifestations of terrorism suggest that, it will continue to pose a challenge to the continent. However, the adoption of measures, including; intelligence gathering, regular training and effective border management will go a long way to reduce the enormity and impact of the terrorist threat. These measures will, however, be effective when there are conscious and continued efforts at implementing good governance principles across the continent.

Key Words: Terrorism, Anti-terrorism, Intelligence Gathering, Training, Border Security Management

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INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade or more, terrorism has become a major security challenge confronting most African countries. Although the causes may vary from one country to the other or from region to the other, they are largely attributed to issues of unemployment; poverty; poor economic conditions; hopelessness; regime repression; corruption; injustice; inequality; and massive violations of human rights including rights of women and minorities. Its manifestations include; suicide bombing, car bombing, kidnapping of humanitarian aid and foreign workers, school children, attacks on mosques, churches, transport terminals and hotels among others. (1)

Although a number of anti-terrorism measures have been employed by state and non-state actors, the threat of terrorism continues to undermine the sanctity of most African states, and as a consequence, slowing the pace of socio-economic development. This paper examines three issues namely; intelligence gathering, training, and border management, perceived as key anti-terrorism measures in Africa and argues that, the adoption and strengthening of these measures can reduce the threat terrorism poses to the continent. The paper first employs the theory of ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ as an explanatory model that underpins the recent upsurge in terrorism in Africa. Although the ‘greed’ component of the theory has largely been advanced by writers like Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler as underlining reason for the emergence of civil wars, in this paper (2), it is argue that, grievance factors are increasingly becoming motivations for the evolution of terrorist groups in Africa. To understand these issues, the second section places in context and examines the experiences and lessons learnt so far from implementing anti-terrorism measures, with reference to key terrorist


incidents in Africa. Thenext section examines three anti-terrorism measures as way forward to preventing and responding to terrorism in Africa. The paper then provides some concluding thoughts.

‘Greed’ and ‘Grievance’and Terrorism in Africa

The theory of ‘greed and grievance’ was first introduced by Collier and Hoeffler in 1998 under the title, On Economic Causes of Civil War (1). Essentially, ‘greed’ refers to the economic opportunity of groups to engage in conflict which thus makes looting a key motivation for civil wars. This suggests that there is a degree of correlation between abundance of natural resources and possibilities of conflict outbreak. For instance, incomes from natural resource predation such as diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone have been cited as important sources of finance for the rebel movements. Again, earning from natural resources was a motivating factor for the emergence of many warring factions in Liberia Civil War. On the other hand, ‘grievance’ model examines inequality, political oppression, and ethnic and religious divisions as causes of conflict. This again is mentioned by Kotia as ethnicity was among the root causes in Liberia Conflict. However, among the many proponents of these contrasting theories, greed trumps grievance argument as the cause of conflicts. To this end, scholars such as Berdal and Malone have argued that measures of social grievance, such as inequality, a lack of democracy, and ethnic and religious divisions, have had little systematic effect on the risk of civil war. They assert that it is primarily the financial viability; that is greed, which motivates rebel groups.  

3- Ibid.
5- Ibid.
Indeed, while the ‘greed’ factor is largely true in perpetuating conflicts such as the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo, in this paper, we argue that, unlike with civil conflicts, social grievances are greater contributing factors to the growing threat of terrorism in Africa. In most cases, an individual or groups’ frustration regarding perceived deprivation (although relative) fosters aggression within an individual or group which can then manifest itself in the form of political violence and terrorism.

Reflecting on the African situation, most religious groups, ethnic minorities, lower and middle income earners and other social groupings feel marginalized relative to the distribution of state resources. In other words, those in authority such as political elites control state resources, and the creation of societies stratified along social classes. For instance, the Touregs in Northern Mali and Northern Niger feel marginalized and neglected as they do not benefit much from the state resources such as gold and uranium. In Senegal, the Casamance region feel alienated from the mainstream political administration of the state. In Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) has persistently waged attacks against the Nigerian state for economic exploitation of oil resources in the Niger Delta. In the northern parts of Nigeria, the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria appears to be waging religious war, part of its grievances are the growing inequality, poverty and marginalization perpetuated by ‘corrupt’ political elites. Libya’s uprising in 2011 that has resulted to the collapse of the Muammar Ghadaffi regime and the emergence of multiple terrorist groups was underpinned by grievance factors such as lack of democratic space and human right abuses by the Ghadaffi regime. These array of examples, no doubt attest to the fact that grievance factors cannot be downplayed as key motivations that can engender groups to engage in terrorist acts.
EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS

Experiences

There is no doubt that terrorism continues to pose enormous security challenge to most African states. Since the 1998 coordinated bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dares Salam in Tanzania occurred simultaneously, (1) series of deadly attacks have also been recorded in Mali, Nigeria, Libya, Kenya, and recently in Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire among others. The effects of these attacks have been devastating as thousands of innocent people have been killed and several critical infrastructure and buildings destroyed. This has created panic and fear among the population in Africa. In response, states as well regional organizations have made conscious efforts at developing frameworks and devising strategies and anti-terrorism measures. Severally, strategies developed become obsolete or counter-productive because of the rapidly changing nature of strategies and tactics used by terrorist groups. Admittedly, many terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabab, Boko Haram, Ansar Dine, and Ansaru are operating across Africa with new tactics and sophisticated equipment which security agencies in Africa cannot march with outmoded techniques and strategies. It is instructive to note that Boko Haram, for example, engaged in proselytisation (dawa), which included recruitment, indoctrination, and radicalization of its members before 2009. These were non-violent approach of pursuing their ideological agenda.

However, in July 2009, the Nigerian military and security agencies killed hundreds of Boko Haram members during confrontation across various cities in northern Nigeria including, Mohammed Yusuf, the founder and moderate leader of Boko Haram. In response, and to demonstrate their resilience, the group became more violent and adopted rather violent and desperate measures to achieve their political and ideological goals. It is

often argued that, the delay by the Nigerian authorities to prosecute those who were responsible for the extra-judicial killing of the Boko Haram leader, Yusuf constituted one of the principal grievances of the members of the sect.\(^{(1)}\) Consequently, the group became more violent and as noted by Campbell:

\[\text{Boko Haram has become brutal, fully exploiting the propaganda value of violence. Its murder methods are grisly, featuring throat-slit
ting and beheadings, which it sometimes captures on video for propaganda purposes. Initially, most of its victims were members of the security forces, persons associated with the government, and Muslims who actively opposed the group. Now, however, victims include women, children, and Muslims who merely do not actively support its agenda.}\(^{(2)}\)

As Nigeria introduces more anti-terrorism and counterterrorism measures, including; amnesty negotiations, introductions of emergency law and the massive deployment of security forces, Boko Haram also continued to change its tactics and strategies, causing more havoc to human lives and properties especially in the highly vulnerable northeast Nigeria through attacks on soft and under-protected targets.

In East Africa, the role of Kenya in fighting Al-Shabab in Somalia has also attracted reprisal attacks by the Al Shabab on Kenya which includes the September 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, (Kenya), that left at least 65 people dead and the April 2015 attack at Garissa University in which 147 personwere killed.\(^{(3)}\)

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Lessons

It is evident from the experiences of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism measures adopted against Boko Haram and Al-shabab by Nigerian and Kenyan governments respectively that, the use of hard security or military approach will not always be an effective measure in addressing terrorist threats. While Kenya has seen reprisal attacks from the Al-Shabab from Somalia, the Boko Haram which hitherto was less violent had transformed into a more formidable and globally recognized terrorist group. Its operational focus has over time changed from attacks on churches and mosques to detonating bombs indiscriminately, kidnapping civilians for ransom, and improved usage of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and the capture of territories. The capture of over 200 girls in Chibok, Nigeria and their ill-treatment, including forcing them into sex and forcible marriages is a consequence of change in tactics, arguably emanating from hard counter-terrorism measures. This should serve as a lesson to states and regional and sub-regional organisations as well as continental organizations such as ECOWAS, SADC and the AU that, the fight against terrorism should be multi-dimensional and in some instances context specific. But more importantly, intelligence sharing, border management and training are key elements of anti-terrorism in Africa.

ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES

Anti-Terrorism are defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts such as bombing, assassination, kidnapping and hostage-taking among others. Anti-Terrorism actions may include limited response and containment of local security forces. Other anti-terrorism measures include creating awareness among the populations, proactive measures adopted to prevent terrorists from carrying out their activities and collaboration among security agencies within a particular state and between nations-states, in particular Africa. Anti-Terrorism measures are therefore aided by good intelligence training of the security agencies and border security management among others.
Intelligence Gathering

Intelligence is information that is analyzed and converted into a product to support a particular cause. Intelligence is both a process and a product and has played an important role in diplomacy and warfare throughout history. In the information age and the emergence of terrorism, intelligence has taken a centre stage of importance. While intelligence alone cannot stop the next terrorist attack in Africa, it is the critical first step in identifying and possibly preventing one.¹

Intelligence gathering at the strategic level is used for long-term planning and for assessing the capabilities of potential opponents at the operational level. With good analysis and the production of clear evaluations, security agencies could have an effective tool to use in an effort to identify potential terrorist operations and targets within their community. Good intelligence therefore has the ability to predict when and where future terrorist incidents or activities could occur. Therefore state security agencies could through timely and qualitative intelligence successfully preempt and thwart the impending terrorist attacks.

The use of intelligence or intelligence gathering in preventing all forms of crimes is very important. However, with regards to terrorism, the coordination of efforts in intelligence gathering and information-sharing within and among states on the one hand, and the regional organization on the hand, is absolutely imperative. This is so because, increasingly terrorist groups are moving across borders, and therefore intelligence gathering should not be limited within state, but across states and similarly among the regional groupings and communities. It should be noted that France has already adopted an anti-terrorism strategy in Africa and the G5 Sahel countries which include Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali and Niger.² While similar anti-terrorism measures exist in the region, there is therefore the need for the coordination of efforts to ensure effective management and monitoring of terrorist threats and radical groups. However,

¹- Richard Hughbank,'Intelligence and Its Role in protecting Against Terrorism’, Journal of Strategic Studies Number 1, Volume 3, No1, March 2010.
²- French Anti-Terror Efforts in Africa’s Sahel Region: www.globalresearch.ca, 6 April 2016.
the effectiveness of these measures will be optimal when locals are involved in information sharing, the intelligence gathering and monitoring process. This therefore calls for measures to educate and create awareness among the population on the need for timely and accurate sharing of information on the activities of of groups suspected to be terrorists.

The threat of Boko Haram has made Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon to coordinate efforts to create a multi-national force to fight the threat. Together with Benin, five leaders within Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) resolved and established the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission with the support of the African Union and other strategic partners.\(^1\)

Bearing in mind that the coordination efforts in intelligence gathering should not be limited to the core security agencies alone. Issues of security are more complex, broad and inter-connected and hence the involvement of other identifiable non-core security agencies and local communities is of paramount importance. This is because perpetrators of terrorist acts in Somalia, Kenya, Mali and Nigeria, for instance, have been identified in local communities. It is in this regard that, Nigeria introduces a community initiative known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), which emerged, first as a community effort, and later as joint efforts with the security forces to help detect and combat Boko Haram.\(^2\) Such an intelligence group may be located within the communities and they should be able to detect suspicious activities by groups planning to carry out terrorist attacks. The Civilian JTF members in Nigeria have been successful in preventing many attacks through community surveillance and have also assisted the security agencies to arrest Boko Haram members.\(^3\) This example in Nigeria could be replicated in various countries within the Africa continent as an anti-

3- Ibid.
terrorism measure. It could be strengthened with proper coordination and structures to serve as an Early Warning Mechanism against terrorism.

The population should be trained to be vigilant and report strange narratives including new people in the neighborhood who avoid the security agencies, different attitudes of people you have known over time. These are just some of the examples of things and acts to be watchful. As terrorism continues to be an evolving security threat, Africa will continue to serve as a critical target. Through patience and intelligence, terrorists continue to further their cause through the understanding of society. It is therefore important that to continue to learn about those who choose to attack the peoples freedom and way of life, security agencies will have to take the lead in this organized war against terrorism in Africa. Security agencies must develop transparent communication and intelligence links. This is because the efficient gathering, analysis, management and utility of intelligence will prove invaluable to efforts at the terrorist threats in Africa.

**Training**

Individual countries, the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) should invest in training at two levels. First is the constant training of the security forces of member-states given the constantly evolving nature of terrorist threats in Africa. It should be noted that the military in many African countries do not have the requisite training to confront the evolving threat of terrorists in Africa. In other words, the changing dynamics of terrorism in Africa and beyond continue to pose new challenges to conventional, unilateral approaches, counter-measures and classical tactics of warfare. This has manifested in Nigeria, where Boko Haram, on many occasions, has been able to outwit the Nigerian military and security forces, questioning the capability of the Joint Task Force (JTF) created by the government.\(^1\) The security forces in Africa have not been adequately equipped to confront the asymmetric nature of tactic adopted by modern terrorist groups. Intelligence agencies in various states continue to adopt obsolete methods of intelligence and are easily outwitted by modern-

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day terrorist groups. Apart from the intelligence agencies, other security institutions in Africa continue to adopt conventional measures as tactic for anti-terrorism activities. They are therefore always outpaced by emerging terrorist groups using asymmetric tactics.

Second is that, the AU and member-states should focus attention on training the youth, especially Muslim youth on the misconceptions of ‘jihad’, which has become a springboard for engaging in radicalization and militancy across many countries in the region. It has been argued that the concept of ‘Jihad’ has largely been misunderstood, misinterpreted by some Muslims and non-Muslims alike and as a consequence “hijacked” and mis-applied by extremists and terrorists to achieve ideological and political goals.\(^1\) Thus, efforts at disabusing the minds of the youth about misconceptions through strengthening mainstream values in the society will remain important. The focus, however, should be comprehensive, including; imparting religious, moral, secular as well as peace education.\(^2\)

To prevent terrorists’ attacks in Africa, it is important that the strategies of the military and security agencies are dynamic enough to adjust to the evolving nature of the threats facing the continent. Training for intelligence agencies, for instance, will need to be re-focused towards changing nature of the threats. The recruitment and deployment of intelligence operatives should be re-designed to meet modern challenges of intelligence gathering. By this, it is expected that the intelligence sector would adopt a progressive and human-centred approach that could enhance its relevance as key element of anti-terrorism and counterterrorism operations in Africa. Equally, other regular security agencies comprising of the Armed Forces, the Police, Gendarmeries and others would need to be re-equipped and re-trained to confront the highly-motivated and trained terrorists rampaging across Africa. It is not secret that several militaries in Africa continue to hold equipment which is inappropriate for confronting terrorists. In addition, most of the forces in Africa are still adopting conventional warfare

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2- Ibid
tactics whilst the terrorist are using asymmetric strategies. The result may be that the Armed Forces and security agencies of several African states are using outmoded strategies and training methods to confront the highly evolving and dynamic threats of terrorism on the continent. This could partly explain why despite the expansion of its Order of Battle (ORBAT) with the creation of 7 Division and 8 Division of the Nigerian Army with Area of Responsibility (AOR) focusing specifically on the Boko Haram ravaged northeast geo-political zone, the Nigerian military initially found it difficult to effectively degrade Boko Haram assets and is yet to completely put an end to group’s terrorism in the region. There is the need for adequate and continuing preparedness in terms of equipment holding, training and doctrine (TRADOC) of African militaries and security agencies in the fight against terrorism on the continent.

**Border Control and Terrorism**

Africa experienced significant level of terrorist activities over the past two years. The countries are facing daunting tasks of managing their respective borders in ways that secures their sovereignty and territorial sovereignty while ensuring that the borders still serve as bridges rather than barriers. Since effective border control remain integral aspect of border management, the security of international borders remain of utmost concern for African states. The importance of border control by states is further recognized under the international law as states have rights to maintain their boundaries, secure their territories and protect their citizens under its suzerainty. The ability to secure national borders is one of the criteria used to classify states as strong, weak and failed. Terrorist have been crossing porous and poorly secured borders across Africa especially in the Sahel area regions with ease whiles armed with weapons, ingredients of making bombs and radical ideas.

Although the concept of borders has historically shifted in definition due to globalization and increased technology, nonetheless, borders still define the territorial sovereignty of states and play a pivotal role in global peace and security. Consequently, the consolidation of borders remains one of the key factors in building stable states, and more importantly the fight against
the increasing threat of terrorism in Africa. This means that, all governments or member-states across Africa should aim at maintaining border security, not only as a requirement for national sovereignty, but also as a measure for ensuring that terrorist groups do not exploit the existing weaknesses to perpetrate acts of terrorism. In this regard, there exists need to adopt comprehensive normative frameworks on border security management, properly demarcate various borders, and provide adequate infrastructure to enable border officials to be able to detect and prevent possible entry of terrorists in a region or a country. Indeed, the fluidity of African borders has facilitated the movement of terrorist networks across the region, with the increasing radicalization and the growth of violent extremists groups.

With the possible exception of Southern African Development Community (SADC), the other four regions of Africa continue to grapple with the threat of terrorism. There is no doubt that the continued destabilization of Libya, with multiple terrorist groups means that the other North African states need to collaborate for effective border control and management. In West and Central Africa especially in the Lake Chad Basin area, the escalation of Boko Haram attacks beyond Nigeria to neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger raised the stakes for sub-regional cooperation among the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) countries in terms of strengthening border control and counterterrorism cooperation resulting to the establishment of African Union backed Multi-National Joint Task Force with headquarters at N'djamena in Chad. Such initiative could be extended to East Africa where the Al Shabab have become a transnational threat beyond Somalia following the group’s attacks in Kenya and Uganda. Similar effort is further considered necessary in the Central Africa States following sustained insecurities in the Central African Republic (CAR), where the ‘anti-balaka’ militia, occasionally attacks Africa Union peacekeepers.

It is partly due to these developments that, for instance, that the Africa Union has developed the African Union Border Programme (AUBP) hinged on four pillars: delimitation and demarcation; cross border cooperation, capacity and partnership and resource mobilization. Efforts should be made at implementing this landmark policy document for effective border management in Africa.
CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that terrorism constitutes a major security challenge for Africa, notwithstanding the fact that legal frameworks and anti-terrorism measures and strategies exist across the continent. As evidenced in this paper, several measures adopted by many African states in responding to terrorist threats have been at best less effective and at worse counter-productive. In Nigeria, for instance, the adoption of hard core military approach rather emboldened the Boko Haram, changing its tactics to become even more daring and violent killing innocent civilians in unimaginable proportions. The AU’s coordinated attacks on Al-Shabab in Kenya has also produced reprisal attacks, killing many people in Kenya. The question then is how do states and regional organizations in Africa prevent and respond to terrorist threats? Intelligence gathering, regular training and effective border security management are all important. However, beyond these states, the AU and its regional economic communities (RECs) such as Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), East African Community (EAC), ECOWAS, ECCAS, and SADC should ensure that there are sustained efforts at addressing governance challenges such as corruption, inequality, marginalization, youth unemployment among others which are drivers of violent extremism.

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PEOPLE FIRST

HUMAN SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

By Pasquale Ferrara

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The Mediterranean has again acquired global relevance. In this part of the world, the fault lines of the international system intersect and collide at a critical juncture between the Arab-Islamic world, the African continent, and the Euro-Asian perspective. Undoubtedly, the Mediterranean region could play a crucial role in enhancing global peace and stability, provided the countries that surround this majestic sea are ready to search for new participatory patterns and methods of inclusive governance.

The current political, social, and economic situations in much of North Africa and other parts of the South Mediterranean have laid forth new challenges, especially in terms of security, human mobility, and intercultural dialogue. However, these circumstances only highlight the importance of dialogue and structured cooperation on an equal footing as fundamental tools for better mutual understanding and respect—particularly on cultural issues. The transitions, transformations, upheavals, and involutions that characterize the political and security dimensions in the region have led to a problematic approach by the relevant actors. As a result, the international community tends to think of this area in terms of overlapping crises, rather than unfolding opportunities.

However, according to a new research program launched at the European University Institute, there is a need for a new appraisal of the events and processes that are happening in the South Mediterranean. At the moment, this part of the world is undergoing turbulent changes, having a dramatic impact on its peoples. In fact, in the South Mediterranean basin, “the many intertwined crises have rendered obsolete the paradigms used to analyze the region and guide policymaking, while

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ongoing transformations require a new focus.” According to this landmark study, the main elements of this new South Mediterranean scenario are the following:

- the reshaping of the region’s political map and changes to the nation-state in light of new military and political developments;
- new human, economic, and informational flows and their effect on established social and political orders;
- the emergence of new forms of governance of peoples and territories, from the local to the transnational;
- the collapse of regional order and the emergence of new geopolitical dynamics, and their implications for the stability of the region and beyond.

This dramatic shift in regional dynamics is articulated around four key axes: social, political, and economic shifts; transformations to the religious field; the emergence of a new regional (dis)order; and, finally, new human, economic, and information flows.

**The Region as a Political Field**

The definition of the South Mediterranean region—its geographical and political borders—is a matter of contention among analysts and academics. There is some convergence, however, on a few fundamental elements that characterize the area as a whole: the existence of an “Arab
core;” the persistence of a shared identity, though fragmented into multiple territorial states; and bordering non-Arab States (Turkey, Iran, and Israel), which are an intimate part of the region’s conflicts and balance of power. As such, the region is considered both the epicenter of world crises and the site of the world’s most protracted conflicts.

As for the terminology, the expression “Broader Middle East and North Africa” (BMENA) is relatively new. Its inception dates back to the first term of U.S. President George W. Bush, and has had an ideological, rather than a geopolitical, connotation.

The BMENA narrative was not so much an attempt to export the institutions of democracy, as was commonly thought, as it was rather an even more radical exercise: the attempt to implant a sort of “Lockean” ideal of society. As a philosophical project, it implied the extension of the basic principles of liberalism in a vast region from the Atlas Mountains to the Hindu Kush.

The narrative standing at the foundation of the BMENA concept includes two fundamental characteristics: first, a democratic society—based on the initiative of private citizens—which operated in the context of a market economy, free of the constraints of authoritarian, nepotistic, and tribal networks; and second, a society of individuals practicing religion as an expression of personal faith and free choice, rather than as a traditional communitarian heritage.

In such a Lockean conception, the state is not necessarily considered an engine of development, but rather a regulator—an honest broker fully accountable to its citizens. The concept of civil society that this vision evokes is indeed that of a community outside the state, and even against the state.

The BMENA discourse implies, therefore, a universalistic vision—one with a Wilsonian and anti-culturalist character, in the sense that it does not recognize cultural features as insurmountable barriers to the adoption of liberal values. From this point of view, it is a theory that is more attributable to Francis Fukuyama (with his thesis of liberalism as the ultimate chapter of human history) than Samuel Huntington (who emphasizes precisely the cultural fault lines between civilizations as invisible, but unavoidable, borders).
There are two main limitations to this BMENA theory of Middle East transformation: one based on a perspective rooted in political science, the other on anthropological analysis. On the one hand, there is the obvious lack of depth in analyzing the multiple dimensions of a modern society in the region—notably an underestimation of the state as a tool of modernization. On the other hand, there exists the inability to acknowledge the persisting influence of traditional values.

Such an approach has been proven unsuccessful because it conceived democratization as an abstract notion, ignoring (accidentally or otherwise) the view that political legitimacy in the region was articulated, historically, somewhere between two drivers: nationalism and Islam. More generally, the main mistake has been to believe that installing democratic procedures at the institutional level (a relatively easy operation) could work without strengthening, in parallel, democratic processes at the grassroots level.

In the region that will be rather defined—in a more realistic way—as “Middle East and North Africa” (MENA) interweaving geostrategic factors operate in a complex political framework. There exist tensions related to old and new radicalism, contrasting and conflicting hegemonic projects, and economic contexts that have to deal with increasing social instability—all of which have been made more acute by the global financial crisis, the trade crunch, and the sharp decrease in oil and gas revenues.

Rather than talking about MENA in the international system, we could instead think about it as an international system in miniature—a geopolitically concentrated set of global issues.

In fact, all first-tier policy issues exist in this area, albeit in extreme and distorted forms.

Second, it is now clear that without a holistic approach that enables us to connect the dots in a comprehensive view, we are wont to misread apparently unrelated events and phenomena. Many geopolitical games are being played simultaneously, but in different contexts. The case of Daesh in Iraq and Syria is a tragic example of a series of overlapping crises: religious, factional, and partisan governance in Iraq, the regional and international exploitation of a divided opposition to an authoritarian ruler in
Syria, confrontation to advance hegemonic ambitions (Iran vs. Saudi Arabia), the “great powers playground” (America vs. Russia), the middle powers sphere of influence (Turkey), the security dilemma (Israel, Egypt), and a refugee tragedy (Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan).

More generally, all the major cleavages that characterize the contemporary world are amplified in this region: the relationship between religion and politics, faith and reason, the community and the individual, the state and society, and, finally, globalism and localism. Moreover, all the features of sovereignty are being brought radically into question: peoples, governments, and territories.

From a culturalist point of view—which, however, does not capture all the complexities of the region—MENA is reductively considered a fault line between the “West and the rest.” But the region is also, simultaneously, a North-South divide, where wealth is oftentimes concentrated in the hands of too few individuals, and not redistributed. There exist, indeed, strong asymmetries and economic contradictions, due in large part to the unequal distribution of the revenue generated by the exploitation of hydrocarbons. MENA is

Third, it becomes clear that, in MENA, the approach of the international community should evolve in a qualitative way from mere crisis management, which may be in itself already a challenging goal, to the much more difficult goal of achieving crisis resolution. Whatever the actors in the region may think, the status quo is no longer a viable option—even in terms of stabilization—because the crises show that ongoing processes have an internal (or externally induced) logic that shifts in the direction of their radicalization and intractability. The several regressions recorded in MENA make increasingly evident that, in current circumstances, time does not work in favor of stability and peace. Urgent action is required with respect to drifts that multiply alarmingly throughout the area, in order to interrupt the deterioration of security conditions—the consequence of which will invariably be felt well beyond the region.

In this area we can find a stateless people (Palestinians), a people with too many states (Kurds), peoples with too much state (Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia), and peoples with too little state (Iraq, Lebanon).
also the area of origin or transit of immigrants and refugees headed towards Europe. Yet, at the same time, it is itself a destination for hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharan, Central, and South Asian immigrants. There are also new structural challenges, such as climate change, desertification, and scarcity of water resources.

On the socio-cultural and demographic side, MENA assembles pre-modern, ultra-modern, and post-modern features. It is perhaps the only region of the world where globalization shows its most schizophrenic effects. On the one hand, there is a net import of lifestyles; on the other, there is a critical appraisal (if not rejection) of Western models in favor of reinterpreting tradition, which may become confrontational and resented. Above all, MENA is an incubator of the future, given that the portion of the population under the age of 30 is increasing exponentially. The figures are astounding: the average age of the population ranges from 18 (in Yemen), to 30 (in Tunisia), in which around 20 percent of the population is between 15 and 24 years old; in Egypt, 70 percent of the population is less than 30 years old.

If one had to summarize the main political features of the region, one could say that it is a unique geographical system in which the classical core-periphery relations are now being re-conceptualized in light of the destabilizing impact of globalization.

Equally relevant is the conflict between identity and sovereignty, whereas the determinants of MENA states’ international behavior are still being influenced by the processes of state formation and complex foreign policy decisionmaking.

The Region as a Security Complex

In MENA, war and disorder coexist with attempts to create structures that are conducive to regional order. According to the traditional reading of the security features of the region, MENA’s regional state system is highly unstable and exposed to conflicts, because it is characterized by an extreme volatility of alliances and recurrent foreign interventions. Moreover, the region’s great ethnic and geographic diversity, coupled with its strategic centrality between East and West, prevents any regional contender or external power from unifying or reorganizing the region coherently.
At the same time, MENA is the most penetrated of the world’s regional diplomatic arenas. As American historian Leon Carl Brown put it in *International Politics in the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game* (1984): “a penetrated political system is neither effectively absorbed by the outside challenger nor later released from the outsider’s smothering embrace.” The main feature of Middle Eastern penetration is a structural interconnection of different political dimensions: local, national, regional, and global. Local leaders and conflicts mesh with national actors and superpower rivalries in an ever-changing pattern of confounding complexity.

A more comprehensive outlook of the region’s security situation is provided by the theory of the “security complex.” One could define a security complex as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed or solved separately from one another.

Security complexes are completely different from security communities. A security community implies cooperative interaction among units. As American political scientist Karl W. Deutsch argued in his classic work *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (1957), in those communities “there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their dispute in some other way.” In a regional security complex, interactions among units can be both conflictual and cooperative. MENA is considered a region which is in “perennial conflict formation.”

Recent dramatic events in the region—particularly the Daesh military takeover of entire areas of Iraq and Syria—have led analysts to critically reappraise post-colonial discourse, either because the governance of several countries has become dysfunctional or, more radically, because the strategic threat to regional order would supposedly imply a *de facto* process of redrawing borders—requiring a sort of new Sykes-Picot arrangement.

Whatever the outcome of the present crisis, there will certainly be a need to rethink the rigid analytical
outlook of the three security complex sub-regions operating in the area: the Levant, the Gulf, and the Maghreb. For instance, the threat that Daesh poses simultaneously to Iraq (part of the Gulf sub-regional security complex) and Syria (part of the Levant sub-regional security complex) renders rather obsolete any approach that is too tightly rooted in the separation of the security environments.

**The New-Med**

Among the many attempts to revamp the political initiatives toward the Mediterranean, the “New-Med”—recently launched by a group of think tanks—seems particularly promising. The New-Med represents an innovation with respect to other networks on, or from, the Mediterranean, which have been traditionally EU-centered or EU-initiated.

In fact, the New-Med is the first Track II network devoted to Mediterranean affairs and linked to the OSCE. Indeed, the New-Med is designed to promote a two-way dialogue between countries on both shores of the Mediterranean, as well as other interested players. It fosters an understanding of the Mediterranean as an increasingly pluralistic region—one which is nobody’s “backyard” or “reserved domain.” According to New-Med analysts, “the Mediterranean has become an economically interdependent but also increasingly multipolar and plural space in recent years.”

Two major transformations recently took place in the region. As New-Med research indicates, emerging international players other than the United States and western European countries—the Gulf states and China, for instance—have increased their presence in the MENA region, both economically and politically. They contributed to opening up the Mediterranean space to influences coming from far beyond the West.

This process is taking place against the backdrop of the economic crisis that has particularly affected those southern European countries that have been most closely tied to the Mediterranean, both for geographic and historic reasons. Not only has this placed a serious strain on their ability to respond to the changes taking place in the Mediterranean region, it has also reduced their capacity to project influence at the international level. Some analysts argue that the latter has led to the end of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation framework—both as conceptualized under the so-called “neighborhood approach,” and operationalized according to the “enlargement-lite” paradigm in the EU’s strategic documents during the 1990s and early 2000s.

According to New-Med research, the other relevant process that has brought
about systemic changes in the Mediterranean societies is globalization. This new paradigm has transformed lifestyles and societal dynamics, leading to the emergence of new societal groups demanding more advanced social contracts and rights. Whilst it has helped the development of democratic movements, it has also given new tools to destabilizing forces. For instance, powerful non-state actors, including transnational criminal networks and terrorist organizations, are leveraging on these trends to recruit new followers and wage battles against the institutions and policies of established states. In short, for the New-Med thinkers, the combination of top-down and bottom-up pressures is today shaping the Mediterranean security equation. Only through a better appreciation of these dynamics, will it be possible to develop new insight about the constraints and opportunities facing the cooperation/integration initiatives promoted by regional and sub-regional organizations.

**The Region as a Human Security Context**

The current MENA narrative is burdened by urgent and multi-dimensional security concerns. However, we should try to move away from old paradigms and find a new political and strategic framework for the future configuration of the region.

Many experiments have been tried and failed in the past, leaving in the political system a stratification of different attempts to find an “Arab way” to independent governance. These include Nasserism, Baathism, pan-Arabism, political Islamism, and Islamic revolution.

Such attempts at modernizing the region’s political systems have been, in most cases, top-down exercises. This has led to para-authoritarianism and, more importantly, to the limitation of pluralism. The most recent season of transformation, the Arab Spring, has left a legacy of contradictory results from Egypt to Tunisia, with unintended consequences (particularly in terms of state disruption) in countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

But we should not forget that the Arab Spring was an attempt to create a new Arab republicanism, which involved the opening of political systems and the advent of new actors. Revolutions and comprehen-
sive reforms do not always produce expected results.

Historical examples point to interesting patterns, which may help us find a way forward. For instance, the “springtime of peoples,” as the European revolutions of 1848 were sometimes called, installed popular regimes throughout much of the Old Continent. But every single one of them collapsed, giving birth to a new era of authoritarianism. Seen in retrospect, 1848 was clearly not a self-contained story; it was rather a mere chapter in the long and turbulent process of European democratic development.

In a way, the social and political situation in MENA today is strikingly similar to the one described in the UNDP’s 2004 Arab Development Report. In that report, it was stated that there is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions in terms of participatory governance. The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s has barely reached the Arab States. This freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development. While *de jure* acceptance of democracy and human rights is enshrined in constitutions, legal codes and government pronouncements, *de facto* implementation is often neglected and, in some cases, deliberately disregarded. In most cases, the governance pattern is characterized by a powerful executive branch that exerts significant control over all other branches of the state, being in some cases free from institutional checks and balances. Representative democracy is not always genuine and sometimes absent. Freedoms of expression and association are frequently curtailed. Obsolete norms of legitimacy prevail.

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These issues are either unresolved or have been only partially addressed in many MENA societies. The “good governance” approach has shown its limits: it has not been perceived by the vast majority of the peoples in the region as an appropriate tool to induce a tangible, qualitative improvement.

I believe that, in conjunction with the governance track, a more pervasive analytical standard should be introduced: that of human security. In modern societies, security should address not only states, but also peoples.
In this regard, insecurity may be produced by factors such as sudden loss of guaranteed access to jobs, the absence of healthcare, insufficient levels of social welfare, and the lack of education. At the same time, insecurity could be connected to violations of human rights, extremism, domestic violence, the spread of conflicts, and displacement. As one recent definition makes clear, human security poses threats to individuals and communities as its focus. Threats can be to their survival (physical abuse, violence, persecution, or death), to their livelihoods (unemployment, food insecurity, health threats, etc.), and to their dignity. Thus, poverty, for example, is conceptualized as a human security threat. Not only because it can induce violence which threatens the stability of the state, but because it is a threat to the dignity of individuals. Human security, in its broadest term, therefore means freedom from want, freedom from fear and a life of dignity.

In the Arab countries, the challenge of overcoming the human security threat is still a top social priority, and it should become a top political priority too. UNDP’s 2009 Arab Development Report clearly states that in the Arab countries, widespread human insecurity relentlessly undermines human development. It is brought on by the depletion of natural resources under pressure, by high population growth rates and by rapid climate change, which could threaten the livelihoods, income, food and shelter of millions of Arabs. It is ingrained in the predicament of one-fifth of the people in some Arab countries, and of more than half in others, whose lives are impoverished and cut short by hunger and want.

I believe that the region’s political and social actors should focus more on human security as an overarching strategic challenge, in combination with new institutional schemes in the wake of the Arab upheavals of 2011.

Top-down nation-building in the Middle East (and beyond) has so far failed to incorporate human needs. This has, in turn, produced widespread dissatisfaction, a lack of attachment to political institutions, and electoral processes without real political mobilization. The connection between human security and good governance could be found in a reassessment of the concept and practice of pluralism, both as a participatory framework and as a source of a new legitimacy.
BOOK REVIEW


Author: U JoyOgwu

Reviewed By: Ibeh Chinyere (1)

The Anatomy of a Consensus is a 258-page compendium of ideas by various contributors who tried to provide a critical account of the proceedings during the United Nations Programme of Actions (UNPoA) global conference addressing the general threat of illicit trade, transfer and acquisition of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). The book which is divided into three broad sections is designed to stimulate reflections and enhance understanding of both the achievements and challenges associated with curbing the proliferation of SALWs.

In the prologue, former President of Nigeria, His Excellency Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, highlighted the implications of illicit trade in SALW by non-state actors, terrorist and other criminal network to nations. He noted that the challenge posed by illicit SALWs is a challenge to the entire mankind that requires combination of effective cooperation, coordination and synergy of actions. In the foreword, Ban Ki Moon, the immediate past Scribe of the United Nations noted that illicit trade in SALWs is one of the foremost threats to international peace and security. He also stressed the need to build a consensus on strategies to address the threats of arms trade, acquisition and transfer.

The editor described in strong terms the devastating effects of SALWs across all the regions of the world. This necessitated the UN member

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states to design measures to prevent and combat the illicit trade of SALW through a periodic conference. Other contributors to the book examined the complexities and competing interest faced before and during negotiations in the first and second review conference. Contributors also reviewed the evolution and application of the consensus rule in disarmament and arms control process. This elucidated some of challenges the UNPoA has faced under this rule of procedures. It is the cumulative view of the contributors that truth lies not merely in the adoption of the Declaration and outcome documents, but in the robust and systematics implementation, impact of certain decisions which is the responsibility of all member states. They further validated the importance which the UN member states placed on the regulation of illicit flow of SALWs.

**Main Highlights**

The main highlights of the book focused on:

a- The importance of frank and cautious deliberations as avenue to identifying contentious issues associated with illicit trade in SALWs.

b- The relevance of inclusiveness in the negotiations, search for common ground, implementations efforts and lessons learnt from the processes.

c- Despite the existence of divergent views on national positions regarding the question of SALWs, the UN was able to reach consensus on the subject matter.

d- The critical importance of coordination at national, regional and global levels.

e- The contributions by non-governmental organisations like the civil societies and their role and impact in the whole process.

f- The controversy surrounding border control issues; and

g- The need to strengthen international cooperation and assistance in the implementation efforts.
The book further identified some other procedural arrangements and measures adopted by some regional organisations like the ECOWAS member states in responding to the UNPoA. These arrangements focus on the need to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all aspects at various national and regional levels.

The Anatomy of a Consensus is therefore one of the numerous efforts at addressing the question of illicit trade in SALWs. It is highly informative and a thought-provoking piece of literature which is undoubtedly a timely contribution, especially within the context of what we have recognized, problematically in the contemporary global system. It is therefore a must-read for all scholars and policy makers in the field of international relations and strategic studies.